ABriefAggiornamentoforLeftistIntellectuals

ABriefAggiornamentoforLeftistIntellectuals

byGunnarSkirbekk

Source: PRAXISInternational(PRAXISInternational),issue:3+4/1990,pages:224235,onwww.ceeol.com.
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A BRIEF AGGIORNAMENTO FOR LEFTIST INTELLECTUALS

Gunnar Skirbekk

The political events in Eastern Europe during the year 1989 and the first part of 1990 do require some critical reexamination among leftist intellectuals. But these events should be seen in a broader setting of decisive changes within the modern world. In this paper I shall make a few sketchy remarks on some of the notions and perspectives which in my view are to be reconsidered, first related mainly to Eastern Europe, then seen in a broader scale.

1. Eastern Europe
I start with the simple observation that the political and ideological fall of Stalinist socialism in Eastern Europe was experienced with astonishment and euphoria. Nobody had, to my knowledge, predicted that this system would fall apart so fast and so peacefully. And even though the future is filled with difficulties and uncertainties, it seems plausible to think that this regime and its ideology are discredited beyond the point of possible restoration, at least in this part of the world. The very unpredictedness of the events asks for serious considerations among scholars of different disciplines and political affiliations. For leftist intellectuals there are in addition at least two main points that require a critical reflection, the one being the strength of market economy, the other the stength of nationalism in post-communist Eastern Europe. I shall briefly elaborate these two points. Market economy It has for a long time been quite clear that Soviet-type economy does not function well. It has also become clear that the traditional Yugoslav model, based on decentralization and self-rule on enterprise level, has severe difficulties. I thus assume that most leftist intellectuals now tend toward some kind of market economy with political frames which allow for a version of a planned market. These are deep changes among Western leftist intellectuals: not only pure market economy, but also the Soviet as well as the Yugoslav model of economic life have lost their attraction, and what remains is some kind of mixed economy, mostly of a social democratic nature. In this perspective the apparent sympathy for market economy among
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many East European reformers as well as among a large part of the electorate therefore represents a challenge to leftist intellectuals.
East European Nationalism It has also for a long time been well known that there are national and ethnic tensions within what was called the Soviet bloc. But the strength of these nationalist forces has been a surprise for most Western observers; and for leftist intellectuals, having international solidarity as an ideal and often arguing in favour of an historical "overcoming" of nationalism as a basic force, this emergence of strong nationalism in Eastern Europe asks for a serious reexamination. There are certainly various explanations for the emergence of East European nationalism. I shall here just mention three. The first one I would call the "out of the ice" explanation: The East European nationalism in its different forms was suppressed by the Soviet system. Nationalist tensions from the pre-Soviet period could not be properly discussed, nor properly "lived through", with the Soviet system. It became frozen, as it were. And once the "glacier" of the Soviet repression "melted" the old nationalist tensions reappeared, like de-frozen mammoths coming out of the ice. The strength of this explanation is its descriptive fit. (It even seems to fit for the case of suppressed national tensions within the federal republic of Yugoslavia.) As a sociological explanation, however, it is weaker. It does not really give a sociological explanation of how nationalism could survive all these (forty to seventy) years. Its explanatory power, I assume, is rather to be found in its tacit reference to psychological or pscyhoanalytic explanations of repressed psychic tensions, which tend to survive subconsciously just because they are not verbalized and openly worked out. But in a long-term societal perspective we would like to know why these attitudes and emotions did not change in accordance with other changes in society; or we would like to know which manifest or latent functions they had within this society. If no such function tan be demonstrated it seems unsatisfactory, as a sociological explanations, simply to say that they prevailed "under the ice". Thereby we have already touched upon the second type of explanation for the emergence of East European nationalism, i.e. an explanation which claims that nationalism did play a role within these societies during the years of Soviet domination, though unrecognized by most observers. To substantiate this functional explanation one has to go empirically into each case, in order to see whether nationalism of some kind did have such a role and importance within the society. I shall not try to follow this thread, but merely indicate what I have in mind. One reasonable case is Poland, another Yugoslavia. For one thing we could investigate the social function of the Catholic Church in Poland and its connection to Polish nationalism, and we would investigate the interconnection between economic differences within Yugoslavia and the call for political and cultural separation in Slovenia and Croatia. In these cases, however, nationalism has for a long time been recognized and this kind of explanation has already been applied. The point is now that similiar explanations could be tried out also on cases of

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nationalism which have hitherto been overlooked in one way or the other like DDR German nationalism or the strength of Baltic nationalism. There is still another kind of explanation worth mentioning, namely one which underlines the creative aspect within the emergence of nationalism: The various forms of nationalism were not there, frozen under the ice or latently functioning, but they are formed actively (but not necessarily consciously) in order to fill an ideological vacuum that occurred by the withdrawal of Soviet political domination. (This is one of the competing theoretical positions among historians trying to explain the emergence of Norwegian nationalism around 1814. I can imagine the same controversy about nationalism in the Third World, such as in the movement of negretude. ) The dispute between these three attempts at explaining nationalism has to be solved by empirical research, but the dispute also entails conceptual controversies concerning the proper nature of the agents and the determining factors (be it politically acting individuals, classes or social conditions). There is certainly a lot more to be said about nationalism and different ways of describing and explaining its emergence in East Europe. The point I would make so far, is simply this: nationalism, as a case of particular collective identity, has to be taken seriously, also in modern societies. It has to be taken seriously both as a functional factor within a society and as a factor in human collective identity limiting a We from a They. However, the East European experience of nationalism does not occur as something unique in our times. It adds to other experiences of nationalism, even in modern societies such as in Japan. The latter case is specially interesting since Japan undoubtedly is modern. It therefore contradicts the view that modernity by necessity leads toward universalism and away from particular collective identities e.g. in the form of nationalism. It indicates that there are different ways of modernization and different ways of being modern. The case of Japan might even be made sharper: So far Japan seems to have had less socio-cultural disintegration than Western societies, and the cohesion of its homogeneous culture might be an explanation for this. Furthermore, Japanese economy is able to invest in long-term perspectives to a higher degree than Western societies - a fact which might be analyzed in the light of the long-term interest embedded in a national culture in contrast to the rather short-term interest of singular agents on the market. The latter point is also interesting in an ecological perspective, since economic and political agents with a long-term concern are strongly required in this ecological perspective. These brief remarks on possible linkages between particular collective identity and economy lead us back to the question of market economy in the form Soviet-dominated parts of Europe. Here I would allow myself to start with a rough and speculative model. To the extent that Stalinist economy was based on a top-down system of commands, connected with a threat toward those who did not obey, this system of motivation is no more functioning. Maybe it did function at an earlier stage, when it was supplemented by a pride of working for the revolution, or for being a Soviet proletarian fighting or

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having courageously fought Fascism. But this cultural motivation is severely weakened. It hardly functions any more. And at the same time market mechanisms, distributing reward and punishment according to market behaviour, have not yet taken over. Thus there is a strange interregnum in this transition within the former State-socialist countries, the Soviet Union included. It is a question whether this system of top-down command could ever have overcome the threshold of control, which is easier concerning quantity than quality and easier concerning reproduction of known products than creation of new ones - in this respect it is a question whether this system could ever compete with a market economy in decisive fields of modern economy like quality consumer-goods and in informatics. My point, however, is just the following. To the extent that the old Stalinist economy, based on command and threat, is definitely dismissed, there are two (ideal-type) options for East Europeans when it comes to economic motivation, i.e. either market economy or a restoration of cultural motivation. The latter option (some would say, temptation) is one which would be interested in nourishing any kind of a strengthening of the collective identity, and then nationalism, too, is close at hand. Thus East European nationalism could also be investigated in a perspective of such a (possible) functional tie with this kind of economic revitalization - should we say, Japanese style! In this perspective Russian nationalism (such as Pamiat) could also be investigated as an attempt at a restoration of a functional economy; it should not only be interpreted in terms of Russian traditionalism per se. But any nationalism of this sort within the Soviet Union would work counterproductively, i.e. against the unity of the Union. Such a nationalist (cultural) motivation might perhaps have some importance to get Estonians working, or Armenians, or Lithuanians, or Russians - but hardly all of them, together. In that perspective market economy, and a strong presidency, is a safer way to keep the Empire afloat, and even hope for economic progress (which is Gorbachev against the nationalists of various kinds). At this point I would like to sum up my brief remarks on nationalism and economic motivation in East Europe: Intellectuals should take the notion of particular collective identity seriously also in modern societies, both with regard to its function for social cohesion and with regard to its political and economic function. Diversity and particularity should not be overlooked in any of these spheres of modern life. It might even be evaluated as valuable, e.g. in an ecological perspective. On the other hand, intellectuals should differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate "particular collective identities". In cases of rationally confirmed legitimacy, a rationally founded tolerance is required, whereas in cases of rationally confirmed illegitimacy, criticism and possibly political strategies are required. Such attempts at differentiating between legitimacy and illegitimacy can only take the form of open and enlightened analyses and discussions, the basis of which is exactly the equality of the participants and the universality of the arguments. To this crucial point I shall return in the second part of the paper.

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I would now like to delineate a few themes that in my view for a long time were disregarded or inadequately treated among leftist intellectuals, though gradually most of them are back on the agenda. Since there has been a considerable improvement in reintroducing these themes, my first point is just to give a brief reminder of some of the main issues. The second and main point consists in my conclusion concerning the notion of politics in a modern world. I shall approach the matter by positing three spheres - which for the sake of brevity could be called the sphere offree decision, the sphere of rights and the sphere of truth - and I shall briefly indicate their autonomy as well as their mutual dependence. I shall also briefly indicate some of the levels of autonomy and independence within each sphere. For pedagogical and philosophical reasons I shall proceed in an Hegelian manner in the sense that indicated shortcomings in one position lead over to the next - the power of the negative fueling a transcending movement, so to speak. (1) During the student movement direct democracy was an ideal, for some, the ideal. Direct democracy meant participation, participation both in a process of free speech and open discussion and in a process of decision concerning one's own situation. It meant learning, not only scholarly learning, but learning through participation, through discussion and decision and through the personal experience of conceiving the world in different perspectives dependent on the various contexts within which the various discussions were located. These are all valuable insights. But all along there were equally clear shortcomings connected to any model of direct or participatory democracy. One set of problems is associated with the capacity question: Participation takes time, and time is scarce. In an adult modern world, with professional and family life duties, lengthy and frequent meetings and teach-ins soon become a problem - and more so if participatory democracy is introduced in all the different spheres of activity in which modern man takes part. These are the problems of overburdening. Another set of problems is connected to the decision procedure. Formally unregulated group decisions aiming at unanimity can easily lead to repression of unpopular opinions or neglect of minorities. This point indicates a need for a differentiation between intellectual discussion and voting procedures and it indicates a need for legal protection of free speech and of minority views. And in large-scale modern societies with many levels, institutions and perspectives there is not only a capacity need but also a procedural need for transcending participatory democracy in favour of some form of representative democracy. In accepting representative democracy one also has to accept nomination procedures and elections, parties and interest groups, voting and compromises. This is the old and well-known discussion of direct democracy (of "the ancient") and representative democracy (of "the modern" - as in Benjamin Constant's criticism of Rousseauean ideals). Our point is just to remind of

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the need in modern societies for supplementing participatory democracy (restricted to a reasonable extension within lower levels) with representative democracy (at higher levels). (In parenthesis we could add that intellectuals, and especially young intellectuals with fewer duties, do have an inherent bias for teach-ins compared with committee work and party politics.) I shall not elaborate this point further. I shall just briefly recall the importance of the corporative system including influential interest groups and of the administrative apparatus and the mass media - institutions characteristic of modern representative democracy. Compared both with the importance of the corporative sector and with the amount of empirical research on its various aspects this sector seems to be insufficiently elaborated intellectually, not least among leftist intellectuals. Through these intermediary and mixed systems, too, the political institutions are in mutual connection with the economic system as well as with the sphere of socio-cultural reproduction (and creation). Finally I would emphasize the inherent tension between argumentation and voting, or between free and enlightened discussion and decision making by legal procedures leading up to a vote. In politics both are needed, since politics is dependent on legality and enlightenment - right and truth - at the same time as politics is a domain of power and controversy. An enlightened, law-regulated representative democracy represents a civilized answer to this "fight of the goods" (as Max Weber has it). (2) In swallowing representative democracy with its various ingredients a sobering step forward has been taken. Thereby one has also accepted the need for legal regulations, namely of the procedures of election, of negotiation and of voting. Legality, law and order, are precious ideas. Misuse of these ideas is certainly to be expected. But these ideas should not merely be seen in the light of authoritarian repression and as an ideological expression of those in power (be they overclass, males or parents). Law and order are necessary and basically desirable in any civilized modern society. The need for open criticism is certainly always there. But without these frames of legality modern society shall most probably deteriorate into untamed power struggle and repression, nepotism and corruption. Legal procedures are required for the process of decision-making leading up to voting. This means that not everything is up for renewed decision all the time. This imposes a self-restriction of the power game of politics. It makes it more predictable and thus more civilized. Along these lines there is a wisdom in political systems that restrict their own freedom of constantly redoing their own decisions. Like Ulysses one rather decides to tie oneself to the mast. The aspect of stability and predictability which follows from this self-restriction is definitely one of high civilisatory value. Any civilized constitutional system should also pay due attention to human rights - or should we rather say "natural rights" when communities and traditions as well as animal rights and ecological rights are included. Former vulgar criticism of the notion of rights has mostly evaporated, and this issue is today safely placed on the agenda for leftist intellectuals. The issue to be discussed is no more the legitimacy of this notion but the question about the

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status of various rights or proposed rights and the relation between rights and political decisions - the former question involving the discussion of the foundation of rights and of their mutual interrelations, the latter question involving the discussion of the relation between the domain of what should be decided by reason and remain more or less unchangeable and what should be decided by voting and be more open for changes. One decisive point is thus the one which leads from "positive right" to "natural right" (to talk in old tongues), i.e. from the actually existing legal system to a nomative evaluation of this system. Only if this latter possibility, that of a normative evaluation, is granted, can rights in principle be grounded beyond the sphere of power. And this is a point where the discussion among intellectuals, leftist or not, is still to a large extent underdeveloped. In saying this I expose a view that among quite a few is seen as questionable. I shall therefore delineate my position on the possibility of a normative foundation. My position is that of so-called discourse ethics (found in K.-O. Apel, J. Habermas et al.) and I shall first concentrate on a few counter-arguments against competing positions before focusing on the position itself. Scepticism against the possibility of a rational foundation of basis norms might have positivistic roots. According to positivism only statements can be true or false, norms not (i.e. basic norms, since so-called hypothetic norms certainly are empirically testable, like the claim "you ought to do your homework in order to pass your exam"). It is now-a-days well-known that positivism as a position is untenable. A main counterargument is that of its self-referential inconsistency. It can also be shown that there are "institutional facts" inherent in various institutions (such as "corner" in football), meaning that the very distinction between facts and norms is inadequate. Within a society there are numerous "institutions" with their inherent norms and values, which can be analyzed and investigated in various ways. In formulating the criticism of positivism in these terms we are already indicating a contextualist (or historicist) position concerning the status of norms: Norms are embedded in different contexts. Within each context the context-inherent norms are valid and in this sense mandatory. There is also overlap between many contexts, and in that sense there is a normative transition. But there is no universal position above the various contexts, and thus there are no universally valid norms, i.e. norms that are obligatory for everybody and that can serve as a basis for a rational criticism of given context, such as given religious or national traditions or legal systems within states. In other words, there is no impartiality. (Therefore the attempt at such a rational grounding is frequently interpreted as power in disguise, be it class, race or sex.) This is a decisive point, and a difficult point. First of all we have the theoretical problem of describing contextualism without pragmatic inconsistency, i.e. without making universal validity claims in describing a position that implicitly or explicitly denies such a universality. Despite all arguing about differences between showing and stating (or claiming) and the like, I cannot really see that contextualism does

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avoid this inconsistency (cf. my arguments in "Contextual and Universal Pragmatics", Thesis Eleven, September 1990). Then we have the practical problem of relativism inherent in this kind of contextualism: The rational foundation of basic rights becomes questionable, and the same goes for any criticism of traditions and states violating these rights. These critical remarks on contextualism lead me over to the pragmatic notion of discursive rationality which, I claim, gives the best available answer to the question of the foundation of basic norms. The first argument is one about self-reference: Not only are the other positions (positivism and contextualism) shown to be self-referentially inconsistent, but in reflecting on such dilemmas we realize that there is a core of unavoidable while undeniable insights -like the principle of contradiction, which cannot be deductively demonstrated, but which can be shown to be presupposed in any attempt at denying it. This is a peculiar kind of experience, a reflective experience, which requires a pragmatic attitude (in contrast to a semantic or third-person attitude). Through language this insight is intersubjectively accessible, also for criticism. Through language we can argue with each other for and against the different claims. In taking part in an argumentation we participate in an activity with constitutive presuppositions on which we can reflect and which we can thematize and discuss. Within such an argumentative activity we do recognize each other mutually as rational and as fallible - as rational enough to follow the argumentation and as fallible in the sense that each of us need the correction of the others. And in order to take part in an argumentation we have to accept the force of the better argument over against less good arguments, and we have to be interested in improving the given arguments. What is now said has the status of a claim concerning what is a correct description of a serious discussion, but also of what we undeniably have to presuppose while discussing. The latter claim is again one of self-reference. I shall not here tire the reader by any further discussion of the more intricate questions connected to this position. In this paper I shall merely recall a few decisive points (cf. my comment on these questions in "Pragmatism in Apel and Habermas" in Essays in Pragmatic Philosophy I, eds. I. Gullvag and H. H0ibraaten, Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1985). In my interpretation the notion of "rational consensus", in contrast to "best available real consensus", indicates an unavoidable regulative idea of any argumentative discourse. The operative notion is rather that of meliorism, of improving the best available, real position. Here the emphasis is on the elimination of what is not good enough, rather than on the notion of seeking perfection. For this reason I prefer a reinterpreted version of the Rawlsian motion of reflective equilibrium to that of consensus, viz to the extent that the term "discursive-reflective equilibrium" indicates that the best available position at any time is, and should be, open to challenges and thus to improvement. New arguments can in principle always emerge, and therefore we should seek them and take them into consideration, in order to tryout and possibly improve our given equilibrium. In saying this I have to

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add that the reason for talking about consensus is equally decisive, namely the very point that an argument is what can be agreed upon by every rational being who argues under ideal (sufficiently ideal!) conditions. The notion of a valid argument is one that is intersubjectively valid, universally valid. And for this reason symmetric conditions among the discussants is essential, meaning that liberal virtues (or rights) of equality and free speech can rightly be regarded as presuppositions for rationality - and thus as undeniable norms. However, in using the term "discursive-reflective equilibrium" in addition to that of consensus (on a somewhat other level) I want to stress the intersubjective aspect of real discourse (in addition to the reflective aspect, which in principle can be taken care of monologically, at least for some time). This again implies that I regard real discourse, not only the idea of an ideal discourse, as essential, both theoretically and practically. This, by the way, is also a point where one of the basic and valuable ideas of participatory democracy reemerges. Real discourse, in this frame of argumentative rationality, also entails that the actual understanding of one's identity, interest and needs are questioned, opening up for a possible change and improvement. This is the deeper meaning of the learning process of discursive activity. In talking about real discourse and possible changes and improvements one should bear in mind that the "explicit discourse" is just a part of a process within which we have all kinds of afterthoughts on previous discourses and preparations for new ones, connected with various kinds of reading and writing, and often also travelling to meet new challenges and perspectIves. The latter point indicates three important insights. (i) There is a gradual transition from discourse to action. This is not merely an empirical claim; even though we have an unavoidable regulative idea of rational consensus, any actual consensus has the status of the until now best available equilibrium for the discussants under optimal conditions. And to the extent that an ideal speech situation, or a final consensus, is not available in real discourse, there is no hard core sharply delimited from a soft environment of mere action; there is rather gradual transition (as there are empirical and transcendental arguments; cf. my remarks in Truth and Preconditions, Bergen 1973). (ii) Understanding concepts and principles is immanently corrected to use the practice - both are needed (practice and principles). (iii) Finally this indicates that the problem of transferring the validity of norms from discourse to society at large is a problem which should not be stated too crudely. To the extent that normative answers are found within the process of discourse their validity to relevant extra-discursive activities is rather like the one in theoretical discourse. (Normative answers within a discourse - though fallible like any discourse-immanent answer, be they theoretical or not - are partly rooted in intersubjective consensus but partly in the adequacy of the concepts involved. Norms never appear naked, as it were, but always within some language, the adequacy of which is also to be decided. Thus the difference between theoretical and normative validity claims and answers

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should not be conceived in clear-cut dichotomic terms.) To the extent that the normative answer is tied up with reflectively recognized preconditions for discursive rationality they have the status of norms constitutive for rationality, which is also relevant for everyday life outside the relatively strict activity of argumentation. (Add to this the Habermasian arguments for a universal pragmatic, or even those of developmental logics, with their mixture of empirical and philosophical elements.) At this stage I shall end these brief remarks on the notion of discursive rationality. My point was just to recall how this position allows for a rational grounding of basic rights, thus giving a ground different from power, interests and partiality. (3) Non-distorted and enlightened people are required for rational discourses as well as for representative or participatory democracy. The third angle is thus that of enlightenment. In negative terms it entails an attempt to do away with individual and social distortion. In positive terms it entails the whole system of learning, from the early stages of socialization all through the educational system up to scientific and scholarly research. For one thing this means that education is a condition for democracy as well as for any rational discourse. But despite this dependence the sphere of research and education (of enlightenment as I said) has its relative autonomy, just like truth should not be overrun by power (nor by normative right). However, when it comes to scientific and scholarly research there is within large-scale political and economic projects a rational need to mediate between different disciplines, to bring the insight of the various disciplines into some intelligible whole, which can be discussed publicly and decided politically. This requires for one thing an hermeneutic and reflective competence among the researchers, and it requires legal and practical frames for the public discussion (cf. my article "Technological expertise and global ethics in a time of scientization and ecological crisis", written for the journal Chelaviek, Moscow, September 1990, in English in the lahrbuch for The Centre for the Theory of the Sciences and the Humanities, University of Bergen, 1990). It is thus worth while noticing that discursive rationality is a common denominator for the highest level at all three spheres of our triangle of democracy, rights and enlightenment. A lack of understanding of the role and importance of discursive rationality is therefore, in my view, a severe deficit in any notion of political culture. And at this point, it seems to me, there is still some work to be done, in order to bring intellectuals, leftist or not, into an adequate position. Then there is a second conclusion of main importance for my effort of an ideological reconsideration: Even though my triangular model is fairly simplistic - for one thing economy and culture (nationalism!) are left out - it does not only give some hints about dependencies and autonomies and about the need for (and possibility of) a universalistic (though fallible) discursive rationality (embracing basic normative themes as well as theoretical ones), but it indicates the importance of a balance between these spheres (and

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levels). Negatively stated we could say that political culture is essentially mutli-dimensional. It is not one-dimensional in the sense that it makes sense to think of some maximizing along one dimension alon~ - be it participatory democracy or moralistic virtue. Any attempt in that direction is doomed to fail, and to lead to disaster, since the very point is that of an interplay of many factors, not the perfection along one line - "radical, more radical, most radical"! Politics is not the place for perfectionism, but of a pragmatic balance, where the crucial point is not perfection but sufficiency. Politics is not a realm for existential exercises or pseudo-religious emotions and aspirations. It is not the realm for utopia and perfection. It is the realm of a sufficiently good balance and interplay of many factors and concerns. But, within it all, there is a demand for discursive rationality. The important political question is that of what, at any time, is "enough", what is good enough - or ra.ther, to know, in concrete cases, when the balance is not good enough. And this genuinely political insight cannot be learnt by books or by discussions alone. In addition a practical experience is required. Practical experience in this sense is only acquired through a multidimensional learning process, in first person (as it were) - whereby one learns to see the world from the different perspectives of different activities. This is not the god's eye surveying it all from above, but a pragmatic learning process of seeing the world from different spheres and levels. The time for strong actions and severe interventions is the one when the interplay has got out of balance. In between these moments of crisis politics is and should be a realm of un-utopic cool pragmatism.
3. Conclusion

Starting with recent events in Eastern Europe and following up with originally neglected themes among many leftist intellectuals I have tried to delineate some of the notions and perspectives that in my view have to be reconsidered. My main point is that of indicating a fruitful tension between discursive rationality and pragmatic concern for the possible imbalance of the interplay that constitutes a modern world and a political culture. This might seem too much, in terms of rationality, and too little, in terms' of utopian aspirations. But this, I think, is exactly the lesson to be learnt for modern man, for leftist intellectuals included. What, then, do we have? Life, I suppose, as long as it exists, and in all its wonder. And we have our common rationality and our common world, with a political culture which in a long-term perspective is out of balance, in crisesbe it socio-cultural disintegration or ecological sustainability . So there is time for deep and wise interventions, while still keeping the balance that there is. Politically, what does it mean? If I am not mistaken these reflections point in a certain direction: Not state socialism, nor Yugoslav socialism, not free market economy North American style, hardly any national-capitalism Japanese style either (for its lack of universality). What remains is some sort of a reasonable social democracy - the term used not for specific political parties, but for a more general political approach - social democracy,

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improved (for one thing) by a concern for socio-cultural reproduction and for urgent ecological questions. This, I assume, is not the answer desired by all leftist intellectuals. But then, what is the alternative - the political alternative? And finally, where does all this lead us, in geo-political terms? Probably nowhere. But if there should be somewhere to look, rather than somewhere else, it seems reasonable to look at North Western Europe - not as an ideal, but only as what is probably less miserable than most other places. But the basic question is that of moving along, both with a reasonable balance and with a rational and deep concern for a sustainable future.