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Hobbes's Iconoclasm Author(s): Frank Coleman Source: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Dec., 1998), pp. 987-1010 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the University of Utah Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/449114 Accessed: 16/03/2009 16:30
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Hobbes's

Iconoclasm
FRANK COLEMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

This essay shows that Hobbes'sthought rests on biblical foundations, casting him in an unfamiliarrole - that of an iconoclastic prophet, a Jeremiah,in three Jeremiah.He resemblesthe laterprophets,particularly ways: first by warringagainstidolatry,reconceivedas the attributionof of the Brain,"as Hobbes calls sanctity to mental images, "Phantasmes ch. 45, 449, E.W 3: 651)-as distinguishedfrom limitthem (Leviathan images"(Deuteronomy4: 28, Jeremiah1: ing such attributionto "graven 16); second, by viewing iconoclasm, followed by catastrophicintervenand third, by being centrally tion, as the path to political regeneration; preoccupiedwith the implicationsof the biblicalidea of a creatednature for material,cultural,and political artifice.The essay furthershows that the biblical cosmology underlyingHobbes naturaland civil philosophy is not, as might be supposed, in conflict with the premissesof his scientific writings,but is harmoniousand coincident with it.

"The freest intellects are not those beginning with unaided reason but those firmly bound to a story of ideas through time." Eldon Eisenach
NOTE:The researchfor this articlewas assistedby a grantfromthe NationalEndowment for the Humanities.All biblical referencesare taken from the RevisedStandard Annotated Bible(OxfordUniversityPress, 1973). I have TheNew Oxford Version: been fortunatein the comments and support received in preparingthis manutext script. H. MarkRoelofsintroducedme to the hebraic bible as an appropriate for inquiry and research.Thanks to the hospitable invitation of Edwin Curley,I was enabled to make furtherprogress on this essay at a seminar on Hobbes at NorthwesternUniversity Eldon EisenachandJoshua Mitchellgave generouslyof their talents in an effort to improve the breadth, focus, and coherence of this latestversion. Dennis Crow,GayneNeurney,perhapsunawares,helped me to test positions offeredhere by treatingthem as worthy of attention. While the help I have received has been substantial,I am awarethat there may remain faults for which I am solely responsible. Vol. 51, No. 4 (December 1998): pp. 987-1010 Research Political Quarterly,

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Research Political Quarterly

OVERVIEW

Here I raise the possibility that Hobbes shares common ground with a distinctive strand of biblical literature,prophetic iconoclasm, and that we may acquire insight into the sources of his thought by exploring its connection with the authors who originate this literature, the later prophets. The Old Testamentprohibits attributionof sanctity to graven images (Deuteronomy 4: 28, Isaiah 39: 18-20, Jeremiah 1:16, 10: 5-6). Hobbes goes further. Idolatry, he says, is the attribution of sanctity to "anImage, or any Creature,either the Matter thereof, or any Fancy"(Leviathanch. 45, 449, 452; E.W 3: 653, 656, italics mine).' We may speculate that Hobbes makes this change to bring the "SeparatedEssences" (Leviathanch. 46, 465-66; E.W 3: 465-66), i.e., the ch. 8, 59; E.W.3: 70), by which Aristotle "Nesses, Tudes, and Ties"(Leviathan and his descendants claimed the world to be ruled within the scope of iconoclastic attack. These entities are assigned causal force, Hobbes scoffs, even though lacking the properties of physical embodiment (Leviathanch. 46). Nevertheless, an internal difficulty arises in Hobbes's position to which the present essay calls attention. At the same time thathe adopts the stance of the iconoclast towardAristotle and his descendants, Hobbes remains anxious to defend himself against the charge of idolatry. This anxiety emerges in a lengthy passage (Leviathanch. 45, 447-55; E.W 3: 647-63) and its occasion is the attribution of sanctity to the civil sovereign. The sovereign, Hobbes says, is the "livingRepresentantof God" (Leviathan ch. 45, 454; E.W 3: 658) and the "Imageof God" (Leviathan ch. 45, 448; E.W 3: 650) because s/he is alleged to be in a direct line of ch. 36, 299 and ch. 44, 419; E.W 3: 605-606 descent from Moses (Leviathan and see Leviathanch. 30, 234-36; E.W. 3: 326-29). The question arises why Hobbes should call attention to the Old Testament prophetic literature on iconoclasm when its premises may be turned against the very institution, the civil sovereign, in whose behalf he has mounted an extensive philosophic defense. Hobbes cannot have been unaware that idolatrous worship of kings is one of the pivotal dramas of the Old Testament.It is severely proscribed by the later prophets (Hosea 8: 4), an outlook which is foreshadowed in the former prophets (1 Samuel 10: 17-20).2

Chapter and page references are to Leviathan 1991, followed by citation of the standard

Works edition: TheEnglish Hobbes,edited by Sir William Molesworth(John of Thomas Bohn, 1839-45), cited hereafteras E.W followed by volume and page number. One may say, of course, that Hobbes'suse of the rhetoricof iconoclasm is just that, a screen employed to subvert biblical text and to convert an audience steeped in the of Hobbes tropesof biblicaldiscourseinto rationalchoice actors.Butthis interpretation

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Hobbes's Iconoclasm Underlying the iconoclasm of the later prophets and of Hobbes, is the biblical idea of a creatednature.3This idea is at the center of a crucial problem to which the prophets point, one which has a bearing upon the idolatry issue. It may be stated thus: if, by virtue of the reciprocaleffects which artifactsexert upon their makers, i.e., extending human capacities and shaping conscioustheir authors,4then might it not be the ness, artifactsmay be said to "remake" case that humanity shares in the otherwise exclusive role assigned God in the Genesis epic, and elsewhere in the Bible, i.e., as the maker of "worlds,"and, if this is the case, then might it not be that any conventional manner of human This artifice carries within it an implicit challenge to God's role as "maker." challenge becomes explicit in the case of idolatry.Idolatryis the impious supposition that a person's powers of making extend beyond the production of conventional forms of artifice, chairs, tables, lamps, etc., to the manufacture of likenessesof the divine.5Jeremiah bluntness, puts this issue with characteristic "Canman make for himself gods?"and he answers, of course, "Such are no gods"(Jeremiah16: 20). Both the question raised by Jeremiah and the biblical idea of creation upon which it rests reappear in Hobbes (E.W 1: 1-92; E.W. 3:18). In the Hobbes compares the task confronting the authors introduction to Leviathan
to may commit a solecism, imputingto him motives and perspectivesmore appropriate that Hobbes'siconoclasm is solely rhetorical. later times, and to conclude, overhastily, SeeJohnston (1986: 183-84). in interpreting The firstto suggestthat the biblicalidea of creationmay be of importance (1957: iii) who, takinga cue fromthe introducHobbes,so faras I am aware,is Oakeshott tion to Leviathan, states that the inspirationfor Hobbes'sthoughtmay be seen to spring from the Genesis epic, wherein civil society like nature,is the product of creativewill. Following this lead, Greenleafsuggests that Hobbes'splace as the head of a biblically derived traditionof will and artificebe made the basis for furtherstudy (see Greenleaf 1982). Oakeshott'sview of Hobbes is also buttressed by Foster (1934, 1935, 1936) who offersthat modern science, as expressedin the philosophies of Hobbes, Descartes, Bacon and Locke, rests upon an unstated premise, one that derives from the biblical idea of a creatednature. It bears emphasis that in recommendinga returnto the Bible the Old Testament.Hoffert's for an understandingof Hobbes, I mean, primarily, (1984) suggests an study makes the point that Hobbes'sfrequentcitation of the Old Testament affinityof thought and purpose. The role of human agency in the production of artifactsis easily seen. Not as easily graspedis the role of artifactsin reconfiguringthe identity of their makers.The explanation for this is that the arc of creationis apparentin the formercase but in the latter remainsunobserved.Be this as it may,the reciprocaleffectsof artifactson their makers did not escape the attentionof Hobbesand the prophetsas this essaywill make evident. ElaineScarry(1985: 223-33). Feuerbach's See particularly (1989) discovery,that God is man'sinvention,was in factconsideredlong beforeby the laterprophetsand rejected as idolatrous.

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Political Research Quarterly of the leviathan state to the task confronting God in the creation epic of Genesis. He begins Leviathan thus; "Nature(the Art whereby God hath made and the is World) by the Art of Man, as in many other things, so in this govemes also imitated,"that man can make government through pacts and covenants resembling, Hobbes says, "thatFiat, or the 'Letus make man,' pronounced by or as we would say today, God in the Creation,"and he can make "automata," machines. As the product of artifice, the leviathan state invites attention to that other artifact in history, Israel. However, unlike Israel, whose maker is God and whose matter is man, leviathan is derived from man who is both, "the Matter thereof, and the Artificer"(Leviathan10; E.W 3: ix). From the introduction we learn that Hobbes intended the members of a Protestantculture, to draw upon the Genesis epic for an understanding of their role as or makers, of the state and that he intended a comparison be"artificers," tween the state, a "mortal God" (Leviathanch. 17, 120; E.W. 3: 158), and Israel, God'sartifactin history. Thus while Hobbes' reflections turn upon the same question as raised by Jeremiah, "Canman make for himself, gods?"perhaps, he wishes to answer it differently The argument showing that Hobbes's thought rests on biblical foundations concludes by casting him in an unfamiliar role-that of an iconoclastic prophet, a Jeremiah.6He resembles the later prophets, particularlyJeremiah, in three ways: first, by warring against idolatry,reconceived as the attribution of sanctity to mental images, "Phantasme(s)of the Brain,"as Hobbes calls ch. 45, 449; E.W 3: 651) as distinguished from limiting such them (Leviathan attribution to "gravenimages" (Deuteronomy 4:28, Jeremiah 1:16); second, by viewing iconoclasm, followed by catastrophic intervention, as the path to political regeneration;and third, by being centrally preoccupied with the implications of the biblical idea of a created nature for material, cultural, and political artifice. Nevertheless, as will be noted later, some qualifications concerning Hobbes's relation to prophetic tradition are necessary.
ANDARTIFACT ARTIFICER(S)

The issue of the relationship between artificerand artifact,as that issue is posed by idolatry,is the subject of a typology developed by Elaine Scarry.This typology, drawing on the concerns of the later prophets, illuminates the biblical idea of a created nature, the nature of idolatry, and the tension between
6

no seriousefforthas been Hobbeshas been cast in this role before.Nevertheless, madeto supportthislinkage.Thepresentessaydoesmakesuchan effortbecauseit For a view which is believedthat biblicalinfluenceon Hobbesis foundational.
places the emphasis upon Calvinist doctrinal influence see Martinich (1992: 64). Also, see Eisenach (1931: 55-57).

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Hobbes's Iconoclasm political creation and other, more conventional, forms of material and cultural artifice. It provides an analytical frameworkwithin which themes common to the later prophets and Hobbes can be seen and sets the stage for the discussion of prophetic iconoclasm which is to come. Since the typology helps to frame the issues to be pursued, it will be given some attention. Following the use of Scarryfor these purposes, the role of iconoclasm in state creation, as that is presented both in the later prophets and in Hobbes, will be developed. In this later stage of the analysis attention will be shifted from Scarry's typology to a direct examination of iconoclasm in the prophetic literature and in Hobbes's writings. Scarry distinguishes among kinds of artifice on the basis of whether or not observation of the human component in the creation of the artifactwill interfere with the extension of the capacities of their author, the reciprocal task which all artifactsare tasked to perform. For example, affixed to category "a"artifactssuch as poems, films, paintings and sonatas is a personal signature. This is so much the case that pointing to two objects in a room a person may say "Thisis a Millet and that one is a Van Gogh."About to lower a needle to a record a person will proclaim "Handel"(Scarry 1988: 314). In this instance identifying the human component in the creation of the artifact not only does not interfere, it assists in enhancing human capacities. We may say that the human artifactbears a personal signature and that its nature as an artifactis not only recognized and recoverablebut self-announcing. A second class of artifacts,Scarrysuggests, bears a general,as distinguished from a personal signature, with the consequence that the human component in its creation is recoverable, if not recognizable. As one maneuvers through the dense sea of artifactswhich sustain daily life, tablecloths, dishes, lamps, city parks, streets, language, street lights, armchairs, and so forth, one does not actively perceive these objects as humanly made. But if one stops for any reason and thinks about their origins, one can with varying degrees of success recover the fact that they all have human makers and this recognition will not diminish their usefulness (ibid. 312-13). The leviathan state, it is useful to interject, is an example of this variety of artifact. The imaginative exercise required of us by Hobbes - the removal of the presence of constituted authority while retaining in the mind the characteristics of the political culture of which one is a member-is intended, precisely, to call to attention the presence of an unrecognized but recoverable artifact.Were it not for the state, as Hobbes continually reminds, we would be and the life of man, "solitary,poore, nasty, brutish, and returned to "nature" short" (Leviathan ch. 13, 89, E.W 3: 113). The unrecognized function of the state is to provide us with security in the enjoyment of the "Contentmentsof life" which goes beyond "barePreservation"to whatever a "man by lawfull 991

Research Political Quarterly ch. 30, 231; E.W.3: 322 and see Industry...shall acquire to himself (Leviathan ch. 14, 93; E.W 3: 120). But this office, though unrecognized by a sensibility which peace has dulled, can be recovered through a suitable reminder of the ch. 18, 128; E.W 3: 170). horrors of the state of nature (Leviathan A third classification touches upon the idolatry issue. This class of artifacts is distinguished by the circumstance that observation of their human origin will interfere with the reciprocal task implied by the creation of the artifact. In order for the artifact to discharge the function for which it was created the toil and imagination expended by its human author in the process of its creation must remain undisclosed. Marx alleges that capital occupies this role in Western society since, though created by labor, once created it transforms labor into a "commodity," a thing made by capital (Marx 1988). Concealment of the relationships between artificer and artifact is indispensable to discharging the function for which the latter was called into being. More recently, McLuhan (1964: 23) has suggested that the "medium"has become "the message". McLuhan assigns the message to the medium as a way of pointing out that the media usurps public speech; speech acts originating in human agency are detached from their source and reassigned to the media, an impalpable, omnipresent deity often thought to control every aspect of contemporary life . The issue of the relationbetween artificerand artifact,between (M)aker(s) and the made, is central to the issue of idolatry.Implicit in idolatry is the view that not only such straw men as the golden calf (Exodus 32), and the "scarecrows" in the cucumber field (Jeremiah 10: 5) but, scandalously, God, himself, may be a category "c"artifact.In the eyes of the prophets, idolatry is the major offense of the Old Testament.Hobbes appears to commit this very offense not occasionally and inadvertently but repeatedly and deliberately.As noted before, the state is a "MortallGod"(Leviathan ch.17, 120; E.W. 3: 158); state creation is equivalent to the Genesis epic (Leviathan10; E.W 3: ix); the monarch occupies the same place as is afforded God in the decalogue (Leviathanch. 30, 234-36; E.W 3: 326-28); the sovereign is "theliving representant ch. 45,445-57; E.W 3: 645-63). Unlike Israel,whose maker of God"(Leviathan is God and whose matter is man, the state, the "MortallGod,"is derived from man who, as Hobbes emphasizes, is both "the Matterthereof, and the Artificer"(Leviathan10; E.W 3: ix). Thus man upstages God as the artificerof central importance in the events leading to the generation of the state. Hobbes appears determined to bring to the fore the very role feared and deplored by the prophets, man as a creatorwhose powers rival those of God. To remove human artifice from the stain of rivaling the powers of God, indeed to preempt the issue of whether human powers of artifice extend beyond categories "a"and "b"to category "c,"the Old Testament proceeds by
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showing that in every case artificewhich bears divine sanctiontriumphs, artifice whichlacksapproval comesto dust.Anexampleis the buildwhereas of the of Babel and the creation of a nativelanguage.Neitherof tower ing forms of human is authorized these making by God. Thusin the biblicalaccountthisactivity is viewedas the productof wickedinsolenceandthe tower of Babeland its languagemust be (and is) dealtwith in an horrificmanner (Genesis11:1-9). A greateroffenceis the makingof gravenimages.These and unimaginable imagesoffera tangiblesubstitutefor the unrepresentable Godof Israeland thus offera meansof relieffor the strained religiousimagination.Buttheyalso directly pose the issue of whetheror not humanmaking as audais also,therefore, includesthe makingof God.Suchactivity regarded and a wickedinsolenceand also meetswith devastating cious reply(Exodus make clear that 32: 20; Leviticus26:1-2). Finally,the ten commandments the day God's makingaloneis to be honoredas in the keepingof the sabbath, in on which he restedfromhis projectof world creation.Manparticipates halfrom labor on this God'sprojectof world transformation by abstaining lowed day (Deuteronomy 5:12). Fromthese and like instancesone gathersthatthereis strongpresumpof anyformof humanmaking, the propriety tiveevidencein the Bibleagainst which not havethe expresssanction within "a" and does "b," categories falling havstanceis warranted of God.Thisprecautionary by the dangerthatIsrael, its role in the creationprocess,might come to displace ing reappropriated the thoughtcannotesGod'shegemonicpositionas "maker." Nevertheless, in from above as the (eremiah 16: 20), attention, Jeremiah cape quotation formsof artifice "b" and "a" extend thatman's beyondcategories powersmay "c." Whenthe issue does occur,it is raisedin rhetorical to category form,i.e., the "Shall answers raisedonly to dismissit. Isaiah's itself, potterbe question 'He made should of its the as the that maker, did not say thing clay; regarded him who formed of makeme';or the thingformedsay it, 'Hehas no under(Isaiah29: 16). As noted,Jeremiah immediately respondsto his standing'?" 16: 20). The dominantmotifis areno gods"(Jeremiah own question,"Such Israeldid not makeGod. God madeIsrael."Itis He thathath unmistakable. madeus and we arehis"(Psalms100). stressesGod's To review:the characteristic stanceof the Old Testament and assignshim an exclusiverole in the creationprocess. role as "maker" of artificeare rigidlyseparated, defined,and sanctionedbecause Categories to makeand remake the taskwhichGodmustdischarge, Israel,is threatened is (perceived once his exclusiveroleas an artificer as) compromised by actsof artifice divine human and valorizes humanmaking.Hobbes,by comparison, as we shallsee. differently
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GENERATION

Considerthe idolatryissue and Scarry's typology alongsideHobbes'sequally concerns with and its pronounced making reciprocaleffects. Scarry's typology is implicit in Hobbes'sdivision of PartsI and II of Leviathan into the "Rationall" kingdom, a product and sponsor of "a"recognized and recoverable forms of artificeand "b" unrecognized but recoverableforms of artificeas distinguished from the "Prophetique" kingdom, the subject matter of PartsIII and IV,and a product of category "c"unrecognized and unrecoverable artifice (Leviathan ch. 12, 79, ch. 31, 246, ch. 35; E.W 3: 98-99, 345; see Eisenach 1981: 5766). This division, the "Rationall" kingdom which is a product of human artiwhich is a product of divine artifice, rests upon fice, and the "Prophetique" Hobbes's definition of philosophy. Investigation of this definition repays attention because it shows that while Hobbes differs from the later prophets in valorizing human above divine artificethat, nevertheless, the biblical idea of a created nature is foundational to both. Philosophy, Hobbes says, is "theKnowledge acquired by Reasoning, from the Manner of Generation of any thing to the Properties;or from the Properties, to some possible Way of Generation of the same; to the end to be able to produce, as far as matter, and humane force permit, such Effects, as humane life requireth"(Leviathan ch. 46, 458; E.W. 3: 664). He applies this definition in the following passage: to the "arts"
Of the arts, some are demonstrable,others indemonstrable; and demonstrable are those the construction whereof is in the power of the artist himself, who in his demonstration,does no more but deduce the consequences of his own operation .... (C)onsequentlywhere the causes are known, there is place for demonstration,but not where the causes are to seek for. Geometrythereforeis demonstrable,for the lines and figures from which we reason are drawn and describedby ourselves;and civil philosophy is demonstrable,because we make the commonwealthourselves. But because of naturalbodies we know not the construction,but seek it fromthe effects,therelies no demonstrationof what the causes be we seek for, but only of what may be. (E.W. 1:183)

Several distinguishing features of Hobbes's philosophy are present in this passage. First, the possible objects of "demonstrable" knowledge are restricted to those wherein we may conceive of ourselves as artificers, actively engaged in the creation of the object of our understanding, and where we may thereby (in an act of "pre-cognition") deduce the manner of its creation from our own activity. "Demonstrable" knowledge, therefore, is only of such effects as we are competent to produce and this means that 994

Hobbes's Iconoclasm knowledge claims absent determinate artificers and their products should be viewed with suspicion for "wherethere is no generation or property,there is no philosophy" (E.W. 1: 10). To lay stress, knowledge is only of artifactsand the manner of their generation. Leviathanas an example, is written from the perspective of a precognition of the causes of the state because we are both its "Matter" and its "Maker." But, more extensively, Hobbes cites language (Leviach. 17, 120; thanch. 4, 24-25, 32; E.W. 3: 18-19), commonwealth (Leviathan E.W 3: 158), and geometry (Leviathan ch. 20, 145; E.W. 3: 195-96) as satisfying this definition of the proper objects of philosophic concern. By contrast,the subjectmatterof philosophy does not extend to phenomena which areingenerable,such as God (Leviathan ch. 31,252; E.W.3: 354), a limitation also applying to His works, i.e., to Nature, although to a lesser extent, for "thereis no effect in naturewhich the Author of naturecannot bring to pass by more ways than one" (E.W. 7: 88). Hobbes'sview of knowing as "making" (see Hanson 1991: 637; Funkenstein 1986: 327) has the consequence of privileging we know the cause and functionsof philosophy,where as artificers the "synthetic" the seek the effects, as distinguishedfrom functions, where we know "analytic" the effects and seek a probablecause, a preferenceclearlyremarkedby Hobbes (E.W. 1: 66-74) and noted by a number of commentators(Shapin and Schaffer 1985: 148). A properinferenceto draw fromthis definitionof philosophy is that insofaras the state is consideredan effectof God or Nature,civil philosophy has nothing to say about it. But since Hobbes obviously does think civil philosophy can illuminate the generationof the state, it must be so because its manner of generationis dependent on human making. as Second, since "demonstrable" knowledge is only of such effects(artifacts) civil we arecompetentto produce,it is not only possiblebut desirableto separate fromnaturalphilosophy (for a contrastingview see Watkins 1969: 93-94; Sorell 1986: 25-26). It is desirablebecause knowledge of such effectsas we are competent to produce,the subjectmatterof civil philosophy,occupies an epistemologically privilegedplace in comparisonto effectswhere the causes are to be sought, the subjectmatterof natural placeoccupiedby natural philosophyThesubordinate is in of knowable Hobbes's hierarchy things stated with clarityand philosophy forcein the assertion,"(the)Principlesof naturalScience..areso farrefromteaching us any thing of God'snature,as they cannot teach us our own nature,nor the ch. 31, 252; E.W.3, 354).7 natureof the smallestcreatureliving"(Leviathan
7

to Sorell(1986: 26), Hobbesis not sayingthatnatural philosophyfailsto conAccording role. But it of the statebut ratherintendsa lesser,auxiliary tributeto our understanding accountwhat naturalphilosophyhas to contributeto our remainsunclearfromSorell's thatthe manner of the leviathan state.He acknowledges of the generation understanding sciences. of the natural of the statemaybe graspedentirelyindependently of generation

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andempirically mustbe logically "demonstrable." ItsemThird, knowledge is the of based on world cause-effect relations pirical secondary, demonstrability wherenature, is real,i.e., non a priori(Leviathan ch. 46, 463; because created, E.W.3: 672), and,therefore, countsas evidence,not merelyas illustration, of as we makeaboutthe effectsof knowncauses such propositional statements of (see Foster19: 35: 454). It is truethatHobbesdiminishesthe importance nothclaims on concludeth based knowledge "Experience experimentation. Hobbessays as a way of replyingto Boyle (and the Royal ing universally," of theworldcould who considered coherent account thataninternally Society) Hobbes 1994:ch.4, be builtup fromthe resultsof laboratory experiment(see and Shaffer Martinich 1997: 1985: 110-54; 100-103). But this p.33; Shapin does not mean thathe denied the value of experimental proof,only thathe of philosophy such accountsas fallingshort of the requirements regarded a knowledgeof is established through"reckoning," Logicaldemonstrability
ch. 5, 32-33, 36; E.W. 3: 30-31, definitions and their consequences (Leviathan

36). Neitherlogicalnor empiricaldemonstrability may stand on their own accountsof in valid demonstrative butexistin an interdependent relationship aregenerated. the mannerin which effects(artifacts) If we ask what is the derivationof Hobbes'sepistemology,Foster'sreSuch an hypothesis casts an ply is the biblical idea of a creatednature.8 illuminatinglight upon the origins of Hobbes'sphilosophy because the real, and radiBible, like Hobbes, projectsa view of natureas artifactual, withdraws is true for the as Hobbes, Bible, intelligibility cally contingent. from "nature" and ascribesintelligibilitysolely to those things which are the product of artifice, God or man, but always and only a determinate stateas created,natureis realand, as such, propositional artificer. Further, forevidence,not merely mentsaboutnaturemustrelyon sensoryexperience ch. 46, statements abouttheworld(Leviathan forillustration, of propositional such 1963: 454-55). Additionally, 463; E.W.3: 672; Macpherson propositions as are brought forwardby science about nature must be stated in astheproduct ch. 9) because (Leviathan nature, language hypothetico-deductive a radical elementof of creative will, both in the Bibleand in Hobbes,harbors 1963: 7: 463). (E.W. 3, 88; Macpherson contingency
8 See Foster(1934: 448, 453). Contrast search Macpherson(1962: 9-46). Macpherson's for a naturalphilosophy which will enable him to account for the physiological and behavioralpremises underlying Hobbes's"possessivemarket"model of society leads the thought in modem science,particularly him to concludethatthesepremisesoriginate of Galileo. Despite the acknowledgedinfluence of the Bible on 17th century culture, Macphersonnever considers the possibility that modern science, itself, may be rooted in a biblical cosmology.

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Iconoclasm Hobbes's A significant problem for Hobbes is that while he affirmsthat the proper and category "b" artifacts,among object of philosophic concern is category "a" which common-wealth, language, and geometry are to be included (because these effects all have determinate artificers and manner of generation) and that while his preference for category "a"and "b"artifacts is unmistakable (Leviathanch. 13, 89 E.W 3:113), nevertheless, as Hobbes well knows, in history, particularly contemporary English history, the state is considered a category "c"artifact. This circumstance does not bring him satisfaction but rather occasions the well-known lament, "It is impossible that a Commonwealth should stand, where any other than the Soveraign, hath a power capable of giving greaterrewardsthan Life;and of inflicting greaterpunishments, ch. 38, 306-37; E.W. 3: 437). Religion, he maintains, than Death"(Leviathan chs. 12 and 31), supwhether "natural" religion or "civil"religion (Leviathan for that of mind which foments "Warre" and plies fertile grounds "glorying" and "b"forms of artifice(Leviathan the foregoing of the benefits of category "a" ch. 13, 88-90; E.W. 3:1 12-14). On what basis does Hobbes valorize category "a"and "b"artifice over category "c?" Why does he consider the state an instance of the formerbut not the latter? Hobbes's scale of value is a consequence of his definition of phiand "b,"by Hobbes's losophy. Human artifice, falling within classifications "a" of is the and exclusive definition, object philosophic concern because proper human agency The definition of effects are the issue of these recoverable only philosophy contains the corollarythat the state is and ought to be the product of human agency exclusive of category "c"artifice.Additionally,it contains an implicit valorization of categories "a"and "b"artifice in comparison with catHobbes makes egory "c."In one of the most rememberedpassages of Leviathan and "b"artificeis the chief cost clear that foregoing the benefits of category "a" of failing to observe the agreements which constitute the state. because In such condition(of Warre), thereis no place for Industry; no Culture,of the and consequently the fruit thereofis uncertain: no Navigation, nor use of the commoditiesthat may be imEarth; of moving no Instruments no commodious Sea; Building; by ported of the muchforce;no Knowledge suchthingsas require andremoving no Society; no Arts;no Letters; no accountof Time: faceof the Earth; of violentdeath; andwhichis worstof all, continuall feare,anddanger And the life of man,solitary, poore,nasty,brutish,and short.(Leviathanch. 13, 89; E.W3: 113) Thus Hobbes wishes to assimilatethe task of creatingthe state (an unrecognized but recoverableartifact)to the language of classification"c,"but only in and "b"can orderthat furtheracts of human making fallingwithin category"a" 997

Political Research Quarterly occur. By contrast, the later prophets are alarmed over the prospect that categories "a"and "b"artifice will encourage the conceit that human making extends to category "c."They wish to keep artifacts falling within classification "c"(the issue of God as unrecognized and unrecoverable artifact) separate from those fallingwithin classifications"a" and "b'in orderthat the former may avoid being absorbed by the latter. This difference over the distribution of valorization among the categories of making, which extends to a difference in ascription of the site of artifice (i.e.,whether the primary artificer is man or God) conceals an important area of agreement. To the question of what significance is involved in the attribution of making, both Hobbes and the later prophets both answer "everything." Hobbes's ascription of the site of artifice to man is of crucial importance as is the Old Testament attribution of the site of artifice to God. Hobbes and the later prophets are united by a preoccupation with the reciprocal effects of made things, i.e., the manner in which artifacts reconfigure the identity of their makers. This effect is not neutral, as the prophets observed, because the consequence of such remaking is to induce the belief that man's powers as a maker rival those of God. Idolatry makes explicit the presumption hidden within all acts of human making that man's powers as an artificer compare with those of the Maker of Israel. Despite the presence of such a threat, Hobbes values the products of human artifice at a higher rate. For example, the making of the "Mortal God," a patently idolatrous act by Old Testament standards, does not cause Hobbes to shrink from the implicit comparison between human and divine making. The reason that he does not shrink is that Hobbes shares with the prophets the idea of knowledge as making-for both the world is made intelligible through artifice. Although Hobbes and the latter prophets resolve the problem of the site of artifice (Scarry 1985: 221-33) in a completely different way, one stipulating God and the other man as the proper site, and although the categories of artifice are valorized differently, this difference is overshadowed by the significance of their agreement on the premise of a created nature. Since Hobbes's conception of making has common ground with the prophetic literature of the Old Testament, it becomes reasonable to investigate this literature, its idea of a created nature, as well as biblical views of the manner of generation of the state.
BIBLICAL SOURCES

Hobbes restricts the possible objects of knowledge to those which are the product of our own creation. A typology illuminating this idea of possible "recoverable" artifacts and "b" objectsof knowledge shows that only category"a" 998

Hobbes's Iconoclasm fall within Hobbes'saccount of possible objects of knowledge and only those categories as well promote the useful arts which bring peace. The question to which we come is whether Hobbes's account of the causal forces drivingthe concerning the generagenerationof the state is relatedto the biblicalnarrative tion of Israel.Posed differently,is there a connection between iconoclasm, art, and political regeneration,in Hobbes and the latter prophets? Or, to put a fine point on the matter, does Hobbes rely upon a distinctively biblical understanding of the knowledge required to make the state in his many references to knowledge as making? The Bible conceives of the world as God'sartifact.It begins with a project of world creation, recording the manner in which a solitary,powerful, procreative will, God, creates the world in the beginning through fiat (Genesis 1, 2). The world, as the creation epic makes clear, has no independent, physical existence save as the product of God'screative will. The Bible further records that God'sactivity as a powerful, procreativeforce is duplicated on many subsequent occasions. He makes Adam, a word properly translatedfrom the Hebrew as mankind (von Rad 1961: 55). He makes wombs, formerlybarren, to become fertile (Genesis 17, 25: 21). He covenants with Abraham, promising him that his descendants will be a mighty nation, as numerous as the sands of the seashore or the stars of heaven (Genesis 15: 5, 22: 17). This promise is inherited by and fulfilled in the people of Israel. The scope of God's power as an artificerin the Bible cannot be exaggerated. Although the world produced in the beginning is pronounced "good,"it is only so because it is God's artifact, and its role thereafter is confined to serving as a backdrop against which numerous additional acts of artifice may be displayed. One scholar notes that for the Old Testamentmind there truly is no such thing as nature (natura), there is only creation (creatura), (von Rad in 1961: 53). Another notes that there is no word in the Hebrew for "nature" that make of and its current meaning as the "totality the processes up powers the universe" (Kaufman 1972: 349). This omission is significant. The desacralization of the natural realm enjoined in many Biblical passages (Exodus 23; 23-24; Deuteronomy 4: 15-32;Jeremiah 3: 6-11), combined with the reduction of nature to God's artifact, removes every obstacle that might stand in the way of God'sproject of world transformation.God'soriginal act, the creation of the world, conceives of the entire cosmos as the proper domain for acts of artifice.All forms of material,cultural,and politicalcreationoriginate with God, are substantiated by Israel and the world, and are unhindered in the manner of their expression by a natural realm. What is the connection between the biblical idea of creation and the generation of the Israelite state? To answer this question we must shift attention from the narrative of God's redemptive activity in history (see, e.g., Walzer 999

Political Research Quarterly 1985 and Roelofs 1988) to the essential relation between Israeland its Maker. The most essential attributeof Israelin the biblical record, as contrasted with God, is that it is body. It is one body as in the account where Israel, battling with the Midianites, smites them "as one man" (Judges 6: 16-18). When Israel swears to the Mosaic covenant it is "with one voice" (Exodus 24: 3). Pedersen says that Israel in the biblical account must be regarded as one, moral, collective, physicalperson (Pederson 1926: 267-79). Manybiblical passages bring into relief the sentient and perishable nature of Israel'sbody by contrasting it with the indomitable, imperishable nature of its Maker.9"Allflesh is grass, and all its beauty is like the flower of the field" we are reminded (Isaiah 40: 63). Despite this reminder of the fragile, evanescent character of its existence, Israel is proud in the peculiar biblical sense that it is recalcitrantmaterialfrom which God can produce a work of artifice. "Ihave seen this people and behold, it is a stubbor people" (Deuteronomy 9: 13). "Iknow that you are obstinate, and your neck is an iron sinew and your foreheadbrass"(Isaiah 48: 4). Israel's pride extends to a glorying in its accomthat its and the conceit powers rival those of God. All instances of plishments "a" and the "b" artifice, categories prophets warn, harbor the implicit threat that they may extend to category "c." Idolatryis the most complete expression of Israel'spride. The reason this is so is that the implicit threat that category "a"and "b"artifice may spill over becomes overtin idolatry. into "c" Herethe artificeof Israelrivalsand destabilizes
9 "Sentience" is a term of art in Scarry's (1985: ch. 3) interpretiveframework.She prothat extreme the biblical sentience, Israelas a body in pain, takes poses emphasisupon place within a narrativestructurewhich enacts an importantintuition concerning the nature of creation.Pain of sufficientobduracyand intensity deprivesus of all artifice, language included, by which the world is known and expressed; it is, therefore, deworlding. But this condition seeks relief in its opposite- the imaginationextended into its objects. The imagination,which cannot be conceived apart from its objects removes us from the condition of pain by seeking extension outaccordingto Scarry, ward into the object world. While it may offend common sense to view pain as an intentionalstate, it may be so consideredin the context of work, labor, and creation; inopposite pain, in this same context, is rangedthe imagination,its complementary, tentionalstate. These intentionalstates, the body in pain and the imaginationextended for while the former into its objects, while opposed, arenevertheless,complementary; is a state of embodimentwithout the relief of the objects of imagination,the latteris a state of objectification(derivingfrom the natureof the imagination)without the relief of embodiment. Creation,labor, artifice mediates the tension which exists between these intentional states because through the aversivenessof work we are lifted out of the silent, cellular contractionof the body in pain and into the createdworld. This is treatthe dynamicwhich the Old Testament scripturesseek to convey in theirnarrative ment of the relationshipsbetween Israel,the body in pain, and its Creator, particularly as they relateto wounding and creation.

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God's position as the site of artifice. By the same token, iconoclasm, the destruction of the artifacts which purport to represent God in a catastrophic event, is the antidote to man'sprideful claims and the path to political regeneration. Let us note that iconoclasm is not limited to the smashing of idols; it includes the breaking of bodies as well. The prophets continually warn of the consequences following upon Israel'sintractablebehavior. his heart Blessed is he who fearsthe Lord Buthe who hardens always; will fallintocalamity(Proverbs 28: 14) Hewho is oftenreproved, his neckwill suddenly be yet stiffens broken (Proverbs 29:1) beyondhealing. I havepersistently sentmyservants theprophets to themdayafter day, to or their neck... didnotlisten me, incline theear, butstiffened yetthey
Therefore... the dead bodies of this people will be food for the birds of

7: 5, 32) theair,andforthebeastsof the earth." (Jeremiah A whiff of calamity is salutary because it reminds Israel of the basic facts of human sentience, it is mere body, and that God's displeasure may reduce Israel to its essential attribute- a body in pain. God, whose authority over his creation is complete, may reverse the course of his making and destroy his creation. In the passage from Isaiah quoted above he concludes, "The grass withers, the flower fades, when the breath of the Lord blows upon it; surely the people is grass"(Isaiah 4: 7). Let us review this. Idolatryis the premierexemplarof pride because it is by and "b" formsof definitionan elevationof human capacitiesbeyond category"a" artificeto include category"c." Hence Isaiah(39: 18-20, 41: 29, 42: 8, 44: 9-20, 46: 5-7),Jeremiah(1:16, 2:17, 7: 18, 10, 17: 20), Micah (1: 7-8), and Habakkuk (2: 18-19) repeatedlyexpress deep shock at the presumption inherent in idolatry that man's powers of artifice are considered to rival those of God. "They have burned incense to other gods, and worshipped the works of their own hands"(Jeremiah1: 16). Faith, by contrast, consists in submission to the will of God to include his repossession of the sentient body of Israel from which He has been expelled by rebellious pride. Iconoclasm prepares the way for the reoccupation of Israel by God because it is attended by cataclysm and consequent to cataclysm is the wounding of Israel.Wounding is an essential element within the trajectoryof political regeneration because only thus is Israel reduced to a body in pain (Scarry 1985: 198-210), hence deworlded, hence in need of having its world restored through the extensions of artifice made possible by the Artificer.A central drama of the Old Testament-the crushing of Israel'spride by an event which demonstrates God's prowess - conflates wounding with divine creation. 1001

Research Political Quarterly Wounding is necessary to the drama of political regeneration, as it is visualized in the Hebraic Bible, because only thus can Israel be reminded that it is perishable, mortal, sentient-a body in pain-and only thus can Israelachieve awareness of the role of its Makerin liberating it-through artifice- from its cell of silent and painful contraction. The conflation of wounding and political creation is so pronounced in the Bible that the most extreme form of punishment is not the prophesied catastrophe, itself, but the deprivation of sentience necessary to comprehend its object lesson.
Hearand hear but do not understand; see and see but do not perceive. Makethe heart of this people fat, and their ears heavy, and shut their eyes; lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understandwith their hearts, and turn and be healed. (Isaiah6: 9-11)

When God wishes to punish pharaoh he not only sends plague but hardens his heart (Exodus 10). Thus the worst punishment for pride is not necessarily adversitybut deprivation of the characteristicsof sentient life and, hence, the very possibility of regeneration. Conversely,belief, an intentional state which is the opposite of pride, is strongly reinforced by Old Testamentpassages. As pride is a resistance to the occupation of Israel'sbody by the Artificer,so belief is characterizedby the malleability of Israel to God's intentions. The objective of the covenant renewal ceremonies of the Old Testament(Exodus 20-24, Deuteronomy 20-24) is to evoke the circumstances which occasion belief: the contraction of Israel to embodied pain during its period of bondage and enslavement, its opportunities for self-extension through the activities of the primary Artificer, the manner in which belief in the Artificerhas, in fact, produced this self-extension, the opportunities for further remaking which arise from this. The intentional states and preoccupations which inform prophetic iconoclasm in Jeremiah are also present in Hobbes. Hobbes's admonitions to the "childrenof Pride,"by whom I understand him chiefly to mean religious and political elites (see Baumgold 1990; Hobbes 1990), is tied to the circumstance that he relies upon them for an intuitive appreciation of his biblically derived argument for civil authority.This is an argument which trades upon all the significant themes of biblical discourse. As Hobbes invokes the powers of the God"as the appropriateresponse to the children of pride so must the "Mortall predicament to which he is responding be seen as biblical as well. This predicamentmay be stated in termsof the intractable,froward,cranky,stiff-necked disposition of Israel (and their modem descendants!) toward their Artificer, 1002

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the vainglorious pride which makes them think themselveshis equal, the of forgetting originsand covenantobligations,the competitionamongreliand thus the need for giousand politicaleliteswho aimto usurpsovereignty, a wounding,savagepen, Hobbes!!!, to shatterthe idols, and to bringmen to of theirdependence an awareness on theArtificer. Thusstated,the perception is biblically of the problemto whichLeviathan is addressed inspiredand so is wherethe soverline of Leviathan the proposedIresolution. Thepenultimate is "the children of ch. (Leviathan 28, 221: E.W eign pictured overawing pride" becausethe objectof attackis 3: 307) could havebeen writtenby Jeremiah idolatrouspride, a "vain(i.e., delusional)conceit"that the powersof man rivalthose of the mortalGod "towhich we owe, under the Immortal God, ch. 17, 120. E.W.3: 158). ourpeaceand defence" (Leviathan in Hobbes moregenerally stated Asnoted,iconoclastic attack is, if anything, than in the prophets. It extends beyond the making of graven images (Deuteronomy4: 28, Isaiah 39: 18-20, Jeremiah 1: 16, 10: 5-6) to the eitherthe matter of sanctity or anyCreature, attribution thereof, to, "an Image, ch. 45,449,452, E.W.3: 653, 656). ButwhileHobbes oranyFancy" (Leviathan of sancthebetterto embrace the attribution the scopeof the attack, broadens of Aristotle to deal with the vain mental and thus to images philosophy tity remains ch. 8, 59: E.W3:70), the objectof attack andscholasticism (Leviathan the same as in Jeremiah, i.e., to remindthe pridefulof the facts of human the Mortall sentienceand of theirdependenceon the greatArtificer, God, to ch. 17, Godpeaceanddefenseis owed (Leviathan whom,underthe immortal the objectof iconoclasticattackis to stabilize 120, E.W.3: 158). Ultimately, from the Artificer of Israelto man, the the site of artificenow transferred state. makerand the matterof the leviathan
Those who are the object of Hobbes's attack-it is a long list-are the

most ch. 46, 47);the Church whichhaspresumed Church Catholic (Leviathan conscientious ch. 12, 86; E.W.3:109); the hyper of Reformation (Leviathan
ch. 11, 72; E.W. ch. 7, 48; E.W.3: 53); vain glorious men (Leviathan (Leviathan

ch. 15, 107; E.W.3:140);rich and potent natures(Leviathan 3: 88); "higher" ch. 3: 324); thosetakenwith a vainconceit E.W. (Leviathan 233; 30, subjects inch. 13; 87. E.W3:110 ); the privately of their own wisdom (Leviathan ch 8: 3: E.W. (Leviathan 55; 64). spired Thislistingshouldnot divertattentionfromthe premier objectof attack And the reasonfor this may be eviwhich is Aristotleand his descendants. of efficacyto mentalimages,the tudes,ties,and dent. First,the attribution theworld andhis descendants considered Essences by whichAristotle separated technicaldefinitionof idolatryabove.Second, to be governed,fits Hobbes's of Hobbes's whichis theantithesis Aristotelianism suppliesa glossuponnature beginningpoint. Nature,forHobbes,is not simplythose phantasmswhich
1003

Political Research Quarterly remain to mind following the conceptual exercise of imagining away the world (E.W. 1: 91-2) but it is the experience of the world's absence. Hence the obliterating, deworlding force of pain, "the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short," is the beginning point for Hobbes and opposed to this, solely, are the achievements of artifice (Leviathanch. 13, 89; E.W. 3: 113) through which the world is restored. Aristotle's a priori investigation of nature cannot engage the Hobbesian perspective because to do so would require surrender of an exclusively conceptual manner of encountering the world. Much stress is laid by Hobbes on the sword of the sovereign as a means of defeating pride and securing covenants made (Leviathan ch. 28, 221; E.W. 3: 307). But prior to the sword of the sovereign is Hobbes's iconoclasm which, like Jeremiah's, is intended to deworld us, and thus to put us in a frame of mind to be receptive to the interventions of artifice. Having proposed Hobbes's filiation with the later prophets, let us acknowledge some qualifications. First, one cannot imagine Hobbes becoming offended, as is true of Jeremiah, about "committing adultery with stone and tree" (Jeremiah 3: 9). He just assumes that insofar as these impulses remain they are of such a marginal character as not to constitute an obstacle to the forms of self-extension which the state makes possible. The desacralization of nature is assumed to be complete. Second, the object of Jeremiah's iconoclasm is to restore a covenant with the Artificer, whereas the evident intent of Hobbes's iconoclasm is to enhance opportunities for categories "a"and "b"forms of artifice. Another way of putting this is that and "b"forms of artifice while the prophHobbes valorizes only category "a" these with ets treat deep suspicion because of their implied relation with category "c" issues. Third, Hobbes's elevation of the monarchical sovereign to Mortal God itself invites iconoclastic attack. Hobbes's defense of monarchy restores a dilemma familiar to the students of the Old Testament. For the installation of the kings as God's representatives on earth deposes the kingship of God over Israel (1 Samuel 10: 17-20). Hosea makes a direct link between Israelite kingship and the successive development of idolatrous worship. He says Theymadekingsbut not throughme. Theyset up princes,but withoutmy knowledge. Withtheirsilverand gold theymadeidols for theirown destruction.(Hosea 8:4) Hobbes pretends to do no more than to restore the biblical solution, the kings are sanctioned by God. Therefore it cannot be idolatrous (Leviathanch. 12, 88, E.W 3: 108) to be their obedient subjects. This saves his position. But it is 1004

Hobbes's Iconoclasm reasonably evident that Hobbes is exposed to iconoclastic attack from the ch. 45, very sources on which he is dependent and that he knows it (Leviathan 447-55, E.W. 3: 650-58). Let us return to the question raised at the outset of this essay, "Whatis This relation is trunHobbes'srelation to Old Testamentprophetic tradition?" cated. While he looks back to the iconoclasm of Jeremiah as the inspiration for his attack on contemporaneous idolatries and while the biblical idea of a created nature occupies a foundational place in mounting this attack, nevertheless, the object of the attack is not to restore obedience to the Immortal God, or, at least it would seem, not primarily The attackis in the service of the state, an artifactof man, and the forms of self-extension heralded by this artifact.10Insofar as prophetic tradition may be invoked to mount an attack on the state, it is clear that Hobbes regards it as an irrelevant and dangerous, historical anachronism (Leviathanch. 32, 258-59, ch. 36, 290, 298, E.W 3: 364-65, 412, 425). A possible explanation for Hobbes'ssweeping dismissal of the prophets is that having revitalized a tradition that may be arrayedagainst the monarchy,he wished to put some distance between himself and it. Even so, insofar as the prophets invoke a judgment in behalf of biblically inspired, collective values, Hobbes is most certainly a prophet. Eisenach suggests the term "prophet"of "humane politics" or "prophetichumanism" as apt for the ambiguous position taken by Hobbes in relation to the scriptures and modem liberalism.11More to the point for the view offered here is that Hobbes is a prophet in the service of category "a"and "b"forms of artifice.

10Freudcatches the

spirit of this distinctivelymodern enterpriseof Hobbes in a passage which bears comparison with the triumphantlisting of the extensions of artifice in He writes: "Withevery tool man is perfectinghis own organs,whether moLeviathan. tor or sensory,or is removing the limits to their functioning. Motor power places gigantic forces at his disposal, which, like his muscles, he can employ in any direction; neitherwaternor air can hinder his movements;by means thanksto ships and aircraft of spectacleshe correctsdefects in the lenses of his own eye; by means of the telescope he sees into the fardistance;and by means of the microscopehe overcomesthe limits of visibilityset by the structureof his retina.In the photographiccamerahe has created an instrumentwhich retainsthe fleetingvisual impressions,just as a gramophonedisc of the power he retainsthe fleetingauditoryones; both are at bottom materializations possesses of recollection,his memory.Manhas, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic ch. 13, 89; E.W 3: 113). God (Freud 1961: 42-43; cf. Leviathan 11Eisenach (1981: 56). CompareMitchell (1993a: ch. 2 and 1993b: 79-100). The account offeredhere contrastswith Mitchell'swhile remainingcompatible in other respects. For example, the dilemma of man'spridefulnature is said by Mitchell to wait until St. Paul to receive attention.By contrast,I locate this issue in the later prophets. 1005

PoliticalResearch Quarterly CLOSE

Some accounts of Hobbes, in contrastto the view above, reject the idea of biblicalinfluence,12 otherinterpretations of Hobbesacknowledgethe importance of biblicalinfluence, while limiting its extent.13 This is unfortunatebecause it is

whereas Mitchellsays that the dilemma of man'ssinful pride remainsunreSimilarly, solved prior to Christ'satonement, I believe the ascriptionof sentience to God in the laterprophetsanticipatesthe resolutionof the New Testament. In IsaiahGod is referred to as crying out "likea woman in travail" (Isaiah42: 14), in JeremiahHis eyes become "afountainof tears"(eremiah 9: 1) and He speaks of himself as grievously"wounded" (Jeremiah10: 19). When God takes on the characteristicsof human sentience, the of the Old Testament,are transof wounding and creation,so characteristic narratives formed. Christ,whosebodyis broken for us, reenactsthe familiarbody breakingnarratives centered on pride; at the same time He acknowledges and legitimizes human the towardits alleviation.Interestingly, sufferingand redirectsartifice,therapeutically, prophets deride the worship of idols preciselybecause, lacking the propertiesof sentience, they lack the healing power of God (Jeremiah10: 5; Isaiah44: 9-20). A further point of contrastis that Hobbes'sstress on man as artificer, tirelesslylaboringto overcome the adversitiesof human sentience, and indeed creatinghis own identity in history,mayaddressman'sspiritualneed in ways thatgo beyond the accountwhich Mitchell the limits on politicalsovereigntyarisingfromthe Hobbesiancovenant provides.Lastly, put in doubt the saving role attributedby Mitchellto the state. For a discussion which stressesthe limits on sovereigntyimposed by the covenantrelationsee Coleman(1977 and 1974: 57-89). Also see Scarry(1985: 210-21, 230-32). 12 For example,Johnston states that Hobbes employs biblical discourseas a cloak within which is concealed a very different,modem, and scientific message. He contends that the object of Hobbes'sreviewof importantdoctrinesof Christianteachingin Leviathan (Pts. IIIand IV) relatingto miracles,prophecy,the authorityof scripture,the natureof criteriawhich subverttheir God, the statusof the soul, is to subjectthem to rationalistic meaning. The result of this corrosive analysis is that we are transformedinto "more rationaland predictablebeing consistent with the thrust of PartsI and II, ratherthan This accountturnson a distinctionbetweenHobbes's conformedto Christian orthodoxy. real and apparentintentions, his esoteric contrastwith his exoteric doctrine; it is assumed throughoutthat Hobbes'shidden agendais to convertus all into scientific,rational choice actors, a view which commends itself to those who see Hobbes in a similar light (Johnston1986: 134). And see Curley(1989-90: 162-249); Hampton(1988). For an account which, like Johnston's,presents Hobbes as the progenitorof a distinctively but which, unlikeJohnston,views this achievemodem idea of "scientific enlightenment" ment with forebodingsee Kraynak (1990). 13Following the eschatologicalversion of history presentedby Hobbes in Leviathan (ch. 35), Eisenachallows the existence of a biblicalinfluence on Hobbes only in a weak and epiphenomenal sense. The shortcoming in Eisenach's(and Pocock's)interpretation, accordingto the view offered here, is that it limits the scope of biblical influence to Christian placein Protesperhapsa consequenceof focusingupon Hobbes's eschatology, SeeEisenach sectarian (1981) andPocock(1973: 174). tant,post-Reformation, controversy. 1006

Hobbes's Iconoclasm possible thatthe Bible,correctlyused, would assistthese same scholarsin illumiJohnston, as an example, refusesto accept Hobbes's nating theirown arguments. own affirmations that his "materialism" is coincident with and possibly derived ch. 34, 35). He representsHobbes as having from biblical sources (Leviathan wrestedbiblicaltext to camouflagea materialistic philosophy arrivedat by indewe mean the transformation of pendent means. Nevertheless,if by "materialism" the world into artifact, thereis possibly no majortext more materialistic than the Bible, a view confirmed by a number of authors (Scarry 1985; White 1987; Kaufman 1972; Foster 1934). It is true that the prophets, as we have noted, are deeply suspicious of artifice directed to extending human powers and capacities; but, even so, the principle of transformingthe world into artifact remains and thus becomes availablefor appropriationand redirectionby others (e.g., Hobbes). Hobbes is quite right, therefore, to discover the origins of his philosophy of artificein the Bible and his statements to that effect should be taken as what he meant to say. It is also unfortunate to restrict the influence of the Bible to Christian eschatology. The central figure in Eisenach's and Pocock's interpretation of Hobbes is the Christian protagonist caught between the conflicting claims of "Rationall"vs. "Prophetique"forms of political rule (Leviathanch. 246, E.W. 3: 345) during a period of God's withdrawal from history. Pivotal to this account are Hobbes's remarks on the "kingdom" of God as variously conceived in history and his reflections on the manner in these conceptions shape the prospective loyalties of the members of common-wealth (Leviathanch. 12, 31, 35). One may concede that God's redemptive intervention in history is central to the scriptures and that Hobbes is wrestling with the political implications of this in the passages to which these authors point. But God's redemptive activity in history is not the only narrative of significance in the Bible - there is the creation epic - and, it is possible that the Bible is conceptually more diverse than the Second-Coming- there is the idea of nature as God's artifact and of iconoclasm as the path to a regenerative politics. The present interpretation has attempted to retrieve these biblical themes for an understanding of Hobbes.
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Received:February6, 1977 Accepted:June 4, 1998 coleman.frank@epamail.epa.gov

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