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ISSN 1563-9304 | Ashara 4 1416 BS, Thursday | June 18, 2009

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A Nation’s Pain That Resonates In The Region

Book Review :The Raj Lives- India In Nepal

Thursday April 10 2008 15:08:21 PM BDT

Reviewed By Mohammed Ashraf, USA

As Nepal embarks on its first real quest for renewal since emerging as a nation-state two and half
centuries ago, it continues to draw massive international attention. The global media’s propensity
for running with neat story lines, however, stands in the way of a substantive analysis of the
Himalayan nation’s entrenched complexities. More relevant for South Asia, perhaps, is a less-
known narrative: the overwhelming role and influence of India in almost all domains of Nepalese
life.

A new book, “The Raj Lives”, illuminates this aspect of the Nepalese experience in ways that
carry resonance in the wider neighborhood. The author, Sanjay Upadhya, is a prominent
Nepalese journalist who has closely observed and analyzed India-Nepal relations for more than
two decades.

Upadhya starts with a basic paradox. Historically, Nepal has remained an independent and
sovereign country since Prithvi Narayan Shah conquered dozens of principalities into a unitary
state under the Shah dynasty. Yet Nepal remains locked in what Upadhya calls an “embrace of
estrangement” with India.

Half a century after coming into existence, Nepal was forced to cede a third of its territory to the
British Indian rulers after a two-year war. The 1816 Sugauli Treaty, by, among other things,
stationing a British resident in Kathmandu against the wishes of the rulers, turned Nepal into a
virtual protectorate of British India.

Upadhya does not dwell in too much detail on why the British did not bring Nepal formally
under the Raj. Still, he shows how Nepal stifled under it. By patronizing the Rana oligarchy and
pitting it against the monarchy – represented by a succession of minors – the British succeeded in
creating a buffer against Tibet and China. In doing so, they avoided the political, administrative
and military costs of subduing the harsh mountainous terrain. By recruiting young Gurkhas into
the British Indian army, London succeeded in emaciating Nepal’s earlier military prowess and
cushioning the Ranas, to a great extent, against internal opposition.

Time continued its forward march. The independence of India in 1947 had a major bearing on
Nepal’s domestic politics. The Ranas faced growing opposition from younger Nepalese educated
in India. The new leaders in New Delhi shared close ties with prominent Nepalese democracy
activists, many of whom took part in India’s independence struggle. In 1950, New Delhi enticed
the Ranas into signing a Peace and Friendship Treaty in perpetuity in exchange for continued
support. Six months later, having flawlessly extricated the king from his palace and brought him
to Delhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and his associates forced the Ranas to share power with the monarchy
– from whom they had usurped power a century earlier – as well as the democrats.

In one of the poignant ironies that Upadhya evokes, the “dawn of democracy” in Nepal
essentially saw the same Rana prime minister keep his job, this time as a commoner. After the
so-called “Delhi Compromise” – which Nepalese communists, in particular, branded a sell-out –
New Delhi systematically strengthened the king against the political parties. Upadhya explains,
with compelling confirmation, the principal premise of the book: How India virtually adopted
British colonial policies on Nepal.

After King Mahendra ended Nepal’s brief interlude with multiparty politics in 1960 by
dismissing Prime Minister B.P. Koirala’s elected government, Nehru offered token criticism of
what he called a “setback to democracy”. The Indian government provided refuge to Nepalese
exiles and supported their armed insurgency. But New Delhi never really extended enough
political support to the Nepali Congress to enable it to mount a serious challenge to monarchical
rule.

India’s defeat in the 1962 war with China prompted Nehru to engage with the palace, which had
steadily sought – and received – assurances of Chinese support. Upadhya narrates how India
used the exiles to wrest concessions from the palace-led Panchayat regime. The situation
discouraged B.P. Koirala – who had gone into exile in India after being released from prison in
1968 – to the point where he returned to Nepal to mount a peaceful campaign for change from
within.

A major instance of Indian maneuvering came in the form of the 1989 trade and transit dispute.
Rajiv Gandhi’s government was infuriated by Nepal’s decision to purchase a small consignment
of weapons from China. The 1950 treaty also contained an exchange of letters that was kept
secret for nine years. India was using those to pressure successive Nepalese governments –
democratic and autocratic alike – to bring the country in its sphere of influence.

At the height of the trade and transit dispute, the Indian media revealed the existence of a secret
agreement under which it claimed Kathmandu had explicitly pledged to buy arms from India
alone. Disputing that interpretation, Kathmandu insisted that the Chinese had offered the
weapons at bargain prices. Citing disagreements over the extension of the trade and transit
treaties, India imposed a virtual embargo on Nepal. Meanwhile, it encouraged the banned
political parties to rise up against the king.

It soon emerged that India was pressuring King Birendra to sign a comprehensive treaty that
would have brought Nepal into a Bhutan-like arrangement in exchange for continued support for
palace rule. Perhaps mindful of the Ranas’ fate, the king refused. Growing popular protests
ultimately forced him to restore multiparty democracy. India proudly claimed it had been behind
the parties all along. Privately, Upadhya explains, New Delhi presented the democratic
government with the same restrictive treaty.

The Nepali Congress government refused to sign that treaty, but India nevertheless won
favorable terms on the sharing water resources, something the palace-led government had
consistently refused. This time, it used the communists to ensure the ratification of the Mahakali
Treaty in 1996. New Delhi secured prior rights on water, while Kathmandu is still waiting for the
detailed project report, which was to have been ready in six months.

The 1950 treaty also provided for an open international border and the freedom of movement,
residence, property, business and other benefits for each other’s citizens on a reciprocal basis.
But India, given the asymmetries, has been the beneficiary. Upadhya describes how India has
been using its “special relations” with Nepal to prevent it from developing ties with Pakistan and
Bangladesh. With the latter, Nepal is separated by 18 kilometers of Indian territory. New Delhi
has rejected Kathmandu’s pleas for transit access primarily on security grounds. Upadhya
explains that for most Nepalis, the 1950 Treaty lives as the preeminent symbol of the
perpetuation of the Raj.

The book suggests that India had encouraged King Gyanendra to take a more assertive role to
combat the Maoist insurgency, while New Delhi provided refuge to key Maoist leaders.
Although he makes no definitive assertion, Upadhya suggests that India might have tacitly
supported King Gyanendra’s seizure of absolute powers, only to oppose him when he named
himself head of government instead of an India-friendly politician. In any case, Upadhya shows
how New Delhi continued to engage with the palace over the succeeding months.

It was only when King Gyanendra led a successful effort to tie Afghanistan’s membership of
SAARC with the induction of China as an observer that New Delhi took a hard line. Days after
the summit in Dhaka, New Delhi forged an alliance between the Nepalese opposition parties and
the Maoist rebels against the palace.

“The Raj Lives” vividly portrays Nepal’s geopolitical compulsions. Since the collapse of the
royal regime in 2006, China has emerged as an even more assertive external player in Nepal,
precisely what New Delhi had sought to prevent. Beijing expects Kathmandu to respect its
security sensitivities, especially concerning Tibet, and has made its wishes known explicitly in
public. The recent Tibetan protests underscored Nepal’s vulnerability vis-à-vis its two giant
neighbors. More and more Nepalese feel that India’s response to China’s influence would
determine their country’s future irrespective of whether it remains a monarchy or becomes a
republic after this month’s election.

If Nepal were the only country in the region struggling to ward off Big Brother, it could have
been brushed aside as an aberration. “The Raj Lives” comes as a powerful reminder of how
easily other South Asian nations can share Nepal’s sentiments.

-------------------------------------
The Raj Lives: India In Nepal
Author: Sanjay Upadhya
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2008
Pages: 350; Hardbound Edition
Price: Indian Rs.645
---------------------------------------

Mohammed Ashraf is a freelance writer . Mr Asraf is of Pakistani heritage currently living in the
United States and who has also lived in Nepal,
E Mail : mohammed-ashraf@excite.co

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