Mind Association

Presuppositions of Human Communication. by Ramchandra Gandhi Review by: J. Mason Mind, New Series, Vol. 86, No. 341 (Jan., 1977), pp. 148-151 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2253602 . Accessed: 23/08/2013 13:06
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and the statusof the proposition ascribea property be empirical.Neither conditionseems clearlysatisfied; the RHS merelyexcludesan identificationwhose exclusionis alreadynecessary giventhe identification made in the LHS. Schlesingeropts for the view that inductionis the only-satisfactory methodforprognosticating ab6ut the unobserved.Counter-induction, he conclusionssince thereare infinitely claims, does not yield determinate fromthe past. Unfortunately manyways in which the future may differ thereare manywaysin whichthefuture by thesametolken maybe likethe no sound basis forchoosinginductionin past (p. 43) so that this offers to otherpredictive preference policies. The linguistic conservatisminherent in the author's dismissal of constructedpredicates such as grue' is perverse;there is, 'artificially to using the stock of predicatesavailable in our he says, no alternative natural languages because there is no way of choosing amongst the infinite number of alternative predicates (p. 43). We need to increase and improveour stock of predicatesas new challengesto our language arise in the formofnew theories and new phenomenaand at thesepoints choices have to be made. The book ends with a pot-pourriof materialon self-reference, time which seems rathertenuouslyrelatedto what has gone and determinism as anything beforethoughthesectionon timeis as interesting in thebook. I would recommend Professor Schlesinger's presentationof the Paradoxes of Confirmation. But I suspect that the intelligent undergraduatewill have a number of questions which even an introductory textshould tryto answer.The book is too shortand I cannot give very high marksto the authoror to the publisher'sreaderon this count.
SAINT DAVID LAMPETER S UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, R. A. SHARPE

By RAMCHANDRA Presuppositions of Human Communication. OxfordUniversity Press, I974. Pp. I47. C2.00.

GANDHI.

is a useful RamchandraGandhi's Presuppositions ofHumanCommunication and exploratory continuation of workbegun by philosophersof speech, particularly by H. P. Grice in his I957 article on speaker's meaning. Grice's account of speaker's meaning is oftenconfusedand seemingly incoherent, but there have been many who have thoughtthat there is in Grice's work. Gandhi has sought,with a fair somethingimportant degree of success, to untanglethe problemsbequeathed to us by Grice, thingsto say about the nature and in the process has many interesting action. of communicative The virtue of Gandhi's work is that it shiftsthe emphasis of the from meaningto communication. We need to be able to investigation in its own terms. What has understandthe nature of communication have employedthe concept so oftenhappened is that meaning-theorists of communication withoutgivingit adequate analysis.Gandhi's position of meaning,e.g., is that beforewe can advance in our understanding

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in terms of human institutions and conventions,we must already be operatingwith the thoughtof human beings as communicative agents. We mustsomehowbe able to give a non-circular accountof communication,or our appeal to institutions and conventions will be vacuous. Gandhi focuseson two questionsto make his projectclear: a. What is it forsomebodyS to fail to communicate to somebody else A absolutelyanything at all? b. What is it for S to communicatesomething to A, as opposed to failing to communicate absolutelyanything at all? (p. 25). An answerto the former questionwould give us the necessary conditions forcommunication, and an answerto thelatter would giveus thesufficient conditions. The answer to these questions will involve the notion of addressing somebody communicatively. This is both a necessary and sufficient condition forcommunication. A subsidiary question, whichis nevertheless crucial to a theoryof speech-actsis what the necessaryand sufficient conditionsare for telling somebody something,as opposed to merely addressingsomebody communicatively. Gandhi believes that once we have orderedour understanding of whatit is to tellsomebodysomething, we will have gone a long way towardsunderstanding such othertypes of speech acts as imperativesand interrogatives. Gandhi also tries to elucidatethe notionofnon-serious or non-literal speech,since he realizes that communication, in the broad sense, is not restricted to the literal exchangeof information. with someone always involvesbringinghim to know Communicating but not everycase of bringingsomeone to know something something, is a matterof communicating with him. For example, a burglarwho breaksa vase is not communicatively addressinghimself to the sleeping occupants, thoughhe does succeed bringing themto knowofhis presence. We cannot by-pass this problemby writing in a conditionto the effect thatto communicate it is necessary to want to bringsomeone's attention to oneself.An exhibitionist presumablyexhibitshimselfout of a desire to be noticed, and he also expects that those who notice him will see that he desires theirattention;yet he could hardlybe said to be communicatingwith them. He has not, in fact, even addressed himself towardthem. communicatively Among the technicaltermsthat Gandhi introducesin the course of his discussion,the notion of addressing is central.He holds that the act of communicatively addressingoneselfto an audience, in an open way, is a necessaryand sufficient conditionforcommunication. The speaker's act of addressing,Gandhi argues, must both imply that S wants A to attendto S, and S's act mustnot be describableby A as S's trying to get A to notice S in some merelycausal fashion.'. .. S addresses A if and A's attention to the fact that S is trying only if S attracts to attract A's attention to the factthat S is trying to attractA's attention to himself, i.e., to the fact that S wants A to attendto the fact that S wants A to attendto him' (p. 39). The next question is how S can succeed in addressingA. Gandhi's answer is complex. S must succeed in attracting A's attentionto the

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and that he could do so A's attention, to attract factsthat S is trying in a purelycausal fashion,but that he is also at the same time showing in a merelycausal fashion.In order reluctanceto attractA's attention address A, he must invitea response,not inducea for S to successfully to addresssomeoneis to bringthatperson A. Put simply, response,from something.I do not invite to recognizethat one wishes to communicate and thusdo notestabto myself a responseifI compelsomeone'sattention as Gandhi rightly communication, contact.Moreover, lish communicative is reciprocal, and a necessary generalconditionforthe success of stresses, thathe has been addressed. is thatthe addresseeacknowledges addressing Granted that the act of addressingsomeone is a necessarycondition forcommunicating with him,it is obvious thatif all we were able to do systemwould be severely were to address people our communication restricted. We need to be able to tell people various things,primarily potentialis to be realized. In if our full communicative linguistically, for to Gandhi's account of assertion, what followsI will address myself is. what telling it is in thisaccountthatwe findthe basis forunderstanding Once we have this, Gandhi claims,we will be a fairway towardunderand interrogative standingothersortsof speech-actssuch as imperative utterances. that for S to tell A that p, S Gandhi begins by assuming,rightly, to A. The information involvedis what communicates some information with him. For telling, S must S brings A to know in communicating something. communicate morethansimplythathe wantsto communicate This resultis alreadyestablishedby the act of addressing.Can we then bringA to know that p? Obviously say that S should communicatively not, since S mightsucceed in tellingA thatp, and p mightnevertheless simplyto utteran indicativesentencein the be false. Nor is it sufficient presence of A to make an assertion,since A must be in a position to we recognize that it is he who is being told something.Furthermore, cannot analyse 'telling'by sayingthat S tells A thatp only if S believes that S communithatp. S might,afterall, be lying.So the information cates to A in the course of tellinghim thatp is not thatS believesthatp. whichmustbe communicated, beyondsimply information The minimum can addressingsomeone,in orderto tell him thatp, is thatthe inference that S believes that p. We cannot say be drawn,but is not necessitated, and in the same breathadd that S's behaviour that S told A something is primafacie evidence for the assertionthat S does not believe that p. Whatever S does in tellingA that p cannot be incompatiblewith S's believing that p, although it need not be necessaryfor S actually to condition. believe thatp. Thus tellingrequiresno sincerity Afterhaving said what telling someone is not, Gandhi presentshis S's actionas implying own positiveanalysis.'A should be able to interpret at least that S wants A' to believe that S wants A to believe ... that S it as an act of tellinghim believed thatp, forhim to be able to interpret thatp' (p. 56). The ellipsisin the middlemarksthe place foran indefinite number of clauses to repeat themselvesaccordingto the exigencies of of repetition indicatesthe openexamples.Such indefiniteness particular activities. ness which is essentialto communicative

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a Gricean analysisat thispoint. Gandhi has the virtueof not following Grice's position,at least in his early work,is that assertingsomething or getting to someone is a matterof gettinghim to believe something, him to believe that the speaker believes something.Gandhi makes the that if an audience decides that a speakeris trying shrewd observation he will have reason, not to believe it to. get him to believe something, himself, but to believe that the speakerhimselfdoes not believe it. We cannot elucidate speaker's meaningin termsof instrumental intentions and theirrecognition by an audience.Ratherthansaythattelling someone of getting himto believesomething, is a matter we should say something that tellingsomeone somethingis a matterof 'not really' trying to get or trying to get him to believe that the someone to believe something, speakerbelievessomething. to get someone to believe something 'Not really'trying is a matterof presenting evidencewhich is unconcealedly simulated.It does not force any specificinterpretation upon an audience. If I tell you that p, you that I may be lying,but it must be able to conceive of the possibility must not be obvious that I am lying.Nor, on the otherhand, must you be compelledto believe that I believe what I am tellingyou, since this or have some otherdevious would rule out the possibility thatI am lying, intention in communicating. Gandhi bases his notion of someone's 'not really' tryingto get an audience to believe somethingupon the idea of 'primafacie' evidence, can have theform, and upon the factthatan utterance but not theforce, ofan actionoftrying to getsomeoneto believesomething. To tellsomeone somethingI must primafacie imply that I believe that p. I must not thatI do not believethatp. present primafacie evidenceforthe assertion An act which has the formbut not the forceof an act of trying to get someone to believe something is an act of 'not really'trying to get him to believe it. This result,coupled with an open-endedset of conditions fortelling,completesthe analysisof assertion. I findit difficult to discoverany serious flawsin Gandhi's argument. It is originaland will need to be assessed frommanyquarters.Whatever faultswe may discoverin the course of time, Gandhi's work must be recognizedas bringing new lifeto the philosophyof communication and speech. In this review I hope merely to have whetted the reader's appetiteformore.
MIDDLESEX POLYTECHNIC

J. MASON

Art and Imagination: A Study in thePhilosophy of Mind. By ROGER SCRUTON. London: Methuen, I974; New York: Barnes & Noble. Pp. Viii+256. ?4.-5, P.B C2.50. It is difficult to summarizeDr. Scruton's argument and do justice to its The issues whichcall forarbitration sophistication. are large: forinstance who is rightabout representation-Scrutonor Goodman? At the same time some quite simple things are elaborately said. A summary of Scruton's views runs the risk of misrepresenting them and must omit

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