Rachel Ann Sinel

CIVIL LAW REVIEW

Page 1 of 6 As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fianc Yman was at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was "an overseas worker, who, respondent realized deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy." Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question, "[h]e believed in good faith that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married." Considering that respondents Judge's jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-TaranganPagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog. Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should exercise extra care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in its solemnization, he is likewise commanded to observance extra precautions to ensure that the event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the Family Code which states in no uncertain terms that Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage , to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those mentioned in Article 8. Case: Republic of the Philippines vs. CA and Angelina M. Castro (SECRET MARRIAGE) Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari (RTC valid, CA not valid) Facts:The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. As ground therefore, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage. On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila. Trial court denied the petition but on appeal CA declared the marriage void for lacking the essential requisite of a valid marriage license.

Article 1- Definition of Marriage Marriage is a special contract of a permanent union between a man and woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. Marriage is the foundation of the family and an inviolable institution whose nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation except that marriage settlements may fix property relations within the limits provided by the Family Code of the Philippines. Case: Edwin A. Acebedo vs. Eddie P. Arquero Nature: Administrative Case Facts: On June 1, 1994, Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Brookes Point, Palawan for immorality. Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the MTC Brookes Point, and respondent unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife at Bancudo Pulot, Brookes Point, Palawan as a result of which a girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero, was born to the two on May 21, 1989. Attached to the letter-complaint was the girls Baptismal Certificate reflecting the names of respondent and Dedje Irader as her parents Respondent claimed that the immorality charge by the petitioner was just a mere harassment and a product of complainnats hatred and jealousy. By respondents own admission however, he had an illicit relationship with the petitioners wife for 8-9 months. The reason for having this illicit relationship was explained by the respondent that the petitioner and his wife had a kasunduan in writing and duly notarized. The Kasunduan indicated that they would sever their marriage ties and allow themselves to live with other possible partner and that no one would go to court to institute any action against the other.

Issue: Whether or not the Kasunduan is enough ground to sever the marriage tie.

Ruling: SC ruled that respondents justification fails, being an employee of the judiciary, respondent ought to have known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife. Art 1 of the family code provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution whose nature and consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. It is an institution of public order and policy, governed by rules established by law which cannot be made inoperative by stipulation of the parties. Respondent is suspended for 6 months. Article 3- Formal Requisites of Marriage/ Authority of Solemnizing Officer Case: Zenaida Beso vs Judge Juan Daguman, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan Nature: Administrative Complaint Facts: Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr., for solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Registrar. The respondent acting as a solemnizing officer solemnized the wedding of the pertitioner and his fiance in Calbayog City. The judge having jurisdiction only in Sta. Margarita, Samar. After the wedding the husband abandoned the petitioner, Smelling something fishy the petitioner went to the local civil registrar to search for the marriage documents but to no avail her marriage was no registered. Petitioner went to the judge to search for the marriage documents but said judge did not possess the documents, it was in fact within the possession of the husband and he left no copy to the judge. Issue: Whether or not the marriage was valid?

Whether or not the judge was authorized to solemnize the marriage in this case? Whether or not the judge is duty bound to process the papers for registering the marriage?

Ruling: With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides, among others, that Art. 7. Marriage my be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that: Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the counsel-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at the point of death or

Issue: W/N a valid marriage license was issued? Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas?

in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or were both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

Ruling: The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former.

Rachel Ann Sinel

CIVIL LAW REVIEW

Page 2 of 6 "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in

Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas. It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer. In fine, SC hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.The petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by respondent appellate court Case: Jaime Sevilla vs. Carmelita Cardenas Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari (RTC: invalid; CA reversed and declared it valid) Facts: There are two facts given by both the plaintiff and the respondent: There was a Civil Marriage contracted in the City Hall of Manila Thereafter a Religious Ceremony was Conducted in Quezon City Plaintiff averred that he was forced to enter into marriage with the respondent Respondent averred that the plaintiff and took her away from her parents and arranged a wedding for them Plaintiff alleges that he did not procure a marriage license Due to irreconcilable differences, plaintiff and respondent were separated, thereupon plaintiff obtained a divorce decree and subsequently married in the US It was attested by different witnesses that it was the plaintiffs family that arranged the marriage. RTC declared the marriage void for lack of a marriage license, because they found out that there was no existing license on record CA reversed the decision due to the fact that it was not substantially proven that there was no marriage license issued. There were erratic problems with regard to the records because records were not found due to the absence of the handling officer.

apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus

Issue: Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question?

Held: SC agrees with the ruling of CA the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License. It can also mean, as SC believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, SC cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein. Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years producing two offsprings, now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991.We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.

hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage." This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Petition is Denied. Judgment of CA is affirmed by SC. Case: Filipina Sy vs. CA, RTC of San Fernando Pampanga and Fernando Sy Nature: Petition for Review on Decision of CA (affirmed RTC in denying for the declaration of nullity of the marriage) Facts: Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the grounds that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living separately for more than one year. In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that one afternoon, she went to the dental clinic at Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her son, and started spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking her when she fell on the floor, and released her only when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on different parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries. Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent, docketed as on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest thereafter. RTC and CA denied the declaration for nullity of the marriage of Filipina and Fernando based on latters allegedly psychological incapacity. However, upon this petition, Filipina Yap-Sy contended that the lower courts overlooked the dates of their marriage ceremony and the issuance of a marriage license. Issue: W/N marriage was valid due to absence of marriage license? Ruling: Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of marriage before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out that these critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted before the court.

Rachel Ann Sinel

CIVIL LAW REVIEW

Page 3 of 6 In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage Ceremony (Article 6) Case: Lucio Morigo y Cacho vs People of the Philippines Nature: Petition for review on certiorari (RTC convicted Lucio of Bigamy guilty beyond reasonable doubt) Facts: Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978). Lucia worked in Singapore and Canada and maintained communication with Lucio. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol. On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020 . The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution.

The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract in her petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court. The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's answer admitting it. This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct examination. Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona. Case: Engrace Nial vs. Norma Bayadog Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code. The lower court dismissed the action on the ground that petitioners should have filed the action to declare their fathers marriage to respondent before his death applying by analogy of Article 47 of the FC (which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate fro annulment of marriage)

Issue: Whether or not there was a marriage ceremony validating the marriage of Lucio and Lucia?

Issue: Whether or not the second marriage was void ab initio due to the absence of a marriage license?

Ruling: There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. They executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other. The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period? Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union.

Held: The SC found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married. The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court, hence, the decision had long become final and executory. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

Rachel Ann Sinel

CIVIL LAW REVIEW

Page 4 of 6 Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife of the decedent. The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract which Antonietta Chua failed to produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. The trial court correctly ruled in its 21 August 1992 Order that: Case: Imelda Pilapil vs. Hon. Corona Somerah Nature: Special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash (Petitioner being charged of adultery) Facts: On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named JamesChua sometime in 1983". The case was filed in court but a Motion to Quash was filed but which was denied. Hence, a petition was filed before the Supreme Court contending that the complainant cannot be qualified as an offended party since he has already obtained a final divorce under his national law prior to the filing of the case. Issue: Whether the adultery case against the petitioner can prosper even after she and her former

Case: Antonietta Garcia VDA De Chua vs. CA, Hon. Japal Guiani and Florita Vallejo, as administrator of the Estate of the late Roberto L. Chua Facts: During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981. Out of this union, the couple begot two illegitimate children, namely, Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo.On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City. This is a case regarding the distribution of the property of the late Roberto Chua and the resolution of the designation of the Adminitratrix of his Estate Sometime from 1970 up to late 1981 petitioner lived with Roberto Lim Chua as husband and wife and out of said union they begot two (2) children, namely, Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua who was born in General Santos City on April 28, 1977 and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua who was born in Davao City on August 30, 1978. It was found that the deceased Roberto Lim Chua died single and without legitimate descendants or ascendants, hence, the above named minors Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua, his children with herein petitioner shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. At the hearing of the motion to dismiss on August 19, 1992, counsel for movant Antonietta G. Chua presented 18 Exhibits in support of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent and that the latter resides in Davao City at the time of his death. Exh. "1" was the xerox copy of the alleged marriage contract between the movant and the petitioner. This cannot be admitted in evidence on the ground of the timely objection of the counsels for petitioner that the best evidence is the original copy or authenticated copy which the movant cannot produce. Further, the counsels for petitioner in opposition presented the following: a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that no such marriage contract was ever registered with them ; a letter from Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have solemnized the alleged marriage that he has not solemnized such alleged marriage. Exhibit "2" through "18" consist among others of Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married; passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City. Petitioner through counsels, objected to the admission in evidence of Exhibits "2" through "18" if the purpose is to establish the truth of the alleged marriage between the decedent and Antonietta Garcia. The best evidence they said is the marriage contract. They do not object to the admission of said exhibit if the purpose is to show that Davao City was the business residence of the decedent. Petitioner through counsels, presented Exhibit "A" through "K" to support her allegation that the decedent was a resident of Cotabato City; that he died a bachelor; that he begot two illegitimate children with the petitioner as mother. Among these exhibits are Income Tax Returns filed in Cotabato City from 1968 through 1979 indicating therein that he was single; birth certificates of the alleged two illegitimate children of the decedent; Resident Certificates of the decedent issued in Cotabato City; Registration Certificate of Vehicle of the decedent showing that his residence is Cotabato City.

foreign husband had divorce in Germany?

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is the legal wife of the deceased?

Held: It is clear from the foregoing that the movant failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the movant failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage. Consequently, she has no personality to file the subject motion to dismiss. The petitioner has no standing to be the administrator of the properties of her children with the deceased. PETITION is denied. Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of administration. An interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; his interest is material and direct, and not one that is only indirect or contingent. 21

Ruling: No. In case of adultery or concubinage, the complainant must be the offended spouse and by this is meant that the complainant is still married to the accused. Since they are already divorced, he has no more capacity to file such action because said divorce and its effects are recognized in the Philippines insofar as he is concerned. Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of the petitioner, has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was not the offended spouse at the time of the suit. Case: Republic of the Philippines vs. Cipriano Orbecido III Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari regarding the declaration of the capacity of Orbecido III to remarry by RTC Facts: Cipriano married Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 In 1986 Myros left for the US, a few years later, Cipriano discovered that Lady Myros had been naturalized as an American citizen It was in the year 2000 that Cipriano learned from his son that Lady obtained a divorce decree and then remarried Cipriano thus filed a petition for authority to remarry invoking paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code The RTC granted the petition

Rachel Ann Sinel

CIVIL LAW REVIEW

Page 5 of 6 1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other; 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage MANUEL T. ABELARDO, respondent. Facts: October 1989, respondent and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and requested him to advance the amount of US$25,000.00 for the purchase of a house and lot petitioner, in October 31, 1989, issued a check in the name of a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, who acknowledged receipt and the amount was in full payment of the property when petitioner inquired about the status of the loan due, respondent spouses pleaded that in they are not yet in the position to settle the obligation respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioners inquiries on the amount to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner petitioner made a formal demand for the payment of the amount of US$25,000.00 but the spouses failed to comply with their obligation petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages against respondent and his wife before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial courts decision and dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence to show that the subject amount was indeed loaned by petitioner to respondent and his wife SC reversed decision of CA

Hence the present recourse where the Solicitor General argues that the subject provision only applies in the case of a valid mixed marriage- between a Filipino citizen and an alien

Issue: Does par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code apply in the case of Cipriano? Ruling: The twin requisites for the application of Par 2 of Art. 26 of the FC are both present in the case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. The intent of paragraph 2, Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The subject provision includes cases involving parties who at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The respondent must prove to the said divorce as a fact and in accordance with the foreign law, where Lady is naturalized. Case: Herminia Borja-Manzano vs. Judge Roque Sanchez, MRC, Infanta, Pangasinan Nature: Administrative Complaint against Judge Sanchez for Gross Ignorance of Law Facts: Herminia Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on May 21, 1966 in Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated." Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him. For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether the subsequent marriage of the deceased husband is valid? Whether the Judge can be charged of Gross Ignorance of Law? Ruling: No. The subsequent marriage of the late David Manzano with Luzviminda Payao is null and void, because, even though the two cohabited for seven years, still both of them had legal impediments to be married again because of their previous valid marriages. Not all of the requirements of Article 34 (Provision on Legal Ratification of Marital Cohabitation) are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in the affidavits of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge himself, expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Yes. Judge Sanchez is guilty of Gross Ignorance of Law. Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void Note: Article 34 of the Family Code: For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:

Issue: w/n CA erred in dismissing the case due to lack of evidence to prove that respondent spouses are liable

Held: petition GRANTED, respondent spouse are jointly and severally liable in the payment plus damages a. General rule is that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. o The defendants never denied that the check of US$25k was used to purchase the property and used as family home o Spouses didnt deny that the same served as their conjugal home, thus benefiting the family. o acknowledgment of the loan made by respondent wife binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family b. R husband cannot allege as a defense that the amount of US $25,000.00 was received as his share in the income or profits of the corporation and not as a loan for he is not a stockholder nor an employee of the company c. the amount of money loaned came from the personal account of the plaintiff Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. Case: ILUSORIO vs. BILDNER

Rachel Ann Sinel Facts: Held:

CIVIL LAW REVIEW

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Potenciano Ilusorio a lawyer and a rich business man is married to Erlinda Kalaw and had 6 children Upon his arrival from the US the stayed in Antipolo with Erlinda for 5 months Their children alleged that their mother overdosed him as a result of his deteriorating health Erlinda filed a petition for guardianship over the properties due to his health problems and advanced age After attending a meeting in Baguio city he did not return to their house in Antipolo but instead lived in Makati Erlinda filed a petition for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband and visitation rights CA granted the petition for humanitarian reasons SC reversed the CAs decision

Issue: w/n the CA erred in granting the petition for habeas corpus
Writ of habeas corpus should not be issued No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife Evidence show that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Ilusorio that would justify the issuance of the writ Even though he is in medication- does not render him mentally incapacitated Ilusorio was in sound and alert mind and can still make his own choices

Case: AYALA INVESTMENT vs. CA AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO MAGSAJO, petitioners, COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING, respondents. Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM) obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as AIDC). To security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness to AIDC PBM failed to pay the loan AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching Court found PBM and Ching jointly and severally liable upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of execution pending appeal. Upon AIDC's putting up of an P8M bond private respondents filed a case of injunction against petitioners alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal partnership levied because the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership auction sale took place. AIDC being the only bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale by petitioner Magsajo trial court promulgated its decision declaring the sale on execution null and void

Issue: w/n respondent court erred in ruling that the conjugal partnership of private respondents is not liable for the obligation by the respondent-husband Held : NOT liable
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of the spouses. Philippine Blooming Mills has a personality distinct and separate even though members of the said family happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity. The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. In the case at bar, respondent-appellant AIDC failed to prove that the debt was contracted by appelleehusband, for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. The debt is clearly a corporate debt and petitioners right of recourse against Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings. It does not extend to the conjugal partnership of gains of the family of