IS2009-2

LCT 25/03/08 15/04/08

Future trends for instrumentation in hazardous areas

Introduction There has been continuous change in the detail of the methods of explosion protection applied to instrumentation over the last fifty years and the probability is that the techniques will continue to evolve. The change will be gradual and much slower than is usually predicted because of the inevitably conservative approach to safety related matters. There are two fairly safe predictions; one is that any relaxing of the current level of safety will not be permitted because it is politically unacceptable. The second is that the need to document risk and the consequent bureaucracy will increase. Some factors, which will affect the choice of equipment in the future, are discussed in the following sections. Area classification The most significant factor to cause change in area classification is that the requirements imposed by legislation and environmental concerns to minimise leakage of toxic and flammable materials means that large Zone 1/Division 1 will become unacceptable. Open-air installations will become predominantly Zone 2/Division 2 to an even greater extent. Enclosed locations will also be affected but possibly to a lesser extent. There will remain some small Zone 1 locations and inevitably some instrumentation will be concentrated in these areas. In some circumstances, for example where instrumentation is in close contact with the process fluid, instruments create their own Zone 1 locations. Zone 0 areas are normally confined to spaces with very restricted ventilation such as the vapour space of storage tanks and within process vessels. It can be argued that many of such locations are above the upper flammable limit for most of the time, but persuading an end user not to allocate a Zone 0 is not likely to succeed. Area classification is difficult and consequently where there is a well-established acceptable standard practice this will be used and is almost impossible to change. Electrical installations in Zone 0 are always kept to a minimum because they are difficult to install and maintain. However essential Zone 0 instrumentation such as the measurement of temperature and level are adequately covered by a wide range of intrinsically safe ia apparatus, and this will remain the standard solution for the foreseeable future. There is an IEC standard IEC 60079-26 which suggests that certain combinations of explosion proof techniques are acceptable for use in conjunction with Zones 0 but this approach is a second best compromise which solves a few difficult problems and is best avoided if possible. There is always the difficult problem of selecting equipment when the hazardous materials are at temperatures and pressures outside the limits of normal ambient conditions. Oxygen enrichment presents a similar problem. The IEC and most national standards do not address this problem and fortunately in European applications the ATEX directives are not applicable. The usual instrumentation solution is to choose ia IIC T4 apparatus, preferably with an increased factor of safety and offer a prayer to an appropriate god. None of the other methods of protection are acceptable in these circumstances. Internationally acceptable solutions There is an increasing demand to design plants so that they can be constructed in any part of the world without significant modification and there is some merit in using a uniform recognisable practice to achieve a common acceptable level of safety. Fortunately the IEC Ex certification scheme has made significant progress and although the dream of one certificate acceptable everywhere is some way off the scheme goes from strength to strength. A major delaying factor is that the U.S., although permitting the use of Zones, still predominantly uses the two Division approach to area classification with its consequent allegiance to U.S. explosion-proof. Additionally the requirement for local certification in the U.S. is a hindrance, which is not likely to be removed in the near future since there are considerable vested interests in its retention. A similar situation exists in Europe where the ATEX apparatus directive represents a similar barrier to trade. There are laudable attempts to reduce these problems but change will require persistence and time.

Intrinsic safety has a considerable advantage over other explosion proof techniques in that it is the only technique, which is universally accepted and can be used in all three zones. The introduction of ic to replace the non-incendive technique of typen extends its applicability to Zone 2. The preferred route for the international use of instrumentation in all hazardous areas has now become IEC Ex intrinsically safe certification followed by local ratification of the IEC test report to overcome local legislative difficulties. However how far the ic concept will become the established approach to Zone 2 instrumentation has yet to be determined. The current Zone2/Division 2 documents are predominantly written with power systems in mind and are not conveniently applicable to instrument systems. The principal advantages of ic are that it does create a well-defined approach to Zone 2 instrumentation, it does allow existing apparatus certified as ia or ib and simple apparatus to be used in ic systems and enables all categories of intrinsically safe systems to be combined in cables and junction boxes. It may be that some end users will prefer to maintain their freedom to make up their own rules for Zone 2/Division 2 instrumentation as appears to be the current practice in some large organisations. In practice many ic systems will use ia or ib certified apparatus because it is available and provides an economic solution. For example ia IIC certified switch isolators are frequently used in Zone 2 installations. The versatility, low cost and large factor of safety of these isolators plus their permitted use with any type of switch make them an instant universal solution to all switch transfer problems. Their fail-safe characteristics and well-established reliability frequently lead to them being used in non-hazardous locations. Risk analysis This approach to explosion prevention is the current flavour of the month. European legislation in the form of the ATEX installation directive [1999/92/EC] requires a risk analysis of all installations. The IEC standards by introducing categories of apparatus are encouraging this approach. The fact that nowhere is the acceptable risk defined is a slight problem but this is apparently not a deterrent to legislation. The major implication of this approach is that the consequences of an explosion have to be taken into account. Area classification may be used as part of the risk analysis but alternative solutions are permitted. The consequences to be considered include an assessment of the number of people killed or injured by the explosion and environmental damage caused directly or indirectly by the explosion. How far economic consequences such as loss of production, destruction of the installation and damage to adjacent property have to be considered is possibly not a safety concern but may influence decisions on the precautions to be taken. A quantitative assessment of all the risks is not possible so an acknowledgement of their existence and an approximate estimate of risk has to suffice. Where the risk is substantial then a high level of protection might be required of the instrumentation. For example a fuel store within a densely populated area might require ia IIC T4 throughout, since this would be the safest economic solution available. It is theoretically possible that an unmanned site in the middle of the dessert could use normal instrumentation, but this is a relaxation of the requirements and is therefore unlikely to be allowed. A side effect of risk analysis is the need to demonstrate that it has been done and the inevitable need for detailed documentation. Third party certification of equipment will become the norm and installation instructions will need to be improved and possibly made more specific. The use of the IEC Ex and manufacturers web-sites will make the distribution of this information easier. Removing the need to store files of information, which inevitably become out of date will have both safety and economic advantages. However the sole use of web-sites is not currently acceptable to all regulatory authorities. Presumably the preservation of trees is not part of their green agenda. Longer term it will be interesting to see how many engineers consider themselves competent to prepare the necessary risk analysis. It may be that the prudent engineer will minimise his personal risk by insisting on well-documented certified apparatus of the highest category. Signing one of these documents could adversely affect ones personal and corporate liability. The adage that nobody got fired or caused an explosion by using ia IIC T4 apparatus may become engineering folklore.

Dust There is increased awareness of the hazard associated with combustible dust and some of the instrumentation needs cannot be solved by any technique other than intrinsic safety. For example the measurement of the temperature of a pile of grain is best done by an 'ia IIB system with a fault power level less than 250 mW. The IEC standards now cover the use of intrinsic safety where dust is the hazard. However the use of this technique in dust applications is at present limited, but is expected to grow as the appreciation of the risk of dust explosions increases and the pressure from legislation grows. There are some locations where there is a combined dust and gas hazard. The safety requirements of apparatus for use in these environments are being considered by an IEC working group, but this work is at a very early stage. Meanwhile the only acceptable solution for instrumentation is to use intrinsically safe apparatus taking into account both risks. In this situation ia IIC apparatus with a matched power less than 750 mW is frequently the solution. Future trends in intrinsic safety Changes in this technique are usually governed by IEC standards, which are in turn driven by changes in technology. The current five-year cycle for these standards is extremely slow but it is difficult to see how this can be improved. The present system ensures that the standard is a consensus document, which has been given considerable thought by many people from different backgrounds. It is not a perfect system but it is the only one we have got. That it can function reasonably well is illustrated by the FISCO standards for Fieldbus systems, which have been produced at a reasonable speed. Ideally future work ought to aim to make the application of intrinsically safe apparatus simpler. For example, the simpler interconnecting cable requirements used in the FISCO standard could be extended to other systems. Possibly the information derived from intelligent systems such as the HART system could replace the inspection procedures required by the IEC standards. It would be a considerable advantage if electronic interrogation removed the need to read largely unintelligible labels in the field. It should be possible to modify the operational integrity checks to include safety checks. If this can be done and the checks could be done frequently, say weekly, then the approach to fault tolerance could be modified. The result might be safer installations at a lower lifetime cost. Conclusion The natural synergy of intrinsic safety with the low power requirements of instrumentation together with the high level of safety achieved ensure that this technique will continue to be the preferred solution for instrumentation in hazardous areas for the foreseeable future. The ability to do live maintenance and replacement, the relaxed wiring and electrical protection requirements, the simple apparatus rules and the comprehensive code of practice give this technique considerable advantages over all other methods of protection. The two areas, which are difficult to predict, are how far ic will become the technique of Zone2 and whether intrinsic safety will be widely used where dust is the hazard. It must however be recognised that trends in instrumentation are not entirely based on technical and economic factors. If this were the case the use of U.S. explosion proof and IEC flameproof techniques in instrumentation would have almost disappeared by this time. Inevitably many engineers continue to use techniques, which have served them well for many years, and they believe they understand. An element of not invented here is also fairly widespread. It is also true that the argument that we have always done it that way, and we have never had any trouble is a powerful one when applied to safety considerations. It seems probable that in the future, as in the present, intrinsic safety will be part of the pool of techniques to solve problems. It will be the preferred solution of some people and some organisations and its merits will lead to even greater acceptance