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JOHN P. S PRI NGGA TE, ES Q.
NevadaBar #13 50
2 03 S outh A rlington A venue
Reno, NV 89501
Telephone: 775.3 2 3 .8881
A ttorney for Plaintiff
IN THE FAMILY DIVISION
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
* * * * *
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A S HWI N
144
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Plaintiff, CA S E NO.:
vs. DEPT. NO.:
BHA RTI JOS HI ,
&A t
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Defendant.
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2 1
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COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE
COM ES NOW the Plaintiff above- named, and for acause of action against the
Defendant above- named, complains and alleges as follows:
I
That for more than six weeks immediately preceding the commencement of this
action, Plaintiff has been, and now is abonafide resident of and domiciled in the S tate of Nevada
and has been for said period of time actually, physically and corporeally present in said state.
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I I
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LA W OFFI CES OF
JOHN P S PRI NGGA TE
2 03 S A RLI NGTON A VENUE
RENO, NEVA DA 8950)
(775) 3 2 3
-
5551
1
That Plaintiff and Defendant intermarried on or about the 11th day of M ay, 1987,
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in Bombay, I ndia, and ever since that time have been and now are husband and wife.
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in
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That there are 2 children born the issue of this marriage, both ofwhich are majority
6 in age.
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I V
That there is community property and debts belonging tothe parties which must
be allocated and distributed by the Court.
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V
That Plaintiff has found it necessary toretain the services of an attorney to
prosecute this action, and he is entitled toareasonable attorney's fee therefore, plus costs of suit.
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VI
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That the parties are incompatible in marriage and there is nochance for
reconciliation,
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
1. That the contract of marriage now existing between the parties be dissolved, and
that Plaintiff be granted an absolute decree of divorce, and the parties heretobe restored tothe
status of single persons.
2 . That this Court determine that there is community property/debt of the parties,
and distribute the same.
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/I I
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LA W OFFI CES OF
JOHN E S PRI NGGA TE
2 03 S . A RLI NGTON A VENUE
RENO. NEVA DA 89501
(775) 3 2 3 - 0881
- 2 -
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3 . That the Defendant be ordered topay Plaintiff areasonable sum as and for
his attorney's fees and costs, plus all other fees paid toother professionals retained by him as a
result of this litigation.
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
DA TED this ?.- ,1 day of June, 2 008.
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LA W OFFI CES OF
JOHN P S PRI NGGA TE
2 03 5. A RLI NGTON A VENUE
RENO, NEVA DA 8950
(775) 3 2 3 - 8001
- 3 -
NOTA RY P LI G
VERIFICATION
S TA TE OF NEVA DA
) ss:
COUNTY OF WA S HOE )
A S HWI N JOS HI , under penalties of perjury, being first duly sworn, deposes and
says:
That he is the Plaintiff in the above- entitled action; that he has read the foregoing
COM PLA I NT FOR DI VORCE and knows the contents thereof; that the same is true of his own
knowledge, except for those matters therein contained stated upon information and belief, and as
tothose matters, he believes them tobe true.
A S HWI N JCI S HI
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S UBS CRI BED aml S WORN to
befoe me thisVr- day of
, 2 008
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LAW OFFICES OF
JOHN R SPRINGGATE
203 S. ARLINCTON AVENUE
RENO, NEVADA 89501
(775) 323-8881
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF WASHOE, STATE OF NEVADA
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AFFIRMATION
Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
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The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document, COMPLAINT
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FOR DIVORCE filed in case number: TO BE DETERMINED
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ocument does not contain the social security number of any person
- OR-
El Document contains the social security number of aperson as required by:
K A specificstate of federal law, towit:
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2 0
2 1
(S tate specificstate or federal law)
- or-
O For the administration of apublicprogram
- or-
0 For an application for afederal or state grant
- or-
0 Confidential Family Court I nformation S heet
(NRS 12 5.13 0, NRS 12 5.2 3 0 and NRS 1 .05
2 2
2 3
Date: June
1
/1 , 2 008
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(S
2 5
John P. S pringate, Esq.
(Print Name)
Plaintiff
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(A ttorney for)
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- 5-
LA W OFFI CES OF
(OLI N F. S TI RI NGGA TE
2 03 S . A RLI NGTON A VENUE
RENO. NEVA DA 89501
17751 3 2 3 '
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Submitted by:
j2ignatu

CODE: 1740
JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ.
Nevada Bar #13 50
203 South Arlington Avenue
Reno, NV 89501
Telephone: (775) 3 23 .8881
OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
ASHWIN JOSHI.
Plaintiff, Case No.:
Dept. No.:
08
6
011
,
9,
BHARTI JOSH1
Defendant.
SHORT FORM FINANCIAL DECLARATION
15
STATE OF NEVADA )
16 ) ss.
COUNTY OF WASHOE
1, 05).10)
0
9
6514
) , being duly sworn and under the penalties of perjury, depose
and state as follows:
I have read the contents of this Financial Declaration and am competent to testify as to the
contents, and the contents are true of my own knowledge except for those matters stated on information
and beli
+ UBSCRIBED ANp SWORN to
ef r - me thisc day of
4110
, 200e .
rafimirteihad_,
NOTARY PUBLIC
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T h
(Signa e 8f Declarant)
as to those matters, I believe them to be true.
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LAW OFFICE S OF
JOHN P. SPRINGGATE
2035. ARLINGTON AVE NUE
RE NO. NE VADA 89501
(775) 323
-
8881
llllllllllll I444444
444444444444444! l l l l l . 1 1
1 1 1 1 . ! . . P. 1 1 ,04l l l l l l l OP
MFIRIGirl iuM41 41 1 1 . 4
Lf NDA A. KNOWLDE N
Notary Publio - State of Nevada
Ap p oin h en t fiecorded in 4Vas h oe Courtly
No: 00.c5 f i3-2 - E x g res Jan uary 24, 2010I
MONTHLY INCOME
If you are presently unemployed, questions 1-2 and then go on to the rest
of the questions. If you are employed, print "not applicable" in questions
1-2 and go on to the rest of the questions.
1. N/A I am presently unemployed and have been unemployed since
(date of your last employment)
2. My last employer was , and I earned
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per hour / week / month (circle one),
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Answer all of the following questions. If the question is not applicable in
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your particular circumstances, print "N/A" in the spaces.
Monthly Money Earned and Received
3 . I am employed and the earn the following wages:
I am paid by the hour and my hourly wage is: $ 17.00
I work hours per week.
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2
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I am paid (circle one) every week: every 2 weeks;
lx a month; 2x a month, and without anything being
deducted from it, each check is for (attached last
3 paystubs): $ 671.00
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I work overtime approximately hours per
month at the rate of $ per hour for
an average monthly overtime earning of: $1,000.00 (VARIES/APPROX.)
I receive commissions each month in the amount of: SN/A
(averaged over a year)
I receive tips each month in the amount of: SN/A
I receive bonuses each month in the amount of: $N/A
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Based upon the above information,
My total average monthly income from employment is: $3 ,600.00
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LAW OFFICE S OF
JOHN IS SPRINGGATE
203 S. ARLINGTON AVE NUE
RE NO, NE VADA 89501
(7751323
-
8881
-2-
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Income Other Than Wage Earnings
I receive child support each month from the other party in
the amount of (amount of court order $
):
$N/A
I receive child support each month from someone else in the
amount of (amount of court order $
):
$N/A
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4
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I receive alimony/spousal support each month from the
other party in the amount of
(amount of court order $ ): $N/A
I receive alimony/spousal support each month from
someone else in the amount of
(amount of court order $ ): $N/A
I receive the following government assistance.
I receive Social Security Benefits each month in the amount of: $N/A
I receive Non Social Security Benefits each month in the
amount of SN/A
I receive State or County assistance (welfare, T.ANF,
SIIS, etc.) each month in the amount of: $N/A
I receive unemployment month in the amount of: $N/A
I receive retirement benefits each month in the amount of: $N/A
10. I receive investment income each month in the amount of: $N/A
1 I receive income from rental properties (excluding
depreciation) each month in the amount of: $N/A
2 I live with someone (friend, relative, significant other) who
contributes to the living expenses each month in the amount of $N/A
3 I am receiving educational or school benefits in the amount of: $N/A
5.
6.
8.
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I am receiving money from friends, relatives, or others each
month in the amount of $N/A
I am receiving other sources of income, including but not
limited to, monthly distributions from a trust or will in
the amount of: (PART-TIME WORK/RUTHERFORD) $ 100.00
Y TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME FROM ALL SOURCES IF: $3 ,700.00
(this amount is your "gross income")
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LAW ()micas OF
J OHN P. $PR1NGGATE
203 5. ARLINGTON AVENUE
RENO, NEVADA 89501
(775) 323-8881
-3 -
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HOW MUCH IS BEING WITHHELD FROM YOUR INCOME EACH MONTH?
Federal income taxes $ 682.00
Social Security $ 223 .00
Medicare taxes $ 52.00
Child support for children with the other party $N/A
Child support for children with someone else $N/A
Alimony/spousal support paid to the other party $N/A
Alimony/spousal support paid to someone else $N/A
Retirement, 401K, etc. SN/A
Health insurance total: SN/A
Of this amount, $ is the
amount paid for your and the other
party's children.
Any other garnishments or withholdings, please list:
NONE
OTAL WITHHOLDING FROM PAYCHECK:
$N/A
$ 957.00
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YOUR TOTAL EXPENSES EACH MONTH
(REPORT ONLY THE AMOUNT YOU ACTUALLY PAY)
Each month I pay rent or mortgage or I contribute to the
rent or mortgage where I live in the amount of:
For food each month, I spend or contribute to the family with
whom I am living the amount of:
For house/apartment utilities (gas, power, water, garbage,
sewer) I pay or contribute to my household the amount of
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$ 500.00
$ 400.00
$ 50.00
Life Insurance $N/A
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/1
//
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LAW OFFICES OF
JOHN P. SPRJNGGATE
203 S. ARLINGTON AVENUE
RENO. NEVADA 8950
(75) 3 23
-
8881
-4-
5. I have a vehicle and pay the following each month:
Vehicle payment each month in the amount of: $ 3 90.00
Fuel for the vehicle in the amount of: $ 450.00
Insurance for the vehicle (if paid over a period of
six months or a year, average the payment out) $ 125.00
Repairs and maintenance (averaged over a year) $ 55.00
6. I do not own a vehicle, but my monthly transportation costs
(bus, taxi, etc.) are: $N/A
7. I have medical bill that I pay on each month in the amount of: $ 3 00.00 (+ /-)
8. I have medical prescriptions each month in the amount of: $N/A
9. I pay health insurance (not deducted from my check) in the
amount of: $N/A
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10. I am paying child support each month that is not deducted
directly from my paycheck in the amount of
(amount of court order $
11. I am also legally responsible for the support of others, namely:
each month in the amount of (amount of court order
$ )
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$N/A
$N/A
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SN/A 12. Each month I pay child care in the amount of:
16
13 . I have credit card/charge account payments each month and pay
those charges as follows:
Name of Credit Card or Charge Account
Bank of America in the amount of: $ 100.00
Best Buy in the amount of: $ 100.00
Discover in the amount of: $ 100.00
WAMU in the amount of: $ 100.00
U.S. Bank in the amount of: $ 150.00
Household in the amount of: $ 100.00
Wells Fargo in the amount of: $ 200.00
14. Clothing, cleaning, laundry, etc. each month: $ 50.00
15. I have school or educational expenses each month of: $N/A
16. My recreational expenses each month are: $ 100.00
17. My charitable expenses each month are:
$ 20.00
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LAW OFFICE S OF
JOHN P. SFRINGGATE
203 S. ARLINGTON AVE NUE
(7751 323-8881
-5-
1
18. Other expenses not listed above, please list:
Personal Products
TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES:
11
1. House/Mobile Home (circle one) Separate/Community/Joint (circle one)
Who has possession? (circle one) me/the other party.
a. How much is it worth. $N/A
b. How much you owe on it: $N/A
2. Checking Accounts:
Write the Account's Location, Separate/Community/Joint Property, and Who Has Possession
Wells Fargo/Separate/Joshi $ 200.00
18
3 . Savings Accounts:
Write the Account's Location, Separate/Community/Joint Property, and Who Has Possession
Wells Fargo/Separate/Joshi $ 275.00
$N/a
Cash you have on hand: $ 475.00
Retirement Accounts (indicate in whose name accounts are held)
NONE
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$ 50.00
$3 ,270.00
4
NET INCOME (DEFICIT) EACH MONTH
(TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME MINUS TOTAL
WITHHOLDING MINUS TOTAL MONTHLY
EXPENSES:)
5
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$ 500.00
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ASSETS AND DEBTS
In the following section, list ALL assets and debts you have, either
separately or jointly with the other party.
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23 5.
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I/I
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LAW oPF10E S OF
JOE -IN P. SPRiNGGATE
203 5. ARLINGTON AVE NUE
(775) 323
-
8881
-6-

6. Vehicles: (list ALL vehicles owned by you and/or the other
party, even if your name is not on the registration and include
such things as motorcycles, boats and recreational vehicles)
a. Made and model: Chevy/Trailblazer
What you owe on the vehicle: $17,450.00
What the vehicle is worth: $11,000.00
b. Make and model: Dodge/Grand Caravan
What you owe on the vehicle: $ 7,500.00
What the vehicle is worth: $ 4,000.00
c. Make and model: Honda Civic
What you owe on the vehicle: $N/A
What the vehicle is worth: $ 2,000.00
7. Stocks and bonds: $N/A
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8. Credit Cards and Store Charge Accounts:
Name of Account
NONE
Balance Minimum Monthly Payment
$N/A
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On the lines below, please list any other assets worth more than $500.00
or debts you have that have not been previously listed. Assets such as
furniture, jewelry, boats, assets held in your child's name or joint
tenancy with any other person, and personal loans owed to you. Debts
such as medical bills and personal loans owed to others.
Asset Value of Asset
Computer System $ 1,400.00
Flat Screen TV $ 1,700.00
Jewelry (Wells Fargo Safe Deposit Box and
India Locker safe deposit) $1.Inknovv
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n
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LAW OFFICES OF
.101
-
SN P. SPRINGGATE
RENO, NEVADA 89501
(775) 3 23 8881
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$ 5,670.00
$ 5,000.00
$ 2,3 95.47
$ 1,726.65
$ 5,067.81
$ 1,107.3 6
$3 ,000.00
$ 664.00
$6,420.00
3
Meena Fowler (Sister)
Ashik Nanabhai
Bank of America
Best Buy
Discover
WAMU
U.S. Bank
Household
Wells Fargo
4
5
6
7
9 ATTORNEY FEE ARRANGEMENT
10 have paid my attorney $3 ,000.00, including costs and expert fees, since this case began. Ipaid this amount
rom (source of funds used) personal credit card. I currently owe my attorney $0.00 in addition to the
mount paid above. My fee arrangement is as follows:
12
Attorney's fees at $225.00 per hour against retainer; paralegal rate at $60.00 per hour
Balanced Owed on Debt
1
Debt
2
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LAW orr[cEs or
JOHN P. SPPJNGGATE
RENO. NEVADA 89501
(775) 3 23 -8881
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF WASHOE, STATE OF NEVADA
AFFIRMATION
Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document, SHORT FORM
FINANCIAL DECLARATION filed in case number: TO BE DETERMINED
ocument does not contain the social security number of any person
-OR-
0 Document contains the social security number of a person as required by:
0 A specific state of federal law, to wit:
Date: June
(State specific state or federal law)
-or-
El For the administration of a public program
-or-
0 For an application for a federal or state grant
-or-
0 Confidential Family Court Information Sheet
(NRS 125.13 0, NRS 125.23 0 and NRS 12 tz .05
2008 11114 pAamair
W
rI igna.
hn P. Spring gate Esq.
(Print Name)
Plaintiff
(Attorney for)
LAW OFFICE S OF
JOHN 7 SPRINGGATE
RENO. NEVADA 89501
(775) 3 23
-
8881
-9-
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2(136 JUL 18 PM to 21
HO WA
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D . C O N
BY
DEP UTY
C ode: 1 1 37
ZAC HARY C O UGHLIN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 9473
WASHO E LEGAL SERVIC ES
650 Tahoe Street
Reno, NV 8950 9
Telephone: (775)32 9-2 72 7
Facsimile: (775)32 4-550 9
Attorneys for Defendant/C ounterclaimant
ASHWIN JOSHI,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
vs.
BHARTI JOSHI,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
COMES NOW the Defendant, Bharti Joshi, by and through her counsel of record,
Zachary B. C oughlin, Esq. , of Washoe Legal Services, and hereby answers Plaintiff Ashwin
Joshi's C omplaint for Divorce as follows:
I.
As to Paragraphs I, II, III, and VI of the Plaintiff's C omplaint, Defendant admits each
and every allegation contained therein.
II.
As to Paragraph V of the Plaintiff's C omplaint, Defendant denies each and every
allegation contained therein.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that this action be dismissed, with Plaintiff to take
nothing by way of his C omplaint.
/ / /
/ / /
Case No.: DV08-01168
Dept. No.: 5
1

C O UNTERC LAIM
C O MES NO W, Bharti Joshi, Defendant/C ounterclaimant, by and through her counsel,
Zachary B. C oughlin, Esq. of Washoe Legal Services, and for a cause of action complains and
alleges as follows:
I.
The Defendant/C ounterclaimant, Bharti Joshi (hereinafter "Bharti")is a resident of the
State of Nevada and for a period of more than six weeks preceding the filing of this action has
resided and been physically present and domiciled in the State of Nevada, and now resides and
is domiciled therein, and during all of said period of time Bharti has had and still has the intent
to make said State of Nevada her home, residence, and domicile for an indefinite period of
time.
IL
The parties entered into a good faith marriage on or about the 1 2
th
day of May, 1 987, in
Mumbai, India, and ever since said date have been and now are, Husband and Wife.
III.
That there are no minor children born the issue of the marriage. There are however,
two children over the age of eighteen for which Defendant requests the C ourt to instruct
Plaintiff to assist Defendant in providing financial help for their education. Bharti is not
pregnant at this time.
IV.
That there is community property to be equitably divided, which includes but is not
limited to, Defendant's "woman's wealth" given by Defendant's parents for Plaintiff to hold
when they were married, the vehicles in each party and the children's possession, and the
money the Defendant earned while working for Legendary Luxury C amping Safari in
Houston, Texas, which was automatically deposited in Plaintiff's account every month for two
and one half years, which Plaintiff told Defendant he would give to her.
V.
That there are community property debts and obligations for this C ourt to divide in a
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fair and equitable manner, including but not limited to, medical bills incurred by Plaintiff that
should be deemed his sole and separate debt, and payments on the vehicles in each parties'
possession.
VI.
That Bharti should be awarded a reasonable sum as and for alimony, until her death or
remarriage, whichever occurs first.
VII.
That Bharti wishes to return to her former name, to wit: BHARTI R. DAVE.
VIII.
That Bharti has been required to retain the services of an attorney and requests the
C ourt set reasonable attorney's fees and costs to be paid to WASHO E LEGAL SERVIC ES.
IX.
That Plaintiff/C ounterdefendant and Defendant/C ounterclaimant are incompatible in
marriage.
X.
That neither party is an infant, incompetent, or in the military service.
WHEREFORE, Defendant/C ounterclaimant, Bharti Joshi, prays judgment as follows:
1 . That the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore existing between the
Plaintiff/C ounterdefendant and Defendant/C ounterclaimant be dissolved, the
Defendant/C ounterclaimant be granted an absolute decree of divorce and each of the parties
hereto be restored to the status of a single, unmarried person.
2 . That the community assets be equitably divided.
3. That the community property debts and obligations be equitably divided.
4. That the Defendant/C ounterclaimant be awarded a reasonable sum as and for
alimony until her death or remarriage, whichever occurs first.
5. That the Defendant/C ounterclaimant return to her former name, to wit: Bharti
R. Dave.
6.
That WASHO E LEGAL SERVIC ES be awarded reasonable attorneys fees.
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ZA 'ARY B. C O UGHLIN,
i
7. That the parties are incompatible in marriage and reconciliation of the partieS is
impossible.
8. For such other and further relief as to the C ourt may deem just and proper.
DATED this ?)day of , 2 0 0 8.
WASHO E LEGAL SERVIC ES
At rney for Defendant/Counterclaimant
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VERIFICATION
STATE O F NEVADA
)s. s.
C O UNTY O F WASHO E
I, Bharti Joshi, being first duly sworn, depose and say as follows:
That I am the Defendant/C ounterclaimant in the above-entitled action; that I have read
the foregoing "Verified Answer and C ounterclaim" and know the contents thereof; that the
same is true of my knowledge except for those matters therein contained stated upon
information and belief, as to those matters, I believe them to be true.
DATED thisij
-
day of July, 2 0 0 8.
BHARTI JO SHI
.......11
,
11.114i i i i i i i i i i i i Ii i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i 111011111.i i i i i i i i i i i i i 1.11.11111111i i i i i i i i i i
NO TARY PUBLIC
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Subscribed and Sworn to before me
this1 7 day of July, 2 0 0 8-.
DEBORAH J. PRINGLE
Notary Public - State of Nevada
Appointment Recorded in Washoe County
No: 01-66S1 8-2-Expires November 4, 2008
5

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL
Pursuant to NRC P 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of Washoe Legal
Services, and that I served on this day the foregoing:
VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
by depositing for mailing, a true and correct copy of the within document with the United
States Postal Service, at Reno, Nevada, addressed to:
Law O ffices of
John P. Springgate, Esq.
2 0 3 South Arlington Avenue
Reno, NV 8950 1
DATED this el day of , 2 0 0 8.
Deborah Pringle
An employee of Washoe Legal Services
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F I L E D
Electronically
07-22-2008:10:21:52 AM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 291976
sEP 1 7 AN 837
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Code: 1137
ZACHARY COUGHL IN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 9473
WASHOE L EGAL SERVICES
650 Tahoe Street
Reno, NV 89509
Telephone: (775) 329-2727
Facsimile: (775) 324-5509
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant
ASHWIN JOSHI,
vs.
BHARTI JOSHI,
PLAINTIFF'S CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT
COMES NOW, Defendant/Counterclaimant, Bharti Joshi, by and through her
counsel, Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq. , of Washoe L egal Services, and hereby submits her Case
Management Conference Statement.
The parties were married on or about May 11, 1987, in Mumbai, India, and ever since
said date have been and now are Husband and Wife.
There are two children the issue of Plaintiff and Defendant, who are majority in age.
The Plaintiff is not pregnant at this time.
That there are remaining community property to be equitably divided by the Court.
That community debts and obligations to be equitably divided by the Court.
That Bharti should be awarded spousal support.
That Washoe L egal Services be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B.030
The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the
Dept. No.: 5
B. Coughlin, Esq. Zac
At ney for Defendant/Counterclaimant
social security number of any person.
DATED this r cl
--
ay of September, 2008.
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2

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of Washoe L egal
Services, and that on the day of September, 2008, I served the foregoing:
PL AINTIFF'S CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT
by depositing for mailing with the United States Postal Service, at Reno, Nevada, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the within document addressed to:
L aw Offices of
Reno, NV 89501
_ I /
(171,e.A.,
DAOrah Pringle
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Code: 1637
ZACHARY COUGHLIN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 9473
WASHOE LEGAL SERVICES
650 Tahoe Street
Reno, NV 89509
Telephone: (775) 329-2727
Facsimile: (775) 324-5509
ASHWIN JOSHI,
vs.
BHARTI JOSHI,
AMENDED DEFENDANT'S CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT
COMES NOW, Defendant/Counterclaimant, Bharti Joshi, by and through her
counsel, Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq., of Washoe Legal Services, and hereby submits her Case
Management Conference Statement.
The parties were married on or about May 11, 1987, in Mumbai, India, and ever since
said date have been and now are Husband and Wife.
There are two children the issue of Plaintiff and Defendant, who are majority in age.
The Defendant/Counterclaimant is not pregnant at this time.
That there are remaining community property to be equitably divided by the Court.
That community debts and obligations to be equitably divided by the Court.
That Bharti should be awarded spousal support.
That Washoe Legal Services be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
2003 SEP 18 PN 14:35
Dept. No.: 5

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DATED this p day of September, 2008.
chary B. Coughlin, sq.
ttorney for Defendant/Counterclaimant
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2
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of Washoe Legal
Services, and that on the / day of September, 2008, I served the foregoing:
AMENDED DEFENDANT'S CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT
by depositing for mailing with the United States Postal Service, at Reno, Nevada, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the within document addressed to:
Law Offices of
Reno, NV 89501
Deborah Pringle
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F I L E D
Electronically
10-02-2008:04:00:34 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
CASE NO. DV08-01168 ASHWIN JOSHI VS. BHARTI JOSHI
J T-10/3/2008

DATE, JUDGE
OFFICERS OF
COURT PRESENT APPEARANCES-HEARING
10/3/08
HONORABLE
SENIOR JUDGE
SCOTT T.
JORDAN
DEPT. NO. 5
J. Taylor
(Clerk)
CD

CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

Present in Court were Plaintiff Ashwin J oshi, represented by counsel J ohn
Springgate, Esq.; and Defendant Bharti J oshi, represented by counsel
Zachary Coughlin, Esq.
This matter was scheduled as a Case Management Conference, and the
parties have agreed to put the following issues before the Court:
Mr. Springgate informed the Court that the parties have two children that
are no longer minors; therefore custody will not be at issue. Plaintiff has a
family debt of approximately $5,000.00 incurred in bringing the family over
from Tanzania. He agrees to keep that debt. The parties have consumer
debt of approximately $20,000.00 that the parties shall be divided equally.
Plaintiff also has a $48,000.00 medical bill. Although it is a community
debt, he will continue to pay and accept liability for it. Mr. Springgate has
explained to Plaintiff that should he be sued for that medical debt he could
file bankruptcy. Although Plaintiff is not pondering bankruptcy at this
point, should it become necessary, it will be a great deal of family debt
Plaintiff will no longer be responsible for. For that reason they agree to
the Court keeping jurisdiction on alimony for five years at $1.00 per year to
protect Defendant should a bankruptcy be filed.
There are two significant items of personal property in dispute, a television
and a computer. Plaintiff requests his personal papers located at the
residence in order to apply for citizenship.
In regard to the automobiles, Plaintiff shall keep the Trailblazer and
maintain, and Defendant shall keep the Caravan and maintain payments
on that vehicle. All other vehicles belong to the children.
Defendant has a claim about her womans wealth brought into the
marriage, and gifts. Plaintiff testifies that he does not have it, and does
not know where it is. He believes it may be with his sister in Tanzania.
Since he doesnt have it, he cannot agree to give it to her. He does,
however agree that it belongs to Defendant and is not community
property. Plaintiff agrees to notify his family that it should be delivered to
Defendant and will attempt to expedite that delivery.
Mr. Coughlin states that Defendant has considered the offer and is not at
a point to agree to it. Defendant is troubled by the lack of effort on
Plaintiffs part to obtain the womans wealth. Defendant strongly fees
some alimony award is in order.
Plaintiff verified that he works at a catering company and has no other
employment.
The Court indicates that its goal is to attempt to settle this matter.
In regard to the marital wealth, both parties agree it should be awarded to
Defendant. It is important Plaintiff cooperate in returning those items to
F I L E D
Electronically
10-10-2008:09:32:54 AM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
CASE NO. DV08-01168 ASHWIN J OSHI VS. BHARTI J OSHI
Page 2 of 2
J T-10/3/2008

Defendant. The Court has no other power to order their return other than
awarding them to Defendant.
The medical debt is being treated as a community debt, and Plaintiff
agrees to pay in full. The Court wants to make sure the parties
understand that should Plaintiff be sued for non-payment of the medical
debt the doctors have the right to pursue Defendant for payment. Her
recourse would be to sue Plaintiff.
The Court states that in regard to alimony, under Nevada rules alimony is
awarded when there is an imbalance between earnings of the parties.
Based upon the information, both parties earn the same amount so there
is no basis for alimony. Since Plaintiff is taking more than the debt, this
should offset any claim for alimony.
In regard to the issue of personal property, each party is to keep what they
currently have in their possession. Plaintiff does not want the television
but requests the financial information from the hard drive of the computer.
The Court states it has no power to order custody or visitation but
encourages the parties to have a meaningful relationship for the benefit of
the children.
The parties agreed to recess and attempt a settlement.
The Court was informed that the parties could not settle, therefore it did
not reconvene.

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IMMI

3696
FILED
FEB 2 5 2009
HOWARDX. CL70CL
.Li
ERK
B y :
DEPU CLERK
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
ASHWIN JOSHI,
vs. CASE NO. DV08-01168
BHARTI JOSH', DEPT. NO. 14
ORDER RE PRETRIAL PROCEDURE
This matter is set for trial on March 12, 2009 at 1:30p.m.
Good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, if a party intends to offer more than ten trial
exhibits, the proposed exhibits must be bound, tabbed and indexed. Plaintiff's exhibits will be
marked in alphabetical sequence and Defendant's exhibits will be marked in numerical sequence.
Each party shall submit two copies of the proposed exhibits to the Court and one copy to the
opposing counsel.
Counsel shall contact Martha Casique-Andrews at 775-325-6779 to schedule a
time with the Clerk to organize and mark exhibits. For trials set for one full day or more,
IDA ER
DISTRICT JUDGE

counsel shall meet with the Court Clerk no later than 3:00p.m. on the Friday prior to trial to
mark the trial exhibits. For trials which are scheduled for less than one full day, exhibits shall be
marked immediately prior to the convening for trial, and counsel shall arrive at least 15 minutes
before the scheduled time of trial.
Prior to meeting with the Court Clerk, counsel shall meet and discuss the
admissibility of proposed exhibits. At the time of marking the exhibits with the Clerk, the Clerk
shall be told which Exhibits may be admitted without objection.
At the opening of trial, counsel shall inform the Court which exhibits are being
admitted without objection.
Each party must file with the Court a trial statement, financial declaration and
UCCJA declaration. Courtesy copies of the trial statement shall be hand-delivered to opposing
counsel and Judge Gardner's chambers by no later than 5:00p.m. five (5) days prior to trial.
Failure to timely deliver these documents may result in sanctions against the offending party as
set forth in NRCP 37.
If the financial circumstances of a party have changed substantially since the
filing of the most recent financial declaration, that party is to file an updated financial declaration
at the same time as filing the trial statement.
Dated this
v
day ay of February, 2009.
-2-
CER IFICATE OF MAIL ING
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), T certify that I am an employee of the Second Judicial District
Court, and that on this date I deposited by county mail, at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the
attached, addressed to:
ZACHARY B COUGHL IN ESQ
299 SOUTH ARL INGTON AVENUE
RENO NV 89501
JOHN P SPRINGGATE ESQ
203 SOUTH ARL INGTON AVENUE
RENO NV 89501
Dated this D5 day of February, 2009.
Adminis ative Assistant
-3-
1
2

CODE: 4220
Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 9473

ORIGtNAL
ILED
2019 MAR 5 AM 9: 26
=: ,>299 South Arlington Avenue
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IN TH SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF
NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
--iL
=
6:,ASHWIN JOSHI,
IV
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Defendant/Counterdefendant,
vs. Case No.: DV08-01l68
BHARTI JOSHI, Dept. No.: 14
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL STATEMENT
COMES NOW, Defendant, BHARTI JOSHI, by and through her counsel of record, Zachary
B. Coughlin, Esq. of Washoe Legal Services, and pursuant to WDCR 5, submits her trial statement
for the trial presently scheduled for March 12,2009.
I. INTRODUCTION - RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant, BHARTI JOSHI (hereinafer "BHARTI"), and Plaintiff, ASHWIN JOSHI
(hereinafer "ASHWIN"), intermarried on or about May II, 1987.
A Complaint for Divorce was fled on July 1, 2008. Defendant filed an Answer and
Counterclaim to the Complaint on July 22, 2008. A Case Management Conference was held on
October 3, 2008.
26
II. ADMITTEDIUNDlSPUTED ISSUES
27
1. That there are no remaining minor children of the parties, and BHARTI is not pregnant.
28
2. That BHARTI is entitled to her "Woman's Wealth," and ASHWIN will notify his family that it

1 should be delivered to BHARTI and will expedite that delivery.

2 3. That ASHWIN shall keep the Trailblazer and maintain payments on the vehicle. That
3 BHARTI shall keep the Caravan and maintain payments on the vehicle.
4 4. That each party will keep the community property assets in their possession. ASHWIN does
5 request the financial information from the computer. The television and computer are to remain in
6 BHARTI'S possession.
7 5. ASHWIN has agreed to pay the medical debt in full. ASHWIN will also pay the family debt of
8 $5,000.00 incurred when he brought the family to the United States fom Tanzania.
9 6. That the parties are incompatible in marriage.
10 III. SIGNIFICANT ISSUES IN DISPUTE
11 B. ALIMONY
12
BHARTI should be awarded alimony/spousal support in an amount determined by the Court.
13 ASHWIN'S current income is $ 1,000.00 per month more than BHARTI'S.
14 NRS 125.150 provides that the Court may award such alimony as appears just and equitable. In
15
the seminal case, Buchanan v. Buchanan, 90 Nev. 209 (1974), the Court laid out a series of factors to
16
guide the Court in determining if an alimony award is just and equitable, including the financial
17 condition of the parties, the nature and value of their respective property, the duration of the marriage,
18 the husband's income, eaing capacity, age, health, and ability to labor and the wife's income age,
19 health, station, and ability to ea a living.
20
Alimony is an equitable award serving to meet post-divorce needs. As stated by the Nevada
21 Supreme Court in Shydler v. Shydler, 114 Nev. 192,954 P.2d 37 (1998): "".two of the primary
22 puroses of alimony, at least in marriage of significant length, are to narow any lage gaps between the
23 post-divorce earing capacities of the parties .. . and to allow the recipient spouse to live 'as nearly as
24 fairly possible to the station in life enjoyed before the divorce. "
,
25 C. DEBTS/OBLIGATIONS
26 ASHWIN has enumerated credit charge accounts. BHARTI has no direct information about
27 these charges; and she cannot recall any accrued benefi t to the community. These debts should be set
28 aside to ASHWIN as his sole and separate obligation. It is believed that these enumerated accounts are
2

1 solely in ASHWIN'S name.
2 IV. SCHEDULES OR SUMMARIES

3
At this time, Defendant does not anticipate the use of any schedules or summaries as
4 contemplated by WDCR led).
5 V. WITNESSES
6 Defendant and Plaintiff
7 VI. CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL
8
The undersigned counsel certifies that he has made reasonable efforts to resolve as many
9
issues as possible with Plaintiff s counsel. Settlement efforts will continue until trial.
10
II
The undersigned does hereby afrm that the preceding document does not contain the social
12 security number of any person.
13 DATED this Iday of March, 2009.
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HARY B. COUGHLIN, ESQ.
Attorey for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certif that I am an employee of Washoe Legal Services, and
that on th day of March, 2009, I served the foregoing:
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL STATEMENT
by depositing with the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the
within document addressed to:
Law Ofices of
Reno, NV 89501
4
Deborah Pringle
=m==m==
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LW OFFICES OF
JOHN P SPRINGGATE
21lJ S. ARLINGTON AVENUE
RENO, NEVADA 8951
(n5) 323-8881
F I L E D
Electronically
03-11-2009:04:56:07PM
HowardW.Conyers
ODE: 4220
ClerkoftheCourt
OHN P. SPRlNGGATE, ESQ.
Transaction#644213
evada Bar #1350
Reno, N 89501
Telephone: 775.323.8881
Attorey for Plaintiff
*****
ASHWIN JOSHI,
Plaintiff, CASE NO.: DV08-01168
vs. DEPT. NO.: 14
BHARTl JOSHI,
Defendant.
TRIAL STATEMENT OF PLAINTIFF
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, ASHWl JOSHI, by and through his attorey of record,
JOHN P. SPRlGGATE, ESQ., and hereby submits his Trial Statement in accordance with
WCDR 5.
A. Concise Statement of Claimed Facts.
Mr. Joshi commenced this action by his Complaint for Divorce on July 1, 2008. The
parties have been married for ahost 22 years, and both children are of majority age. They are both
residing in Washoe County. Mr. Joshi is 51 years of age; and Mrs. Joshi is 46 years of age.
There are community assets and debts which the Court will need to determine the
distribution of. Mrs. Joshi is in possession of almost all of the community friture and
Undisputed
Statement
Appropriate Comments. Sugestions
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furshings. They each have cars, and debt thereon. Mrs. Joshi is a phannacy tech at Raleys,
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earing $29,500 in 2008 while Mr. Joshi is a catering manager, earing $41,500 in 2008.
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4 B. Statement of Admitted or Facts
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The parties' ages and date of marriage are admitted. As well, there is "woman's wealth,"
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or dowry, which Mrs. Joshi brought into the marriage. The parties were married in India, and
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10 primarily jewelry.
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C. ofIssues of Law
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None. While it may seem to be an alimony case, Mr. Joshi's earngs are subject to the
travel and convention business fluctuations, while hers are not. More importantly, he is prepared
to take an unfair amount of the community debt, which he has been servicing, which equalizes
their incomes.
D. or Information
The parties, through their attoreys, have stipulated to use the beginning of the trial as a
frther settlement conference, as there are relatively few issues.
DATED this day of March, 2009.
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L\,' OFFICE OF -2-
JOHN P SPRlNGGATE
:(3 S. ARLINGTON AVENUE
RENO. NEVADA 89501
(5)32H881
x
c{
nda Kno1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certi1 that I am an employee of THE LAW OFFICES
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4 OF JOHN SPRING GATE, and that on this date I personally served at Reno, Nevada, a true copy
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of the within Defendant'S Trial Statement, flly addressed to:
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Zack Coughlin, Esq.
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Washoe Legal Services
299 S. Arlington Avenue
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Reno, N 89501
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for mailing by frst class mail, postage prepaid
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by personal delivelY
by telephonic facsimile (329-5509)
by Federal Express or other overight delivery
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by placing a true copy thereof for collection and delivery by Reno/Carson
Messenger Service on this date.
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The undersigned does hereby afirm that the preceding document does not contain the
-
Dated this day of March, 2009
A.
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L OFPICES OF -3-
JOHN P SPRINGGATE
cn_l S. ARLINGTON AVENUE
RENO, NEVADA 89501
(n5) 323-888\
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________________
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CODE: 1845
INTHE FAMILYDIVISION
OFTHESECONDJUDICIALDISTRICTCOURTOFTHESTATEOFNEVADA
INANDFORTHECOUNTYOFWASHOE
ASHWINJOSHI,
Plaintiff, CaseNo. DV08-01168
vs.
Dept.No. 14
BHARTIJOSHI,
Defendant/ Counterclaimant.
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ORDERAFTER TRIAL
AComplaintfor Divorcewasfiled by ASHWINJOSHI (hereinafterMr.Joshi),by
andthroughhisattorney,JOHNP.SPRINGGATE,ESQ.,onJuly8,2008. AnAnswerand
Counterclaimwasfiledby BHARTIJOSHI (hereinafter'Ms.Joshi'),byandthroughher
attorneyofrecord,ZACHARYB. COUGHLIN,ESQ.,onJuly18,2008. Argumentwas
heardonMarch12,2009andMarch17,2009. Mr.Joshiwaspresentandrepresentedby
JohnP.Springgate,Esq.;andMs.Joshi, waspresentandrepresentedbyZacharyB.
Coughlin,Esq., ofWashoeLegalServices.
Alltestimonyandargumentshavingbeenheard,allpleadingson filehavingbeen
read,allexhibits,tapes,andnoteshavingbeenreviewed,theCourtfindsandOrdersas
follows.
III
III
F I L E D
Electronically
04-13-2009:09:23:48 AM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The parties were married May 11, 1987, in Bombay, India.
2. The parties have two children, both of whom are now adults.
Although Mr. Yoshi has no obligation to support said children any longer
pursuant to NRS 125.510(9)(b), Ms. Yoshi requests the financial assistance of Mr. Yoshi so
as to provide for the children's continuing education. (Answer, pg. 2, lines 16-18).
The Court notes that on August 1,2008, Mr. Joshi filed a 'Motion For Return Of
Personal Property' requesting that Ms. Joshi return his passport, green card and social
security card. On August 7, 2008, Ms. Joshi, by and through her attorney of record,
Mr. Coughlin, filed an Opposition to the return of Mr. Joshi's passport citing case law
involving minor children and their support. Ms. Yoshi filed said opposition while
acknowledging the parties' children were both over eighteen years of age at the time. On
August 18,2008, Judge Schumacher ordered Ms. Joshi to immediately return Mr. Joshi's
passport within five days.
3. There is community property to be divided.
In Mr. Joshi's Complaint filed July 8, 2008, he indicated there was community
property and debts which should be divided by the Court.
Ms. Joshi filed an Answer and Counterclaim on July 18, 2008, indicating the
parties' community property should be equitably divided, including Ms. Joshi's
"women's wealth", the vehicles in each party's possession, the vehicles in their children's
possession, and "the money the [Ms. Yoshi] earned while working for Legendary Luxury
Camping Safari in Houston Texas which was automatically deposited in [Mr. Yoshi's]
account every month for two and one-half years, [and] which [Mr. Yoshi] told [Ms. Yoshi]
he would give to her." (Answer, pg. 2, lines 21-26).
The Court notes the following information has been provided and has been taken
into consideration on this issue:
a. "Women's Wealth" Property - The parties agreed that the parties'
community interest in the "woman's wealth" jewelry (location unknown) belongs to Ms.
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Joshi. Mr. Joshi stated that he would contact his relatives, who may have some of the
property, and will request its immediate return to Ms. Joshi.
b. Mr. Joshi's Vehicle - Mr. Joshi introduced evidence that the balance
on his 2005 Chevrolet Blazer is $15,009.75 as of March 6, 2009. (Trial Exhibit"A"); and
Kelley Blue Book value for the Blazer is $10,910 (Exhibit "B"). Therefore, a deficit in the
amount of approximately $4,100.00 exists on the vehicle. At the conclusion of trial, Mr.
Joshi requested that he be awarded the Chevrolet Blazer.
Ms. Joshi presented no evidence on this issue. To the Court's knowledge, Ms.
Joshi conducted no discovery on this issue.
c. Ms. Joshi's Vehicle - There was no evidence introduced regarding the
value of Ms. Joshi's car.
d. Son's Vehicle - Mr. Joshi testified that his adult son is presently
driving the Jeep Grand Cherokee and is making the payments for the car directly to the
lender, Clear Star Financial. Both parties testified that Ms. Joshi and the parties' son are
named on the title. No evidence was presented regarding the balance owed on the Jeep
Grand Cherokee.
Ms. Joshi presented no evidence on this issue. To the Court's knowledge,
Ms. Joshi conducted no discovery on this issue.
e. Daughter's Vehicle - Mr. Joshi testified that the parties' adult
daughter drives and makes payments on the Honda Accord and that title is held in the
name of both Mr. Joshi and the parties' daughter.
Ms. Joshi testified that she made a payment of $6,000.00 on her credit card for said
automobile and the present balance on the credit card was approximately $5,000.00.
However, Ms. Joshi presented no evidence to corroborate this contention. Ms. Joshi did
not specify a date on which said debt was incurred, she did not provide evidence of any
payments made on said credit card, and she did not present evidence of any credit card
with a balance in the amount of $5,000.00 remaining thereon.
Ms. Joshi presented no further evidence on this issue.
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e. London Bank Account - Mr. Joshi testified that that he did not know
if Ms. Joshi's earnings from Tanzania were placed in a London bank account. Mr. Joshi
testified he did not control Ms. Joshi's money at that time.
Ms. Joshi presented no evidence that her earnings were placed in a London bank
account. To the Court's knowledge, Ms. Joshi conducted no discovery on this issue.
f. Community Bank Accounts - Ms. Joshi testified that she requested
access to the bank accounts from Mr. Joshi, but that he would not let her see the bank
statements. Further, Ms. Joshi testified that she did have her own credit and she did have
access to Mr. Joshi's credit card statements.
There was no further evidence presented as to the community bank accounts.
4. There is community debt to be divided.
a. General Credit Card Debt - Mr. Joshi testified that he owes
approximately $15,650 in credit card debt (Trial Exhibit "E"), and argued the charges
were incurred for community expenses, holidays, family expenses and household
expenses.
Ms. Joshi presented no evidence regarding community credit card debt.
b. Best Buy Credit Card Debt - Mr. Joshi stated that the parties
purchased a computer and T.V. at Best Buy for approximately $1,314.00. Mr. Joshi
testified Ms. Joshi has both of these items.
Mr. Joshi requested he be awarded the computer presently in Ms. Joshi's
possession and that she retain the T.V.
Ms. Joshi presented no evidence on this issue.
c. Medical Debt - Mr. Joshi testified he owes $6,735.00 to St. Mary's
Hospital for surgery in May 2008 (Trial Exhibit "F") and $500.00 to REMSA (Trial Exhibit
"G").
At trial, Mr. Joshi offered to pay these community debts.
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Ms. Joshi presented no evidence on this issue. To the Court's knowledge, Ms.
Joshi conducted no discovery on this issue.
d. Family Debt - there are two debts owing to family members or on
behalf of family members that were presented at trial.
Mr. Joshi introduced evidence at trial regarding a $5,000.00 debt to Rod and
Meena Fowler (Trial Exhibit "H") in the form of a letter from Rod and Meena Fowler.
The letter states that the parties owe money in the amount of $6,000.00, which was "long
overdue" by approximately six (6) years, for money loaned to Mr. Joshi's mother when
she was ill. The letter references a "copy of your letter agreeing to pay us back", but did
not attach a copy of said letter. At trial, Mr. Joshi testified that he did not have a copy of
the referenced letter. Ms. Joshi testified that this debt was "made up."
Mr. Joshi testified regarding a debt of approximately $5,000 owing to a family
member by the name of Ashik Nanaby (sp?), for buying plane tickets for the Joshi family
to come to the Unites States in 2001. Ms. Joshi testified that she could not obtain any
information regarding this debt as the other party "wanted to stay out of the divorce."
At trial, Mr. Joshi offered to pay these community debts.
e. General Community Debt - Mr. Joshi testified that he pays
approximately $600 per month for community debts, excluding his car and insurance.
Ms. Joshi presented no evidence regarding general community debt.
Mr. Joshi offered to pay the community debt in his name that he had been paying
and take an unequal division of community debt.
5. Ms. Joshi requests spousal support.
Specifically, Ms. Joshi requested spousal support "until her death or remarriage,
whichever occurs first." (Answer, p. 3, lines 5-6).
Mr. Joshi is 51 years of age and Ms. Joshi is 46 years of age. The parties moved to
the United States from Tanzania in 2001.
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Ms. Joshi is a college graduate and has worked continuously since the parties
moved to the United States. Ms. Joshi is presently employed by Raley's as a
pharmaceutical technician and earned approximately $29,500.00 in 2008. Ms. Joshi has
testified she has raised the parties' children and thereby has foregone educational
opportunities and has put her dreams aside.
Mr. Joshi testified he is a high school graduate. Mr. Joshi is employed as a catering
manager. In 20m3, Mr. Joshi earned approximately $41,500.00 while working for two
companies - American Bar and Restaurant and Sierra Sport Service. At trial, Mr. Joshi
introduced his W-2 from American Bar and Restaurant reflecting earnings of $4,157.
(Trial Exhibit "C"); and his W-2 from Sierra Sport Service in the amount of $37,504.18
(Trial Exhibit "D"). Mr. Joshi testified that business is slow and he is presently working
for only one company - American Bar and Restaurant. Mr. Joshi testified he has only two
weeks of work scheduled for March, 2009; and he filed for unemployment benefits in
March, 2009.
Mr. Joshi requested the Court consider his net income after deducting taxes, factor
in the present $600 per month he is presently paying for community debt, and set off any
alimony responsibility by his assumption of an unequal distribution of community debt.
Further, to protect Ms. Joshi in the event Mr. Joshi filed for bankruptcy, Mr. Joshi
suggested that the court maintain jurisdiction over the issue of spousal support for five
years.
5. Ms. Joshi requests reasonable attorney's fees be paid to Washoe Legal
Services for the services of Mr. Coughlin. Mr. Joshi requests reasonable attorney's fees be
paid to his attorney, Mr. Springgate.
On July 18, 2008, Mr. Coughlin filed a Statement of Legal Aid Representation
which states Defendant is receiving "free legal assistance" from Washoe Legal Services
pursuant to NRS 12.015.
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On October 3, 2008, Judge Jordan presided over the parties' Case Management
Conference. At that hearing, the parties were unable to reach a settlement. Further, on
March 12, 2009, Judge Gardner conducted a Settlement Conference for approximately one
and one-half hours, prior to starting the trial at approximately 3:00 pm. The parties did
not agree on settlement and trial was commenced.
In his closing argument at trial, Mr. Coughlin, on behalf of Ms. Joshi, stated that he
did not understand and could not agree with equalizing debt when one party ended up
with a nicer car. He stated that he had"crunched the numbers" and could not see it the
other way. Mr. Coughlin cited an ALR article regarding community debt and stated his
client"does not have much for the creditors to take." He requested that his client assume
one-half the community debt and that the Court find Plaintiff's two $5,000 debts to family
members and friends as Mr. Joshi's separate debts. Mr. Coughlin stated his client is being
asked to "foot the bill" for Plaintiff's debts and referenced that Ms. Joshi is a caring and
committed mother.
Mr. Joshi testified that he had paid Mr. Springgate $4,000.00 since July, 2008,
for attorney's fees and costs.
Mr. Joshi requested that Mr. Coughlin personally pay his attorney's fees for 4.15
hours of trial at the rate of $225 per hour pursuant to NRS 7.085. Mr. Springgate testified
Mr. Coughlin had not conducted any discovery, had produced no evidence regarding
Ms. Joshi's community debts other than her Financial Declaration on file, had presented
no evidence regarding alimony, and had acted in a vexatious and unreasonable manner
in representing Ms. Joshi in this divorce proceeding.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Ongoing Support for the Adult Children's Education-
Pursuant to NRS 125.510(9)(b), except where a contract providing otherwise has
been executed pursuant to NRS 123.080, the obligation for care, education, maintenance
and support of any minor child created by any order entered pursuant to this section
ceases: (a) Upon the death of the person to whom the order was directed; or (b) When
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the child reaches 18 years of age if he is no longer enrolled in high school, otherwise,
when he reaches 19 years of age.
There has been no evidence presented by Ms. Joshi justifying a request for
continuing support of the parties' adult children. As there has been no legal basis
presented to make such a finding, the Court denies Ms. Joshi's request that Mr. Joshi
financially provide for the adult children's education.
2. Community Property/Debt -
Pursuant to NRS 125.150(1)(b) and Putterman v. Putterman, 113 Nev. 606, 939 P.2d
1047 (1997), in granting a divorce, the Court shall ensure an equal disposition of the
community estate, absent compelling reasons justifying an unequal distribution. The
Court must make written findings as to why such a division is appropriate.
a. "Women's Wealth" - The parties have agreed that the parties'
community interests in the "women's wealth" belongs entirely to Ms. Joshi according to
their customary beliefs, and thereby should be declared her sole and separate property.
As such, Mr. Joshi is ordered to contact any and all relatives who may have this property
and immediately return said property to Ms. Joshi as soon as possible.
b. Mr. Joshi's Vehicle - The 2005 Chevrolet Blazer shall be considered
Mr. Joshi's sole and separate property. Mr. Joshi shall be responsible for the debt
remaining thereon. As the car is worth $10,910.00but there is $15,009.75 due and owing
on said car, the Court will consider Mr. Joshi's assumption of this asset as an undertaking
of community debt of approximately $4,100.00.
c. Ms. Joshi's Vehicle - Ms. Joshi's car shall be considered her sole and
separate property. Ms. Joshi shall be responsible for any debt remaining thereon. As
there was no evidence presented as to its value (either positive or negative), the Court is
unable to determine a value for this community asset.
d. Son's Vehicle - As the only evidence presented on this issue was the
fact that the parties' adult son drives this vehicle and makes the payments thereon, this
asset will not be divided among the community.
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e. Daughter's Vehicle - The only evidence presented on this issue was
the fact that the parties' adult daughter drives this car and makes payments thereon. Ms.
Joshi presented no evidence of a balance owing on the car or its fair market value.
Thereby, this car will not be divided as a community asset.
f. London Bank Account - there was no evidence presented to the
Court verifying said bank account exists. As such, there is no factual basis to support an
order dividing it as a community asset.
g. Community Bank Accounts - there was no evidence presented as to
the existence of community bank accounts. As such, there is no factual basis to support
an order dividing it as a community asset.
h. Computer - Mr. Joshi is awarded the computer purchased at Best
Buy. Ms. Joshi shall deliver said computer to Mr. Springgate's office on or before Friday,
April 17, 2009, at 5:00pm.
1. Television - Ms. Joshi is awarded the television purchased at Best
Buy. It is the Court's understanding this television is currently in Ms. Joshi's possession.
J. General Credit Card Debt - The evidence presented indicates a
general debt of approximately $15, 650.00 which has been expended for community
purposes.
Mr. Joshi agreed to be responsible for this debt at trial. As such, Mr. Joshi shall be
solely and separately responsible for this debt.
k. Best Buy Credit Card Debt - The evidence presented indicates there
is a debt of approximately $1,314.00 outstanding for the purchase of the television and
computer.
Mr. Joshi agreed to be responsible for this debt at trial. As such, Mr. Joshi shall be
solely and separately responsible for this debt.
/ / /
/ / /
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1. Medical Debt - As Mr. Joshi has offered to pay these debts, he shall
be solely and separately responsible for the payment of $6,735.00 to St.Mary's Hospital;
and $500.00 to Remsa.
m. Family Debt - There was no documentary evidence presented as to
the debt owing to Ashik Nanaby (sp?) for buying plane tickets for the Joshi family.
Further, as the only evidence provided regarding the $5,000.00 debt to Rod and Meena
Fowler indicates said debt was incurred for the benefit of Mr. Joshi's mother. As
Mr. Joshi has agreed to take on both of these debts, they shall henceforth be his sole and
separate responsibility.
n. General Community Debt - There was no evidence other than
testimonial evidence to establish community debts. As Mr. Joshi has offered to pay any
remaining community debt in his name that is hereafter outstanding, said debt shall be
the sole and separate responsibility of Mr. Joshi.
The Court notes Mr. Joshi has likely incurred an unequal distribution of the
community debt in this case. The Court finds his testimonial acquiescence at trial to take
on this debt is a compelling reason to make an unequal distribution of the community
debt.
3. Spousal Support-
The statutory mandate for alimony is that it be "just and equitable."
NRS 125.150(1)(a). Alimony is an equitable award to serve the post-decree needs and
rights of the former spouse. Wolff v. Wolff, 112 Nev. 1355, 929 P.2d 916 (1996). Although
post-decree incomes need not be equalized, in marriages of some duration, alimony may
be used to narrow large gaps between the post-divorce earning capacities of the parties
and to allow the recipient spouse to live"as nearly as possible to the station in life
enjoyed before the divorce." Shydler v. Shydler, 114 Nev. 192, 196954 P.2d 37,39 (1998).
The individual circumstances of each case will determine the appropriate amount and
length of any alimony award. Id.
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Pursuant to NRS 125.150(8), there are eleven (11) factors the court shall consider in
awarding alimony.
Ms. Joshi presented no evidence in support of her request for alimony other than
her own testimonial evidence that she raised the parties' children, had foregone
educational opportunities, and put her dreams on hold while married. Ms. Joshi testified
that she is healthy and has always worked. There was no reference to any of the eleven
factors in NRS 125.150(8) in Ms. Joshi's presentation and argument in support of an
award of spousal support.
The Court finds that the parties presently earn approximately the same amount,
Ms. Joshi earns $2,458 per month and Mr. Joshi earned approximately $3,125 per month
in 2008, but testified he is working substantially less in 2009 and has filed for
unemployment benefits the beginning of March 2009. (See NRS 125.150(8)(a)). The
parties have been married 21 years and Ms. Joshi has always been employed during that
time. (See NRS 125.150(8)(d)). Ms. Joshi obtained a college degree prior to marriage and
Mr. Joshi has a high school degree. (See NRS 125.150(8)(h)). Both parties are healthy and
able to work. (See NRS 125.150(8)(k)).
Based upon the evidence presented and the applicable law, this Court does not
believe Ms. Joshi is entitled to an award of alimony.
4. Attorney's Fees-
This Court enjoys discretion to award attorney's fees in a divorce action. (See
NRS 125.150(3); Love v. Love, 114 Nev. 572, 959 P.2d 523 (1998).) Also, pursuant to
NRS 18.010(2)(b), the court has authority to order attorney's fees "when the court finds
that the... defense of the opposing party was brought or maintained without reasonable
ground or to harass the prevailing party." Finally, pursuant to NRS 7.085, if a court
finds that an attorney has: (a) filed, maintained or defended a civil action or proceeding
in any court in this State and such action or defense is not well-grounded in fact or is not
warranted by existing law or by an argument for changing the existing law that is made
in good faith; or (b) unreasonably and vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding
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beforeanycourtinthisState,thecourtshallrequiretheattorneypersonallytopaythe
2 additionalcosts,expensesandattorney'sfeesreasonablyincurredbecauseofsuch
3 conduct.
4 At trial,Mr.SpringgatestatedthatMr.Coughlinhadconductedno discoveryin
thiscase. Inaddition,Mr.Coughlinfailedtopresentonedocumentarypieceofevidence
6 attrialonbehalfofMs.Joshi'sclaims. Mr.CoughlinarguedincessantlywiththeCourt
7 throughouttrialandmadesarcastic,derogatoryremarksto theCourt,Mr.Springgate,
8 andMr.Joshithroughouttrial.
9 TheCourtnotesthattherewerewellover40objectionsduringfour(4)hoursof
trial. Mr.Springgate'sobjectionswerewell-foundedandcontinuouslysustainedexcept
11 inoneinstance. Mr. Coughlinwasoverruledoneveryobjectionexceptoneandargued
12 withtheCourtovermostrulings. Mr.Coughlinwasadmonishedapproximately15times
13 by the Courtto quitarguing,to askspecificquestions,to discontinueaskingquestions
14 callingfor alegalconclusion,andtorefrainfrommakingdegradingremarkstobothMr.
Joshi andMr.Springgate.
16 TheCourtnotesthatatonepoint,afteranexhibithadbeenadmitted,
17 Mr. Coughlincouldnotfindthecopyprovidedby Mr.Springgatein discovery. Mr.
18 Coughlindemandedacopybe providedat trial,stating"amIsupposedtoberifling
19 throughmypapers? My understandingisthatyouaresupposedto provideacopy."
Whenaskedif he hadthecopyofthedocument,Mr.Coughlinstated,"1 donotknow. I
21 couldspendmytimeandmentalenergylookingaroundfor Mr.Springgate'sdocument
22 likeIamhis assistant,or wecouldask Mr.Springgateto provideacopyatthetimeheis
23 seekingadmissionlikeIbelievetherulestates." Mr. Coughlincitednoruleandthen
24 proceededto interrupttheproceedingstwiceapproximatelyfive (5)minutesandtwelve
(12)minutespostrulingtore-arguethe point. Mr.Springgaterepliedto thearguments
26 byreferencingwhenexactlythecopyhadbeenprovidedtoMr. Coughlinduring
27 discoveryandwherethecopycouldbe located. The Courthadto admonishMr.
28 Coughlinto quitarguingthepointandreiteratethattheexhibithadbeenadmitted.
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Mr. Coughlinfiled anAnswerandCounterclaimon Ms.Joshi'sbehalfthat
includedallegationsunsupportedby law;andfiled anOppositionto therequestfor
returnofMr.Joshi'spassportwithoutanyfactualorlegalbasis. Further,attrial,Mr.
Coughlinpresentedalmostno evidencetosupportMs.Joshi'srequestsandclaims.
ThemosttroublingaspectofthiscasewasMr. Coughlin'srude,sarcasticand
disrespectfulpresentationattrial;Mr. Coughlin'sinabilityto understandabalancesheet;
hisfailuretoconductdiscovery;andhis lack ofknowledgewithregardto the rulesof
evidenceandtrialprocedure. Allofthiswascompoundedwithacontinuously
antagonisticpresentationofthecase thatresultedinashiftfromafairlysimpledivorce
case toacontentiousdivorcetriallastinganexcessiveamountoftime.
For allthesereasons,theCourtfindsthatMr. Coughlin'spresentationofthecase
andargumentsinsupportthereofto be unfoundedinfact, unwarrantedby existinglaw,
unreasonable,andvexatiousthroughoutthisentireproceeding.
Basedupontheforegoing,Mr.Springgate'srequestthatMr. Coughlinpersonally
payMr.Joshi4.15hoursattherateof$225perhourfor thecostofthetrialisGRANTED.
Mr.Coughlinshallsubmitacheckto Mr.Joshi intheamountof$934within30daysof
thisOrder.
5. PreparationoftheDecree-
Mr. Springgateshallpreparethedecreeofdivorceconsistentwiththis
memorandumdecision. Mr. Springgateshalltenderhis proposeddecreetoMr.
Coughlin,pursuanttoWDCR9,within20daysfromthedateofthisorder.
GOODCAUSEAPPEARING,IT ISSOORDERED.
Dated: April 2009. ..;/ /7

DISTRICTJUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Pursuantto NRCP5(b),IcertifythatIamanemployeeofthe SecondJudicial
DistrictCourt,andthatonthe dayofApril,2009,Ielectronicallyfiled the foregoing
withthe ClerkoftheCourtSystemwhichwillsendanoticeofelectronicfilingto the
following:
Document: ORDER AFTERTRIAL
JOHNP.SPRINGGATEESQ
ZACHARYB.COUGHLINESQ

AdministrativeAssistant
14

Request for Reconsideration - 1
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Code 2490
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
299 S. Arlington Ave
Bar No.: 9473
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
Attorney for Zach Coughlin

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DIVISION OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Ashwin Joshi,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Bharti Joshi,
Defendant
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)

Dept. 14

REQUEST FOR ADJUSTMENT OF FILING DATE OR EXTENSION OF TIME
COMES NOW, Zach Coughlin, Esq., on behalf of himself with respect to the personally
liability for attorneys fees pursuant to NRS 7.085. Mr. Coughlin attempted to timely file a
Request for Reconsideration on eFile, however, a technical deficiency regarding the signature
line resulted in a rejection of the filing. Annie of the filing office communicated this to Mr.
Coughlin on April 29
th
, 2009, and indicated it required a refilling (775 328 3112 is Annie contact
number).
Dated this 29
th
day of April, 2009
/sig/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
On his own behalf

This watermark does not appear in the registered version - http://www.clicktoconvert.com
F I L E D
Electronically
04-29-2009:04:48:38 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an agent of Zach Coughlin, Esq. and that on
the 27
th
day of April, 2009, I electronically filed at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the within
REQUEST FOR ADJUSTMENT OF FILING DATE OR EXTENSION OF TIME, fully
addressed to:
JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ
203 S. Arlington Ave.
Reno, NV 89501


The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social
security number of any person.

Dated this 29
th
Day of April, 2009

Melissa Ulloa /sig/
Melissa Ulloa
Agent of Zach Coughlin, Esq.


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Code 2490
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
299 S. Arlington Ave
Bar No.: 9473
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
Attorney of Record for Joshi Bharti*

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DIVISION OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Ashwin Joshi,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Bharti Joshi,
Defendant
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Dept. 14

REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION; REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO
RESPOND
COMES NOW, Zach Coughlin, Esq., on behalf of himself with respect to the personally
liability for attorneys fees pursuant to NRS 7.085, and commenting to the Court in regard to his
representation of the Defendant, Joshi Bharti, and moves the Court to Reconsider the Order After
Trial it entered and served electronically on April 13
th
, 2009. This motion is made and based
upon the attached memorandum of points and authorities and all the papers and pleadings on file
in this action.

F I L E D
Electronically
04-30-2009:03:35:14 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court

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(Please Note: Mr. Coughlin attempted a to timely file this Request on eFile, however, a technical
deficiency regarding the signature line resulted in a rejection of the filing, communicated to Mr.
Coughlin on April 29
th
, 2009, and required a refilling after being informed of the problem by
Annie at the filing office (775 328 3112 is Annie contact number).
Dated this 27
th
day of April, 2009
/sig/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
On his own behalf

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

The Order Requiring Attorney to Personally Pay Opposing Counsels Legal Fees Should be
Reconsidered and Set Aside.

Mr. Coughlin wishes to express his sincere and profound respect for this Court and for
opposing counsel John Springgate, Esq. He recognizes the valuable opportunity presented by
the criticisms set forth and is resolved to redouble his efforts in developing along the path of
becoming a consummate professional of the ilk to which Judge Gardner and Mr. Springgate
belong. Mr. Coughlin feels is fair to point out that subsequent to this Trial Mr. Springgate
reached out to Mr. Coughlin and a very productive communiqu resulted which has led to Mr.
Coughlin being fortunate enough to be provided much useful instruction in aid of Mr. Coughlins
journey to, hopefully, one day becoming anywhere near as accomplished and respected a
professional as Mr. Springgate.
*It is important to note at the outset that Mr. Coughlin does not believe he is currently
representing Ms. Joshi. It is Mr. Coughlins understanding that Washoe Legal Services
substituted a different attorney to represent Ms. Joshi henceforth in this case. Mr. Coughlin has

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and intends to continue to make every appropriate attempt to accomplish this transition in a
manner that attends to all matters of concern to Ms. Joshi.
This Court enjoys discretion to award attorney's fees in a divorce action. (See NRS
125.150(3); Love v. Love, 114 Nev. 572, 959 P.2d 523 (1998)). Also, pursuant to NRS
18.010(2)(b), the court has authority to order attorney's fees "when the court finds that
the...defense of the opposing party was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to
harass the prevailing party." Finally, pursuant to NRS 7.085, if a court finds that an attorney has:
(a) filed, maintained or defended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State and such
action or defense is not well- grounded in fact or is not warranted by existing law or by an
argument for changing the existing law that is made in good faith; or (b) unreasonably and
vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding before any court in this State, the court shall
require the attorney personally to pay the additional costs, expenses and attorney's fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
Whether counsel defended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State where such
action or defense is not warranted by existing law or by an argument for changing the
existing law that is made in good faith?

Should Ms. Joshi have been ordered to pay half the community credit card debt (for
which her personal property probably could not be used to satisfy as she was not a cosigner on
nearly all of the accounts), any subsequent failure on her part to do so could likely not be
used as a proper basis to set off any alimony award received. However, the Courts Order
After Trial points out that Mr. Joshi requested the Court consider his net income after deducting
taxes, factoring in the present $600 per month he is presently paying for community debt, and
set off any alimony responsibility by his assumption of an unequal distribution of
community debt. (Emphasis added). The Courts Order seems to endorse this arrangement as

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fair and acceptable and the Courts statements to Mr. Coughlin and Ms. Joshi at the Settlement
Conference explicitly indicated how well grounded in legal custom this scenario was thought to
be. However, the majority rule in the various states and overwhelming balance of recorded case
law suggests otherwise, sometimes very strongly. Nevada may not have authority directly on
point, though In Re Anders (a bankruptcy case from Nevada) may be.
The court in each of the following cases determined that an offset against an arrearage of
alimony for payments to various third parties on behalf of a former spouse, including tuition and
sums spent in satisfaction of a bank loan or credit card charges, would not be permitted. The
special nature and purpose of the support obligation owed by a divorced spouse to her former
spouse will be a consideration affecting the court's determination of the propriety of an offset in
most instances. For example, in several jurisdictions in which the courts have determined that
the support obligation is a "duty" and not a "debt," it has been held that a setoff of an ordinary
debt should not permitted as a matter of right against the support obligation. It should be noted
that in a few jurisdictions, there is no indication that an offset considered by the court to
retroactively modify the decree will be permitted under any, or at least most, circumstances.
Nevada does not appear to have any reported case law on this issue, as can sometimes be the
case.
Remanding the case for a new trial to determine whether the wife consented to certain
payments to third parties in lieu of alimony arrearages due under a separation agreement, the
court in Lopez v Lopez (1980, App) 125 Ariz. 309, 609 P2d 579, observed that support
payments, whether for the wife's or child's support, are to be disbursed by the supported spouse
as she sees fit, and the supporting spouse ordinarily is not entitled to credits against past-due
support for monies that he paid to third parties on his own accord and without her consent.

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The court in Morel v Morel (1982, La App 5th Cir) 425 So 2d 1289, cert den (La) 430 So
2d 99, refused to allow as an offset against delinquent alimony pendente lite and child support
several non-complying expenditures by the husband, including the payment of the children's
tuition, a community debt, when the amount expended could be recovered by him at the time of
the settlement of the marital community, and the payment was not made pursuant to the spouses'
agreement. A request by the wife that the husband make such payments during a later time
period was found irrelevant to the instant indirect payments.
Although apparently agreeing with jurisprudence to the effect that the supported spouse is
entitled to spend support funds as she chooses, and the supporting spouse may not usurp this
right by making payments to others on his own accord, the court in Feazell v Feazell (1984, La
App 3d Cir) 445 So 2d 143, held that the husband's payments to third parties on behalf of his
former wife were not unilateral, but in accordance with the wife's direction and, consequently,
permissible.
Where the wife testified that she used the credit card to "balance out" household expenses
for herself and the children while the couple was separated, the court in Youngberg v Youngberg
(1986, La App 4th Cir) 499 So 2d 329, would not permit an offset against post-divorce
permanent alimony and child support arrearages for one-half of the credit card charges. The
husband had been ordered to pay alimony pendente lite and child support during the period in
which the charges were made, but was current in his payments at that time, and asserted that the
wife made the charges without his permission. The wife maintained that the credit card charges
were for expenses for which the husband was responsible. The court concluded that neither
spouse intended such a credit when the husband paid the credit card account balance, denying the
offset apparently based on the lack of evidence of an agreement between the parties.

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In Gottsegen v Gottsegen (1987, La App 4th Cir) 508 So 2d 162, the court disallowed
credit against past-due permanent alimony for pre-award payments made on veterinarian and
cable television bills when those items could not be considered necessary for the wife's support,
pursuant to La.R.S. 9:310, which provided for the retroactive effect of such awards subject to
credit for any support provided.
Credit card charges for the purchase of luggage and an airline ticket by the wife
immediately prior to separation, which apparently fell to the husband to pay, were not offset
against arrears in alimony pendente lite by the court in Rauch v Rauch (1988, La App 5th Cir)
535 So 2d 1317, when the husband's claim was not "liquidated" within the meaning of LSA-C.C.
art. 1893, the statutory setoff provision.
Although affirming the lower court's postponement of a decision respecting the husband's
right to credit until the divorce trial because this aspect of the decision was not appealed, the
court in Keff v Keff (1983, 3d Dept) 95 App Div 2d 888, 464 NYS2d 29, remarked that a
judgment requiring the husband to pay the full amount of the claimed arrears in temporary
maintenance and child support would have been appropriate, notwithstanding a claimed setoff
for amounts paid by him for attorney's fees owed by the wife (Ms. Joshi should receive a similar
set off for the fees paid to Mr. Springgate). The court noted that the husband neither moved for
relief of the support order, nor proffered any reason for his neglect, and his unilateral reduction
of support was improper.
The court in Gluck v Gluck (1987, 2d Dept) 134 App Div 2d 237, 520 NYS2d 581,
concluded that a husband's payment of the spouses' credit card bills, apparently prior to divorce,
could not be offset against arrears in (temporary) maintenance and child support owed to his
wife.

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In Bruner v Bruner (1978, La App 2d Cir) 356 So 2d 1101, cert. gr. (La) 358 So 2d 641,
it was held that the trial court erred in allowing a husband credit or an offset against a claimed
arrearage of alimony pendente lite for payments made by him to third parties on his wife's behalf
where the evidence did not show that the payments were made at the request of, or with the
consent of, his wife.
A husband was not entitled to credit against arrears in pendente lite maintenance and
child support for voluntary payments he made to third parties for his wife's and children's
benefit, according to the court in Krantz v Krantz (1991, 2d Dept) 175 App Div 2d 865, 573
NYS 2d 738, on the ground that several of the payments also satisfied the husband's
contractual obligations.
And, in Kerpen v Kerpen (1991, 2d Dept) 172 App Div 2d 496, 567 NYS2d 849, the
court refused to credit a husband with voluntary payments made on behalf of his wife for "club
and other items" toward the sum of money owed by him for maintenance and child support under
a pendente lite order.
Mr. Springgate presented no case law or other legal authority beyond his own
professional opinion as to the legal basis for including such a set off for payments owed to third
party creditors in satisfying a domestic support obligation. Courts universally have embraced
the position that the unique nature or purpose of the support obligation owed to the former
spouse must be considered in any determination as to whether a setoff would be permitted
against that obligation. Mr. Springgate, who provided a thorough exposition in court (that
astutely referenced the Hein and Rodriguez cases) regarding the precedential history of
excluding evidence of the respective fault of the parties in property distribution and also in,
perhaps, an alimony determination, seemingly was unaware of the reasonableness and firm

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grounding in multitudinous precedent for sticking to the position that a debt to a third party
creditor might not be used to properly offset an alimony obligation.
This, so much so that Mr. Springgate felt it reasonable to move for Mr. Coughlin to
personally pay Mr. Joshis legal fees, at least in part, for Mr. Coughlins part in Ms. Joshis
declining to accept the offered settlement. One might wonder whether Mr. Springgates request
for sanctions in that regard was well- grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or by an
argument for changing the existing law that is made in good faith, or whether it unreasonably
and vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding before any court in this State.
The court in Palmer v Palmer (1966) 52 Misc 2d 610, 275 NYS2d 978, recognized the
principle that a husband may not set off against unpaid alimony and child support payable to his
wife debts or claims owed to him by her, nor payments made by the husband to third parties for
the benefit of his wife or child without the wife's prior consent that they be instead of the amount
fixed by the matrimonial judgment or order, although in the controversy before the court,
concerning summer camp expenses paid by the husband on behalf of a daughter, the wife waived
the rule. The court added that without consent, indirect payments must be regarded in addition to,
not in lieu of, the support fixed by the court, that is a gift.
The court in Compton v Compton (1987, Tenn. App. Middle Section) No. 86-258-II,
held that a husband could not offset against alimony arrearages bills paid on behalf of his wife
without her request or agreement that the payments were in lieu of alimony, but in making the
payments had conferred to her an "officious benefit." The husband paid less alimony per month
than the amount ordered by the court, but contended that he also paid bills for his wife which
more than offset the deficiency for that period. Refusing to permit the offset against the
deficiency in alimony, the court pointed out that to vary the terms and allow a set off for the

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payment of other bills not included in the decree would subject the courts to a plethora of
such claims, making enforcement of the simplest divorce decree a quagmire for the trial
judge.
The language emphasized immediately above brings up an interesting point. The
Settlement, and ultimately the Order After Trial call for a situation where Ms. Joshi may well
(and it is very likely according to Mr. Springgate) need to ask this Court to have another hearing
in the future should Mr. Joshi discharge any of the debts he has been ordered to pay (or perhaps
even where Ms. Joshi has done so). However, the resolution urged by Ms. Joshis counsel would
arguably be more in line with judicial economy were courts in this State to adopt the majority
rule forbidding the offset of alimony due through payment to third party creditors. To the extent
the case loads in Family Court are so overburdening, having such a clear statement of the law
would obviate the need to have more and more contempt hearings following the discharge of a
supporting spouses obligations in bankruptcy.
Can it be said, considering NRS 7.085, that Mr. Coughlin filed, maintained or defended
a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State and such action or defense [was] not well-
grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or by an argument for changing the existing law
that is made in good faith in the instant case? Mr. Coughlin respectfully urges this Court to
consider the arguments set forth herein for reasons why the sanctions entered could be
reconsidered.
Seemingly, the award of attorneys fees relates, in part, to Mr. Coughlins failing to
counsel his client to accept a settlement offer whereby Ms. Joshi would agree to take $1.00 of
alimony for five years in exchange for Mr. Joshi agreeing to be responsible for about $20,000 of
consumer debt. This is the arrangement contemplated by Siragusa, and it makes sense when

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courts are adjudicating the marital dissolutions of extremely wealthy parties. This is not one of
those situations. This consumer debt was largely incurred on the Mr. Joshis credit cards, to
which Ms. Joshi was not a co-signer or authorized user and was never allowed to examine any
sort of itemized statement of the charges incurred (despite Mr. Coughlins written requests to
opposing counsel and indication that allowing her to do so would further settlement
negotiations). Exhibits A and B (please note that not all such correspondences are immediately
available to Mr. Coughlin given the situation referenced elsewhere in this Motion). Whether the
large balance transfers Mr. Joshi testified to making were made to transfer debt from an account
for which he was the only signatory to one where Ms. Joshi was a co-signatory (and thus could
see her separate property used to satisfy the debt) is certainly a valid point of inquiry.
Mr. Coughlin argued against accepting such a settlement (though he certainly informed
Ms. Joshi that the decision to go to trial was largely hers, but an attempt will be made to veer
away from considering the divergent interests of attorney and client in situations such as these, as
well as the lack of notice constitutional problems associated with NRS 7.085 awards). Mr.
Coughlin anticipated the trial may well result in an alimony award to Ms. Joshi of roughly $500
per month, potentially for over 10 years, when considering that equalizing payments for a
$12,000 yearly income disparity was a good yardstick for a 21 year marriage that produced two
children. This seems particularly true where it would take 12-20 years of payments to get Ms.
Joshi to social security age.
Should Ms. Joshi have been ordered to pay half the community credit card debt (for
which her personal property probably could not be used to satisfy as she was not a cosigner on
nearly all of the accounts), any subsequent failure on her part to do so could likely not be
used as a proper basis to set off any alimony award received. However, the Courts Order

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After Trial points out that Mr. Joshi requested the Court consider his net income after deducting
taxes, factor in the present $600 per month he is presently paying for community debt, and set
off any alimony responsibility by his assumption of an unequal distribution of community
debt. (Emphasis added). Additionally, the Court noted that to protect Ms. Joshi in the event
Mr. Joshi filed for bankruptcy, Mr. Joshi suggested that the court maintain jurisdiction over the
issue of spousal support for five years.
Indeed at the Settlement Conference (which was conducted the same day as the Trial,
something Mr. Coughlin agreed to in an effort to appease Mr. Joshis counsel stated desire to
encourage judicial economy) the Court seemed to indicated the reasonableness of this settlement
proposal and the jurisdictional $1.00 payment. It was unclear whether any subsequently
increased support obligation over and above the $1.00 set forth in the decree would enjoy
priority over third party creditors should Mr. Joshi file bankruptcy. It is clear that support
obligations enjoy priority in bankruptcy proceedings, it is not as clear whether this priority is
with respect to the original $1.00 per year award, or to any subsequently modified amount.
Like many domestic violence cases, the Settlement offered essentially exerted a good
deal of inappropriate power and control (a la the Duluth model) over Ms. Joshi and her rights
and Mr. Coughlin objected to that and is hopeful others can see why he felt strongly that doing
so was the right thing to do.
The Courts Order after Trial is not sufficiently detailed and specific to support an award
personally requiring counsel to pay opposing sides attorneys fees.

-Requirements of specific findings

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In the following cases, the courts held or recognized that specific findings by the trial
court were required before an attorney could be assessed with his opponent's fees. Major v First
Va. Bank, 97 Md. App 520, 631 A2d 127 (1993). (RICO claim; $25,000 for counsel fees).
In O'Brien v Cseh, (1983, 2d Dist) 148 Cal App 3d 957, 196 Cal Rptr 409 ( 12[b]), the court
found that an order by the trial court assessing attorney fees against counsel and giving only
"good cause appearing" as a reason for the sanction failed to meet the statutory requirement of a
detailed recital of the circumstances justifying the imposition of sanctions.
The court reversed an award of fees against an attorney that was imposed by the trial
court without any finding as to the actual costs incurred by the opposing parties, in City of El
Monte v Takei, (1984, 2d Dist) 158 Cal App 3d 244, 204 Cal Rptr 559 ( 9[a]). The case was
remanded for a hearing to determine reasonable expenses and counsel fees, since under the
applicable court rules the sanctions were limited to that amount.
If Mr. Joshis bare and inconsistent assertions in court regarding the various debts he
sought this Court to divide constitutes sufficient evidence for the court a question arises. Why
is this proof deemed sufficient with regard to the evidence presented where, when Ms. Joshis
points of contention are backed by similar evidence (testimony and financial declarations), the
court takes issue with the lack of evidence presented? Mr. Coughlin recognizes the level of skill
Mr. Springgate displays in court, when combined with the far superior reputation amongst his
peers in legal circles that Mr. Springgate enjoys arguably entitles Mr. Springgate the benefit of
the doubt.
Trial court abused its discretion in imposing a monetary sanction on the ground of failure
to perform a reasonable investigation before filing claims; no evidence was presented at the
sanctions hearing, and the sanctions order did not state that the trial court considered evidence.

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Russell v. McBride Elec., Inc., 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 2022 (Tex. App. Dallas Mar. 16 2006).
Administrative findings and decision were not supported by substantial evidence and the record
did not demonstrate a reasonable basis for the ALJ's refusal to set aside the default order;
however, the record did not demonstrate that the department's motion for new trial was a
pleading frivolously presented for an improper purpose, unwarranted by existing law, and
without evidentiary support, and there was no showing that the motion was filed in bad faith to
support an award of attorney's fees. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Frieda, 112 S.W.3d 768, 2003
Tex. App. LEXIS 6604 (Tex. App. Beaumont 2003). In a lawyer's action to impose sanctions
against another lawyer, the sanctions were reversed as the stated bases for the sanction were
violations of Tex. Civ. Pac. & Rem. Code Ann. chs. 9, 10 and Tex. R. Civ. P. 13; both the lack of
evidence for the amount of necessary attorney's fees and the failure of the trial court to
demonstrate either the rationale for the sanction imposed or that a lesser sanction would have
sufficed, required a remand. Hemphill v. Hummel, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 5799 (Tex. App.
Corpus Christi July 31 2008). In a case where a mother was trying to recover real property from
her daughter, sanctions were properly not awarded because there was some evidence supporting
the daughter's counterclaims for breach of contract and fraud; the mother did not disprove
allegations made by the daughter that she and her husband had paid part of the cost of a septic
system, as well as the taxes on the property. Delahoussaye v. Kana, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS
8561 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. Nov. 13 2008).
In Charles v Charles, (1986, Dist Col App) 505 A2d 462 ( 4[a]), the court reversed an
assessment of attorney fees against an attorney, where the trial court had failed to make a
specific finding of bad faith. The court stated that it is within the inherent authority of trial
courts to assess attorney fees against an attorney who has acted in bad faith, if the sanction is

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imposed after fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the record. But although counsel's
conduct in this case made an assessment of fees appropriate, and there had been fair notice
and a hearing on the plaintiff's motion for attorney fees, the court decided that the absence of
a specific finding of bad faith required reversal and remand for a new hearing directed to that
issue.
The Courts Order after Trial in the Joshi divorce matter did not contain any language
related to this intent question. This Order failed to specify whether the court found counsels
actions to exhibit bad faith. As such the sanction should not be upheld as it is not sufficiently
detailed and specific.
Before a proper finding of a Frivolous claim may be made under a statute authorizing fee
awards against attorneys on that basis, it is necessary for the trial court to find that the
attorney knew that the action was without any reasonable basis in law and could not be
supported by a good- faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,
held the court, in Radlein v Industrial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., (1984) 117 Wis. 2d 605, 345
NW2d 874. The court stated a two-pronged test for determining an attorney's responsibility in
sanctions for commencing a Frivolous action: first, is the law ready for an extension,
modification, or reversal; and if not, then second, was the argument for such change made in
good faith even though not successful. Frivolous action claims are an especially delicate area,
said the court, since the ingenuity, foresightedness, and competency of the bar should be
encouraged and not stifled.
The Courts Order After Trial in the case at bar should reconsider any finding that
counsel put forth an action that was without basis in law (it is not entirely clear what NRS 7.085
contemplates necessary with respect to the intent issue). Mr. Coughlin mentioned the Siragusa

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and Allen opinions in court and referenced the American Law Reports covering the pertinent
issues underlying the dispute with regard to the appropriateness of the settlement discussed. The
ALRs counsel was referring to are Debts for alimony, maintenance, and support as
exceptions to bankruptcy discharge, under 523(a)(5) of Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11
U.S.C.A. 523(a)(5)), 69 A.L.R. Fed. 403; Spouse's right to set off debt owed by other
spouse against accrued spousal or child support payments, 11 A.L.R.5th 259 (Originally
published in 1993); Change in financial condition or needs of husband or wife as ground for
modification of decree for alimony or maintenance, 18 A.L.R.2d 10 (Originally published in
1951) .
In a post-divorce proceeding, the court did not err in modifying husband's alimony
obligation by continuing it beyond term called for in decree where original decree called for
husband to make alimony payments to wife of $3,000 per month for sixty months, where decree
also required husband to pay wife $1.250 million over fifteen years for her share of community
property interest in husband's medical practice, where husband fell behind in his payments and
his property settlement obligation was later discharged in bankruptcy although his alimony
obligation was not, where court properly considered discharged obligation as "changed
circumstance" justifying modification in that discharge of obligation had changed both husband's
and wife's financial circumstances, and where modification of alimony award based upon
discharged property settlement obligation did not re-create debt discharged under federal
bankruptcy laws. Siragusa v Siragusa, 108 Nev 987, 843 P2d 807, CCH Bankr L Rptr 75035
(1992); In re Siragusa, 27 F.3d 406, 31 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 890, Bankr. L. Rep. P 75,965,
C.A.9 (Nev.), June 20, 1994 (NO. 92-16788).

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There is no explicit relation of debt allocation and community property distributions to
the spouses. The Nevada statutes do not mandate any particular order of decision among child
support, spousal support, property division, or debt allocation. This has led to a certain amount of
confusion as judges attempt to achieve equity through a holistic approach to deciding all issues
in the case. (Marshall Willick, Esq. article at http://www.willicklawgroup.com/get_file/id=283).
The Nevada Supreme Court has opined that where a party does not pay the debts that
were supposed to be paid, that party is not entitled to the property share that was awarded based
on anticipation of such payment. Allen v. Allen, 112 Nev. ___, ___ P.2d ___ (Adv. Opn. No.
149, Oct. 22, 1996). The Nevada Supreme Court has likewise allowed the reopening of alimony
to the party to whom a debt fell because the other party was supposed to pay that debt but failed
to do so. Martin v. Martin, 108 Nev. 384, 832 P.2d 390 (1992). What is still lacking, however,
is any clear guideposts as to which party should have been allocated what debt to begin with.
The Nevada case law, however, appears to presume that the debt terms set out in the decree are
absolute, and that other terms, such as alimony (See Martin v. Martin, 108 Nev. 384, 832 P.2d
390 (1992)), or property division (See Allen v. Allen, 112 Nev. ___, ___ P.2d ___ (Adv. Opn.
No. 149, Oct. 22, 1996)), will be amended to enforce the debt division. In the interests of
judicial economy it is important to note that, while there is no significant appellate authority on
these subjects, costly proceedings in the lower courts to enforce debt payment terms by less
drastic means (primarily, contempt sanctions) are common.
To the extent that the Courts sanctions in the case at bar were motivated by a concern for
judicial economy, fashioning a decree that will potentially see these parties returning to court to
litigate costly contempt proceedings should Mr. Joshi (or perhaps Ms. Joshi, though much case

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law is presented here that would argue against it) discharge his various debts in bankruptcy
seems ill advised.
In Nevada, except for real estate and jointly- managed businesses, it appears that both
spouses have free reign to incur debt for which the community is responsible. It also seems
rather clear that the creditors of such community debt are unaffected by anything in a divorce
decree from pursuing either of the parties for repayment. See Marine Midland Bank v.
Monroe, 104 Nev. 307, 756 P.2d 1193 (1988) (bank is free to pursue wife for delinquent joint
credit card debt despite divorce courts order for husband to pay such debt). It is typically very
difficult to pursue a spouse who is not a cosigner with respect to using that spouses separate
property covers any community debt.
In Martin v. Martin, 108 Nev. 384, 832 P.2d 390 (1992), an August 1988 divorce decree
ordered child support and for the husband to pay two Visa accounts. He filed bankruptcy in
September, and had them discharged in April of 1989. The wife filed a motion for spousal
support; after an evidentiary hearing, the lower court found that the debt payment terms were
characterized as being in the nature of alimony, maintenance and support and so ordered
support in an amount sufficient to repay wife for credit debts now falling to her. On appeal, the
Nevada Supreme Court affirmed that in this case the hold harmless provisions qualified as
maintenance or support, since court found that without it the spouse would be inadequately
supported. The husbands assumption of debt was tied to an agreement for lower child support,
and when he breached the agreement, he left her inadequately supported. While discharge was
proper, he could not discharge obligations arising out of the decree. The appellate court
apparently did not address timeliness question of how wife could file a motion for alimony
nearly a year after the divorce was final (local rules permit only six months to modify a decree

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under NRCP60(b)), but there may have been additional procedural facts not recited in the
opinion.
In Allen v. Allen, the husband and wife entered into an oral property settlement; the wife
waived child support, and the husband agreed to pay certain debts and pay $16,250.00 to the
wife to equalize the division of community property. 112 Nev. ___, ___ P.2d ___ (Adv. Opn.
No. 149, Oct. 22, 1996). The agreement was made during a settlement conference held by the
district court judge, but was not reduced to writing for a year, when the court entered a divorce
decree nunc pro tunc adopting the agreement. In the interim, the husband filed bankruptcy, and
was released from most of the financial obligations. The wife claimed that the husband used
the bankruptcy to defraud her out of her share of the community property and that because of the
bankruptcy there was a failure to equalize the division of community property as intended. The
wife moved to set aside the decree, which was denied by the district court as barred by federal
law.
The Supreme Court, noting that the district court knew all these facts, expressed no
understanding of why the district court would enter the decree in the first place, but held that in
any event, it was error to refuse to set it aside. Noting its holding in Siragusa v. Siragusa (108
Nev. 987, 843 P.2d 807 (1992)), the Court again held that the lower court could consider the
effect of the husbands bankruptcy upon the community and the rights of the parties, but this is
not to say the state court would be interfering in any way with the bankruptcy courts decree.
The Court expressly rejected the husbands assertion that the wifes fraud claim was waived
under 11 U.S.C. 524 because she failed to file a complaint in the bankruptcy action. Finally,
the Court concluded that even aside from the question of fraud, the decree entered was inherently
unfair and should be set aside: Under no circumstances, bankruptcy or no bankruptcy, should

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one party to a divorce be allowed to take all of the benefits of the divorce settlement and leave
the other party at the disadvantage suffered by the wife in the present case. Although some of
these comments may be dicta, Allen provides authority for the proposition that whenever a
bankruptcy has an effect upon the community and the rights of the parties, a motion can be
entertained to ameliorate that effect.
However, it appears that an intervening bankruptcy has no effect on the liability of
the non-custodian for child support arrears, or the ability of the custodian to collect them.
In In Re Anders, No. BK-S-91-24783-LBR (Bk. Ct., D. Nev., Mar. 10, 1993), the court held that
a former wife who declares chapter seven bankruptcy could retain a child support arrears
judgment (granted after she filed bankruptcy) despite the bankruptcy. The court held that child
support is a property interest belonging to the child and the custodian merely has a right to
enforce the childs property interest. The 11 U.S.C. 541(b) exception from the property of the
bankruptcy estate for powers which are exercisable solely for the benefit of another apply to
child support by analogy. This argument should arguably be expanded to include the duty
associated with other support obligations, such as alimony, ahead of the debt to monolithic third
party multi- national credit card and insurance companies being rewarded with trillions of dollars
in bailouts whilst throwing luxury executive getaways weekend bashes.
The proposition supported by In Re Anders speaks to a situation addressed at trial in the
case at bar. What should or would happen if Ms. Joshi was granted alimony and subsequently
moved to discharge her share of the community debt in bankruptcy or simply just failed to pay
these debts (or, as Mr. Springgate suggested, if she was forced into bankruptcy)? In Re Anders
and the large number of cases representing persuasive authority (all non-Nevada and non-U.S.
Supreme Court cases are cited herein merely as persuasive authority, of course) cited

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elsewhere in this motion support the position that a support obligation (alimony too, not just
child support) should be upheld even where the supported party has failed to live up to the debt
distribution terms of a Courts divorce decree. Following this rule would cut down on the costly
contempt proceedings that Mr. Springgate suggested he may bring should Ms. Joshi be granted
alimony and fail to pay her share of the debt distribution (something that case law from Nevada,
In re Anders arguably bars).
Indeed, the very existence of this majority rule would seem to vitiate Mr. Springgates
argument that counsels actions were vexatious in regard to the position counsel argued on behalf
of Ms. Joshi at trial. Mr. Coughlin stated in court at trial that the public policy underlying
alimony and other support obligations did not warrant placing the interests of behemoth multi-
national credit card conglomerates ahead of those of the citizens of Nevada who have been
granted an alimony award by the courts of this state. Perhaps it is for that reason that, at one
point during trial, Mr. Springgate announced to the Court that he could basically see the logic in
the position opposing counsel was taking and could understand why one would make the
argument. Mr. Springgates Trial Statement mentions that this probably would seem like an
alimony case to most people. Mr. Springgate moved for attorneys fees to be personally assessed
against opposing counsel at the conclusion of trial, a point at which Mr. Springgate for the first
time broached the subject of moving for such personally liability for fees against opposing
counsel. Clearly the lack of notice in this regard is troubling from a constitutional law
perspective.
One might ask how Mr. Springgate, in making such a motion (never mind presenting a
divergence of interests between opposing counsel and opposing counsels client) has not himself
violated NRS 7.085. Can one really seek personally liability for fees, alleging that opposing

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counsel has filed, maintained or defended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State
and such action or defense is not well- grounded in fact or is not warranted by existing law or by
an argument for changing the existing law that is made in good faith; or unreasonably and
vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding before any court in this State when one has
plainly announced in open court that they actually see the validity of opposing counsels
position?
This brings up the question of a legal services attorney who is not charging the client for
his services asking the court to award attorneys fees to his client. This Courts Order After Trial
perhaps takes issue with such a request, noting that Ms. Joshi requests reasonable attorney's fees
be paid to Washoe Legal Services for the services of Mr. CoughlinThe Court notes the
following information has been provided and has been taken into consideration on this issue: On
July 18, 2008, Mr. Coughlin filed a Statement of Legal Aid Representation which states
Defendant is receiving "free legal assistance" from Washoe Legal Services pursuant to NRS
12.015. However, Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 61 (September 22, 2005) the
Nevada Supreme Court concluded that a party is not precluded from recovering attorney fees
solely because his or her counsel served in a pro bono capacity. While Nevada law has been
silent on this issue, many courts have concluded that an award of attorney fees is proper, even
when a party is represented without fee by a nonprofit legal services organization. There exist
many decisions to support such a ruling: Martin v. Tate, 492 A.2d 270, 274 (D.C. 1985); In re
Marriage of Brockett, 474 N.E.2d 754, 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Butler v. Butler, 376 So. 2d 287,
287 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); In re Marriage of Gaddis, 632 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982); Ferrigno v. Ferrigno, 279 A.2d 141, 142 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1971); Sellers v.
Wollman, 510 F.2d 119, 123 (5thCir. 1975) (holding that it is proper to award attorney fees to

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legal aid society in Truth- in-Lending Act action); Folsom v. Butte County Assn of
Governments, 652 P.2d 437, 447 n.26 (Cal. 1982) (concluding that an attorney fee award is
proper to a legal service organization in a suit to enforce a public transportation law).
In addition to the various state courts, the United States Supreme Court has concluded
that an award of attorney fees to a nonprofit legal services organization is to be calculated
according to the prevailing market rate, stating that Congress did not intend the calculation of fee
awards to vary depending on whether plaintiff was represented by private counsel or by a
nonprofit legal services organization. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894 (1984).
The Courts Order in Joshi arguably does not comply with the dictates set forth in Miller
v. Wilfong, and thus should not stand. Second, while it is within the trial courts discretion to
determine the reasonable amount of attorney fees under a statute or rule, in exercising that
discretion, the court must evaluate the factors set forth in Brunzell v. Golden Gate National
Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969). The Nevada Supreme Court noted that under
Brunzell, when courts determine the appropriate fee to award in civil cases, they must consider
various factors, including the qualities of the advocate, the character and difficulty of the work
performed, the work actually performed by the attorney, and the result obtained. We take this
opportunity to clarify our jurisprudence in family law cases to require trial courts to evaluate the
Brunzell factors when deciding attorney fee awards. Id. at 349. (Emphasis added).
Additionally, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled in Wright v. Osburn, that family law trial
courts must also consider the disparity in income of the parties when awarding fees. 114 Nev.
1367, 1370, 970 P.2d 1071, 1073 (1998). The Court in Miller v. Wilfong clarifies the Wright
language, noting that parties seeking attorney fees in family law cases must support their fee
request with affidavits or other evidence that meets the factors in Brunzell and Wright. Miller

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v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 61 (September 22, 2005). Ms. Joshis counsel submitted
such in affidavit, seeking a fee waiver. The Courts Order notes that Mr. Coughlin filed a
Statement of Legal Aid Representation which states Defendant is receiving "free legal
assistance" from Washoe Legal Services pursuant to NRS 12.015.
Mr. Joshi seemingly did not produce the required materials pursuant to the language in
the cases cited above, nor did the Courts Order set forth an application of specific elements
required in an award of attorneys fees. The result obtained in this case would not seem to argue
on favor of an award of attorneys fees. Mr. Joshi would not seem to be able to argue that he
was the prevailing party where he has been ordered solely responsible for the vast majority of
community debt. Pursuant to NRS 125.150(1)(b) and Putterman v. Putterman, 113 Nev. 606,
939 P.2d 1047 (1997), in granting a divorce, the Court shall ensure an equal disposition of the
community estate, absent compelling reasons justifying an unequal distribution. The Court must
make written findings as to why such a division is appropriate. The Courts Order here notes
that Mr. Joshi has likely incurred an unequal distribution of the community debt in this case.
The Court finds his testimonial acquiescence at trial to take on this debt is a compelling reason to
make an unequal distribution of the community debt.
It is not clear to Ms. Joshis counsel that any such testimonial acquiescence on Mr.
Joshis part took place at trial. Mr. Joshis counsel may have broached a suggested disposition,
though it is not clear to Mr. Coughlin how this differs from discussing settlement negotiations at
trial. Typically statements against interest made during settlement negotiations are not
admissible. If such acquiescence did take place at trial, then why would Mr. Springgate devote
the majority of the Trials four and a quarter hours running time to entering credit card balance
statements (devoid of itemization and only representing very recent balances), one after another?

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Mr. Springgates case took over three hours to conclude. By that time, Mr. Coughlin felt forced
to present a much shorter case on Ms. Joshis behalf, resulting on only approximately forty
minutes being devoted to Ms. Joshis presentation. This was a particular disadvantage with
respect to the presentation of evidence in support of an alimony award. The Court found a lack
of factual support for an award of alimony to be one of these reasons supporting awarding
sanctions. Perhaps, Mr. Springgate could have sent some discovery of his own to speed up that
part of the Trial in the form of Requests for Admissions. Mr. Coughlin does not recall Mr.
Springgate sending any discovery requests, though access to the file would certainly enable Mr.
Coughlin to verify this to be the case. Mr. Springgate did not do this. Indeed, there was a real
paucity of discovery requests sent out by Mr. Springgate, though the Court spent much of its
opinion on the sparseness of discovery sent out by the non- moving party. Additionally, though
no formal Offers of Judgment appears to have been exchanged between these parties, NRCP
68(e) and NRS 17.115(3) makes offers during settlement negotiations inadmissible.
No evidence was presented at trial or cited in the Courts Order as to the qualities of the
advocate, the character and difficulty of the work performed, or the work actually performed by
the attorney. The Courts Order did make one mention of the difficulty of the work performed
here, pointing out that issues the Court took with Mr. Coughlins counsel were compounded
with a continuously antagonistic presentation of the case that resulted in a shift from a fairly
simple divorce case to a contentious divorce trial lasting an excessive amount of time.
(Emphasis added). The Court viewed this as a simple divorce case in its bare essence. The court
viewed a trial that lasted 4.15 hours to have taken an excessive amount of time.
Ms. Joshi has paid taxes during her adult life, taxes which fund the administration of
justice. If, where, as here, there are genuine disputes with regard to how the law should be

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applied, and Ms. Joshis position is supported by a vast body of reported case law (though,
admittedly, Mr. Coughlins Trial Statement was wholly insufficient in setting out the authority in
support of the position taken at trial and it is inappropriate to essentially put the Court in the
position at trial of knowing every arcane point of law that might come up), and the opposing side
has refused to honor requests (See Exhibit A and Exhibit B) to produce proof in support of
various points of contention (i.e., support for whether Mr. Joshi had made efforts to track down
the womans wealth, sufficient documentation to prove two personal loans totaling over $11,000,
proof that his surgery was necessary, itemized statements proving that his incongruously high
amount of credit card debt was all incurred for community purposes in a marriage where
expenses were essentially shared and paid for out of each spouses respective personal credit
accounts), the trial length in the present case does not appear excessive. 4.15 hours for a
Divorce Trial stemming from a 21 year marriage that produced two children, where a short
Settlement Conference was conducted the same day and immediately preceding the beginning of
the Trial, would not seem to be so excessive, especially in an age where some partys divorce
trials last several days or weeks.
Indeed, some parties Divorce Settlement Conferences, whether singular or multiple, last
longer than this combined Settlement Conference/Trial did. Ms. Joshis counsel chose not to
penalize Ms. Joshi by accepting a settlement where the only legal precedent offered in support of
the positions it contained was the esteemed opinion of opposing counsel as to the imminent
reasonableness of the offer on the table, along with Mr. Joshis counsel mentioning perhaps one
case where jurisdiction was reserved to increase alimony where a millionaire physician had
offered to cover some debts along with agreeing to a very, very large cash payout (in the
millions) to the spouse he was pledging to support. Mr. Coughlin recognizes the deficiencies in

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his own presentation and admits that a thoroughly briefed Trial Statement or Settlement
Conference Statement by Mr. Coughlin likely would have gone a long way towards determining
whether the Court believed the issues related to using third party debts as a set off for alimony
where a worthy use of the Courts limited resources and in line with the concerns for judicial
economy that all competent practitioners need to keep foremost in their minds. Regarding
Siragusa, such a case simply does not resonate with someone in Ms. Joshis set of circumstances.
Regardless, such a case says one could proceed with such a settlement arrangement (dependent
upon the chance to come back to court to litigate contempt proceedings in the future and possibly
be put in a better position as a result), it does not say that one must or risk having ones attorney
face the peril of being personally responsible for opposing counsels attorneys fees.
The Courts Order did not compare the result obtained at trial to the settlement discussed,
nor was any exposition given to the relative merits of either during the Settlement Conference,
save a very strong and prolonged suggestion to accept the settlement both by the Court and
opposing counsel. The Courts Order did not set forth anything that seemed to evaluate the
Brunzell factors when deciding attorney fee awards. Miller at 349. Nor did the Court address
the proviso in Wright that family law trial courts must also consider the disparity in income of
the parties when awarding fees (Id. at 1370), and Miller that parties seeking attorney fees in
family law cases must support their fee request with affidavits or other evidence that meets the
factors in Brunzell and Wright. Mr. Joshi did not appear to submit such an affidavit, unless one
considers his Financial Declaration to suffice. The parties respective Financial Affidavits
indicate that Mr. Joshi makes approximately $12,000 more per year than Ms. Joshi. When Ms.
Joshis requests were supported only by her testimony and Financial Declaration on file the
Court took the view that the evidence was so little so as to support sanctions against Ms. Joshis

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attorney. Further, the Courts Pre-Trial Order mandates that Mr. Joshi file an updated Financial
Declaration wherein he swears, under penalty of perjury that his recent reduction in income is
based in fact.
In another case, the trial court did not satisfy requirements for exercising its inherent
authority to impose attorney fees against an attorney for bad faith conduct when it ordered
husband's counsel to remit one half of his fees received to wife's counsel, where trial court did
not permit husband's counsel to present witnesses or other Evidence in his defense, trial court did
not make an express finding of bad faith or findings justifying the relief ordered, and order did
not show how the fees awarded directly related to the fees incurred as a result of the alleged bad
faith conduct by husband's counsel. Finol v. Finol, 912 So. 2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist.
2005), related reference, 2005 WL 2373889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2005) and reh'g denied,
(Nov. 7, 2005).
Another court ruled that petitioner's request for costs and expenses of litigation, including
attorney fees, did not provide notice to respondent's attorney that she could be held liable for
attorney fees under statute that awarded fees in situations where an attorney brought or defended
an action that lacked substantial justification; there was no motion requesting attorney fees from
attorney, there was no mention that the trial court was considering an award against attorney, and
the notice of the hearing contained no reference to the statute that awarded fees against attorneys
for bringing or defending an action that lacked substantial justification or to the possibility that
attorney could be assessed attorney fees for her conduct; overruling Cohen v. Feldman, 219
Ga.App. 90, 464 S.E.2d 237. West's Ga.Code Ann. 9-15-14(b). Williams v. Cooper, 625
S.E.2d 754 (Ga. 2006). See Kukui Nuts of Hawaii, Inc. v R. Baird & Co., (1990, Hawaii App)
789 P2d 501, 8[a].

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At trial, Mr. Springgate stated that Mr. Coughlin had conducted no discovery in
this case. To the extent that discovery can exist outside of asking Mr. Joshi to produce something
via a Request for Production or the like, it is not clear how Mr. Springgate is able to be certain
with regard to what Ms. Joshis counsel did or did not do with respect to conducting discovery.
Mr. Springgate did not appear to send Ms. Joshi any Interrogatories, Request for Productions, or
Request for Admissions, nor did he take anyones deposition. Mr. Coughlin would need access
to the file to determine this with surety, however eFlex and CourtConnect provide no indication
that any was sent out. Ms. Joshis counsel did send Mr. Springgate several written
correspondences suggesting documentation that Mr. Joshi could produce in an effort to speed
these parties along towards settlement.
Whether Mr. Coughlin defended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State
where such action or defense is not well-grounded in fact?

The Courts Order After Trial points out that, at trial, Mr. Springgate stated that Mr.
Coughlin had conducted no discovery in this case. Apparently Mr. Springgate did not mention
the attached written correspondence wherein Mr. Coughlin suggested a multitude of documents
that Mr. Joshi could provide if he sought to expedite settlement, including a request for
documentation that would help establish that the debts Mr. Joshi claims were exclusively for the
benefit of the community and the existence of a valid medical debt incurred out of necessity.
Exhibit A. Further Mr. Coughlin requested documentation from Mr. Joshi related to three of
the car loans involving these parties and the respective title holders for each of these vehicles.
Exhibit B. Additionally, Mr. Coughlin sent Mr. Joshi written correspondence requesting that
Mr. Joshi provide some indication of what he meant on his Financial Declaration when he listed
jewelry in a Wells Fargo safe deposit box and India Locker safe deposit box. Exhibit B. This

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written request asked that Mr. Joshi provide information related to the whereabouts of this
jewelry, what a description of this jewelry would entail, and what happened to this jewelry.
The Court also notes, in explaining its decision to personally charge this legal aid
attorney with the legal fees of the accused perpetuator of domestic violence, that Mr. Coughlin
failed to present one documentary piece of evidence at trial on behalf of Ms. Joshi's claims.
This is not so, Mr. Coughlin presented Mr. Joshis own Financial Declaration, as well as that of
Ms. Joshi, both of which clearly supported the claim for alimony in establishing at the least a
$12,000 yearly disparity in the parties respective incomes. Nonetheless, there does not seem to
exist any legal precedent supporting the implication that failing to produce some specific form or
type of evidence (here documentary evidence is mentioned) plays some role in a proper
application of NRS 7.085. Were this the case, attorneys could arguably be told they violated
NRS 7.085 for failing to conduct even one deposition, or send out one request for admission, etc.
Such an arbitrary interpretation of NRS 7.085 simply should not stand when considering the
potentially devastating policy implications and chilling effect on attorneys ability to zealously
advocate for their clients. Were this application upheld it would perhaps encourage attorneys to
further over utilize the sometimes ineffective and inefficient practice documentary discovery has
become in so many instances. This is not meant to suggest that attorneys should not be gravely
concerned with discovering all items necessary to protect their clients interests to the fullest, but
rather, to merely consider what is the judicious use of discovery techniques.
Indeed, discovery is hopefully conducted to further some legitimate objective, rather than
to satisfy some perceived need to send out what may be unnecessary and overly burdensome
discovery requests in an attempt to avoid sanctions that may later arise. This situation arises, by
analogy, in modern medicine, where, in some cases, the practice of the day is to order every

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diagnostic test known to science, no matter how costly and ineffective is and without regard to
whether any intelligence was actually utilized in making the decision to order such a test,
whether or not some analysis and deduction could obviate the need to make such arrangements.
Further some people can afford more discovery than others, and many legal services attorneys
would likely attest to the need to make do with less when representing domestic violence
victims.
With respect to whether the position taken by Mr. Coughlin and Ms. Joshi was supported
by the facts, Mr. Joshis own admission at trial and the partys financial declarations prove the
income disparity necessary to support any alimony award. The undisputed length of the
marriage, 21 years (included in the Courts Findings of Fact), certainly argues in favor of an
alimony award and is, pursuant to NRS 125.150(8) (and the six Sprenger factors,), among the
eleven (11) factors the court shall consider in awarding alimony. The fact that Ms. Joshi worked
fewer hours than Mr. Joshi, largely to enable her to be the childrens primary caregiver,
particularly in the childrens younger years, similarly argues for an alimony award and is
included among these factors.
Ms. Joshis counsel feels strongly that existing law did indeed warrant the position taken
at trial. The court also took some issue with Ms. Joshis counsels repeated objections to
opposing counsel entering exhibits into evidence without providing a copy to opposing counsel
at the time they were being introduced (indicating that the documents were produced at some
earlier stage of the litigation). However, the courts own Pre- Trial Order indicated that should
more than ten exhibits be used at trial, the introducing party is to provide opposing counsel with
copies that are bound, tabbed, and indexed. It is possible more than ten exhibits were
introduced into evidence. Mr. Coughlin has not been afforded sufficient opportunity to review

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the tape of the trial to determine exactly how many exhibits were offered. Nonetheless the Court
can amend the Pre-Trial Order at any time and in any way necessary.
The Courts Order finds that the parties presently earn approximately the same amount,
Ms. Joshi earns $2,458 per month and Mr. Joshi earned approximately $3,125 per month
in 2008, but testified he is working substantially less in 2009 and has filed for unemployment
benefits the beginning of March 2009. The Court may have failed to include both jobs Mr.
Joshi worked in 2008 in assessing the income disparity of the parties. This may have been done
on purpose given Mr. Joshis testimony regarding the reduction in hours offered by his employer,
though that is not clear. Mr. Joshi violated the rules set forth in the Courts Pre-Trial Order by
failing to submit and updated Financial Declaration upon his claim of substantially changed
circumstances bearing on any potential alimony liability. Ms. Joshis counsels experience is
that an inordinately high percentage of litigants experience just such a set of circumstances
immediately prior to trial. The Courts Order After Trial states that Mr. Joshi earned
approximately $3,125 per month in 2008, but testified he is working substantially less in 2009
and has filed for unemployment benefits the beginning of March 2009.
However, dividing by 12 the amount Mr. Joshi himself reports in his own Financial
Declaration indicates that Mr. Joshi actually earned $3,458 per month in 2008. At trial, Mr.
Joshi introduced his W-2 from American Bar and Restaurant reflecting earnings of $4,157.
(Trial Exhibit "C"); and his W-2 from Sierra Sport Service in the amount of $37,504.18
(Trial Exhibit "D").If the Court finds Mr. Joshis mincing, erratic, testimonial evidence regarding
the prospects of his future unemployment (and how he kind of applied for unemployment though
he knew he would be working a few shifts in the next couple weeks except for the fact that he
also said he would not have any shifts at all in the next couple weeks) to be persuasive, one must

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wonder why Ms. Joshis testimonial evidence regarding the reduction in hours she is facing at
her employment was not similarly instructive to the Court. In 2008, Mr. Joshi earned
approximately $41,500.00 while working for two companies -American Bar and Restaurant and
Sierra Sport Service. At trial, Mr. Joshi introduced his W-2 from American Bar and Restaurant
reflecting earnings of $4,157. (Trial Exhibit "C"); and his W-2 from Sierra Sport Service in the
amount of $37,504.18 (Trial Exhibit "D").
The Court may have left out the additional $333 per month that Mr. Joshi has reported
making at Sierra Sport Service by introducing his 2008 W-2. The Court makes no mention of
the fact that Mr. Joshi failed to present any sort of evidence, save his own testimony, to support
his contention that his income will be changing substantially in 2009. It is not clear to Mr.
Coughlin that Mr. Springgate, though an officer of the court, can sufficiently corroborate such an
income reduction to an appropriate degree of certainty by merely discussing it with Mr. Joshi and
then proceeding to attest to it in court (without submitting an updated Financial Declaration). To
suggest this is in no means meant to impugn Mr. Springgates reputation. However, Mr.
Springgates reputation (that of an extremely skilled and versatile litigator who has taken on
some of the most high profile cases around) does not make something Mr. Joshi said true and in
need of no further evidentiary support simply upon Mr. Springgates repeating it to the court.
Bringing of frivolous civil claim or action as ground for discipline of attorney, 85 A.L.R.4th
544 (Originally published in 1991).
The Courts opinion chose not to describe Mr. Joshis failure to file the required updated
Financial Declaration in the terms it chooses to describe similar situations involving Ms. Joshi.
Indeed, the Courts opinion sets forth no less than thirteen instances where Ms. Joshi failed to
present any evidence relating to some specific issue. However, just going on the testimony

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referenced in the Courts opinion, one has to wonder why the Court failed to similarly point out
that Mr. Joshi failed to introduce any evidence (or documentary evidence or non-testimonial
evidence per the Courts varying descriptions of what is and is not evidence) to support his
claims that he had contacted his family to try to ascertain what they had done with the
approximately $7,000 golden jewelry bridal dowry, that all the consumer debt he alleges was
indeed incurred for the benefit of the community (realizing the presumption found in Nevada
law), that his surgery was necessary or that he was even sure it was surgery (he testified he had
no idea what kind of procedure was performed or why somebody, apparently a surgeon, took a
sharp object and cut open his body and presented him with a large billcertainly there was no
documentary evidence presented to prove that this was not an elective procedure or that it was
necessary and not a result of Mr. Joshis negligence in the same way that his failure to opt in to
the health insurance offered by his employer was, though Mr. Coughlin recognizes he was remiss
in not doing the appropriate discovery in this regard, to the extent that it was not barred by the
physician-patient privilege), that he had actually written some letter to Meena Fowler indicating
that he was pledging to pay back some $6,000 Ms. Fowler was sending to Mr. Joshis mother,
that he had taken out a loan of $5,000 from Mr. Anaby to purchase plane tickets for the familys
2001 immigration (the Courts Order did note the paucity of evidence in this regard), that he
actually does pay or has been paying $600 per month towards the community credit card debts
(though he apparently has been making these payments with community funds, in much the same
way that he has paid Mr. Springgate, though Mr. Joshi did appear to indicate that he used his
personal property, his IRS tax return, to pay Mr. Springgate, though the community is apparently
liable for such a necessary), that he actually has paid Mr. Springgate the various amounts he
inconsistently testified too, or that he has only two weeks of work scheduled for late March,

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2009; and he filed for unemployment benefits in March, 2009, or that the large balance transfers
he made in this year of divorce were actually for the purpose of obtaining a better interest rate
rather than making sure as much of the debt as possible was placed in an account where Ms.
Joshi was a co-signer, rather than in an account that Mr. Joshi was the sole signatory to.
The Court simply did not choose to comment on Mr. Joshis failure to present any
documentary evidence regarding these pertinent claims. Alternatively, the Court seemingly did
not miss any opportunity to point out an instance (on at least thirteen occasions) where Ms. Joshi
did not present the type of evidence the Court apparently wished to see (documentary evidence,
apparently, was sought, as opposed to the proffered testimonial evidence or statements against
interest under oath by the opposing party regarding the fishy payment arrangements related to the
daughters motor vehicle, the mode of payment used to purchase it, and the existence of a $6,000
cash advance taken from Ms. Joshis personal credit to fund the cash purchase). Mr. Joshi
testified that his wife had taken out a $6,000 cash advance from her personal credit card and
given the cash to Mr. Joshi who converted that cash to a money order to purchase the car the
daughter uses, but which is titled in the daughters and Mr. Joshis name.
Why Ms. Joshi would need to present documentary evidence regarding these matters
when Mr. Joshi readily admitted the case in question is unclear, particularly where Mr. Joshi has
been involved for some curious reason in transferring the monthly car payments made by the
daughter to Ms. Joshi for the car that Ms. Joshi took out a $6,000 cash advance from her credit
card account, to which she was the sole signatory, the same car that has Mr. Joshis name on the
title and does not have Ms. Joshis name on the title.
Miscellaneous Other Issues

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Given the decision in Lofgren v.Lofgren, (if community property is lost, expended or
destroyed through the intentional misconduct of one spouse, the court may consider such
misconduct as a compelling reason for making an unequal disposition of community property
and may appropriately augment the other spouses share of the remaining community property.
112 Nev. ___, 926 P.2d 296 (Adv. Opn. No. 156, Nov. 7, 1996).
Arguably, Mr. Joshi and Ms. Joshis combined testimony (together with Mr. Joshis early
Financial Declaration where he lists two separate safety deposit boxes containing gold jewelry)
support the view that the disappearance of the womans wealth ceremonial wedding jewelry at
issue here should be held against Mr. Joshi, and accordingly an unequal disposition of
community property (or community debt) may be appropriate to the extent of the approximate
value of these items. Ms. Joshi testified their value was in the $6,000 range. The womans
wealth is arguably Ms. Joshis separate property to begin with, as per Indian custom (though at
times in court Mr. Joshis grasp of the culture from which he apparently came was astoundingly
faint), however, the holding in Lofgren could arguably be extrapolated to apply in such a
situation.
Mr. Joshis own Trial Statement (line 12, page 2) comments on the case at bar, stating
that while it may seem to be an alimony case Mr. Joshis earnings are subject to the travel and
convention business fluctuations, while hers are not. Further, Mr. Springgates Trial Statement
was filed at 5 p.m. the day before Trial. Mr. Joshis Trial Statement was filed more than 5
calendar days before Trial, in accordance with Rule 5 of the Second Judicial District Court
Rules. Mr. Joshis Trial Statement notes that Mr. Joshi he is prepared to take an unfair amount
of the community debt, which he has been servicing, which equalizes their incomes. (emphasis
added). Whether it is appropriate to include the terms of a settlement negotiation in a Trial

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Statement is debatable. However, Mr. Springgate clearly wrote that the case may seem like an
alimony case and then clearly moved for opposing counsel to have personal liability for fees
under NRS 7.085 for the first time in his closing statement at Trial, seemingly asserting that
opposing counsel could not reasonably see this as an alimony case. Ironically, it would seem
Mr. Springgates moving for fees under NRS 7.085 was not reasonably grounded in fact or law.
WDCR 5(1)(c)-(d) requires that Trial statements shall be served and filed 5 calendar
days before trial, and that each party shall serve and file a trial statement which shall set forth
the following matters in the following order:
(c) A statement of issues of law supported by a memorandum of
authorities.
(d) In non-jury cases, a list of summaries of schedules referring to
attached, itemized exhibits concerning any subject matter which involves
accounting, computation, chronology, or similar data reasonably calling for
orderly itemization, e.g., wages, income, expenses, inventories, business
operations, tax computations, disability periods, property losses, itemizations
of claimed losses or injuries, and the data and reasons upon which an expert
bases his opinion (not the opinion itself), which clearly reflect the claims,
defenses, or evidence of the party, together with references to the records or
other sources upon which such summaries or schedules are based.

Mr. Springgates Trial Statement, at page 2, line 14, lists none under the heading of
Statement of Issues of Law. His Trial Statement fails to cite a single source of authority in
support of this, or any authority in support of the matters for which are apparently so well
established by precedent that there are literally no real issues worth disputing. Mr. Springgates
Trial Statement does not contain any a list of summaries of schedules referring to attached,
itemized exhibits concerning any subject matter which involves accounting, computation,
chronology, or similar data reasonably calling for orderly itemization, e.g., wages, income,
expenses, inventories, business operations, tax computations, disability periods, property losses,
itemizations of claimed losses or injuries, and the data and reasons upon which an expert bases

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his opinion (not the opinion itself), which clearly reflect the claims, defenses, or evidence of the
party, together with references to the records or other sources upon which such summaries
or schedules are based. (emphasis added). There simply is nothing attached to his Trial
Statement. There were no exhibits attached to the Trial Statement submitted at 5 p.m. the day
before Trial by Mr. Joshi. WDCR 5(d) calls for attaching exhibits to the Trial Statement. Mr.
Springgate failed to do this. Ms. Joshis counsel objected on that basis. The Court seemingly
took Mr. Springgates word that he had provided the documents forming the basis of the exhibits
he introduced at some earlier point in the litigation, likely as part of his 16.2 production, though
even if that were the case, the documents provided at that time clearly were not marked as
exhibits or organized by an index. Mr. Coughlin does believe Mr. Springgate provided these
documents in the 16.2 production and that they were bates stamped in the manner Mr. Springgate
indicated. Mr. Coughlin recognizes that, in the future, he should be prepared to utilize such
production at trial should it be offered as an exhibit without having an additional copy,
specifically marked as an exhibit provided at the time it is sought to be introduced into evidence.
In some cases, argument may be appropriate that suggests that to simply announce that one
previously included the needle they are now wishing to introduce into evidence at Trial in the
haystack that they had produced to the opposing party several months earlier is simply
insufficient. This may be a stronger argument where a partys Trial Statement is deficient in
some ways, such as note referencing with any specificity the documents a party intends to offer
as exhibits. Lastly, the Courts own Pre-Trial Order was not followed by Mr. Joshis counsel.
The Courts Order and reasoning for imposing sanctions focused in large part on Ms.
Joshis counsels objections to Mr. Joshis counsel introducing exhibits into evidence without
providing opposing counsel a copy at the time in which Mr. Joshi was seeking to introduce these

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exhibits. The Courts own Order Re Pre-Trial Procedure Orders that if a party intends to offer
more than ten trial exhibits, the proposed exhibits must be bound, tabbed and indexedeach
party shall submit two copies of the proposed exhibits to the Court and one copy to the opposing
counselfor trials which are scheduled for less than one full day, exhibits shall be marked
immediately prior to the convening for trial, and counsel shall arrive at least 15 minutes before
the scheduled time of trialeach party must file with the Court a trial statementfive days
before trialfailure to timely deliver these documents may result in sanctions against the
offending party as set forth in NRCP 37if the financial circumstances of a party have changed
substantially since the filing of the most recent financial declaration, that party is to file an
updated financial declaration at the same time as filing the trial statement.
Mr. Joshis case relied in large part upon the idea that his income had been greatly
reduced and would continue to be so hindered. There was testimony on his part that he might
have filed for unemployment, that he probably was not schedule to work anymore at one or both
of his jobs in the foreseeable future, only to be contradicted minutes later by his testimony that
he had a shift or two scheduled at his main job, the one where he earned $37,500 in 2008. How
he could still qualify to file for unemployment without yet losing his job completely is another
question. Nevadas unemployment system allows one to file if his hours have been reduced
such that he is no longer earning more than his weekly benefit amount. Mr. Joshis weekly
benefit amount, based on his Financial Declaration could be no more than the $350 maximum
cap set by law. Mr. Joshi grossed approximately $700 per week in 2008. Mr. Joshi did not file
an update Financial Declaration, as required by the Pre-Trial Order (financial circumstances of
a party have changed substantially since the filing of the most recent financial declaration, that
party is to file an updated financial declaration at the same time as filing the trial statement)

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Mr. Joshis arguments against alimony were largely based on the idea that his income had
declined significantly, yet Ms. Joshi did not have the benefit of enforcing the requirement that
Mr. Joshi file, under penalty of perjury, an updated Financial Declaration attesting to as much.
The court should not criticize Ms. Joshi for a lack of discovery in this regard while viewing Mr.
Joshis testimonial assertions (however erratic and inconsistent they may have been) at trial as
presenting sufficient evidence (though lacking in the documentary evidence required by the
Pre-Trial Order and perhaps NRS), while at the same time sanctioning Ms. Joshis counsel for
essentially not trying the case in the way the Court (which does not have the benefit of knowing
everything that goes on behind the scenes) would suggest it be tried. The Court essentially
overlooked multiple instances of divergence from the NRCP and the Pre-Trial Order by Mr.
Springgate while sanctioning what could perhaps be deemed optional litigation decisions that are
customarily left up to the parties own volition as to whether or not to proceed upon some specific
course (such as choosing to conduct a deposition). Mr. Coughlin recognizes that the direction
given by Judge Gardner during this Trial as to the type of evidence that should be offered or the
manner of presentation at trial were absolutely dictates that he should adopt immediately if he
hopes to function at all effectively as an attorney.
It appears that Mr. Joshi may have offered more than ten exhibits at Trial (especially if
the documents representing the various money transfers in regard to the Meena Fowler debt were
considered separate exhibits), though the proposed exhibits were not bound, tabbed and indexed.
They were never even proposed until the exact point in time at which Mr. Joshi sought to
introduce them. Surely they were not all being offered for impeachment purposes. For this
Trial, which was scheduled for less than one full day, the exhibits were not marked immediately
prior to the convening for trial, and Ms. Joshis counsel did indeed arrive at least 15 minutes

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before the scheduled time of trial. Mr. Joshis counsel did not submit two copies of the proposed
exhibits to the Court and one copy to the opposing counsel. See Cardenas v. Peterson Bean Co.,
180 Neb. 605, 611-612, 144N.W.2d 154, 159 (1966); Priest v. McConnell, 219 Neb 328, 330
(1985); In Re OBryan, 246 B.R. 271, 276-279 (1999).
To qualify as an exhibit a document should be marked as an exhibit or in some way
contain some indication that it is an exhibit. Though arguably the relatively slight amount of
documents produced in the instant case makes such an argument irrelevant, one should not be
able to pick several needles out of a haystack they produced in their 16.2 productions and claim
that they are exhibits previously provided to the opposing party. This places an inappropriately
high burden on the opposing party to index and organize the documents produced by Mr. Joshi.
Many litigators suggest that if one is following the other side they are not leading the litigation.
Rule 46. TrialStatements and documentary evidence.
1. Stipulating to documents. Before trial, the parties shall stipulate
which documents are admissible. Such stipulation will avoid the need for
foundational witnesses.
2. Exchanging documents. Copies of documents shall be exchanged
by counsel and marked for identification by the court clerk no later than 1
business day prior to the commencement of trial.
3. A trial statement shall be filed in accordance with Rule 5. (Local
Rules of Practice for the Second Judicial District Court).

Rule 12. Form of papers presented for filing; exhibits; documents; legal
citations.
4. All exhibits attached to pleadings or papers shall clearly show the
exhibit number at the bottom or on the right side thereof. Copies of
exhibits must be clearly legible and not unnecessarily voluminous, and
must be reduced to 8 1/2 inches by 11 inches, or conveniently folded to
that size. Original documents shall be retained by counsel for introduction
as exhibits at the time of a hearing or at the time of trial rather than
attached to pleadings. Rules of the District Courts of the State of
Nevada.


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Mr. Joshis counsel clearly did not comply with Rule 46 or Rule 12. Ms.
Joshis counsel should not be sanctioned for objecting to the introduction of Mr.
Joshis exhibits. The exhibits entered clearly were not marked for identification
by the Court one day prior to trial. Mr. Springgate had not provided any
documents prior to Trial that contained any attempt to mark them as exhibits such
that compliance with the rules could be inferred. They were only marked at the
time Mr. Joshi sought to introduce them. There is ample persuasive authority for
the position taken by Ms. Joshis counsel with regard to the introduction of Mr.
Joshis exhibits.
LR 9017. Use of Alternate Direct Testimony and Exhibits at Trials
(d) Submission of Declarations, Exhibits , and Objections. Unless
the court orders otherwise, copies of all declarations of witnesses
and exhibits that are intended to be presented at trial or at the
hearing on a contested matter must be furnished to opposing
counsel and lodged with the court as follows:
(1) The plaintiff or movant must submit to opposing counsel all
declarations and exhibits in its case in chief not less than ten (10)
business days before the trial or the hearing on the contested
matter;
(2) The defendant or respondent must submit all declarations and
exhibits in its case five (5) business days before the trial or the
hearing on the contested matter;
(3) Two (2) business days before trial or the hearing on a contested
matter each party must lodge with the courtroom deputy clerk of
the judge to whom the matter is assigned, one (1) copy of all
declarations and exhibits that the party intends to present at trial,
and an original and one (1) copy of that party's written objections
to the admission of any of the declarations or exhibits of an
opposing party. Copies of exhibits lodged with the clerk must
be premarked by counsel, and must be accompanied by a cover
sheet index containing a brief description of each exhibit ; and
U.S.Dist.Ct.Rules D.Nev., LR 9017.

3. Selecting exhibits
After all possible exhibits are identified, counsel should select those that
he himself will bring to the trial, and those that he will subpoena another

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to bring. He should have available everything that he might have to
produce at the request of his opponent, and, if he doesn't have original
documents or articles, he should be prepared with copies, and/or testimony
concerning the originals.

4. Preparing exhibit lists

Counsel should prepare a list of his witnesses with an outline of the points
to be established by each one. The outline should indicate which exhibits
the witness can identify, the number tentatively assigned to the exhibit,
and a description of it 5 Am. Jur. Trials 553.

WDCR 10: Form of Pleadings:
6. All exhibits attached to pleadings or papers must be 8 1/2 x 11 inches
in size; must be separated with bottom-tabbed divider pages; must be
labeled numerically, i.e., Exhibit 1, 2, 3, etc., rather than alphabetically,
and it will be mandatory effective January 1, 2008, that all exhibits be
identified numerically. Exhibits that are smaller must be affixed to a blank
sheet of paper 8 1/2 x 11 inches in size, with invisible adhesive tape on all
sides. Staples must not be used to affix an exhibit to a sheet of paper.
Exhibits that are larger than 8 1/2 x 11 inches must be reduced to 8 1/2 x
11 inches. Exhibits such as maps must be folded so as to appear 8 1/2 x 11
inches in size. All exhibits attached to pleadings or papers must be
separated by a bottom- tabbed divider page and clearly marked with the
exhibit number at the top and bottom of the page. All exhibits attached to
pleadings or papers must be preceded by an Index of Exhibits indicating
the exhibit number, exhibit description, and the length of each exhibit
(number of pages). Copies of exhibits must be clearly legible and not
unnecessarily voluminous. Original documents must be retained by
counsel for introduction as exhibits at the time of a hearing or at the time
of trial rather than attached to pleadings.

Ms. Joshis counsels comments were not rude or sarcastic, especially considering the
totality of the circumstances here, as more fully discussed above. Nonetheless, the Court failed
to include much at all in the way of specific examples of the rude, sarcastic, or derogatory
language or behavior that formed the basis for these sanctions. Specificity is required as set forth
in the cases cited supra. Specifics are very important in using judgments as precedent. Further,
it might be somewhat unfair to criticize Ms. Joshis counsel for a lack of knowledge with regard

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to the rules of evidence and trial procedure where Mr. Springgates presentation was counter to
the rules and Pre-Trial Order in so many ways. However, Ms. Joshis counsel certainly will
utilize the Courts Order as an important and informative guide to the areas of counsels trial
presentation and practice that need immediate improvement.
The sanctions issued in this case were improper in that they apparently relied upon the
delay in the return of Mr. Joshis Tanzanian passport early in this litigation. The Courts Order
notes that Ms. Joshis counsel filed an Opposition to the request for return of Mr. Joshi's
passport without any factual or legal basis that on August 1, 2008, Mr. Joshi filed a 'Motion
For Return Of Personal Property' requesting that Ms. Joshi return his passport, green card and
social security card. On August 7, 2008, Ms. Joshi, by and through her attorney of record,
Mr. Coughlin, filed an Opposition to the return of Mr. Joshi's passport citing case law involving
minor children and their support. Ms. Joshi filed said opposition while acknowledging the
parties' children were both over eighteen years of age at the time. On August 18, 2008, Judge
Schumacher ordered Ms. Joshi to immediately return Mr. Joshi's passport within five days.
Regardless, Judge Schumacher already ruled on Mr. Springgates request for attorneys
fees related to this issue. No Attorneys fees were granted by Judge Schumacher. Mr. Joshi did
not file a Motion for Reconsideration at that time. The issue is barred under the law of the case
doctrine. The law of the case doctrine is a species of collateral estoppel and it applies to intra-
action issues. Tien Fu Hsu v. County of Clark, 2007 WL 4532623 (Nev. 12/27/2007). Thus,
once an issue has been decided on the merits, the law of the case doctrine makes that issue
binding not only on the parties, but on the court as well: no other judge of coordinate
jurisdiction may undo the decision (Siegel, NY Prac 448, at 723 [3d ed.]).

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Mr. Springgate filed a Motion seeking the return of this passport which on a somewhat
questionable interpretation of 18 USC 1028 and 18 USC 1544, claiming Ms. Joshis failure to
immediately return it to him amounted to extortion. Ms. Joshis counsel merely asked Mr.
Springgate to provide some law that was relevant to the issue at hand or allow a reasonable
amount of time for Mr. Coughlin to determine the prudence of turning over the Tanzanian
passport. Mr. Coughlin did not suggest Mr. Joshi was committing a RICO violation by
withholding or doing nothing to aid in the return of Ms. Joshis womans wealth. Granted, a
passport may deserve a greater degree of protection, but this is the type of judgment call that can
take some time for attorneys to consistently and immediately make in an appropriate fashion.
Mr. Springgates Motion and Reply on this issue failed to cite any particular section of these
statutes or include much in the way of their statutory language. Ms. Joshis counsel has looked
up these statues and included the only parts that could seem even tangentially relevant below:
18 U.S.C. 1544Misuse of a Passport: Section 1544 of Title
18 proscribes the use or attempted use of someone else's passport,
or its use in violation of any applicable regulation or law. It also
proscribes giving one's passport to another for the other's use
18 USC 1028: Fraud and related activity in connection with
identification documents, authentication features, and information
(4) knowingly possesses an identification document (other than
one issued lawfully for the use of the possessor), authentication
feature, or a false identification document, with the intent such
document or feature be used to defraud the United States;
(7) knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful
authority, a means of identification of another person with the
intent to commit, or to aid or abet, or in connection with, any
unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that
constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local law; or

To assert that Ms. Joshi was committing some form of extortion such to bring this
situation within the purview of either of these sections of the U.S.C. is not entirely fair.

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The Courts Order appears to have taken issue with the request made for ongoing child
support where the two children of the marriage were 19 and 20 years old and in college, noting
that 1. Ongoing Support for the Adult Children's Education- Pursuant to NRS 125.510(9)(b),
except where a contract providing otherwise has been executed pursuant to NRS 123.080, the
obligation for care, education, maintenance and support of any minor child created by any order
entered pursuant to this section ceases: (a) Upon the death of the person to whom the order was
directed; or (b) When the child reaches 18 years of age if he is no longer enrolled in high school,
otherwise, when he reaches 19 years of age. There has been no evidence presented by Ms. Joshi
justifying a request for continuing support of the parties' adult children. As there has been no
legal basis presented to make such a finding, the Court denies Ms. Joshi's request that Mr. Joshi
financially provide for the adult children's education.
Nevertheless, in appropriate cases, a support obligation may be imposed on the basis of
estoppel or implied contract. In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal.App.3d 848, 152 Cal.Rptr. 121
(1979); In re Marriage of Valle, 53 Cal.App.3d 837, 126 Cal.Rptr. 38 (1975). See, also,
Clevenger v. Clevenger, supra; V.L.P. v. J.S.S., Del., 407 A.2d 244 (1978); Fuller v. Fuller,
D.C., 247 A.2d 767 (1968); Mace v. Webb, 614 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1980); Gingery (not
reported) 1992 WL 150269; Watkins, 117 P.3d 1114; Kass, 235 A.D. 2d 150 (1997); Callahan v.
Dye, L 1667668, 8-10 (Alaska 2006); Ramsey, 23 N.E. 69, 71 (Ind. 1889). Additionally, the
demonstrable needs of the child, not the child's age, are determinative of the duty of support.
Therefore, while parents are not generally required to support a child over eighteen, his or her
enrollment in a full- time educational program has been held to require continued support.
Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 543; Khalaf v. Khalaf, 58 N.J. 63, 71-72 (1971); Limpert, supra, 119

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N.J. Super. at 442-43; Schumm, supra, 122 N.J. Super. 149-50. See, also, Ross v. Ross, 167
N.J. Super. 441, 444-46 (Ch. Div. 1979) (law school).
Testimonial evidence was presented by Ms. Joshi that these spouses had planned to help
their children financially during college. An implied contract to contribute to the adult childrens
educational expenses is supported by the evidence presented. Ms. Joshis testimony showed that
this family adhered to the strong cultural tradition in many families with ties to India in that the
education and furtherance of their childrens careers was of paramount importance to these
parties and that Ms. Joshi had lived and planned her life I accordance with that belief. Ms. Joshi
anticipated and believed, quite reasonably, that Mr. Joshi would contribute something to his
childrens college expenses.
There exists more attenuated support for this proposition. In Miller v. Miller, 16 Ill. 298,
where one remains with a parent, or with a person standing in the relation of a parent, after
arriving at majority, and remains in the same apparent relation as when a minor, the presumption
is that the parties do not contemplate the payment of wages for services.
Additionally, this presumption may be overthrown, and the reverse established, by proof
of an express or implied contract, and the implied contract may be proven by facts and
circumstances which show that both parties, at the time services were performed, contemplated
or intended pecuniary recompense other than such as naturally arises out of the relation of parent
and childin the absence of express proof a contract may be implied from circumstances.
Schwarz v. Schwarz, 26 Ill. 81.
Incidentally, one of the objections the Court ruled against Ms. Joshis counsel on
concerned a recently proposed bill before our States Legislature:

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Assembly Bill 125 AN ACT relating to domestic relations;
requiring the court, in certain actions for divorce, to consider any history
of domestic violence between the spouses when determining whether to
award temporary maintenance or alimony; creating a rebuttable
presumption in certain actions for divorce that an award of temporary
maintenance or alimony should not be made to a spouse who engaged in
certain acts of domestic violence against the other spouse; and providing
other matters properly relating thereto.
Legislative Counsels Digest: Existing law provides that a court
in any action for divorce may: (1) require one spouse to pay money for the
temporary maintenance of the other spouse; and (2) award alimony to
either spouse in a manner that appears just and equitable. (NRS 125.040,
125.150) This bill requires a court that is considering whether to award
temporary maintenance or alimony in certain actions for divorce to
consider evidence of any history of domestic violence between the
spouses. This bill also creates a rebuttable presumption in certain actions
for divorce that temporary maintenance or alimony should not be awarded
to a spouse who has engaged in acts of domestic violence not more than 5
years before the filing of the action for divorce or at any time after the
action is filed.) (http://www.leg.state.nv.us/74th/Bills/AB/AB125.pdf)
(Referred to Committee on Judiciary)

The Court was not precluded from considering the abuse allegations in the instant case.
It was arguably appropriate to let the abuse allegations into evidence for purposes of the alimony
determination. Mr. Springgate gave a detailed explanation of the validity of basing property
distributions and, perhaps, alimony on such fault issues. This led to the Court ruling such abuse
allegations were inadmissible. However many courts allow such evidence. Bernard, L206411,
2-7 (Ohio 2002); Havell, 186 Misc. 2d 726; The Place of Fault in Modern Divorce Law, 28
Ariz. St. L.J. 773 (Fall 1996); Divine, 752 S.W. 2d 79 (1988). The Court at times seemed to be
object to Ms. Joshis counsel desire to respond to the various objections, or make his own
objections, seemingly out of annoyance with Ms. Joshis counsels trial presentation. Ms.
Joshis counsel has great respect for Judge Gardner and deeply regrets any trial presentation
found objectionable and is resolved to improving as an advocate with renewed vigor. Hopefully
this Motions attempt at thoroughly presenting some of the issues that arose at trial will

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demonstrate such a desire. Objections must be entered into the record to preserve issues for
appeal (particularly such potentially precedent making questions of law).
The Courts seeming annoyance is understandable. The expectations on Family Court
Judges in Nevada are enormous, the case loads crushing, and the need to enforce standards of
practice that aid in judicial economy is high. This is combined with the extreme emotional
intensity of the subject matter and the litigants very personal connections to the issues at hand.
Further, it is likely very frustrating to have attorneys who are a mere work in progress practicing
in ones courtroom, particularly where such an attorney may feel the opposing side is seeking an
advantage through intimidation, causing such an attorney to react in an overly antagonistic
manner, to the detriment of ones trial presentation.
Many of Nevadas Family Courts do allow evidence of abuse to be presented in arguing
for an award of alimony. Nevada is a no- fault state; consequently, marital fault is not an issue in
the division of property or the awards that the court makes. The Nevada Supreme Court has set
forth a series of factors in the Sprenger case [Sprenger v. Sprenger, 110 Nev. 855, 878 P.2d 284
(1994)] called the Sprenger Factors. There are six different factors that the court set forth in
determining how to award alimony. They have also addressed the fault issue in the Rodriguez
case [Rodriguez v. Rodriquez, 116 Nev. 993, 13 P.3d 415(2000), and Hein, and these two cases
may be contradictory]. There is no current factor that says the issue of domestic battery must be
considered, but many of the courts already do consider it. (see Minutes for AB 125: Assembly
Committee on Judiciary February 26, 2007, pages 4-5).
Conclusion
For the reasons cited in the various arguments contained in this Motion for
Reconsideration, the sanction assessing Ms. Joshis counsel to personally pay Mr. Joshis

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attorneys fees for 4.15 hours of Trial should not be upheld. Ms. Joshis counsel had found no
authority supporting a request under NRS 7.085 on account of a failure to accept a settlement
that proposes using consumer credit card debt as a set off for an alimony award. To ask for fees
under these circumstances may be a NRS 7.085 violation itself. Ms. Joshi should be awarded an
alimony payment of $500 per month for a period of twenty years, taking her to social security
age. Mr. Joshi should be ordered to contribute $6,000 to each of his two childrens college
expenses. The childrens contributions to the car payments should not be considered in dividing
each party half of the respective debt related to these vehicles, which the parties admitted at trial
were incurred during the marriage. The partys testimony and Mr. Joshis admissions establish
the amount owing on these vehicles. Mr. Joshi should be ordered to refinance the vehicle
awarded to him in this Courts Order. Any debt amounts that Mr. Joshi balance transferred from
an account to which he was the sole signatory to an account both spouses were signatories to
should be subtracted from the community debt apportioned to Ms. Joshi. As a side note, Mr.
Coughlin has been prevented from accessing Ms. Joshis files, contact information, and other
items necessary to prepare this Motion. Perhaps this Motion is not an appropriate place to go
into why that has occurred, but Mr. Coughlin wishes to implore this Court to preserve for Ms.
Joshi, the opportunity to seek Reconsideration, and possibly an Appeal, and to allow an
extension of time for another attorney at Washoe Legal Services to appear as counsel (though
Mr. Coughlin remains counsel of record as of this date). Alternatively, this Motion would seem
to provide support for the various issues that Ms. Joshi may seek Reconsideration of. Mr.
Coughlin also asks that he be allowed more time to more fully develop this Motion for
Reconsideration and to access the necessary materials from Washoe Legal Services to do so,
including the relevant file, work product, video of the trial, and record of correspondences

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between opposing counsel and Mr. Coughlin. Mr. Coughlin has been prevented from doing so
despite making all reasonable efforts to do so. More information related to this set of
circumstances can be provided, however, it seems prudent at this juncture not to set forth details
in this Motion at this time.

Respectfully submitted to the Court this 27
th
day of April, 2009
/sig/ Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
On his own behalf

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the 27
th
day of April, 2009, I electronically filed at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the within
Request For Reconsideration and Motion for Extension of Time, fully addressed to:
JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ
Reno, NV 89501


The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social
security number of any person.

Dated this 27
th
Day of April, 2009

Melissa Ulloa /sig/
Melissa Ulloa


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LIST OF EXHIBITS
1. Exhibit 1- email from Zach Coughlin, Esq. to John Springgate, Esq. sent October 22
nd
,
2008. Two pages long.
2. Exhibit 2- email from Zach Coughlin, Esq. to John Springgate, Esq., sent November 10
th
,
2008. Two pages long.

oz L I )
cb
0
> n s
OCE03
0
Code: 3980
Caryn R. Stemlicht, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 4391
Reno, NV 89501
Telephone: (775) 329-2727
Facsimile: (775) 324-5509
Attorneys for Defendant
ASHWIN JOSHI,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BHARTI JOSHI,
Defendant.
STIPULATION AND ORDER TO ENLARGE TIME PERIOD FOR MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, ASHWIN JOSHI, by and through his undersigned
counsel, and Defendant, BHARTI JOSHI, by and through her undersigned counsel, and hereby
agree and stipulate, pursuant to WDCR 12(8), to enlarge the period of time for Defendant to
file a motion for reconsideration of this Honorable Court's "Order After Trial" as filed herein
on April 13, 2009. Plaintiff mailed a "Notice of Entry of Order After Trial" to Defendant on
April 13, 2009; thus Defendant would have as and through April 30, 2009, so as to file said
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /

FILED
APR 3 0 2009
HOWARD .
VERB, CLERK
By: ) Arriutin
E L
Dept. No.: 14
DISTRICT JUDGE
E LEGAL SERVICES W
Caryn ternlicht, Esq.
Attorn 'r Defendant

Motion. The parties agree to allow Defendant an additional fifteen (15) judicial days from
April 30, 2009, so as to file any motions for reconsideration of this Court's prior Order.
DATED this 28
th
day of April, 2009
ORDER
Pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant, by and through counsel, shall have as
and through May 21, 2009, to file a Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's "Order After
Trial" as filed herein on April 13, 2009.
DATED this day of April, 2009.
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2
F I L E D
Electronically
05-13-2009:01:13:53 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
1 CODE: 2650
2 Nevada Bar #1350
3 Reno, NY 89501
Telephone: 775.323.8881
4 Attorney for Plaintiff
5
6 IN THE FAMILY DIVISION
7 IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
9
10 ASHWIN JOSHI,
11
12 vs.
Plaintiff,
13 BHARTI JOSHI,
14
15
Defendant.
~ /
* * * * *
CASE NO.: DV08-01l68
DEPT. NO.: 14
16 OPPOSITION TO REOUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION
17 COMES NOW the Plaintiff, ASHWlN JOSHI, by and through his counsel of record,
18 JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ., and opposes the Motion of Zack Coughlin, Esq., representing
19 himself, for reconsideration of the Order After Trial. This opposition is made and based upon the
20 attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and all the papers and pleadings on file in this
21 action.
22 DATED this -.L1.... day of May, 2009.
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SQ.
I MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
2 Mr. Coughlin, via e-filing, filed a request for reconsideration and extension of time to
3 respond. A stipulation to extend the time for filing a motion for reconsideration was already
4 granted to Washoe Legal Services, which is the attorney of record for Ms. Joshi. As Marc Ashley,
5 Esq., or Caryn Sternlicht, Esq., of Washoe Legal Services are representing Ms. Joshi, Mr.
6 Coughlin's motion is addressed herein only insofar as it concerns the sanctions assessed
7 individually against him under NRS 7.085.
8 A Court has the inherent authority to reconsider its prior orders. Trail v. Farreto, 91 Nev.
9 401,536 P.2d 1026 (1975). That authority is further provided by local rule, in our case, Washoe
10 District Court Rule 12(8). However, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that points or
II contentions not raised in the first instance cannot be raised on rehearing. Achrvm v. Expressway
12 Plaza Ltd., 112 Nev. 737, 742, 917 P.2d 447 (1996), and that failure to make the arguments in the
13 first instance constitutes a waiver. See, also, ChowdhlY v. NLVH, Inc., 111 Nev. 560, 893 P.2d
14 385 (1995).
15 More importantly, rehearings are appropriately only where "substantially different evidence
16 is subsequently introduced, or the decision is clearly ell'Oneous". Masomy & Tile Contractors
17 Ass 'n. v. Jolley, Urga & Wirth, Ltd., 113 Nev. 737,941 P.2d 486 (1997). And, the trial judge has
18 great discretion on the question of rehearing. Harvey's Wagonwheel, Inc. v. MacSween, 96 Nev.
19 215,; 606 P.2d 1095 (1980).
20 Mr. Coughlin puts forward no new facts, or new law, which would justifY any change in
21 the Court's prior decision.
22 Prior Proceedings:
23 The parties previously appeared before the Honorable Scott Jordan, and attempted to settle
24 the matter at a Settlement Conference in October, 2008. At that time, the parties left with a draft
25 settlement, which would have been along the same lines as that proposed at trial, to-wit: that Mr.
26 Joshi would take essentially all of the community debt, and would not pay alimony. Ms. Joshi
27 rejected that settlement, and at trial, the parties again tried to settle for approximately one and one-
28 III
-2-
I half hours of their allocated trial time. Settlement was unavailing, and the parties proceeded to
2 trial; due to the loss of trial time, the trial was continued to another day for conclusion.
3 The Argument for Reconsideration.
4 Mr. Coughlin's points and authorities in support of his position are essentially unavailing
5 because they address a different issue. The cases, when read, address the issue of whether a party
6 can alleviate a pre-existing alimony debt or arrearage by paying outstanding bills to a third party,
7 and claim a "set off" of the amount due the obligee. While those cases would be in agreement with
8 Nevada practice, this was not the situation presented herein.
9 Mr. Joshi and Ms. Joshi had approximately $16,000.00 of community debt that was due
10 and needed to be paid to third parties. As Mr. Coughlin cOlTectiy points out on page 17 of his
II Motion, "creditors of such community debt are unaffected by anything in a divorce decree fi'om
12 pursuing either of the parties for repayment." The community creditors could pursue either Ms.
13 Joshi or Mr. Joshi. It appeared from the evidence at trial that Mr. Joshi was paying the vast
14 amount of the outstanding community debt. He proposed to the Judge that in lieu of paying
15 alimony, the Court utilize the after-tax differential between their incomes to pay that community
16 debt. This would be a benefit to both parties, reduce their joint debt, and improve both of their
17 credit scores.
18 Mr. Coughlin's position at trial, which both judges tried to dissuade him from, and which
19 he re-argues in his Motion, is incorrect in that it was based upon a flawed premise. He seemed
20 to be arguing for a equal distribution of debt, with the knowledge that Ms. Joshi would essentially
21 be judgment proof because of her limited assets and income. Thus, in Mr. Coughlin's world, she
22 would continue to receive alimony, but would not have to pay her share of the community debt.
23 This argument is essentially grounded in bad faith; Mrs. Joshi is arguing that she should be
24 attributed debt, with no intention of paying, knowing she will still receive alimony.
25 However, beyond the bad faith argument, the true flaw in the argument is revealed at page
26 10, where Mr. Coughlin argues that should Ms. Joshi have been ordered to pay half of the
27 community credit card debt, and that any subsequent failure on her part to do so "could likely not
28 be used as a proper basis to set off any alimony award received." This is incorrect. As Mr.
-3-
1 Coughlin notes previously, the third party creditors would not be restrained by the divorce decree.
2 Thus, should Ms. Joshi fail to pay her attributed share of community debt, they would proceed for
3 collection against Mr. Joshi. If Mr. Joshi's monthly payments increase, due to her failure to pay
4 the debt, he could most certainly move the Court for a modification of his alimony award to reduce
5 the same, based upon the fact that his monthly expenses had increased. Alimony is modifiable
6 based upon a change of circumstances, and that change in attribution of debt would most clearly
7 be a change of circumstance affecting his ability to pay. See, NRS 125.150. Her fail\U'e to pay
8 the .debt would also affect her perceived "need," the other half of the alimony equation.
9 In order to protect Ms. Joshi's potential claim to alimony, in the event that Mr. Joshi should
10 be unable to pay these community debts that he was assuming, it was Senior Judge Jordan's
11 suggestion at the Settlement Conference that her right to alimony be secured by $1.00 per year for
12 five (5) years, so that ifthere was a default in the payment of the community debts, she would stilI
13 have an alimony award, and she could move for a modification and increase ofthe alimony. This
14 format was urged upon by the Court at trial, and memorialized in the Order After Hearing. The
15 Court recognized the sense of this proposal, in that the great likelihood would be that if Mr. Joshi
16 was unable to pay the community debt he would have to file bankruptcy, and were that to happen,
17 Ms. Joshi would have to file bankruptcy as well.
18 Respectfully, counsel misunderstands the law in this matter and has not thought through
19 his position. Siragusa v. Siragusa, 108 Nev. 987, 843 P.2d 807 (1992) clearly holds modification
20 of an alimony award would be appropriate based upon a discharged property settlement agreement.
21 Counsel's position has been throughout that Ms. Joshi should be awarded alimony and the
22 community debt. However, he has made it clear that she would discharge or be non-collectible on
23 her debt, not recognizing that either Mr. Joshi or the debtors would come after her for the balance
24 of the payments. Mr. Joshi, under Siragusa, could certainly use that as grounds for any
25 modification of any alimony that he was otherwise awarded to pay. In lieu of all the above, he
26 offered to pay the debt and not pay her alimony.
27 III
28 III
-4-
1 Sanctions.
2 NRS 18.010 provides that the Courts can liberally construe NRS 18.010(2)(b) in favor of
3 awarding attorney's fees in all appropriate situations. The Legislature expressed an intent that the
4 Court award attorney's fees and impose sanctions under NRCP 11 in all appropriate situations in
5 order to punish and deter frivolous or vexatious claims and defenses, due to the burden such
6 claims and defenses placed onjudicial resources. See, also, Trustees o/the Plumbers & Pipe fitters
7 Union Local 525 Health & Welfare Trust Plan v. Developers Surety & Indemnity Co., 120 Nev.
8 56,63,84 P.3rd 59 (2004). The language ofNRS 7.085 is very similar to that ofNRCP 11, and
9 the intent of the legislature is clear.
10 CONCLUSION
11 Mrs. Joshi's pursuit of this matter was frivolous or vexatious, in that it was not grounded
12 under existing law, and in fact, was essentially urging a distribution of debts and assets in bad
13 faith. Under any set of circumstances, we would end up in the same place: Mr. Joshi will end up
14 paying the vast majority of the community debt, and that was what he proposed to the Court. In
15 the event that the parties have to discharge those obligations, Ms. Joshi's right to alimony would
16 be maintained. The award was straight forward, reasonable, acceptable, both to the Settlement
17 Judge, the Trial Judge, and counsel for Mr. Joshi. It is regrettable that Ms. Joshi's counsel did not
18 recognize the validity of that position, and continues to argue that his view of the facts and law is
19 accurate. HistOlY and experience would suggest that he is not correct, and his motion for
20 reconsideration is more of the same. Wherefore, the Order should be maintained, and the Request
21
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24
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for Reconsideration denied, so that this matter may move to conclusion.
DATED this /:7 day of May, 2009.
-5-
1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2 Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee ofTHE LAW OFFICES OF
3 JOHN SPRlNGGATE, and that on this date I personally served at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of
4 the within OPPOSITION TO REOUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION, fully addressed to:
5 Zack Coughlin, Esq.
945 West 12th Street
6 Reno, NY 89503
7 Caryn Sternlicht, Esq.
8 299 S. Arlington Avenue
Reno, NV 89501
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
x for mailing by first class mail, postage prepaid
by personal delivery
by telephonic facsimile
by Federal Express or other overnight delivery
17 social security m b ~ a n y person.
18 Dated this _1_ day of May, 2009.
19
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-6-
IN THE FAMILY DIVISION OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL COURT
OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
ASHWIN JOSHI,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BHARTI JOSHI,
Defendant.

***
FAMILY COURT
MOTION/OPPOSITION NOTICE
(REQUIRED)
CASE NO.: DV08-01168
DEPT. NO.: 14
NOTICE: THIS MOTION/OPPOSITION NOTICE MUST BE ATTACHED AS THE
LAST PAGE to evelY motion or other paper filed pursuaut
to chapter 125, 125B or 125C ofNRS and to any answer
or response to such a motion or other paper.
A. Mark the CORRECT ANSWER with an X YES
1. Has a final decree or custody order been entered in this case? If then
continue to Question 2. If!lQ, you do not need to answer any other questions.
2. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion filed to change a final order? If
Xllli, then continue to Question 3. If!lQ, you do not need to answer any other
questions.
3. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion filed only to change the amount of
child support?
4. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion for reconsideration or a new trial
and the motion was filed within 10 days of the Judge's Order?
IF the answer to Question 4 is YES, write the filing date found on the front page of Date
the Judge's Order.
NO
X
X
X
X
B. If you answered NO to either Question I or 2 or YES to Question 3 or 4, you are exempt from the $25.00 filing fee.
However, if the COUlilater determines you should have paid the filing fee, your motion will not be decided until the
$25.00 fee is paid.
I affirm that the answers provided on the Notice are hue.
/ 3 Signature:
Print Name:
Telephone:
>boca ..
John P. Springgate, Esq., Attorney At Law
Reno, Nevada 8950 I
775-.323.8881
F I L E D
Electronically
05-13-2009:01:13:53 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
/'
1 CODE: :247
2 Nevada Bar #1350
3 Reno, NY 89501
Telephone: 775.323.8881
5
6 IN THE FAMILY DIVISION
7 IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
ASHWIN JOsm,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BHARTI JOSHI,
Defendant.
~ /
* * * * *
CASE NO.: DV08-01l68
DEPT. NO.: 14
16 MOTION TO STRIKE
17 COMES NOW the Plaintiff, ASHWIN JOSHI, by and through his counsel of record,
18 JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ., and enters his Motion to Strike the Notice(s) of Appeal filed
19 by Zack Coughlin, Esq., on his own behalf and as attorney of record for Bharti Joshi, on
20 May 12,2009. This motion is made and based upon the attached Memorandum of Points and
21 Authorities, and all the papers and pleadings on file in this action.
22 DATED this ~ day of May, 2009.
23
24
25
26
27
28
ATE, ESQ.
1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
2 NRAP 3A provides that an appealable judgment or order may be appealed from review
3 as provided in the rules and not otherwise. NRAP 3A(b) provides that appealable detenninations
4 include "a final judgment in an action or proceeding commenced in the Court in which the
5 judgment was rendered."
6 No final judgment has been entered in this matter as yet. The Court has entered an Order
7 After Trial on April 13, 2009. It has not yet been memorialized into a Findings of Fact,
8 Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree of Divorce. Further, it has been held that a premature
9 appeal has no affect, and the District Court retains jurisdiction despite the filing of a premature
10 appeal. So. Nev. Homebuilders Ass'n. v. City o/No. Las Vegas, 112 Nev. 297, 913 P.2d 1276
11 (1996).
12 Accordingly, the undersigned asks the Court to strike the Notice(s) of Appeal as untimely
13 filed while this matter awaits final disposition in the District Court.
14 DATED this ) -:3 day of May, 2009.
15 /---
16
17
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-2-
, SQ.
2 Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of THE LAW OFFICES OF
3 JOHN SPRlNGGATE, and that on this date I personally served at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of
4 the within MOTION TO STRIKE, fully addressed to:
5 Zack Coughlin, Esq.
945 West 12th Street
6 Reno, NY 89503
7 Caryn Sternlicht, Esq.
8 299 S. Arlington Avenue
Reno, NY 89501
9
10
11
12
13
X for mailing by first class mail, postage prepaid
by Federal Express or other overnight delivery
14 Messenger Service on this date.
15 AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B.030
16 The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the
17 social security u m b e ~ ,05 any person.
18 Dated this /3
i
%.ay of May, 2009.
19
20
21
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23
24
25
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27
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-3-
ASHWIN JOSHI,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BHARTI JOSHI,
Defendant.
/
***
FAMILY COURT
(REQUIRED)
DEPT. NO.: 14
NOTICE: TillS MOTION/OPPOSITION NOTICE MUST BE ATTACHED AS THE
LAST PAGE to every motion or other paper filed pursuant
or response to snch a motion or other paper.
l. Has a final decree or custody order been entered in this case? then
continue to Question 2. If!lQ, you do not need to answer any other questions.
then continue to Question 3. If!lQ, you do not need to answer any other
questions.
child SUPP01t?
the Judge's Order.
NO
X
X
X
X
B. If you answered NO to either Question 1 or 2 or YES to Question 3 or 4, you are exempt l1'01n the $25.00 filing fee.
However, if the Comt later detelmines you should have paid the filing fee, your motion will not be decided nntil the
$25.00 fee is paid.
I affirm that the answers provided on the Notice are hue.
/3 ti;-2009 Siguature:
Print Name:
Telephone:

John P. Springgate, Esq., Attorney At Law
Reno, Nevada 8950 I
775-.323.8881
9
11
!J
17
18
19
IJ
25
Emergencv Shortening Granting
Emergency Request Appeal Pauperis
8
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Zach Coughlin, Esq. ==:2
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Bar No. 94 73
945 W. 12t
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St.
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Reno, NV 89503
Phone 7 75 3388118 .
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Attomcy for Bharti Joshi ad Zach Coughlin

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1
No.: DV08-01l68 Dept 14
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TH
ST ATE OF NEV ADA I AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
10
IZ
Ashwin Joshi,
Plaintif,
14
vs.
Bharti Joshi,
Defendant
16
Defendant's Motion for Ol'der Time and Order
to Proceed on In Forma
COMES NOW, BHARTI JOSHI, Defendant above name (hereinafer "Ms. Joshi"),
20
by and through her attorney of record, ZACH COUGfIN, ESQ., and hereby requests
21
entry of Order Shortening Time and a Decision on, in reference to "DEFENDANT'S

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" filed and served April 3O'
h
, 2009 (though eFile
24
attempts were submitted on April 27"
h
, 2009; however, a filing technicality resulted in
delay of this electronic filing appearing on eFlex), as follows:
16
27
I.
The Order requested here would facilitate the timely entry of an appropriate
Page I
Kip,
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Z1
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W
Z`
2.
4 .
Order on Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration. Although an order granting or denying
a Motion for Reconsideration is not itself appealable, the Supreme Court will consider
arguments raised in the Motion for Reconsideration so long as the District Court considers
the motion on the merits, the Notice of appeal is fled afer the Order disposing of the
Motion, and the motion and order are included in the record on appeal. Arnold v.
123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 4 1, 168 P. 3d 105 0 (Nev. 2007). Due to the short time one has to
fle a Motion for Reconsideration and have it properly preserve issues for appeal, Ms.
Joshi respectfully requests that this Court hear and decide her Motion for Reconsideration
on an Order Shortening Time.
The Court is authorized to enter and Order Shortening time pursuant to WDCR Rule
11 (re: extension or shortening of time), and the facts in the instant case make it appropriate
for the Court to do so as requested her by Ms. Joshi.
The instant Motion, and the substantive Motion which is concerns, are being
personally served Wednesday, March 12, 2009, and notice is hereby given to opposing
counsel that each such Motion will be submitted to this Honorable Court for decision on or
after 9:00 a.m. March 12t
h
, 2009.
This Court's Order Afer Trial, on page 13, states that "5 . Preparation of the Decree -
Mr. Springgate shall prepare the decree of divorce consistent with this memorandum
decision. Mr. Springgate shall tender his proposed decree to Mr. Coughlin, pursuant to
WDCR 9, within 20 days from the date of this order." In this regard, Ms. Joshi and her
counsel are not sure if this Court's Order Afer Trial is a Final Decree from which the 30
days to tile a Notice of Appeal runs, or for that matter, the 10 days to file a Motion for
Reconsideration (also, eFlex and Court Connect indicate an extension of time to file a
Motion for Reconsideration was granted; however, the 30 days within which to file a Notice
of Appeal afer the filing of a Notice of Entry of Order is jursidictional and can not be
Page 2
Hurley,
A., Spreader Specialists,
Monroc, Inc.,
Siragusa.
waived), see, Power of Trial Court Indirectly to Extend Tme for Appeal, 89 ALR 941
(1934), supplemented 149 ALR 740 (1944); "to hold that the decree to be appealed from
2
was the docket entry rather than the formal decree is to go directly contrary to the judge's
J
opinion quoted above, in which he directed the counsel to prepare the decree and provide
4
for exceptions."; In Re Mercantile Co., 56 F. 2d 1023, 1024, 1025 (5 Cir., 1932);
Scott Et A. v. Gearer Et 197 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1952); Inc. v.
6 114 Idaho 15, 752 P.2d 617 (Ct. App. 1988).
7
5. Ms. Joshi and her counsel respectfully request that the relief sought in Mr. Coughlin's
8
Motion for Reconsideration be granted as to Mr. Coughlin's personally liability for Mr.
9
Joshi's attorney's fees. With respect to the other rulings included in this Court's Order Afer
10
Trial, Ms. Joshi requests the opportunity to make use of the extension of time granted by
11
this court for her to file a Motion for Reconsideration. To the extent that Ms. Joshi will not
1Z
be able to have such a Motion for Reconsideration heard or decided afer the time for which
1J
fling a Notice of Appeal has run (which is arguably May 1 2t
h
, 2009), Ms. Joshi requests that
14
this Court utilize the Motion for Reconsideration Mr. Coughlin fled on his own behalf with
15
respect to attorney's fees in fnding that Ms. Joshi should have been awarded alimony greater
16
than the $ 1.00 per year, "jurisdictional hook" as contemplated by A analysis
17
utilizing the "Tonopah Formula" (see, ln cearchO/ a COhCrCnl !heOre/|a/MOOe//Ot
18
Al'mOny,Nevada Lawyer, by M. Willick, Esq. (April 2007); The So-Called "Tonopah
19
Formula "for Alimony Explained, Nevada Family Law Report, T. Torvinen, Esq.,
20
(September 2002)) suggests that Ms. Joshi, as one who is leaving a marriage that last 16
21
years longer than 5 years, who is 16 years past her 30t
h
birthday, who has two children born
of this marriage, and whose education consists of a degree from a foreign country and in a
23
field for which she is not currently working nor for which she has worked in in many years,
and where there is a $ 12,000 yearly income disparity (which would be over 40% of Ms.
25
Joshi's income), and where Mr. Joshi developed his skill and earning capacity during the
26
marriage and during a time when Ms. Joshi was more of a hands on caregiver with regard to
27
their two children, is potentially entitled to an alimony award of approximately $400 per
28
Page 3
J
J
Upton-Wheeler,
1P
I
20
25
Upton-Wheeler,
Upton-Wheeler,
Upton
Wheeler,
Rodris'ez
month for a period of at least 10 years (if not for her lifetime as this was a 21 year marriage
and many practitioners note that the 20 year mark is a fairy common bench mark for
Z
awarding lifetime alimony). Further, Wheeler v. 113 Nev. 1185, 946 P 2d
200 (1997), notes that a child support obligation can not be set ofby a shared debt owed by
4
the spouses to a third party creditor. "Set off' of one spouse's support obligation against
other spouse's obligation to pay equity in marital residence not allowed. The Court in
Wheeler held that the trial court erred in completely releasing non-custodial parent from
obligation to pay child support by allowing the non-custodial parent a "set-off' of her child
8
support obligation against her husband's obligation to pay her one-half the equity in the
marital residence. Wheeler v. 113 Nev. 1185, 946 P.2d 200, 1997 Nev.
LEXIS 135 (1997) , and the holding in In Re Anders. arguably weigh against this Court
11
using such debts as an off set to an award of alimony to Ms. Joshi.
11
Similarly, if spousal abuse or marital misconduct has an adverse economic impact on
IJ
the victim spouse, the court may consider it when determining whether an unequal division
14
of community property is warranted. Wheeler v. 113 Nev. 1185, 946 P.2d
200 (1997). Ms. Joshi arguably deserves a new trial or having her motion for
10
reconsideration granted in light of the exclusion of evidence of domestic violence as creating
I!
economic consequence which may have afected the alimony award, debt distribution, or
1
property distribution. Even if a legitimate compelling reason exists to support an unequal
1"
distribution of property, such unequal distribution cannot be accomplished by reducing or
eliminating the non-custodial parent's obligation to pay child support. Wheeler v.
21
113 Nev. 1185,946 P 2d 200, 1997 Nev. LEXlS 135 (1997) Further, contrary to
22
the interpretation Me Springgate cited at trial, the case (Rodriguez v. Rodriquez,
23
116 Nev. 993, 13 P.3d 415 (2000; Fault as a determinative factor in alimony awardl' in
Z1
Nevada and other community propert jurisdictions, Mazzeo, Catherine, 2 Nev. L.J. 177
195 (2002). Rodriguez, perhaps contrary to Me Springgate's interpretation, held that:
26
27
"A year afer Lofgren was decided, we decided the case of
Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 113 Nev. 1185, 946 P.2d 200 (1997).

Page 4
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We concluded in Wheeler that the district court erred by relying on

evidence of the husband's spousal abuse as a basis for making an
unequal division of the parties' community property. [***10] Id. at
1190, 946 P.2d at 203. We noted that by amending NRS
125 .150( 1) in 1993, the legislature sought to preserve the concept
of no-fault divorce in Nevada. See id. at 1189-90, 946 P2d at 203.
We also recognized the legislature's determination that "in divorce
proceedings, testimony regarding the relative faults of the parties
could have an adverse efect on the children and could increase the
expense of litigation" Id. at 1190, 946 P 2d at 203 (citing Hearing
on AB. [3]47 Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary, 67th
Leg. (Nev., May 10, 1993, and April 30, 1993))
However, in Wheeler, we also recognized that sometimes marital
misconduct results in adverse economic consequences for one of
the parties. 11 Nev. at 1190, 946 P2d at 203. We determined that
a district court may consider evidence of the economic
consequences of marital misconduct in determining whether an
unequal division of community property is warranted. See id. As
we noted in Heim, "alimony is wholly a creature of statute." Id. at
607, 763 P 2d at 679. The legislature has elected to distinguish the
appropriate considerations [***11] for the division of community
property from those which exist for an award of alimony. The
legislature has devised a scheme that permits the court to deviate
fom the rule requiring an equal division of community property if a
compelling reason exists for doing so. However, the legislature has
not seen ft to permit the court to withhold an otherwise just and
equitable alimony award for any similar reason.
According to both the legislative history and the plan language of
the statute, a judge is not permitted to consider the fault or
misconduct of either of the parties when considering an award of
alimony. We hold that when considering an award of alimony, the
court may not consider either party's misconduct or fault. We
perceive no reason to engraf the "misconduct resulting in an
economic impact" exception to the alimony portion of the statute.
We have previously determined in Wheeler that the relevance of
fault or misconduct is limited to instances where, because of its
economic impact on one of the parties, fault or misconduct
constitutes a compelling reason to deviate from equal division of
the community estate.
Moreover, an exception is unnecessary. Nevada has well [*** 12]
settled case law that provides guidelines for the trial court to
consider when making a just and equitable alimony award.
Commonly referred to as the "Buchanan factors, " these guidelines
were enunciated over twenty-five years ago in Buchanan v.
Buchanan, 90 Nev. 209, 523 P. 2d 1 (1974) They include [419]
Page 5
15
16
May, by:
Signature!
19
the fnancial condition of the parties: the nature and value of [the
parties'] respective propeliy; the contribution of each to any
property held hy them as tenants by the entirety; the duration of the
marriage; the husband's income, his earning capacity, his age, health
2
and ability to labor; and the wife's age, health, station and ability to
earn a living. Id. at 21 5, 523 P2d at 5. While we acknowledge the
3
archaic tenor of the language, as well as the unnecessary variation
between the [*999] considerations articulated for the husband and
4
the wife, we also note with approval the commonsense approach
5 that permeates these points. And the durability of the factors over
time is a testament to their viability.
6
So, for example, if one spouse commits repetitive acts of physical
7
or mental abuse against the other, causing a condition in the injured
spouse which [***13] generates expense or affects that person's
8
ability to work, the physical and/or mental condition caused by the
misconduct can be taken into account in two ways: first, as a
9
compelling reason to make an unequal distribution of property or
10
second,without considering evidence of fault or misconduct, the
court in deciding alimony will, per Buchanan, take that spouse's
11
physical and mental condition into account when examining his or
her financial condition, health and ability to work."
12
CONCLUSION
13
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant request this Court grant the relief
14
requested, including granting the Order to Proceed on Appeal In Forma Pauperis.
16
Dated this 12t
h
day of 2009
17
18
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No 9473
20
Attorney for Bharti Joshi and Zach Coughlin
11 Law Ofce ofZach Coughlin, Esq.
945 W.12,
h
St., Reno, NY 89503
22
Tel 77 5338 8118
23
24
25
27
28
Page 6
Emergency
2
Shortening Granting Emergency Request Appeal
Pauperis,
10
1
20
25
/signature/
19
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certif that I am an agent of Zach Coughlin, Esq, and that on
th
J the 12 Day of May, 2009, I electronically fled and or personally served at Reno,
4 Nevada, a true copy of the within Defendant's Motion for Order
Time and Order to Proceed on
6 In Forma flly addressed to:
John Springgate, Esq.

8
Attorney for Ashwin Bharti
203 S, Alington Ave.

Reno, NV 8950J
Caryn Sternlicht, Esq.
11
12 299 S. Arlington Ave.
Reno, NV 89501
1J
14
AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B030
16
17
The undersigned does hereby afirm that the preceding document does not contain the
I
social security number of any person,
th
Dated this 12 Day of May, 2009.
21
Melissa Ulloa
12
Melissa Ulloa
23
l
26
27
18
Page 7

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to

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IN THE FAMILY DIVISION OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
< < <
)
FAMILY COURT
(RQUIRD)
CASENO,
Vc
1
DEPT NO, _
)
`D
)
)
)
)
`
LAST PAGE to ever motion or other paper filed pursuant to chapter I25, l25B
or I25Cof NRS and to any answer or response to such a motion or other paper
A. YES NO
Mark the CORRECT ANSWER with an ?
1. Has a fnal decree or custody order been entered in this
case'? Ifl then continue to Question 2. If you do not
D
need to answer any other questions.
2. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion filed to
change a final order? If, then continue to Question 3. If
[
D
HU you do not need to answer any other questions.
3. Is this a motion or an a motion filed only to
change the amount of child
4. Is this a motion or a opposition to a motion for
reconsideration or a new trial and the motion was fled
[
within IO days of the Judge's Order?
Die
IF the answer to Question 4 is YES, write in the
date found on the front page of the Judge's Order l ^{
If you NO to either Question 1 or 2 or YES (0 Question 3 or 4, you are
B.
from the S25.OOfiling fee. However, if the Court later determines you should have paid the
filing fee, your motion will not be decided until the $25. (I() fee is paid
I afrm that the ans\\ ers proVIded on thIS NolIce are true
Print Address:
Telephone Number:
\ \o ^i
\ \ -MF<Ar1 Ti'J 15 4 Pr ~^L
\c-6 \ .c/| ::. S +l')tc g
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9
day of ay,

signaturel-
Z
ach Coughlin, Esq.
8
15
$1030 ._
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
BarNo. 9473
945 W. 12th St.
Reno, NV 89503
Phone 775 338 8118
on his own behalf and
Attorney of Record for Joshi
BhartilDefendant, see explanation
| + 27
Dept. 14
fN TH SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE
STATE OF NEVADA I A FOR
1COUNTY OF WASHOE
10
II
Ashwin Joshi,
12
Plaintiff,
13
vs.
14
Bharti Joshi, Defendant
16
17
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROCEED
18 ON APPEAL I FORMA PAUPERS
19
Pursuant to NS 12.015, and based on the following Afdavit, I request
20
permission form this Court to proceed without paying courts costs or other costs and
21
fees as provided in NRS 12.015 because I lack suficient financial ability.
22
2, Dated this 12h 209
2
25
26
Nevada Bar. No. 9473
Law Ofice ofZach Coughlin, Esq.
27
945 W12th St., Reno, NV 89503
2 Tel: 775 338 8118
Afidavit in Support of Motion to Proceed In Fonna Pauperis Page 1
5
10
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20
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I.
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AFFIDAVIT
State of Nevada }
}ss.
County of Washoe )
I, Zach Coughlin being frst duly sworn, depose and say that I am the
Appellant in the above-entitled case; that in support of my motion to proceed on
appeal without being required to prepay fees, cost or give security therefor, 1 state
that because of my poverty I a unable to pay the costs of said proceeding or to give
security therefor; that I believe [ am entitled to redress; and that the issues which I
desire to present on appeal are the following:
Whether is was appropriate to use debts to third party creditors to of set an
alimony award to Ms. Joshi. Whether evidence of domestic violence should have
been admitted for determining alimony, debt distribution, and community property
distribution. Whether charging attorney Zach Coughlin, Esq. to pay the opposing
party's attorney's fees was an abuse of discretion or otherwise inappropriate and not
supported with suficiently specifc detail or based on appropriate grounds in Judge
Gardner's Order Afer Trial. Whether the $1.00 per year alimony award to Ms. Joshi
is insuficient in light of the facts, evidence presented, existing case law, and the
Tonopah formula for an Appellant who is 46 years old, the parties were married for
21 years and had two children during the marriage, the Appellant's education was
received in a foreign country and is not related to her current employment, an
Extended Protection Order was granted against Respondent, and Respondent
developed his skill and earning capacity during the marriage while Appellant spent
more time at home devoted to raising the party's two children. Whether the time for
filing the Notice of Appeal ran from Notice of Entry of the Order Afer Trial where
the Order Afer Trial directed John Springgate, Esq. to prepare a Final Decree within
20 days (and this was not done). Whether Mr Joshi's income was incorrectly stated
Afidavit in Support of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
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in Judge Gardner's Order After Trial and therefore not an appropriate basis on which
to deny alimony.
Whether John Springgate, Esq. should have been pennitted to introduce
exhibits that were not identified in his Pre-Trial Statement (which was fled at 5 p.m.
the day before Trial) and where Mr. Springgate did not provide opposing counsel a
copy of the exhibits introduced at trial at the time they were admitted into evidence,
or ffeen minutes before Trial as ordered in the Pre-Trial Order (rather, Mr.
Springgate indicated that the documents which formed the basis of the exhibits he
introduced at the Trial were provided as part of his client's 16.2 production).
Whether it was inappropriate for Judge Gardner to, during the Settlement Conference,
tell Ms. Joshi's attorney to "shut up" and directed Ms. Joshi to not listen to her
attorney.
I frther swear that the responses which 1 have made to the questions and
instructions below relating to my ability to pay the cost of prosecuting the appeal are
true.
1. Are you presently employed? Mr. Coughlin is not currently employed.
a. [f the answer is yes, state the amount of your salary or wages per month and
give the name and address of your employer. nla
b. If the answer is no, state the date of your last employment and the amount of
the salary and wages per month which you received. Mr. Coughlin was employed,
within the last week, at Washoe Legal Services and received a yearly salary of
approximately $50,000
2. Have you received within the past twelve months any income from a business,
profession or other form of self-employment, or in the form of rent payments, interest,
dividends, or other source? No.
a. If the answer is yes, describe each source of income, and state the amount
received from each during the past twelve months. nla
3. Do you own any cash or checking or savings account?
Afidavit in Support of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Page 3
28

ot
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SUScBED
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a. If the answer is yes, state the total value of the items owned. Mr. Coughlin has
approximately $8,000 in a checking account.
4. Do you own any real estate, stocks, bonds, notes, automobiles, or other
2
valuable property (excluding ordinary household furishings and clothing)? No.
3
a. If the answer is yes, describe the property and state its approximate value: Mr.
5 Coughlin owns a 1996 Honda Accord worth approximately $2,000.
4
5. List the persons who are dependent upon you for support and state your
7 relationship to those persons. n/a.
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6. I have total monthly expenses of approximately $2,200.
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I understand that a false statement or answer to any question in this afdavit will
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subject me to penalties for perjur
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A SWORN to before me this)Z day of May, 2009

) ? !Q,!er _/
)

Notary Public
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! Apointment Recorded in Wahe o., ;
No: 980552-2 Expires July 13, 2011 l
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Afidavit in Support of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Page 4
/signature/ Coughlin, Esq.
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ORER
2
Let the applicant proceed without prepayment of costs or fees or the necessity of
l giving security therefor.
4 DA TED this ..... ... . . . . . . . day of , , , . . 2009
5
6
District Judge
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8 Dated this 12t day of May, 2009
9
Zach
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11 Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar. No. 9473
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Law Ofce ofZach Coughlin, Esq.
945 W.12th St, Reno, NY 89503
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Tel 77533881 18
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Afdavit in Support of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Page 5
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Isignaturel
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE A MAILING
2 Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an agent ofZach Coughlin, Esq. and that on
the 12
th
Day of May, 2009, I electronically fled at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the
within MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROCEED ON
APPEAL I FORMA PAUPERIS fully addressed to
6
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Reno, NV 89501
9
II
Reno, NV 8950 1
12
Judge Linda Gardner
Dept. 1 4
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Second Judicial District Court
14 Washoe County
AFFlRMATION PUSUANT TO NRS 23 9B 03 0
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The undersigned does hereby afrm that the preceding document does not contain the
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Dated this 12th Day of May, 2009.
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Melissa Ulloa
2
Melissa Ulloa
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Afdavit in Suppor of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Page 6

ol ct/6
|
I

filing
exempt

|( /' Y==7_
_3?" `/l l
***
)
FAMILY COURT
)
)
``.
(REQUIRED)
CASE NO.
DEPT. NO.
\
MunC /| ,. r' ".
`[ ; Pfw, `!* ' _
LAST PAGE to every motion or other paper filed pursuant to chapter 125, I25B
or 125C ofNRS and to any answer or response to such a motion or other paper
A YES NO
Mark the CORRECT ANSWER with an `.
1. Has a tlnal decree or custody order been entered in thi s
case? If, then continue to Question 2. IfQ, you do not
. .
chage a final order? If, then continue to Question 3. If
.
no, you do not need to answer any other questions.
3. Is this a motion Of an opposition to a motion filed only to
change the amount of child support?
4. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion for
reconsideration or a new trial and the motion was filed
.
.
within 10 days of the Judge's Order?
Date
IF the answer to Question 4 is YES, write in the
date found on the front page of the Judge's Order
Tfyou answered NO to either Question I Of 2 or YES to Question 3 Of 4, you are
B.
from the $2500 fling fee. However, if the Court later determines you should have paid the
fling fee, your motion will not be decided until the $25. 00 fee is paid.
I afrm that the answers provided on this Notice are true.
Date Signature '/',
Print Name:
Print Address:
Telephone Number:
Rev. 10/24/2002
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$1310
Zach Coughlin, Esq,
Bar No, 9473
945 W, 12th Sf.
Reno, NY 89503
Phone 775 338 81 18
No.: DV08-01168
l\J
,
, "
, "
Dept. 14
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE
STATE OF NEVADA TN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
Ashwin Joshi,
Plaintiff,
vs,
Bharti Joshi,
Defendant
CASE APPEAL STATEMENT
1. Name of appellant filing this case appeal statement: Bharti Joshi and Zach
Coughlin,
2, Identify the judge issuing the decision, judgment, or order appealed from
Judge Linda Gardner, Department 14, Second Judicial District Court,
3, Identify all parties to the proceedings in the district court: Ashwin Joshi,
Plaintiff Bharti Joshi, Defendant
4, Identify all parties involved in this appeal: Bharti Joshi and Zach Coughlin,
Appellants, Ashwin Joshi, Respondent
5, Zach Coughlin, Esq" is the attorney for Bharti Joshi and Zach Coughlin,
Case Appeal Statement Page 1
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Mr. Coughlin is no longer with Washoe Legal Services. Mr. Coughlin's address
IS: 945 W 12th St, Reno, NY 89503; Tel 7753388118.
John Springgate, Esq. is the attorney for Ashwin Joshi. Mr. Springgate's
address is 203 S. Arlington Ave, Reno, NY 89501; Tel: 7753238881.
6. Indicate whether appellant was represented by appointed or retained counsel in
the district court: Appellant filed a Statement of Legal Aid Representation as she was
represented by Zach Coughlin, Esq. of Washoe Legal Services, counsel which she
retained.
7. Indicate whether appellant is represented by appointed or retained counsel on
appeal: Bharti Joshi is represented by Zach Coughlin, Esq.; Zach Coughlin, Esq. is
also representing himself with respect to the order that he personally pay Mr. Joshi's
attorney's fees.
8. Indicate whether appellant was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and
the date of entry of the district court order granting such leave: Applicant has not
heard received and Order from Dept. 14 with regard to this issue though an Affidavit
in Support of Motion to Proceed on Appeal In Forma Pauperis was filed.
9. Indicate the date the proceedings commenced in the district court (e.g., date
complaint, indictment, information, or petition was filed): A Complaint for Divorce
was filed July I, 2008 by Ashwin Joshi.
Dated this 12'h day of May, 2009 by

Zach Coughlin, Esg.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Law Office of Zach Coughlin, Esq.
945 W.12'h St., Reno, NY 89503
Tel 775 338 8118

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Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certifY that I am an agent ofZach Coughlin, Esq. and that on
the 12th Day of May, 2009, I electronically filed at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the
within Case Appeal Statement, fully addressed to:
Reno, NY 89501
Reno, NY 89501
Dated this 12th Day of May, 2009.
elissa Ulloa
Melissa Ulloa
Agent ofZach Coughlin, Esq.
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CODE:
INTHE FAMILYDIVISION
OFTHESECONDJUDICIALDISTRICTCOURTOFTHESTATEOFNEVADA
IN ANDFORTHECOUNTYOFWASHOE
ASHWINJOSHI,
Plaintiff, CaseNo. DV08-01l68
v.
Dept.No. 14
BHARTIJOSHI,
Defendant.
-------------/
ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION
Uponreviewofthepleadingsandpapersfiledherein,theCourtfindsandOrders
asfollows.
Initially,theCourtwouldlike to clarifyithastakenunderdeliberationonlythose
portionsofthemotionwhicharerelevanttotheawardofattorney'sfees. Baseduponthe
'NoticeofSubstitutionofCounsel'filed May14,2009,Ms.Joshihaschosentoretain
WashoeLegalServicestorepresentherfor the remainderofthiscaseintheplaceand
steadofMr.Coughlin,andrequestsafinaldecreeofdivorceenteredassoonaspossible.
(Notice,1:15-21).
Apartymovingfor reconsiderationmustdosowithinten(10)daysofthenoticeof
entryoftheorderatissue. WDCR12(8). If timelyfiled,motionsfor reconsiderationare
onlyappropriatelygrantedwhenthecourthasmisapprehendedor madeamistake
regardingapertinentcasefact or issueoflaw. Haroeq'e Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. MacSween, 96
Nev.215,606P.2d1095(1980). This typeofmotionmaynotbe usedto presentnew
F I L E D
Electronically
05-21-2009:11:27:19 AM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
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information or to reargue a previously litigated issue. In Re Ross, 99 Nev. 657, 688 P.2d
1089 (1983); see also DCR 13(7).
A 'Notice of Entry of Order' was filed April 13, 2009. Pursuant to WDCR 12(8),
Mr. Coughlin should have filed the request for reconsideration by April 27, 2009.
Mr. Coughlin filed a 'Request for Adjustment of Filing Date or Extension of Time' on
April 29, 2009, in which he indicates he II attempted to file a timely Request for
Reconsideration on eFile, however, a technical deficiency regarding the signature line
resulted in a rejection of the filing." (Request,l:17-1:19). This pleading was never
submitted to the Court for a decision and Mr. Coughlin was never granted leave to file his
motion. Mr. Coughlin then proceeded to file a 'Request for Reconsideration; Request for
Extension of Time to Respond' on April 30, 2009.
Despite the procedural deficiencies, the Court finds a review of the substantive
argument presented herein is warranted in consideration of the grave nature of the Court'
holding that Mr. Coughlin is to personally pay opposing counsel's trial fees.
(1) Counsel defended a civil action or proceeding in this Court where such action or
defense was not warranted by existing law, or there was no good faith argument
for a modification of existing law -
Mr. Coughlin urges the Court to reconsider its ruling that he maintained and
defended this action without existing law, or made no good faith argument to change
existing law. Mr. Coughlin contends his position throughout this case was that his client i
entitled to more than $1.00 in alimony per year in exchange for Mr. Joshi taking on over
$20,000.00of consumer debt. (Request, 9:23-9:27). Mr. Coughlin cites to various opinions
submitted by courts across the country to support the proposition that a II debt to a third
party creditor may not be used to properly offset an alimony obligation." (Request, 1:18 -
11:21, 15:11-21:7). The persuasive authority presented herein was never submitted to the
Court prior to this time and thereby cannot be taken into account as it attempts to present
new evidence to support an already litigated issue.
/ / /
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The Court understands from this motion that Mr. Coughlin's position was that his
client was willing to take on community debt so long as she also received an alimony
award. It has become apparent that Mr. Coughlin's underlying intent was to create a
'judgment proof' client in that she would ultimately not be able to pay the community
debt allocated to her, but her alimony payments would remain intact. Mr. Coughlin asks
" [w]hat should or would happen if Ms. Joshi was granted alimony and subsequently
moved to discharge her share of the community debt in bankruptcy or simply just failed to
pay these debts?" (Request, 19:21-19:25). Mr. Coughlin's answer to this question is that"a
support obligation (alimony too, not just child support) should be upheld even where the
supported party has failed to live up to the debt distribution terms of a Court's divorce
decree." (Request, 20:1-20:3). Mr. Coughlin advocated for this position although he knew
third party creditors could, and likely would, ultimately go after Mr. Joshi when his client
failed to pay the community debt allocated to her in the decree of divorce. (Mr. Coughlin
states"creditors of such community debt are unaffected by anything in a divorce decree
from pursuing either of the parties for repayment... [and] it is typically very difficult to
pursue a spouse who is not a cosigner with respect to using that spouses separate property
[to] cover any community debt" and " [s]hould Ms. Joshi have been ordered to pay half of
the community credit card debt (for which her personal property probably could not be
used to satisfy as she was not a cosigner on nearly all of the accounts), any subsequent
failure on her part to do so could likely not be used as a proper basis to set off any alimony
award received." (Request 10:24-10:27; 17:3-17:11).
Mr. Springgate contends Mr. Coughlin's position lacks merit pursuant to
NRS 125.150 and Siragusa v. Siragusa, as it is well established that this Court has
jurisdiction to modify an award of alimony when one party fails to pay their attributed
share of the community debt. 108 Nev. 987, 843 P.2d 807 (1992). Mr. Springgate specifies it
has been Mr. Coughlin's position that Ms. Joshi preferred an equal distribution of debt in
addition to an award of alimony so that she could continue to collect alimony even if she
failed to pay her half of the community debt. Mr. Springgate contends Mr. Coughlin's
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pursuit of this matter was vexatious and frivolous "in that it was not grounded under
existing law, and in fact, was essentially urging a distribution of debts and assets in bad
faith." (Opp.5:11-5:13).
Mr. Coughlin has presented various decisions by courts throughout the United
States in support of his position on alimony and the distribution of community debts.
However, as stated above, the argument and case law presented herein were never
presented to the Court prior to this time. As such, there is no valid argument that the
court has misapprehended or made a mistake regarding a pertinent case fact or issue of
law when Mr. Coughlin is presenting argument and persuasive authority for the first time
in an attempt to re-litigate the issue. Not only did Mr. Coughlin fail to present any of the
argument contained herein at trial, he also failed to present any relevant Nevada law
regarding alimony at trial to sustain the contention that his client was entitled to such
support.
Overall, this portion of Mr. Coughlin's motion lends credence to this Court's
finding that his presentation of the case and arguments in support thereof were
unfounded in fact, unwarranted by existing law, unreasonable, and vexatious (Order,
13:11-13:13). At no point does Mr. Coughlin demonstrate that any of the information
contained herein was presented at trial for the Court to take into consideration. Further,
Mr. Coughlin acknowledges he advocated for a 'judgment proof' client and ultimately
contemplated placing Mr. Joshi in such a position that he would be pursued by third party
creditors should Ms. Joshi have been allocated any of the community debt in the decree of
divorce.
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies reconsideration of the award of attorney's
fees.
(2) The Court's 'Order After Trial' is sufficiently detailed and specific to support an
award personally requiring counsel to pay opposing side's attorney's fees -
Mr. Coughlin argues the Court failed to be sufficiently detailed and specific in its
Order with regard to Mr. Coughlin's sanctionable behavior, and with regard to the
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reasonableness of attorney's fees as the Court did not require an affidavit pursuant to
Willer v. Wilfong. (Request, 11:22 - 21:7; 22:10; 24:16).
The Court would direct Mr. Coughlin to review pages 11-13 of its 'Order After
Trial' for specific instances as to why this Court awarded attorney's fees to Mr. Springgate.
As for the contention that Miller was not satisfied, Mr. Coughlin's assertion of Miller
is unmeritorious under these circumstances. The Supreme Court specified that parties
seeking attorney fees in family law cases must support their fee request with affidavits or
other evidence that meets the factors in Brunzell and Wright. 112 Nev. At 623-624.
The Court witnessed first hand any and all evidence required under Brunzell during the
trial as it observed the qualities of the advocate, the character and difficulty of the work
performed, the actual work performed by the attorney, and the result obtained.
As Mr. Springgate is requesting attorney's fees for only that time spent at trial, there is no
need for any additional evidence to support the reasonableness of Mr. Springgate's fees.
Further, the requirement that the Court take into account the disparity in income pursuant
to Wright is nonsensical as the Court is not requiring the fees to be paid by a litigant.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court denies Mr. Coughlin's request for
reconsideration.
(3) Request for extension of time is denied -
Mr. Coughlin requests he be granted "more time to more fully develop this Motion
for Reconsideration and to access the necessary materials from Washoe Legal Services to
do so, including relevant file, work product, video of trial, and record of correspondences
between opposing counsel and Mr. Coughlin." (Request, 49:24-50:1).
This Court has substantively considered Mr. Coughlin'S 50 page motion despite its
procedural deficiencies. No good cause appears to grant Mr. Coughlin further lenience on
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
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thismatter. Accordingly,Mr. Coughlin'srequestforanextensionoftimeto morefully
develophis requestfor reconsiderationisdenied.
GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May.z]:2009.

Gardner
DistrictCourtJudge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Pursuantto NRCP5(b),IcertifythatIamanemployeeofthe SecondJudicial
DistrictCourt,andthatonthe ~ dayof 2009,Idepositedformailing,first
classpostagepre-paid,atReno,Nevada,atrueandcJrectcopyofthe foregoing
documentaddressedto:
Document: Order Denying Request for Reconsideration
ZachCoughlin,Esq.
945W.12
th
Street
Reno,NV89503
IalsocertifythatonthecJ. 1 dayof 2009,Ielectronicallyfiledthe
foregoingwiththeClerkofthe Courtsystemwhichwillsendanoticeofelectronicfilingto
thefollowing:
JohnP.Springgate,Esq.
Marc Ashley,Esq.
~ e ~
AdministrativeAssistant- Dept.14
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$3785
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Bar No. 9473
945 W.12th St.
Reno, NV 89503
Phone 775 338 8118
Atorey for Zach Coughlin
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I TH FAMILY DIVISION OF TH SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF THE
ST ATE OF NEVADA I A FOR
TH COUNTY OF WASHOE
Ashwin Joshi,
No.; \ V ( 0 \ \ 6
Plaintif
\P' It
vs
.--'
Bharti Joshi,
Defendant
RPLY TO OPPOSITION
Comes Now, Zach Coughlin, Esq. , to fle this Reply to Opposition to
Motion For Reconsideration of the Order After Trial. This Reply to Opposition is
made and based upon the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Exhibit,
and all the papers and pleadings on fle in this action
DATED this 20m day of May, 2009.
ach Coughlin, Esq
Page I
NOTE by Coughlin: despite having a 5/20/09 filing stamped date, which made timely Coughlin's Reply
to Springgate'es 5/13/09 Opposition to Coughlin's Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Gardner's
5/21/09 Order Denying Coughlin's Motion actually has a numerically prior eflex number assigned to
it, owing to the 2JDC originally rejecting Coughlin's filing just long enough to sneak Judge L.
Gardner's 5/21/09 Order through, to wit, eflex:
DV08-01168-1079627 (Ord Denying ...).pdf
DV08-01168-1083206 (Reply...).pdf
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Mr. Joshi's counsel's Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration presents and
J
opportunity to really clarif some of the salient points at issue in this litigation. The

decision in this case is clearly erroneous. Mr. Springgate incorrectly asserts that two
Settlement Conferences occurred in this case. That is patently incorrect. The argument Mr.
6 Spring gate leads with is that past due alimony is far diferent than soon to be due alimony
7 and therefore the multitude of case ofered in support of denying a set of for debts to third
8 party creditors with alimony are not relevant.
9
Further, Mr. Springgate makes another misstatement when on page 3 of his
Opposition he claims to quote from Mr. Coughlin's Motion for Reconsideration, citing that
11
"creditors of such community debt are unafected by anything in a divorce decree from
12
pursuing either of the parties for repayment. See Marine Midland Bank v. Monroe, 1 04
13
Nev. 307, 756 P2d 1 193 ( 1 988) (bank is free to pursue wife for delinquent joint credit
l
card debt despite divorce cour' s order for husband to pay such debt)." (Emphasis added).
This is true, perhaps, were both spouses are signatories and on the credit applications.
16
Indeed, the portion Mr. Springgate quotes refers to a situation involving a joint credit card
17
account, that is where both spouses are signatories. The point Mr. Springgate seems to be
18
making is not so true where, as here, only Mr. Joshi is a signatory to the credit accounts at
19
issue. Perhaps this was an another innocent mistake on Mr. Springgate's part. However,
the very next sentence, on page 17 of the Reconsideration Motion points out that it "is
21
typically very difcult to pursue a spouse who is not a cosigner with respect to using that
21
spouses separate property covers any community debt. " Mr. Springgate is curiously silent
23
as to where the law falls in that respect. Given the years and years of experience that Mr.
H
Springgate reminded the Court he possesses (at one point, during the Trial he mentioned
that "while Mr. Coughlin was not practicing in those unfortunate days where fault was still
16
a factor in an alimony analysis, I was . . . ") it would be very desirable for Mr. Springgate to
l
provide his input ,vith regard to what creditors might do to execute upon Ms. Joshi's
1
Page 2
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Mr.
property in this situation. In fact, Mr. Springgate did, as will be discussed, make some
vague arguments with respect to the doctrine of necessaries.
2
Mr. Springgate attempts to encapsulate what he believes Mr. Coughlin's argument to
J
have been when, in his Opposition, on page 3, that Mr. Coughlin's position "was based on a

fawed premise. He seemed to be arguing for a equal distribution of debt, with the
knowledge that Ms. Joshi would essentially be judgment proof because of her limited assets
6 and income." Here, again, Mr. S pringgate curiously fails to address the more pressing issue
7
that stems from the fact that his client is the sole signatory on all the credit accounts at
8
issue. Perhaps it is the weakness of the doctrine of the necessaries application the facts of
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this case present that result in Mr. Springgate's failing to pursue such a line of argument and
instead focus on relative non sequiturs, such as Ms. Joshi's post-divorce income or near
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complete lack of assets. Instead, Mr Springgate reverts to a tactic he seems to employ just
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about every time his arguments come up short, that of accusing opposing counsel of "bad
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faith", and usually, calling for sanctions. To the extent that no real precedent is offered in
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support of such an assessment, Mr. Springgate's argument are veering, regrettably to the ad
hominem.
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Again, on line 28, page 3 of his Opposition, Mr. Springgate misstates Nevada law, in
17
spite of his many, many years of experience. With regard to the assertion that any failure on
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Ms. Joshi's part to flfll an obligation to pay a third party creditor stemming from a divorce
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decree could not be properly used to set of a spousal support obligation, Mr. Springgate
not only brings in an argument that is only relevant to situations where both spouses are
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signatories on a credit account and application, but he goes on to seemingly misstate
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Nevada law as it relates to the Court's ability to reduce a supported spouses alimony award
2
where the supported spouse failed to flfill some debt distribution term in a decree.
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Springgate states that his client could "move the Court for a modifcation of his alimony
award to reduce the same" Mr. Springgate may have been able to get some opposing party
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or opposing counsel to agree to some settlement along those lines, but Nevada law would
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seemingly prevent (or at least strongly argue against) those Nevada District Courts bound
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by Upton-Wheeler from entering such a modifcation under such circumstances.
discussed in more detail, infa.
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trial .".
This is
Mr. Coughlin does admit that he is not sure the extent to
which U pton-Wheeler would prevent a court from entering a modification of an alimony
award based on a supported spouses failure to comply with a debt distribution, however,
the precedent does seem to preclude an ofset. The diference between an "ofset" and a
"modifcation" seem dubious, or at least, dificult to fully understand.
Pursuant to NRS 7. 085, if a court finds that an attorney has: "(a) filed, maintained or
defended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State and such action or defense is
not well-grounded in fact or is not warranted by existing law or by an argument for
changing the existing law that is made in good faith; or (b) unreasonably and vexatiously
extended a civil action or proceeding before any court in this State, the court shall require
the attorney personally to pay the additional costs, expenses and attorney's fees reasonably
incurred because of such conduct." Neither basis is supported by the record with regard to
the sanction issued.
The Court ' s Order Aer Trial is not suficiently detailed nor specific enough to be
upheld. The Court's Order, with respect to attorney's fees (set forth below), gives a broad
indication of what it was Mr. Coughlin did that it found objectionable I does not
specifically identif which actions violated NRS 7. 085(a) or which violated NRS 7.085(b).
Further, the Court improperly relied on 'testimony' by opposing counsel Springgate. M.
Springgate was never sworn in, nor did he provide any afdavits to support his various
assertions, including the extent to which Mr Coughlin conducted discovery, the amount
and dificulty of the work Mr. Sprngate performed, the extent to which Mr. Springgate
himself sent out any discovery, etc.
The notes that Mr. Coughlin "made sarcastic, derogatory remarks .. throughout th
However, aside from quoting Mr. Coughlin in one instance where Mr. Coughlin
correctly pointed out that Mr Springgate was not in compliance with court rules with
respect to his attempts to enter exhibits into evidence at trial, the Court never provides any
specificity or detail with regard to how Mr. Coughlin's conduct was "sarcastic" or
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"derogatory". This allows little to no transparency and permits an impermissible amount of
unfettered discretion to the Court. The potential for abuse is simply to high to uphold a
sanction where only mere broad, general, and conclusory basis are ofered as the Cour's
for the sanctions. The potential for sanctions being handed down because of a mere
diference of philosophy, political ideology, viewpoint, or other impermissible characteristic
must be strongly curtailed.
This is particularly true in family court where tempers run hot, the subject matter is
quite emotional and personal, and the demands on the Court, attorney's, and litigants are
high. Attorney's liability under state law for opposing party's counsel fees, 56 A.L.RAth
486 See Annotation: What conduct constitutes multiplying proceedings unreasonably and
vexatiously so as to warrant imposition ofliability on counsel under 28 U S. C. A. 1927 for
excess costs, expenses, and attorney fees, 8 1 A.L. R. Fed. 36 (the Committee Minutes from
the Nevada Legislature's discussions ofNRS 7. 085 indicate that this federal statute and
FRCP Rule II played a significant role in the formulation ofNRS 7. 085, see Exhibit #1)
(This Court ofen references the legislative history of statutes and amendments to statutes,
to verit the intended objects and goals of legislation, and ofen makes reference to the
proposed objective of statutory amendments, and the comments of those proposing the
changes, to ensure that the interpretation of statutes is consistent with legislative intent
See, e g. , Steward v. Steward, III Nev. 295, 890 P.2d 777 (1995) (exploring bill draf and
quoting committee minutes at length to ensure that the Court's interpretation was
"consistent with the intent of the legislature" in enacting the provision), Joseph F. Sanson
Investment v. 286 Limited, 106 Nev. 429, 795 P 2d 493 (1 990) (noting that committee
minutes would be reviewed to discer legislative intent and purpose if such minutes
existed), Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 1 13 Nev. 1 1 85,946 P. 2d 200 (1 997) (same);
McKellar v. McKellar, 1 1 0 Nev. 200, 871 P. 2d 296 (1994) (reviewing 1987
amendment to child support statute for legislative intent). Mr. Springgate's Opposition
makes mention of the clear intent of the legislature with regard to NRS 7. 085. It is not
clear from where or with what Mr. Springgate was able to divine the intent ofthe
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legislature Exhibit A, attached hereto, is a comprehensive collection of all relevant
Committee Minutes and other documentation related to the Legislatures creation and
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subsequent amendments to NS 7. 085.
There is a wealth of authority to support a requirement of specifc and detailed
fndings in a Court's ordering sanctions. In the following cases, the courts held or
recognized that specifc findings by the trial court were required before an attorey could be
6 assessed with his opponent's fees. Major v First Va. Bank (1993) 97 Md App 520, 631
7 A2d 1 27 (RICO claim; $25,000 for counsel fees).
8
In O'Brien v Cseh (1983, 2dDist) 148 Cal App 3d 957, 196 Cal Rptr 409 ( 12[b]), the
9
court found that an order by the trial court assessing attorney fees against counsel and
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giving only "good cause appearing" as a reason for the sanction failed to meet the statutory
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requirement of a detailed recital of the circumstances justifing the imposition of sanctions.
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The court reversed an award of fees against an attorney that was imposed by the trial
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court without any fnding as to the actual costs incurred by the opposing parties, in City of
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El Monte v Takei ( 1 984, 2d Dist) 1 58 Cal App 3d 244, 204 Cal Rptr 559 ( 9[a]). The case
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was remanded for a hearing to determine reasonable expenses and counsel fees, since under
16
the applicable court rules the sanctions were limited to that amount.
17
In Charles v Charles ( 1 986, Dist Col App) 505 A2d 462 ( 4[aJ), the court reversed an
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assessment of attorey fees against an attorney, where the trial court had failed to make a
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specific fnding of bad faith. The court stated that it is within the inherent authority of trial
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courts to assess attorney fees against an attorey who has acted in bad faith, if the sanction
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is imposed afer fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the record. But although
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counsel's conduct in this case made an assessment of fees appropriate, and there had been
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fair notice and a hearing on the plaintiffs motion for attorney fees, the court decided that
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the absence of a specific finding of bad faith required reversal and remand for a new hearing
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directed to that issue.
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Before a proper finding of a frivolous claim may be made under a statute authorizing fee
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awards against attorneys on that basis, it is necessary for the trial court to fnd that the
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attorney knew that the action was without any reasonable basis in law and could not be
supported by a good-faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law, held the court, in Radlein v Industrial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. ( 1 984) 1 1 7 Wis 2d 605,
345 NW2d 874. The court stated a two-pronged test for determining an attorney's
responsibility in sanctions for commencing a frivolous action: first, is the law ready for an
extension, modification, or reversal; and if not, then second, was the argument for such
change made in good faith even though not successful. Frivolous action claims are an
especially delicate area, said the court, since the ingenuity, foresightedness, and competency
of the bar should be encouraged and not stifled. In this case, however, the court decided
that a special hearing before the trial court on the issue of frivolousness was not necessary,
because the attorney had been placed on notice to defend his position both in the trial court
and on appeal. The court afirmed the award against the attorey, observing that there was
no possible reasonable argument for his theory.
See Williams v Capps Trailer Sales, Inc. (1992, Ala App) 607 So 2d 1272, 6[a].
Trial court did not satisf requirements for exercising its inherent authority to impose
attorney fees against an attorney for bad faith conduct when it ordered husband's counsel to
remit one half of his fees received to wife's counsel, where trial court did not permit
husband' s counsel to present witnesses or other evidence in his defense, trial court did not
make an express finding of bad faith or findings justifing the relief ordered, and order did
not show how the fees awarded directly related to the fees incurred as a result of the alleged
bad faith conduct by husband's counsel. Finol v. Finol, 912 So. 2d 627 (Fla. Dist Ct. App.
4th Dist. 2005), related reference, 2005 WL 2373889 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2005)
and reh'g denied, (Nov. 7, 2005).
Petitioner's request for costs and expenses ofJitigation, including attorney fees, did not
provide notice to respondent's attorney that she could be held liable for attorney fees under
statute that awarded fees in situations where an attorey brought or defended an action that
lacked substantial justification; there was no motion requesting attorney fees from attorney,
there was no mention that the trial court was considering an award against attorey, and the
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notice of the hearing contained no reference to the statute that awarded fees against
attorneys for bringing or defending an action that lacked substantial justifcation or to the
possibility that attorney could be assessed attorney fees for her conduct; overruling Cohen
Feldman, 21 9 Ga.App. 90, 464 S. E. 2d 237 West's Ga.Code Ann. 9- 1 5- 14(b). Williams
v, Cooper, 625 S,E.2d 754 (Ga. 2006). See Kukui Nuts of Hawaii, Inc v R Baird & Co.
( 1990, Hawaii App) 789 P2d 50 I.
Further, it cannot be said that Mr. Coughlin unreasonably and vexatiously extended a
civil action or proceeding before any court in this State. In Eberly v Eberly (1985, Del Sup)
489 A2d 433, a divorce action, the court assessed attorney fees against a lawyer who has
acted in bad faith or willflly abused the judicial process, sanctioning the wife's attorey for
tactics that unreasonably and vexatiously prolonged the proceedings and increased the cost
of representation to both parties. These tactics included fIing repeated motions to hold the
husband in contempt for failure to pay alimony on time, even though the husband was
hospitalized and had explained to the trial court the good faith eforts he was making to
meet his obligations, and advising his client to deny that the marriage was irretrievably
broken even though she had made such an allegation herself, in order to delay the
proceedings. The cour ordered the amount of the husband's reasonable attorey fees
attributable to such tactics, both at trial and on appeal, to be determined on remand and
assessed against the wife's attorey personally.
The extent to which the Court deemed Mr, Coughlin conduct to be vexatious or
unreasonably prolonging the proceedings in this action seems to rest on a fi nding that M.
Coughlin "argued incessantly with the Court throughout trial and made sarcastic,
derogatory remarks to the Court, Mr. Springgate, and Mr. Joshi throughout trial. The
Court notes that there were well over 40 objections during four (4) hours of trial." Mr.
Coughlin is obliged to make such objections given that his failure to do so will prevent the
preservation of the various issues for appeal, Attorney's in Nevada's District Courts are
not obligated to take a continuing objection and contemporaneous objections are
supportable conduct under all applicable rules, One of Mr Coughlin's arguments with
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Rodriguez,
Rodriguez
Buchanan,
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respect to an objection concerned the admissibility of evidence of abuse or domestic
violence for the purposes of establishing monetary damages to be considered in the property
or debt distribution as well as any alimony determination There is Nevada case law that
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arguably sets the precedent that the admission of evidence of such conduct for the purpose
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ofered is mandatory. See Catherine Mazzeo, Note, Rodriguez v Rodriguez: Fault as a
Determinative Factor in Alimony Awards in Nevada and Other Community Property
6 Jurisdictions, 2 NY. LJ. 1 77, 1 82-83 (2002). The economic consequences of spousal
7 abuse or marital misconduct can provide compelling reasons for unequal disposition of
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community property. Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 1 1 3 Nev. 1 1 85, 946 P. 2d 200 ( 1 997).
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In the Nevada Supreme Court added example of factors that "conceivably could
from time to time be relevant as well" such as "repetitive acts of physical or mental abuse"
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by one spouse "causing a condition in the injured spouse which generates expense or afects
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that person's ability to work" In Wheeler, the Nevada Supreme Court "recognized that
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sometimes marital misconduct results in adverse economic consequences for one of the
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parties." 1!3 Nev. at 1 1 90, 946 P. 2d at 203. "We determined that a district court may
consider evidence ofthe economic consequences of marital misconduct in determining
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whether an unequal division of community property is warranted." See id.
Further, the Court seemed to suggest that evidence of spousal abuse could
factor in to an alimony analysis, not so much as a fault factor, but as a part of an analysis of
the factors specifcally set forth by statute or Buchanan. "Moreover, an exception is
unnecessary. Nevada has well settled case law that provides guidelines for the trial court to
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consider when making a just and equitable alimony award. So, for example, if one spouse
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commits repetitive acts of physical or mental abuse against the other, causing a condition in
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the injured spouse which generates expense or afects that person's ability to work, the
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physical andlor mental condition caused by the misconduct can be taken into account in two
ways: first, as a compelling reason to make an unequal distribution of property or second,
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without considering evidence of fault or misconduct, the court in deciding alimony will,
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per take that spouse's physical and mental condition into account when
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examining his or her financial condition, health and ability to work " rd. at 998-99.
Mr. Coughlin sought to have this issue introduced at trial for both debt distribution and
alimony, however the Court rled against it. To the extent that the sanctions issued relate
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to a lack of evidence presented, documentary or otherwise, such an inadmissibility ruling
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presents a Catch-22 Mr. Coughlin should not be sanctioned in such a situation.
Mr. Springgate seemingly misstated the holding ofthe Nevada Supreme Court in
Rodriguez to the Court. Mr. Coughlin should not be sanctioned for arguing objections
7 based on mandatory precedent in support of his position at trial. A similar argument exists
g
for Mr. Coughlin objecting to Mr. Springgate's violation ofWCR 5 and the Court's own
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Pre-Trial Order with respect to attempting to have exhibits introduced into evidence
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without properly identiting such exhibits previously and where Mr. Springgate failed to
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comply with court rules by neglecting to provide an appropriate copy of such exhibits at the
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appropriate time.
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The Court's Order Aer Trial is instructive in pointing out the diference between
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providing a copy of a document ad providing a copy of an appropriately identified and
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marked exhibit. "When asked ifhe had the copy of the document, M. Coughlin stated, "I
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do not know 1 could spend my time and mental energy looking around for Mr. Springgate's
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document like 1 am his assistant, or we could ask Mr. Springgate to provide a copy at the
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time he is seeking admission like 1 believe the rule states. " Mr. Coughlin cited no rule and
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then proceeded to interrupt the proceedings twice approximately fi ve (5) minutes and
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twelve(12) minutes post ruling to re-argue the point. Mr. Springgate replied to the
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arguments by referencing when exactly the copy had been provided to Mr. Coughlin during
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discovery and where the copy could be located. The Court had to admonish Mr. Coughlin
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to quit arguing the point and reiterated that the exhibit had been admitted." (Emphasis
1
added).
There is a significant diference between a document and an exhibit. A inappropriate
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advantage is granted a party who can deliver a large quantity of documents in the 16.2
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production, only to subsequently fail to ever properly mark or identit which of these
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documents it chooses to make exhibits, and who then refuses to provide a copy of the
exhibit at the time its introduction is sought at trial. This places an inappropriate burden on
the receiving party to index, categorize, and maintain the 16. 2 production of the party
seeking introduction of a document as an exhibit. WCR 5 was enacted for a reason, and
this very situation argues in favor of enforcing WDCR 5 and the Court's own Pre-Trial
Granting Mr. Springgate such an advantage is unfair, particularly where Mr.
Springgate never fled a Case Management Conference Statement, fled his Settlement
Conference Statement at 5 p m. the day before trial (in contravention of WDCR 5 as well),
improperly indicated in his Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration that two
Settlement Conferences had taken place in this case when only one existed (and the one
Settlement Conference was actually combined with the frst day bf trial in deference to Mr.
Springgate's request and suggestion that the parties do so in the interest of judicial
economy and, presumably, to keep Mr. Springgate's fees down for his client's beneft), and
where M. Springgate failed to comply with the Court's direction that he draf a Final
Decree fom the Court' s Order Afer Trial within 20 days of that Order's date of entry.
Mr. Springgate holds opposing counsel to an extraordinarily high standard considering
some of the areas in which his own execution is lacking. Further, Mr. Springgate actually
tried to argue that opposing counsel's prudence in seeking to ascertain the availability. of
having Mr. Joshi's passport put in the Court's custody pending the resolution of this matter
or the state of the law with regard to the propriety of a spouse retaining the other spouse's
passport during a divorce proceeding was tantamount to extorion. Mr. Springgate was
threatening sanctions even at that early stage of this litigation. Surprisingly Mr. Springgate
did not assert a RICO or FDCPA claim at that time as well. Mr. Joshi's failure ever contact
anyone in his family with regard to returing Ms. Joshi's "woman's wealth" or Mr. Joshi's
dubious inability to remember anything about his culture's customs in this regard seemingly
were not relevant to Mr. Springgate's passport issue analysis.
Regardless, Judge Schumacher did not see fit to enter sanctions, as such, the law of the
case doctrine bars Judge Gardner from relying on that issue to support the present sanction.
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I is simply in poor taste for counsel to constantly use the threat of sanctions i n lieu of
actually producing some written legal authority or precedent to support the positions M
Springgate seeks to maintain. It seems Mr. Springgate would rather prefer to attempt to
intimidate, threaten calling for sanctions, or suggest what a small little community the family
law bar is and how quickly word gets around, as opposed to present cogent legal analysis.
The Court's Order Afer Trial further notes that "Mr. Coughlin filed an Answer and
Counterclaim on Ms. Joshi's behalf that included allegations unsupported by law." Page 1 3
"The parties have two children, both of whom are now adults. Although Mr. Y oshi ( sic)
has no obligation to support said children any longer pursuant to NRS 1 2S. 5I0(9)(b), Ms.
Yoshi (sic) requests the financial assistance ofMr. Yoshi (sic) so as to provide for the
children's continuing education. (Answer, pg. 2, Jines 16-18)" Id. at page 2 M Coughlin
clearly stated, on several occasions, during the Settlement Conference, to Ms. Joshi and
Judge Gardner, that there was little support for the claim Ms. Joshi continued to urgently
implore Mr. Coughlin to present, that of support for the continuing education of the party's
children, who both recently reached the age of majority. Mr. Coughlin counseled Ms. Joshi,
in front of Judge Gardner and out loud, that there was little to no chance that Judge
Gardner would rule favorably to Ms. Joshi on that issue. Mr. Coughlin's Motion for
Reconsideration, however, does establish that there is a basis in law for seeking such a
contribution. As such, sanctions are inappropriate to the extent they are based on this issue,
an issue which not a second of court time at trial was spent. Judge Gardner was present
and across the table when Mr. Coughlin implored his client to accept Judge Gardner's
strong indication that the ongoing child support or educational costs contribution issue for
the adult children was a dead end that would likely try the court's patience.
"At trial, Mr. Springgate stated that Mr Coughlin had conducted no discovery in this
case. In addition, Mr Coughlin failed to present one documentary piece of evidence at trial
on behalf of Ms. Joshi's claims. Mr. Coughlin argued incessantly with the Court throughout
Page 1 2
trial and made sarcastic, derogatory remarks to the Court, Mr. Springgate, and Mr Joshi
throughout trial. The Court notes that there were well over 40 objections during four (4)
hours of trial. Mr Springgate's objections were well-founded and continuously sustained
except in one instance. Mr. Coughlin was overrled on every objection except one and
argued with the Court over most rlings. Mr Coughlin was admonished approximately 1 5
times by the Court to quit arguing, to ask specifc questions, to discontinue asking
questions calling for a legal conclusion, and to refrain from making degrading remarks to
both Mr.Joshi and Mr. Springgate. The Cour notes that at one point, afer an exhibit had
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been admitted, Mr. Coughlin could not fnd the copy provided by Mr. Springgate in
discovery. Mr. Coughlin demanded a copy be provided at trial, stating"am I supposed to be
rifling through my papers? My understanding is that you are supposed to provide a copy. "
When asked if he had the copy of the document, Mr. Coughlin stated, " 1 do not know. I
could spend my time and mental energy looking around for Mr. Springgate's document like
I am his assistant, or we could ask M. Springgate to provide a copy at the time he is
proceeded to interrupt the proceedings twice approximately tlve (5) minutes and twelve( 1 2)
minutes post ruling to re-argue the point. Mr. Springgate replied to the arguments by
referencing when exactly the copy had been provided to Mr. Coughlin during discovery
and where the copy could be located. The Court had to admonish Mr. Coughlin to quit
arguing the point and reiterate that the exhibit had been admitted M. Coughlin tlled an
Answer and Counterclaim on Ms. Joshi's behalf that included allegations unsupported by
law; and tlled an Opposition to the request for return of Mr. Joshi's passport without any
factual or legal basis. Further, at trial, Mr. Coughlin presented almost no evidence to
suppor Ms. Joshi's requests and claims.
The most troubling aspect of this case was Mr. Coughlin's rude, sarcastic and
disrespecttul presentation at trial; Mr. Coughlin's inability to understand a balance sheet; his
failure to conduct discovery; and his lack of knowledge with regard to the rules of evidence
and trial procedure. All of this was compounded with a continuously antagonistic
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seeking admission like I believe the rule states. " Mr. Coughlin cited no rle and then
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It should
presentation of the case that resulted in a shif from a fairly simple divorce case to a
contentious divorce trial lasting an excessive amount of time.
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For all these reasons, the Court finds that Mr. Coughlin's presentation of the case and
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arguments in support thereof to be unfounded in fact, unwarranted by existing law,
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unreasonable, and vexatious throughout this entire proceeding."
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Mr. Joshi's counsel' s actions did not unreasonably and vexatiously extend a civil action
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or proceeding before any court in this State.
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Mr. Coughlin presents a wealth of legal precedent and authority in support of the
13
position taken at trial, much coming from community property jurisdictions. Indeed, the
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sum of American jurisprudence suggests the majority rule with respect to a of set of
alimony and joint obligations to third parties is in line with the position argued by Mr.
16
Coughlin at trial.
17
For example, the request to ofset the husband's payment ofa pre-existing joint
18
obligation against a support obligation was denied when categorized by the cour as a
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request by the husband for contribution of the wife's share of a pre-existing joint obligation.
Maloof v Maloof 1991 Ohio App LEXIS 523 (Ohio App, Cuyahoga Co 1991).
21
be noted that the court also found that the spouses did not agree to the ofset. Id.
22
It is debatable whether the credit card debt Mr. Joshi asked the court to consider in
23
failing to award alimony is a "joint obligation". Mr. Joshi was the sole signator on all the
24
credit accounts for which he presented debt at trial. While Nevada's community property
law presumes such debts were incurred for the beneft of the community, and as such, joint
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obligations, the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act and Nevada's common law "doctrine of
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necessaries" arguably do not expose Ms. Joshi to any liability for these debts on the facts
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presented, and certainly there is little chance of personal liability being attributed to Ms.
Joshi. Further, the ability of these third party creditors to actually get and enforce any sort
of judgment against Ms. Joshi is arguably infinitesimally small, if not barred by federaJ law
and or the FDCPA See, " Articles or services for husband personally as "family expenses"
or "necessaries, " within statute making wife liable therefore," 13 AL R. 1396.
In an action by a hospitaJ against a wife to recover the reasonable value of hospital
services frnished during the last illness of her late husband, who died leaving no property,
and who had not abandoned or deserted his wife or secured a decree of separate
maintenance, the court held in Swogger v Sunrise Hospita, Inc., 88 Nev 300, 496 P2d 751
( 1 972) , that i n view of a statute providing that a wife must support her husband out of her
separate property when he had no separate property, they had no community property, and
he could not support himself the wife's separate property was liable for the hospital debt
incurred by her husband. It accordingly afrmed a judgment of the lower court in favor of
the hospital. As a general rule, the court explained, the separate property of a wife is not
liable for the debts of her husband. It pointed out, however, that the statute in question was
an exception to the rule. The duty to support as provided i n the statute, the court explained,
necessarily ran to the beneft of creditors, such as the hospital, who supplied necessaries of
life to an infirm, impecunious husband.
The facts presented in the marital dissolution at bar do not support finding Ms. Joshi
liable on a doctrine of the necessaries analysis, as Mr. Springgate suggested at (rial and
throughout this litigation Mr. Joshi is currently an able bodied and employed adult. There
was no showing that MR Joshi could not support himself
The court in Keck v Keck (1933) 21 9 Cal 316, 26 P2d 300, reversed an order which in
effect allowed a husband to offset a pre-existing judgment debt in his favor against accrued
alimony owed his former wife, saying that alimony was founded on the maritaJ duty of a
husband to support his wife and not an ordinary debt, and the two demands did not by
operation of law compensate and discharge one another under Califoria Code of Civil
Procedure 440. Consequently, the court decided that the husband could not, in the
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manner of an ordinary judgment debtor, as a matter of right, and by motion, avail himself of
the remedy provided for by the statute. The judgment against the wife, who had been
appointed as guardian of her husband for a period of years during the marriage, arose as the
result of a settlement of guardianship accounts.
Upon the wife's order to show cause, the court in Williams v Williams ( 1 970, 1 st Dist) 8
Cal App 3d 636, 87 Cal Rptr 754, ruled that a husband could not automatically set of,
under California Code of Civil Procedure 440, his former wife's portion of a net deficit
resulting from the operation of a community property apartment house against either
alimony or child support arrearages for the reason that a support obligation was not an
ordinary debt but rather was a court-imposed marital duty. The husband had made none of
the support payments provided for in a divorce decree, but managed, by agreement, the
apartment house, discharging the loss incurred in its operation by paying taxes, trust deed
payments, and for repairs and improvements, subsequently arguing that the past-due
support obligations and the apartment house defcit were "cross demands" within the
purview of the Code which should be deemed satisfed so far that they were equal. The
court ruled that to allow the set of of a wife's portion of a net deficit resulting from the
operation of a community property apartment house against the husband's alimony
arrearages would amount to a retroactive alteration of the alimony debt which had accrued,
in violation California Code of Civil Procedure 139.
Many courts adopt a view that the support recipient's control of support funds is a
consideration in determining other spouse's right to set of The courts in the following
cases expressed or recognized the view that a set off would not be permitted where the
supporting spouse usurped the right of the recipient of support to control those funds, but
allowed the requested set of or found it supportable, where the supported spouse, by
agreeing to an alterative means of paying the support owed, was found to have controlled
the disbursement of the funds.
Observing that support payments, whether for the wife's or child's support, are to be
disbursed by the supported spouse as she sees fi t, and the supporting spouse ordinarily is
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alimony.
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Wheeler v.
not entitled to credits against past-due support for monies that he paid to third parties on his
own accord, the court in Lopez v Lopez, ( 1 980, App) 1 25 Ariz 309, 609 P2d 579,
remanded the case for a new trial to detennine whether the wife had consented to allow
certain indirect payments, made to doctors and dentists and others, to substitute for
payments to her of alimony and child support, and the grant of the requested credits
consequently allowable.
Where, as the result of a dispute between the spouses, the husband made direct
mortgage payments on a community property, those payments could not be set of against
alimony due his wife according to the court in Van Morkhoven v Kleiner, ( 1 965, La App 3d
Cir) 180 So 2d 601 , under the rule that the wife was entitled to spend her alimony as she
chooses. It was shown that soon afer a judgment of separation, a dispute arose as to
whether the wife was required to pay from an award of alimony the monthly mortgage
payment on the community home which she occupied, which she refused to do. Thereupon,
the husband made the payments directly to the mortgage holder, deducting the same
amount from the alimony due her. The court applied the general test to determine what
payments made by the husband should be credited to alimony: whether the wife had the
unrestricted right to determine how the fnds were disbursed. DisalIowing credit for the
mortgage payments, the court found a clear restriction as to how the wife spent her
Nevada case law supports the view that a Nevada cour has no authority to permit set
of of a supported spouse's debt which was discharged in bankruptcy.
1 \3 Nev 1 185, 946 P 2d 200 ( 1 997). Also, it was decided in the case related
below that it was beyond the authority of the court to enter a judgment against a spouse to
whom support was to be paid, subsequent to bankruptcy proceedings, in order to efect an
ofset against the support obligation for marital debts, avoided by the spouse in bankruptcy,
that the supporting spouse was required to satisf.
Where the wife's obligations, assumed as par of the property division pursuant to the
divorce, were discharged in bankruptcy, and those debts could in no way be considered
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nondischargeable alimony or support, it was decided in v ( 1 986, Wyo) 71 4
P2d 774, that the court had no authority to enter a post-bankruptcy judgment for the
husband, to be ofset against past-due child support, for payments he had paid, as co-
debtor, or might ultimately be required to pay in satisfaction of the marital debts. The
divorce decree ordered the husband to pay child support, and awarded to the wife a van, the
family home, and a floral business, all subject to the indebtedness incurred against them, and
required her to pay approximately $1 3, 650 in other debts, including certain credit card bills.
The wife was discharged in bankruptcy with respect to all of these debts. However, most of
the arrears in child support accrued when the husband deducted payments made on the
credit card debts Iom the ordered child support. The judgment appealed by the wife
allowed the husband to recover for all payments made on the discharged debts, then and i n
the fture. The court voided most of the provisions of the judgment due to the supremacy
of the federal bankruptcy law, the purpose of which was to aford the debtor a new
opportunity in life unhampered by pre-existing debt. Moreover, the court enjoined the
husband, as a creditor named in the bankruptcy proceedings, from trying in any fashion to
ofset the debts in the future. The husband was allowed to recover for post-visitation air
fare he had paid in order to return the children to the wife when this obligation might be
categorized as nondischargeable support owed by the wife under the bankruptcy laws. The
court also was infuenced in small measure by the principle that child support is for the
benefit of the children and only administered in trust for them by the wife.
And see, in the context of this discussion, Re Marriage of Mills ( 1 989, Iowa App) 441
NW2d 41 6, in which the court refsed to allow the ofset, against support arrears, of a lien
on the marital home owed to the husband under the terms of the decree, which survived
bankruptcy proceedings, based in some part on equitable grounds, when that wife lost the
home through foreclosure, rather than profited from its sale. However, the Court in the
present case seemed to fnd even the impression that Mr. Coughlin might somehow
contemplate such an application was sanctionable. "Mr Coughlin cited an ALR article
regarding community debt and stated his client "does not have much for the creditors to
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take " He requested that his client assume one-half the community debt and that the Court
find Plaintifs two $5,000 debts to family members and friends as Mr. Joshi's separate debts
Mr. Coughlin stated his client is being asked to "foot the bill" for Plaintif's debts . .. " Order
Afer Trial, Page 7.
The court i n Maloof v Maloof, 1991 Ohio App LEXS 523, ( 1 991 , Ohio App,
Cuyahoga Co), did not believe that it was error to deny a husband credit against his support
obligation for money paid in satisfaction of a defciency judgment arising trom the
foreclosure sale of the marital home, in some measure, because the original mortgage loan
for the property was undertaken by the spouses prior to their divorce and, as such, the debt
was not made on the credit of alimony awarded to the wife subsequently. Consequently,
according to the court, the husband, as an assignee standing in the shoes of the lending
institution, the assignor, could not attach alimony and child support payments to collect on
the judgment when the lending institution could not have done so.
Where the husband sought credit for one-half the payments of debts on various jointly
owned properies, the court in Hanshaw v Hanshaw, ( 1 988, W Va) 377 SE2d 470, held it
was proper to refse to of set unpaid temporary alimony owed to the wife by such
payments when the debts were incurred prior to the spouses' separation.
The court in Morel v Morel (1982, La App 5th Cir) 425 So 2d 1 289, cert den (La) 430
So 2d 99, ruled that payments, not in compliance with the support order, on a community
obligation incurred to purchase an automobile in possession of the wife were not available
to reduce arrears in alimony pendente lite and child support when those payments were
recoverable by the husband at the time of the settlement of the marital community, and the
wife did not agree that they should be made in lieu of support payments. The wife's later
request that the husband make the payments, together with several other indirect payments,
was found insuficient to prove an ofset against arrears that accrued during the period at
Issue.
A husband who had paid community automobile loan payments was properly denied
credit for his wife's share of such payments against his accrued alimony obligation to her
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where the parties had not "clearly agreed" that the husband's payments on the vehicle were
in lieu of part of the alimony obligation, according to the court in Thompson v Thompson
(1 983, La App 1st Cir) 428 So 2d 858. The rule applied by the court was that an alimony or
child support judgment remains in force until the party liable applies to the court and
obtains a modification, unless the party to whom payments are made requests or consents to
indirect payments or waives the payments. Although the wife had been aware that the
husband was making payments on the vehicle because she called the lender each month to
ask if he had, and she would have used any equivalent amount paid directly to her to
discharge the same debts, the cour found that, at most, the wife had merely acquiesced in
the husband's payments on the vehicle rather than agreed to an alternative method of
alimony payment The court also noted that the husband admitted that there was no mention
of alimony at the time he expressed the desire to provide his wife with transportation The
court did agree that the results in this case were inequitable, and that a tacit understanding
between two adults as the parties here obtained should be permissible in law in those cases
not involving child support. The court suggested that the husband was free to seek
appropriate credit for discharging a community obligation in a property settlement with his
wife, but rejected the argument that she was personally liable to him for the amount paid
under a theory of quasicontract.
Some courts have refused an ofset when the obligation associated with an automobile
or residence was incurred prior to the divorce and, thus, the payment benefted the spouse
obligated to pay support as welL
Where the wife testified that she used the credit card to "balance out" household
expenses for herself and the children while the couple was separated, the court in
Youngberg v Youngberg ( 1 986, La App 4th Cir) 499 So 2d 329, would not permit an
ofset against postdivorce permanent alimony and child support arrearages for one-half of
the credit card charges. The husband had been ordered to pay alimony pendente lite and
child support during the period in which the charges were made, but was current in his
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payments at that time, and asserted that the wife made the charges without the his
permission. The wife maintained that the credit card charges were for expenses for which
the husband was responsible. The court concluded that neither spouse intended such a
credit when the husband paid the credit card account balance, denying the ofset apparently
based on the lack of evidence of an agreement between the parties.
In the following cases, in which the particular type of payment or debt was not
disclosed by the court or at issue, it was decided that a spouse was not entitled to the
requested set of against accrued alimony.
In Bruner v Bruner ( 1 978, La App 2d Cir) 356 S0 2d 1 1 01 , cert gr (La) 358 So 2d 641 ,
it was held that the trial court erred in allowing a husband credit or an ofset against a
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claimed arrearage of alimony pendente lite for payments made by him to third parties on his
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wife' s behalf where the evidence did not show that the payments were made at the request
of, or with the consent of, his wife. Had Ms. Joshi consented to the settlement agreement
she was so urgently implored to accept, she could not avail herself of this argument. A
15
husband was not entitled to credit against arrears in pendente lite maintenance and child
support for voluntary payments he made to third parties for his wife's beneft, according to
the court in Krantz v Krantz ( 1 991 , 2d Dept) 1 75 App Div 2d 865, 573 NYS2d 738, on the
ground that several of the payments also satisfied the husband's contractual obligations.
Credit Matters:
2
Things are less than cheery for creditors pursuing premarital debt, or a debt incurred by
21
only one of the spouses afer marriage. This is not Mr. Coughlin's fault and he should not
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be sanctioned on account of this. Nevada does, however, recognize "the doctrine of
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necessaries." NRS 1 23. 090 provides:
24
"If the husband neglects to make adequate provision for the support of his wife, any
other person may in good faith supply her with articles necessary for her support, and
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recover the reasonable value thereof from the husband. The separate property of the
husband is liable for the cost of such necessities if the community property of the spouses is
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not suficient to satisf such debt."
See Rodgers v. Rodgers, 1 10 Nev 1 370, 887 P. 2d 269 ( 1 994); Lewis v. Hicks, 108
2 Nev. 1 1 07,
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1 6; 843 P 2d 828 ( 1 992), contra, Phillips v. Morrow, 104 Nev 384, 760 P. 2d l i S
4
( 1 988).
However, a curious duality existed in the Joshi Trial. The Court seemed to be upset
6 with Mr. Coughlin, implying some bad faith to the extent that the position Me Coughlin
7 argued might somehow take advantage of the creditors dificulty in forcing Ms. Joshi to pay
8
them on accounts to which Me Joshi is the sole signatory. The Court's consternation in
9
this regard was in strange incongruity to the claims ofMr. Springgate that the doctrine of
necessaries would necessarily aid these creditors in executing upon Ms. Joshi's property. It
11
would seem one cannot have it both ways.
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NRS 1 23 1 to states a diferent standard for when husbands must be supported by
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wives:"The wife must support the husband out of her separate property when he has no
14
separate property and they have no community property and he, fom infirmity, is not able
or competent to support himself"
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This statutory exception to the protection of separate property only applies if a creditor
17
supplies goods or services "necessary" for the life of the other spouse. Although the limits
18
ofthis have not been defined, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that a husband cannot be
19
held personally liable under NRS 123 090 for the debts of his wife which were incurred
pursuant to a contract to rent an automobile Ferreira v. P. c. H. Inc., 105 Ney. 305, 774
11
P2d 1041 ( 1 989) Thus, it is likely that the word "necessary" will be narrowly construed by
22
the Nevada courts, therefore providing protection for the personal property of spouses.
23
The facts of the case at bar do not support holding Ms Joshi personally liable for Mr.
24
Joshi' s attorney' s tees, as Mr. Springgate state the law required, nor do they support
precluding Ms Joshi an appropriate alimony award in light of the fact that Mr. Joshi chose
to be the sole signator on all his credit accounts. Me Joshi wanted the power and control
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ofbeing a sole signator, he should not be rescued by the doctrine of the necessaries.
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Regardless, Mr. Coughlin should not be sanctioned for failing to agree to such a rescue of
Mr. Joshi.
By way of analogy, Nevada case law has expressed the burden of proof as one of clear
and certain evidence that a lender or vendor primarily relied on that spouse's separate
personal property to secure the credit - rather than on that spouse's earning capacity - to
establish that loan proceeds are separate property. This is known as the "intent of the
lender" test See Schulman v. Schulman, 92 Nev. 707, 71 6- 1 7, 558 P. 2d 525, 530-3 1
( 1 976). Conversely, the argument can be made that Mr. Joshi ' s the debts on the accounts
to which Mr. Joshi is the sole signatory should not be viewed as community debts given that
the lender apparently did not consider Ms. Joshi ' s status at all. Further, federal law may
prevent such consideration in the event Mr. Joshi qualifed for credit on his own. Creditors
thus need to have the signature of both parties on an application for credit in order pursue
collection of the credit debt from both parties.
As a theoretical matter, creditors would appear to be restricted to collection against the
person (or property of the person) incurring the obligation, either during the marriage, or
afer the divorce. At least when the creditor is someone other than a former spouse of one
of the parties to the marriage, as in Greear v. Greear, supra, 303 F. 2d 893 (9th Cir. 1 962).
As a practical matter, this restriction appears to provide no barrier; banks do not typically
care about the source of money in accounts being garnished, but only the name on the
account (See, also, Dimick v. Dimick, 1 1 2 Nev. 402, 91 5 P 2d 254 ( 1 996) (husband' s
signature of both spouses' names on a trade-out purchase agreement, and both parties'
signatures on "vesting instructions" that would have made them joint tenants of the
property at the close of escrow, did not actually transfer any property interest to the wife .
One notable exception - by which one spouse can create a debt that becomes an
obligation of the other spouse as a matter oflaw - is through "the doctrine of necessaries,",
discussed above, although the stated statutory grounds for when husbands' property is
liable for the support of wives is diferent from that in which wives' property is liable for the
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wife's car
of the
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decree
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Marine
suppor of husbands.
The only appellate case discussing the 1 873 statute for a husband' s payment of
"necessaries" for a wife indicates that the terms "necessary for her support" and
"necessities" will be construed
somewhat closely. In one such Nevada case, a husband was found not liable for his
rental for "failure to provide adequately for her support" where there was no conversion
automobile and no proof of community purpose in its rental. This argues in favor of the
position Mr. Coughlin argued at trial. Ferreira v. P. c. H. Inc. , 1 05 Ney. 305, 774 P. 2d 1 041
( 1 989); see, also, United Fire Ins. Co. v. McClelland, l OS Nev. 504, 780 P. 2d 1 93 ( 1 989).
NRS 1 23 . 1 1 0 states a gender-based standard for when husbands must be supported by
The wife must support the husband out of her separate property when he has no
separate property and they have no community property and he, from infrmity, is not able
or competent to support himself
If a debt is incurred during marriage and owed by both spouses, nothing in the divorce
prevents the creditor from chasing whichever spouse it chooses for payment.
Midland Bank v. Monroe, 1 04 Nev. 307, 756 P 2d 1 1 93 ( 1 988). Whether one must be a
signatory for the debt to be "owed" is somewhat dependant on who is doing the enforcing,
the creditor or a Family Court Judge and whether or not more than one spouse was a
signatory on the credit application. Ofcourse, where such a creditor chases one spouse for
a debt allocated to the other upon divorce, the spouse saddled
with the other's adjudicated debt has recourse to the divorce courts to obtain
reimbursement See, e. g. , Putterman v. Putterman, supra, 1 13 Nev 606, 939 P.2d 1047
(1 997) (upholding the trial court' s unequal division of community property for, among
other things, the husband's violation ofa joint preliminary injunction by charging several
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thousands of dollars i n credit card debt afer the separation, which the wife paid).
Strangely, while spouses cannot do so directly, to some extent the duty of support can
be enforced indirectly, but this seems primarily to beneft creditors, not a market-
disadvantaged spouse. Under the doctrine of necessaries the untitled spouse, in theory, is
allowed to pledge the other spouse' s credit to purchase a necessary. A creditor-but not a
spouse-may have the right to sue to enforce the duty and collect the debt. For a recent
article arguing that the necessaries doctrine and the community property regime more
broadly, may place creditors' rights above spouses, see Andrea Carroll, The Superior
Position of the Creditor in the Community Property Regime: Has the Community Become a
Mere Creditor Collection Device?, SANTA CLARA L. RV. 1 (2007)
Creditors do rely on the support doctrine quite regularly, particularly medical care
providers. A typical example i s where medical care is provided with the assumption that the
patient spouse will pay, but then does not. At that point (frequently after the death of the
patient spouse), the medical care provider attempts, ofen successflly, to establish liability
of the non-patient spouse based on the necessaries doctrine. The non-patient spouse is ofen
held accountable for the medical bills, and even non-marital wealth can be reached. See,
e.g. , Jersey Shore Med. Ctr Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 41 7 A. 2d 1 003, 1 01 0 (N.J.
1 980). Courts have recently grappled with whether liability is sole, joint, or primary and
secondary. The trend seems to be toward primary liability for the debtor spouse and
secondary for the non-debtor Mr Joshi's sole signatory debts are largely very poor
candidates for a doctrine of the necessaries approach towards Ms. Joshi by the various
creditors. Mr. Joshi did have about $7,000 of medical debt for a surgery, but to the extent
that Mr. Joshi seemingly had no idea what surgery was performed or why, it was arguably
not a necessary procedure. The fact that the hospital or medical provider apparently
"wrote-of' nearly $50,000 of the debt would argue against such an application as well
The third party creditors in this case (especiaJly considering the bulk of the debt is not
medical debt) likely reaJize it is not at all clear they will have a right to get paid by Ms.
Joshi, and even if they do, it likely will take costly litigation to determine liability. See, e. g. ,
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Marie T. Reilly, You and Me Against the World: Marriage and Divorce from Creditors'
Perspective, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY 1 95, 1 96 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed.,
I
2006).
2
Mr. Joshi' s arguments concerning his sole signatory credit debts largely based on the
4 illusory promise of the necessaries doctrine For further discussion and citations regarding
the merchant's burden of proof see id. See, also, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy,
6 Vivian Eulalia Hamilton, William & Mary Law School, Virginia Journal of Social Policy and
7 the Law, Vol. 1 1 , p. 307, Spring 2004. The Settlement ofered to Ms. Joshi was, therefore,
8
largely a chimera. Mr. Coughlin indicated as much in court. He should not be sanctioned
9
for that. Actually, one may consider Mr. Coughlin's recognition of such an arcane wrinkle
in the law to be fairly impressive for an attorney being paid at the low end of salaries for one
J
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in the legal profession. Such analysis does not come without substantial dedication. This
12
seemingly would not be a reason to levy a sanction. Wherefore, the Order should not be
maintained, the Request for Reconsideration granted.
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Reply Opposition,
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Isignaturel
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certif that I am an agent of Zach Coughlin, Esq and that on
the 1 2
th
Day of May, 2009, I electronically fled at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the
within to fully addressed to.
203 S Arlington Ave.
Reno, NV 89501
11 The undersigned does hereby afirm that the preceding document does not contain the
12 social security number of any person.
th
Dated this 20 Day of May, 2009.
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Melissa Ulloa
Melissa Ulloa
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5
L Exhibit # 1 - Thiry (30) pages long
INDEX TO EXHIBITS
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. ,
CODE: FILED
Marc Ashley, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 8326
2009 MY 21 RH 9: 58
WASHOE LEGALSERVICES
Hap,Ru W. CONYERS
Reno, NV 89501
Telephone: (775) 785-5712
BY
Facsimile: (775) 324-5509
DEPUTY
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF
NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
ASHWIN JOSHI,
vs.
BHARTI JOSHI,
MOTION TO CORRECT PROPOSED DECREE
BHARTIJOSHI, Defendant/Counterclaimant, by her attorneys, Washoe Legal Services by Marc
Ashley, objects to the form of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce and
moves that it be corrected because key provisions have been omitted through mistake, inadvertence or
excusable neglect, as more fully set forth in the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities.
DATED this 26th day of May, 2009.
ivn
Marc Ashley, Esq.
State Bar No. 8326
Reno, NV 89501
775-329-2727 ext. 5716
Dept. No.: 14

MEMORANDUM OFPOINTS AND AUTHORITIES
NRCP Rule 60 allows a Court to relieve a party from the terms of a final judgment, order or
other proceeding on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. Defendant in this case
contends that the final decree was to have contained certain provisions to protect her in case Plaintiff
fails to pay the indebtedness he has been ordered to pay. These debts are in Defendant's name and they
will be asserted against her if he does not pay or files bankruptcy.
Specifically, in its Order After Trial, page 6 lines 18-20, the Court notes that "to protect Ms.
Joshi in the event Mr. Joshi filed for bankruptcy, Mr. Joshi suggested that the court mintain jurisdiction
over the issue of spousal support for five years." It was Defendant's understanding that this was to be
done through an award of maintenance of One Dollar ($1.00) per year for five years. If Plaintiff ceased
paying the debts, she would then be able to request maintenance to offset the added payments. In
discussing the form of the decree with Plaintiff's attorney, he was likewise of this understanding and
maintained that the $1.00 per year language would be in the final decree. However, in preparing the
final papers he noticed that the court denied maintenance altogether at page 11, lines 17-18, so did not
include the expected language.
Accordingly, Defendant moves the court to amend the order to include an award of maintenance
in the amount of One Dollar ($1.00) per year for five years, so Defendant will have recourse to protect
her credit if Plaintiff defaults on the debts in her name.
The debt on the car which is titled in Plaintiff's name and their daughter is also in Defendant's
personal name. Defendant was of the understanding that Plaintiff was also to re-title the car in the name
of Defendant and their daughter, and Defendant moves for amendment of the order to accomplish this.
Dated this 26
th
day of May, 2009.
Marc Ashley, Esq.
State Bar No. 8326
Reno, NV 89501
775-329-2727 ext. 5716
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C09-
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11;
2

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), Ihereby certify that Iam an employee of Washoe Legal Services, and that
on they day of May, 2009, Iserved the foregoing:
MOTION TO CORRECT PROPOSED DECREE
by depositing with the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, at Reno, Nevada, a true and correct
copy of the within document addressed to:
Law Offices of
Reno, NV 89501
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Deborah Pringle, CP
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F I L E D
Electronically
06-08-2009:08:55:54 AM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
1 CODE: 2645
2 NevadaBar#1350
3 Reno, NV 89501
Telephone: 775.323.8881
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6
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9 ASHWIN JOSHI,
10
11 vs.
Plaintiff,
12 BHARTI JOSHI,
* * * * *
DEPT. NO.: 14
13
14
Defendant.
______________________
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
15 CORRECT PROPOSED DECREE
16 COMES NOW Plaintiff, ASHWIN JOSHI, by and tluough his counsel of record, JOHN
17 P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ., and opposes the Motion to Correct Proposed Decree in the above-
18 entitled matter. This motion is made and based upon the attached Memorandum of Points and
//--/--
19 Authorities, and all papers and pleadings on file in this action.
20 DATED this ( June, 2009.
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2 A proposed Decree has been provided to the Court, conforming to the Court's Findings of
3 Fact and Order After Trial. Mr. Ashley, counsel for Ms. Joshi, has timely moved this Court for
4 relief either from that Order or to correct the proposed Decree.
5 In their arguments to the Court at trial, Mr. Joshi had suggested that the Court incorporate
6 in its Order an award of maintenance of$1.00 per year for five (5) years to protect Ms. Joshi in the
7 event that the distribution of debt required a personal bankruptcy. While Ms. Joshi would be
8 entitled to come back to the Court under Siragusav. Siragusa, 108 N. 987 (1992), and its progeny,
9 and seek relief, it was cettainly easier to maintain jurisdiction in the Court with that award.
10 However, the Comt denied maintenance entirely in its Order After Trial, as Mr. Ashley sets
11 forth in his motion. Accordingly, counsel for Plaintiff cannot stipulate to the request for relief and
12 submits it to the Court.
13 DATED this day of June, 2009.
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TE, ESQ.
2 Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of THE LAW OFFICES OF
3 JOHN SPRlNGGATE, and that on this date I personally served at Reno, Nevada, a tlUe copy of
4 the within OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO CORRECT PROPOSED DECREE, fully
5 addressed to:
6 Marc Ashley, Esq.
Staff Attorney
7 Washoe Legal Services
8 Reno, NV 89501
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x for mailing by first class mail, postage prepaid
by Federal Express or other overnight delivety
Dated thiSS+b.day of June, 2009.
a.
-3-
ASHWIN JOSHI,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BHARTI JOSHI,
Defendant.

***
FAMILY COURT
(REQUIRED)
DEPT. NO.: 14
LAST PAGE to every motion or other paper filed pursuant
or response to such a motion or other paper.
I. Has a final decree or custody order been entered in this case? then
continue to Question 2. If!!Q, you do not need to answer any other questions.
then continue to Question 3. If no, you do not need to answer any other
questions.
child SUppOlt?
the Judge's Order.
NO
X
X
X
X
B. If you answered NO to either Question I or 2 or YES to Question 3 or 4, you are exempt from the $25.00 filing fee.
However, if the COUIt later determines you should have paid the filing fee, your motion will not be decided until the
$25.00 fee is paid.
I affirm that the answers provided on the Notice are true .. {'
Date: June 8, 2009 Signature: a.

Print Name: John P. Springgate, Esq., Attorney At Law
Reno, Nevada 8950 I
Telephone: 775-323.8881
.
2
6
7
8
Code 2475
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Bar No. 9473
945 W. 12
1h
St.
Reno, NV 89503
Phone 775 338 8118
on behalf of himself
13(
N A I F SLED
ZEti J1.111 -8 Mi 10: 54
11
Dept. 14
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Ashwin Joshi,
Plaintiff,
VS.
Bharti Joshi,
Defendant
20
MOTION TO STRIKE; or in the alternative Mr. Coughlin's OBJECTIONS TO
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE OF DIVORCE; AND 2) MOTION TO
STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF PROPOSED DECREE OF
DIVORCE
COMES NOW, Zach Coughlin, Esq., on behalf of himself (and not on behalf of his
former client Ms. Joshi) with respect to the personally liability for attorney's fees
pursuant to NRS 7.085, and commenting to the Court in regard to his former
representation of the Defendant, Joshi Bharti, and moves the Court to grant his Motion
21
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Page 1
/si hlin
Zac Coughlin, Esq.
On his own behalf

to Strike the FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, & DECREE OF
DIVORCE submitted by John Springgate, Esq. on May 22' , 2009. This motion is
made and based upon the attached memorandum of points and authorities and all the
papers and pleadings on file in this action,
DATED this 29t
h
of May, 2009
WDCR Rule 9 holds that "Preparation of findings, conclusions, and judgment. In a
non-jury case, where a judge directs an attorney to prepare findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and judgment, the attorney shall serve a copy of the proposed document upon
counsel for all parties who have appeared at the trial and are affected by the judgment.
Five days after service counsel shall submit the same to the court for signature together
with proof of such service."
Mr. Coughlin was not appropriately served a copy of this proposed Order by either
Mr. Springgate or anyone connected with Washoe Legal Services. It is important to
note that Mr. Coughlin is not Ms. Joshi's attorney anymore, however, WDCR 9 calls for
the attorney, here Mr. Springgate per the court's instructions, to "serve a copy of the
proposed document upon counsel for all parties who have appeared at the trial and are
affected by the judgement."
Mr. Coughlin is arguably a intervening real party in interest, though he has not
Page 2
i

technically made such an appearance. Mr. Coughlin is likely not a "party" for the
purposes of a NRAP 3A analysis (attorney representing a client in a case is not a party to
the action and does not have standing to appeal. Albany v. Arcata Associates, 106 Nev.
688, 799 P.2d 566 (1990). However, the FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, & DECREE OF DIVORCE Mr. Springgate has submitted does affect Mr.
Coughlin. Further the proposed final decree Mr. Springgate submitted does not contain
a sufficiently detailed or specific recitation of why attorney's fees sanctions were entered,
as called for by NRCP 11 and NRS 7.085. By way of analogy such specificity was
required in Houston v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 51 (2006).
Mr. Coughlin is not Ms. Joshi's attorney; however, to some extent Mr. Coughlin
will be affected by the shape Ms. Joshi winds up in after all is said and done in this
divorce matter. As such Mr. Coughlin would like to voice his objection (while
requesting and reserving additional time to have an appropriate opportunity, in
compliance with WDCR 9 to review the proposed Order and voice further objections)
with respect to the proposed final decree's amibiguity, and or silence, with respect to the
characterization of the debt distributed and whether such a distribution is in some way a
form of alimony in light of the restrictions found in 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(5) and 523(a)
(15).
Under 523(a)(15), many courts have held that there must be "hold harmless" or
other indemnification language in a divorce decree in order for one spouse to be
obligated to avoid discharge. See, In re: LaRue, 204 B.R. 531, 535 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1997) Hold harmless agreements and indemnity provisions contained in divorce decrees
are often times characterized as non-dischargeable support awards in bankruptcy,
although the underlying debts to third parties may still remain dischargeable. Bailey v.
Bailey, 254 B.R 901(6thCir. B.A.P. 2000). The debt is non-dischargeable to the ex-
spouse to extent that the other party is required to pay it. Sanders v. Lanfare, 187 B.R.
Page 3
588 (Bankr. W.D.Va. 1996). Other courts have held that debts owed to third parties may
not qualify for non-dischargeability under 523 (a)(5) and (a)(15) without a hold-
harmless provision creating the debt to the ex-spouse. Gibson v. Gibson, 201 B.R. 113
(Bankr. N.D.Oh. 1997); McCracken v. LaRue, 204 B.R. 531,535 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenni 997).
Pursuant to 523(a)(5), "a given domestic obligation is not dischargeable if it is
'actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support." In re Harrell, 754 F.2d 902,
904 (11th Cir.1985). Whether a given debt is in the nature of support is an issue of
federal law. In re Strickland, 90 F.3d 444, 446 (11th Cir.1996). Although federal law
controls, state law does "provide guidance in determining whether the obligation should
be considered 'support' under 523(a)(5)." Id. To make this determination a bankruptcy
court should undertake "a simple inquiry as to whether the obligation can legitimately be
characterized as support, that is, whether it is in the nature of support." In re Harrell, 754
F.2d at 906.
In conducting this inquiry, a court cannot rely solely on the label used by the
parties. As other courts have recognized, "'it is likely that neither the parties nor the
divorce court contemplated the effect of a subsequent bankruptcy when the obligation
arose.' " In re Gianakas, 917 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir.1990) (citation omitted). The court
must therefore look beyond the label to examine whether the debt actually is in the
nature of support or alimony. ld. A debt is in the nature of support or alimony if at the
time of its creation the parties intended the obligation to function as support or alimony.
See In re Brody, 3 F.3d 35, 38 (2d Cir.1993); In re Sampson, 997 F.2d 717, 723-24
(10th Cir.1993); In re Davidson, 947 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (5th Cir.1991); In re Gianakas,
917 F.2d at 762; Williams v. Williams, 703 F.2d 1055, 1057-58 (8th Cir.1983). Thus,
"the party seeking to hold the debt nondischargeable has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the parties intended the obligation as support...." In
Page 4
hlin E 'Si
Respectfully submitted to the Court this 29
th
day of May, 2009
re Sampson, 997 F.2d at 723.
However, the above analysis and precedent must be considered in light of the
recent BAPCPA, as at least one court has ruled that debt arising from a divorce decree
was non-dischargeable even where it was not alimony or support. Proctor v. Tulloss,
Adv. No. 06-4112, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1571 (Bankr. N.D. Ga., March 21, 2007).
(Debtor's obligation, pursuant to a divorce decree, to pay for ex-spouse's vehicle was
non-dischargeable pursuant to Section 523(a)(15).) The BAPCPA amendments also
omit any time limt for contesting the dischargeability of such debts.
Further, it is unclear whether the stipulations to extend the time for filing a Motion
for Reconsideration allows for filing such a proposed decree at this time or the extent to
which that stipulation applied to Mr. Coughlin's interests, albeit the fact that this Court
has entered an Order Denying Mr. Coughlin's Motion for Reconsideration (though
apparently entered prior to receiving Mr. Coughlin's Reply to Opposition) may be
dispositive in that regard.
Accordingly, the undersigned asks the Court to strike the proposed final decree
given the non compliance with WDCR 9 and the other objections cited above.
Zac Coughlin, Esq.
On his own behalf
Page 5
S
the 29
th
day of May, 2009, I electronically filed at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the
within MOTION TO STRIKE; or in the alternative Mr. Coughlin's OBJECTIONS TO
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE OF DIVORCELAND 2) MOTION TO
STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF PROPOSED DECREE OF
DIVORCE, fully addressed to
.

JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
Marc Ashley, Esq. or Caryn Sternlicht, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
Dated this 29
th
Day of May, 2009
Melissa 4a
1
/sig
.----

Melissa Ulloa
Page 6
S
* * *
FAMILY COURT
(REQUIRED)
CASE NO. 0 t/0`3 - c7
a
DEPT. NO.
0[,
LAST PAGE to every motion or other paper filed pursuant to chapter 125, 125B
or 125C of NRS and to any answer or response to such a motion or other paper.
A
-
er
4
= AS
A. Mark the CORRECT ANSWER with an X.
YES
,
NO
I. Has a final decree or custody order been entered in this
case? If m, then continue to Question 2. If no, you do not
change a final order? If des, then continue to Question 3. If
no, you do not need to answer any other questions.

3. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion filed only to
change the amount of child support?
1N
4. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion for
.

M
1
IF the answer to Question 4 is YES, write in the filing
date found on the front page of the Judge's Order.
Date

B.
If you answered NO to either Question 1 or 2 or YES to Question 3 or 4, you are exempt
from the $25.00 filing fee However, if the Court later determines you should have paid the
filing fee, your motion will not be decided until the $25.00 fee is paid.
I affirm that the answers provided on this Notice are true.
Date: Signature:
Print Name
.

Print Address:
Telephone Number:

z
-1/A
c
-
c
-2

Rev. 10/24/2002
''
-
F1
. ,
:D
2009 JUN -B AN 10:54
BY
j
4T f Y
41-

Coughlin, Esq.
On his own behalf

Code 2645
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Bar No. 9473
945 W. 12
th
St.
Reno, NV 89503
Phone 775 338 8118
on behalf of himself
CEs r )
cr
C (3)
I al
- mks;
co
co
I
@coo
-
- 000
0
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I ICID
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=
.MI1=

10
11
Case No. : DV08-01168
Dept. 14
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Ashwin Joshi,
Plaintif f ,
VS.
Bharti Joshi,
Def endant
20
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE
COMES NOW, Zach Coughlin, Esq. , on behalf of himself (and not on behalf of his
f ormer client Ms. Joshi) f iles this Opposition to Mr. Joshi's Motion to Strike.
DATED this 29' of May, 2009
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Page 1
S
Mr. Joshi argues that Mr. Coughlins Appeal (which was also plead in the
alternative as a Petition f or Writ of Mandamus) is untimely in that there may not have
been a f inal order.
"There is simply no principled reasons to distinguish the appealability of an order
determining liability on motion f or summary judgment f rom the appealability of such an
order af ter trial " Metropolitan Dade County v. Green, 596 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1992).
An appeal could not be interlocutory where it was f rom a f inal order af ter trial. People
v. Voss, 191 Colo. 338, 552 P. 2d 1012 (1976) An order of a district court denying writ
of mandamus is a "f inal judgment" within meaning of rule authorizing appeals f rom final
judgments. Rules App. Proc. , Rule 3A(b)(1). Ashokan v. State, Dept of Ins. , 1993, 856
P. 2d 244, 109 Nev. 662.
It is not at all clear that the Order Af ter Trial entered by Judge Gardner on April
12% 2009 is not an appealable f inal order. It certainly is not worth risking given the
deadline f or f iling an appeal is jurisdictional. The question is perhaps irrelevant,
however, given that this case will likely be treated as a Petition f or Writ of Mandamus
which has not similar jurisdictional deadline within which to f ile. Mr. Coughlin will be
submitting a Writ f or Petition of Mandamus that f ully complies with the dictates of
NRAP 21 very soon, likely bef ore June 15
th
, 2009. There is suf f icient precedent to
support a Petition f or Writ of Mandamus to challenge sanctions against and attorney
issued by a district court. Houston v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 122 Nev. Adv. Op.
51 (2006);Of f ice of Washoe County Dist. Atty. v. Second Judicial Dist Court ex rel.
County of Washoe, 2000, 5 P. 3d 562, 116 Nev. 629;"A writ of mandamus will issue to
control a court's arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion. " Marshall v. District
Court, 108 Nev. 459, 466, 836 P. 2d 47, 52 (1992).
While Mr. Springgate has seemed to indicate that he sees such an appeal or
Page 2

mandamus action to be a big waste of everybody's time, he also writes to Mr. Coughlin,
in a May 21", 2009 letter to direct him to drop the appeal, "buy his way out of the
sanctions" and, instead, "workon repairing your [Mr. Coughlin's] reputation with the
Family Court Judges. " Mr. Springgate gives not explicit indication of exactly how Mr.
Springgate knows what the "Family Court Judges" consider Mr. Coughlin's reputation to
be or the extent to which Mr. Springgate plays a role in f ormulating these views. Mr
Springgate's statement veers dangerously close to violating the NEVADA RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8. 4. , which proscribes "Misconduct. It is
prof essional misconduct f or a lawyer to: (e) State or imply an ability to inf luence
improperly a government agency or of f icial or to achieve results by means that violate
the Rules of Prof essional Conduct or other law. "
Mr. Coughlin does not see challenging the sanctions in this case as a waste of time.
Rather, it is a necessary step in preserving or creating an environment where attorneys
f eel saf e in zealously advocating f or clients, where sanctions are required to be
suf f iciently detailed and specif ic so as to reduce the chance of sanctions being used f or
purposes f or which they are not intended or based on rationale that is impermissible, and
to counteract the growing tide of attorneys who would rather imply they enjoy some
vague and ominous inf luence while calling f or sanctions than f ind, apply, and argue
precedent. On that note, Mr. Springgate's Motion to Strike contains no precedent at all
to help this Court determine whether its Order Af ter Trial is a "f inal order" and thus
appealable This is similar to Mr. Springgate's asking f or sanctions without citing any
cases, much less one's that have some cognizable relation to the conduct f or which the
Court apparently tookissue. Perhaps that is because the positions Mr. Springgate
asserts are contradictory, which makes it hard to accurately argue that Mr. Coughlin was
proceeding in bad f aith. One cannot argue that Ms. Joshi will be easily pursued by
creditors collecting on the accounts to which Mr Joshi was the sole signatory via a
Page 3

doctrine of necessaries theory while also asserting that Mr. Coughlin's alleged conduct
exhibits "bad f aith" in that Ms. Joshi would apparently also be judgment proof f rom
these same creditors.
Mr. Coughlin is arguably a intervening real party in interest, though he has not
technically made such an appearance. Mr. Coughlin is likely not a "party" f or the
purposes of a NRAP 3A analysis (attorney representing a client in a case is not a party to
the action and does not have standing to appeal. Albany v Arcata Associates, 106 Nev.
688, 799 P. 2d 566 (1990); Houston v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 122 Nev. Adv.
Op 51 (2006),
Further, it is unclear whether the stipulation to extend the time f or f iling a Motion
f or Reconsideration f iled in this case allows f or f iling such a proposed decree at this time
or the extent to which that stipulation applied to Mr. Coughlin's interests, albeit the f act
that this Court has entered an Order Denying Mr. Coughlin's Motion f or Reconsideration
(though apparently entered prior to receiving Mr. Coughlin's Reply to Opposition) may
be diapositive in that regard.
Accordingly, the undersigned asks the Court to deny Mr Joshi's Motion to Strike
the Notice of Appeal. Mr. Springgate apparently has not f iled any sort of Motion to
Strike with regard to the Second Amended Notice of Appeal (which is also plead in the
alternative as a Petition f or Writ of Mandamus). Mr. Coughlin realizes that the Nevada
Supreme Court has a well established precedent holding an attorneys avenue to challenge
sanctions to lie in the f orm of a Petition f or Writ of Mandamus rather than appeal
(despite many f ederal and state courts allowing attorneys to appeal FRCP 1 I sanctions
against an attorney). Mr. Coughlin may arguably, in good f aith, seekto proceed via
appeal rather than mandamus given the lower standard of review given to sanctions
when proceeding on appeal as compared to the standard when proceeding via
mandamus.
Page 4
Respectf ully submitted to the Court this 29
th
day of May, 2009
Coughlin, Esq.
n his own behalf

On direct appeal, an award of attorney's f ees under NRCP 11 is reviewed under
the abuse of discretion standard. Bergmann v. Boyce,
109 Nev. 670, 676, 856 P 2d 560,
564 (1993). "However, because "[m}andamus will not lie to control discretionary action,
unless discretion is manif estly abused or is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, " we
review this matter under a manif est abuse of discretion standard. Of f ice of Washoe
County Dist. Atty v. Second Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Washoe, 2000, 5
P. 3d 562, 116 Nev. 629.
Accordingly, the undersigned asks the Court to deny Mr. Joshi's Motion to Strike
Mr Coughlin's Notices of Appeal (to the extent they are f or Mr. Coughlin only;Mr.
Coughlin has withdrawn any Notices of Appeal f iled on Ms. Joshi's behalf ) or (to the
extent that Mr. Joshi's prior f iled Motion to Strike can be said to apply to it) the Petition
f or Writ of Mandamus (the def iciencies of which, pursuant to NRAP 21, will be cured in
short order).
Page 5

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certif y that I am an agent of Zach Coughlin, Esq and that on
the 29
th
day of May, 2009, I electronically f iled at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the
within OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE, f ully addressed to
JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
Marc Ashley, Esq or Caryn Sternlicht, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B. 030
The undersigned does hereby af f irm that the preceding document does not contain the
social security number of any person
Dated this 29
th
Day of May, 2009
Melissa Ulloa
Page 6
VS.
**
FAMILY COURT
(REQUIRED)
CASE NO. tVc27
5 ?
Cl
-7
DEPT. NO.
f LI
LAST PAGE to every motion or other paper f iled pursuant to chapter 125, 125B
or 125C of NRS and to any answer or response to such a motion or other paper.
A. Markthe CORRECT ANSWER with an X.
YES NO
I. Has a f inal decree or custody order been entered in this
case? If yss, then continue to Question 2. If no, you do not
I
I
2. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion f iled to
change a f inal order? If des, then continue to Question 3. If
no. you do not need to answer any other questions.

Ig4 I
3. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion f iled only to
change the amount of child support? Ai
IIP
y 4. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion f or

-
IF the answer to Question 4 is YES, write in the f iling
Date
date f ound on the f ront page of the Judge's Order.
B.
If you answered NO to either Question 1 or 2 or YES to Question 3 or 4, you are exempt
f rom the $25. 00 f iling f ee. However, if the Court later determines you should have paid the
f iling f ee, your motion will not be decided until the $25. 00 f ee is paid.
I af f irm that the answers rovided on this Notice are true.
0
Signature.
C C C
Print Name:
Print Address:
Telephone Number:
77 5
-
0
- )7
5 33 S'M
Date:
Roy 10124/2002

Date, Judge, Officers
of Court Present APPEARANCES/HEARING .
March 12, 2009
HONORABLE
L. GARDNER,
DISTRICT
JUDGE
Dept. No. 14
M. Andrews,
Clerk
Reporter-JAVS
T. MARTIN,
Bailiff
Page 1 of 2

HEARING-SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE/TRIAL

THE COURT HELD A SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE OFF RECORD. NO AGREEMENT WAS
REACHED AND THE MATTER CONVENED ON THE RECORD FOR TRIAL.

Plantiff Ashwin Joshi was present with counsel, Zachary Coughlin, Esq., and was sworn to testify.
Defendant Bharti Joshi was present with counsel, John Springgate, Esq., and was sworn to testify.

Mr. Springgate waived opening statement and called Mr. Joshi to testify. Mr. Joshi testified on direct-
examination: Is renting his residence for approximately the last 9 months when he had to leave the marital
residence as per a Protection Order. He took some belongings but the bulk of the belongings are at the
marital residence. Beside the cars, the TV and computer are at issue. He wants the computer. His
information (files) was wiped off the computer. Testified regarding Defendants exhibits A (Clearstar
statement) and B (Kelley Blue Book value print out). Mr. Springgate offered the exhibits into evidence.
They were admitted with no objection by Mr. Coughlin. Mr. Joshi testified he used to work for two
employers, has worked six hours in the past 2 weeks and has filed for unemployment. He hasnt received
unemployment yet but expects to receive $320 per week. He has projected 30 hrs. of work next week, 30
hrs. during three days following that, and no other projected work for the following 2 months. He testified
regarding accounts, balances, and his expenses, referring to Defendants exhibit E. Mr. Coughlin objection
to a question regarding purchase of the computer as a community expense arguing it is leading. The
objection was overruled and the question ruled foundational. Mr. Joshi testified regarding the Discover
account. Mr. Coughlin objection to a question regarding whether it was community expense arguing it calls
for a legal opinion. The objection was sustained. Mr. Joshi testified further regarding Discover, WaMu,
Wells Fargo, other debts, and that the St. Marys account is from an operation he had in May. He didnt
have insurance, didnt have insurance through his employer because he forgot and missed the enrollment
period, and thought he was on his wifes insurance. St. Marys discounted the bill. Mr. Joshi testified
regarding Defendants exhibit F, the St. Marys bill. Mr. Coughlin stated he was not provided a copy, he
may have or not been provided one (on Mr. Springgates comment that it was provided to him prior), and
had no objection to its admittance. Exhibit F was admitted.
Mr. Coughlin moved to not admit the Remsa (marked as exhibit G) bill as an exhibit stating he wasnt
provided a copy. Mr. Springgate provided a prior one, it was marked as Plaintiffs exhibit G and Mr.
Springgate stated it was provided, in his supplemented production of documents, to Mr. Coughlin on
February 17th. Mr. Coughlin stated he didnt know if he received it. The Court overruled Mr. Coughlins
objection as him having already received a copy. Mr. Coughlin argued further. The Court continued to hear
testimony.
Mr. Joshi testified regarding exhibit G. Exhibit G was admitted. Mr. Joshi testified regarding the
anesthesiology bill. Exhibit E was offered and admitted with no objection. Testimony continued. Mr. Joshi
testified further regarding medical bills and money owed to friends who facilitated the parties move to the
US and to his sister and brother in law. Exhibit H was marked. Mr. Joshi testified to exhibit H, transfers
from his sister and brother in law; the debt in the amount of 3.600 (approximately $5,000). Regarding the
letter referenced in the exhibit, Mr. Joshi stated it was no his computer. Mr. Coughlin stated he doesnt
know if he objects to the exhibit. Exhibit H was admitted. Testimony continued. Mr. Joshi stated
information on money owed to his friends was on his computer, Mrs. Joshi cancelled his email, and he
doesnt know if he can retrieve it from the company.
Mr. Coughlin objected on hearsay. The Court found that the exhibit was already admitted. The
objection was overruled. Mr. Coughlin argued further that Mr. Springgate is to bring a copy for him. The
Court reviewed the applicable rule and found that copies have been provided and the statute has been
complied with. Mr. Coughlin argued further. Testimony continued. Mr. Coughlin objected to the testimony
on hearsay. Mr. Springgate rephrased the question and continued his direct-examination. Mr. Joshi
testified further regarding money owed to friends. Mr. Coughlin objected that a question called for a legal
conclusion. Upon arguments presented, the Court overruled the objection. Testimony continued. Mr. Joshi
testified regarding the vehicles.
Mr. Coughlin objected regarding the earlier discussion as to production of documents. The Court found
that Mr. Springgate complied with the rule.
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Page 2 of 2
Mr. Joshi continued his testimony regarding the vehicles. Mr. Coughlin objected on hearsay. The
objection was overruled. Mr. Coughlin argued further. Mr. Springgate continued the questioning. Mr.
Coughlin objected. The objection was overruled. Testimony continued regarding the vehicles, Mrs. Joshis
womans wealth, and regarding the parties debt. Mr. Coughlin objected that Mr. Springgates questioning
is discussing settlement discussions. Upon arguments presented, the objection was overruled. Testimony
continued and concluded on direct examination.
Mr. Joshi testified on cross-examination by Mr. Coughlin: Mr. Joshi testified regarding his tip
earnings. Mr. Springgate objected that a question regarding his tips in that Mr. Joshi is incompetent to
speak as to the IRS and requested the question be rephrased. Mr. Coughlin rephrased the question.
Testimony continued. An objection by Mr. Springgate was sustained. Testimony continued regarding his
unemployment and probability of employment in the next week. Regarding his line of questioning, Mr.
Coughlin agreed that he would stipulate to Mr. Joshis earnings as shown on his W2, and has questions to
Mr. Joshis testimony that he is earning less. Testimony continued. Mr. Joshi testified further regarding his
employment. Mr. Springgate objected to a question as argumentative. The Court found the question was
asked and answered. Mr. Coughlin argued further. After discussion, the Court allowed the question. Mr.
Springgate objected that the question Are you lying? is argumentative, improper, and prejudicial. After
discussion, the Court directed proceeding beyond the question. Mr. Joshi testified further regarding his
unemployment filing and medical billings from Reno Physicians. The Court noted Mr. Joshi testified that
bill has been paid off and no longer an issue as community debt. On inquiry by the Court as to his
questioning of the bill, Mr. Coughlin stated his question goes to impeachment. Mr. Joshi continued
testimony regarding his medical bills. Two objections by Springgate as argumentative were sustained. Mr.
Joshie argued further. The Court sustained the objections. Testimony continued. There was a further
objection as argumentative and further discussion. After discussion, testimony continued regarding the
charges incurred. There was an objection on relevance regarding loans to family. After discussion,
questioning continued. Mr. Joshi testified regarding charges incurred. An objection by Mr. Springgate that
a question calls for a legal conclusion was sustained. Questioning continued. An objection by Mr.
Springgate as argumentative was sustained. Questioning continued. Mr. Joshi testified regarding accounts
and whose name they are in, and regarding debts. An objection by Springgate regarding certain
expenditures and whether they are community in that the question calls for a legal conclusion was sustained
and the Court directed questions be asked that dont call for a legal conclusion. Testimony continued. Mr.
Springgate objected. The Court heard arguments. The objection was sustained. Testimony continued. Mr.
Joshi testified regarding a trip with his sister, regarding account balance transfers, his medical operation, his
legal representation charges, and the IRS income tax filing. Mr. Springgate objected on relevancy to a
question regarding the IRS refund used for legal charges. The objection was sustained.

The Court recessed and the matter was continued to March 17, 2009 at 8:15 am.
F I L E D
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Clerk of the Court
F I L E D
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Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court


Date, Judge, Officers
of Court Present APPEARANCES/HEARING .
March 17, 2009
HONORABLE
L. GARDNER,
DISTRICT
J UDGE
Dept. No. 14
M. Andrews,
Clerk
Reporter-J AVS
T. MARTIN,
Bailiff
Page 1 of 2

HEARING-CONTINUED TRIAL
Plaintiff Ashwin J oshi was present with counsel, Zachary Coughlin, Esq., and was sworn to testify.
Defendant Bharti J oshi was present with counsel, John Springgate, Esq., and was sworn to testify.
This matter continued from March 12
th
. Plaintiff Ashwin Joshi, took the stand and continued his testimony
on cross-examination. Mr. J oshi testified: He paid attorneys fees with a credit card (US Bank) that he then paid
with a tax refund and testified further regarding the debts. An objection by Mr. Springgate as a
mischaracterization of Mr. Joshis prior testimony was sustained. Testimony continued regarding debts. Mr.
Springgate objected on relevance to a question regarding community property. Mr. Coughlin argued that Mr.
Joshi is making a concerted effort to determine what is community property. The objection was sustained.
Testimony continued. Mr. J oshi stated the vehicles were all purchased during the marriage and testified further
regarding the vehicles. An objection by Mr. Springgate that a question regarding the cars, listed in the financial
declaration, is compound and misrepresentative of the testimony was sustained. Mr. Joshi argued further. The
Court informed Mr. Joshi the objection was sustained and requested he proceed with questioning. Mr. Joshi
stated he is going to respond though sustained. The Court held a bench conference with the attorneys.
The matter reconvened. Mr. J oshi continued his testimony on cross examination: He didnt collect
unemployment last year and testified further regarding his employment and debts; testified regarding family visits,
travels, and costs covered by him and Ms. Joshi. Tow objections by Mr. Springgate on hearsay was sustained. An
objection by Mr. Springgate on relevance was overruled. Testimony continued. Mr. J oshi testified that Ms.
J oshis employment check was not deposited to any bank account in London; Ms. J oshis earnings while in
Tanzania were used by the household, she had control of them, and were not deposited into an account; testified
further regarding the Honda. Mr. Coughlin objected to testimony that the daughter is paying for the car. The
objection was sustained. A question by Mr. Coughlin was objected to by Mr. Springgate as argumentative. The
objection was sustained. The Court noted that the Honda was purchased with cash from Ms. Joshi advanced from
a credit card. Mr. J oshi testified further: He and his daughter took the cash to the seller, purchased the car, and
the car was titled in his and the daughters name; the daughter made payments to him by transfer from her account
to Mr. J oshis account, Mr. Joshi took the payment and deposited into Ms. Joshis account to pay the credit card;
when he was out of the house, the daughter started paying Ms. J oshi directly. Mr. Springgate testified as
argumentative to a question as to whether he has proof and argued that Mr. Coughlin could obtain proof on
discovery. Mr. Coughlin argued that Mr. Springgate doesnt know what documents he has on discovery. The
objection was sustained. There was further discussion.
Testimony continued. Mr. J oshi testified further regarding accounts. Objections as argumentative by Mr.
Springgate were sustained. Testimony continued. Mr. Joshi stated he hasnt made an effort to ask his family
about Ms. J oshis womans wealth, Ms. J oshi is on talking terms with them and can ask them; stated Ms. J oshi left
her womans wealth with his mother, his mother has passed, and then left it with his sister, but he really doesnt
know. After discussion regarding testimony, questioning continued. Mr. Joshi stated he doesnt know about a
specific custom but the bride retains her wealth that she brings with her, she keeps it, and she decides whether to
keep it anywhere else. Mr. Springgate objected that Mr. Coughlin is arguing with the witness. The objection was
sustained. There were a further objection and discussion regarding the questioning regarding womans wealth.
The Court addressed the issue of objections. Testimony continued. Mr. Joshi testified further that his
understanding is that Ms. J oshi left her womans wealth with his sister. Mr. Springgate objected to question
whether he attempted to retrieve it from his sister as argumentative. The objection was sustained. The Court
cautioned counsel about broad arguments, about the manner of questioning, and about being argumentative with
the witness. Mr. J oshi stated he told Ms. J oshi she could call his sister and to not involve him; testified regarding
loans from friends and family; testified as to what he (vs. Ms. Joshi or them both) paid for during the marriage.
There were no further questions on cross-examination.
Mr. Joshi testified on re-direct examination: During his surgery, he was off work, applied for unemployment
but didnt receive any. An objection by Mr. Coughlin as argumentative was overruled. Mr. Joshi stated there are
trips of Ms. Joshis also placed on the cards-a vacation to India for two weeks. An objection by Mr. Coughlin to a
question by Mr. Springgate in that it calls for a legal opinion was sustained. Mr. J oshi testified regarding his
legal fees and payments. An objection by Mr. Coughlin as leading was overruled. Mr. J oshi testified further
regarding his legal costs. On re-cross, Mr. Joshi testified that he has paid his attorney $4000-by the end of
February, he paid his attorney $4,000, paid $600 a couple of days ago, stated he has it in writing, and agreed he
has paid a total of $4600; he didnt receive unemployment because he was hospitalized; he didnt receive any
money from the government. There were no other questions and the witness was excused.
Mr. Springgate rested Plaintiffs case.
F I L E D
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Clerk of the Court
DV08-01168
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Page 2 of 2
Mr. Coughlin called Ms. J oshi to testify. Ms. Joshi testified on direct examination: She didnt ask for access
to bank statements; asked for credit card statements but didnt get them; she could have access to Wells Fargo
because the statements were lying around the house but not to credit card statements; she asked the companies for
statements. Two objections by Mr. Springgate to hearsay were sustained. Testimony continued. Ms. J oshi stated
she went to US Bank and was told she couldnt have access with Mr. Joshi present. An objection by Mr.
Springgate to leading was sustained. Testimony continued. Ms. Joshi stated she was never made aware of any of
the $5000 loans; she incurred expenses related to immigration; regarding the letter, exhibit H, stated she thinks
they are trying to make up a debt; she never took any money from them. An objection by Mr. Springgate was
sustained. Ms. J oshi continued her testimony regarding the daughters car, theres $5000 still owed; testified
regarding the Jeep-theres a loan with Clearstar, she and her son; testified further regarding the cars; her children
help her pay the rent, phone, pays expenses with her paycheck; asked for spousal support-got some initially but is
not anymore. Objections by Mr. Springgate to questions regarding whether she considers Mr. Joshi should be
half responsible for her living costs were sustained. Ms. J oshi testified that stated she thinks Mr. J oshi made up
the other $5000 debt owed to Mr. Joshis friend; she asked the friend about it and the friend stated he wanted to
stay out of the divorce and didnt want to discuss it; she didnt inquire to the Fowlers regarding the other debts;
she sent an email to Mr. J oshis sister regarding her womans wealth and received no response; Mr. Joshi also sent
his sister an email after hers. There was discussion regarding Mr. Joshis email, Mr. Coughlin stated hes not
sure if he has a copy and requested to ask questions about it. The request was denied. Ms. J oshi testified
regarding a safety deposit box listed in Mr. J oshis deposit box. There was argument regarding Mr. Coughlins
questioning. The Court directed Mr. Coughlin to ask questions on direct without impeaching his own witness or
arguing with her. Ms. Joshi continued her testimony regarding the safety box. Objections by Mr. Springgate as
argumentative were sustained. Mr. Springgate objected on relevance to a question regarding whether Mr. Joshi
threaten her. Mr. Coughlin argued in response that it goes toward determination of Mr. Josh running up debts.
Mr. Springgate stated his objection is based on Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 116 Nev 993. Mr. Coughlin was
admonished for interrupting. Mr. Coughlin argued that the question was not made to determine fault for purposes
of alimony but for purposes of the validity of the debt. The objection was sustained. Testimony continued. Ms.
J oshi stated she got a TPO on Mr. Joshi. Mr. Springgate objected on the same basis as the prior objection. The
Court admonished Mr. Coughlin to be respectful and took judicial notice. Mr. Coughlin argued further. Mr.
Springgate objected to a question regarding whether accepting alimony made her responsible for debts in that it
called for a legal conclusion. The objection was sustained.
Testimony continued. Ms. Joshi testified further regarding the debts; regarding the car loans, stated each
should take the loan for his/her car; testified regarding her caretaking of the children. Mr. Springgates objection
on lack of foundation was sustained. Ms. Joshi stated she has basically always worked; gave up some of her
dreams for the family and believes Mr. J oshi did not take the same responsibility to the marriage. An objection by
Mr. Springgate to a question whether Mr. Joshi exerted control over the marriage was overruled. Mr. Coughlin
had no further questions.
Ms. Joshi testified on cross-examination: Ms. J oshi stated the parties didnt have joint accounts; testified
regarding the car debt-her daughter makes the payments directly to the credit card account around $200.
Objections by Mr. Coughlin to a question whether Mr. Joshi should sign the title over to the daughter on the basis
that it calls for speculation, on relevance, and argumentative were overruled. Ms. Joshi stated she is concerned
about Mr. Joshi owning the car and the debt for it of about $5000; the son is paying for his car and its in his
name. Mr. Coughlin objected on relevance to whether the parties children live with her was overruled. Ms.
J oshi stated she has a safety deposit box, her womans wealth is not in it; her womans wealth from Mr. J oshi was
left with his family; her womans wealth from her side is with her. An objection on relevance to whether she has
attorneys fees was overruled. Ms. Joshi continued testimony: In Tanzania Mr. Joshi owned a restaurant and she
helped him in the business; testified regarding her employment in the US; she has a degree in commerce from
Bombay; she has individual accounts in her name.
Ms. Joshi testified on re-direct examination. Ms. J oshi testified that there was domestic violence during
the marriage. Mr. Springgate objected on relevance. Mr. Coughlin argued that it goes toward her ability to have
any reasonable opportunity to object to any incurred debts. Mr. Springgate argued that whether or not she
incurred debts (for representation) are relevant to community debt and domestic violence is not relevant. Upon
arguments presented, the objection was sustained. There were no other questions and the witness was excused.
There were no other witnesses or testimony. The Court recessed. Upon reconvening, the Court heard closing
arguments from the attorneys.
Mr. Springgate moved the Court for attorneys fees, imposed on Mr. Coughlin directly, under NRS 7.085.
Mr. Coughlin argued in response and in opposition.

The Court took the matter under submission and will issue an Order.
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CODE: 1745
JOHN P. SPRINGGATE,ESQ.
NevadaBar#1350
203 SouthArlingtonAvenue
Reno, NV 89501
Telephone: 775.323.8881
Attorneyfor Plaintiff
INTHEFAMILYDIVISION
IN THESECONDJUDICIALDISTRICTCOURTOFTHESTATEOFNEVADA
INAND FORTHECOUNTYOFWASHOE
*****
ASHWINJOSHI,
Plaintiff, CASENO.: DV08-01168
vs. DEPT.NO.: 14
BHARTIJOSHI,
Defendant.
____________----'1
FINDINGSOFFACT,
CONCLUSIONSOFLAW,
AND DECREEOFDIVORCE
The above-entitled mattercame on for trial before this Court on March 11, 2009 and
March 12,2009. ASHWINJOSHI,Plaintiff,waspresentandrepresentedbyhiscounsel,JOHN
P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ. BHARTI JOSHI, Defendant, was present and represented by her
counsel, ZACHCOUGHLIN, ESQ. The Courtissuedits OrderAfterTrial whichwas filed on
April 13,2009.
FINDINGSOFFACT
1. Plaintiff is a residentof the Stateof Nevada, and for a periodof more than six (6)
weeksbeforecommencementofthisactionhasresidedandbeenphysicallypresentanddomiciled
inthe StateofNevada.
2. Defendantisaresidentofthe State ofNevada,and foraperiodof more thansix
(6) weeks before commencement ofthis action has resided and been physically present and
domiciledinthe Stateof Nevada.
F I L E D
Electronically
06-19-2009:09:57:23 AM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
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3. Plaintiffand Defendant were married on May 11, 1987 in Bombay, India, and ever
sincethatdate have been, andnoware, Husbandand Wife.
4. There aretwo childrenofthismarriage,bothofwhomare now adults.
5. Defendantisnotpregnantatthis time.
6. Plaintiff and Defendant have become, and continue to be, incompatible in
marriage,and no reconciliationispossible.
7. The currentaddressofPlaintiffis 1644FieldcrestDrive, Sparks,NV 89434.
8. The currentaddressof Defendantis260BoothStreet, Apt. Q, Reno, NV 89509.
9. The Courtadopts,asFindingsof Fact, each and everyConclusionof Lawbelow,
whichbythis referenceareexpresslyincorporatedherein.
CONCLUSIONSOFLAW
1. JURISDICTION. This CourthasjurisdictionofPlaintiffand Defendant,and of
the subjectmatterherein.
2. GROUNDS. Plaintiffis entitledto aDecreeofDivorcefromDefendanton the
grounds ofincompatibility.
3. CHILDSUPPORT/ADULTCHILDREN'SEDUCATION. MrJoshi willnotbe
held responsibleforthe continuingeducationofthe adult childrenofthis marriage.
4. COMMUNITYPROPERTY/DEBT.
A) Women'sWealth:The"women'swealth"atissuehereinisthe sole andseparate
propertyofthe Defendant. Plaintiffisto contactany and all relativeswho may
have this property and immediately ask them to return said property to the
Defendantassoon aspossible.
B) Mr.Joshi'sVehicle: The 2005 ChevroletBlazershall beconsideredasPlaintiff's
soleandseparatepropertyandPlaintiffshallberesponsibleforthedebtremaining
thereon. Sincethecarisworthabout$10,910.00andthere is$15,009.75dueand
owingon the vehicle,Mr. Joshi'sassumptionofthis asset istobe consideredas
anundertakingofcommunitydebt ofapproximately$4,100.00.
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C) Ms. Joshi's Vehicle: Ms. Joshi's car shall be considered as her sole and separate
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property and she shall be responsible for any debt remaining thereon. Since no
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evidence was presented to the Court as to the value of the auto, either positive or
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negative, there is no value for this community asset.
D) Son's Vehicle: This vehicle is not considered as an asset and will not be divided
6 among the community.
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E) Daughter's Vehicle: This vehicle is not considered as an asset and will not be
8 divided among the community.
9
F) London Bank Account: There is no factual basis to support that this account exists
and therefore it is not being considered a community asset.
11 G) Community Bank Accounts: There is no factual basis to support that community
12 bank accounts exist and therefore the same is not being considered a community
13 asset.
14 H) Computer: The computer which was purchased at Best Buy is awarded to Mr
Joshi.
16 I) Television: Ms. Joshi is awarded the television which was purchased at Best Buy.
17 Said television is currently in Ms. Joshi's possession and shall be deemed her sole
18 and separate property.
19 J) General Credit Card Debt: There is general debt of approximately $15,650.00
which has been expended for community purposes. Mr. Joshi has agreed to be
21 responsible for this debt and the same shall be considered as his sole and separate
22 responsibility.
23 K) Best Buy Credit Card Debt: There is an approximately balance of $1,314.00
24 outstanding for the purchase ofthe television and computer. Mr. Joshi has agreed
to be responsible for this debt and the same shall be considered as his sole and
26 separate responsibility.
27 III
28 III
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L) Medical Debt: There isadebtduetoSt.Mary'sHospital for$6,735.00andadebtto
REMSA for$500.00. Mr.Joshihasagreedtoberesponsible forthesedebtsandthe
sameshallbeconsidered ashissoleandseparateresponsibility.
M) Family Debt: ThereisadebtduetoAshikNanaby anda$5,000.00 debtduetoRod
andMeena Fowler. Mr.Joshihasagreedtoberesponsible forthesedebtsandthe
sameshallbeconsidered ashissoleandseparateresponsibility.
N) General CommunityDebt: Therewasnoevidencetoestablish community debt. Mr.
Joshiagreedtotaketheremainingcommunity debt inhisnamethatisoutstanding
andthedebtshallbehissoleandseparateresponsibility. ItshouldbenotedthatMr.
Joshihas likely incurred an unequal distributionof the community debtof the parties
andtheCourtfindshistestimonytobeacompelling reasonformakinganunequal
distributionof thecommunitydebt.
5. Spousal Support: TheCourthasfoundthat Mr.Joshi is51andMs.Joshiis46;the
partiesearnroughly equivalent amounts;thepartieshavebeenmarried 21yearsbutMs.Joshihas
alwaysbeenemployed duringthattime;Ms.Joshihasacollegedegree; bothpartiesareableto
work; and after considerationof the net income, deduction of taxes, and the amount paid in
communitydebtbyMr.Joshi, anawardofalimonyintheamount ofonedollar($1.00)shallbe
awardedtoMs.JoshipursuanttoNRS 125.150,Wolffv. Wolff 112Nev. 1355,929P.2d 196,and
Shydler v. Shydler, 194Nev. 192,196,954P.2d37,39(1988).
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
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JUDGEMENTANDDECREEOF DIVORCE
NOW,THEREFORE,IT ISHEREBYORDERED,ADJUDGED,ANDDECREED 1.
Plaintiff,ASHWINJOSHIbe, and he is,finally and absolutelydivorcedfrom Defendant,
BHARTIJOSHI,and that the bonds ofmatrimonyheretoforeexistingbetweenPlaintiffASHWIN
JOSHI, and Defendant,BHARTIJOSHI,be,and theyherebyare, dissolved,and thepartieshereto
arerestoredtothe statusofsingleandunmarriedpersons.
2. There Defendant'snameshall berestoredtothat ofBHARTIR.DAVE.
3. The matter,assetforthin theprecedingFindingsof Fact, ConclusionsofLaw, and
DecreeofDivorce,isherebyratified, adopted,and approved,and thepartiesare
Orderedto complywith thetermsofsuch.
GOODCAUSEAPPEARING,IT IS SOORDERED.
Dated: June1
lui
.
,1 \ /
.' .:
Lin M. Gardner
DistrictCourtJudge
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CODE:
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ASHWIN JOSHI,
11
v.
12
13
BHARTI JOSHI,
14
Plaintiff, Case No. DV08-01168
Dept. No. 14
Defendant.
--------------/
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE IN PART; ORDER GRANTING
16
MOTION TO STRIKE IN PART
17
On April 13, 2009, the Court entered an Order After Trial specifying its findings of
18
fact and conclusions of law based upon the divorce trial that took place March 12 and
19
March 17,2009.
On May 12, 2009, a Notice of Appeal was filed by Zachary Coughlin, Esq.,
21
specifying he was appealing the Order After Trial entered April 13, 2009.
22
On May 13, 2009, a Motion to Strike was filed by John P. Springgate, Esq., alleging
23
the Notice of Appeal filed on May 12, 2009, was untimely filed pursuant to NRAP 3A.
24
Specifically, Mr. Springgate argued there was no final judgment entered in this
matter yet as the Order After Trial had not been memorialized into a Findings of Fact,
26
Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree of Divorce'.
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1 A Decree of Divorce was entered in this case on June 19,2009.
F I L E D
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07-15-2009:02:34:56 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
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On May 27, 2009, a Request for Submission was filed by Mr. Springgate.
On June 8, 2009, Mr. Coughlin opposed the motion and argued it was not clear
whether the Order After Trial was a final order, and " [i]t certainly is not worth risking the
deadline for filing an appeal. .. " Opposition 2:13-2:14.
On June 8, 2009, a Request for Submission was filed by Mr. Coughlin,
Upon review of the pleadings and papers filed herein, the Court finds and Orders
as follows.
Insofar as Mr. Coughlin is appealing the award of attorney's fees, the Court finds
the Order After Trial entered April 13, 2009, was a final order from which Mr. Coughlin
may appeal as the Court did not intend the award of attorney's fees to be included in the
Decree of Divorce. Accordingly, Mr. Springgate's Motion to Strike is denied with respect
to the appealability of the Order After Trial as it pertains to the award of attorney's fees.
With regard to appeal of the issues pertaining to the Joshi marriage/ divorce, the
Court finds the Order After Trial was not a final order from which Mr. Coughlin may
appeal as the Court intended all issues pertaining to the Joshi marriage/ divorce to be
separate and apart from the award of attorney's fees. Accordingly, Mr. Springgate's
Motion to Strike is granted with respect to the appealability of the issues pertaining solely
to the Joshi divorce.
GOOD IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July J ,2009. de: ('
/{IJ / .t-Vf:i II
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CERTIFICATEOF MAILING
PursuanttoNRCP5(b),IcertifythatIamanemployeeofthe SecondJudicial
DistrictCourt,andthatonthe ; {P dayofJuly, 2009,Idepositedfor mailing,firstclass
postagepre-paid,atReno, Nevada,atrueandcorrectcopyofthe foregoingdocument
addressedto:
Document: OrderDenyingMotionto StrikeinPart;OrderGrantingMotionto Strike
inPart
ZacharyCoughlin,Esq.
945W.12
th
Street
Reno,NV89503
J5
foregoingwiththe ClerkoftheCourtsystemwhichwill sendanoticeofelectronicfilingto
the following:
JohnSpringgate,Esq.
Marc Ashley,Esq.
8f/J1JYnu
StephenieBroome
AdministrativeAssistant- Dept. 14
3
DEPUTY
BY
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CODE: 4050
Nevada Bar #1350
Reno, NV 89501
Telephone: 775.323.8881
Attorney for Plaintiff
FILED
2E3JUL 22 Mi 9: 32
RO
0; ERS
* * * * *
ASHWIN JOSHI,
vs. DEPT. NO.: 14
BHARTI JOSHI,
Defendant.
STIPULATION TO AMEND DECREE OF DIVORCE
COME NOW the parties hereto, ASHWIN JOSHI, Plaintiff, by and through his counsel
of record, JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ., and BHA.RTI JOSHI, by and through her counsel of
record, MARC ASHLEY, ESQ., of Washoe Legal Services, and hereby stipulate and agree to an
Order Amending the Decree of Divorce in the following regards:
In response to Ms. Joshi's motion, the Court amended the proposed Findings of Fact to
include a finding of ONE DOLLAR ($1.00) per year alimony for Ms. Joshi. However, the Decree,
as amended by the Court, did not include a term. The parties had originally agreed or suggested
a term of five (5) years and they therefore stipulate and agree that this Stipulation and Order
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1 41
Ya"S ft A E, ESQ.
iii
203 ' outh Arli E , on Avenue
Re o, NV 895 a
Te : 775.323, :881
("K
MARC ASHLEY,
thereon shall amend the Decree of Divorce to include ONE DOLLAR ($1.00) alimony for five (5)
years in favor of Ms. Joshi.
DATED: per /9 DATED: - - 09
Reno, NV 89501
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CODE: 3370
IN THE FAMILYDIVISION
INTHE SECONDJUDICIALDISTRICTCOURTOFTHE STATEOFNEVADA
INAND FORTHECOUNTYOF WASHOE
* * * * *
ASHWIN JOSHI,
vs. DEPT. NO.: 14
BHARTI JOSHI,
Defendant.
/
ORDERTO AMENDDECREEOFDIVORCE
The parties having stipulated and agreed to an Order Amending the Decree of Divorce to
provide alimony of ONE DOLLAR ($1.00) per year for five (5) years, and good cause appearing
therefor,
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATEDthisl-5 dayof ,2009. 1.ry
Submitted by:
Reno, NY 89501
Telephone: 775.323.8881
F I L E D
Electronically
07-23-2009:04:17:13 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
F I L E D
Electronically
08-04-2009:03:02:18 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
I CODE: 2145
2 Nevada Bar #1350
3 Reno, NV 89501
Telephone: 775.323.8881
4 Attorey for Plaintiff
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*****
9 ASHWIN JOSHI,
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11 vs.
Plaintif,
12 BHARTI JOSHI,
13 Defendant.

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DEPT. NO.: 14
15 MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: CONTEMPT
16 COMES NOW, Plaintiff above-named, ASHWIN JOSHI, by and through his undersigned
17 counsel, JOHN P. SPRING GATE, ESQ., and moves this COUli for its Order to Show Cause why
18 te Defendant's previous counsel, Zachary Coughlin, should not be held i contempt of this COUli.
19 M. Coughlin is in contempt of this Court's Order dated April 10,2009, for his refsal to pay the
20 COUli ordered attorey's fees due M. Springgate in the amount of$934.00.
21 Plaintiff also requests reasonable fees for making this motion.
22 This Motion is made and based upon the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
23 and the Afdavit submitted herewith and all the evidence to be produced at the hearing had
24 hereon.
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2 NRS 1.210(3) states that the Court has the power to compel obedience to its orders and
3 NRS 22.010(3) provides that "the refusal to abide a lawfl order issued by the Court is in
4 contempt".
5 The Order of April 10, 2009, provides that the Defendant's attorey, Zachary Coughlin,
6 Esq., is to pay $934.00 as and for attorey's fees within thirty (30) days of the date of the order.
7 In this case, Mr. Coughlin is in violation of this Order by failing to make the payment
8 ordered by this Court.
9 Although he has appealed this Order to the Nevada Supreme Court, and he has filed a bond
10 for costs on appeal, he has not filed a motion for a stay of this order, nor has he bonded against
11 the judgment. Accordingly, and without those protections, the Judgment remains valid and
12 enforceable, even pending the appeal.
13 Although the parties have been diligently attempting to resolve the matter with the
14 Supreme Court Settlement Judge, they have been unable to do so. Accordingly, there is no valid
15 reason for the Plaintiff to withhold enforcement of his judgment, and he moves this Court for its
16 Order requiring Mr. Coughlin to appear and show cause why he should not be held in contempt,
17 and order him to reimburse M. Josh the attorey's fees as ordered, and pay the attorey's fees
18 and costs incurred in having to respond to this matter and file this motion. That amount may be
19 frther increased depending on Mr. Coughlin's opposition, the reply, and hearing.
20 DATED this -day of August, 2009.
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fa:1

Attomcy for Bharti Joshi ad Zach Coughlin

entry of Order Shortening Time and a Decision on, in reference to "DEFENDANT'S

Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 113 Nev. 1185, 946 P.2d 200 (1997).

We concluded in Wheeler that the district court erred by relying on

John Springgate, Esq.

203 S, Alington Ave.

A SWORN to before me this)Z day of May, 2009

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