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ReflectionsonAntiMarxism:ElsteronMarx'sFunctionalismandLabour
TheoryValue
ReflectionsonAntiMarxism:ElsteronMarx'sFunctionalismandLabourTheory
Value
byDavidSchweikert
Source:
PRAXISInternational(PRAXISInternational),issue:1/1988,pages:109122,onwww.ceeol.com.
on Anti-Marxism: Elster on .Marx's
Labor Theory of Value
Schweikert
Brian 'Barry has dubbed him "the prince of foxes," and the title is not
inappropriate..
l
Jon Elster knows many things. He has command of the
Marxian corpus; he grasps many facets of technical economics, political
theory, history, philosophy, even psychology.. In addition he has an acute
sense for subtle distinctions and the ability to articulate them precisely.. Yet
for all these talents, his Making Sense of Marx
2
is a problematic work..
Left intellectuals have been kind to the book.. Michael Walzer raved in the
New York Review ofBook.
3
Andrew Levine gave it high marks in TheJournal
of Philosophy.. 4 In this journal Rolf Zimmermann called it "a penetrating
study.. "
5
In a recent issue of Inquiry devoted to the book it was hailed as "lucid
and illuminating," "refreshingly irreverent," a work of "genius.. "6 I think this
is much too generous.
To begin with, Making Sense ofMarx is chock full of bad argument. Elster
says his book is largely about details,7, but if one looks closely at the details,
much of its argumentative force dissipates. Such is my claim. The first two
sections of this paper will aim at substantiation.. In successive sections I will
examine two of Elster's theses: that Marx is repeatedly guilty of illicit
functionalism and that Marxian economic theory has been proven rigorously
to be wrong.. I confine myself to only two of Elster's many provocative charges
so as to be able to pay suitable attention to details, but I think a similar
analysis could be given of many others. In addition to bad argument, Making
Sense of Marx is laden with casual, gratuitous jibes that play a significant role
the book's overall rhetorical strategy. In Section 11 I will offer some
reflections on this strategy, particularly as it involves Elster's curious anti-
Marx Marxism.
I
As all who have followed the Cohen-Elster debates know well, Ion Elster is
the arch-foe of functional explanation.
8
The anti-functionalist drum beat
continues in Making Sense of Marx.. In the opening chapter Elster asks, "Did
Marx practice functional explanation? If so, was he successful? If not, could
his explanations be improved?" (p. 27). EIster asserts that he will mainly
explore the first two questions. Moreover, "in this book I shall be concerned
with functional explanations of a rather crude kind. These are attempts to
explain behavior simply {Elster's emphasis] by pointing to the fact that it has
beneficial consequences for some agent or agents" (p.. 28).. More defensible varieties
Praxis International 8: 1April 1988 0260-8448 $2.00
110 Praxis International
offunctional explanation need not be considered, "since it is certain that Marx did
not propose any of these sophisticated versions offunctionalism" (p. 29).
We observe that since Elster proposes to consider only crude functional
explanations, the second question has been answered. If Marx has engaged in
"functional explanation" as Elster will use the term, he cannot have suc-
ceeded. No one, certainly not Cohen, the foremost defender of functional
explanation in Marx, thinks that crude functional explanations are satisfac-
tory. So the three questions have been pared to one: did Marx engage in crude
functional explanation?
Elster is quite certain he did. Elster announces that he will "survey the main
instances of [objectionable] functional explanation in Marx" (p. 27), and
proceeds with a seven-page indictment: On page 29:
It is certainly because Marx believed history to be directed to a 'goal - the
advent of a communist society - that he felt justified in explaining, not only
patterns of behavior, but even individual events, in terms of their contribution to
that end.
On page 31:
From recognizing the long-run benefits to the capitalist class of state actions that
(in the short run) go against its interest, there was but a short step to the
conclusion that the benefits explain the concessions made to the workers . . .
Two pages later:
There is a strong tendency in Marxism to explain, say, religion or bourgeois
political economy in terms of their stabilizing influence on the prevailing
relations of production.
If one reads these pages with care, one is struck by a large omission. No
effort has been made to show that Marx explained the various phenomena in
question simply by pointing to their beneficial effects. It is important to be
clear. There is nothing methodologically illicit in pointing out that certain
phenomena have beneficial consequences. There is nothing wrong in saying
that a giraffe's long neck is beneficial for its survivaL Crude functionalism
asserts that the giraffe has a long neck simply because it is beneficial for its
survival. That is, crude functionalism asserts a) that the long neck is
functional, b) that the long neck exists because it is functional, and c) that its
being functional is a sufficient condition for its existence. Assertion c) is the
problematic one, since it amounts to a denial that any account need be
supplied as to how the beneficial consequence (survival, in this case) should
bring about the long neck.
9
For seven pages Elster is content to charge Marx
with crude functionalism, but he offers no proof.
Elster seems suddenly to recognize that "1 have given relatively little textual
evidence so far of Marx's tendency to engage in functional explanation,
referring the reader to later chapters for examples and details" (p. 34). In fact
Elster's admission falls short. Looking back over this "survey of the main
instances of functional explanation in Marx," we see that he has not supplied a
single quote from Marx.
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Praxis International III
This oversight is remedied in his final on functional explanation
- in a manner that bears close examination. Elster introduces a selection from
Volume of Capital with the remark that it reveals Marx's "cavalier attitude
to the canons of explanation" (p. 35). relevant section of the quote reads
as follows:
The circumstance that a man without fortune, but possessing energy, solidity
and business acumen may become a capitalist in this manner . . . is greatly
admired by apologists of the capitalist, system. Although this circumstance
certainly brings an unwelcome number of new soldiers of fortune into the field
and into competition with the already existing individual capitalists, it also
reinforces the supremacy of capital itself, expands its base and enables it to
recruit ever new forces for itself out of the substratum of society.
social interms of
no attempt to suggest a
v ..... n ...... "'t- ... The statement is both a
an instance invalid functional
Elster comments: read
its beneficial consequences
mechanism beyond that
violation of methodological
explanation" 35).
I would ask reader to look again at the quote. Is it an instance of crude
functionalism? Is it an attenlpt at any sort of functional explanation, crude or
otherwise? Leave aside the fact that Volume III of Capital was an unfinished,
unpolished work. The statement Elster has quoted asserts a true proposition:
social mobility is beneficial to capitalism. Nothing more. Marx has not
claimed that social mobility is explained by its beneficial consequences. Marx
does not say that there is social mobility under capitalism because it is
beneficial to capitalism. It is Elster, not Marx, who gives the passage that
meaning. 10 To repeat what was said above: there is nothing illicit in pointing
out that a certain phenomenon has beneficial consequences. What is methodo-
logically problematic is to claim that these consequences in and of tllemselves
explain the phenomenon. I find it astonishing that a thinker so capable of
observing distinctions - and so harsh on those who do not - should be
so careless.
Nor is this an isolated example. Elster's index lists twenty-six entries under
"functional explanation." They are scattered throughout the book, so it takes
some effort to examine the evidence comprehensively and in toto. I would
invite reader to do so. I have looked at all the indexed instances and have
found not one convincing case of crude functionalism. In many instances
Elster remarks that a passage "suggests" a functional explanation (pp. 188,
285, 370, 389, 499). In some instances his interpretations are exotic as, for
example, when reads Marx as implying that business cycles are to be
explained terms of their beneficial effect on working class militancy (p.
Ill). Ponder this interpretation for an1oment. To think that business cycles
are to be explained in terms their beneficial effect on working class
militancy is to think that business cycles occur because such cycles promote
militancy. Seriously now ... does anyone imagine that Marx thought that?
I do not mean to say that there are no passages in Marx that might be read as
instances of bad functionalism. 1 do mean to say that they are few, and that
1
they are two sorts:
enhances suvivability,
Alternatively (or in
"-'_.II.a._.....Jl. ..... .ll. consequences of A and act
disagreement. if Elster's original position
.l\.U\".lL.A.IL.............. on methodological grounds only if he
there exists no plausible causal
analyzing, Marx must be read as
is beneficial to capitalism, and other
capitalism's stability. must
n'O' ..... .,."'1IC'O it
113
account as to how
_ from such mobility and
asserts no more a), and
is more reasonable than c). I would
JI. by Marx, it need not be regarded as
.l\,lI.4.1..I.""'\.Ji.'U'.A..l.I.....l.Jl.O";'JI..I..JI., since d) might well true. I take it as not
the capitalist state at least sometimes acts to promote the
general interests of bourgeoisie. 14
foregoing analysis is meant to demonstrate not only the flimsiness of
Elster's case against Marx specific instance, to highlight just how
rilall"'lr'\o'")nr1l1Inn- it is in' general to charge of functionalism. One
an instance effects are alleged; one must establish
...........ll. ... _ ...., ... ., not a causal, is intended; and one must show
JI.,,..a..ll..Il. .JI."U'.lI.Ji\.,,.4... explanation any plausible causal supplement. The
charge is easy to (any of beneficial effect can be so construed),
but difficult to prove. Elster rests content the easy part.
At the same time, I was discovering Marxist economic theory in the wake of the
"capital controversy." I was excited at these rigorous formulations of Marx's
theory, and then when it turned out that their main use was to prove
that it was wrong. (p. xiii).
labor theory value is three-fold. argues that the
ground because it cannot with heterogeneous
objection, he analyzes four distinct claims that might
substance of theory as a theory of price formation.
dismisses two "transcendental" interpretations of the
defends this rather dramatic claim his chapter on Marxian
economics. He claims to be mainly reporting has been demonstrated in
the recent work von Weizsaecker, Samuelson, Steed-
man Roemer. argues Marx's analysis of capitalism as an
economic system rests on two pillars, each of which has been conclusively.
shown to be false: labor theory of value and the law of falling rate of
profit. us concentrate our attention on first, which is the more central
of two.
Elster's attack on
theory cannot get
labor. Setting aside
be to constitute
he examines
theory.
The labor theory of value cannot get off ground, says Elster, because the
labor value of a commodity cannot be unambiguously defined. His is a
you-can't-add-apples-and-oranges critique: an hour's worth of skilled labor of
a non-producible sort or an hour's worth particularly unpleasant labor
cannot be set to an hour's worth of simple, unskilled labor or even to
some multiple standard. There exists "genuinely and irreducibly
heterogeneous labor" (p. 131).
problem here is that Elster has not given us a statement of the labor
of value, nor have we he
114 Praxis International
is supposed to accomplish. He alludes to "the intentions behind the labour
theory of value" (p. 131), these remain unspecified. Yet they are crucial.
The fact of the matter is, we can add apples and oranges. Among other ways:
we can abstract from physical differences and add their weights or volumes;
we can regard them as marketable commodities and add their production costs
or selling prices; we can add up the labor that went into producing them,
choosing, if we wish, to abstract from labor differences altogether or to weigh
certain types of labor according to selected standards. Which aggregative
technique is appropriate depends on the project. (If they are to serve as ballast
for a boat, the first would be best.) If the labor theory of value is not meant to
be a theory of relative prices - and few Marxists think it is - then
heterogeneous labor need not be a problem. Like all economic theories,
Marx's involves simplification and abstraction. The issue must be whether a
particular simplification - in this case, an assumption that alllabor is equally
skilled and equally unpleasant - is useful or not.
Elster takes up this question, but after his a priori objection, and in a
less-than-satisfactory manner. Even if definitional difficulties could be resol-
ved, he says, "The theory of labor value fails because there is no use to which
the concept can-be put" (p.131). To substantiate this charge, Elster specifies,
then refutes, four claims that he takes to be versions of theory regarded as
a theory of price formation: 1) prices are proportional to labor values; 2) if
prices are normalized so that the sum of all prices equals the sum of alllabor
values, then the totality of surplus-value equals the totality on ptofit; 3) labor
values can be determined independently of prices, but not conversly; 4) prices
are independent of the composition of final demand. 16 He argues (correctly)
that none of these claims is true, even of Marx's own general model.
But consider: Marx did not think 1) was true of his general model, and
there is no textual evidence that he held either 3) or 4). Elster acknowledges as
much - though not without a bit of self-contradiction. He proclaims that "all
have some textual support in Marx, " then concedes immediately that 1) "was
asserted in Capital I as a convenient simplification only," and that "nothing
quite as specific as 3) is found in Marx" (p. 135). As evidence for 4) he quotes
a passage from Capital Ill, then comments, "I believe that Marx intended to
say not only what he actually states in the first sentence, that changes in labour
values are a sufficient condition for price changes, but that they are a
necessary condition as well" Cp. 136; emphasis mine). So much for textual
support for 1), 3) or 4).
It is true that Marx believed 2), but, Robert Paul Wolff to the contrary
notwithstanding, this proposition is not a central theoretical claim, nor was it
so regarded by Marx.
17
Three points are worth noting. Marx nowhere argues
for 2); it appears to him, wrongly, to be self-evident. However, the claim is
not far wrong; it is a reasonable approximation in general, and it holds
rigorously in certain models.
I8
Finally (and most importantly) nothing
significant turns on the fact that it is not universally true. Whatever one might
want to make of 2), it is hardly a "pillar of Marxian economics."
Elster concludes his attack on the labor theory of value by considering what
he calls "transcendental" interpretations of the theory, (pp. 138-41).
Praxis International
115
In 1973 Michio Morishima proved what he labeled "the fundamental
theorem of Marxian economics": the economy-wide rate of profit will be
positive if and only if the rate of exploitation is positive. 19 This result spurred
Robert Paul Wolff to constuct, then critique, a rather peculiar argument for
the labor theory of value. Marx is held to be reasoning in Capital I that profit
is possible only if labor is the source of all value. 20 Elster, like Wolff, sees this
argument as failing because "in fact, similar 'fundamental theorems' can be
proved with respect to steel or any other basic commodity" (p. 141).
Again the problem here is interpretation. It is ingenious, but surely
implausible, to read the central argument of Capital I (the locus of this
interpretation) as a defense ofa particular theory ofvalue rather than as a critique of
capitalism. Surely what Marx is arguing is that capitalist profit is based on the
exploitation of workers, not that profit is inexplicable unless we regard labor as
the source of all value.
21
Again Elster refutes a view that Marx does not hold.
Elster sees another transcendental argument in Capital I, this time in the
opening pages. So far as I can tell, this interpretation is unique to Elster. He
reads Marx as trying to establish that a condition for the possibility of
commodity exchange is that each item be the product of human labor. Elster
then counters: not all exchangeable products are producted by labor;
moreover, products exchange in virtue of the fact that they are useful and
scarce, not because they are products labar (pp. 138-141).
Both sophistication and superficiality are in evidence in this analysis. Many
critics read the opening pages of Capital I as Marx's attempt to show that
commodities will exchange only when they embody equal quantities of abstract
human labor. But it has now been conclusively established that Marx was well
aware when composing this text that the price/labor-value correspondence
holds only under very special circumstances.
22
It is a mark of Elster's
acuteness that he does not repeat the usual criticisms.
Unfortunately, his interpretation is little better. Knowing that Marx does
not think that exchange-values are in general proportional to labor-values,
Elster abstracts completely from the quantitative problem and interprets
Marx as attempting to answer a qualitative question: what property or
properties must a commodity possess in order to become an object of
exchange? quotes from the well-known passage where Marx examines corn
and iron for signs of exchange-value, then interprets it thus:
This famous pasage can be broken down into two steps, (i) For exchange to be
possible, the goods exchanged must have some common element. (ii) This
common element can only be the property of being products of human labor (p.
139).
But this cannot be what Marx is arguing, for he knows well that commodities,
in order to exchange, must be useful. Two pages before the quote excerpted
by Elster, Marx writes, "A commodity is, in the first place ... a thing that
by its properties satisfies human wants.,,23 Clearly, Marx does not subscribe to
(ii).
What Marx is arguing is masked by an ellipsis Elster has inserted in his
Marx quote: "Each of them, so far as it is exchange value, must therefore be
116
.lI. ..... u.u....... Jl.U.ll1o,.. to common
geometrical, a chemical, or any other natural
139). The ellipsis represents a COIltal.nlrlg
exchange-value of cqmmodities must
something common to of
quantity. "24
We see that Marx is ....... 1"' .. 'II"1II1''\"7
knows, and says so
must be useful. but does not
argues those opening pages. (Presumably
scarcity.) A theoretical account of an economic
thematize the quantitative nature of exchange.
tative dimension is not so simple as proportionality,
being the only obviously quantifiable variable,
determinant.
Marx mayor may not be right on score. Neoclassical economists have
labored mightily to construct a quantitative theory prices on
notions of utility scarcity. Sraffa and the neo-Ricardians ""'_.,. ........ 'fI- ........... .. rI1
powerfully.. 25 Marx's argument is by no means ....... U.l,J. ..... J.'U0..lL
Elster's reconstruction the qualification that the common 1I..-A. ..... Jl.Jl.Jl.'... ..LJl.L
fiable, it is se silly as Elster it appear.
To recapitulate briefly: Elster's "conclusive" refutation the theory
of value consists of seven arguments, six of which invoke distinct interpreta-
tions of the theory. first argues that the theory founders on heterogeneous
labor. He proceeds to refute four interpretations of the theory as a theory
price formation, then two transcendental interpretations. His first argument,
the one devoid of interpretation, fails for precisely that reason. We cannot
assess the charge that heterogeneous labor undermines theory without
knowing what the theory is intended to accomplish. Of the remaining six only
one refutes a proposition actually believed by Marx (so far as we can tell from
the textual evidence), and that proposition is not theoretically significant.
short, an invisible man, five straw men, and one bit player.
I don't mean to be unfair to Elster. After all, Marx himself did not provide a
systematic statement of, or rationale for, a labor theory of value, and it is
certainly the case that many Marxists have been muddled as to what is at stake
with the theory. It has too often served as a touchstone for True Believers with
little care given to specification or justification. Still - to make an analytical
distinction - failing to specifiy adequately or to justify is a different matter
from relying on a theory that has been conclusively refuted.
Moreover, it seems to me that a reasonable interpretation is not so hard to
come by - if one is seriously interested in making sense of Marx. One would
begin by recognizing that Marx did not explicitly champion a distinctive
theory of value. He did not even use the term "labor theory of value."
Therefore, the question should be: what to make of certain practices of Marx
that seem constitutive of what now might be called "value theory"? Above all,
what'to make of the practice of regarding commodities as ...... O ...,iI".a.C'o.a.,..... 1.\- .... ....... , ...........
definite quantities of abstract, socially-necessary human
By regarding commodities as "'lI ... U' IS
1
118 Praxis International
something else that is central to any real understanding of a capitalist
economy. He is able to do macro-analysis. To investigage macroeconomic
relationships - growth, unemployment, instability, crises - one must add
apples and oranges. Until the advent of Leontief input-output analysis and the
neo-Ricardian theoretical analogues, the only available aggregative options
were market prices and labor values. The unsuitability of the former is
evidenced by an almost complete lack of macroeconomic analysis during the
half century following the neoclassical triumph over labor-oriented classical
economics. It took the Great Depression and Keynes to reintroduce macroe-
conomics to the profession, and even Keynes, aggregating by using ratio
of market prices to the wage rate, could only theorize short-run instabilities. 30
Given Marx's concern to investigate the "laws of motion" of a capitalist
economy, his allegiance to a labor theory of"value was a quite rational decision.
It is not obvious that labor-value analysis has been wholly superseded even
today. A case can certainly be made that for certain purposes equilibrium
prices (i. e., neo-Ricardian theory) is a more suitable instrument, but if the
project is to study development and disequilibrium, a labor-value orientataion
remains useful. I think Harvey's Limits to Capital demonstrates this point, as
does the work of Samir Amin, Arghiri Emmanuel, and many others who
regularly employ Marxian value categories. To write all this off as resting on a
conclusively refuted theory is, to put it mildly, ungenerous.
If his sustained arguments are ungenerous, Elster's casual comments are
even more so. These are the elements that leap out at the reader, evoking,
depending on one's orientation to Marx, a smile or a wincee ,Marx's views are
variously judged to be "incoherent," "rather absurd," "rambling,"
"downright silly," "massively Utopian," "confused," "lacking intellectual
discipline," "boring," "extreme and exaggerated," "pointless," "trivial,"
"obscure," "illogical," "narrow," etc., etc. Alien Wood finds all this
"refreshingly irreverent." I find it excessive.
Yet Elster still claims to be a Marxist (p. 531). Elster claims that "most of
the views I hold to be true and important, I can trace back to Marx." (p. 531).
even allows workers are usually exploited by capitalists, and that this
is unjust.
31
It is worth considering what to make of this self-identification.
I think it pointless to engage in a debate as to whether Elster is or is not a
Marxist. It is worth considering, however, the rhetorical effect of his public
profession on the readers of his book. I think tllat Making Sense of Marx is
structured to elicit certain responses, and that Elster's self-identification as a
Marxist is a key component of the book's rhetorical strategy. 32
I take it as obvious that readers' responses to Elster will vary, depending on
whether or not they see themselves as Marxists. Consider the non-Marxist
reader. Here Elster's self-identification as a Marxist functions to lend
credibility to his anti-Marxist attacks in the expected fashion. When an author
proclaims ,himself to be a Marxist, his defenses of Marx will be scrutinized
carefully; "concessions" will be accepted without much question. Michael
Praxis International 119
Walzer's reactioll to Elster fits this model'exactly. Walzer finds the anti-Marx
arguments wholly persuasive. "I find little to quarrel with any of this. Elster
makes a strong case against Marx; it is hard to imagine a stronger one."
Walzer's only objection is Elster's intimation that there remain good reasons'
for calling oneself a Marxist. This, Walzer asserts, "is mere sentimental
Marxism (not quite a rational choice)."33
The Marxist reaction to Elster is more complicated. Many will be put off by
the rhetorical excesses and will respond in kind. Meikle and Slaughter, two
contributors to the Inquiry symposium, take this tack, but it is not effective.
Elster takes the high road, dismissing their charges as the rantings of "Marxist
fundamentalists. "34
Other Marxists, particularly those of an analytical bent, face another
temptation: to enter the fray by accepting Elster's agenda and playing
according to his rules. This temptation is quite powerful. Elster is a worthy
opponent. It is fun to match wits with one so intelligent as he, all the more so
since the game has the illusion of danger while being perfectly safe. It is about
Marxism, so it has affective bonds to deep emotional currents, yet the issues
joined are wholly non-threatening to any entrenched power, political or
academic.
35
There is no place in the debate for a sustained critique of
capitalism, nor for a sustained critique of mainstream academic methodology.
Since it is an argument among "Marxists," the former may be presumed and
need not be discussed; since the rules of the game are precisely the prevailing
conventions, these will not be questioned either.
36
I don't think it necessary to resist this temptation always. Parts I and 11 of
this paper testify'to that. But I do worry about Elster's overall effect on Left
scholarship, especially analytical Marxism. His is an influential presence. He
holds positions at two prestigious institutions. He's an editor of the Cam-
bridge series, Studies in Marxism and Social Theory. He is a prolific writer. He
engages in many debates and comments on many papers. Unfortunately, he
reinforces what I take to be three distressing tendencies of analytical Marxism.
First, there is the tendency to sidetrack discussion onto inconsequential
details that do not in any way challenge capitalist hegemony nor contribute to
Marxian revitalization. The Cohen-Elster exchanges on functional explanation
constitute a case in point. Secondly, there is the tendency to regard only
analytical methodology as reputable, that is, to think that the only way to
proceed is to extract from Marx clear and unambiguous propositions that can
then be tested for falsity or inconsistency. It is not at all clear to me that this is
the best way to "make sense of Marx." It is clear to me that it is not the only
way.
Finally, there is the tendency to consider worthy of respect only those
Marxists willing to write off most of Marx as "inaccurate, incoherent,
confused or misguided. "37 Apart from a small circle of friends, Elster has
nothing good to say about other Marxists. He proclaims on the last page of his
book that "it is not possible today, morally or intellectually, to be Marxist in
the traditional sense," to accept "all or most of the views that Marx held to be
true and important." This is surely unfair - appropriate for the temper of the
times, perhaps, but unfair.
120
Praxis International
Elster claims, also on the final page, that "in the sense that was to him the
most important - Marx's life and were in vain." It seems to me that
most important to Marx was the project of replacing capitalism with a more
decent and humane social order. I am not convinced that Elster's work does
much to advance this project. Analytical Marxists who are seriously concerned
about doing so would do well to resist this "prince of foxes" who is also, I'm
afraid, a bit of a Pied Piper.
NOTES
1. Brian Barry, "Superfox," Political Studies (January 1980), 136.
2. Jon Elster, Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge: 1985). Page references to this work will be given in
parentheses in the text.
3. Michael Walzer, "What's Left of Marx," New York Review ofBooks (November 21, 1985), 43-8.
4. Andrew Levine, book review,]ournal of Philosophy (December, 1986), 721-28.
5. Rolf Zimmermann, "Making Sense of Human Liberation: Jon Elster, Analytical Marxism and
Socialist Perspectives," Praxis International 6 (January 1987), 488.
6. By Michel Thomas, Allen Wood and Douglas North respectively. Inquiry (March 1986), 4, 12, 58.
Less flattering assessments are given by the contributors Scott Meikle and Cliff Slaughter.
7. JonElster, "Reply to Comments," Inquiry (March 1986), 66.
8. The debate began with Elster's review of Karl Marx's Theory of History (Princeton, 1978) in Political
Studies (1980). It developed further in their Theory and Society (1982) exchange, and has continued in
their contributions to John Roemer, ed., Analytical Marxism (Cambridge, 1986). In this latest
exchange, however, Elster has softened somewhat. More on this below.
9. I am simplifying slightly. A functional explanation in sensu strictus (crude or otherwise) denies that
such a causal account must be given. Cohen argues that an explanation can be valid in the absence of a
causal account, if one can cite a "consequence law" with guarantees that whenever long necks are
beneficial to survival they occur. Crude functionalism denies the need for either a causal account or a
consequence law: the benefit in and of itself explains the occurrence of the phenomenon. Cf. Jon
Elster, "Marxism, Functionalism and Game Theory," Theory and Society 11 (1982),453-82, and G.A.
Cohen, "Reply to Elster," 483-96. More on this issue below.
1O. Presumably Elster sniffs functionalism in the claim "the circumstance that a man without fortune may
become a capitalist enables capital to recruit ever new forces for itself." But consider: "the
circumstance that migrant workers cross easily into the United States enables growers to recruit farm
laborers without difficulty" does not assert that the circumstance of easy passage is brought about by
the actions of the growers. To read it thus would surely reveal a cavalier attitude to the canons of
interpretation.
11. That Marx might be arguing thus is suggested by the rest of the paragraph: "In a similar way, the
circumstances that the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages formed its hierarchy out of the best brains
in the land, regardless of their estate, birth or fortune, was one of the principal means of consolidating
ecclesiastical rule and suppressing the laity. The more a ruling class is able to assimilate the foremost
minds of a ruled class, the more stable and dangerous becomes its rule." Capital, v. III (New York,
1967), 601. If Marx is explaining anything here, it would seem to be the stability of a ruling stratum,
not social mobility.
12. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History, 248-77. Cohen calls established claims of this sort "conse-
quence laws," and the causal mechanisms "functional elaborations." His thesis is that a functional
explanation is legitimate, even without an elaboration, provided it incorporates a consequence law.
13. See the references in No 8, in particular, Elster, "Further Thoughts on Marxism, Functionalism and
Game Theory," in Roemer, ed. Analytical Marxism, 204. '
14. It seems to me absurd to suggest, as Elster does, that Marx held some esoteric conception of the
origins of class mobility. Marx's general account is plain enotigh: the bourgeoisie struggled against
feudal restrictions because these restrictions were obviously contrary to their own interests. Once
these feudal restrictions were removed, there were no legal barriers prohibiting "a man without
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fortune, but possessing energy, solidity and business acumen from becoming a capitalist." one
might wonder why some new set of restrictions was not imposed. Part of the answer m'lght be a
perception on the pan of many capitalists that such restrictions would not be to their long-run
advantage. So far as I know, no such restrictions were proposed in Marx's day, but if they were, some
sort of functional explanation might be in order as to why such restrictions were, not adopted. That is,
c) might be true - though I see no reason for thinking Marx is asserting c) in the quote under
discussion.
15. Elster's treatment of the second is equally problematic. He is right that the law of the falling rate of
profit cannot be rigorosly demonstrated, but that is scarcely news. Paul Sweezy's influential and
highly sympathetic interpretation of Marx, The Theory of Capitalist Development (New York, 1942)
made exactly the same point (96-108), as have countless commentators since. But Sweezy, unlike
Elster, goes on to examine what is surely the crucial issue: does such a tendency in fact exist, and if so,
does it exist for the reasons Marx suggests. Instead, Elster makes a counter-assertion: that Marx's
claim that the rate of profit falls as a result of the increase of the productive force is "contrary not only
to intuition, but to truth as well" (155) - an assertion that can no more be demonstrated rigorosly
than can Marx's claim.
16. Making Sense, 135. I have reformulated 2) slightly. As Elster presents it (the two clauses are set out
independently), it is not a meaningful interpretation.
17. Robert Paul Wolff, Understanding Marx: A Reconstruction and Critique o/Capital (Princeton, 1984),
117-140. Wolff argues that 2) constitutes Marx's solution to the classical problem of natural prices. I
don't find this interpretation convincing; there is certainly no textual evidence that Marx thought of 2)
this way.
18. Wolff, Understanding Marx.; also Michio Morishima, Marx's Economics (Cambridge, 1973), Chapter
7.
19. Morishima, Marx's Economics, 53 ff.
20. Robert Paul Wolff, "A Critque and Reinterpretation of Marx's Labor Theory of Value,
and Public Affairs 2 (Spring, 1981), 89-120. Elster (curiously) does not cite Wolff, and his own
formulation is slightly different (and less coherent): "labor power [is] the condition of possibility for
the existence of a general surplus" (39).
21. See my "On Robert Paul Wolff's Transcendental Interpretation of Marx's Labor Theory of Value,"
22. See Wolff, Understanding Marx, 93-97.
23. Wolff, Understanding Marx, 351.
24. Marx, Capitall, 37 (emphasis mine).
25. Piero Sraffa's Production 0/ Commodities by Means of Commodities (Cambridge, 1960) provoked a
debate that has not yet ended. In presenting a model in which prices are determined without any
reference to utility or scarcity, he dealt neoclassical theory a body-blow from which it may never
recover.
26. For a compelling articulation of a richer, more complicated answer compatible with what follows, see
David Harvey, The Limits to Capital (Chicago, 1982), especially 5-24 and 35-38.
27. In this sense the neo-Ricardian analysis of Steedman and others should not be regarded as being in
opposition to Marx's methodology, since neo-Ricardian analysis - in sharp contradistinction to
neoclassical analysis - also emphasizes real costs. In fact, it specifies them even more concretely.
This analysis should properly be regarded as an extension of the labor theory of value, not as a
non-Marxian alternative. Whether or not this- concreteness is more useful or not in clarifying the real
workings of a capitalist economy remains an open, much debated, question. See lan Steedman, Marx
After Straffa (London, 1977) for a defense of this approach. See Ben Fine and Laurence Harris,
Rereading Capital (New York, 1979) for a critique.
28. Marx, Capital I, 218.
29. See Morishima, Marx's Economics, 63 ff. for the proof. The proof is not trivial, and it may be doubted
that Marx had the requisite mathematical skills or techniques at hand to accomplish such a proof.
Nonetheless, his intuition was quite sound.
30. See Morishima, Marx's Economics, 89 ff. for more on this issue.
31. "Reply to Comments," 66.
32. I am not positing here a conscious intention. I am reflecting on the way the book seems to work on its
readers.
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33. Walzer, "What's Left of Marx?", 45.
34. Jon Elster, "Reply to Comments," Inquiry (March 1986), 69.
35. I am thinking here of the West, specifically the United States. How the book might be read elsewhere
is a very different matter.
36. It might be maintained that this criticism applies to all analytical Marxists, not just to Elster. I find
this conclusion premature, although, as I note below, analytical Marxism does often exhibit certain
unfortunate tendencies. I do not mean to suggest either that the only efforts in which Marxist
intellectuals should engage are criticism of capitalism and criticism of conventional methodology. I
take it as self-evident that if Marxism is to be a living philosophy and not a corpse, it requires
self-criticism and self-renewal.
37. "On almost every point of detail Marx can be shown to have been inaccurate, incoherent, confused or
misguided." Elster, "Reply to Comments," 66.