Int. J.

of Human Resource Management 17:5 May 2006 842-859 13

Who gets the job? Recruitment and

selection at a 'second-generation'
Japanese automotive components
transplant in the US

Steven E. Gump

Abstract Literature on Japanese transplant manufacturing firms in the automotive sector

often emphasise the importance placed on attitude as opposed to skills in the hiring
decisions for line workers. In this paper, a case study of one second-tier components
supplier for a major Japanese automotive assembler in the Midwestern United States
provides the opinions of senior managers and human resource associates regarding
recruitment and selection practices. In-depth interviews, carried out over a two-week
period in August 2000, are used to develop an understanding of the recruitment and
selection process for line workers as well as to investigate the desired skills and value of
previous Japanese experience. Results of the case study analysis are compared with two
models from the literature: (I) a model of recruitment and selection at Japanese
automotive-related firms in Japan and (2) a model of recruitment and selection at Japanese
transplant automotive-related firms abroad. Deviations from the two models point not to a
new paradigm of 'second-generation' Japanese transplants - those that have moved into
regions quite familiar with Japanese firms and related management and production
methods - but rather to overall weaknesses in the stereotypical models. Managerial
opinions within the case study firm place limited value on familiarity with a Japanese
environment, considering such experience secondary to attitudes and work ethics that are
in line with the philosophy of the case study firm.

Keywords Japan; automotive transplants in the West; personnel practices; recruitment

and selection.

Introduction
Encouraged, for example, by publication in 1979 of Ezra Vogel's Japan as Number One:
Lessons for America, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a flurry of interest in - and research
on - Japanese management practices. Scholars such as Abo (1994), Babson (1998),
Beechler and Yang (1994), Dedoussis and Littler (1994), Delbridge (1995), Morris et al.
(2000), Pil and MacDuffie (1999), Purcell et al. (1999), Taylor (2001) and others have all
considered the extent to which Japanese personnel practices can be (and have been)
transferred to Japanese firms operating abroad. But what happens to these practices over
time? After creating models of recruitment and selection at Japanese automotive firms in
Japan and abroad, I describe the recruitment and selection procedures of a second-tier

Steven E. Gump, Department of Educationai Organization and Leadership, University of Illinois at

Urbana-Champaign, 333 Education Building (MC-708), 1310 South Sixth Street, Champaign, IL
61820-6925, USA (tel: -i-l 217 333 2i55; fax: -I-1 2i7 244 3378; e-maii: sgunip@uiuc.edu).
The tnternational Journal of Human Resource Management
ISSN 0958-5192 print/ISSN 1466-4399 online © 2006 Taylor & Francis
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
DOI: 10.1080/09585190600640877
 Gump: Who gets the job? 843

Japanese manufacturing firm in the Midwestern United States. 1 analyse the empirical
data with respect to the two models in an attempt to understand what over two decades of
Japanese presence in the area have done to the 'stereotypicar American worker in the
automotive or automotive components industries. Have the criteria for selection at new
Japanese transplants become more stringent? Can the newest transplants expect their
new employees to be familiar with - or to have previous work experience in - a
Japanese manufacturing environment? Although a single case study cannot be used to
create a new theoretical model for analysing trends in the evolution and development of
recruitment and selection processes, I hope, in a manner suggested by anthropologist
David Plath (1983: 12), that this brief survey may point to what would be the main
features of such a model.

Recruitment and selection practices at Japanese automotive and automotive

components firms in Japan
In his straightforward yet pioneering 1958 work The Japanese Factory, James Abegglen
introduced the West, through the 'first systematic [English-language] study of a Japane.se
factory' (Dore, 1973: 31), to industry in what was then the only non-Western
industrialized nation. Ensconced within the culturalist perspective that was de rigueur of
his time (Beechler and Yang, 1994), Abegglen set a precedent by emphasizing the large
factory in his study and introduced concepts that became known as the widely touted
'three pillars' of Japanese industrial relations: lifetime commitment, seniority wages, and
enterprise unionism (see, for example, Koike, 1983: 29; Nakamura and Nitta, 1995:
325).' Although nearly 50 years have passed since its publication, much can be gleaned
from Abegglen's book about stereotypical recruitment and selection methods of large,
successful Japanese firms.
When one continues a survey specifically of automotive and automotive components
firms in Japan, it becomes obvious that the industrial frameworks in most instances are
quite similar to what was laid down in the Abegglen text. The explanation is simple:
Most Japanese automotive plants fall into the category of 'large factories' (the size
assessed by Abegglen) and thus prove representative examples of firms offering and
attempting to adhere to systems of lifetime commitment, seniority wages, and enterprise
unionism. In fact, Abegglen's work, along with works of Robert Cole (1971) and Ronald
Dore (1973), has had, arguably, the most far-reaching influence on subsequent research
and debate on Japanese employment relations in the English-speaking world (Delbridge,
1998: 6),
A careful reading of the Abegglen text reveals a multitude of information on the early
post-War Japanese industrial relations system and frames the consideration of
recruitment and selection methods in this paper. With the exception of works by writers
who are seeking to discredit one or more of the three pillars of Japanese industrial
relations, the early works of Cole and Dore, a later work of Whitehill (1991), and
additional texts have primarily supported and built upon the structure as introduced
nearly half a century ago by Abegglen (see Gump, 2004).
As explained by Abegglen, the recruitment and selection process for regular
employees - those who would, at least in principle, be employed for life, be they
applying for positions as salaried employees or workers paid hourly wages - is rather
involved. The intricacies are related to the fact that the majority of Japanese business
leaders believe 'employees are their most important assets' (Whitehill, 1991: 128).^
Recruited directly from schools (almost invariably), attitude and character of potential
employees are emphasized over skills, with capability being believed to relate to
844 The International Journal of Human Resource Management

education level and relative status of the school attended. (Expressing a commonly
shared viewpoint, Abegglen writes that 'education in Japan almost totally determines
career choices' [1973: 181].) The typical selection process involves a paper-and-pencil
entrance exam, a physical examination, and an all-important interview, often led or
attended by high-ranking personnel managers or, occasionally, the company president.
Even if a personal connection has been used in some way along the process of
introducing the candidate to the firm, background checks of varying degrees are still
frequently carried out, largely to verify that the potential recruit has a 'stable' nature that
would be likely to conform to the company culture. How, then, does the level of attention
paid to the recruitment and selection processes at large firms in Japan transfer to Japanese
firms that set up operations abroad?

Transferring Japanese recruitment and selection methods abroad: experiences of

Japanese automotive-related firms in the West
In a review of the literature on the experiences of Japanese transplant firms (Japanese
firms that have set up facilities abroad), at least two themes specifically relating to
Japanese industrial relations stand out. First, extracting recruitment and selection
practices from the Japanese industrial relations system as a whole is a difficult task; and
the complexities become more difficult with Japanese firms operating abroad. Second,
despite its intricate nature, the so-called Japanese industrial relations system as practiced
in Japan seems to be more homogenous - if, indeed, homogeneity can be treated as a
relative attribute - than the experiences of Japanese transplant firms abroad. Here I have
culled from the case studies some similarities that exist among various transplant firms in
the West. The experiences of each company, of course, are different; but the approaches
taken toward recruitment and selection can be understood as deriving from the particular
mould briefly described in the first section of this paper.

Working for the Japanese at Mazda in the US

Fucini and Fucini's Working for the Japanese (1990) offers a case study of Mazda, which
set up a production facility in Flat Rock, Michigan (near Detroit), in 1984, thus becoming
the first Japanese automotive manufacturer to locate so near the historical heartland of
the American motor industry.'' When Mazda ran application forms in Detroit-area
newspapers in 1985, some 96,500 applications were received for the planned 3,500
positions (1990: I, 5).^* The response was not surprising, given that the unemployment
rate in the area hovered around 20 per cent through the 1980s. The challenge, then, was
sorting through all the applications to find 'suitable' employees.
To determine the potential suitability of applicants, Mazda spared no expense by
employing a five-step screening process that required applicants to complete (I) a written
application; (2) a two-hour battery of exams covering basic math, reading
comprehension, and vision; (3) a 30-minute personal interview; (4) a group problem-
solving assessment; and (5) a simulated work exercise. Only the last two stages were
carried out at the Mazda site.
In contrasting the Mazda recruitment and selection method with that of American-
owned plants, Fucini and Fucini make clear that Mazda was searching for workers with
the right personalities (a theme that recurs throughout their book).^ Whereas the Big
Three automakers (Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors) 'had been interested only in
hiring workers to build automobiles', Mazda 'wanted people who could become part of
a team' (1990: 2). The fourth stage of the application process, the directed group
exercises, was designed to test for this attribute.
 Gump: Who gets the joh? 845

The fifth stage of the Mazda application procedure at Flat Rock, the simuiated work
exercise, was undertaken to ensure that applicants had the coordination and endurance
needed to be able to buiid cars (Fucini and Fucini, 1990: 54), Such tests, important for
applicants with no prior factory experience, support the idea that Mazda's screening
process emphasized youth and inexperience (Fucini and Fucini, 1990: 63),^ In Choosing
Sides (Parker and Slaughter, 1988), Parker, an experienced electrician who had worked
for Chrysier and Ford but who was unsuccessfui as a candidate for a Mazda job, develops
his suspicions that prior work experience at a Big Three plant is not a benefit - and
perhaps even a detriment - to one's Mazda application, Fucini and Fucini relate Parker's
views as follows:

Former American autoworkers who were tainted by their past experience would not only have to
learn Mazda's new system, they would have to unlearn all of the bad habits that they had
acquired at Big Three plants. One thing Parker was certain of was that the Mazda screening
process gave laid-off autoworkers no credit for their greatest asset - car-building experience
(1990: 64, emphases in original).
Elsewhere in the Fucini and Fucini text, other subdued biases (such as those again,st older
applicants or minority applicants) in the Mazda screening process come to light (1990:
62), The end result was a young (average age 31), inexperienced (more than 70 per cent
of Fiat Rock employees had no prior factory experience), and predominantly male (over
72 per cent) workforce with a smaii minority repre,sentation (1990: 63), But all of the,se
workers, now members of the 'Mazda family', had passed the five-stage .screening
process and possessed 'what Mazda training literature described as "the will to
participate'" (1990: 68-9), By surviving the selection process, these workers were also
viewed by Mazda to possess the inteiiigence, interpersonal skills, and physical ability
necessary both to fit in to the company culture as well as to succeed in their jobs,

US addendum: working for the Japanese at Subaru-Isuzu

Largely taken from her personal experiences as a line worker there, Graham's (1994)
treatment of the selection process at Subaru-Isuzu Automotive (SIA) near Lafayette,
Indiana, raises four interesting issues either not addressed or oniy briefly sugge,sted by
Fucini and Fucini, First, echoing sentiments of both Abeggien and Whitehill, Graham
states that SIA's selection process 'focused on eliminating potentiai workers' (1994:
132), Graham describes the various stages of examinations, which were remarkably
similar to those at Mazda: a general aptitude test, team problem-solving exercises, a
simulated work exercise, and a physicai examination and drug screening (1994: 133), A
logistical difference at SIA, however, was that appiicants were interviewed only after
passing all of the previous tests. This difference leads to a second issue not addressed by
Fucini and Fucini: Where does the power behind the ultimate hiring decision lie? At SIA,
the tearn leaders make the ultimate decisions (Graham, 1994: 133); at Mazda in Flat
Rock, Fucini and Fucini only insinuate that the consensuai discretionary power faiis
higher up in the hierarchy (1990: 72-3),
Third, Graham emphasizes how long the selection process takes from personal
experience. She was finally hired some six months after beginning her attempts to gain
employtnent at SIA (1994: 132), From the perspective of the company, then, the
selection process gives 'ample time for selecting what it perceived as the most qualified
workers' (1994: 133),
Finally, Graham, through discussing the selection process with co-workers, exposes
the remarkable finding that 'many workers complied with the perceived terms and
846 The International Journal of Human Resource Management

conditions of employment at SIA by involving themselves in a kind of charade' (1994:

133), Some workers even felt they had been hired because they had 'figured out the
process'. They had sometimes appeared unnaturally 'cooperative and enthusiastic when
interacting with other applicants during team scenarios' in the selection process, because
they felt this was the behaviour the company preferred (1994: 133), Grahatn summarizes
the impiications as follows: 'Since it was not necessary that an inherent liking for team
participation be part of one's personality, the goal of the process is to select workers who
outwardly adapt to management's efforts at structuring behaviour' (1994: 134),''

Additional perspectives on Japanese transplants

Although this paper is largely dedicated to a consideration of transplants in the US, the
voiume of available English-language scholarship includes a large amount written not
only by Americans but also by British, Canadian, and Australian speciaiists. For
example, Purcell et al. (1999) found that Japanese manufacturing firms in Austraiia
preferred to hire experienced workers, as opposed to workers directiy out of schooi, for
factory-floor (gemha) positions. In contrast, however, general comments about Japanese
transplants in Britain (offered by Dunning, 1986; Morris et al., 2000) and in Wales
(offered by Morris et al., 1993) fit with the image of transplant firms that has come into
focus thus far. First, Morris et al. (1993: 79) mention the emphasis placed on attitudes
during recruitment at Japanese firms in Wales, an emphasis that appears also at the
transplant automotive firms mentioned above. Second, in generai agreement with
Dunning, they state that, at least during the 1980s, 'Japanese companies came to have a
reputation for recruiting school leavers with no previous work experience, no practicai
knowledge of trade union activities, and most importantly, untainted with "bad habits"
picked up from working with British companies' (1993: 80), Are not these 'bad
habits' that may taint potential Weish workers the same 'bad habits' that Parker
mentioned Mazda feared with respect to applicants who had previously worked for a Big
Three firm in the US? Neither, as has been demonstrated above, is the emphasis on youth
and inexperience anything unique to the situation in Wales,
Referring again to automotive transplants in the US, Florida and Kenney (1991: 388)
remark that the processes of screenitig and selecting new recruits constitute an
'organizational mechanism' that identifies potential workers 'who possess initiative, who
are dedicated to the corporation, who work well in teams, and who will not miss work'
(Kenney and Florida, 1993: 109), In other words, the extensive screening processes are
carried out 'to identify workers who "fit" the Japanese model' (Florida and Kenney,
1991: 388), But whose understanding of this 'Japanese model' matters?
MacDuffie (1988: 17) addresses this question by explaining what he believes to be the
true origins of the elaborate recruitment and selection techniques common at Japanese
automotive transplants:

Most of the transplants, early in their start-up activities, have hired experienced American
human resources managers, generally from outside the auto industry, and delegated
considerable authority to them. To some degree, the elaborateness of the hiring process at the
transplants reflects the perceptions of these managers about the requirements of the Japanese
production system ,,, rather than any specific plan of the Japanese management,
MacDuffie's research uncovers a further twist: He explains that the complex approach to
recruitment used by Japanese transplant firms abroad does not occur in Japan
(1988: 16-17), Others, including Rosenbaum and Kariya (1989) and Florida and Kenney
(1991), support MacDuffie's claims, MacDuffie's argument suggests that Abegglen's
 Gump: Who gels the job? 847

depiction of all reguiar Japanese workers - both salaried and hourly alike - completing
multiple levels of exams and interviews, for example, is anachronistic in contemporary
Japan. Even as early as 1979, Clark explained how exams for school recruits (workers
who came directly from high school) were gradually dropped 'when it became clear that
the company was no longer able to pick and choose' (1979: 157-8).'* The current
situation in Japan with respect to school recruits, as Rosenbaum and Kariya (1989) spell
out, involves a complex network of linkages between high schools and employers:
Teachers from select high schools are requested to match job-seeking students to the
needs of the employers. Thus the school system shoulders the burden of ensuring that
graduates meet certain standards, and entrance exams given by the firms for geniha
positions become unnecessary. When Japanese transplants abroad give entrance exams
even to gemha-\eve\ applicants, the suggestion is one of concern over the lack of
homogeneity with respect to skills in the local workforce (MacDuffie, 1988: 17).
Interesting, then, is how the pattern of recruitment and selection at Japanese
transplants resembles more closely the Abegglen-Cole-Dore model presented earlier
than what MacDuffie and others have shown to be current practice in Japan with respect
to gemha-\eve\ recruitment and selection. Should the Western human resource managers
and their understandings of the 'Japanese model' that conform largely to the Abegglen-
Cole-Dore paradigm be blamed for this confusion?'"' Are they simply incorporating what
they understand to be necessary 'building blocks for organizations' in order to 'avoid
illegitimacy' (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 345)? The consequences of any discrepancies,
however, are minimized when one recognizes that both systems serve a similar function:
identifying workers who 'fit' with the company (Florida and Kenney, 1991: 388).

Recruitment and selection at a Japanese transplant in the Midwestern US

In the first part of this paper, I used the literature to formulate two models of Japanese
methods for recruitment and selection: first, as they are practiced in Japan; second, as
they are transferred abroad. In this section I provide an in-depth look at the recruitment
and selection policies and practices that specifically relate to gembci workers at one firm,
pseudonymously renamed Midwest Automotive Parts Production, Inc. (MAPP). I used a
combination of ethnographic and clinical research methodologies (a la Schein, 1990:
111) to understand the strategic human resource culture at MAPP. Quotations in the text
have been taken from directed interviews carried out during the second and third weeks
of August 2000 with the Human Resources (HR) Administrator, the Manager of
Administration, the Senior Manufacturing Manager, the Senior Staff Engineer, and the
Executive Vice President, all Caucasian Americans. Additional information has come
from the Associates' Handbook (an artefact of MAPP's organizational culture that i.s
given to all new employees), public relations documents, local newspaper articles, and
my experiences from working as a translator at MAPP for six months in 1999. In the final
section of this paper, I contrast this empirical material with the two earlier models and
also offer a brief consideration of the future of recruitment and selection at Japanese
transplants in the US.

Situating the case study firm

Established in February 1998 with an initial investment of $46.8 million by its Japanese
parent firm, MAPP is within a three-hour drive of its main customer, a large
Japanese automotive assembler. MAPP is located along the 'transplant corridor' (Kenney
and Florida, 1993: 99), an area stretching from southwest Ontario through Michigan,
Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee (and west into Indiana and Illinois). As a second-tier
848 The International Journal of Human Resource Management

transplant supplier of automotive components located near several other Japanese

supplier firms, MAPP produces transmission gears in a four-.stage, technologically
intensive process involving high-speed computerized numerical control (CNC)
equipment with built-in statistical process controls (SPC). Daily shipments of finished
gear sets are made in a typically 'just-in-time' fashion to the engine plant in a
neighbouring state.'" In the year after the first mass production shipment on 20 July 1999,
over 1.2 million gears were sent to the main supplier, with total sales of $14.2 million. In
August 2000, daily production requirements, met over the course of two 8-hour shifts,
five days per week, were for 1,200 sets of seven different gears.
What Oliver and Wilkinson (1992), Florida and Kenney (1991), and others have
identified as standard practices at Japanese transplants can be found at MAPP: an open
office plan, a common dining hall, no reserved parking spaces, no 'clocking in', and the
same company uniforms worn by gemba and non-gemha workers alike. On the
production side, total quality management, SPC, kaizen, quality circles, and total
preventative maintenance (TPM) are all parts of the daily routine. The expectation, then,
is that the organization of employees, personnel management, and recruitment and
selection methods are also in line with those of other similar Japanese transplant firms.

Charting employee organization and demographics

In 2000, MAPP employed a total of 101 associates to meet the daily production
requirements. Of these employees, 60 were gemba associates who were paid on an hourly
basis and are referred to by the management as 'non-exempt' workers. Salaried
associates, on the other hand, are 'exempt'. Classifying associates as either exempt or
non-exempt, according to the Manager of Administration, is but one of many ways in
which 'Japanese companies try to do away with the barriers between upper management
and blue-collar' workers, who, in most situations, are never referred to as 'blue-collar'.
Everyone at MAPP is an 'associate'; and the exempt/non-exempt dichotomy is
apparently believed to be not as empowering - and, conversely, not as demeaning - as a
white/blue-collar classification. (In contrast, the stereotypical 'American' business
mobilizes appellative and other linguistic devices to divide clearly the management from
the hourly-wage workers.)
Most of the 41 non-gemba associates filled positions related to administration,
engineering, or quality control. My discussion of recruitment and selection at MAPP,
however, specifically focuses on the gemba employees - those whose primary
responsibilities are to operate the CNC machinery.
Led by the exempt Senior Manufacturing Manager, the 60 non-exempt gemba
associates oversee the production process. They 'oversee' it because gear production
involves very little hands-on work (with exceptions being the gears that are routinely
pulled off the line for manual quality control measuring with gauges and calipers,
calibrated in microns - millionths of a meter). Instead, the machines, which are loaded
automatically, are arranged so that gears can move from one stage of the production
process to the next with minimal human interference. The hands-on work of gemba
associates, then, involves the expensive, automated machinery (set-ups, tool changes,
and TPM) or intricate measuring tools. Mindless work this is not.
The 60 gemba associates working in August 2000 were organized along functional
lines into four departments: lathing, tooth cutting and shaving, heat treating, and grinding
and meshing. The four departments correspond to the four stages in the production
process for transmission gears, beginning with raw forgings before lathing and ending
with finished gears after grinding and meshing.
 Gump. Who gets the job? 849

With respect to organization from the perspective of industrial relations, the transplant
model is illustrated yet again by the total lack of union involvement at MAPP. The
following quotation from the Associates' Handbook (p. 4, under the heading 'Associate
Relations') provides the official view on unions:

IMAPP] is commiued to maintaining an associate relations climate which promotes maximum

personal development and achievement. We are dedicated to treating all associates fairly and
providing good working conditions, competitive wages and benefits, and, above all, the respect
that each of us deserves. We also believe in open and direct communications which permit
resolution of associate problems in an atmosphere ot mutual trust, responsive to individual
circumstances. [MAPP] shall continue its efforts to enhance these objectives.

[MAPP] does not believe that our associates would benefit from outside intervention into this
relationship. We oppose representation of our associates by a third party. We firmly believe that
the best interests of all associates can be served without third-party interference. We greatly
value our ability to work with associates individually without their being subjected to
burdensome costs, complicated rules, and outside interference.

The strong language that repetitively speaks against third-party representation in the
second paragraph must have been deliberately included to minimize any chances of
misinterpretation. During my six-month tenure at MAPP in 1999, tnention of unions was
never heard in any context - either in the boardroom or out on the factory floor.
Of the 60 gemha employees, 11(18 per cent) are females, and 4 (7 per cent) represent
racial minority groups. (Two of the 11 women are double-counted among the four
minority associates, tneaning only 13 out of the 60, or 22 per cent, are wotnen, non-
Caucasians, or both.) The average age of gemha associates is 28 years; the youngest
worker is 20. Exactly three-quarters (45 associates) had previously worked in a factory
setting before coming to work at MAPP. Of these 45 associates with prior factory
experience, exactly one-third (15 associates - one-quarter of the total number oi gemha
workers) had previously worked for a Japanese manufacturing firm. After considering
the recruitment and selection methods employed by MAPP, I will explore the question of
bias toward applicants with previous manufacturing experience at a Japanese firm.

Recruiting the getnba associates at MAPP

One benefit of using such a young company as MAPP as a case study is that the core
adtninistrators 1 interviewed, who had been with the firm since its inception, had detailed
(and corresponding) institutional memories. Furthermore, in addition to having drawn up
a projected hiring schedule with senior management, MAPP's Manager of
Adtninistration had recruited, screened, interviewed, and hired every associate (and
knew each one by name). Ameliorated by the small size of the firrn, the sense of intimacy
among associates at MAPP reflects well the attitudes expres.sed in the 'Associate
Relations' section of the Associates' Handbook, quoted above. Sotne senior managers
would credit the workforce for maintaining an atmosphere of tru.st and mutual respect.
How, then, does MAPP attract such employees, and from where do they come?
For the gemha associates, initial advertisements of openings were made in area
newspapers in the late sutnmer of 1998. Group Leaders were hired by September (in time
for a two-week training trip to the parent cornpany in Japan), and other associates were
hired beginning in October and Novernber of that year. Advertisements listed minimum
requirements for the positions and briefly described the cotnpany as a future
'manufacturer of high-precision transmission gears for the autotnobile industry'. In
addition to placing advertisements in local and, more recently, regional, newspapers.
850 The International Journal of Human Resource Management

MAPP also recruited directly from area schools - the local public university and nearby
community and technical colleges. Interestingly, though, there is no minimum
educational requirement for gemba associates. Math skills are important, however, and
emphasis was placed on these in newspaper advertisements (for example, 'metric system
measuring experience desired') as well as in later screening exercises.
According to the Manager of Administration, most applications for gemha positions at
MAPP come from people who already live in the area. For those who are currently
employed at MAPP, the longest one-way commute is 45 minutes by car. According to the
Manager of Administration, a 'sizeable number' of applications come from workers at
any of several other Japanese companies in the area. 'People who have worked for a
Japanese firm generally seem to like working for a Japanese firm and want to stay with
a Japanese company', he explained. An investigation into this issue revealed that two of
the largest companies in the immediate area where CNC equipment is used are Japanese-
owned automotive components firms. When a newspaper advertisement carried in local
papers calls for ' 1 - 2 years CNC lathing, milling, or grinding experience', the field is
automatically narrowed; and given the demographics and the function of geography
within the transplant corridor, workers with the preferred type of CNC experience would
most likely have had work experience at a Japanese firm.
But why, then, would employees at other Japanese firms want to leave their current
companies for gemba positions at MAPP? First, MAPP's compensation is higher than the
average of similar manufacturing firms in the area. Second, MAPP offers very
competitive benefits. According to the Manager of Administration: 'One of the main
reasons we are able to attract and retain workers is because of our pay and benefits. That's
how we get most of our floor associates. Sometimes they'll take a pay cut just because of
the benefits we offer.' In order to explain why five associates came to MAPP from one
particular established Japanese CNC manufacturing firm in the county, the Manager of
Administration simply explained that that company had begun requiring its employees to
pay for their own health insurance: 'People who are making $13.50 or $14.00 an hour at
that firm can drop back to $12.00 [MAPP's entry-level salary] because of the cost of
health insurance in the United States - and they'll still come out ahead.'
Applications have also come in from people who have been recommended by current
associates; the Manager of Administration estimates that as many as 20 per cent of all
current gemba associates were recommended through word-of-mouth. Though
all attempts are made to ensure that these recruits go through the same process as any
other applicant, the Manager of Administration confessed the following:

If we hear of a person by word-of-mouth . . . he or she tends to get hired. But, then again, if you
look at the situation, very few people are going to recommend somebody that they want to work
with who doesn't have a good attitude or work ethic. If the individual doesn't work out, it
reflects badly on the associate who made the initial recommendation.

Selecting the gemba associates at MAPP

Once applicants have responded to an advertisement (or heard otherwise about the
company) and have sent resumes to MAPP, the HR Administrator looks through the paper
applications and cover letters, searching for key words regarding job history and previous
experience that would be in line with any known openings. Managers of the four
departments of Administration, Engineering, Quality Control, and Manufacturing notify
the HR Administrator whenever any particular openings are anticipated. If there are no
openings, the HR Administrator passes the applications along to the Administrative
 Gump: Who gets the job? 851
Assistant, who enters key skills or experiences into a computer database and files the
applications for reference, after which they are retained for one year. The database is
queried when an opening arises, and people who have made applications earlier are
always considered along with any who may be applying for specific, advertised openings.
The Manager of Administration estimates that about 20 or 25 applications are
received for each posted opening. The HR Administrator, responsible for the initial
screening, selects five or six applications to bring to the attention of the manager who
needs a position filled. The HR Administrator explained a primary focus of his paper
screening as follows:

One of the main things that I'm always looking at is job history: has this person been jumping
around a lot, or has he or she worked for the same company for five plus years? Those are the
type of people that we're interested in, basically because of the commitment that we make to the
associates as far as training and the benefits that we give them. We want people to be here for a
long time; so we want people with that history of staying with a company for a long time.

After consulting briefly with the particular manager regarding which candidates to phone
for an interview, the HR Administrator conducts an initial screening by phone, verifying
information in the application and asking about flexibility - shifts, overtime, weekend
work, and switching shifts, if necessary. 'If they say a definitive "no" to any of tho.se,
then, pretty much, they are no longer a candidate. We have to have their flexibility of
being able to work any shift that we require', said the Manager of Administration, when
questioned about the HR Administrator's role in the initial screening process. If no major
problems are revealed during the phone conversation, an interview is set up at the firm.
When candidates arrive for interviews at MAPP, they are greeted by the HR
Administrator, who once again conducts an individual pre-screen for a few minutes.
'Now that I've been here long enough', the two-year veteran HR Administrator affirmed:

I'm beginning to learn what it is that the managers are looking for in an employee: the types of
personalities, backgrounds, work experience But my role in the interviewing process is
limited - I don't have a lot of authority in terms of deciding whom to hire. The main things I'm
looking for [in a prc-scrccning interview] are whether this person's personality and work ethic
will fit with our organization. The managers are the ones who are looking at the specific skills
and backgrounds.

As the ultimate hiring decisions come down to the responsible manager (into who.se
division the new as.sociate would be assigned) and the Manager of Administration, who
both follow up the HR Administrator's pre-interview with lengthier interviews of their
own, I posed a question to the Senior Manufacturing Manager about what specific
attributes he looks for in a candidate. With little hesitation, he answered that applicants
need a history of good attendance - 'or they have to have a very good explanation why
they do not'. The Senior Staff Engineer echoed the Senior Manufacturing Manager's
.sentiments:

I do believe that a person, on attendance, is apt to continue to exhibit the same attendance
behaviours in subsequent positions People either have a mindset that their jobs are important
and they're committed to them and they're going to be there - or they have the mindset that
other things are more important in their life; and if they get to work, fine, or if they don't get to
work, they can find someplace else to go It's difficult to modify a person's behaviour unless
some other outside influence arises. Typically, I've seen that the threat of losing a person's job
docs not modify that behaviour process."
852 The International Journal of Human Resource Management

In the interviews with managers following the pre-screen by the HR Administrator,

the Manager of Administration described the particular personality traits that he attempts
to evaluate:
What we're looking for is whether the candidate would fit into [MAPP's] philosophy of an
associate. Will they come to work on time? Are they willing to be flexible in their positions for
the well being of the company? Will they do something they haven't specifically been hired for
if it's in everyone's best interests? We ask questions to try tofindout what types of suggestions
they've made in the past to better the places where they've worked .... Those are just some of
the major things we try to find out in the interviews.

The Senior Staff Engineer also offered a lengthy exposition on the personality traits of
ideal applicants, concluding that the 'basic personality trait of how work is approached'
is the most important issue to bring to the surface in the interviews. In my continued
discussions with the Manager of Administration and the Senior Manufacturing Manager
regarding attributes of ideal candidates for entry-level gemha positions, only cursory
attention was paid to specific skills, per se. When isolated, though, the preferred
competencies for gemha workers include CNC machining experience and familiarity
with the metric system (for taking measurements and calibrating equipment).
When I initially interviewed the Manager of Administration, I came prepared with a
bank of questions about the written exams that were administered between the pre-
screening interview by the HR Administrator and interviews by the relevant senior
managers. Somewhat to my surprise, I found that the exams had been discontinued in
April 2000. The Senior Staff Engineer expressed concern over the loss, for he saw the
written tests as a chance for the applicants to 'sit down and prove their abilities'. (The
General Aptitude Test Battery, a three-hour set of tests covering basic math and reading
skills necessary for statistical process control, had previously been administered to all
gemha applicants called in for interviews at MAPP.) The Senior Staff Engineer
appreciated being able to see how the applicants dealt with subjects they did not
particularly like, since 'every day, on the job, there are things we don't like to do that we
must do in order to get our jobs done.' Although the Senior Staff Engineer believes there
may be a difference in quality of associates hired after the exams were discontinued, the
Manager of Administration 'cannot tell that big a difference between those who were
examined and those who were not'. A drug test remains part of the selection process but
is not administered until after a person is hired.

Evaluating previous Japanese experience: disconnected or desired?

At the core of the questioning during my interviews, I was looking for any sort of bias
that might be exhibited toward applicants with previous work experience at a Japanese
firm. Is a labour force where 25 per cent of the gemha associates have previously worked
at a Japanese firm out of the ordinary for this region of the US? Considering that MAPP is
within the transplant corridor, that most local CNC manufacturing companies are
Japanese owned, and that the wages and benefits offered by MAPP are competitive,
perhaps such a proportion in the workforce is to be expected. Models in the literature,
with their emphases on hiring workers with the right 'attitudes', seem to suggest a
positive bias toward workers familiar with a Japanese manufacturing environment.
Interview material at MAPP, however, was inconclusive in the identification of any
such bias. Although most senior staff in this study admitted that familiarity with a
Japanese manufacturing setting was viewed at least neutrally (and typically the
familiarity was seen as a benefit), none claimed they would hire an associate on those
grounds alone. The Senior Staff Engineer, for example, was perhaps most pessimistic
 Gump. Who gets the job? 853

about any ideas of bias, downplaying the value of any previous experience and believing
that Americans who had never been exposed to the so-called Japanese system could
possess the right sorts of personality traits that 'are more important than the type of
organization worked at before'. In fact, the Senior Staff Engineer commented at length
about the problem of 'inbreeding' that he saw at many Japanese businesses. (He was
speaking mainly about managerial positions but often made references to gemba workers
as well.) Hiring only associates who had been 'socialized into the Japanese ways of
thinking and doing things' would merely perpetuate this inbreeding, which, worst of all,
made a company more and more resilient to change over time, he believed.
The HR Administrator looked at previous experience more positively and said he
definitely questions applicants about any previous Japanese exposure if they had
indicated such experience on their resumes. A very pointed question is asked: 'What is
your opinion of working at a Japanese company?' The HR Administrator continued:

Mo.st of the time - I'd .say probably as much a.s 90 per cent or better - they'll usually say it has
been a positive experience; but then again, considering this i.s a Japanese-owned company, I'd
expect them in an interview for a job here to say, 'Yes, 1 love working for the Japanese.' But it's
not that big of an issue for me. In terms of hiring considerations, I look at it as part of the
person's personality.

To the Senior Manufacturing Manager, though, previous Japanese experience is

'definitely a benefit'; yet he would still not hire a person primarily because he or she had
experience at a Japanese company. 'I'm looking at the whole person, not isolated
aspects', the Senior Manufacturing Manager said. When asked about the differences he
has seen between gemba associates who have prior Japanese experience and those who
do not, the issue of personality traits rose to the forefront: 'I think the ones who have
[worked at a Japanese firm] are a little more relaxed and not as intimidated when they
have to communicate with the Japanese. I think it's much easier for them not to be shy.'
Finally, the Manager of Administration remained neutral yet spoke of a type of 'cultural
shock' that might befall a worker who has never before experienced a Japanese
manufacturing environment.
Without looking more closely at the local labour market or surveying similar Japanese
firms along the transplant corridor, commenting conclusively about the 25 per cent of
associates who came to MAPP with previous experience at a Japanese firm is impossible.
What is possible, however, given the portrait of the recruitment and selection procedures
at MAPP painted empirically in this section, is a comparison with the two models
described earlier in order to identify any possible future trends in recruitment and
selection for Japanese automotive components suppliers in the transplant corridor.

The second generation of Japanese transplants in the US: a new paradigm of

recruitment and selection?
This section ties together three pictures: (I) the model of Japanese recruitment and
selection practices in Japan formulated in the first section, (2) the model of recruitment
and selection practices at Japanese transplants abroad created in the second section, and
(3) the description of recruitment and selection at the case study firm presented in
the third section. A core consideration is the significance of deviations in the MAPP
example from the two models presented earlier. I examine such differences in light of
views of the Executive Vice President, a 22-year American veteran of the Japanese
automotive assembler that is MAPP's major customer.
854 The International Journal of Human Resource Management

A 'second-generation' Japanese transplant has moved into an environment, such as

found along the transplant corridor, where Japanese companies are typically well
respected and often viewed as model firms in their communities.''^ The nationalistic
friction that existed when Mazda moved into Flat Rock two decades ago has largely
abated. MAPP, at least, seems to have been welcomed by a regional labour market that
was ready and willing for another Japanese firm to locate in its area. 'A lot of times, even
on resumes, applicants will put, "I've worked for a Japanese company X number of
years'", said MAPP's Manager of Administration, insinuating that working for the
Japanese in MAPP's area is considered a noteworthy achievement.
As a positive stereotype is a stereotype nonetheless, a consideration of how MAPP's
recruitment and selection policies compare with other stereotypes, those of the
recruitment and selection models depicted earlier, may help expose the types of systemic
adaptations made by small, second-tier transplant components firms, organizations that
are frequently overlooked in the literature (Barton and Delbridge, 2004).
First, with respect to MAPP's employee organization, the classification of associates
as either 'exempt' or 'non-exempt' is almost a direct parallel of the practice in Japan of
differentiating salaried staff from hourly workers. In MAPP's case, the salaried staff are
labelled 'exempt', and the hourly workers are 'non-exempt'. Though members of both
groups receive the same benefits and exercise similar privileges (regarding where to dine,
where to park, etc.), the same hierarchy that would distinguish white-collar positions
from blue-collar ones clearly places salaried staff (exempt associates) above the hourly
workers (non-exempt associates).
Second, MAPP's stance toward unions - the opposition of third-party arbiters -
parallels the transplant model, which is clearly derivative of the Japanese systetn as
practiced in Japan. The relevant content quoted above from MAPP's Associates'
Handbook, in fact, is quite similar to a complementary passage from the employee
handbook at Nissan (Tennessee), quoted in Kenney and Florida (1993: 113).
Third, and also true to form for the transplant model, is the emphasis placed on
attitudes over skills when screening candidates for gemba positions. All managers
mentioned, in some form, the need for a 'fit' with the MAPP philosophy. Schein (1990:
115) comments on the relationship of organizational cultural 'fit' to socialization as
follows: 'The socialization process really begins with recruitment and selection in that
the organization is likely to look for new members who already have the "right" set of
assumptions, beliefs, and values.' At MAPP, however, no evidence of bias in the
screening process against applicants who have been members of unions can be found (see
Kenney and Florida, 1993: 136). Likewise, management supports the hiring of female
and minority associates both to comply with Equal Opportunity regulations as well as to
diversify the workforce at MAPP. The average gemba worker at MAPP, at 28 years old,
is even younger than the average worker at Mazda's Flat Rock facility (who is 31).
Fourth, the overall recruitment strategies practiced at MAPP are in line with the
transplant model. Newspapers, though just recently becoming an acceptable means for
canvassing for applicants in Japan, are the preferred mode for advertising positions; area
schools are contacted for recent graduate recruits; and word-of-mouth referrals also result
in many posts being filled. Like the larger automotive assemblers described in the second
section, MAPP enjoys an application-to-opening ratio of around 20:1; but whether more
than one out of each score would be qualified for a position remains unknown.
Turning to systemic deviations, MAPP's application and selection processes are much
less involved than those of the Japanese or Japanese transplant models. The differences in
this arena highlight a problem in comparing small, second-tier components firms with the
giant automotive transplants. Although the literature emphasizes the long and often
 Gump: Who gets the job? 855

drawn-out, multi-stage application and selection processes used by the Japanese

transplant automotive assemblers, the MAPP case provides a model of economy.
Especially since the termination of the three-hour written assessments, the whole of the
pre-screening interview with the HR Administrator, an interview with the interested
manager, and a third interview with the Manager of Administration or another senior
manager can easily be completed in one morning or afternoon. Offers of positions are
typically made by telephone after the final decisions have been made, usually within a
few days after the interviews.
The discontinuation of written exams for gemba positions reverts more closely to
contemporary Japanese practice, where such tests have recently been reserved for
applicants to salaried staff positions. At the same time, removing the exams expresses
(perhaps undue) confidence in the American education system. But if a sizeable enough
portion of applicants has already worked for a Japane.se company, the expenditure on
re-examining these candidates for positions at MAPP could be written off as
unnecessary. Is the abandoning of written exams, then, an evolutionary marker of a
second-generation Japanese transplant? As new transplants start siphoning workers from
established Japanese firms in their areas (MAPP has attracted workers from five Japanese
transplants within a 30-mile radius), do the entrance barriers become simplified, with
previous Japanese experience providing the necessary nod to proceed to the interview
stage? If one Japanese firm found a candidate's personality to be acceptable, would not
he or she fit in at other Japanese companies just as well? However appealing these
suggestions may sound, the MAPP case study does not support such developments but
rather suggests that such assumptions would point to misapplications of the Japanese
model.
MAPP's Executive Vice President, in fact, cautions greatly against the overvaluing of
Japanese experience when selecting new recruits. In a comment that nullifies the value
placed on generalized models, he maintains that 'just like American companies, Japanese
companies are different Because a company is Japanese certainly doesn't mean that
its management style is identical to all other Japanese companies.' The Executive Vice
President estimates that only 50 per cent of someone's experiences at one Japanese firm
would be relevant at another firm: 'Some things will be very easy for someone with
Japanese exposure to adapt to because of that background. But the other 50 per cent will
depend on the unique culture of the Japanese company.' This culture depends on the
personalities of the senior staff and managers and is not easily stereotyped, despite
extensive literature suggesting the contrary.
To take but one revealing example of how second-tier transplants differ, consider the
Executive Vice President's commentary on lifetime employment. Here is a fascinating
remnant of the paternalistic Japanese model that has made its way to a firm in the
Midwestern US. The transplant model would suggest, for a firm of MAPP's size and
position near the bottom of the supply chain, that such a stance is extraordinary.
According to the Executive Vice President:
In working for a company, it's like you're raising a family ... and when you hire somebody,
you're hiring his or her family as well The number one job of management is to make sure
that when you hire somebody, he or she has a job to eome to every day for the rest of his or her
life - or you shouldn't hire that person. It's easier said than done these
If lifetitne employment a la the Abegglen-Cole-Dore tnodel is actually practiced at
MAPP, the example of MAPP would be of interest to Kendall (1984) and Levine (1983;
1989), who re.serve such practices as lifetime employment for only a select few of the
largest Japanese cotnpanies, none of which would fall into the sub-contracting sector.
856 The International Journal of Human Resource Management

Thus, even though MAPP upheld the transplant model in certain areas (organization
of the employees, an emphasis on attitude over skills in interviews), other realms yielded
unanticipated findings (a comparatively uninvolved selection process, a philosophy of
lifetime employment). Like any company, MAPP has its own idiosyncrasies. Were a new
paradigm based solely on MAPP to be introduced, then, such a model would most likely
have limited application.
Although the results of this study may prove inconclusive regarding a new pattern for
Japanese automotive components transplants, the details certainly reveal that much of
interest to the researcher is occurring at such firms. In this investigation, then, I have
ultimately questioned the accountability of stereotypical systems models. At the same
time, however, the value of such models for creating frameworks for formulating and
analysing a case study such as the one presented in this paper cannot be overlooked.

Notes

1 Shimada employ.s a cultural allusion by referring to these characteristics as the 'Three Sacred
Treasures' of Japanese industrial relations (1985; 44); and Aoki refers to them as the 'three
sacred tools' that 'allegedly harmonize industrial relations and elicit employee cooperation' in
Japan (1984: 4). Takezawa et al. (1982: 162) point out that the 'three pillars of industrial
relations' became widely recognized from the late 1960s to the latter half of the 1970s; the three
were mentioned in reports of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) as early as 1972.
2 Perhaps past-tense verbs would be more appropriate in this sentence. Hanami (2004), for
example, questions the value and relevance of lifetime employment in contemporary Japan.
3 For another useful description of the Flat Rock case, see Babson (1998).
4 Such high numbers of applications - ordinarily 30 to 100 for each job opening - are typical for
transplants in North America (Rinehart et al., 1997: 33).
5 See, inter alia, p. 19 of the Fucini and Fucini text (on Bill Judson, Flat Rock's United Auto
Workers representative) and p. 45 (on Denny Pawley, the highest-ranking American at the Flat
Rock plant). Judson, for example, was chosen to work with Mazda because of hi.s 'even-
tempered character' and 'stability' (Fucini and Fucini. 1990: 19), precisely what Japanese firms
in Japan look for in their candidates, according to the model suggested by Abegglen.
6 The same can be said for Honda's Marysville plant (which, in 1982, beeame the first Japanese
automobile facility to open in the US), where 'few associates - even managers - had seen a car
plant before the company hired them' (Toy et al., 1988: 37).
7 Bacon and BIyton (2005) contrast managerial and employee views in considering the extent to
which team working can be interpreted as a method for enforcing employee compliance.
8 However, Clark (1979: 158) maintains that a more complex system involving exams and
interviews was retained for university graduates in Japan.
9 Milkman, who surveyed 66 Japanese-owned, non-automotive manufacturing plants in
California in 1989, found that the US-trained managers 'do not conform to the "Japanese"
model' but rather use 'standard' human resource techniques (1992: 151). Whereas the typically
US-trained human resource managers at automotive transplants practice recruitment and
selection along what they believe to be 'Japane.se' lines, those at US transplants outside the
automobile industry are doing 'as the Americans' (1992: 151). This trend implies that the
suggestion by Takezawa etal. (1982: 140) regarding the uniqueness of the Japanese automobile
industry may be relevant to the question of the transferability of Japanese industrial relations
abroad.
10 Yet, perhaps because the company is still young - or perhaps to provide safety buffers - the
process more closely resembles 'internal JIT' (Delbridge, 1995: x) in that there are larger-than-
necessary stockpiles of raw materials and finished goods at the beginning and end of the
production proeess.
11 At least two interesting reasons why attendance may be stressed when selecting recruits to work
at Japanese manufacturing firms can be described. First, if the firm is operating a strict just-in-
 Gump: Who gets the job? 857
time system with all waste eliminated, there is no spare lahour: everyone is needed in order to
keep the production going. This approach was suggested by MAPP's Senior Manufacturing
Manager. Second, though, is that attitudes may serve as proxies as to how work is perceived.
This nuance was suggested by MAPP's Senior Staff Engineer, who perceived a direct link
between an individual's attendance and work ethic.
12 With respect to a large automotive assembler, see Kenney and Florida's description of Toyota's
attempts at 'welfare corporatism' in Georgetown, Kentucky (1993: 291-5). Regarding the .same
plant, see also Mishina (1998).
13 When questioned about the sources of such philosophies, the Executive Vice President
confes.sed that he had worked within the Japanese ranks for 22 years; and although he spent the
first 12 years of his working career at an American firm, the latter experiences had influenced his
management style more deeply.

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