Consti cases intro The Constitution of the Philippines 1. De leon v esguerra De Leon v. Esguerra G.R. No.

78059 August 31, 1987 Melencio-Herrera, J. Facts: In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982. On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was by authority of the Minister of Local Government. Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality. Petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall b e six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified, or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors. On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, promulgated on March 25, 1986, which provided: SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or

executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,1986. By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution. Issue: whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987 Held: February 8, 1977, should be considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in keeping with the dictates of justice. But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading. SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which the barangays form a part, and limits the Presidents power to general supervision over local governments. Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years ... Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern. There is nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading: Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.

Gonzales Vs. Comelec 27 SCRA 835 G.R. L-27833 April 18, 1969 Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Taada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association. He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for

national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions. Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state. Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional. Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the clear and present danger rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Taada clearly explained, such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country. The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.

The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command

Imbong v Comelec September 11, 1970 RA 6132: delegates in Constitutional Convention Petitioner: Imbong Respondents: Ferrer (Comelec Chair), Patajo, Miraflor (Comelec Members) Petitioner: Gonzales Respondent: Comelec Ponente: Makasiar RELATED LAWS: Resolution No 2 (1967) -Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2 delegates from each representative district who shall be elected in November, 1970. RA 4919 -implementation of Resolution No 2 Resolution 4 (1969)-amended Resolution 2: Constitutional Convention shall be composed of 320delegates a proportioned among existing representative districts according to the population. Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2 delegates. RA 6132-Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2 & 4. Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file their candidacy Sec 2: apportionment of delegates Sec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in the election or from assuming any appointive office/position until the final adournment of the ConCon. Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving support/representing a delegate to the convention. FACTS: This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related petitions of running candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA 6132.Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire law Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8

ISSUE: Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and whether the parameters set by such a call is constitutional. HOLDING: The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional. RATIO: - Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution -Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132: Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for convention for the purpose by votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4 - Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed for such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted more representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of delegates I other provinces with more population. - Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more time to the Constituional Convention. - Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of political parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards any particular party/group, it applies to all organizations.

Occena v. COMELEC G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981 Fernando, C.J. Facts:

Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding. Issue: What is the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments and how may it be exercised? More specifically as to the latter, what is the extent of the changes that may be introduced, the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a proper submission? Held: The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof. One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. It may be observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is concerned, the question of the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not new. Considering that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the 1935 Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment. Issue: Were the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as Successor of the Interim National Assembly? Was there revision rather than amendment?

Held: Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one is no argument against the validity of the law because amendment includes the revision or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people. Issue: What is the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper submission? Held: The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of three- fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity? As to the requisite standard for a proper submission, the question may be viewed not only from the standpoint of the period that must elapse before the holding of the plebiscite but also from the standpoint of such amendments having been called to the attention of the people so that it could not plausibly be maintained that they were properly informed as to the proposed changes. As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the applicable

provision: Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision. The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.

Tolentino v. COMELEC G.R. No. 148334 January 21, 2004 Barredo, J. Facts: Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines, the Senate on February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. The resolution further provides that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004. On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th. Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They contend that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term. Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition. Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentinos and

Mojicas standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006. Issue: whether or not the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified: for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645 Held: (1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity. The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special election is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void. (2) There is no basis in the petitioners claim that the manner by which the COMELEC conducted the special Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirement exists in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC fix the date of election, if necessary, and state among others, the office/s to be voted for. Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May 14, 2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to amend the resolution by providing as it now appears, that the senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.

(1) (2)

Sanidad v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 90878 January 29, 1990 Medialdea, J. Facts: Republic Act No. 6766, entitled AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION was enacted into law. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act. Petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the OVERVIEW for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides: Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues. It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution. Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondent who merely reports the news, petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously and necessarily contains and reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or subject about which he writes. Petitioner believes that said provision of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press and further imposes subsequent punishment for those who may violate it because it contains a penal provision, as follows: Article XIII, Section 122, Election Offenses and Banned Acts or Activities. Except to the extent that the same may not be applicable plebiscite. the banned acts/activities and offenses defined in and penalized by the Omnibus Election Code (Sections 261 , 262, 263 and Article XXII, B.P. Blg. 881) and the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6646 shall be aplicable to the plebiscite governed by this Resolution. Issue:

Is Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press? Held: It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is also the reason why a columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is acandidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take a leave of absence. However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.

Santiago v. COMELEC G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997 Davide, Jr., J. Facts: Private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative (hereafter, Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order 1. country; Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the

2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation; 3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for Peoples Initiative, a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, 7Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limit. According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments: (1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution Amendments by Peoples Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments.

(2)

It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: There is not a single word in that law which can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law. Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar asinitiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law. The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the peoples initiative. Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for peoples initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose. Issue: Is R.A. No. 6735adequate to cover the system on initiative on amendments to the Constitution? Held: No. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides: Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. This provision is not self-executory. Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action. This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332). That section reads as follows: Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed: (a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (b) by a constitutional convention; or (c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___ Section ___of the Constitution. Indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. Has Congress provided for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative point to R.A. No. 6735. But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right? A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer. First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads: Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).

The inclusion of the word Constitution therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to d irectly propose, enact, approve, or reject , in whole or in part, the Constitution through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to laws, ordinances, or resolutions. Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be . It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows: (c) The petition shall state the following: c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be; c.2 the proposition; c.3 the reason or reasons therefor; c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein; c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Emphasis supplied). The use of the clause proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed only strengthens the conclusion that Sect ion 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of

values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. Sec. 3. Definition of terms xxx xxx xxx There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution; a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied). Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on amendments to the Constitution. While R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the following: (a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;

(b) The conduct and date of the initiative; (c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its approval; The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition; The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines; and The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:

(d) (e)

(f)

(a)

The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;

(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned; (c) The effect of the legislative bodys failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power of initiative as a consequence thereof; The formulation of the proposition; The period within which to gather the signatures; The persons before whom the petition shall be signed; The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have been obtained; The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered voters for their approval, which must be within the period specified therein; The issuance of a certification of the result; The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;

(d) (e) (f) (g)

(h)

(i) (j)

(k) The limitations on local initiative; and (l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word Constitution in Section 2; (b) defines initiative on the Constitution and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of plebiscite as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition. There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service.

The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by empowering the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act. The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest . The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution; Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution; Delegation to the people at large; Delegation to local governments; and Delegation to administrative bodies. Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid. Issue: Is COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on theconduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, void? Held: Yes. The COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No.

6735. Reliance on the COMELECs power under Section 2(1) of Article IX -C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the completeness and the sufficient standard tests. Issue: Did the COMELEC act without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin petition Held: Yes. Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated. Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Bacani v. NACOCO Digest G.R. No. L-9657 Nov. 29, 1956 Two-fold Function of the Government FACTS: Bacani and Matoto are court stenographers both assigned in the CFI of Manila. During the pendency of another civil case (Civil Case No. 2293 entitled 'Francisco Sycip vs. NACOCO'), Alikpala, counsel for NACOCO(Natl Coconut Corporation) , requested the said stenog raphers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript

1.

containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees. The NACOCO paid the amount of P564 to Bacani and P150 to Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. 3. Subsequently, the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts by virtue of a DOJ circular which stated that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question. Petitioners countered that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court while the defendants set up as a defense that the NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 hence, exempt from paying the stenographers fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a government entity. No, it is not. 1. GOCCs do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. While NACOCO was organized for the purpose of adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States and of providing Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products, a function which our government has chosen to exe rcise to promote the coconut industry. It was given a corporate power separate and distinct from the government, as it was made subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government. 2. There are functions which our government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people. 3. President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as follows: (1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and robbery. (2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children. (3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime. (4) The determination of contract rights between individuals. (5) The definition and punishment of crime. (6) The administration of justice in civil cases. (7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.

4.

(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests. 4. The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The principles deter mining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals.

PVTA v. CIR G.R. No. L-32052 July 25, 1975 Fernando, J. Facts: Private respondents filed a petition wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Their prayer was for the differential between the amount actually paid to them and the amount allegedly due them. Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration would predicate its plea for the reversal of the order complained of on the basic proposition that it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444. Issue: whether PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions Held: No. A reference to the enactments creating petitioner corporation suffices to demonstrate the merit of petitioners plea that it performs governmental and not proprietary functions. As originally established by Republic Act No. 2265, its purposes and objectives were set forth thus: (a) To promote the effective merchandising of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets so that those engaged in the industry will be placed on a basis of economic security; (b) To establish and maintain balanced production and consumption of Virginia tobacco and its manufactured products, and such marketing conditions as will insure and stabilize the price of a level sufficient to cover the cost of production plus reasonable profit both in the local as well as in the foreign market; (c) To create, establish, maintain, and operate processing, warehousing and marketing facilities in suitable centers and supervise the selling

and buying of Virginia tobacco so that the farmers will enjoy reasonable prices that secure a fair return of their investments; (d) To prescribe rules and regulations governing the grading, classifying, and inspecting of Virginia tobacco; and (e) To improve the living and economic conditions of the people engaged in the tobacco industry. The amendatory statute, Republic Act No. 4155, renders even more evident its nature as a governmental agency. Its first section on the declaration of policy reads: It is declared to be the national policy , with respect to the local Virginia tobacco industry, to encourage the production of local Virginia tobacco of the qualities needed and in quantities marketable in both domestic and foreign markets, to establish this industry on an efficient and economic basis, and, to create a climate conducive to local cigarette manufacture of the qualities desired by the consuming public, blending imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes. The objectives are set forth thus: To attain this national policy the following objectives are hereby adopted: 1. Financing; 2. Marketing; 3. The disposal of stocks of the Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) and the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) at the best obtainable prices and conditions in order that a reinvigorated Virginia tobacco industry may be established on a sound basis; and 4. Improving the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes through blending of imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco; such importation with corresponding exportation at a ratio of one kilo of imported to four kilos of exported Virginia tobacco, purchased by the importer-exporter from the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration. Functions relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations may not be strictly considered constituent. Under the traditional constituent-ministrant classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government. Nonetheless, the growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals, continue to lose their well defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice. Government v. Monte De Piedad Digest

Facts: 1. Spain paid $400,000 into the treasury of the Philippine Islands for the relief of those damaged by an earthquake. 2. Upon the petition of Monte de Piedad, an institution under the control of the church, the Philippine Government directed its treasurer to give $80,000 of the relief fund in Four (4)4 installments. As a result, various petitions were filed, including the heirs of those entitled to the allotments. All prayed for the State to bring suit against Monte de Piedad, and for it to pay with interest. 3. The Defendant appealed since all its funds have been exhausted already on various jewelry loans. Issue: Whether the government is the proper authority to the cause of action YES. The Philippine government, as a trustee towards the funds could maintain the action since there has been no change of sovereignty. The state, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae of the people. These principles are based upon public policy. The Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it was exercising its sovereign functions or powers and was merely seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands was ceded to the United States. Finally, if said loan was for ecclesiastical pious work, then Spain would not exercise its civil capacities. Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh 75 PHIL 131 FACTS: Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus which prays that the respondent judge be ordered to continue the proceeding which was initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation. It is based on the proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas McArthur which had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines. Furthermore, it was contended that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending the court of the defunct republic in the absence of enabling law. ISSUES: Whether the government established in the said Japanese occupation is in fact a de facto government. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission were good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the US Forces.

HELD: In political and international law, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial department of a de facto government is valid. Being a de facto government, judicial acts done under its control, when they are not political in nature, to the extent that they effect during the continuance and control of said government remain good. All judgment and judicial proceedings which are not of political complexion were good and valid before and remained as such even after the occupied territory had come again into the power of true and original sovereign. Wherefore, the respondent judge is directed to take cognizance of the civil case (3012) and continue the proceedings.

People of the Philippines vs Gozo on November 9, 2011

Political Law Sovereignty

Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which is within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the Mayors Office and some neighbors, she demolished the house without acquiring the necessary permits and then later on erected another house. She was then charged by the City Engineers Office for violating Mun. Ord No. 14 Series of 1964 which requires her to secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign country. ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base? HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base.

Laurel v. Misa G.R. No. L-409 March 28, 1946 Bengzon, J. Held: A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereignde jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them is one of the rules of international law of our times; recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioners contention rests. A foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is

nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own. As a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation, for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemys country, as well as those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they cannot be committed against the latter; and that, while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation. Although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience; and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force, are

in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants. Since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor. The crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United States, exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this constitution.

Ruffy v. Chief of Staff G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936 Tuason, J. Facts: This was a petition for prohibition, praying that the respondents, the Chief of Staff and the General Court Martial of the Philippine Army, be commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial of petitioners before that body. Preliminary injunction having been denied by us and the General Court Martial having gone ahead

with the trial, which eventually resulted in the acquittal of one of the defendants, Ramon Ruffy, the dismissal of the case as to another, Victoriano Dinglasan, and the conviction of Jose L. Garcia, Prudente M. Francisco, Dominador Adeva and Andres Fortus, the last-named four petitioners now seek in their memorandum to convert the petition into one for certiorari, with the prayer that the records of the proceedings before the General Court Martial be ordered certified to the Supreme Court for review. The ground of the petition was that the petitioners were not subject to military law at the time the offense for which they had been placed on trial was committed. In their memorandum they have raised an additional question of law that the 93d Article of War is unconstitutional. Issue: whether petitioners were not subject to military law at the time the offense for which they had been placed on trial was committed Held: No. The 2d Article of War defines and enumerates the persons subject to military law as follows: Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. The following persons are subject to these articles and shall be understood as included in the term any person subject to military law or persons subject to military law, whenever used in these articles: (a) All officers, members of the Nurse Corps and soldiers belonging to the Regular Force of the Philippine Army; all reservists, from the dates of their call to active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or order to obey the same; (b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary third lieutenants; (c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Army of the Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared though not otherwise subject to these articles; (d) All persons under sentences adjudged by courts-martial. The petitioners come within the general application of the clause in subparagraph (a); and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty for training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same. By their acceptance of appointments a s officers in the Bolo Area from the General Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they became members of the Philippine Army amendable to the Articles of War. The Bolo Area, as has been seen, was a contingent of the 6th Military District which, as has also been

pointed out, had been recognized by and placed under the operational control of the United States Army in the Southwest Pacific. The Bolo Area received supplies and funds for the salaries of its officers and men from the Southwest Pacific Command. As officers in the Bolo Area and the 6th Military District, the petitioners operated under the orders of duly established and duly appointed commanders of the United States Army. Issue: whether the 93d Article of War is unconstitutional as it deprives the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by death or imprisonment for life Held: No. Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities for the ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the President as Commander in Chief, independently of legislation. Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary. Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations. Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that courtsmartial must pertain to the executive department; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the President as Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives. Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration,GR L-21289, 4 October 1971 Facts: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation,

after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed. Issue: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Held: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962. LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO (G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986) FACTS: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines." ISSUE:

Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate. HELD: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that: The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country; It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government. Villavicencio vs Lukban L-14639 Facts:

Justo Lukban as Manila Mayor together with the police officer, took custody of 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latter's consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Davao City where they were signed as laborers. A writ of habeas corpus was filed against the mayor on behalf of those women. The court granted the writ, but the mayor was not able to bring any of the women before the court on the stipulated date.
Issue:

Whether or not the act of mayor has a legal basis.

Held:

The supreme court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating vice was commendable, but there was no law saying that he could force filipino women to change their domicile from manila to nother place. The women, said the court, although in a sense "lepers of society" were still filipino citizens and such they were entitled to the constitutional enjoyed by all other filipino citizens. The right to freedom of domicile was such a fundamental right that its suppression could considered tantamount to slavery. The supreme court upheld the right of filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the Liberty of abode. "Ours is a government of laws and not of men."

LAUREL V. MISA FACTS: A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. He claims that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason for the reasons that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and consequently the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizen thereto were then suspended; and that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic. ISSUE: WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE ALLEGIANCE OF A FILIPINO CITIZEN TO THE GOVERNMENT BECOMES SUSPENDED DURING OCCUPATION Held: A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereignde jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them is one of the rules of international law of our times; recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants

to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioners contention rests. A foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own. As a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation, for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemys country, as well as those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they cannot be committed against the latter; and that, while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation. Although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing

laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience; and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants. Since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor. The crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United States, exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this constitution.

Ruffy v. Chief of Staff G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

Tuason, J. Facts: This was a petition for prohibition, praying that the respondents, the Chief of Staff and the General Court Martial of the Philippine Army, be commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial of petitioners before that body. Preliminary injunction having been denied by us and the General Court Martial having gone ahead with the trial, which eventually resulted in the acquittal of one of the defendants, Ramon Ruffy, the dismissal of the case as to another, Victoriano Dinglasan, and the conviction of Jose L. Garcia, Prudente M. Francisco, Dominador Adeva and Andres Fortus, the last-named four petitioners now seek in their memorandum to convert the petition into one for certiorari, with the prayer that the records of the proceedings before the General Court Martial be ordered certified to the Supreme Court for review. The ground of the petition was that the petitioners were not subject to military law at the time the offense for which they had been placed on trial was committed. In their memorandum they have raised an additional question of law that the 93d Article of War is unconstitutional. Issue: whether petitioners were not subject to military law at the time the offense for which they had been placed on trial was committed Held: No. The 2d Article of War defines and enumerates the persons subject to military law as follows: Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. The following persons are subject to these articles and shall be understood as included in the term any person subject to military law or persons subject to military law, whenever used in these articles: (a) All officers, members of the Nurse Corps and soldiers belonging to the Regular Force of the Philippine Army; all reservists, from the dates of their call to active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or order to obey the same; (b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary third lieutenants; (c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Army of the Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared though not otherwise subject to these articles; (d) All persons under sentences adjudged by courts-martial.

The petitioners come within the general application of the clause in subparagraph (a); and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty for training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same. By their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area from the General Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they became members of the Philippine Army amendable to the Articles of War. The Bolo Area, as has been seen, was a contingent of the 6th Military District which, as has also been pointed out, had been recognized by and placed under the operational control of the United States Army in the Southwest Pacific. The Bolo Area received supplies and funds for the salaries of its officers and men from the Southwest Pacific Command. As officers in the Bolo Area and the 6th Military District, the petitioners operated under the orders of duly established and duly appointed commanders of the United States Army. Issue: whether the 93d Article of War is unconstitutional as it deprives the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by death or imprisonment for life Held: No. Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities for the ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the President as Commander in Chief, independently of legislation. Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary. Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations. Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that courtsmartial must pertain to the executive department; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the President as Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives.

REAGAN VS. CIR, digested Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011 GR # L-26379, December 27, 1969 (Constitutional Law Power to Tax) FACTS: Petitioner questioned the payment of an income tax assessed on him by public respondent on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of

the US Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base. Petitioner contends that the base is outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond the jurisdictional power to tax. ISSUE: Whether or not a sale made on a foreign military base is excluded from tax. HELD: No. The said foreign military bases is not a foreign soil or territory for purposes of income tax legislation. Philippine jurisdictional rights including the power to tax are preserved.

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). This Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 is a codification of consensus points reached between GRP and MILF Peace Panel and of the aspiration of the MILF to have a Bangasmoro Homeland According to the stipulations in the MOA-AD, Ownership of the Bangasmoro Homeland is vested to the Bangasmoro people. MOA-AD describes the Bangasmoro people as the first nation with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations. The Bangasmoro Juridical Entity (BJE) is granted by the MOA-AD the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain andAncestral Lands of the Bangasmoro. It was also stipulated that BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its internal waters. Issues: 1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic 2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication; 3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 4. Whether there is a violation of the peoples right to information on matters of public concern. 5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself. 6. cralawWhether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and

7. cralawWhether MOA-AD is constitutional Held: Issue 1: The court believes that the petitions in the case at bar provide an exception to the moot and academic principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Issue 2: Yes. Any alleged violation of the consti by any branch of the government is a proper matter for judicial review. In the case at bar, the failure of the respondents to consult the local government units or communities affected amounts to a departure from the mandate under E.O. No. 3 and the fact that the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution, rendered the petition ripe for adjudication. Issue 3: The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents almost consummated act ofguaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Issue 4: Yes, there is a violation of the peoples right to information.An essential element of this right is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people.The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived

such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny. Issue 5: No. The MOA-AD is not a document that can bind the Philippines under international law. It would have been signed by representatives of States and international organizations not parties to the Agreement, this would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under international law. Issue 6: Yes. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. These petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what it had done in a number of landmark cases. Issue 7: Yes. The MOA-AD is unconstitutional because it cannot be reconciled with the present constitution. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them. The associative relationship between the GRP and the BJE is unconstitutional because the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. The court denied the respondents motion to dismiss and granted the main and intervening petitions. Republic v. Villasor G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973 Fernando, J.

Facts:

A decision was rendered in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40. Respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an order declaring the aforestated decision final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City as well as Manila to execute the said decision. Pursuant to the said order, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. On the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served notices of garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with several Banks, specially on the monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution; the Philippine Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment on June 30, 1969. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank or their branches are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. It was alleged that respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, hence, the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void.

Issue:

whether the garnishment suit against the AFP is a suit against the State without its consent

Held:

Yes. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by

the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. Such a principle applies even to an attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued in favor of an employee.

The State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof.

Lasco vs UNRFNRE Case Digest_Eldepio Lasco et al v United Nations Revolving Fund For Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE) G.R. Nos. 109095-109107 February 23, 1995 Facts: Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with privaterespondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for NaturalResourcesExploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of theUnited Nations.The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of thePhilippineGovernment and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island.Petitioners are thecomplainants for illegal dismissal and damages.Private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since itenjoyed diplomatic immunity. Issue:WON specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity Held:Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse.Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunitiesof the SpecializedAgencies of the United Nations states that each specialized agency shall makea provision for appropriate modes of settlement of (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which thespecialized agencyisa party. Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in thePhilippines.Its presence is by virtue of a joint project entered into by thePhilippine Government and theUnited Nations for mineral exploration in DinagatIsland SEAFDEC VS. NLRC G.R. Nos. 97468-70, September 2 1993, 241 SCRA 580

FACTS: Two labor cases were filed by the herein private respondents against the petitioner, Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), before the National Labor RelationsCommission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City. In these cases, the private respondents claim having been wrongfully terminated from their employment by the petitioner. The petitioner, who claims to be an international inter-government organization composed of various Southeast Asian countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenged the jurisdiction of the public respondent in taking cognizance of the above cases. The private respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter, allege that the petitioner is not immune from suit and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international organization, it has, however, impliedly, if not expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly raising the issue of jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit. HELD: The Court ruled for the petitioner. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is an international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. It has already been held in Southeast Asian FisheriesDevelopment Center-Aquaculture Department vs. National Labor Relations Commission (G.R. No. 86773, 206 SCRA 283/1992). Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDECAQD) is an internationalagency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including itsDepartments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located.One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from thelegal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such objection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states.

CALLADO VS. IRRI G.R. No. 106483, May 22 1995, 244 SCRA 210 FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto Callado was employed as a driver at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). On February 11, 1990, while driving an IRRI vehicle on

an official trip to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident. After evaluating petitioner's answer,explanations and other evidence by IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager, the latter issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner on December 7, 1990. Petitioner then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Private respondent likewise informed the Labor Arbiter, through counsel, that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, and that it invokes suchdiplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same. However, the Labor Arbiter finds private respondent IRRI to have waived its immunity considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case. ISSUE: Whether or not IRRI waived its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-employee relationship. HELD: The Court ruled in the negative and vote to dismiss the petition. Theres no merit in petitioner's arguments, thus IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed. Presidential Decree No. 1620, Article 3 provides: Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives. The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity. On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on, made its position clear. Through counsel, the Institute wrote the Labor Arbiter categorically informing him that the Institute will not waive its diplomatic immunity.

Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. v. CA G.R. No. 91359, September 25, 1992 Grino-Aquino, J.

Facts:

The constitutionality of the following provisions of R.A. 5487(otherwise known as the Private Security Agency Law), as amended, is q uestioned by VMPSI in its complaint:

SEC. 4. Who may Organize a Security or Watchman Agency. - Any Filipino citizen or a corporation, partnership, or association, with a minimum capital of five thousand pesos, one hundred per cent of which is owned and controlled by Filipino citizens may organize a security or watchman agency: Provided, That no person shall organize or have aninterest in, more than one such agency except those which are alreadyexisting at the promulgation of this Decree: x x x. (As amended by P.D. Nos. 11 and 100. )

SEC. 17. Rules and Regulations by Chief, Philippine Constabulary. -The Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, in consultation with thePhilippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators,Inc. and subject to the provision of existing laws, is hereby authorized to issue the rules and regulations necessary to carry out the purpose of this Act.

VMPSI alleges that the above provisions of R.A. No. 5487 violate the provisions of the 1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency.

Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that all private security agencies/company security forces must register as members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are located.... As such membership requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal and constitutional provisions against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade.

On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8)

hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila.

On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower than the standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986.

PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to operate a security agency (Annex D, Petition).

The PC-SUSIA made similar findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of VMPSIs license.

As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI when it requested one.

VMPSI wrote the PC Chief on March 10, 1988, requesting him to set aside or disregard the findings of PADPAO and consider VMPSIs application for renewal of its license, even without a certificate of membership from PADPAO

Issue:

whether or not VMPSIs complaint against the PC Chie f and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent

Held:

Yes. The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily governmental function of regulating the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the Governments consent, especially in this case because VMPSIs complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees from said public respondents. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose.

While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded.

A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed by them as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities.

The correct test for the application of state immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by the State but the legal nature of the act.

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into a business contract. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.

In the instant case, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and PADPAO was intended to professionalize the industry and to standardize the salaries of security guards as well as the current rates of security services, clearly, a governmental function. The execution of the said agreement is incidental to the purpose of R.A.5487, as amended, which is to regulate the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen or security guard agencies.

Rayo v. CFI of Bulacan G.R. No. L-55273-83 December 19, 1981 Abad Santos, J.

Issues:

whether the power of respondent National Power Corporation to sue and be sued under its organic charter includes the power to be sued for tort

Held:

Yes. The government has organized it as a GOCC, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. (R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3 (d).) As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government.

MALONG V PNR Facts:

The Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on October 30, 1977 their son, Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train while it was between Tarlac and Capas. The tragedy occurred because Jaime had to sit near the door

of a coach. The train was overloaded with passengers and baggage in view of the proximity of All Saints Day.

The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to pay them damages totaling P136,370. Upon the Solicitor General's motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that it had no jurisdiction because the PNR, being a government instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State (Sec. 16, Art. XV of the Constitution). The Malong spouses appealed to this Court pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440

R.A. No. 5440 changed the mode of appeal from courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts) to the Supreme Court in cases involving only questions of law, or the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, etc. or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, etc., or the jurisdiction of any inferior court, from ordinary appeal i.e., by notice of appeal, record on appeal and appeal bond, under Rule 41 to appeal by certiorari, under Rule 45

Issue/s:

1. WON PNR is immune from suit. 2. WON the State acted in a sovereign capacity or in a corporate capacity when it organized the PNR for the purpose of engaging in transportation 3. WON the State acted differently when it organized the PNR as successor of the Manila Railroad Company

Held: No, PNR is NOT immune. The State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs against the Philippine National Railways.

Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner

Department

of Agriculture (DA)

and

Sultan Security

Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and thesecurity agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case

Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that the State may not be sued without its consent reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The States consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters intobusiness contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit.

Shauf v. Court of Appeals (191 SCRA 713), November 27, 1990 Facts:

Petitioner Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the US Air Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is qualified. She had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the said Air Base at the GS 1710-9 level for approximately four (4) years at the time that she applied for the same position in 1976. Her application was forwarded to Anthony Persi, an Education Director, who by then had some reservations regarding Shaufs work experience. Persi requested the Civilian Personnel Office to initiate immediate inquiry to the Central Overseas Rotation and Recruiting Office (CORRO). Persi was informed by CORRO that an Edward Isakson was selected for the position. By the reason of her non-selection to the position, Shauf filed an equal employment opportunity complain against the respondents for alleged discrimination by reason of her sex and nationality. RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual damages + 20% of such amount as attorneys fees + P100k as moral & exemplary damages. Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be collected from defendants. The defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim that the petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies and the case should be dismissed. CA reversed the RTC decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit. Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity and this is not a suit against the US government which would require consent and the respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule allowing suits against public officers & employees for criminal and unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines and is not part of international law. Issue: Whether or not the privaterespondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces. Ruling: No, they are not immune.As expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution, the State may not be sued without its consent. This is a generally accepted principle of international law under Art. II, Sec. 2. The case may be taken as a suit against the US since the damages to Shauf will be taken from funds of the US. However, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the course of their duties. The unauthorized acts of the government officials are not acts of the State. The respondents are being sued in their private and personal capacity.

Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuineland reform program. There was a marcherspolice confrontation which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens MendiolaCommission for the purpose of conducting an investigation. The most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government. Based on such recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic and the military/policeofficers involved in the incident.

Issues:
(1) (2) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of Whether or not the State is liable for immunity damages

Held: The

Court held that there was no valid waiver of

immunity as claimed by the petitioners. The recommendation made by theCommission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for a cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the Commission does not in any way bind the State.

The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officerswho allegedly were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military andpolice officers who were responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as they exceeded their authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered official.

MERITT vs. Government of the Philippine Islands Digested

MERITT vs. Government of the Philippine Islands 34 Phil 311 FACTS: It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, when an ambulance of the General Hospital struck the plaintiff in an intersection. By reason of the resulting collusion, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious. The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain had suffered material injury. Upon recovery the doctor noticed that the plaintiffs leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The damages that the plaintiff got from the collision disabled him to do this work as a contractor and forced him to give up contracts he recently had. As the negligence which cause the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom. The Philippine Legislature

made an Act (Act No. 2457) that authorizes the plaintiff to bring suit against the GPI and authorizing the Attorney- General to appear in said suit. ISSUE: Whether or not the Government is legally-liable for the damages incurred by the plaintiff. RULING: No, the Government is not legally-liable for the damages incurred by the plaintiff. It being quiet clear that Act. No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Governments liability to any cause not previously recognized. That according to paragraph 5 of Article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the May 18, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. It is, therefore, evidence that the State (GPI) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of Article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained

by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, be legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefore, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.

People of the Philippines v. Purisima G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978) FACTS: Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one essential element of the crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy. ISSUE: W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities. HELD: The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measure is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or whereas clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

US v. Ruiz (Consti1)

US v. Ruiz UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER, petitioners, vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents. En Banc

Doctrine: implied consent Date: May 22, 1985 Ponente: Justice Abad-Santos

Facts:

At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids and complied with the requests based on the letters received from the US. In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects. The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.) Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion.

The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

Issue/s:

WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity

Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.

Ratio:

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts) The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act

AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA [43 SCRA 360; G.R. No. L26400; 29 Feb. 1972]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was noannotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigables counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of actionagainst the defendants.

Issue:
may

Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant properly sue the government.

Held:

In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu,

it was held that when the government takes away property from a

private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due compensationprice or value of the lot at the time of the taking.

Jusmag vs NLRC (article XVI Sec. 3) GR 109913 Dec 15, 1994 Facts: Florencio Sacramento was a support personnel of the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the Philippines. When he was dismissed, he held a position as Illustrator 2 was the president of a labor organization registered with DOLE. However, he was terminated due to the abolition of his position. He filed a complaint with DOLE on the ground that he was illegally terminated. Respondent asked for reinstatement. Petitioner filed for motion to dismiss as he invoked his immunity from suit. Labor arbiter dismissed his suit and has petitioned in the National Labor Relations Commission and the latter reversed the ruling of the labor arbiter for the reason

that the petitioner lost his right not to be suid because the petitioner failed to refute the existence of the employer-employee relationship and when he hired the services of the private respondent. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has immunity from suit Ruling: The petitioner has immunity from suit. Even if he hired the services of the private respondent, it has still been acting on behalf of the governmental function of the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement between the Philippines and America. Since USA has not consented for the waiver of its immunity from suit, the complaint shouldnt have prospered. The immunity is one of the recognized principles of International law that the Philippine adopts. Hence, the petition has been granted.
Santiago vs. Republic (Consti1) Ildefonso Santiago, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Alfredo T. Santiago, petitioner, vs. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Director, Bureau of Plant Industry, and the Regional Director, Region IX, Zamboanga City, repondent.

December 19, 1978

Fernando, J:

Facts:

Petitioner Ildefonso Santiago donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of Plant Industry on the terms that the Bureau should construct a building and install lighting facilities on the said lot. When time passed and there were still no improvements on the lot, Santiago filed a case pleading for the revocation of such contract of donation but the trial court dismissed the petition claiming that it is a suit against the government and should not prosper without the consent of the government.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent government has waived its immunity from suit.

Held:

Yes.

Ratio:

The government's waiver of immunity was implied by virtue of the terms provided in the deed of donation. The government is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation but it did not comply with such terms. Thus, the donor Santiago has the right to be heard in the court. Also, to not allow the donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to equity which the government so advances. The Court of First Instance is hereby directed to proceed with the case.