CRIMINAL LAW II LIBEL (p. 6) NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN (1964) PONENTE: Brennan, J.

. KEY CONCEPTS: Actual malice requires that an untrue statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false Libelous per se, under Alabama law, is implied by published words that tend to injure a person in his reputation or to bring him into public contempt (p. 267). FACTS: Respondent Sullivan was a commissioner in the City of Montgomery, Alabama. One of his duties is the supervision of the Police Dept. Sullivan brought this libel suit against four petitioners and against the New York Times Company, publisher of the newspaper NY Times. Sullivan believed he was libeled in a NY Times advertisement, which included statements, some of which are false, about police action allegedly directed against students who participated in a civil rights demonstration and against a leader of the civil rights movement, Dr. Luther. At the bottom of the advertisement were the names of the 4 petitioners and others. Sullivan said the alleged libelous statements referred to him because the police dept. is under his supervision.1 The trial judge instructed the jury that such statements are libelous per se, legal injury being implied without proof of actual damages and that for the purpose of compensatory damages malice was presumed. As to punitive damages, the judge instructed that mere negligence was not evidence of actual malice and would not justify an award of punitive damages. The judge refused to instruct that actual intent to harm or recklessness had to be found before punitive damages could be awarded, or that a verdict for respondent should differentiate between compensatory and

punitive damages. The jury found for respondent Sullivan and the State Supreme Court affirmed. ISSUE: Whether the rule of liability that was as applied to the libel suit of Sullivan against the critics of his official conduct abridges the freedom of speech and of the press that is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (see p. 268 ) RATIO: Jury judgment and State Supreme Court judgment is reversed and remanded. The rule of liability that was as applied to the matter of Sullivan and the critics of his official conduct ABRIDGES THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS THAT IS GUARANTEED BY THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. The rule of law applied by the Alabama courts is deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments (p. 264). A State cannot award damages to Sullivan for defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct because actual malice was not proved. Moreover, factual error or content defamatory of official reputation, or both, are insufficient to warrant an award of damages for the false statements about Sullivans official function. The thing is, there was no referenceby name or official positionto Sullivan in the allegedly libelous parts of the advertisement (p. 288; see footnote; or read pp. 256-259). Sullivan simply inferred the alleged reference to him from the word police and they. OTER OPINIONS: Black, J, concurring: The Times advertisement and individual defendants had an absolute, unconditional constitutional right to publish in the Times advertisement their criticisms of the Montgomery agencies and officials (see p. 293). Goldberg, J, concurring: The First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution afford to the citizen and to the press an absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct despite the harm which may flow from excesses and abuses (p. 298). In a democratic society, one who assumes to act for the citizens in an executive, legislative, or judicial capacity must expect that his official acts will be commented upon and criticized. Such criticism cannot be muzzled or deterred by the courts at the instance of public officials under the label of libel (p. 299). US v. BUSTOS (1918) PONENTE: Malcolm, J. FACTS:

The 3rd paragraph of the advertisement said armed police officers ringed the Alabama State Campus, and when the students refused to yield, a dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve the protesters into submission. Sullivan argued that the word police in the 3 rd paragraph referred to him because he supervised the Police Dept; in effect, he was being accused of ringing the campus with Police. He added that the paragraph would be read as imputing to the police, and hence to him, the padlocking of the dining hall in order to starve the students into submission. The 6th paragraph states that the Southern violators/police used intimidation and violence in responding to Dr. Kings peaceful protests. The 6 th paragraph went on to say they, allegedly referring to the police, bombed Kings home, assaulted his person, arrested him 7 times, and charged him with perjury. Sullivan said in the 6 th paragraph the word they referred to him; in effect it accused the Montgomery Police, and hence him. Several statements, however, in both paragraphs were false.

In 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal Criminal action against the petitioners, now become the defendants, was instituted on October 12, 1916, by virtue of the following information: Xxx the said accused, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and with malicious intent to prejudice and defame Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano who was at said time and place justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol of this province, wrote, signed, and published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against the justice of the peace Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano xxx ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga. NO. RATIO: All of this has been written and published by the accused with deliberate purpose of attacking the virtue, honor, and reputation of the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, and thus exposing him to public hatred contempt, and ridicule. It should be noted that the information omits paragraphs of the petition mentioning the investigation before the judge of first instance, the affidavits upon which based and concluding words, "To the Executive Secretary, through the office of Crossfield and O'Brien." In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroy that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the

justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper. And finally the charges and the petition were submitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary, the Executive Secretary. HELD: The defendants and appellants are acquitted. MERCADO v. CFI, RIZAL (1982) NATURE: Petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition to review the decision of the Court of First Instance PONENTE: Fernando, J. FACTS: Rafael Mercado (Rafael) sent a telegram to Department of Public Works and Communications Secretary David Consunji requesting an investigation of Virginia Mercado (Virginia) of the Public Service Commission. According to Rafael, he had reason to believe that Virginia had enriched herself through corrupt practices, and that he is writing as an answer to President Marcoss appeal that information be given on undesirable employees in government service. Virginia filed a complaint for libel against Rafael. Rafael sought to quash the information on the ground that the telegram was privileged communication. The motion to quash was denied by the lower court, hence this appeal. ISSUE: WON the landmark case of US vs. Bustos (enunciating the doctrine that the free speech and free press guarantees of the Constitution constitute a bar to prosecutions for libel arising from a communication addressed to a superior complaining against the conduct of a subordinate) can be invoked here. RATIO: Although US vs. Bustos provides a standard by which constitutional rights can be protected against arbitrary libel prosecutions, qualified privilege maybe lost by proof of malice. An example of qualified privilege would be a complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official

when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. The statements must be made with an honest sense of duty; selfseeking motive is destructive. What casts doubt on the good faith of Rafael is a summary of his conduct viz Virginia. Rafael, in addition to the telegram in question, had sent other communications to other bodies regarding Virginia, with the collective effect of harassing and maligning the good character and reputation of the private respondent. It need only be alleged and proven that the offensive communication was made with malice. Such burden of doing so is on the prosecution. HELD: Petition dismissed. Certiorari to annul the order denying the motion to quash does not lie. Neither should the criminal complaint for libel be dismissed. NEWSWEEK v. IAC (1986) PONENTE: Feria, J. FACTS: On March 5, 1981, private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual sugar planters, filed a case in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province of Negros Occidental, against petitioner and two of petitioners' non-resident correspondents/reporters Fred Bruning and Barry Came. The complaint alleged that petitioner and the other defendants committed libel against them by the publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in the February 23, 1981 issue of petitioner's weekly news magazine Newsweek. The article supposedly portrayed the island province of Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners or sugarcane planters who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers/laborers, but also brutalized and killed them with imprunity. Complainants therein alleged that said article, taken as a whole, showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts intended to put them (sugarcane planters) in bad light, expose them to public ridicule, discredit and humiliation here in the Philippines and abroad, and make them objects of hatred, contempt and hostility of their agricultural workers and of the public in general. They prayed that defendants be ordered to pay them PlM as actual and compensatory damages, and such amounts for moral, exemplary and corrective damages as the court may determine, plus expenses of litigation, attorney's fees and costs of suit. A photo copy of the article was attached to the complaint. On November 5, 1981, petitioner Newsweek filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the printed article sued upon is not actionable in fact and in law; and (2) the complaint is bereft of allegations that state, much less support a cause of action. It pointed out the non-libelous nature of the article and, consequently, the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action.

Newsweek argues that private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action because the complaint made no allegation that anything contained in the article complained of regarding sugarcane planters referred specifically to any one of the private respondents; that libel can be committed only against individual reputation; and that in cases where libel is claimed to have been directed at a group, there is actionable defamation only if the libel can be said to reach beyond the mere collectivity to do damage to a specific, individual group member's reputation. ISSUE: WON Newsweek committed libel. NO. RATIO: Court ruled that "in order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that he be named." In an earlier case, the Court declared that" ... defamatory matter which does not reveal the identity of the person upon whom the imputation is cast, affords no ground of action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel could have identified the personality of the individual defamed." Defamatory remarks directed at a class or group of persons in general language only, are not actionable by individuals composing the class or group unless the statements are sweeping; and it is very probable that even then no action would lie where the body is composed of so large a number of persons that common sense would tell those to whom the publication was made that there was room for persons connected with the body to pursue an upright and law abiding course and that it would be unreasonable and absurd to condemn all because of the actions of a part. Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be. The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all or where the representation of class interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party. This is a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy. The disputed portion of the article which refers to plaintiff Sola and which was claimed to be libelous never singled out plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter. The news report merely stated that the victim had been arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the area by Pablo Sola, the mayor of Kabankalan. Hence, the report, referring as it does to an official act performed

by an elective public official, is within the realm of privilege and protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press. SORIANO v. IAC (1988) PONENTE: Gutierrez, J. FACTS: Tantuico, the then Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) filed an Information for libel against Soriano and six others in connection with press releases and articles imputing to Tantuico the tampering by COA personnel of election returns in the May 14, 1984 Batasan elections at his residence in Tacloban City and in the COA Regional Office in Palo, Leyte. Tantuico sought to assure the victory of certain candidates in the said Batasan elections. Soriano filed a motion to quash the Information on the ground of improper venue. He contends that the libel case should have been filed at Quezon City where Tantuico holds office and where the publication house of the Guardian is located. The Guardian published the articles against Tantuico. ISSUE: Should the Information for libel against Soriano be quashed? YES. RATIO: The liability of a Quezon City must be deemed as commencing with the publication of the allegedly libelous material in his newspaper and not with the typing or mimeographing of press releases by interested persons in different municipalities or cities, copies of which are sent to metropolitan newspapers for national publications. The amendments to the law on libel were intended to free media persons from the intimidating harassment of libel suits filed in any place where a newspaper happens to be sold or circulated and to avoid the harassment of media persons through libel suits instituted in distant or out-of-the-way towns by public officers who could more conveniently file cases in their places of work. As Tantuico held office in Quezon City and the offending newspaper is published in Quezon City, the case should be filed with a Quezon City court. HELD: The petition is granted. The RTC is directed to dismiss the complaint against petitioner. NOTES: The Philippines follow the multiple publication rule in that each and every publication of the same constitutes a distinct offense.

SANTOS v. CA (1991) NATURE: Petition for review of the decision of the CA PONENTE: Fernan, J. FACTS: On Feb 23 1970, Santos, a columnist of the then Manila Daily Bulletin, wroyte and published his weekly column an article entitled Charges Against CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc.. The article quoted an unverified complaint filed with the SEC on Feb 13 by Rosario Sison and her daughters charging CMS particularly its chairman and controlling stockholder Carlos Moran Sison of engaging in fraudulent practices in the stock market. That day, Sison sought a meeting with Santos wherein he submitted his reply which he wanted published the very next day and in the same column. Santos said that it was already past the deadline for the next day's issue so it will be published on Feb 25. The reply was not published on Feb 25 so Sison called Santos and told him not to publish the reply anymore as it would only rekindle talks. He also informed Santos that he would be sued for libel, to which Santos replied: Well sue me for libel. RTC and CA convicted Santos of libel. ISSUES: 1. WON the publication of a complaint filed with SEC before any judicial action is taken therein is privileged as report of a judicial proceeding. NO. 2. WON Santos was motivated by malice. NO. RATIO: First Issue Malice is presumed in every defamatory imputation, unless communication is privileged under ART 354 which includes: 1. private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty 2. a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are confidential in nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in the said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions However, the character of the privilege is a matter of defense which may be lost by positive proof of express malice. According to Cuenco v Cuenco, pleadings in judicial proceedings are considered privileged because they are presumed to contain allegations and ascertions lawful and legal in nature. Also, in Manuel v Pano, the Court

categorically stated that the publication of a complaint, being a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding made in good faith and without comments is privileged Second Issue The published article itself is but a faithful reproduction of a pleading filed before a quasi-judicial body. What Santos has done was to simply furnish the readers with information that a complaint has been filed against a brokerage firm SAZON v. CA (1996) NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA. PONENTE: Hermosisima, Jr., J. FACTS: Petitioner Fernando Sazon and private complainant Abdon Reyes were members of the PML-Parang Bagong Lipunan Community Association, Inc. (PML-BLCA), an association of homeowners of PML Homes. The association had a monthly newsletter, the PML-Homemaker, of which the petitioner was the editor. Dec. 11, 1983: Both ran in the election of its board of members. Petitioner was elected as director and was also elected by the new board as president of the homeowners association. Private complainant lost. Complainant then on Jan. 16, 1984 wrote a protest letter to the Estate Management Office of the Home Financing Corporation (EMO-HFC). Two days later, he wrote his co-homeowners explaining his election protest and urging them not to recognize the petitioner and the others who won. Meanwhile, in response to the election protest, EMO-HFC ordered the PMLBLCA to conduct a referendum to be supervised by the EMO-HFC. Complainant requested then his co-homeowners to attend a general meeting with the reps of the EMO-HFC which was to be held before the referendum. Soon after the meeting, leaflet PML Scoop were received by the homeowners. The leaflet was entitled Supalpal si Sazon, obviously referring to the affirmative action of EMO-HFC. Thinking that only complainant was capable of such acts, petitioner Sazon started writing, publishing, and circulating newsletters to his cohomeowners, culminating in the appearance in the Feb. 10, 1984 issue of the PML-Homemaker of which the libel case is based upon. The trial court found petitioner guilty, to which CA affirmed. ISSUE:

WON the questioned article written by the petitioner is libelous. YES. RATIO: Art. 353 of the RPC defines libel. For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: a. it must be defamatory b. it must be malicious c. it must be given publicly d. the victim must be identifiable In libel cases, the question is not what the writer of an alleged libel means, but what the words used by him mean. Here, the defamatory character of the words used by the petitioner are shown by the very recitals thereof in the questioned article. Petitioners used the following words: mandurugas, mag-ingat sa panlilinlang, matagal na tayong niloloko, may kasamang pagyayabang, an gating pobreng super kulit, patuloy na kabalastugan, mastermind sa paninirang puri, etc. The test is laid down as [Lacsa v IAC (1988)]: A charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach their honesty, virtue, or reputation, or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule. The test was satisfied. Art. 345 meanwhile provides: Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. Prosecution need not prove malice on the part of the defendant (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that the defendants imputation is malicious (malice in law). The burden is on the side of the defendant to show good intention and justifiable motive in order to overcome the legal inference of malice. Art. 354 has exceptions if the article is a privileged communication. In the instant case, none of the homeowners for whom the newsletter was published was vested with the power of supervision over the private complainant or the authority to investigate the charges made against the latter. Moreover, a written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated among the public. Lastly, the rule is that defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts of public officers which are related to the discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation . But any attack upon the private character of the public officer

on matters which are not related to the discharge of their official functions may constitute libel. The article attacked solely the private character of the complainant and delved on matters completely unrelated to his official functions. Clearly, there was malice in fact on the part of the petitioner as he was driven by revenge and that the objective was to malign and to injure the reputation of the complainant.