COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Re: Fire Command Station (PCS) Systems & Protocol Type of event

: Memo; based on interviews with Alan Reiss (former Director of the Port Authority World Trade Department) and Michael Hurley (former WTD Life Safety Director) Date: July 1, 2004 Special Access: None Prepared by: Madeleine Blot Team: 8b Location: N/A Participants - Non Commission: N/A Participants - Commission staff: N/A

The following systems / methods existed for transfer of information to and form the fire command stations ("PCS") in the lobbies of WTC 1 and WTC 2, which were managed by the buildings' deputy fire safety directors ("DFSD's"). 1) The public address system*: The p.a. system was used to make voice announcements to tenants in the buildings. The DFSD could select to make an announcement to specified floors, to the entire tower, or to one or more of the stairwells (selected by pushing appropriate buttons; separate buttons existed to transmit to each of the 3 stairwells). Announcements were generally made to "affected" areas, as indicated by automatically-generated computerized alarms (see below) or by actual reports from tenants. Public address announcements were regularly preceded by a tone; 'advisory' announcements were preceded by "chimes" and "emergency" announcements were preceded by the warble evacuation alarm signal; the tone would be overridden (unless sounding automatically in default mode) when the DFSD pressed the push-to-talk button. • Protocol regarding instructions to building tenants: Each PCS contained manuals with pre-scripted announcements pertaining to a number of specified emergencies. Instructions existed for standard fire emergencies, as well as for bomb threats and other non-fire events. If an incident arose for which no script was provided, it was standard procedures for the DFSD to consult with the FSD before making an announcement, to determine instructions and wording. If the DFSD could not

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED contact the FSD, it was acceptable for him to act on his own. DFSD's, though called "deputies," were all NYC-certified fire safety directors and many were retired members of the FDNY. In all cases, once the FDNY arrived on the scene, it had jurisdiction over any decisions concerning evacuation and/or other emergency procedures. FSD's could make recommendations and/or object but the decision was ultimately the FDNY's. There was no pre-written script specifying how to advise tenants in one tower if there was a major event or explosion in the other. (See WTC Protocols & the South Tower, dated Jul. 24, 2004). In general, announcements were either "advisory" or "emergency." Advisory announcements generally informed tenants of an event which either did not affect them or did not require immediate action (e.g., an incident which was occurring in another location but perceptible to tenants, or a non-emergency situation such a power dip). The purpose was reduce anxiety. Emergency announcements advised tenants how to proceed in situations which did require immediate attention (e.g., evacuation). (See also Michael Hurley interviews, dated July 8, July 22, & July 23, 2004) & Memo re WTC Protocols & South Tower, dated July 24, 2004) 2) Emergency intercom "floor warden" phones: Floor warden intercom phones were located on each floor of the towers to enable the designated floor "fire warden" (a civilian tenant) to communicate with the FCS when an emergency event occurred (as fire drill training instructed). Lifting the handset at the floor location would automatically connect the fire warden (or anyone using the phone) to the FCS. The FCS was alerted by a sound alarm and a red LED alert. 3) Computerized alarms*: The FCS was equipped with a computer monitor by means of which the DFSD could monitor conditions throughout the building. When an alarm condition occurred (i.e., smoke, heat) it would automatically trigger a coded message to appear on the screen at the fire command desk, indicating the type and location of the alarm. 4) Hardlines: The FCS contained regular landline phones which tenants could reach by dialing standard 7-digit numbers. Phone numbers were provided liberally; they were given to all fire safety team members and many others who might need to the contact the FCS. 5) Evacuation Tone*: Under normal circumstances, the evacuation tone could be activated 1) manually; 2) by the water flow detection alarm, or 3) by the smoke detector alarm. The tone would also sound automatically in default mode if the transponder received an alarm input triggered by an actual alarm condition but was unable to "communicate" with the FCS. Transponders generally covered 3floor areas and would receive input from and generate tones to those areas in the manners indicated. The tone would be broadcast through the public address speakers. * Indicated items were components and/or features of the class "E" fire alarm system, installed by the Port Authority in response to the 1993 bombing ($70 million); (See also Alan Reiss interview dated Jun. 16, 2004). It was comprised of six separate systems, in

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED different physical locations, and covered all areas owned and operated by the PA. (WTC 1,2,4, 5, sub grade areas, concourse). The system contained redundant electronics and control panels in physically dispersed locations, in case pertinent areas (i.e., lobby PCS) had to be evacuated. Functionality of Systems on Sept. 11thAfter Impact of Planes: This issue of which and to what extent building systems functioned on September 11 after the towers were hit by the planes is being thoroughly investigated by NIST. Because we lack the resources and expertise to conduct this type of investigation, we have refrained from attempting to draw broad conclusions. However, our research has yielded the following, non-technical, information: * Public-Address System: nV^^ a 1) From 911 tapes: The p.a. system was generally not heard in the background of X ^ f\/ M any 911 tapes that we have listened to. Staff recalls hearing an announcement in \) ^ V the background one call that did not appear to correspond to the events taking ""~J • pj\ tf place at the time. In a separate call, people from the 97th floor of the South Tower , 0 I flO^ make repeated references to having heard an announcement to "go down the rC i \^/ stairs." 0 ^ 2) Interviews: No civilian evacuees whom we interviewed from either tower recalls V>M hearing p.a. announcements after their respective buildings were struck. No family members/ co-workers of victims, who spoke with victims on the phone while in the towers, recall hearing announcements in the background. The DFSD stationed in the North Tower recalls receiving confirmation from some tenants, who called down to the FCS for direction after the building was hit, that they had heard his p.a. announcements. He does not recall which floors the acknowledgments came from but does not remember receiving any communications from people at or above the impact. An employee of American Building Maintenance told us that he recalled hearing an automatic, pre-recorded message on some lower floors in the North Tower. However, as noted, p.a. announcements were made "live." (See Michael Hurley interview June 21, 2004). A Port Authority employee, who was on the 35th floor of the South Tower when it was hit, recalls hearing what sounded like a p.a. announcement emanating from the floors while he was evacuating down a stairwell, but he did not enter the floor to check. * Floor Warden Phones: No evacuees we spoke with attempted to use the floor warden phones. The DFSD in the North Tower has told us that he received calls via those phones after the NT was hit; the former fire safety director (PA), who reported to the North Tower lobby that morning, recalls seeing that calls were coming through by that method (the former FSD was not responsible for actually answering the calls). The NT DFSD does not remember which floors he received these calls from, but does not recall being in communication with anyone at or above the impact by any method. An ABM employee, who remained in the stairwells and on floors in the 20's and 30's of the NT, recalls observing people attempting to use the floor warden phones, but does not believe that

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED they could get through. In the Port Authority transcripts of recorded calls to the PA police desk, a fire warden from the 106th floor reports that the "fire phones are out." * Hardlines: The DFSD in the north tower remembers receiving calls from tenants in that tower via landline phones. There is other evidence of successful use of landline phones to make calls from within the towers, including to 911 * Evacuation Tone: the tone was heard in some locations below the impact zone in the NT, and in some locations both above and below the impact zone in the ST. (911 calls and interviews). We have not determined whether the evacuation tone had been activated manually or was operating in default mode. This may be determined by NIST.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Re: Evacuation Tone Type of event: Interview / Correspondence Date: June 2 - 4 , 2004 Special access: None Prepared by: Madeleine Blot Team: 8b Location: By telephone / email Participants - Non Commission: Alan Reiss, former Director of Port Authority World Trade Department Participants - Commission staff: Madeleine Blot

Staff was reminded during a meeting with Michael Hurley, the former PA fire safety director for the WTC, that the WTC fire alarm evacuation tone was programmed to sound automatically in default mode in a particular area if the transponder controlling that area was unable to "communicate" with the PCS (this would alert the transponder, in lay terms, that there was problem). Staff asked whether it could be concluded that, in areas where the alarm tone was triggered in default mode, other components of the system (e.g., the public address system) were not functional. Staff followed up with Alan Reiss. Mr. Reiss recalled that the evacuation tone could be activated in two ways. First, the deputy fire safety director could manually activate the tone to sound on individual or multiple floors, as the situation required, from the lobby FCS. This would send a signal to the transponder to pump out the evacuation tone and flash the strobe lights. When the push-to-talk button was pressed, the tone would be overriden for voice announcements. This was the method used to initiate fire drills. The system was also programmed so that, if a transponder received an alarm input (e.g., smoke from a smoke detector), it would send a signal to the FCS and receive an acknowledgment. If this acknowledgement was not received (i.e., the transponder could not 'communicate' with the FCS), the transponder would generate an evacuation tone on the floors it covered (typically a 3-floor area). The purpose of programming the system

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED to generate the evacuation tone in default mode was to ensure that tenants were alerted to the existence of alarms conditions on their floors, if regular system signals failed. If, during the evacuation on September 11, the evacuation tone was heard on all floors throughout the building, it could be surmised that the console signal was able to get through, i.e., that the transponder was able to communicate with the PCS, since actual smoke and/or other alarm conditions may not have existed immediately on all floors to trigger the tone to sound in default mode. On the other hand, if evacuees did not report hearing the tone right away—but it was heard in various locations as the morning progressed—it could be surmsied that it was triggered in those areas in default mode, as alarm conditions arose, rather than manually. Mr. Reiss was not certain whether the fact that an evacuation tone sounded in default mode in a particular location could be taken to mean that other systems in that location were unable to function. He explained that there were many pairs of wires in the dual risers serving to the system (rather than, e.g., 2 in the case of a telephone system) and there were also various failure modes (e.g., open, short, cut). Therefore, there could be many permutations as to what did and did not get damaged. Mr. Reiss referred the question to PA engineering and the manufacturer of the fire alarm system. The manufacturer's technical response was beyond the scope of staff s investigation. However, Mr. Reiss explained, in summary, that it was possible for, e.g., the floor warden phones to have worked in a location where, e.g., the public address system did not (if those wires were shorted). (See also MFR Int NIST, dated Jun. 7, 2004) Staff does not have the resources or expertise to pursue a technical investigation of this topic. The issue in being thoroughly investigated by NIST. For purposes of our research, we will state facts learned from interviews or our analysis of other materials and refrain from drawing conclusions.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Re: Public Address System in stairwells Type of event: Interview / Correspondence with Alan Reiss Date: June 22, 2004 Special access: None Prepared by: Madeleine Blot Team: 8b Location: By email Participants - Non Commission: Madeleine Blot Participants - Commission: Alan Reiss, Former Director of Port Authority World Trade Department

In response to a question from staff, Alan Reiss confirmed that the fire alarm public address system did have speakers in the fire stairwells. Because the stairwells were part of a different circuit/zone from the floors, announcements were activated by a separate switch at the fire command desk (there was a switch for each of the A, B and C stairwells). (Staff member Madeleine Blot had previously been informed either by interviewees or other staff members that the p.a. system could not be broadcast into the stairwells).

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Re: Chimes Type of event: Date: July 25, 2004 Special access: None Prepared by: Madeleine Blot Team: 8b Location: By email Participants - Non Commission: Alan Reiss, former Director of Port Authority World Trade Department Participants - Commission staff: Madeleine Blot

In response to a question from staff, Alan Reiss explained that "chimes" were a tone which could be generated by the fire alarm system in addition to the warble evacuation tone. Chimes were regularly used to precede "advisory" announcements over the public-address system, whereas the warble siren was used to precede emergency announcements. Chimes were used for advisory announcements in order to avoid inspiring panic in a non-emergency situation.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Re: PCS systems; Evacuation tone Type of event: Interview / Correspondence Date: June 4, 2004 Special access: None Prepared by: Madeleine Blot Team: 8b Location: By email Participants - Non Commission: J. Randall Lawson, National Institute of Research and Technology (NIST) Participants - Commission staff: Madeleine Blot

Staff contacted Randy Lawson of NIST to inquire whether NIST had made any determinations about the functionality of building systems at the WTC on Sept 11, specifically in light of recent testimony by Lloyd Thompson at their joint interview. NIST told staff that some evidence suggests that the floor warden phones were not working. They confirmed that the evacuation tone could be activated manually or in default mode, and that it could also be activated automatically by the system (under regular conditions). In follow up, NIST confirmed that under the normal course of events, the evacuation tone could be activated in the following three ways: 1) manually, 2) by the water flow detection alarm, or 3) the smoke detector alarm. It would also be generated in default mode if the block of floors corresponding to the transponder, or "slave unit," was severed from the overall building alarm control system. When the alarms were activated from the transponder or block mode, it was difficult to turn the alarms off. A whooping sound was initiated, and there was no capability for verbal announcements. However, verbal announcements could be made via other audio systems in the building.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Re: Public address announcements Type of event: Interview / Correspondence Date: June 21,2004 Special access: None Prepared by: Madeleine Blot Team: 8b Location: By email Participants - Non Commission: Michael Hurley, former Port Authority fire safety director of WTC Participants - Commission staff: Madeleine Blot

In response to a question from staff, Michael Hurley confirmed that all public address announcement were made "live." There were no pre-recorded or automated messages.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Re: PCS systems backup, landline numbers & scripts Type of event: Interview / Correspondence Date: June 4, 2004 Special access: None Prepared by: Madeleine Blot Team: 8b Location: By email Participants - Non Commission: Michael Hurley, former Port Authority fire safety director of WTC Participants - Commission staff: Madeleine Blot

In follow up to the June 2nd meeting, staff asked Michael Hurley several questions related to PCS systems and protocol. Mr. Hurley confirmed that each PCS contained a pre-scripted announcements corresponding to a number of specified situations and/or emergencies, including evacuation for fire emergencies, fire or smoke conditions not requiring evacuation, smoke outside the complex, electrical power outages, elevator service interruptions, disruptions to water or HVAC service, bomb threats. (Staff later obtained copies of WTC scripts). The purpose was to enable specific and consistent messages to be broadcast by deputy fire safety directors (vs. their making it up on the spot). Mr. Hurley also confirmed that since each tower's PCS could be operated remotely, it was possible for announcements to one tower from the lobby of the other. Control of all systems regularly controlled from the tower lobby FCS's could be also be transferred to the OCC, which served as an additional backup. The landline telephone numbers for the FCS's were distributed widely to those who might need to contact the PCS. They were given to the tenant fire safety teams (wardens, deputy wardens & searchers) during fire drills. They were also given others, including construction crews, fire alarm system contractors, electricians, welders, sprinkler contractors, the FDNY, and probably many others. The numbers were liberally distributed because there was a 24-hour presence at the tower FCS's.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Re: WTC systems follow up Type of event: Interview / Correspondence Date: June 17, 2004 Special access: None Prepared by: Madeleine Blot Team: 8b Location: By email Participants - Non Commission: Michael Hurley, former Port Authority fire safety director of WTC Participants - Commission staff: Madeleine Blot

Michael Hurley confirmed staffs understanding of the various methods of information flow to and form the FCS, as set forth in an email corresponding to staffs memo on FCS Systems & Protocol. Mr. Hurley pointed out that the tones which regularly preceded announcements were set to sound automatically (as opposed to being manually activated at the time) when the system was set to broadcast a message, as preprogrammed. The tone could be overridden by voice announcements if the push-to-talk button was pressed. Mr. Hurley also confirmed that tones were broadcast through the public address speakers.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Re: Repeater System Type of event: Conference call Date: July 2004 Special access: None Prepared by: Madeleine Blot Team: 8b Location: By email Participants - Non Commission: Ray Simmonnetti, Port Authority; James Begley, Deputy General Counsel, Port Authority. Participants - Commission staff: Sam Caspersen; Madeleine Blot

Commission staff spoke with Ray Simmonnetti about various aspects of the towers' repeater system, in order to elaborate on questions posed by the FDNY concerning this matter. See MFR prepared by Sam Capsersen.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Re: Public-address announcements in the South Tower Type of event: Interview / Correspondence Date: April 15, 2004 Special access: None Prepared by: Madeleine Blot Team: 8b Location. By email Participants - Non Commission: Alan Reiss, Former Director of Port Authority World Trade Department Participants - Commission staff: Madeleine Blot

Alan Reiss contacted staff to relay information relevant to staff member Madeleine Blot's research. A PA employee, who was on the 35th floor of the South Tower on the morning of September 11, told Mr. Reiss that he did not recall hearing any public address announcements after the building was hit. The PA employee did recall hearing announcements before the building was hit1 and also remembered hearing the evacuation tone after the building was hit.

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Content of announcements not specified

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