Enrilevs. Senate Electoral Tribunal Facts: On January 20, 1995, Sen.

Aquilino Pimentel filed with the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) an election protest against Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and other senatorial candidates who won in the May 1995 senatorial elections. On June 30, 1995, the petitioner, Sen. Enrile, filed his answer in counter-protest. Issues having joined, the SET required the parties to submit the list of pilot precincts number not more than25% of the total precints involved. On Aug. 21, 1997, SET held a press conference at the Supreme Court Session Hall announcing the partial and tentative results of the revision of ballots in the pilot precincts without resolving the protest. In the tabulation presented, the petitioners name dropped to the 15th position in the senatorial race. On September 24, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Partial Results in Sen. Pimentels Protest and to Conduct Another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All Parties. Respondent and Sen. Coseteng filed separate comments alleging petitioners motion is premature consi dering the SET has not resolved respondents election protest. Nevertheless, the SET denied petitioners motion holding no sufficient basis to discard the partial tabulation. The SET also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. A petition for Certiorari assailed for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion the resolution that denied petitione rs Motion to Annul/Set Aside Partial Results in Pimentels Protest and to Conduct another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All Parties. Issue: Whether or not there is still useful purpose that can serve in passing upon merits of said petition. Held: No. The Court finds the petition becoming moot and academic. The tenure of the contested senatorial position subject to respondents protest expired on June 30, 1998. The case became moot considering there is no more actual controversy between the parties and has no useful purpose that can serve in passing upon any merit. Where issues have become moot and academic, justiciable controversies are lost, thereby rendering the resolution of no practical use or value. The petition is dismissed.

Gonzales v Narvasa G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000 Facts: On December 9, 1999, a petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. In his capacity as citizen and as taxpayer, he seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Petitioner also prays that the Executive Secretary be compelled through a mandamus to furnish the petitioner with information requesting the names of executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacaang. Issue: Whether or not petitioner possesses the requisites of filing a suit as a citizen and as taxpayer. Held: No. The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have standing to bring suit as citizen. Petitioner did not in fact show what particularized interest they have to bring the suit. As civic leaders, they still fall short of the requirements to maintain action. Their interest in assailing the EO does not present to be of a direct and personal character. Furthermore, they do not sustain or are in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement. As taxpayers, petitioners cannot attack the EO. There is no appropriation granted from Congress but only an authorization by the president. There being exercise by Congress of its taxing and spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the PCCRs creation. The peti tioner has failed to show that he is a real party in interest. With regards to the petitioners request of disclosure to public information, the Court upheld that citizens may invoke before the co urts the right to information. When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition with the exception that respondent Executive Secretary is ordered to furnish petitioner with the information requested.

MONTESCLAROS V. COMELEC FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, seeking to prevent the postponement of the SK elections originally scheduled on May 6, 2002 and also to prevent the reduction of the age requirement for membership in the SK. Petitioners sent a letter to the Comelec, demanding that the SK elections be held as scheduled on 6 May 2002. Montesclaros et.al also urged the Comelec to respond to her letter within 10 days upon receipt of the letter, otherwise, she will seek judicial relief. However, Benipayo, then COMELEC Chairman, wrote identical letters to the Speaker of the House and the Senate President about the status of pending bills on the SK and Barangay elections. In his letters, the Comelec Chairman intimated that it was operationally very difficult to hold both elections (barangay and SK elections) simultaneous ly in May 2002. Instead, the Comelec Chairman expressed support for the bill of Senator Franklin Drilon that proposed to hold the Barangay elections in May 2002 and postpone the SK elections to November 2002. The Senate and the House of Representatives passed their respective bills postponing the SK elections. The Bic ameral Committees consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay elections to 15 July 2002 and lowered the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but not more than 18 years of age. ISSUE: Whether or not there is actual controversy in the case which seeks to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections and which seeks to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK. HELD: The Courts power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following requisites are c omplied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. Herein, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002 which is a date acceptable to them. With respect to the date of the SK elections, there is therefore no actual controversy requiring judicial intervention. Further, their prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. It creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. Having no legal effect, a proposed bill violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before. Absent a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the internal processes or procedures of Congress. A party must also show that he has a real interest in the suit. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest. One who is no longer qualified because of an amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK membership. Only those who qualify as SK members can contest, based on a statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not a property right protected by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (CHREA) vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

FACTS: On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission. To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same resolution, authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from savings under Personnel Services. By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 the CHR collapsed the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification. Among the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one Accounting Clerk II. The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request. In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBMs disapproval of the plantilla reclassification. Meanwhile, the officers of pe titioner CHREA, in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions. The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request in a Resolution and reversed the recommendation of the CSC Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management? HELD: CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the CSC-Central Office both erred in sanctioning the CHRs alleged blanket authority to upgrade, reclassify, and create positions inasmuch as the approval of the DBM relative to such scheme is still indispensable. Petitioner bewails that the CSC and the Court of Appeals erroneously assumed that CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy insofar as financial matters are concerned, particularly with regard to the upgrading and reclassification of positions therein. The CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.as the laws designated body to implement and administer a unified compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals,we echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.

PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ G.R. No. 113105, August 19 1994, 235 SCRA 506 FACTS: House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets. On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, making it as Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETYFOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions. Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Section 25, Article 7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court. Petition prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void the provision under Article 16 of the Countrywide Development Fund and the veto of the President of the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994. There were 16 members of the Senate who sought for the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Department of Budget and Management and the National Treasurer and questions the constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt services. Senator Tanada and Senator Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, DPWH, and National Highway Authority. ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress have the legal standing to question the validity of acts of the Executive. HELD: The Court held that the members of Congress have the legal standing to question the validity of acts of the Executive which injures them in their person or the institution of Congress to which they belong. In the latter case, the acts cause derivative but nonetheless substantial injury which can be questioned by members of Congress. In the absence of a claim that the contract in question violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature, petitioners have no legal standing to institute the instant action in their capacity as members of Congress.

REPRESENTATIVE AMADO S. BAGATSING VSCOMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATIONFACTS OF THE CASE PETRON was originally registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1966 under the corporate name "Esso Philippines, Inc." .ESSO became a wholly-owned company of the government under the corporate name PETRON and as a subsidiary of PNOC.PETRON owns the largest, most modern complex refinery in the Philippines. It is listed as the No. 1corporation in terms of assets and income in the Philippines in 1993. President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 50 in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom Constitution. Implicit in the Proclamation is the need to raise revenue for the Government and the ideal of leaving business to the private sector by creating the committee on privatization. The Government can then concentrate on the delivery of basic services and the performance e of vital public functions. The Presidential Cabinet of President Ramos approved the privatization of PETRON as part of the Energy Sector Action Plan. PNOC Board of Directors passed a resolution authorizing the company to negotiate and conclude a contract with the consortium of Salomon Brothers of Hongkong Limited and PCI Capital Corporation for financial advisory services to be rendered to PETRON. The Petron Privatization Working Committee (PWC) was thus formed. It finalized a privatization strategy with 40% of the shares to be sold to a strategic partner and 20% to the general public The President approved the 40% 40% 20%privatization strategy of PETRON. The invitation to bid was published in several newspapers of general circulation, both local and foreign. The PNOC Board of Directors then passed Resolution No. 866, S. 1993, declaring ARAMCO the winning bidder. PNOC and ARAMCO signed the Stock Purchase Agreement, the two companies signed the Shareholders' Agreement. The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 112399 sought:(1) to nullify the bidding conducted for the sale of a block of shares constituting 40% of the capital stock (40% block) of Petron Corporation (PETRON) and the award made to Aramco Overseas Company, B.V.(ARAMCO) as the highest bidder and (2) to stop the sale of said block of shares to ARAMCO. The petition for prohibition and certiorari in G.R. No. 115994 sought tom annul the sale of the same block of Petron shares subject of the petition in G.R. No. 112399. ARAMCO entered a limited appearance to question the jurisdiction over its person, alleging that it is a foreign company organized under the laws of the Netherlands, that it is not doing nor licensed to do business in the Philippines, and that it does not maintain an office or a business address in and has not appointed a resident agent for the Philippines (Rollo, p. 240).Petitioners however, countered that they filed the action in their capacity as members of Congress. ISSUE: WON Petitioners have a locus standi. HELD: Petition is dismissed. In Philippine Constitution Association v. Hon. Salvador Enriquez , G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994, we held that the members of Congress have the legal standing to question the validity of acts of the Executive which injures them in their person or the institution of Congress to which they belong. In the latter case, the acts cause derivative but nonetheless substantial injury which can be questioned by members of Congress (Kennedy v. James, 412 F. Supp. 353 [1976]).In the absence of a claim that the contract in question violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature, petitioners have no legal standing to institute the instant action in their capacity as members of Congress.

However, petitioners can bring the action in their capacity as taxpayers under the doctrine laid down in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994).Under said ruling, taxpayers may question contracts entered into by the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations alleged to be in contravention of the law. As long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the presentation.

Lacson vs. Perez FACTS: On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an angry mob assaulting and attempting to break into Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected. Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a state of rebellion, which allegedly gave a semblance of lega lity to the arrests, four related petitions were filed before the Court assailing the declaration of a state of rebellion by the President and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law. 1. On May 6, 2001, the President ordered the lifting of the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the ins tant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. 2. As to petitioners claim that the proclamation of a state of rebellion is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, there are actually general instructions to law enforcement officers and military agencies to implement Proclamation No. 38 and obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts. This means that preliminary investigations will be conducted. 3. Moreover, petitioners contention that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. 4. Petitioners cannot ask the Court to direct the courts before whom the informations against the petitioners are filed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the case. Such relief is clearly premature considering that as of this date, no complaints or charges have been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime. 5. Hold departure orders issued against petitioners cannot be declared null and void since petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders in their petition. 6. Petitioner Defensor-Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger of being arrested without a warrant. Hence, her petition of mandamus cannot be issued since such right to relief must be clear at the time of the award. 7. Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the Peoples Movement against Poverty (PMAP), argues that the declaration of a state of rebellion is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary to interpret what took place on May 1. The Court disagreed since the President as the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. 8. As for petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), it is not a real party-in-interest. LDP has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion. Even if instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition. PETITIONS DISMISSED (However, petitioners cannot be arrested without the required judicial warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege)

Cutaran vs. DENR FACTS - Cutaran et.al. assails the validity of DENR Special Order 31, Special Order 25, and Department Administrative Order 2 for being issued without prior legislative authority. - Special Order (SO) 31 (1990): Creation of a Special Task force on acceptance, identification, evaluati on and delineation of ancestral land claims in the Cordillera Administrative Region - Special Order (SO) 25: Creation of Special Task Forces provincial and community environment and natural resources offices fo r the identification, delineation and recognition of ancestral land claims nationwide - DAO 2: Implementing Rules and Guidelines of Special Order no. 25

The same year SO 31 was issued, relatives of petitioners filed separate applications for Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) for the land they occupy inside the Camp John Hay Reservation. -These petitions were denied. Also pursuant to the SOs, the heirs of Apeg Carantes filed application for CALC for some portio ns of land in the Camp John Hay Reservation, overlapping some of the land occupie d by the petitioners. The petitioners contend that if not for the respondents timely resistance to the Orders, the petitioners would be totally evicted from their land. - Petitioners filed in the CA petition to enjoin respondents from implementing Orders on ground that they are void for lack of legal basis. CA ruled that SO31 has no force and effect for preempting legislative prerogative for it was issued prior to the effectivity of RA7586 (National Integrated Protected Systems), but it sustained SO25 and DAO 2 on the ground that they were issued pursuant to powers delegated to DENR under RA7586. - Petitioners now contend that CA erred in upholding the validity of SO25 and DAO 2 and seek to enjoin the DENR from processing the application of CALC of Heirs of Carantes. ISSUE WON SO 25 and DAO 2 are valid HELD Not a justiciable controversy Ratio The petition was prematurely filed. There is yet no justiciable controversy for the court to resolve. The adverse legal interests involved are the competing claims of the petitioners and heirs of Carantes to possess a common piece of land. Since the CALC application of the Heirs of Carantes has not yet been granted or issued, and which the DENR may or may not grant, there is yet no actual or imminent violation of petit ioners asserted right to possess the disputed land. - Definition of justiciable controversy: a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law. - Subject to certain well-defined exceptions, the courts will not touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its validity. - This Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners speculation that the DENR will approve the application of the heirs of Ca rantes. There must be an actual governmental act which directly causes or will imminently cause injury to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to possess the land before the jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners were being evicted from the land by the heirs of Carantes under orders from the DENR.

Kilosbayan vs. Guingona FACTS: Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg . 42) which grants it the authority to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities, the PCSO decided to establish an on -line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, a multinational company and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia, became interested to of fer its services and resources to PCSO. As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individual nominees) organized with some Filipino investors in M arch 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which was intended to be the medium through which the technical and management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO. Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO. On 15 August 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to the PCSO. On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President announced that it had given the respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate the countrys on-line lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract would be submitted not later than 8 November 1993 for final clearance and approval by the Chief Executive. On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. Considering the denial by the Office of the President of its protest and the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that only a court injunction can stop Malacaang, and the imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994, KILOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition. Petitioner claims that it is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders. The rest of the petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Taada and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as members of the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens. Senators Webb and Taada and Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacities as members of Congress and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippines. The public respondents, meanwhile allege that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit, citing the Courts resolution in Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi 2. Whether or the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign. is legal and valid. HELD: We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.

The language of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169 is indisputably clear. The PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither can it assign, transfer, or lease such franchise. Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument. Undoubtedly, from the very inception, the PCSO and the PGMC mutually understood that any arrangement between them would necessarily leave to the PGMC the technical, operations, and management aspects of the on-line lottery system while the PSCO would, primarily, provide the franchise. The so-called Contract of Lease is not, therefore, what it purports to be. Woven therein are provisions which negate its title and betray the true intention of the parties to be in or to have a joint venture for a period of eight years in the operation and maintenance of the on-line lottery system. We thus declare that the challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to law. This conclusion renders unnecessary further discussion on the other issues raised by the petitioners.

Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997 Facts: The petitions assail the constitutionality of various provisions of RA 8180 entitiled the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996. Under the deregulated environment, any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitions raise a justiciable controversy (2) Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the law (3) Whether or not Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180 violates the one title one subject requirement of the Constitution (4) Whether or not Sec. 15 of RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power (5) Whether or not RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition Held: As to the first issue, judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where a statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void. The effort of respondents to question the legal standing of petitioners also failed. The Court has brightlined its liberal st ance on a petitioners locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. In the case, petitioners pose issues which are significant to the people and which deserve the Courts forthright resolution. It is also contended that Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180 on tariff differential violates the provision of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. The Court did not concur with this contention. The title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. The Court held that Sec. 5 providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of RA 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Petitioners also assail Sec. 15 of RA 8180 which fixes the time frame for the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry for being violative of the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power. There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Se ction 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Congress expressly provided in RA 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President. He is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Petitioners also argued that some provisions of RA 8180 violate Sec. 19, Art. XII of the Constitution. Section 19, Art. XII of the Constitution espouses competition. The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason for regulation of unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle of Sec. 19, Art. XII of the Constitution which cannot be violated by RA 8180. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. As the dominant players, they boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products therefore works to their immense benefit. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of RA 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost. The most important question is whether the offending provisions can be individually struck down without invalidating the entire RA 8180. The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. RA 8180 contains a separability clause. The separability clause notwithstanding, the Court held that the offending provisions of RA 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck down. The provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing are among the principal props of RA 8180. Congress could not have regulated the downstream oil industry without these provisions. Unfortunately, contrary to their intent, these provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition, encourage monopolistic power and interfere with the free interaction of market forces.

LIM v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Facts: Beginning January of year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in Balikatan 02-1. They are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. Its aim is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through joint training with its American counterparts; the Balikatan is the largest such training exercise directly supporting the MDTs objectives. It is this treaty to which the VFA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it seeks to reaffirm. On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. Issue: Whether Balikatan 02-1 activities covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement? Held: To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself. The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an imperma nent basis, in activities, the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel must abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31 and 32 contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements. It clearly provides that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties inte ntions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context. It appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word .activities arose from accident. It was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes other than military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nations marine resources, sea sea rch-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the like. Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that .Balika tan 02-1, a mutual anti- terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise, falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement.

Tolentino vs. COMELEC FACTS:The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite on the proposal to lower the voting age from 21 to 18, before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then under revision) had been approved. Tolentino et al filed a motion to prohibit such plebiscite and the same was granted by the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper. HELD: The propose amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification. Election here is singular which meant that the entire constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the people were not given a proper frame of reference in arriving at their decision because they had at the time no idea yet of what the re st of the revised Constitution would ultimately be and therefore would be unable to assess the proposed amendment in the light of the entire document. This is the Doctrine of Submission which means that all the proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to the people for the ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT piecemeal.

Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned. PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI. ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid. HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

Anti-Graft League of the Philippines vs. CA [G.R. No. 97787; August 1, 1996]

Facts: PD 674 was issued by Pres. Marcos, establishing the Technological Colleges of Rizal. It directed the Board to provide funds for the purchase of a site and the construction of the necessary structures thereon. The Province was able to negotiate with respondent Ortigas & Co., Ltd. for the acquisition of four parcels of land located in Ugong Norte, Pasig. The projected construction, however, never materialized because of the decimation of the Provinces resources brought about by the creation of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) in 1976. Twelve years later, with the property lying idle and the Province needing funds to propel its 5-year Comprehensive Development Program, the then incumbent Board passed Resolution No. 87-205 dated October 15, 1987 authorizing the Governor to sell the same. The property was eventually sold to Valley View Realty Development Corporation. Issue: 1) WON the action is a taxpayers suit. 2) WON petitioner has locus standi.

Held: 1) No. To constitute a taxpayers suit, two requisites must be met, namely, that public funds are disbursed by a political su bdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed, and that the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged ultra vires act. In the case at bar, disbursement of public funds was only made in 1975 when the Province bought the lands from Ortigas at P110.00 per square meter in line with the objectives of P.D. 674. Petitioner never referred to such purchase as an illegal disbursement of public funds but focused on the alleged fraudulent reconveyance of said property to Ortigas because the price paid was lower than the prevailing market value of neighboring lots. The first requirement, therefore, which would make this petition a taxpayers suit is absent. 2) No. As a taxpayer, petitioner would somehow be adversely affected by an illegal use of public money. When, however, no such unlawful spending has been shown, as in the case at bar, petitioner, even as a taxpayer, cannot question the transaction validly executed by and between the Province and Ortigas for the simple reason that it is not privy to said contract. In other words, petitioner has absolutely no cause of action, and consequently no locus standi, in the instant case. People vs. Vera [G.R. No. L-45685; November 16, 1937] Facts: Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case. The CFI of Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to an indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prison mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prision correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prison mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on August 19, 1937. But at this juncture, herein petitioners came to this court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." This court may review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment of conviction rendered by this court in said case (G. R. No. 41200). Issue: WON the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present case. Held: Yes. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. Cruz vs. DENR [G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000] Facts: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part. The Commission on Human Rights asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous people. It prays that the petition be dismissed. Held: There was NO MAJORITY VOTE reached as the Justices were equally divided at 7-7. The case was then redeliberated upon, but the voting still remained the same. Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSED. Separate Opinions: KAPUNAN [dismiss] (1) The petition presents an actual controversy.

(2) Petitioners have the requisite standing. As citizens, they possess the public right to ensure that the national patrimony is not alienated and diminished in violation of the Constitution. As taxpayers, they possess the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. MENDOZA [dismiss] (1) It is not a justiciable controversy. Judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases or controversies without upsetting balance of power. (2) Petitioners do not have legal standing. In Tanada v. Tuvera, when the question is one of public right and the object of mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest. But in this case, what public right is there for petitioners to enforce when the IPRA does not apply to them except in gener al and in common with other citizens? Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 148560; November 19, 2001] Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unw arranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law. Issue: WON the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial challenge. Held: No. On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not be invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real. The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress decisio n to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit. Zandueta vs. De La Costa [G.R. No. L-46267; November 28, 1938] Facts: Francis Zandueta was presiding over a 5th Branch of Courts of First Instance of Manila. He received a new ad interim appointment issued (Commonwealth Act No. 145) to discharge the Office of Judge in the Court of First Instance of the 4th Judicial District with the authority to preside over the Court of First Instance of Manila and Palawan The ad interim appointment of the petitioner was disapproved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly. The President of the Philippines appointed Sixto Dela Costa (respondent), judge of 4th Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Court of First Instance of Manila and Palawan. Dela Costas appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly. Petitioner questioned the validity of the appointment alleging that C.A. No. 145 is unconstitutional. Issue: WON Zandueta may question the constitutionality of C.A. No. 145 by which the new ad interim appointment of judge of first instance of the 4th Judicial District, to preside over the Court of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, was issued in his favor Held: No. Zandueta is estopped by his own act questioning the constitutionality of C.A. No. 145. He should know that his ad interim appointment was subject to approval by the Commission on Appointments. If the said commission disapproved, it would become ineffective and would cease him discharging the office. Zandueta is free from to accept or not the ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Commonwealth. Nothing or nobody compelled him to do so.

When a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by law qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath, enters in the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of appointment, and he cannot question the constitutionality of the law by which he was last appointed. He is exempted from the said rule if he did not accept the new appointment or when he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies. De La Llana vs. Alba [G.R. No. L-57883; March 12, 1982] Facts: In 1981, BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. De la Lla na was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can remove judges not Congress. Issue: WON petitioners have legal standing. Held: Yes. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de la Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera. Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." The other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on the matter. Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has been amply demonstrated.

Canlas vs. Napico Facts:The petitoners seek the issuance of a Writ of Amparo. They claim that they were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied in our Constitution. Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment. They claimed that fraudulent and spurious land titles were issued by certain Land Officials. These Land Officials should be summoned to answer their participation in the issuances of these fraudulent and spurious titles, now, in the hands of the Private Respondents Issue : Whether or not the writ of amparo applies in this case. Held : The petition is dismissed. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court is not included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the abovequoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available.

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel Facts: The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). This Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 is a codification of consensus points reached between GRP and MILF Peace Panel and of the aspiration of the MILF to have a Bangasmoro Homeland According to the stipulations in the MOA-AD, Ownership of the Bangasmoro Homeland is vested to the Bangasmoro people. MOA-AD describes the Bangasmoro people as the first nation with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations. The Bangasmoro Juridical Entity (BJE) is granted by the MOA-AD the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangasmoro. It was also stipulated that BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its internal waters. Issues: 1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic 2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication; 3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 4. Whether there is a violation of the peoples right to information on matters of public concern. 5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself. 6. cralawWhether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and 7. cralawWhether MOA-AD is constitutional

Held:

Issue 1:The court believes that the petitions in the case at bar provide an exception to the moot and academic principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Issue 2:Yes. Any alleged violation of the consti by any branch of the government is a proper matter for judicial review. In the case at bar, the failure of the respondents to consult the local government units or communities affected amounts to a departure from the mandate under E.O. No. 3 and the fact that the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution, rendered the petition ripe for adjudication.

Issue 3: The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution.

Issue 4:Yes, there is a violation of the peoples right to information.An essential element of this right is to keep a contin uing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people.The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order.

The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.

Issue 5: No. The MOA-AD is not a document that can bind the Philippines under international law. It would have been signed by representatives of States and international organizations not parties to the Agreement, this would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under international law.

Issue 6:Yes. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. These petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what it had done in a number of landmark cases.

Issue 7:Yes. The MOA-AD is unconstitutional because it cannot be reconciled with the present constitution. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them. The associative relationship between the GRP and the BJE is unconstitutional because the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

The court denied the respondents motion to dismiss and granted the main and intervening petitions.

Ynot vs. IAC Facts: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos. ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police

power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.