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December 1, 2011
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Issues
Many markets work through intertemporal contracts: Labor markets, credit markets, intermediate input supplies, ... Contracts solve (or create) a number of problems:
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Insurance: rms insure workers against low productivity shocks. Incentives: work hard to keep your job. Information revelation: you can lie once, but not over and over again.
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Optimal contracts
If there are no frictions, agents can write complete contracts. Frictions prevent this:
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Lack of commitment: borrowers can walk away with the loan. Private information: rms dont observe how hard employees work.
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An analytical trick
The set of possible histories grows exponentially with t . A trick, due to Abreu, Pearce & Stachetti, makes this tractable. Use the promised expected future utility as a state variable. Then the current payo can (often) be written as a function of todays play and promised value.
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Environment
The world lasts forever. There is one non-storable good. A money lender can borrow / lend from "abroad" at interest rate 1 . A set of agents receive random endowments yt . They can only trade with the money lender.
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Preferences
t =0
t u (ct )
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Endowments
Each household receives iid draws yt . y takes on S discrete values, y s . Probabilities are s .
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Complete markets
Households could achieve full insurance by trading Arrow securities. Consumption would be constant at the (constant) mean endowment.
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Incomplete markets
We consider 3 frictions:
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Households cannot commit not to walk away with a loan. Households have private information about yt . Households have private information and a storage technology.
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Assumptions:
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the money lender oers the contract to the household the household can accept or reject the household accepts any contract that is better than autarky
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The state is the promised future value of the contract. To characterize, take rst-order conditions.
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Assumption: Households can walk away from their debt. As punishment, they live in autarky afterwards. The contract must be self-enforcing. Applications: Loan contracts. Labor contracts. International agreements.
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Contract
We can study an economy with one person - there is no interaction. A contract species an allocation for each history: ht = {y0 , ..., yt } An allocation is simply household consumption: ct = ft (ht ) (1)
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Contract
t =0
t (yt ft (ht ))
(2)
t =0
u (ft (ht ))
(3)
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Participation constraint
With commitment, the lender would max P subject to the resource constraint.
What would the allocation look like?
t =
(4)
stay in contract
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Autarky Value
t =0
u (yt ) =
E u (yt ) 1
(5)
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Recursive formulation
The contract is not recursive in the natural state variable yt . History dependence seems to destroy a recursive formulation. We are looking for a state variable xt so that we can write: ct = g (xt , yt )
xt +1 = l (xt , yt )
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Recursive formulation
The correct state variable is the promised value of continuation in the contract: vt = Et 1 j u (ct +j )
j =0
(6)
The household enters the period with promised utility vt , then learns yt . The contract adjusts ct and vt +1 to fulll the promise vt . Proof: Abreu, Pearce, Stachetti.
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Recursive formulation
The state variable for the lender is v . The obective is to design payos, cs and ws , for this period to max discounted prots
S
P (v ) = max s [( ys cs ) + P (ws )]
cs ,ws s =1
(7)
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Constraints
1
Promise keeping:
S s =1
s [u (cs ) + ws ] v
(8)
Participation: u (cs ) + ws u ( ys ) + vAUT ; s Bounds: cs ws [cmin , cmax ] [vAUT , v ] (10) (11) (9)
Cannot promise less than autarky or more than the max endowment each period.
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P (v ) = max s [( ys cs ) + P (ws )]
cs ,ws s =1 S
s =1 s
s [u (cs ) + ws ] v
+ s [u (cs ) + ws u ( ys ) vAUT ] Note: Participation constraints may not always bind. Then s = 0.
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FOCs
cs ws
: s = u (cs ) [s + s ] : s P (ws ) = s + s
(15) (16)
Assumption: P is dierentiable. (Verify later) Envelope: P (v ) = What do these say in words? (17)
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FOCs
Simplify:
u (cs ) = P (ws )1
(18)
This implicitly denes the consumption part of the contract: cs = g (ws ). Properties:
Later we see that P (v ) is concave (P < 0, P < 0). ) Therefore: u (cs ) dcs = [ P ((ws)] 2 dws and dc /dw > 0.
P ws
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Promised value
P (ws ) = P (v ) s /s Two cases:
1
(19)
s ws
= 0 = v
The household is fully insured against income shocks in the range where s = 0. Intuition: this happens for low y . The lender may lose in such states: he pays out the promise.
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The constraint: u (cs ) + ws = u ( ys ) + vAUT implies cs < y s (21) because ws v vAUT (any contract must be better than autarky otherwise the agent walks). The household gives up consumption in good times in exchange for future payos. To make this incentive compatible, the lender has to raise future payos: ws > v . (20)
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Amnesia
When the participation constraint binds, c and w are solved by u (cs ) + ws = u ( ys ) + vAUT u (cs ) = P (ws )1 This solves for cs ws = g1 ( ys ) = l1 ( ys )
v does not matter! Intuition: The current draw ys is so good that walking into autarky pays more than v . The continuation contract must oer at least u ( ys ) + vAUT , regardless of what was promised in the past.
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Intuition: For low y the participation constraint does not bind, for high y it does. The threshold value y (v ) satises:
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Consumption obeys the no-participation equation u (cs ) = P (v )1 . The participation constraint binds with ws = v : u (cs ) + v = u ( y [v ]) + vAUT
y (v ) > 0: Higher promised utility makes staying in the contract more attractive.
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Consumption function
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For y y (v ): Pay constant c = g2 (v ) and keep c , v constant until the participation constraint binds. For y > y (v ): Incomplete insurance. v > v . v never decreases. c never decreases. As time goes by, the range of y s for which the household is fully insured increases. Once a household hits the top y = y S : c and v remain constant forever.
2 3 4 5
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Intuition
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Implications
Think about this in the context of a labor market. "Young" households are poor (low v and c ). Earnings rise with age. Earnings volatility declines with age (because the range of full insurance expands). Old workers are costly to employ. Firms would like to re them. This broadly lines up with labor market data.
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Implications
Inequality is rst rising, then falling. Young households are all close to v0 initially. Old households are perfectly insured in the limit. Middle aged households dier in their histories and thus payos.
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Numerical example
Reading
Ljungqvist & Sargent, "Recursive Macroeconomic Theory," 2nd ed. ch. 19. Abreu, D., Pearce, D., & Stacchetti, E. (1990). Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1041-1063. Kocherlakota, N. R. (1996). Implications of ecient risk sharing without commitment. The Review of Economic Studies, 63(4), 595. Thomas, J., & Worrall, T. (1990). Income uctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem. Journal of Economic Theory, 51(2), 367 - 390. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(90)90023-D
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