US Exit Plan

NATO leaders in Chicago have signed Osamas plan for exit strategy from Afghanistan, aimed at reducing US-led military troops from 90000 to 20000 in Afghanistan. The plan calls for an end to combat operations in Afghanistan. Handing over security responsibilities to Afghan forces in 2013 and the withdrawal of the U.S-led international military troops by the end of 2014. After that, a new and different NATO mission will advise, train and assist the expected 352,000strong Afghanistan force. Obama has said "I don't think that there's ever going to be an optimal point where we say - this is all done, this is perfect, this is just the way we wanted it and now we can wrap up all our equipment and go home. This is a process, and it's sometimes a messy process, just as it was in Iraq". Yet a final round of negotiations remains & the plan has to be finalized.

The Afghan exit strategy is fraught with peril

GEOFF BURT, MARK SEDRA, AND MICHAEL LAWRENCE

The international communitys 2014 exit strategy from Afghanistan rests on two pillars: training an Afghan security force that can stand on its own feet, and fostering regional co-operation on a conflict that defies borders. Forging a political settlement with the Taliban is considered by most to be the indispensable third pillar of this strategy, even if U.S. and NATO officials are reticent to recognize it as such. Unfortunately, an assessment of progress in all three areas gives cause for serious concern. Septembers assassination of former president Burhanuddin Rabbani, who chaired the Afghan high peace council overseeing negotiations with anti-government groups, appears to have derailed efforts to find common ground with the Taliban. Pakistans absence from the just-concluded Bonn II Conference over an accidental NATO bombing that left 24 of its soldiers dead has similarly left prospects for a regional strategy bleak. The final pillar, the training program for the Afghan National Security Forces, has fared little better. As the 2014 target for the withdrawal of most international troops looms, NATOs training mission is scrambling to add nearly 50,000 soldiers and police to Afghanistans 306,000-strong security force over the next year. The Afghan security forces are now responsible for seven geographic areas accounting for 25 per cent of the population. The prospects, however, of creating a force capable of assuming security responsibility for the entire country by 2014 remain dubious.

According to U.S. government sources, only one of the Afghan National Armys 161 units is capable of operating independently; this represents a regression from the four units that were rated as independent in June. No units of the police are capable of functioning without direct coalition assistance, and no sections of the ministries of Interior and Defence (which will soon be charged with managing the security situation) are capable of autonomous action. All are rife with corruption. Meanwhile, the number of security incidents confronting the Afghan security forces continues to increase, with the UN citing a 39-per-cent rise in 2011 over the previous year. Some view these problems as transitory amid a record of steady improvement, a message trumpeted at Bonn. The real dilemma, however, is that even if Afghanistan could achieve the desired force levels and improve the impact of its training programs, the force would be fundamentally unsustainable without massive and prolonged international subsidies. The U.S. Defence and State departments have requested more than $5-billion to sustain the Afghan police and military in 2012. Continued training and operations add further billions to the tab. Contrast these figures with the Afghan governments revenues in 2010, which were a paltry $1-billion. Although donors in Bonn have pledged to finance the Afghan government over the next decade, several U.S. accountability offices note that there has been no comprehensive study of the actual costs of sustaining the Afghan security forces after withdrawal, and the conference simply postponed any concrete assessment. In a climate of economic crisis and fiscal austerity, it seems unlikely that donor countries will continue to bridge such a glaring resource gap for the foreseeable future.

With all three of the pillars of the international exit strategy teetering, what is the likely outcome of the transition? What is at stake?
After 2014, Afghanistan will almost assuredly be stuck with a bill it cant pay but if it does not keep training and developing the security forces, attrition will quickly decimate NATOs achievements. One in seven soldiers and police desert each month, and for every 10 soldiers trained another 13 trainees drop out. Any disruption in salary payments to the security forces that will likely accompany a drop in international subsidies will compound this problem. With all three of the pillars of the international exit strategy teetering, what is the likely outcome of the transition? What is at stake? If the Afghan security forces do prove unsustainable after 2014, they will likely splinter into factions led by various strongmen. (The armys leadership is largely comprised of former Northern Alliance commanders.) In the best-case scenario, Afghanistan will feature controlled instability and limited sovereignty with the Taliban controlling the bulk of the south and parts of the east of the country, various warlords controlling the central and northern regions, and the government controlling an

enclave around Kabul and some key urban centres, with low-level conflict along the fringes. In the worst-case scenario, the country will return to the civil war that devastated it during the 1990s. Either outcome could easily sacrifice the most basic goal and achievement of international intervention: ousting al-Qaeda and denying safe haven to it and other Islamist militant groups. Even more worryingly, it could foist upon Afghanistan yet another humanitarian crisis. The real tragedy of the situation is that international assistance may have inadvertently created the conditions for renewed civil war. When Operation Enduring Freedom commenced in 2001, the Taliban controlled over 90 per cent of the country and the Northern Alliance was barely hanging on. The intervention has restored a rough parity, which could portend a long and bloody struggle. Indeed, most Afghans view the past 10 years not as the beginning of a new era of peace, but rather as a temporary lull in an ongoing conflict. While the international community is struggling to implement its Plan A for the future of Afghanistan, Afghan groups and regional states such as Pakistan, Iran and India are already onto Plan C, making strategic calculations about which Afghan factions will best serve their interests and security following the international withdrawal. The optimistic final communiqu from the Bonn II Conference belies the harsh realities on the ground in Afghanistan, tragically demonstrated by Tuesdays suicide bombings, which killed dozens of Shia worshippers celebrating Ashura. Instead of trying to grasp victory from the jaws of defeat, NATO and its international partners will soon have to acknowledge the severity of the situation and work to head off its most dire consequences.

Pakistan termed biggest stakeholder in post-2014 Afghanistan

Pakistan is the biggest stakeholder on the issue of post-2014 Afghanistan which is when US and Nato forces plan to exit and the future of the region should be chalaked out with Pakistans engagement.

A representative parliamentary delegation comprising all political parties apprised British leaders, parliamentary leaders and opinion makers in the UK of this, said a statement issued by Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed. The two sides discussed the perspective and concerns of Pakistan about the end-game in Afghanistan and on the planned exit of the US and Nato forces from Afghanistan in 2014 and its impact on the region. It was underlined that Pakistan was the biggest stakeholder on the issue of post-2014 Afghanistan, hosting 2.5 million refugees, having suffered and sacrificed the most after 9/11 with over 40,000 losses of lives of civilians and soldiers. The Afghan reconciliation process requires Pakistans proactive participation, and its interests were in a stable, united and peaceful Afghanistan, the statement added.

The US exit from Afghanistan: Implications for the Role of South Asian Stakeholders
Posted by Amit Kumar, Ph.D.

By end-2014, once the US led ISAF coalition leaves Afghanistan, the role of Afghanistan's South Asian neighbors is vital and critical. Will some of these stakeholders be critical in helping implement parts of the fight-talk-build strategy the US is currently wrestling with? Do Afghanistan's future security, governance, and developmental needs necessitate a salient role for its South Asian neighbors? Is a regional strategy for Afghanistan an answer to the US's post exit predicament as far as Afghanistan is concerned? What implications would the US-Afghan-Taliban talks have on the role and concerns of the aforementioned South Asian stakeholders? The piece addresses the implications of the US-led exit from Afghanistan for the role of South Asian stakeholders like India, Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, and brings out a need for the US to engage these stakeholders in resolving the Afghan conflict.

Implications for South Asian Stakeholders India has signed a Strategic Partnership agreement with Afghanistan last October -- which, among other things calls for Indian aid in training the Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army once the US led coalition leaves Afghanistan; in effect taking over part of the role the US is playing presently in this regard. In addition, the agreement calls for Indian assistance in the economic development of Afghanistan. India has bagged a contract worth billions of dollars for development of the Hajigak iron deposits in Bamiyan province in Afghanistan; for establishment of steel mills to process this iron ore; and for construction of a railway line to

transport this steel for export through the Iranian port of Chabahar. In addition, Indian assistance in roadbuilding in Afghanistan has been progressing for the past several years. The close alliance between Al-Qaida affiliates like the anti-India Lashkar-e-Tayibba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and the Taliban including elements of the Haqqani Network constitutes a direct threat to India's security. India's interest in kicking off the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan Pakistan India (TAPI) gas pipeline as well as the US's championing the cause of the New Silk Road Initiative are important developmental issues that merit careful deliberation and thought. This pipeline would serve the commercial interests of these four countries but of course the lack of adequate security in Afghanistan and Pakistan remains a challenge for this project to ever get off the ground. Pakistan has had a historic association with the Taliban and would like to gain and maintain strategic depth (against Indian influence) in Afghanistan once the ISAF coalition departs by propping the Pashtun dominated Taliban and its most deadly faction, the Haqqani Network, in a post exit dispensation. Indian and the Russian Federation's support to the erstwhile Northern Alliance groups comprising the ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and the Hazaras, who are all opponents of the Pashtun dominated Taliban, creates a scramble for power and the very distinct possibility of the encore post-2014 of a terrible inter-ethnic internecine civil war that gripped the country in the late 1990s. Moreover, the Taliban resides on both sides of the porous Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and has enjoys quite a following in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region of Pakistan. Due to the US led invasion of Afghanistan, and the putative action of the Pakistan Government in 2007 against what is mistakenly referred to as the Pakistan Taliban, millions of Pashtuns have migrated to the Pakistani port city of Karachi, creating additional pressures on resources, and more ethnic strife amongst Pakistan's Muhajir community that is predominant in that city. Iran and the Russian Federation are concerned with the rising drug trafficking activity emanating from opium cultivation and processing in Afghanistan that adversely affects the populations of these two countries. Iran is also concerned with the plight of the Persian speaking Hazara ethnic minority in Afghanistan in the current and post US exit situation. Kazakhstan has for the past few years been an alternate land supply route for the NATO troops in Afghanistan. Quite understandably, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are concerned about the plight of their ethnic brethren, the Tajiks and Uzbeks respectively, in the event of a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan post 2014. The Need for a Regional Solution to the Afghan Problem Given the tremendous stakes that Afghanistan's South Asian neighbors have in the security, development, and governance scenario in Afghanistan, it is but natural that they be involved by the US in carving a solution to the Afghan problem. Given the fact that the exit date for withdrawal of the US-led ISAF is only two and a half years hence, it is imperative that the US consults these countries. The consultation could be of varying degrees and at various stages of the negotiating process with the Taliban. It is absolutely critical for the US to consult both Pakistan and India. Their involvement in resolving the Afghan problem should not be seen as mutually exclusive. What matters most to the US is any help it can get to bring normalcy to Afghanistan and the establishment of security, governance, and development processes in that country. The Pakistan Parliament's drafting in recent days of an agreement that would forbid US drone strikes in Pakistan territory and stop the supplies to the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan through Pakistan, creates an urgent need for the US to look for other supply routes in Central Asia to supplement the existing arrangement in Kazakhstan. Given the US's uneasy relationship with Iran, it quite imaginable for Washington to find it difficult to allow Iran to be

part of any South Asian solution. However, and quite notably, Iran has already participated in one of the international conferences recently held to help chart the future course in Afghanistan. Conclusion US policy makers may seriously like to weigh in on the dire need to bring in South Asian stakeholders into rescuing Afghanistan from the suffering, chaos, and near breakdown of security and governance that it finds itself in. Different ethnic stakeholders within Afghanistan and their allies outside Afghanistan may all be beneficiaries of such a serious engagement amongst its neighbors. And the US would be the greatest beneficiary of such engagement, in finding a way to try to end the Afghan conflict, which by any account is one of the gravest foreign policy and security challenges it has had to confront in a very long time.

Withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan (Endgame): Issues and challenges for Pakistan Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi

Obama administration seems to have fulfilled the US agenda in Afghanistan: killing of Osama Bin Ladin, breaking the backbone of terrorism in the region, reconstruction and democratization of Afghanistan. President Obama asserted recently that Afghanistan no longer represents a terrorist threat to the US. According to him, tide of war is receding and that America, it is time to focus on nation-building here at home. If, largely, the goals in Afghanistan are achieved, this means setting in motion a substantial withdrawal of the US forces. This would acknowledge the formal end of terrorism and a shift of his administrations focus towards the fast-changing political and economic landscape in the US. His second woe can be accepted in harsh reality of domestic economic restrains. However, the tide of war against terrorism has not receded.

This paper/ presentation will focus on the US announcement of the withdrawal of forces, the endgame in Afghanistan and its implications on Pakistan with a futuristic view. Key words: US, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Taliban, Policy Mr. Obama announced plans to withdraw 10,000 troops from Afghanistan by the end of this year. He said the drawdown would continue at a steady pace until the United States handed over security to the Afghan authorities in 2014. The decision to withdraw forces from Afghanistan has been taken by the president who faces relentless budget pressures, an increasingly restive American public and a re-election campaign next year (The New York Time, 2011, June 22). It is well-understood that the US is facing a deep but challenging financial crunch at home. However, ending the war responsibly is just the other way round. This conflict has cost hundreds of billions of dollars and 1,500 American lives (The New York Time, 2011, June 22). Exit strategy in haste will ruin all the sacrifices and investment. Terrorism is a menace which has not yet been curbed in Afghanistan or Pakistan in its totality. The American policy makers have coined a unique term to define two nations fighting against the terror despite believing in one nation one state- phenomenon. They call

Author is Lecturer, Department of International Relations and Director, South Asian Centre for International and Regional Studies (SACIRS), Peshawar Pakistan.Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi 130 Pakistan and Afghanistan as AfPak (Raza, 2009: 120). AfPak region is

worse affected by the terror and terror as a threat. Terror is still persistent and the threat is still looming on the heads of not only the Af-Pak but also for the US interests in the region. After the Death of Osama Bin Ladin (OBL) In September 2001, OBL was a major factor in US attack over Afghanistan in 2001. However, when the mastermind of the 11 September attacks in the US and the world most wanted man was killed in a US operation in the northwestern Pakistan in May 2011, the US president Barak Obama announced it in a statement that, justice has been done" (The Guardian, 2011, May 2). Back then some section of people were considering the OBL death not only a great achievement for the US forces in Afghanistan so far, but they also were not sure of any phenomenal role left anymore for the US forces to stay longer in Afghanistan. But the high US officials have made it clearer when they started giving an impression that with the end of OBL, the war on terror is not yet over. Of course, when it comes to the US adversaries in the region, Taliban are stronger than the last time. The use of extensive military force to eliminate the Taliban and its Al-Qaeda supporters has not yielded positive military results in Afghanistan. The Taliban movement has shown greater resilience over the years, deepening its roots amongst the Afghan populace. Particularly, their resistance had increased in the Pashtun-dominated north-southern provinces along the Pakistan border. So much so that the NATO forces has removed their basis from the bordering Afghan provinces of Nuristan and Kunar after growing Taliban attacks. Similarly, the allied forces have struggled to keep security of the Capital Kabul intact due to off and on attacks from Taliban. In one such terror incident the Afghan President Karzai narrowly escaped after a

military parade to mark the 16 years since the overthrow of the countrys Soviet backed rule was attacked. The security forces whisked Karzai away, however, three people including a parliamentarian was killed. But, more importantly, the message was wide clear in a subsequent media statement, which the local journalists attributed to Taliban. It said, they (Taliban) had not targeted Karzai directly, but wanted to show how easily they could get access to such events (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7369540.stm). Despite the beefed up security, Kabul still has not recovered from such attacks. The show of strength led many stakeholders to believe that solution of Afghan problem would not be easy without including Taliban into any peace process. This was the start of the end of a US policy to purge Afghanistan of all terror networks. Hence, efforts were launched to integrate flexible militants into a broader governmental framework. By employing secret ways Withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan (Endgame) 131 and means, the US officials did try to woo Taliban through the connivance of Karzai government. Such efforts, however, have hardly bore fruits so far now. Partly, because Taliban understand that they are in a much stronger position today then they were in the past. So, therefore, their tone and tenor is least flexible (Interview with Riffat Orakzai, 2011, December, 17). They did agree to hold dialogues but the terms and conditions, which they put forward, through informal means of communication, are seemingly too rigid for the U.S. to make them part of any possible future political settlement (Interview with Riffat Orakzai, 2011, December, 17). Mulla Nasir, the Taliban Commander at Hilmand says: if formal talks are initiated, our first demand is the withdrawal of foreign forces. This is the

condition set by the head of the Emirate- Mulla Omer. We will not move from this position. As of the Karzai, he is installed by the US. Ordinary Afghans will not cooperate with his government. Not after so much bloodshed and sacrifice. Mulla Nasir made the remarkable but startling remark that the Polish troops stationed in Ghazani had offered him thousands of dollars not to attack on their supply conveys. According to him, I have been offered 30,000 per convoy by the polish soldiers to provide them safe passage. A day after the 30,000 offer, we attacked them and inflicted millions of dollars of losses on them. The torched vehicles are still present in the battlefield. Its true. They have offered us hefty bribes to stop attacking them. Mulla Naisrs ideas and opinion is both hard line and moderate. Refusing to say if any future Taliban regime will give Al-Qaeda sanctuary, he is insisting that his movement is not against girls schools, music or television. Yet he had one uncompromising message for the families of NATO troops fighting in Afghanistan: I want to address the *western+ parents who sent their soldiers to Afghanistan. Dont sacrifice your sons for this war. It cant be won. You should look at the Afghan history. No force on the face of the earth; not the Russians; not [the] NATO have defeated the Afghans (Interview with Hilmand Mullah Nasir). Given the intricacy of the conflict, with many actors involved pursuing varying agendas, the likelihood of reconciliation and negotiation with the Taliban insurgents is being questioned. Scepticism prevails amongst many Afghans about the possibility of incorporating Taliban in a power sharing formula. Basically, Afghanistan is a diverse country in view of its ethnic composition. Due to ragging fighting ever since the Soviet intervention in 1979, peace has never visited the land-locked country. It badly damaged ethnic composition of

Afghans. Major communities such as Tajik, Uzbak, Hazarajat etc have all fought the war, but Pashtuns (45 percent) were the most powerful vehicle of resistance against the Soviets. Resultantly, they suffered the most. After the Soviets withdrawal in 1989, factional fighting ensued. Mujahideen commanders turned into mighty warlords (Kurt, 1993: 134). Every one of them was the de facto representative of their respective ethnic communities. In the Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi 132 eastern provinces along the border of Pakistan, many such warlords carried out exploitation of the local Afghans through setting up roadside checkpoints. The emergence of the Taliban movement starting from Qandahar province in early 1994 was the reaction of this exploitation. However, role of the neighboring Pakistan in extending support to this movement throughout its rigid six years rule in Afghanistan is an open secret. This support apparently ended when Pakistan became a non-NATO ally of the U.S in its war on terror and provided its ground and space to facilitate the U.S. attack on Afghanistan in 2001, which brought an end to the Taliban rule (Interview with Mumtaz Bangash, 2012, January 12). With all this background in view, the U.S. policies in Afghanistan lack on two vital fronts. First, the policy makers have empowered relatively smaller communities at the expense of a larger one, which has altered the balance of ethnic composition by giving more political leverage to communities other than the majority Pashtuns. Second, the U.S. policy makers have tried to reach solution to Afghan problem by isolating the issue from its regional geostrategic realities. Addressing both these factors are vital for post-withdrawal Afghanistan. Otherwise, long-lasting peace in this war-torn country would get

solid hurdles on its way. Pakistan as a factor Though Pakistan claimed to have severed its relations with Taliban, but there are enough indications that elements within its official machinery have always enjoyed soft corner for the movement. Partly because Taliban is mostly ethnic Pasthuns and a sizable part of Pashtuns also live on Pakistan side of the divide, where they are more integrated in the mainstream than their ethnic cousins, at present, in Afghanistan. Hence the influence of Pashtun factor in the official decision-making can hardly be ignored and so is the possibility of their support for the Taliban in Afghanistan. More so, the geographical dependency of Afghanistan on Pakistan makes the latter indispensible for the former. On top of that, tribal affinities on both sides of the divide are stronger than any border restriction and this factor has so far made Pakistan a natural route for all Afghans to avail health and business facilities in Khyber Pashtunkhwa (KPK) and FATA (Interview with Dr. Alam Shah, 2011, December 11). Such geographical compulsion has taken shape of emotional and sentimental attachments, which could be witnessed in CIAISI war against the ex-USSR in the early 1980s. Mujahideen from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA fought hand in hand with their ethnic Pashtuns in Afghanistan and together both of them drove the Soviets out. Long-lasting geographical and demographical affiliations of the sort could hardly be evaded easily. That is one reason that Pakistan army have faced severe resistance in Withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan (Endgame) 133 establishing State writ in Pashtuns areas after the country became US allay in 2001. Pakistan so far has lost three thousand troops so far in fighting against

Taliban and 35 thousands of its civilians have fallen prey to suicide bombing and bomb blasts (http://ipripak.org/factfiles/ff105.pdf). Overall Pakistan claims that its economy has suffered a loss of 70 billion during the last one decade, which severely hits every sector of the society. Keeping in view this vital role of Pakistan in the US war on terror, how could the US afford to ignore geographical and demographical sensibilities of its allyPakistanwhen it comes to talks with Taliban? (Interview with Dilawar Wazir, 2011, December 15). The U.S., however, seems to have little sympathies left for Pakistan. Ever since they attacked Afghanistan, the U.S officials have always looked at Pakistan suspiciously. In this regard the role of Inter-service Intelligence Agency (ISI) invited huge criticism, which was directly blamed for backing Taliban. Afghan President Karzai went to the extent of suggesting the U.S. authorities to hold talks with Pakistan on behalf of the Taliban (The Express Tribune, 2011, December 4). The biggest obstacle to such an approach was always Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who presides over a bureaucracy so riddled with corruption that it is seemingly incapable of providing either basic services or competent governance. Without a reliable partner in Kabul, the counterinsurgency strategy successfully employed in Iraq by Gen. David A. Petraeus, the top NATO commander in the region, was bound to fail (http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-06-30/news/bs-ed-afghanistan20110630_1_insurgents-afghanistan-drone). This situation got further complicated when Pakistan-based-Taliban killed security forces and civilians by penetrating inside the bordering areas of Pakistan (Daily Dawn, 2011, October 24).

On top of all, withdrawal of the US forces will hardly achieve a desired result unless and until the US put the issue in its local context. Growing Indian influence in Afghanistan and continuous US support to boost India as regional power in South East Asia is bound to polarize regional environment. Traditional rivalry between Pakistan and India will always be a factor to influence any peace effort in Afghanistan. Some analysts have also predicted that USD 2 billion Indian investments in Afghanistan (The Hindustan Times, 2011, May 13) have already shifted confrontation between Pakistan and India from its eastern borders along Line of Control (LOC) to the western borders along Afghanistan. That is one reason that for the first time in history Pakistan has deployed over 1,50000 of its troops on its borders along with Afghanistan (Pakistan Observer, 2012, January 30). To further complicate the situation, Afghanistan has reached a strategic partnership agreement with India after Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi 134 the Afghan President Karzai meet its Indian counterpart in Delhi in October 2011 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15161776). Looking at all such developments reaching with the active U.S. consent, if not dictates, the region has got more volatile nature now than it was at any point of time during the last one decade. The US exit-strategy Will the US exit-strategy from Afghanistan will succeed or falter in the coming years? It is the major question on which the future of stability in Afghanistan largely depends. The US exit strategy without completely eradicating terrorism in the region can be equated with the US pack-up just after the Cold War in 1992. They left their most allied ally- Pakistan- at the mercy of terrorists in the

offing- the former Mujahideens against the Soviet Union. These Mujahideens turned into the Taliban later and that cost of the US haste exit strategy was suffered by Pakistan. Mulla Nasirs affirmation confirms that the Taliban are in full spirits. Their backbone is yet to be broken. Death of Osama does not mean the end of terrorism. We would not like to go into the controversy of how and why the war on terror began and how best we could muster its results. But the fact remains that the mess created the US in the post-9/11 haste must not be left for Pakistan again. Practically, counter-insurgency is aimed at sowing the seeds of long-term peace in war ravaged areas like Afghanistan and the Pakistans tribal belt. Since their arrival during October 2001, this was the mandate of the US forces presence in Afghanistan. Theoretically, questions regarding the legitimacy of intervention over state sovereignty and whether counter insurgency as state-policy can succeed, raise doubt over the states intervention at all. Due to the enormity and complexities of such a task, democratizing Afghanistan and pacifying Pakistan are recent examples of failure. The fact remains that the US war on terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan is lacking long term commitment required for successful counterinsurgency and state-building. This intervention might initially have gained domestic and international support but, as casualties and costs mount up, pressures build to the contrary. This can lead states to rush for an exit. The steep rise in the cost of the War on Terror has pressed upon the international coalition forces especially the US to adopt a withdrawal strategy to reduce its losses and achieve a face saving withdrawal from the country. Still, the growing disenchantment in the United States with the war, particularly given the ballooning national debt, the countrys slow economic recovery and

the whopping $120 billion price tag of the Afghan conflict this year alone, were all considerations weighed by the US president. At an occasion he said, Over Withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan (Endgame) 135 the last decade, we have spent a trillion dollars on war at a time of rising debt and hard economic times, Mr. Obama said. Now, we must invest in Americas greatest resource: our people. (The Washington Post, 2011, May 31) Where is Pakistan- the most allied ally during the War on Terror- in the US exit strategy? Are they sensitive about the Pakistani interests in the region? Are Americans repeating the saga of 1992- leaving its ally in the lurch after their supposedly fulfilment of agenda? Is their agenda fulfilled in true sense? These are some of the questions, which deserve an answer by the American administration. However, the withdrawal shows that the the administration may have concluded it can no longer achieve its loftiest ambitions there. This was also acknowledged by President Obama when he stated: We will not try to make Afghanistan a perfect place, he said. We will not police its streets or patrol its mountains indefinitely. That is the responsibility of the Afghan government. (The New York Times, 2011, June 22) The US Pakistan relationship is always based on unequal footings. Its purpose is self-serving interests rather than on mutually compatible objectives. The US policies and actions are guided by its global objectives and determinations. However, Pakistans regional interests guide its relationship: defense against India and Afghanistan. Since the relationship between the US and Pakistan has always been an affiliation between the two asymmetrical states; the relationship is always dictated by the superior. It was quite visible

in the rise and fall of the mercury of relations since 1947. In the past, despite the alliances such as SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan enjoyed less US priority than India which followed a policy of non-alignment. Similarly, the US tilt towards India during the decade long war on terror is a proof of the US insensitivity towards Pakistans regional interests. Pakistan has suffered terrorism over the last three decades. As a democratic Islamic republic and a supporter of the West against Communism, she has been subject to intensive terrorist activities in a systematic way. Since its creation, Pakistan has taken certain progressive steps to create a modern Islamic society aiming at the contemporary values of Eastern civilization. Within this context, one of the pillars of the Pakistani foreign policy has been based on the motto given by the great Quaid-e-Azam, Our foreign policy is one of the friendliness and goodwill towards the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Being loyal to this basic principle, Pakistan had always followed the policy of peaceful solutions of regional and Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi 136 international problems (http://pakteahouse.net/2011/02/19/the-pak-usconundrum/). As is obvious, during the last three decades, Pakistan has been affected by the social, economic and political outcomes of the Afghan conflicts and clashes by international and local actors. Despite the negative impact of Afghan imbroglio, Pakistan has always been very supportive to erstwhile friends- west- in order to reach a peaceful solution to the problems on their

own terms. Following this policy, Pakistan has played a very active role in winning the wars for the west and hence gave more sacrifices for the friends off the shores of Atlanta. As a most recent example, Pakistan did not hesitate to play a leading role in fighting the war on terror. As a former ally during the cold war and now a frontline country in the war on terror, Pakistan was compelled to struggle against the strong waves of terrorist challenges both during the cold war and in its aftermath. Pakistan has suffered terrorism for almost four decades and experienced the most bloody terrorist attacks in almost every corner of her soil. Since the very beginning of the terrorist activities on her soil, Pakistan always used the legal means within the limitations of national and international law. Throughout her struggle against this phenomenon, her calls to the neighboring countries and to her allies in the western world had unfortunately not shown the desired effect of uniting against this common enemy of mankind. The withdrawal of the US forces will have negative implications on Pakistan. The Afghan National Army is yet not able to take control and keep a watchful eye to combat the miscreants. They are inexperienced, not much trained and nave. Their capability and quality to combat terrorism can be judged from the fact that the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda consider their points of deployment as soft belly to attack and carry out suicide bombs in Kabul. After the withdrawal of the US forces, a weak entity in shape of Afghan National Army will replace them. This will mean more incursions in Pakistans tribal belt. In fact, the weaknesses in Afghanistan directly affect Pakistans national and domestic security. The US administration is also in dialogue with the Taliban in Afghanistan

(www.aljazeera.net/mritems/streams/2010/2/21/1_973201_1_51.pdf). They are trying to hammer out a power sharing relationship in Afghanistan. But on the contrary, Pakistans security forces are fighting against the Taliban in Pakistans tribal belt tooth and nail. This dichotomy is un-understandable. At one end two nations are united in the name of AfPak. On the other hand two diametrically opposed strategies are adopted by the US and Pakistan towards a similar entity-the Taliban. Withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan (Endgame) 137 The cost of Second World War was 4.1 trillion U.S. dollars whereas Americas war on terror with 4 trillion U.S. dollars already consumed would soon surpass the Second World Wars costs (The Frontier Post, 2011, August 11). The troops withdrawal have made Taliban bolder and have boosted their bargaining power in secret power sharing talks. Similarly, poor governance, notoriety of the Karzais regime and massive corruption in Afghanistan have also contributed to the confidence of the Taliban. To soften the Taliban stance on complete withdrawal before any negotiations could take place, the U.S. has already ensured that Taliban leaders are removed from the entities that fell under the UN sanctions (The Frontier Post, 2011, August 11). U.S. is working hard to ease out its withdrawal by trying to bring all warring Taliban factions under all acceptable political agreement much before the deadline of 2014. This whole process will encourage the Pakistani government to negotiate with the Pakistani Taliban. The irony of fate is that the Pakistani administration doesnt know the terms of dialogue upon which they could and would negotiate with the Taliban. Furthermore, the Pakistani society, unlike the Afghans, is not ready to consummate the role of the Taliban in official process.

The announcement of troops drawdown has also been linked with Strategic Partnership Declaration with Afghanistan. The declaration, when materialized, will allow the U.S. to retain at least five military bases beyond 2014 in Afghanistan. This will have major implications for Pakistan via-a-vis its relations with its friendly neighboring countries like Iran and China. Afghanistan soil would be used by the US forces for attacking the neighboring countries in the name of countering terrorism. This all can and will take place in the light of Bush Doctrine. In other words, the historic loyal and strategic role played by Pakistan will be replaced by Afghanistan. This will reduce Pakistans strategic importance for American administration. Thus in the circumstances, Pakistan has to evolve a balanced strategy with respect to regional actors. The engagement of the US in Afghanistan must be balanced with the Pakistans consultation with China and Russia. The stereo-typed definition to a success in terms of Afghanistan has been the creation of a strong government in Kabul with stable law and order established by its indigenous army and police. However, the Karzai government has proved to be very inefficient and lazy. With such accosts, the likelihood of a strong government in Kabul is evaporating. Withdrawal of the US forces will mean his inability to curb terrorism with full force. But keeping his track record, he will blame Pakistan for harboring terrorists and their infiltration. This will further fuel to the terror fire and the future relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan will deteriorate. No wonder, in the circumstances, both nations may go for very bad border skirmishes to gain world support. Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi 138 Pakistan absented itself from the Bonn conference 2011 as a mark of protest

at the death of two dozen soldiers who had been killed in a Nato air attack in Mohmand Agency. Pakistan has reduced its cooperation with Nato and the US in the war and is asking for a review of all ground rules. The Wests Af-Pak strategy is in tatters at a time when it ought to have been at its strongest. In brief, Pakistan at present is no longer a player in the endgame in Afghanistan. This would suggest that as of now there is no solid plan for an endgame to coincide with the withdrawal of forces by December 2014 (Daily Dawn, 2011, December 9). Pakistan would be happy, for an endgame in Afghanistan, with a solution that created an anti-Indian set-up; gave a prominent role to the Taliban in Afghanistans future; led to the departure of foreign forces; ended drone strikes and weakened insurgent groups in Pakistan (Daily Dawn, 2011, December 9). It is clear that the Pakistani establishment is convinced that the US will not wish to reduce Indias influence in post-2014 Afghanistan and that to the contrary, the US would wish to see India exercise a dominant role in the future of Afghanistan that is in conjunction with Americas strategic pact with India. In view of this disconnect between the US and Pakistan regarding India, Pakistan is now likely to exercise an independent role in the endgame in Afghanistan (Daily Dawn, 2011, December 9). The economies of Afghanistan and Pakistan have always been a central issue with the policy makers of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the US alike. Corruption, money laundering, internal strife, sectarian conflicts, and constant warring situation with neighboring countries like India and Afghanistan have often mustered crisis for the people of Pakistan. With the withdrawal of the US forces, guns and grenades will re-emerge, as happened in the post USSR

forces withdrawal situation in Afghanistan. The US forces withdrawal will put the situation back to square one. The vacuum created by the departure of the US forces will once again tried to be filled by the war-lords. This will slip Afghanistan into internecine struggle which has been a feature of the Afghan society since long. Pakistan being the neighboring country with sharing of the biggest ethnic Pushtoon entity of 42% in Afghanistan will be drawn into the strife and forced to take side. Pakistan still carries the people in its administration civil as well as military who believe in the strategic depth phenomenon. These theories will re-emerge and hence the situation will turn to 1998 Afghanistan- a breeding ground of terrorism, religious extremism, pestilence and hate. Pakistan as usual will not be able to keep itself isolated from Afghanistan and hence will be entangled in its internal politics once again. Withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan (Endgame) 139 Conclusion President Obama is playing troops reduction politics. He is trying to find a political solution to a military role which needs to be other way round. The situation in Afghanistan is very precarious and hence without panicking about the increasing level of violence, the sanity is needed. A long term solution to a three decade long problem needs an extensive strategy rather than just pullout in haste. Troops reduction politics (TReP) can be a slogan to attract masses in the forthcoming Presidential elections. However, this will lash-back. This will again result in warlordism, sanctuary of terrorists and insecurity of Afghanistans neighboring countries including countries like the US. We can never remake Afghanistan into something resembling a Western democracy; what kind of government ultimately emerges there is something

only Afghans can decide. Our interest is limited to ensuring that the country doesn't become a haven for terrorists intent on attacking the U.S. The counterterrorism strategy outlined by the administration this week represents a realistic approach to the problem that can accomplish our goals in the region and wherever new threats arise at a price in blood and treasure that is far less than what we have been paying up to now (http://articles.baltimoresun.com/201106-30/news/bs-ed-afghanistan-20110630_1_insurgents-afghanistan-drone). For many years, Pakistan has relied on the US for its security and economic growth. However, the lack of US support in the 1971 war with India and its abrupt exit after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 created a negative image of the US that persists even today. This image is now confirmed in the minds of the majority of Pakistanis after the US engagement with India under the strategic relationship umbrella (Daily Dawn, 2011, September 30). Peace in Afghanistan will give a sigh of relief to Afghanistan as well as to its neighboring countries. This is the ultimate purpose of the withdrawal of the US forces and action on endgame. This will also mean the end of international terrorism in the region. The questions of the question is what will be the solution to the trouble in FATA. Will peace in Afghanistan mean peace in FATA and Pakistan? The fear is that the end of terrorism in Afghanistan will shift the focus of terrorists to Pakistan and hence the situation will be like out of the frying pan into the fire. Hence, the policy makers are supposed to work comprehensively on every part of the issue including FATA and Pakistan. This is the place where our policy makers must be vigilant in participating the endgame of Afghanistan and the withdrawal of the US forces from the region.