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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Re: Port Authority Post-9/11 changes

Type of event: Interview / Correspondence

Date: July 1, 2004

Special access: None

Prepared by: Madeleine Blot

Team: 8b

Location: By telephone / email

Participants - Non Commission: Alan Reiss, former Director of Port Authority World
Trade Department

Participants - Commission staff: Madeleine Blot

Alan Reiss relayed to staff that, within the 45 days, the Port Authority would
begin conducting full-scale evacuation drills in all space leased by the PA in New York
and New Jersey, in anticipation of recommendations in the Commission's final report.
(Staffs statement for the May 18 hearing noted that evacuation drills were not conducted
at the WTC). Mr. Reiss has gotten all relevant parties involved in this effort, including
the police, risk, law and emergency management.

Mr. Reiss is also working to develop other safety measures for PA employees,
such as providing every employee with a "go bag," which would include a bottle of
water, a mask, a flashlight, and an emergency instruction card. Mr. Reiss has suggested
that floor wardens familiarize themselves with all on-site staff so that, in the event of a
major emergency, they can easily account for employees at a designated assembly point.
New evacuation signs are also being made for all floors.

Mr. Reiss was responsible for initiating/developing many of the changes

implemented by the Port Authority in response to the 1993 bombing. These
improvements greatly assisted the evacuation of many on September 11. Mr. Reiss is
equally committed to seeing that any deficiencies which may have been exposed on
September 11, in terms of either preparedness or response, are remediated going forward.
Mr. Reiss has fully cooperated with and actively participated in the Commission's
investigation to help staff establish a complete and accurate record of the events leading
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up to and occurring on September 11. He has been receptive to the Commission's
recommendations and has developed many of his own. Mr. Reiss is committed to
ensuring that the lessons learned from the tragic events of September 11 are applied
going forward.

The PA is also working with relevant agencies on WMD plans for all PA-run
facilities, such as airports. They are attempting to be proactive and plan for all
imaginable scenarios. (Mr. Reiss is currently the Deputy Director of Aviation for the
Port Authority)
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Re: AlanReiss

Type of event: Interview / Correspondence re PA employees on upper floors

Date: July 12, 2004

Special access: None

Prepared by: Madeleine Blot

Team: 8b

Location: By email

Participants - Non Commission: Alan Reiss, former Director of Port Authority World
Trade Department

Participants - Commission staff: Madeleine Blot

After September 11, Alan Reiss learned of the actions and deeds of some Port
Authority staff, located on the 88th floor of the North Tower, who perished in the tower
that day. After AA Flight 11 hit the North Tower, tenants on the 88th floor were able to
clear a path through fire and debris to reach the stairwells and descend. However, several
Port Authority employees, including Pablo Oritz, remained in the building to assist in
various ways. Civilian-tenants interviewed by staff have told us that some Port Authority
employees remained on the upper floors, stationed near the stairwells, to assist with the
evacuation. Mr. Reiss learned that some employees ascended the stairs as well. They
were observed attempting to climb over debris between the 91st and 92nd floor, in order to
reach people who were trapped above the impact. It is not known whether they made it
to the 92" floor.1 All subsequently perished that morning.

1 It is generally believed that passage was effectively obstructed from the 92nd floor down. On that basis, it
would be unlikely that anyone would have been able to ascend to the 92nd floor from below.
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Re: Port Authority response to final report

Type of event: Meeting / Briefing

Date: July 22, 2004

Special access: None

Prepared by: Madeleine Blot

Team: 8b

Location: Port Authority Offices, 225 Park Avenue South

Participants - Non Commission: Alan Reiss, former Director of Port Authority World
Trade Department; James Begley, Deputy General Counsel, Port Authority

Participants - Commission staff: Madeleine Blot

Staff met with the Port Authority after the publication of its Final Report on July
22, 2004. The purpose of the meeting was to hear the Port Authority's response to the
report in order to consider any issues raised by them for clarification and/or factual
correction in the team 8 monograph. The Port Authority raised the following issues.

P.280, paragraph 2, second sentence: The word "generators" is incorrect. Mr.

Reiss suggested that this be changed to either "electric service", "commercial power" or
"utility provided power." be changed to "con ed feeders." Staff has sent this as a change
for the "errata" list, indicating that it should read "electric service." The problem is
corrected in the monograph as well. (Staff also noted a problem on p. 279, re"each
hallway", which will also be sent as a factual correction).

P. 282: The Port Authority continues to dispute that they "lacked any standard
operating procedures" for different commands to report to the WTC. This issue was
investigated by staff member Jim Miller, to whom the PA, or PAPD, will respond
separately. Mr. Begley feels that the commission staff responsible for researching this
issue should have spoken a greater number of PAPD commanding officers, including
Larry Fields, for better insight.

P. 286: Mr. Begley does not believe that there was a disagreement between
Michael Hurley (the former fire safety director for the WTC) and Lloyd Thompson, the
DFSD assigned to the North Tower, as to when the first building-wide evacuation
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announcement was made. Mr. Hurley was interviewed early on by commission staff and
gave his impression as to when an evacuation may have been announced. He was not
likely asked to distinguish between partial and full-building evacuations. He has since
heard Mr. Thompson's testimony and has stated no disagreement. Mr. Begley believes
that, if Commission staff found Mr. Thompson's testimony to contradict Mr. Hurley's
testimony, Mr. Hurley should have been interviewed again. Mr. Begley believes this
would accord with the Commission's purpose of establishing a uniform and accurate
record.

P. 294: Paragraph beginning "Other ascended..." "Software" should be changed

to "software of hardware." Staff told the Mr. Reiss that this language was taken from
the Port Authority transcripts. Mr. Reiss does not dispute that this claim was made.
However, he explained that the employee who made the statement might not have a
sophisticated enough understanding of the computer system to identify the problem
that led its breakdown. For the sake of accuracy, Mr. Reiss suggested adding "or
hardware" to the monograph discussion. Staff agrees and the change was made.

P. 550, EN 161: "Satellite" should be changed to "antenna." Factual inaccuracy.

P. 320: Last paragraph (stating significant problems w/ PAPD's command and

control & less clear that PA has adopted new training and/or protocols to correct these
problems). The Port Authority told staff that it has in fact recently initiated new
procedures and protocols to address problems experienced on September 11. Mr.
Begley also pointed out that many of the problems experienced on September 11
were a direct result of the chaos and confusion surrounding the day, rather than
inherent shortcomings in protocols. Staff suggested that Mr. Begley relay this
information to Jim Miller, who is responsible for sections in the report relating to the
PAPD, for Mr. Miller to consider incorporating into the monograph.

Staff also discussed some pending questions in its investigation. In response to a

question from staff, it was established that deputy fire safety directors did have
authority to order an evacuation before the FDNY arrived on the scene, if they judged
that conditions warranted. It was also confirmed that the WTC fire safety plan did
not include a script specifying how to advise tenants in one tower if there was a major
explosion or other event in the other (regardless of cause of the event). Staff recently
reviewed the WTC 1995 Emergency Procedures Manual; staff found many
instructions but only several script interspersed throughout the book. Staff asked if
there was a separate binder containing the scripts. Mr. Reiss found an appendix
containing a number of scripts and provided a copy to Commission staff.
 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Re: Changes made by the Port Authority in response to the 1993 bombing

Type of event: Based on worksheet submitted by PA to Sam Caspersen

Date: March 28, 2004

Special Access: None

Prepared by: Madeleine Blot

Team: 8b

Location: N/A

Participants - Non Commission: N/A

Participants - Commission staff: N/A

This memo was based on a worksheet submitted by the Port Authority to staff
member Sam Caspersen in conjunction with initial interviews. Staff has since
supplemented knowledge pertaining to some topics, reflected in later memos.

POST 1993 UPDATES

In response to the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the Port Authority
implemented the following changes:

I. PHYSICAL CHANGES TO BUILDINGS:

a. Elevator system upgrades:
i. Redesign of lobby command board to show status of every elevator
(as opposed to only ones originating in lobby);
ii. New and improved elevator intercom;
iii. Addition of battery operated emergency lighting and alarm bell in
addition to generator power;
iv. Purchased drifter tools to move elevators in blackouts;
b. Stairs:
 i. Enhanced lighting, e.g., normal and alternate off two subs fed by 8
different feeders; emergency generators; tertiary power; local
battery in fixtures;
ii. Glow-in-the-dark signs for doors (glow paint used by NORAD);
iii. Fluorescent stair riser and handrail paint,
iv. Braille, porcelain, metal to withstand new graffiti?;
c. Backup power for emergency systems, e.g., emergency lights, fire alarm,
OCC (upgraded to 2 MW feeder from PSE&G from pre-1993 tertiary
power?);

II. NOTIFICATION ENHANCEMENTS:

a. Fire alarm system: all new class "E" system, 6 separate systems ($80 mil)
i. Multiples power sources 4 a/c plus battery;
ii. Redundant data risers, style 7-3 risers;
iii. Redundant command stations and electronics in case of necessary
lobby evacuation;
iv. Public address system in ceiling every 50 ft;
v. Upgrade for ADA compliance with strobes;
vi. Backup mode on transponders to generate evacuation tone in case
of communications failure;
b. Installation of FDNY repeater at PA expense ($150,000)

III. COMMUNICATIONS UPGRADE:

a. AT&T cell site installed on roof of 5 WTC with antenna positioned to
ensure coverage for towers and stairwells in WTC 1 & 2 (PA paid for cell
phones for fire warden with pre-programmed critical numbers???);
b. After closet fire in 1994/5 on 54* floor of 1 WTC, WTD leased alpha
pagers for staff contractors and installed group paging system by Pagenet
for emergency info to be broadcast to dozens of staff simultaneously under
any circumstances;

IV. FIRE EMERGENCY UPDATES:

a. Fire Command Station
i. One in each (?) tower lobby; (changed from central location at Bl
Truck Dock pre-1993; changed approved by FDNY); primary fire
command station in lobby of 2 WTC;
ii. New OCC (backup to fire command stations) in first sub-basement
of tower 2); capable of handling all elevators;
iii. Detailed information charts provided in each;
b. Personnel:
i. Dedicated manager of Fire Safety, with masters in fire science and
arson investigations (SPI retired FDNY officer);
ii. Fire Safety Directors in the lobby of each tower twenty-four hours
a day, seven days a week for sole purpose of advancing fire safety,
(retired FDNY employees);
 iii. WTC "senior staff all trained in incident command system by
police;
iv. During transitions (?) Port Authority management staff on duty 24
hours a day, 7 days a week and on-site (7-3 and S-4???), trained as
fire safety directors also;
v. Routine tabletop drills with PAPD and civilians WTD staff;

V. PREPARATION / TRAINING:
a. Fire drills:
i. Conducted bi-annually;
ii. Fire wardens provided hats, whistles, flashlights, video training
tapes; (cell phones??? See above; did not hear this from civilian
fire wardens)
iii. After-hour drills for off-hour tenants, cleaners etc;
iv. Monthly drills of observation, daycare center, etc;
v. Property managers arranged drills for new tenants as soon as they
moved in;
vi. Tenant office managers given tenant manual detailing fire and
emergency plans for tenants;
b. Special Needs:
i. Survey conducted twice a year to determine people with
disabilities; list kepy at fire command station for police/ fire dept;
(approx. 200 in each tower);
ii. PA purchased and loaned EVAC chairs to tenants in wheelchairs;

Following is brief analysis of the usefulness of 1993-induced updates based on interviews

and letters written by civilians:

Civilians who were at the World Trade Center in 1993 and in 2001 described the physical
changes to the buildings as extremely helpful. The updates have often been attributed
with improving the quality of the evacuations as well as substantially reducing their
duration. Some civilians complained about conditions in the stairs where, due to the
destruction caused by the event, improvements were either not in full effect1 or were
obscured.2 However, even where the benefits of the improvements were mitigated by the
destructive effects of the event, it was still more helpful to have them there than not.

FIRE DRILLS

1 Apparently lights were out due to electricity failures in certain affected portions of the stairwells.
2 Overwhelming smoke conditions prevented civilians from being able to see in affected areas of the
stairwells. However, even in an almost black stairwell, one civilians was able to follow glow stripes down
to safety.
The procedure for fire drills, which were conducted [three to four] floors at a time every
six months, was for the designated fire wardens on each floor, usually about [four or
five], to gather people in each of their designated areas to the center of the floor. [Some
civilians indicate that they gathered at the nearest stairwell]. There, the fire warden
would contact the lobby command center by an emergency phone designated for that
purpose. Most civilians, including fire wardens, recall being taught to await instructions
which would be given at the time of an incident, rather than being told any pre-
established procedures, i.e., that they should always evacuate down. However, one
mentioned that they were instructed that, in the event of a fire, they should descend two
flights3 [unclear if two floors below where they were or where the fire is] after checking
doors for heat, and wait there for further instructions. More startlingly, a former fire
warden claimed that, given the floor her company was on, they were specifically
instructed to go to the roof.4 Evacuation drills were never conducted, nor were civilians
ever actually brought into the stairwells.

After the drill, fire wardens would meet with the deputy fire safety directors in charge of
their buildings to discuss the success of the drills.

Civilians vary in their evaluations of the helpfulness of post-1993 fire drills. Some found
them extremely useful, attributing their escape on September 11th to lessons learned in
the drills5. More describe them as formalities which engendered neither the full attention,
nor the participation, of most office workers on the floors. Letters to OSHA by victims'
families and co-workers described drills as effectively "optional," including only those
who actually decided to participate. A former fire warden labeled drills as "very
uncooperative," claiming that most people refused to leave their offices because they
were too busy and those who did participate did not pay attention, talking over PA
announcements and making it difficult for fire wardens to hear instructions over the
emergency phone. She remarked that only once did a fire safety director personally
supervise the drill. She also criticized that drills were not conducted often enough,
leaving newcomers to the building without any directions for emergency situations.6
However an employee from an insurance company on the 28th floor of the north tower
states that they took fire drills very seriously and that everyone had to participate: it is her
recollection that her company security officials participated in the drills with PA fire
safety directors.7 Therefore the degree to which fire drill participation was enforced, and
correspondingly, the success of the preparation varied from company to company:
perhaps companies with more pro-active internal security officials had a higher rate of
participation.

3 Letter to OSHA by fomer Aon employee.

4 Letter from former Aon employee and fire warden for 100th floor; father, also an Aon employee, died on
September 11*.
5 Int. Richard Fern; knew exactly where the stairs were; Int. Ellen Levin; knew where stairs were; did not
go back to collect personal belongings.
6 Former Aon employee and fire warden, identified above; though Reiss' post-1993 changes specifically
dispute this.
7 Int. Ellen Levin; EBCBS, 17th - 31st floors.
The substance of the drills has been criticized as well, faulting the Port Authority for not
bringing civilians into the stairway proper8, for not alerting them that fire doors to the
roof were locked*, and for not adequately explaining the configuration of the stairways
that contained transfer halls and doors on certain floors which civilians found confusing.
Some wondered why full evacuation drills were not conducted.

Some also complain that designated fire wardens were not properly equipped to execute
their responsibilities, i.e., should have had flame retardant suits, masks.

* It is unclear whether the Port Authority had conclusively and preemptively ruled out of
the possibility of rooftop evacuations in any situation and, if so, whether this conclusion
was communicated to civilians during fire drills. If the emergency procedure was indeed
always to evacuate down, the fact of the roof doors being locked would obviously be
immaterial. However, if helicopter evacuations were ever a viable option, civilians
should have been informed about obstacles to getting onto the roof and procedures for
overcoming them. Many family members who wrote letters to OSHA were under the
misimpression that a helicopter rescue was thwarted on September 11th by the very fact
that civilians could not get onto the roof to be rescued.

See Int. Ellen Levin, Blue Cross; at the time of a prior fire, some employees had to go down a flight of
stairs.
9/11 Commission Questions Regarding the WTC

• please confirm that upper transfer hallways were on 76th and 82nd floors
(where stairs. A & C diverted northward and southward respectively); Where
did this occur at lower point in building (in 40's: please give precise floors);
Was this the same in both towers?; Did any of the 3 stairways deviate in any
other way at any other point in either tower?; Please provide number and
location of all "smoke doors". Were there "smoke doors" in all four transfer
hallways (e.g., 76th floor, 82nd floor and 2 lower floors?) How many smoke
doors in each hall (one at both ends of hallways?); Please confirm that
stairways A & C ran from mezzanine level to the 110th floor, and that stairway
B ran from 107th floor to B6 Level (and was accessible from lobby level) in
both towers;

Upper transfer hallways were on 76th and 82nd floors, as per the original
Architectural plans. The plans show 2 smoke doors in each horizontal transfer
passage way.

Lower transfer hallways were on 42nd and 48th floors. The plans show 2
smoke doors in each of this hallway also.

The transfer hallways were same in both towers. The 3 stairways did not
deviate in any other way at any other point in either tower.

• Compliance with City codes: did the Port Authority believe itself to be exempt
from city codes; to what extent was PA actually guided by code requirements?
hi what respects were WTC towers in compliance/ not in compliance?

As a bi-state agency, the Port Authority is not technically subject to municipal

code requirements. The Port Authority, however, has a long-standing policy to
meet or exceed municipal building and fire codes at all of its facilities.
The Port Authority has put this policy in writing, and has signed
Memorandum of Understanding with New York City's Department of
Buildings as well as the Fire Department.

The 1968 NYC Building Code was used as the basis of design of WTC
towers. As a part of the federal building and fire safety investigation of the
World trade Center, the study of World trade Center original design
documents by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has
confirmed this. The December 2, 2003 NIST status report to its advisory
committee states, "PONYA adopted 1968 NYC Building Code for final
design of WTC 1 and WTC2, and WTC 7." (PONYA stands for Port of New
York Authority, the previous name for the Port Authority.

The World Trade Center towers also complied with all subsequent code
changes by the New York City that were retroactively applicable to existing
high rise buildings, e.g., sprinklerization as an alternate to compartmentation
of floor areas, class E fire alarm system, etc.

The World Trade Center Towers conformed to the code as evidenced in the
World trade Center Building Performance Study by Federal Emergency
Management Agency which states, "The study did not reveal any specific
structural features that would be regarded as substandard, and, in fact, many
structural and fire protection features of the design and construction were
found to be superior to the minimum code requirements."

Where literal conformance was not feasible for practical reasons, accepted
engineering practices and engineered solutions to meet the intent of the code
were implemented.

When the towers were built in the 1960s and early 1970s, the spray on
fireproofing on the floor joists met the industry standard for the required fire
resistance rating. In 1995, the Port Authority's Engineering Department did a
study on the fire proofing and based on current tests on specific materials
recommended 1 J/2 inches of fireproofing thickness as a standard for the floor
joists in all new construction and renovation work.