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JYours sincerely
)aniel Marcus
General Counsel
This will confirm my conversation of today with Mr. Greenburg of your staff regarding the
access request that the 9/11 Commission has made to the SEC. Specifically, we agreed that the
9/11 Commission would notify the SEC if the records we produce are requested by private
parties and would give the SEC advance notice if the 9/11 Commission determines to publicly
disclose the SEC's records.
Sincerely,
Richard M. Humes
Associate General Counsel
OFFICE OF THE
GENERAL COUNSEL
July 22,2003
Daniel Marcus
General Counsel
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
301 7th Street SW, Room 5125
Washington, D.C. 20407
This will confirm my conversation of today with Mr. Greenburg of your staff regarding the
access request that the 9/11 Commission has made to the SEC. Specifically, we agreed that the
9/11 Commission would notify the SEC if the documents we produce are requested by private
parties and would give the SEC advance notice if the 9/11 Commission determines to publicly
disclose the SEC's documents.
SinCferely,
Richard M. Humes
Associate General Counsel
OFFICE OF THE
GENERAL COUNSEL
BY HAND DELIVERY
Daniel Marcus
General Counsel
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
301 7th Street SW, Room 5125
Washington, D.C. 20407
Enclosed is a copy of the document responsive to the 9/11 Commission's access request
to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). The responsive document is an
Information Memorandum, dated May 15, 2002, from the Division of Enforcement to the SEC
Chairman and Commissioners with Exhibits A through F. The Information Memorandum
contains a list of the exhibits.
Sincerely,
(Wc
I"
Richard M. Humes
Associate General Counsel
A 9 < a a a p ! ? a f c f e S i - e
INBOX Compose Folders Options Search Problem? Help Addressbook Tasks Memos Calendar Logout
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http://kinesis.swishmail.com./webmail/imp/message.php?index=1429 10/7/03
WED 17:27 FAX 202 942 9537 GC GEN LIT i]002
UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON. D.C. 2O5A9
OFFICE OF THE
GENERAL COUNSEL
Daniel Marcus
General Counsel
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
301 7* St. SW, Room 5125
Washington, DC 20407
202-296-5545 (facsimile)
I am writing to memorialize a telephone call I had with Doug Greenburg on 10 October 2003.
Staff from the Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") Office of International Affairs
were also on the telephone call. That telephone call concerned your 26 September 2003 request
for documents relating to the investigation by the SEC into trading activity potentially designed
to profit from, or avoid losses from, the 11 September terrorist attacks ("SEC Document Request
No. 2"). Specifically, you asked for information received from any foreign government agency
or entity.
A review of our files revealed that information responsive to SEC Document Request No. 2
includes non-public information we received from foreign securities authorities pursuant to our
bilateral Memoranda of Understanding and other information-sharing arrangements. As we
discussed with Mr. Greenburg, we requested non-public information from foreign securities
authorities pursuant to these MOUs, which have standard provisions on use and confidentiality
of information (see MOUs previously sent to Mr. Greenburg).
At the time we made our requests for assistance to the foreign securities authorities, the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States ("NCTA") had not yet been created,
and our requests did not contemplate that the information would be used for the purposes set out
in the NCTA's mandate. We are under an obligation to inform the foreign securities authorities
of the NCTA's request and seek their consent under the MOU prior to any disclosure of the
information.
We understand the critical need for the NCTA to have this information, and anticipate that our
counterparts will appreciate the importance of the NCTA's investigation. We propose to obtain
their consent as expeditiously as possible. This process also will enable us to honor our
commitments and to preserve our relationship with our counterparts so that we can continue to
obtain effective and prompt cooperation in connection with the investigation and prosecution of
violations of the federal securities laws.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you would like to discuss this matter further. We will be
in touch with you to update you on the progress of our discussions with our foreign counterparts.
Melinda Hardy
Assistant General Counsel
202-942-0877
Ethiopis Tafara
Director, SEC Office of International Affairs
Thomas H. Kean VIA FACSIMILE
CHAIR
Richard Ben-Veniste
Mr. Giovanni P. Prezioso
Max Cleland General Counsel
Securities and Exchange Commission
Frederick F. Fielding 450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Jamie S. Gorelick Washington, D.C. 20549
Slade Gorton Dear Mr. Prezioso:
John F. Lehman
I am writing in response to Melinda Hardy's letter of October 15, 2003, which
Timothy J. Roemer concerned our request for reports of investigations into pre-9/11 trading the
James R. Thompson SEC received from foreign governments. Ms. Hardy's letter stated the SEC's
position that the Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) pursuant to which
the SEC received these reports prohibit their disclosure to our Commission
Philip D. Zelikow
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR without consent of the governments of origin. Upon review of the MOUs
provided as examples by the SEC, we disagree with this interpretation and
request that the SEC reconsider it.
In our view, the MOUs at issue plainly allow the reports to be shared with our
Commission. For example, the MOU with Germany allows information
received thereunder to be used as follows:
(a) for the purpose stated in the request with respect to ensuring
compliance with, or enforcement of, the laws or regulations of
the requesting Authority .. . and
(b) for purposes within the general framework of the use stated in
the request, including conducting a civil or administrative
proceeding, assisting in a self-regulatory organization's
surveillance or enforcement activities, assisting in a criminal
prosecution, or conducting any investigation related thereto for
any criminal charge applicable to the violation of the
provisions specified in the request.
We cannot agree with the SEC's position that we are not entitled to the
information because our Commission "had not yet been created" at the time of
the SEC's requests for information. This fact is irrelevant under the MOUs,
which do not designate specific entities which can receive the information.
Instead, they allow sharing of the information "for purposes within the general
framework" of the request. We believe that our investigation of insider
trading in advance of 9/11 falls directly within this general framework.
We are sensitive to the need for the SEC to maintain strong relations with its
foreign counterparts. In the course of our investigation, we have often sought
extremely sensitive information that departments and agencies of the U.S.
government have received from foreign sources. Much of this information
concerned vital matters of national security obtained from foreign law
enforcement and intelligence agencies. Every other agency from whom we
have sought such information has found a way to provide it to us without
compromising its relations with its foreign counterparts. We hope and expect
the SEC can do the same, and our reading of the MOUs suggests no reason
any foreign government would object to our receiving the information.
approvals from being received in time for us to fulfill our statutory mandate.
For this reason, I urge you to reconsider your position and make the reports
available to us immediately.
Sincerely,
Janiel Marcus
General Counsel
UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON. D.C. 2O5A9
OFFICE OF THE
GENERAL COUNSEL _ , ~,nni
October 22,2003
Daniel Marcus
General Counsel
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
301 7th Street SW, Room 5125
Washington, DC 20407
We appreciate the efforts of you and your staff to seek a constructive approach to
resolving this matter consistent with the various important policy objectives that must be
taken into account Please do not hesitate to contact me at (202) 942-0900 if you should
have any questions or would like to discuss this matter further.
Sincerely yours,
\i Prezioso
cc: Doug Greenburg
Counsel, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Ethiopis Tafara
Director, SEC Office of International Affairs
WITH DRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148
Box: 00007 Folder: 0018 Document: 11
Series: Team 4 Files
Copies: 1 Pages: 1
ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.
NND:401
Withdrawn: 10-23-2008 by:
OFFICE OF THE
GENERAL. COUNSEL.
November 4, 2003
BY HAND DELIVERY
Daniel Marcus
General Counsel
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
301 7th Street SW, Room 5125
Washington, D.C. 20407
Sincerely,
(It*
Melinda Hardy
Assistant General Counsel
Enclosures
Unclassified
Memorandum
Per our discussion, attached is the 1/17/04 AP article quoting Sultan bin Nasser al-
Suweidi. The key quotes are on the second page.
Unclassified
WSJ.com - Dubai Banks Remain Focus Of Terror Funding Investigation Page 1 of 3
DUBAI (AP)--Banks in this financial hub of the Arab world remain a key focus in the worldwide
investigation of terror funding despite moves to tighten reporting rules, freeze accounts and
control informal money transfers, U.S. and Arab officials told The Associated Press.
The reason: Dubai's history of shady transactions and the difficulty of tracking a matrix of legal
and illegal free trade.
About half the $250,000 spent on the Sept. 11 attacks was wired to al-Qaida terrorists in the U.S.
from Dubai banks, said officials of the U.S. Treasury and Central Bank of the United Arab
Emirates.
Al-Qaida money in Dubai banks also has been linked to the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in
Kenya and Tanzania blamed on Osama bin Laden.
In addition, before Saddam Hussein's ouster, this Persian Gulf emirate was a favorite transit point
for smugglers sneaking past U.S.-led naval patrols enforcing U.N. trade sanctions. And it was
through Dubai that Russian arms dealers supplied bin Laden's Taliban backers in Afghanistan
before the U.S.-led war ousted their Islamic government, officials say.
( This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. To order presentation-ready copies for distribution to your
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Sultan bin Nasser al-Suweidi, head of the Central Bank, told AP that financial officials are
working closely with the U.S. government to block terror funding. Central Bank officials have
trained with U.S. investigators and other international experts to help them identify money
launderers and suspicious transactions, he said.
"We don't want wrongdoers. We totally don't need them," said the U.S.-educated al-Suweidi, who
arrives at his office before 8 a.m. and is often seen working until 10 at night in the fortress-like
Central Bank headquarters in the Emirates capital of Abu Dhabi.
Banks in Dubai, which were not required to report incoming transfers of less than $55,000 before
the Sept. 11 attacks, must now tell the Central Bank about any transfer of more $11,000, al-
Suweidi said.
http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,BT_CO_20040117_000209,00.html 2/5/2004
WSJ.com - Dubai Banks Remain Focus Of Terror Funding Investigation Page 2 of 3
One of the Central Bank's greatest challenges, however, has been to regulate an informal system
of money transfer known as hawala in which a person takes in money at one end, then instructs an
agent in another country to hand a like amount to a beneficiary.
Widely used by migrant workers in Dubai and the rest of the Persian Gulf, hawala operators
transfer money without a paper trail, raising suspicions the system could be abused by terrorists
wanting to move money around.
In the Emirates, hawala operators have been ordered to register with the Central Bank and to
report transfers larger than $550, although al-Suweidi conceded that not all the dozens of
operators had come forward.
So far, there's no evidence the Sept. 11 plotters used hawala to transfer money, instead operating
through conventional banks.
For example, a year before the Sept. 11 attacks, the United Arab Emirates reported to U.S. ~7/
officials a transfer of $69,985 from a Dubai bank to an account in the U.S. held by Marwan Al- /
Shehhi and Mohamed Atta, al-Suweidi said. The names meant little then but they turned out be /
among the suicide hijackers. /
U.S. authorities took no action, al-Suweidi said, with little to differentiate that transfer from
thousands of others each day, even though it exceeded the $10,000 ceiling of U.S. reporting
requirements.
"I don't want to apportion blame because we must all work together on fighting terrorism," al-
Suweidi said. He added, however, that if U.S. investigators were "unable to predict that the
transaction was wrong when it was reported, how can they depend on us?"
Cutting off terrorists' funds is a key component of U.S. President George W. Bush's antiterrorism
strategy. And Dubai remains a focus of U.S. efforts to stop the financing of terror along with other
banking capitals, said a U.S. Treasury official in Washington, speaking on condition of
anonymity.
"There are opportunities for people to use those facilities for nefarious ends - terrorist financing,
drug trafficking, money-laundering, or general fraud," the official told AP. "...We certainly do
think there still is activity under way in the region and certainly activity that affects Dubai that we
are interested in and we are looking at."
The Emirates Central Bank has frozen 18 suspected terrorist accounts with a total value of more
than $3 million, and provided information to international organizations in 14 terror financing
cases, al-Suweidi said.
The frozen accounts include those of Somali businessman Ahmed Nur Ali Jim'ale, whose al-
Barakaat group of companies is under investigation by U.S. authorities for suspected dealings
with al-Qaida.
Other frozen accounts belonged to Al-Shehhi, one of the Sept. 11 hijackers from the Emirates, and
More than two years ago, GRF was put out of business and the organization
destroyed in its entirety without any public evidence of wrongdoing other
than having raised money for and delivering aid to Muslim populations in
dire need around the world.
Roger C. Simmons