Assads WMD Massacre Response: Real & Potential Risks After the Punitive Air Strikes By Libor Benes

With the planning of any military operation being extremely complex and difficult, military planners have a very tough task. They must take into account all known relevant facts and aspects and even try to identify and include other potential factors. There is always a whole host of risks or effects that is hard or impossible to identify in advance. Military planning must identify, evaluate, and prepare response for any risks, even those improbable ones. What are the main likely, potential, or improbable risks following this military operation (air strikes by missiles fired from ships and by other air assets)? Propaganda, Cyberwar Assad and his allies will try to influence worlds public opinion but also perceptions through a set of actions and messages. a) It is likely that following the air strikes, Assad and his allies will try to proclaim victory and escalate and inspire various anti-Western, anti-American hysteria and propaganda with all sorts of accusations, from attacking innocent civilians to violations of international law. We have heard some elements of this already. b) There is also a risk in a fact that Assad and his allies will try to mis-/dis-interpret the defined goals of the air campaign, try to discredit its legal basis, objectives, and even results. Mixing real goals of the operation with what is beyond its mission will be among the tactic and tools for broader goals. There is always a risk that some elements in Syria or elsewhere might join and adopt these attitudes. Military Escalation The Syrian regime and its allies might attempt to foment some escalation and spill-over of the Syrian conflict in some form that could have a broader impact (in Syria or elsewhere). There is a question about the potential level and forms of such potential escalation attempts. But one of the risks in this eventuality is that this way, Assad and his allies might try to interconnect and mix the definition, goals, and purpose of the military operation with the Syrian conflict itself and with wider regional or broader issues. Assad and his allies will no doubt continue to use cyberwar against the world, mainly those most associated with the punitive military operation. Chemical Weapons I think regarding the defined goal itself of the military campaign, the big question and potential risk is this: What if defiant Assad will use, or even escalate the use of chemical weapons after the military operation? Defiant Assad might use chemical weapons after the air campaign to try to discredit results of the military operation. This brings one of the most serious and difficult questions of the military campaign and although I believe it is just hypothetical and theoretical, we must have ideas and options ready on both

how to structure our message to deter Assad from thinking about it, and also what to do in such eventuality. This is more theoretical question because I am sure in the persuasive capability of the message to Assad delivered by the military campaign and other related messages. I am sure the planners and decisionmakers are preparing all aspects of the operation in the best possible way to achieve the defined goal. And I am sure that the design and execution of the air strikes will be such that it will deter Assad from using chemical weapons ever again. I know it is a bit more ambitious but I think the persuasive power of the air strikes message, along with other right accompanying and follow-up measures, techniques, and negotiations, could even lead Assad to surrendering chemical weapons or other beneficial step. Another danger would be if Assad tried to orchestrate another set-up through which he might try to turn world public opinion against the countries punishing him with air strikes. Assad can use chemical weapons during the military campaign and try to manipulate the public opinion by blaming the air campaign for hitting chemical weapons stockpiles, dispersing them, and harming civilians. He might even aggravate the effects of such an action through a use of human shields if he tried to force some civilians into the areas or buildings where the chemical weapons are stored. This way, Assad might try to discredit the military operation. Conclusion Assad might try to use the situation to reopen a new front following the air strikes. Assad and his allies will continue to use propaganda and cyberwar. There is a risk they might try to escalate and broaden the Syrian conflict, including drawing other actors into it, and mis-/dis-interpret the by us defined goal of the operation and mix it with the Syrian conflict itself. Another tool for discrediting the military operation would be if he used chemical weapons during the conflict against civilians, and tried to shift the blame on the intervention. He might also try to discredit the purpose, goal, and even results of the operation by using chemical weapons after the operation. He could aggravate the situation by using human shields during the military campaign. These are matters of concern or potential concern and I firmly believe those concerns related to Assads use chemical weapons ever again are only hypothetical. All of them must be thoroughly explored, analyzed, prevented, pre-empted, watched, and countered during and after the attack. Strong message through words and actions will eliminate or minimize the potential of these risks.