W.V.

Quine on the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Page 1 sur 7

Arthur Sullivan

W.V. Quine on the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction

I. Introduction

W.V. Quine is arguably the most accomplished metaphysician still living today, and the
most innovative and important empiricist of the twentieth century. Quine has, in effect, re-
established the boundaries of metaphysics with his unwavering criterion of unambiguous
ontological commitment, and his insistence that philosophy is continuous with science, but
with a broader scope. In addition, Quine has brought empiricism to an unprecedented peak
by strictly adhering to Ockham's razor, the principle of parsimony, and a rigorous self-
imposed limit to extensional entities.

Much of the progress and insight with which Quine is accredited rests on his collapse of the
distinction between analytic and synthetic truths in the essay "Two Dogmas of Empiricism."
Quine held that the distinction, that had for centuries been considered both logically and
epistemologically necessary, had never been very well made or conclu- sively defined, and
what is more, that there was no good reason to make it. In the opening paragraph of "Two
Dogmas," Quine asserts that a collapse of the elusive and problematic distinction will blur
the boundary between philosophy and natural science, as well as shift the focus of the
empiricist movement toward pragmatism.

II. Historical Context

In order to understand why Quine holds that the analytic-synthetic distinction was never
conclusively drawn, let us trace its development through the empiricist tradition. The
philosophy of David Hume is an appropriate starting point, for, besides being the apex of
classical empiricism, it is where the behaviourist epistemological doctrine of pragmatism
finds its origin. Pragmatism, the shift of emphasis instigated by Hume, is the insistence that,
in terms of coming to understand human experience, the observable consequences of that
which we claim to know are more important and more illuminating than speculation over the
origin and essence of our ideas.1

A fundamental empiricist premise is that ideas, and subsequently knowledge, come from
experience. Thus, truths such as "all bodies are heavy," long considered by most
philosophers to be analytic a priori, meaning that the subject necessarily contains the
predicate, were for Hume synthetic a posteriori. What this means is that for Hume, the
observing a constant conjunction of two concepts the predicate of heaviness with every
body encountered the mind synthesizes them, customarily connecting them by a
psychological habit. In contrast to these matter of fact propositions, Hume does allow that
some truths are analytic a priori, such as "2+2=4," but that propositions of this status are
purely relations of ideas. They are never to be met with in the world, and have no
observable consequences.2

The proposition "all bodies are heavy" may be used to illustrate just how fuzzy and
inconclusive the analytic-synthetic distinction really is. Let us take the thought of Gottfried
Leibniz, for example. In his view, all that is must accord with a pre-established harmony,
and therefore every subject necessarily contains all of its predicates. All truths are thus
analytic.3 Hume chooses a different starting point and reaches a conclusion that is virtually
opposite. It seems Quine is most justified in asserting that the distinction has never been
well made; each philosopher's view on the subject simply reflects his or her metaphysical

http://www.mun.ca/phil/codgito/vol3/v3doc4.html 08/06/2009
W.V. Quine on the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Page 2 sur 7

standpoint. This standpoint tells us something about their particular predispositions and
approaches to logic, but nothing about the world.

Upon fully unpacking the repercussions of his rigid distinction, Hume finds himself in a
somewhat nihilistic metaphysical position. Essentially, all that we claim to know or hold as
necessary is explained in terms of the structure of our minds - a necessary connection is
fallaciously attributed wherever a constant conjunction is perceived, by a psychological
habit. John Stuart Mill, the last of the classical empiricists, went one step beyond Hume,
and asserted that all knowledge, even the supposed eternal truths of mathematics, is
synthetic a posteriori, simply generalization from experience.4

The idealist movement which dominated the nineteenth century, though, zealously pointed
out that strict adherence to the tenets of classical empiricism not only leads one to conclude
that metaphysics is, in a sense, illusory. That position is also painfully unable to account for
the many complex relations which underlie and compose reality. For example, exclusive
existential commitment to particulars led the classical empiricists to a resemblance theory
of universals. This theory is criticized for, among other reasons, turning to an infinite
regress - we call an object "chair" because it resembles, or shares a significant number of
attributes with, another object which we call by the same name; the reason we call the
second object chair is because it resembles another similar object to which we refer with
the same name, and so on ad infinitum. Hence idealists argued that empiricism is an
untenable position.

A related idealist criticism is very useful in illustrating the movement from classical
empiricism to the analytical school of the twentieth century. Locke, Berkeley, and Hume
were confined to an Adamic, building-block view of language, wherein names refer directly
to objects, and thereby commit existentially to that which is named. Jeremy Bentham was
the first empiricist to point out flaws in this position - for example, the word "two" would
commit one to abstract entities, to numbers out there in the world, which is clearly anti-
empiricist. The unavoidable ambiguity inherent in this view of language was made clear by
Frege. More than one name frequently refers to the same object, or one name to several
objects.5

Enter Bertrand Russell, who, in effect, ushered out classical empiricism and set the stage
for its more sophisticated modern descendant. Russell recognized the need for a non-
empirical mode of cognition, for at least some ideas to come from other than experience, in
order to vault by the impasse where Hume's corpse still lay decomposing. Russell did
accomplish a startling amount in his lifetime, but he was forever inconsistent and often
confusedly undecided. His insistence on abstract entities, such as universals, runs contrary
to Ockham's razor, which was to become the fundamental epistemological principle of
Quine's analytical philosophy.

Quine picked up on Russell's efforts. He, too, was determined to benefit from idealist
criticisms of empiricism and reshape that school into a most tenable position. Quine wished
that his account be more consistent than Russell's, though, and that it be established with a
staunchly minimalist vocabulary. Russell grasped the full import of Frege's distinction
between sine and bedeutung, between the sense of a word and the object$gt;s< to which it
is employed to refer. He instigated a shift of emphasis which Quine drew even further. This
shift of emphasis was not only from mental entities to verbal, but from words to
propositions. Russell considered the sentence, not the name, to be the unit of meaning.
Quine, however, realized that there were two basic reasons why the primacy of sentences
does not satisfactorily solve the problem of names. First, sentences such as "Pegasus is a
winged horse" still commit one to abstract or fictional entities. Second, if names are
absolutely not referential, then sentences are meaningless because they refer to, denote,

http://www.mun.ca/phil/codgito/vol3/v3doc4.html 08/06/2009
W.V. Quine on the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Page 3 sur 7

and commit one to nothing.6

"Predication over designation" is Quine's famous formula for dealing with the problem of
names. He held that one does unambiguously commit oneself to an object by predicating it
in a quantified sentence. The problem of abstract or fictitious entities does not arise
because all statements are phenomenologically translated. "This is blue" becomes {Ex}{x is
blue sense data}. Although names are not referential, the quantified sentence is still
meaningful because to be is defined by Quine as to be the value of a variable.7 The
existential reference, as well as the requisite ontological commitment, are accomplished by
predication. The long-supposed necessary bond between name and object is relinquished
to an outdated and unworkable theory. Quine's thought here resembles Russell's theory of
indefinite descriptions. This again illustrates how he picked up and fine-tuned many notions
which Russell left incomplete. Russell just quantified things known only by description -
such as "x is the author of Waverly, or "x is the first line of Gray's elegy" - whereas Quine
saw the need to quantify all that we can know.

In light of his unwavering ontological commitment, Quine was redefining not simply
empiricism, but reality itself. It is in this context, and toward this metaphysical end, that
Quine sought to collapse the time-honoured distinction between analytic and synthetic
propositions. This task is most forcibly demonstrated in his critique of Kant's views on the
subject.

III. Quine on Kant

In terms of the analytic-synthetic distinction, Immanuel Kant was the most influential idealist
philosopher. Kant admitted to being woken from his dogmatic slumber, in which he was
under the influence of Wolff, a Leiboizian rationalist, by Hume and the problem of induction.
However, he held that the issue was effectively addressed by recognizing the validity of the
synthetic a priori proposition. A synthetic truth is defined by Kant as one whose
contradiction is logically possible, while analytic truths are deemed true in virtue of their
meaning, independently of facts.

. . . either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is

contained in this concept A; or B lies outside the con cept A, although it does
indeed stand in connection with it.8

Quine finds two points of issue with Kant's cleavage: First, it is limited to statements of the
subject-predicate form, and second it appeals to a notion of "meaning" that is somewhat
unfounded.9

The reason which was glossed upon earlier why the distinction has never been conclusively
drawn - that it is somewhat subjective and arbitrary: whether one holds that "all bodies are
heavy" is analytic or synthetic merely reflects personal predisposition and metaphysical
standpoint - is taken a step further here by Quine. When he asserts that Kant's distinction is
limited to the subject-predicate form, he is ontologically rephrasing this objection, and in so
doing, he reaches to the very heart of the issue. What this means is that the way in which
one categorizes propositions affects only linguistic usage, and not anything in the world,
and thus there is no good reason for making the distinction.

There do not exist two distinct types of reality in the world which require two distinct modes
of expression. This leads Quine to conclude that the analytic-synthetic distinction is a purely
logical convention that is ontologically unnecessary and empirically superfluous. In this
respect, Quine agrees with the radical empiricism of Mill, with its claim that there is no a
priori knowledge. The fact that something is the case, or even the fact that something

http://www.mun.ca/phil/codgito/vol3/v3doc4.html 08/06/2009
W.V. Quine on the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Page 4 sur 7

seems to be necessarily the case, does not imply the reality of a priori truths. Quine goes
so far a to refer to the notion of a priori knowledge as a "metaphysical article of faith."10

Quine's assertion that the distinction rests precariously on an ambiguous notion of meaning
serves a likewise function. On the surface, it is a reason why the distinction has never been
well made, but in unpacking this assertion Quine reaches to the metaphysical core of the
issue, and it turns upon the reason why there is no essential need to draw the distinction.
One can recognize something as true, according to Kant, independently of experience, in
virtue of its meaning, if the subject contains its predicate. Quine puts this notion of analycity
itself under his microscope. Much like he exposed the flaws inherent in the bond between
name and existence, he investigates and shatters the privileged link supposed to exist
between certain privileged subjects and their predicates.

When Quine points out that Kant leaves the concept of "contain" at a metaphorical level, he
has found the fulcrum on which the entire distinction rests. Kant never explicated exactly
what it means for one word or concept to contain another. Quine reasons that synonymy of
some sort is required, that the specific subject-concept must at some point overlap the
predicate-concept. The first prospective answer to the problem of synonymy is meaning.

Quine holds that there are only three plausible theories of meaning - reference, mentalism,
and intentional objects.11 The reference theory is the view that the meaning of the word
refers to that for which the word stands. In addition to Quine's demonstration of the problem
of words, which renders untenable the reference theory, Frege's point about the essential
need to distinguish between meaning and reference effectively demonstrates that
synonymy cannot be based upon this reference theory. The mentalist theory holds that
meaning is a mental entity, an abstract thought chord that is somehow struck by the word.
Quine points out that if this were the case, communication would be impossible, because
meaning would be subjective, private, and arbitrary. Meaning as an intentional entity, as an
essential part of an idea or object, is the most difficult to define, to locate, or to know. It is
therefore of little worth to a minimalist empirical approach; Quine scalpels this last notion of
meaning away with Ockham's razor.

Hence, Quine's thorough analysis of the notion of meaning has yielded nothing on which to
base synonymy. No privileged link exists to allow the assertion that any subject contains
any predicate, and therefore there is no way that any proposition may be deemed true in
virtue of its meaning. In "Two Dogmas," Quine then turns to definition, interchangeability,
and verification to see if either notion contains a ground for the synonymy that analycity
seems to presuppose.12 Definition does not clarify synonymy - if "bodies" are defined as
"that which is heavy," that is a mere convention; "heavy" is either presupposed or created to
suit an end, neither of which are grounds for a necessary connection.

Interchangeability is simply too broad to demonstrate synonymy. The fact that two terms
have the same truth value and may, in some situations, be substituted for one another is
insufficient, because the two terms have different significance in terms of Quine's holistic
account of experience, different relevance to his web of belief, or interrelated network of
revisable propositions which form the basis for all intellectual activity.

Finally, synonymy cannot be deduced from verifiability, because Quine reinterprets the
traditional empiricist appeal to experience holistically, to apply to his web of belief. The
entire system as one body must have significance. Thus, isolated sentences are not
affirmed or denied but ascertained pragmatically. Their always revisable significance and
status vary according to their relation to the entire web.

Truth is neither a matter of degree, as it is from the idealist's holistic viewpoint, nor of

http://www.mun.ca/phil/codgito/vol3/v3doc4.html 08/06/2009
W.V. Quine on the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Page 5 sur 7

correspondence, a position to which classical empiricists were led. It is rather judged in

terms of the ability of the statement to resolve and generate questions. Truth becomes a
relational matter, concerned with how well a statement fits into the web. The maxim of
minimation is Quine's criterion for ascertaining the merit of an unfamiliar proposition, and it
may be understood as composed of two aspects.13

Not surprisingly, the first is simplicity - like his empirically-minded medieval forerunner
William of Ockham, Quine holds that a simple explanation with a minimalist vocabulary is
more valuable than a more complex one which appeals to notions which we cannot
precisely define. Second, the principle of minimal destructiveness guides our judgement. If
we encounter something that does seem to be the case, but runs contrary to that which we
previously held to be true, we revise our web of belief in such a way that the new
proposition is agreeably incorporated in the way that has the least effect on the entire
significance of the web.

Quine has studied the analytic-synthetic relation from all plausible angles, and all
conceivable reasons for making the distinction have dissolved under his scrutiny. The
notions of analycity and a priori, he concludes, are unnecessary fictions. There is no need
to postulate a special kind of truth in order to account for reality as purposively and
regularly structured. All sentences are corrigible and revisable, mere parts of the web of
belief which get shifted in respect of its entire significance, and any attempt to classify or
differentiate propositions is demonstrably unfounded.

The terms of Kant's transcendentalist model, intended to explain the conditions of possible
experience rather than ontologically commit, are at best metaphorical when viewed through
Quine's microscope. Philosophy textbooks often refer to Kant's first Critique as an answer
to Hume and the problem of induction. However, Quine's analysis has demonstrated that
Kant was dealing with essentially different questions than Hume. Hume was concerned with
a rigorous description of what our subjective experience entails, whereas Kant waded
through the conditions necessary for a rational agent to experience at all.

IV. Repercussions

The natural sciences were next to come under Quine's microscope, as he picked up on the
work of French physicist and philosopher Pierre Duhem. Duhem pointed out that, because
of the inevitability of multiple uncontrollable variables, it is not possible conclusively to prove
any hypothesis experimentally.14 Duhem's objection fits harmoniously with Quine's
demonstration that all sentences are corrigible and revisable. Quine zealously developed it
to criticize both reductionism and the logical principles behind hypotheses.

Reductionism is the breaking down of sentences to their consequences. It grew out of

Humean pragmatism, but reductionists, such as Rudolf Carnap, went a step further and
asserted that a proposition is identifiable with, or logically equivalent to, its consequences in
the world.15 In addition to Duhem's point, that no consequences can ever be conclusively
proven or relied upon, Quine wished to shift the focus of empirical evidence from these
isolated and specific but unsure hypotheses to the entire system of sentences, to the whole
web of belief. In terms of the logical principles supposed to support hypotheses, the
demonstration that there is an inherent indeterminacy, even in things held to be eternal and
unalterable, supports Quine's tenet that all sentences are corrigible.

This point illustrates Quine's tendency toward pragmatism, his commitment to natural
science, and his solution of Hume's problem of induction. Synonymy is pragmatically
accounted for, and with it is accounted for our ability to learn and to perceive experience as
regularly structured, in terms of the observable consequences of our words. Quine's notion

http://www.mun.ca/phil/codgito/vol3/v3doc4.html 08/06/2009
W.V. Quine on the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Page 6 sur 7

is behavioristically comparative, analogous to the resemblance theory of universals. Words

or expressions that are similarly reacted to, that are employed in the same way, must have
similar status, and in this way, strangely, pragmatism accounts for synonymy of meaning
without postulating the reality of meanings.16

Natural science is shown to be continuous with philosophy, because it is no longer

concerned with ultimate truths, but with data that is corrigible and revisable that fits
agreeably into the web of belief. The scientist is now governed by the maxim of minimation
- he or she is seeking to find and retain the data which accords with the web. Philosophy
has a broader scope than natural science because it also deals with the meta-questions; for
example, what exactly it means to be anything, or what, precisely, one is doing when one
asserts a predicate of a subject.

Hume's problem is, in one sense, left intact, because all is revisable, and one could never
be ultimately or conclusively certain of anything. On the other hand, though, the scientist
and the philosopher do get valuably close to absolute knowledge, and that insight provides
the empirical criteria for viewing the world as it is. Science retains its present form and
present utility; he has merely shifted the logical characterization of theorumhood.17 Quine
treads a mediating path between retiring to backgammon with Hume, because metaphysics
is fundamentally flawed, and postulating virtual realities, which do not unambiguously
ontologically commit, to account for experience, as idealist philosophers tend to do.

V. The Desert Landscape

Exactly what kind of model is Quine's, and to what type of world is he committed? His
position is comprehensive and pragmatic - his desert landscape is illuminated by a holistic
account drained of its idealist flavour. Pretentious and dogmatic aspects which empirically
flawed preceding holistic models, such as Hegel's Absolute, are trimmed away by
Ockham's razor, newly honed to a lethal edge by the shattering of long-supposed-to-be
necessary distinctions and connections. Quine's web of belief is influenced by, and
encompasses, the entire scope of reality. It is established with a minimalist vocabulary, and
is an efficient and integral vehicle toward his metaphysical end unambiguous ontological
commitment, which leads to a somewhat bleak but rigorous membership in the world.
Quine agrees with Franz Brentano that universals have no existential import, so particulars
are all that are the case, all that inhabit this desert landscaper.18 Physical objects exhaust
the domain of substance, and man becomes a mere four dimensional physical object. All
states of mind are psychologized, or reduced to their impact on behaviour. Effectively,
idealist criticisms have not simply been taken note of, but idealism has been hijacked, and
the result is a new kind of empiricism and an original view of the world.

Notes

1. W.V. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism. From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press. 1953), 37.
2. David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature. ed. Ernest C. Mossner (London: Penguin,
1969), 117-230. This is a very superficial paraphrase of Book 1, Part 3.
3. Stephen M. Cahn, Classics of Western Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.,
1977), 436.
4. Cahn, 978.
5. Bertrand Russell. "On Denoting." Logic and Knowledge, ed. Robert Charles Marsh
(London: Unwin Hyman Limited, 1956), 45.
6. W.V. Quine, "A Logistical Approach to the Ontological Problem." The Ways of Paradox
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1976), 198.
7. Quine. "Logistical Approach," 201.

http://www.mun.ca/phil/codgito/vol3/v3doc4.html 08/06/2009
W.V. Quine on the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Page 7 sur 7

8. Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London:
Macmillan Education Limited, 1929), 47.
9. Quine. "Two Dogmas." 21.
10. Quine, "Two Dogmas." 37.
11. Quine, "Two Dogmas," 22 24.
12. Quine, "Two Dogmas." 24-42.
13. Quine, "Two Dogmas." 44-45.
14. "Duhem, Pierre." Encyclopedia of Philosopy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan
Company, 1967), Vol. 2, 423.
15. Quine. "Two Dogmas," 41.
16. Quine, "Two Dogmas," 45.
17. W.V. Quine, "Meaning and Inferemce." From a logical Point of View, 162.
18. W.V. Quine. "On Carnap's Views of Ontology." The Ways of Paradox, 204.

Bibliography

Cahn, Stephen M., ed. Classics of Western Philosophy. Indianapolis:

Hackett Publishing Company, 1977.

Edwards, Paul, ed. Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol.2. New York:

Macmillan Company, 1967.

Hume. David. A Treatise of Human Nature. ed. Ernest C. Mossner.

London: Penguin Books, 1969.

Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith.

London: Macmillan Education Limited, 1929.

Quine, W,V. The Ways of Paradox. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

1976.

-. From A Logical Point of View. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

1953.

Russell, Bertrand. Logic and Knowledge. ed. Robert Charles Marsh.

London: Unwin Hyman Limited, 1956.

http://www.mun.ca/phil/codgito/vol3/v3doc4.html 08/06/2009