Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit Article XVI, Sec. 3, CONSTITUTION Section 3.

. The State may not be sued without its consent. Gen. Rule : The State may not be sued without its consent. Basis : Sec. 3, Art. XVI of the Constitution. Reason : There can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. When considered a suit against the State: 1. The Republic is sued by name; 2. Suits against an un incorporated government agency; 3. Suits is against a government official, but is such that ultimate liability shall devolve on the government: a. When a public officer acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority, he can be held personally liable for damages. b. BUT: If he acted pursuant to his official duties, without malice, negligence, or bad faith, he is not personally liable, and the suit is really one against the State. Application / Prohibition of the rule: 1. This rule applies not only in favor of the Philippines but also in favor of the foreign states.

2. The rule likewise prohibits a person from filing for interpleader, with the State as one of the defendants being compelled to interplead. CASES The Rice and Corn Administration (RCA) is part of the government being in fact an office under the office of the President and therefore, cannot be sued without the consent of the State. The consent to be effective must come from the State, acting through a duly enacted statute. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant RCA agreed to had no binding force in the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority
(Republic vs. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470).

The Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private respondent sustained with regard to its goods. To permit private respondents claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it

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sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious that this case has been converted technically into a suit against the State. The Bureau of Customs, along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely, taxation (Farolan vs. CTA, 217 SCRA 298). It is apparent from the complaint that Bradford was sued in her private or personal capacity for acts allegedly done beyond the scope and even beyond her place of official functions, said complaint is not then vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the grounds relied upon by the petitioners because as a consequence of the hypothetical admission of the truth of the allegations therein, the case falls within the exception to the doctrine of State immunity (USA vs. Reyes, GR 79233, March 1, 1993) . Feliciano was holding property title to which was evidenced by an informacion posesoria. Proclamation no. 90 of President Magsaysay included it among properties for subdivision and

distribution. Feliciano sued the Republic, represented by the Land Authority, to recover possession of the land. The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. The State pleaded immunity from suit. The suit against the State which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued. Informacion posesoria had not been shown to have been converted into a record of ownership. It is nothing more than prima facie evidence of possession. Feliciano must pursue to prove title. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State Immunity can only be made by an act of legislative body (Republic vs. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424). Forms of Consent 1. Express consent 2. Implied consent i) express consent

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1. When he law expressly grants the authority to sue the State or any of its agencies. 2. Examples: a. A law creating a government body expressly providing that such body may sue or be sued. b. Art 2180 of the Civil Code, which creates liability against the State when it acts through a special agent. CASES Respondent Singson cause of action is a money claim against the government for the payment of the alleged balance of the cost of spare parts supplied by him to the Bureau of Public Highways. Assuming momentarily the validity of such claim, mandamus is not remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State, but an ordinary action for specific performance. The suit is against the State which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State. The respondent should have filed his claim with the general auditing office under the provision of comm..act 327 which prescribe the condition under which money claim against the government may be filed
(Sayson vs.

Singson, 54 SCRA 282).

By consenting to be sued, the State simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to the plaintiff, or create any cause of action in its favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court. Subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. The Government of the Philippines is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers, and employees when they act as special agents. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fix order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official (Meritt vs. Government, 34 Phil 311). By engaging in business through the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself of its sovereign character so as to render the corporation subject to the rules governing the private corporations. Garnishment is a proper

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remedy for a prevailing party to proceed against the funds of a corporate entity even if owned or controlled by the government. It is well settled that when a government enters into commercial business it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated just like any other corporation (PNB vs. CIR, 81 SCRA 314). Under its charter (RA 1161, Sec. 4K) the SSS can sue and be sued. So, if assuming that the SSS enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions by virtue of the explicit provision of the enabling law, it can be sued. The government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability
(SSS vs. CA, 120 SCRA 707).

ii) implied consent 1. When the State enters into a private contract. The contract must be entered into by the proper officer and within the scope of his authority. UNLESS: the contract is merely incidental to the performance of a governmental function.

2. When the State enters into a business contract. UNLESS: The operation is incidental to the performance of a governmental function (e.g. arrastre services). Thus, when the State conduct business operations through GOCC, the latter can be generally be sued, even if its charter contains no express sue or be sued clause. Jure Gestionis by right of economic or business relations, may be sued (US v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 6440; Jure Imperii by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions. No implied consent (US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487); 3. When it is a suit against an incorporated government agency Unincorporated a. Performs governmental functions: not suable without State consent even is performing proprietary function incidentally. b. Performs proprietary functions: suable. 4. When the State files suit against a private party UNLESS: the suit is entered into only to resist a claim.. CASES When the State files an action, it divests itself of the sovereign
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character and shed its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant (RP vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 85384,
February 28, 1990).

The claim for damages for the use of property against the intervenor dependant Republic of the Philippines to which it was transferred cannot be maintained because of the immunity of the State from suit. The claim obviously constitutes a charge against, or financial liability to, the Government and consequently cannot be entertained by the courts except with the consent of the government (Lim vs. Brownell, 107 Phil 344). When the government enters into a commercial transaction, it abandons its sovereign capacity and it is to be treated like any other corporation (Malong Vs. PNR, 138 SCRA 63). National Irrigation Authority is a government agency vested with corporate personality separate and distinct from the government (Sec .1, RA 3601), thus is governed by the Corporation Law. Under Sec. 2, PD 552 NIA is allowed to collect fees and other charges as

maybe necessary to cover the cost of operation, maintenance, and insurance and to recover the cost of construction, etc. NIA may also sue and be sued in court. It is authorized to exercise the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provision of NIA charter (Fontanilla Vs. Maliaman, 194 SCRA 486). The application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantel of State immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). If the contract was entered into the discharge of its governmental functions, the sovereign State cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit (JUSMAG vs. NLRC, GR 198813, Dec. 15, 1994). Petitioner filed an action in the CFI of Zamboanga City for the revocation of a Deed of Donation which he had his wife had made to the Bureau of Plant and Industry. He claimed that the donee failed to comply with the condition of the donation. Ordinarily, a
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suit of this nature cannot prosper. It would, however, be manifestly unfair for the government, as donee, which is alleged to have violated the condition under which it received gratuitously certain property, to invoke its immunity. Since it would be against equity and justice to allow such defense in this case, consent to be sued could be presumed (Santiago vs. Republic, 87 SCRA 294). When the government takes any property for public use, which is condition upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. The Court may proceed with the complaint and determine the compensation to which the petitioner are entitle (Ministerio vs. CFI, 40 SCRA 464). iii) Consent to execution Consent to be sued does not include consent to the execution of judgment against it. Such execution will require another waiver, because the power of the court ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs

of execution or garnishment, unless such disbursement is covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law
(Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 84).

Rules Regarding Garnishment or Levy of Government Funds in Government Depository: General Rule: Government funds deposited with PNB or authorized depositories cannot be subject to garnishment. Exceptions: 1. where law or ordinance has already been enacted appropriating a specific amount to pay a valid governmental obligation (Municipality of
San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez, GR No. L-61744, June 25, 1984).

2. funds belonging to government corporations which can sue and be sues that are deposited with a bank (PNB v. Pabalan, 83 SCRA 595). Rules Regarding Payment of Interests by Government in Money Judgments Against it: General Rule: Government cannot be made to pay interests; Exceptions: 1. eminent domain; 2. erroneous collection of taxes; or 3. where government aggress to pay interest pursuant to law. CASES
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When a municipality fails or refuses without justifiable reason to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds (Municipality of Makati vs. CA, 190 SCRA 206) . The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in the PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects,

as appropriated by law. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that it, when there is a corresponding appropriation is required by law. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes (City of Caloocan vs. Allarde, GR 107271, Sept. 10, 2003) . iv) Suits against foreign states / international organizations CASES The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the memorandum and certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the countrys foreign relations. Pursuant to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over
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any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission (Holy See vs. Rosario, GR 101949, December 1, 1994) . The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters intyo

business contracts. The rule does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions and is not for commercial or business purposes (USA vs, Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487). International law is founded largely upon the principles of reciprocity, comity, independence, and equality of States which were adopted as part of the law of our land under Art. II, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution. The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is necessary consequence of the principles and independence and equality of States. However, the increasing need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity. This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or jure gestionis. Is the foreign State engaged in the regular conduct of business? If the
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foreign State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial activity, or if the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii
(Republic of Indonesia vs. Vinzon, GR 154705, June 25, 2003).

Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime in the name of official duty. It is a wellsettled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his actdone with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty (Liang vs. People, GR 125865, January 28, 2002).

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