COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Working Draft March 28, 2004

QUESTIONS FOR VICE PRESIDENT ALBERT GORE

Aviation security as a national security issue

The Gore Commission's first recommendation in the aviation security chapter was "The
federal government should consider aviation security as a national security issue, and
provide substantial funding for capital improvements."

Question: What did the commission mean when it said aviation security should be
treated as a national security issue? What are the specifics of that in terms of funding,
policies, priorities, procedures etc?

Question: What advice do you have for this commission about what that approach
should mean today?

Question: Please discuss the Commission's intentions in designating aviation security as

a national security issue. How did this square with the revisions in the BWG
recommendations which sharply reduced the federal funding goal, diminished the
consequences of CAPPS, put less stress on an expanded role for the FBI, and apparently
dropped the notion of an enhanced security baseline?

A Layered System

The Gore Commission stressed the importance of a "layered" aviation security system.

Question: What do you regard as the fundament principles of a "layered" system.

Question: In the course of the Gore Commission's work did you find the aviation
security system to be an effectively layered system? If so, why? If not, why not—what
was missing?

Checkpoints

Question: The Gore Commission had recommended a rule to certify screening

companies and yet by 9-11 that rule still had not be finalized. If aviation security were an
issue of national security why was it taking so long to implement such an important
reform of the system?

Funding for AVSEC

The report suggested that the federal government should "devote significant resources, of
approximately $100 million annually, to meet capital requirements identify by airport
consortia and the FAA."
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE
Working Draft March 28, 2004
Question: The vast majority of the additional money for aviation security that was
appropriated as a result of this recommendation was for explosive detection equipment.
Was that the commission's intent? What process did you expect to be used in allocating
these new resources?

TWA 800

Question: Did you perceive that the focus from the administration, Congress and/or the
public on aviation security diminish after the incident was deemed to be a safety issue
and not an act of terrorism?

Question: Do you have any reason to believe that TWA 800 was a terrorist act?

Question: What was your immediate evaluation and response to the crash of TWA 800
in 1996? How, when and why did your understanding change over time?

Intelligence and threat analysis

Question: In the deliberations of the Gore Commission what was your mechanism for
understanding the threat to civil aviation? What intelligence information/assessments did
you receive in order to inform your recommendations?

Question: How did you perceive the threat to civil aviation from the intelligence you
received in the course of the Commission's work and, in general, as Vice President?

Question: The FAA has told the Commission that they were frustrated by the lack of
intelligence ("a blind spot") on domestic threats. Did you perceive this blind spot and, if
so, how serious did you think it was?

Question: What was your analysis of the Bojinka plot uncovered in Manila in early
1995? Did this event change in any way, your and the Clinton Administration's
evaluation of the Bin Laden threat to U.S. civil aviation? If so, how? What was done in
response?

FBI

The Gore Commission recommended that the FBI "significantly increase" the number of
agents assigned to counterterrorism investigation to improve intelligence. In the
aftermath of the 1993 WTC bombing the FBI pledged to devote more resources and focus
on the counter terrorism agenda.

Question: Do you believe that the FBI adequately responded to this new emphasis and
the Commission's recommendation?
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE
Working Draft March 28, 2004
Hijacking/Sabotage

Question: The Gore Commission focused heavily on the sabotage threat to aviation.
Little was said about hijacking. What was the Commission's view of the hijacking threat
and given the known shortcomings of our checkpoint screening operations, why wasn't
this more of a focus?

Question: Did you ever discuss or consider the use of aircraft as weapons as a threat to
civil aviation security? For instance, in 1994 when the private plane crashed into the
White House lawn, was this method of attack a topic of conversation or worry? If so,
what steps were taken?

Question: During your deliberations with the Commission, was the panel aware of the
"common strategy" employed by FAA to address hijacking which basically instructed
flight crew to accommodate hijacker demands? If so, what were your views on the
approach?

Question: Please provide us with your recollection of the following documents that relate
to the evaluation of the terrorist threat to civil aviation produced by the FAA's
intelligence division as well as by the Intelligence Community. In particular, do you
recall their consideration of the possibility of suicide hijackings within the United States?
If so, how did you and the Administration respond to this information?

A. The portion of the National Intelligence Estimates of (give dates) which

pertain to civil aviation
B. The FAA's assessment (include names from Manno letter to JI)
C. The 2000-2001 FAA CD-ROM presentation for aviation security stakeholders
(quote)

Technology

Question: Both the Pan Am Commission and the Gore Commission focused on the
importance of maximizing the use of technology to promote security. What advice do
you have for this commission about how to set an aviation security R&D agenda, to fund
it and to deploy the technology?

Question: How do we avoid the problem of waiting to deploy improved technology in

the hope that some even greater capability is right around the corner? What principles
should we apply in this regard?

Passenger Profiling

The Gore Commission strongly supported the use of passenger prescreening initiatives to
determine those passengers who might pose more than a minimal risk to aircraft in order
to better focus scarce security resources, consistent, of course, with the protection of civil
rights. The Commission's report recommended that research be developed on
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE
Working Draft March 28, 2004
"terrorists, hijackers, and bombers." We note "hijackers" because when the computer
prescreening system was implemented it was only applied to passengers who checked
bags, and the only consequence of selection was to screen the baggage for explosives or
apply positive passenger bag match (PPBM).

Question: Was it the commission's intent that prescreening be used only to identify those
who may pose a sabotage threat, or did you have in mind identifying those who might
pose a hijacking threat as well?

Question: Were you aware that the FAA had limited application of prescreening only to
those passengers who checked bags and the consequences of selection meant additional
screening of your checked bags only, not secondary screening of the passenger's person
and/or carry-on belongings?

Question: How do you believe civil rights issues affected prescreening and screening
operations? (GET LETTER TO UNITED)

Question: What advice do you have for how civil rights issues should be considered so
we can meet the goal of protecting both lives and civil liberties in the field of homeland
security?

Positive Passenger Bag Match

The Gore Commission also endorsed the practice of Positive Passenger Bag Match,
including as a means of addressing the risk posed by those identified as prescreening
selectees.

Question: How did you evaluate positive passenger bag match as an appropriate defense
measure in an era when suicide terrorism was a growing practice?

National Airspace Management

The Gore Commission devoted a lot of attention to modernizing and filling gaps in the
National Air Space (NAS) management system, including improving surveillance of
aircraft

Question: Was this focus on national air space management issues exclusively a safety
and efficiency issue, or did you see this in terms of security as well?

Question: Specifically, was there concern about gaps in surveillance net in the event of a
hijacking? Do remember if the military or FAA weighed-in on this point?

TEAM 8 COMMENT
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE
Working Draft March 28, 2004
Air Rage

The Gore Commission addressed issues related to air rage being a danger to aircraft and
flight crew, and focused its recommendations on more vigorous prosecution.

Question: Did consideration of this issue include new rules about securing cockpits
against intrusion?

Reinventing Government

The Commission on Reinventing Government that you also chaired focused intently on
raising barriers to the imposition of new federal rules.

Question: Given that aviation security was a regulatory process that depended on
rulemaking to effect improved security measures, was there concern that the lessons from
the Commission on Reinventing Government, might unwittingly frustrate reforms
contemplated in the report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security?

Question: How did the Reinvention of Government initiative relate to the Federal
Aviation Administration? Which, if any, of the Reinvention initiatives impacted on civil
aviation security?

Recommendations

Question: What would you tell the Commission they should recommend to improve
aviation and transportation security in particular and homeland security in general?

Question: What advice would you have for us to help ensure that our recommendations
are duly considered and implemented?

(Note: Perhaps we can share some of our draft recommendations with the Vice President
to get his views, including the notion of making the NTSB the NTSSB (national
transportation safety and security board).

General Assessments

Question: Upon becoming Vice President in January 1993, please tell us your perception
of the following issues. Please provide specifics wherever possible.

A. The threat to the United States from Islamic fundamentalists

B. The terrorist threat to U.S. civil aviation
C. The status of the civil aviation security system in the United States

Question: Before your service on the Gore Commission, what were your views on the
so-called Dual Mandate of the FA A, and of the security system of divided responsibilities
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE
Working Draft March 28, 2004
between the FAA, the airports and the airlines? How were these views reflected in the
Administration's aviation security policy?

Question: What was your analysis of the civil aviation security system as of the end of
the Clinton-Gore Administration? What were its strengths and weaknesses?

Question: What was your assessment of the performance of FAA Administrator Jane
Garvey? Deputy Administrator Monte Belger? Civil Aviation Security head Irish Flynn?
Do you recall any occasions on which either they sought to get a security measure
adopted which the Administration declined, or you asked them to undertake any security
measures which they indicated they would be unable to carry out?

Question: What is your analysis of the civil aviation security system on 9/11/01? Where
and why did it fail, in your view? In retrospect, is there anything that you believe either
the Clinton or Bush Administrations could have done which would have prevented those
disasters?

Question: What is your assessment of the state of aviation and transportation security
today? What has been improved? What are the major remaining weaknesses?

Baseline Working Group

Question: When did you become aware of the FAA's Baseline Working Group (BWG),
which issued its final report in December 1996? What was your evaluation of its
mandate, and its interaction with the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security?

Question: What is your recollection and evaluation of the following BWG

recommendations, and how did they impact the work of the White House Commission?

A. The notion of raising the aviation security "baseline"

B. The consequences of profiling "selection"
C. An expanded role for the FBI in civil aviation security
D. The need to end unfounded federal mandates on civil aviation security and to
provide $9.9 billion in federal funding for aviation security over the following 10
years.

Question: What role, if any, did you play in the OMB objection to the BWG
recommendations on the grounds that these were too costly and that they departed from
the user-pays principle?

Gore Commission: General

Question: What was your understanding of the mandate of the White House Commission
on Aviation Safety and Security, which you were named to chair? Did that mandate
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE
Working Draft March 28, 2004
change as the Administration's understanding of the cause of the TWA 800 crash
evolved? If so, how?

Question: What role did the airlines; the airports and labor organizations play in the
work of the White House Commission?

Question: What, in your view, were the major recommendations of your Commission?
How did you seek to implement them? What were the results?

Question: What was your view of the dissent to the Gore Commission report issued by
Victoria Cummock?

Question: Please respond to a question posed to the Commission by the Families of the
9/11 victims: Why were implementation timelines scrapped from the final report of the
Gore Commission? (Check exact wording of question.)

Other notes for us

Gore Commission required each airport to conduct a vulnerability study and an "action
plan" to improve security. We need to get the "action plans" for Dulles; Logan and
Newark. They were supposed to define local security threats based on input from FAA
and FBI.

Gore commission called on performance agreements to outline goals and specific means
of measuring progress for AVSEC what was done in this area.
 QUESTIONS FOR VICE PRESIDENT ALBERT GORE

Aviation security as a national security issue

The Gore Commission's first recommendation in the aviation security chapter was "The
federal government should consider aviation security as a national security issue, and
provide substantial funding for capital improvements."

Question: What did the commission mean when it said aviation security should be
treated as a national security issue? What are the specifics of that in terms of funding,
policies, priorities, procedures etc?

Question: What advice do you have for this commission about what that approach
should mean today?

A Layered System

The Gore Commission stressed the importance of a "layered" aviation security system.

Question: What do you regard as the fundament principles of a "layered" system.

Question: In the course of the Gore Commission's work did you find the aviation
security system to be an effectively layered system. If so, why? If not, why not—what
was missing?

Checkpoints

Question: The Gore Commission had recommended a rule to certify screening

companies and yet by 9-11 that rule still had not be finalized. If aviation security were an
issue of national security why was it taking so long to implement such an important
reform of the system?

Miscellaneous

Question: What was your view of the dissent to the Gore Commission report issued by
Victoria Cummock.

Funding for AVSEC

The report suggested that the federal government should "devote significant resources, of
approximately $100 million annually, to meet capital requirements identify by airport
consortia and the FAA."
Question: The vast majority of the additional money for aviation security that was
appropriated as a result of this recommendation was for explosive detection equipment,
was that the commission's intent? What process did you expect to be used in allocating
these new resources?

TWA 800

Question: Did you perceive that the focus from the administration, Congress and/or the
public on aviation security diminish after the incident was deemed to be a safety issue not
an act of terrorism?

Question: Do you have any reason to believe that TWA 800 was a terrorist act?

Intelligence and threat analysis

Question: In the deliberations of the Gore Commission what was your mechanism for
understanding the threat to civil aviation. What intelligence information/assessments did
you receive in order to inform your recommendations?

Question: How did you perceive the threat to civil aviation from the intelligence you
received in the course of the Commission's work and, in general, as Vice President?

Question: The FAA has told the Commission that they were frustrated by the lack of
intelligence—"a blind spot" on threats domestically. Did you perceive this blind spot and
how serious did you think it was?

FBI

The Gore Commission recommended that the FBI "significantly increase" the number of
agents assigned to counterterrorism investigation to improve intelligence. In the
aftermath of the 1993 WTC bombing the FBI pledged to devote more resources and focus
on the counter terrorism agenda.

Question: Do you believe that the FBI adequately responded to this new emphasis and
the Commission's recommendation.

Hijacking/Sabotage

Question: The Gore Commission focused heavily on the sabotage threat to aviation.
Little was said about hijacking. What was the Commission's view of the hijacking threat
and given the known shortcomings of our checkpoint screening operations why wasn't
his more of a focus?

Question: Did you ever discuss or consider the use of aircraft as weapons as a threat to
civil aviation security? For instance, in 1994 when the private plane crashed into the
White House lawn, was this method of attack a topic of conversation or worry? If so,
what steps were taken?

Question: During your deliberations with the Commission, was the panel aware of the
"common strategy" employed by FAA to address hijacking which basically instructed
flight crew to accommodate hijacker demands? If so, what were your views on the
approach?

Technology

Question: Both the Pan Am Commission and the Gore Commission focused on the
importance of maximizing the use of technology to promote security. What advice do
you have for the commission about how to set an aviation security R&D agenda, to fund
it and to deploy the technology?

Question: How do we avoid the problem of waiting to deploy improved technology in

the hope that some even greater capability is right around the corner? What principles
should we apply in this regard?

Passenger Profiling

The Gore Commission strongly supported the use of passenger prescreening initiatives to
determine those passengers who might pose more than a minimal risk to aircraft in order
better focus scarce security resources, consistent, of course, with the protection of civil
rights. The Commission's report recommended that research be developed on
"terrorists, hijackers, and bombers." We note "hijackers" because when the computer
prescreening system was implemented it was only applied to passengers who checked
bags, and the only consequence of selection was to screen the baggage for explosives or
apply positive passenger bag match (PPBM).

Question: Was it the commission's intent that prescreening be used only to identify those
who may pose a sabotage threat, or did you have in mind identifying those who might
pose a hijacking threat as well?

Question: Were you aware that the FAA had limited application of prescreening only to
those passengers who checked bags and the consequences of selection meant additional
screening of your checked bags only, not secondary screening of the passenger's person
and/or carry-on belongings?

Question: How do you believe civil rights issues affected prescreening and screening
operations? (GET LETTER TO UNITED)

Question: What advice do you have for how we should recommend civil rights issues be
considered in resolve so we can meet the goal of protecting both lives and civil liberties?
Question: The Gore Commission recommended that "The FBI and CIA should develop a
system that would allow important intelligence information on known or suspected
terrorists to be used in passenger profiling without compromising the integrity of the
intelligence or its sources." Did this recommendation mean that the FAA should use
intelligence community and law enforcement watch lists to stop known or suspected
terrorists from flying? If not, what was intended by this recommendation?

Positive Passenger Bag Match

The Gore Commission also endorsed the practice of Positive Passenger Bag Match,
including as a means of addressing the risk posed by those identified as prescreening
selectees.

Question: How did you evaluate positive passenger bag match as an appropriate defense
measure in an era when suicide terrorism was a growing practice?

National Airspace Management

The Gore Commission devoted a lot of attention to modernizing and filling gaps in the
National Air Space (NAS) management system, including to improve surveillance of
aircraft

Question: Was this focus on national air space management issues exclusively a safety
and efficiency issue, or did you see this in terms of security as well?

Question: Specifically, was there concern about gaps in surveillance net in the event of a
hijacking? Do remember if the military or FAA weighed-in on this point?

TEAM 8 COMMENT

Air Rage

The Gore Commission addressed issued related to air rage being a danger to aircraft and
flight crew, and focused its recommendations on more vigorous prosecution.

Question: Did consideration of this issue include new rules about securing cockpits
against intrusion?

Reinventing Government
The Commission on Reinventing Government which you also chaired focused intently on
raising barriers to the imposition of new federal rules.

Question: Given that aviation security was a regulatory process that depended on
rulemaking to effect improved security measures, was there concern that the lessons from
the Commission on Reinventing Government, might unwittingly frustrate reforms
contemplated in the Commission on Aviation Safety and Security?
Recommendations

Question: What would you tell the Commission they should recommend to improve
aviation and transportation security in particular and homeland security in general?

Question: What advice would you have for us to help ensure that our recommendations
are duly considered and implemented?

(Note: Perhaps we can share some of our draft recommendations with the Vice President
to get his views, including the notion of making the NTSB the NTSSB (national
transportation safety and security board).

Other notes for us

Gore Commission required each airport to conduct a vulnerability study and an "action
plan" to improve security. We need to get the "action plans" for Dulles; Logan and
Newark. They were supposed to define local security threats based on input from FAA
and FBI.

Gore commission called on performance agreements to outline goals and specific means
of measuring progress for AVSEC what was done in this area.
 GORE QUESTIONS

1. Irish Flynn, former Associate Administrator of Civil Aviation Security at FAA testified
to the Commission on January 27th, 2004 that the Gore report was disappointing because
it didn't stress the central importance of intelligence and law enforcement in detecting
and countering terrorist activities aimed at aviation. Did the Commission consider the
issue of intelligence, particularly domestic intelligence in identifying threats to civil
aviation.

2. Flynn said that the Commission request for only 100 million per year implied that the
threat to civil aviation security was not imminent. He said it was well known that over
1000 CTX machines were needed and that given the need to buy other equipment, 1000
million would permit purchase and installation of about 50 EDS per year. At that pace it
would take 20 years to complete.

3. Gore Commission suggested that aviation security be treated as a National Security

Issue. What did that mean to you?

4. Why was CAPS consequences limited just to checked baggage? Were their civil rights
concerns about applying secondary screening to selectees for their person or

5. How did you see the "reinventing government" effort and the goal of no new rules
impacting the rulemaking process for CAS?
 QUESTIONS FOR VICE PRESIDENT ALBERT GORE

Aviation security as a national security issue

The Gore Commission's first recommendation in the aviation security chapter was "The
federal government should consider aviation security as a national security issue, and
provide substantial funding for capital improvements."

Question: What did the commission mean when it said aviation security should be
treated as a national security issue? What are the specifics of that in terms of funding,
policies, priorities, procedures etc?

Intelligence and threat analysis

Question: The Gore Commission report mentioned the changing threat from terrorism
and that it was a vital issue domestically. How did you perceive the threat to civil
aviation both domestically and internationally from the intelligence you received in the
course of the Commission's work and, in general, as Vice President?

Hijacking/Sabotage

Question: The Gore Commission focused heavily on the sabotage threat to aviation.
Little was said about hijacking. What was the Commission's view of the hijacking threat
and given the known shortcomings of our checkpoint screening operations, why wasn't
this more of a focus?

Technology

Question: Both the Pan Am Commission and the Gore Commission focused on the
importance of maximizing the use of technology to promote security. What advice do
you have for this commission about how to set an aviation security R&D agenda, to fund
it and to deploy the technology?

Passenger Profiling

Will you share with us your recollection of the commission's deliberations about the
following key issues: Aircraft as weapons; the security consequences for passengers
selected by the computer prescreening system the commission endorsed; the civil
liberties aspects of CAPS and CAPS consequences; and the use of watchlists to stop
suspected terrorists from flying? For instance, was it the commission's intent that
prescreening be used only to identify those who may pose a sabotage threat, or did you
have in mind identifying those who might pose a hijacking threat as well?
Reinventing Government

The Commission on Reinventing Government that you also chaired focused intently on
raising barriers to the imposition of new federal rules.

Question: How did the Reinvention of Government initiative relate to the Federal
Aviation Administration? Given that aviation security was a regulatory process that
depended on rulemaking to implement improved security measures, was there concern
that the lessons from the Commission on Reinventing Government, might unwittingly
frustrate reforms contemplated in the report of the White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security?

General Assessments

Question: What was your analysis of the civil aviation security system in place leading
up to and on 9/11/01? Why were the attacks able to succeed? How and why did the
system fail, in your view? In retrospect, is there anything that you believe either the
Clinton or Bush Administrations could have done which would have prevented those
disasters?

Gore Commission; General

Question: Commissioner Victoria Cummock filed a dissent to many of the

Commission's recommendations, arguing that in some cases they lacked specificity,
responsibility, substance, accountability, applicability and timelines and deadlines.
Further, her dissent included what she thought would address those perceived gaps.
Could you comment on that dissent in terms of its validity and how the commission dealt
with her views?

Recommendations

Question: What would you tell the Commission they should recommend to improve
aviation and transportation security in particular and homeland security in general and
what steps can we take to enhance the probability that our recommendations are duly
considered and implemented?

Question: Threats and vulnerabilities to the nation's transportation system are many and
varied. They include not only aviation but maritime, rail, pipelines and other surface
modes. How would you advise that priorities be determined? How should cost be
allocated among stakeholders?
 Aviation security as a national security issue

The Gore Commission's first recommendation in the aviation security chapter was "The
federal government should consider aviation security as a national security issue, and
provide substantial funding for capital improvements."

Question: What did the commission mean when it said aviation security should be
treated as a national security issue? What are the specifics of that in terms of funding,
policies, priorities, procedures etc?
«• i.
Question: What advice do you have for this commission about what that approach
should mean today?
•»
Question: Please discuss the Commission's intentions in designating aviation security as
a national security issue. How did this square with the revisions in the BWG
recommendations which sharply reduced the federal funding goal, diminished the
consequences of CAPPS, put less stress on an expanded role for the FBI, and apparently
dropped the notion of an enhanced security baseline?
•••»

A Layered System

The Gore Commission stressed the importance of a "layered" aviation security system.

Question: What do you regard as the fundament principles of a "layered" system.

Question: In the course of the Gore Commission's work did you find the aviation
security system to be an effectively layered system? If so, why? If not, why not—what
was missing?

Checkpoints

Question: The Gore Commission had recommended a rule to certify screening

companies and yet by 9-11 that rule still had not be finalized. If aviation security were an
issue of national security why was it taking so long to implement such an important
reform of the system?

Funding for AVSEC

The report suggested that the federal government should "devote significant resources, of
approximately $100 million annually, to meet capital requirements identify by airport
consortia and the FAA." /. |
IrlA1^' '

0,
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE
Working Draft March 28, 2004
Question: The vast majority of the additional money for aviation security that was
appropriated as a result of this recommendation was for explosive detection equipment.
Was that the commission's intent? What process did you expect to be used in allocating
these new resources?

TWA 800

Question: Did you perceive that the focus from the administration, Congress and/or the
public on aviation security diminish after the incident was deemed to be a safety issue
and not an act of terrorism?

Question: Do you have any reason to believe that TWA 800 was a terrorist act?

Question: What was your immediate evaluation and response to the crash of TWA 800
in 1 996? How, when and why did your understanding change over time?

Intelligence and threat analysis

Question: In the deliberations of the Gore Commission what was your mechanism for
understanding the threat to civil aviation? What intelligence infonnatiou/assessiriefits did
you receive in order to inform your recommendations?

Question: How did you perceive the threat to civil aviation from the intelligence you
received in the course of the Commission's work and, in general, as Vice President?

Question: The FAA has told the Commission that they were frustrated by the lack of
intelligence ("a blind spot") on domestic threats. Did you perceive this blind spot and, if
so, how serious did you think it was?

Question: What was your analysis of the Bojinka plot uncovered in Manila in early
1995? Did this event change in any way, your and the Clinton Administration's
evaluation of the Bin Laden threat to U.S. civil aviation? If so, how? What was done in
response?

FBI

The Gore Commission recommended that the FBI "significantly increase" the number of
agents assigned to counterterrorism investigation to improve intelligence. In the
aftermath of the 1993 WTC bombing the FBI pledged to devote more resources and focus
on the counter terrorism agenda.

Question: Do you believe that the FBI adequately responded to this new emphasis and
the Commission's recommendation?
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE
Working Draft March 28, 2004
Hijacking/Sabotage

Question: The Gore Commission focused heavily on the sabotage threat to aviation.
Little was said about hijacking. What was the Commission's view of the hijacking threat
and given the known shortcomings of our checkpoint screening operations, why wasn't
this more of a focus?
•*

Question: Did you ever discuss or consider the use of aircraft as weapons as a threat to
civil aviation security? For instance, in 1994 when the private plane crashed into the
White House lawn, was this method of attack a topic of conversation or worry? If so,
what steps were taken?

Question: During your deliberations with the Commission, was the panel aware of the
"common strategy" employed by FAA to address hijacking which basically instructed
flight crew to accommodate hijacker demands? If so, what were your views on the
approach?

Question: Please provide us with your recollection of the following documents that relate
to the evaluation of the terrorist threat to civil aviation produced by the FAA's
intelligence division as well as by the Intelligence Community. In particular, do you
recall their consideration of the possibility of suicide hijackings within the United States?
If so, how did you and the Administration respond to this information?

A. The portion of the National Intelligence Estimates of (give dates) which

pertain to civil aviation
B. The FAA's assessment (include names from Manno letter to JI)
C. The 2000-2001 FAA CD-ROM presentation for aviation security stakeholders
(quote)

Technology

Question: Both the Pan Am Commission and the Gore Commission focused on the
importance of maximizing the use of technology to promote security. What advice do
you have for this commission about how to set an aviation security R&D agenda, to fund
it and to deploy the technology?

Question: How do we avoid the problem of waiting to deploy improved technology in

the hope that some even greater capability is right around the corner? What principles
should we apply in this regard?

Passenger Profiling

ThlTGore Commission strongly supported the use of passenger prescreening initiatives to

determine those passengers who might pose more than a minimal risk to aircraft in order
to better focus scarce security resources, consistent, of course, with the protection of civil
rights. The Commission's report recommended that research be developed on
tlv U
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE
Working Draft March 28, 2004
"terrorists, hijackers, and bombers." We note "hijackers" because when the computer
prescreening system was implemented it was only applied to passengers who checked
bags, and the only consequence of selection was to screen the baggage for explosives or
apply positive passenger bag match (PPBM).

Question: Was it the commission's intent that prescreening be used only to identify those
who may pose a sabotage threat, or did you have in mind identifying those who might
pose a hijacking threat as well?

Question: Were you aware that the FAA had limited application of prescreening only to
those passengers who checked bags and the consequences of selection meant additional
screening of your checked bags only, not secondary screening of the passenger's person
and/or carry-on belongings?

Question: How do you believe civil rights issues affected prescreening and screening
operations? (GET LETTER TO UNITED)

Question: What advice do you have for how civil rights issues should be considered so
we can meet the goal of protecting both lives and civil liberties in the field of homeland
security?

Positive Passenger Bag Match

The Gore Commission also endorsed the practice of Positive Passenger Bag Match,
including as a means of addressing the risk posed by those identified as prescreening
selectees.

Question: How did you evaluate positive passenger bag match as an appropriate defense
measure in an era when suicide terrorism was a growing practice?

National Airspace Management

The Gore Commission devoted a lot of attention to modernizing and filling gaps in the
National Air Space (NAS) management system, including improving surveillance of
aircraft

Question: Was this focus on national air space management issues exclusively a safety
and efficiency issue, or did you see this in terms of security as well?

Question: Specifically, was there concern about gaps in surveillance net in the event of a
hijacking? Do remember if the military or FAA weighed-in on this point?

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Air Rage

The Gore Commission addressed issues related to air rage being a danger to aircraft and
flight crew, and focused its recommendations on more vigorous prosecution.

Question: Did consideration of this issue include new rules about securing cockpits
against intrusion?

Reinventing Government

The Commission on Reinventing Government that you also chaired focused intently on
raising barriers to the imposition of new federal rules.

Question: Given that aviation security was a regulatory process that depended on
rulemaking to effect improved security measures, was there concern that the lessons from
the Commission on Reinventing Government, might unwittingly frustrate reforms
contemplated in the report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security?

Question: How did the Reinvention of Government initiative relate to the Federal
Aviation Administration? Which, if any, of the Reinvention initiatives impacted on civil
aviation security?

Recommendations

Question: What would you tell the Commission they should recommend to improve
/•aviation and transportation security in particular and homeland security in general?

^Question: What advice would you have for us to help ensure that our recommendations
are duly considered and implemented?

(Note: Perhaps we can share some of our draft recommendations with the Vice President
to get his views, including the notion of making the NTSB the NTS SB (national
transportation safety and security board).

General Assessments

Question: Upon becoming Vice President in January 1993, please tell us your perception
of the following issues. Please provide specifics wherever possible.

A. The threat to the United States from Islamic fundamentalists

B. The terrorist threat to U.S. civil aviation
C. The status of the civil aviation security system in the United States

Question: Before your service on the Gore Commission, what were your views on the
so-called Dual Mandate of the FAA, and of the security system of divided responsibilities
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between the FAA, the airports and the airlines? How were these views reflected in the
Administration's aviation security policy?

Question: What was your analysis of the civil aviation security system as of the end of
the Clinton-Gore Administration? What were its strengths and weaknesses?

Question: What was your assessment of the performance of FAA Administrator Jane
Garvey? Deputy Administrator Monte Belger? Civil Aviation Security head Irish Flynn?
Do you recall any occasions on which either they sought to get a security measure
adopted which the Administration declined, or you asked them to undertake any securityt
measures which they indicated they would be unable to carry out?

Question: What is your analysis of the civil aviation security system o» 9/11/01? Where
and why did it fail, in your view? In retrospect, is there anything that you believe either
the Clinton or Bush Administrations could have done which would have prevented those
disasters?

Question: What is your assessment of the state of aviation and transportation security
today? What has been improved? What are the major remaining weaknesses?

Baseline Working Group

Question: When did you become aware of the FAA's Baseline Working Group (BWG),
which issued its final report in December 1996? What was your evaluation of its
mandate, and its interaction with the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security?

Question: What is your recollection and evaluation of the following BWG

recommendations, and how did they impact the work of the White House Commission?

A. The notion of raising the aviation security "baseline"

B. The consequences of profiling "selection"
C. An expanded role for the FBI in civil aviation security
D. The need to end unfounded federal mandates on civil aviation security and to
provide $9.9 billion in federal funding for aviation security over the following 10
years.

Question: What role, if any, did you play in the OMB objection to the BWG
recommendations on the grounds that these were too costly and that they departed from
the user-pays principle?

Gore Commission: General

Question: What was your understanding of the mandate of the White House Commission
on Aviation Safety and Security, which you were named to chair? Did that mandate
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change as the Administration's understanding of the cause of the TWA 800 crash
evolved? If so, how?

Question: What role did the airlines; the airports and labor organizations play in the
work of the White House Commission?

Question: What, in your view, were the major recommendations of your Commission?
How did you seek to implement them? What were the results?

Question: What was your view of the dissent to the Gore Commission report issued by
Victoria Cummock?

Question: Please respond to a question posed to the Commission by the Families of the
9/11 victims: Why were implementation timelines scrapped from the final report of the
Gore Commission? (Check exact wording of question.)

Other notes for us

Gore Commission required each airport to conduct a vulnerability study and an "action
plan" to improve security. We need to get the "action plans" for Dulles; Logan and
Newark. They were supposed to define local security threats based on input from FAA
and FBI.

Gore commission called on performance agreements to outline goals and specific means
of measuring progress for AVSEC what was done in this area.