22 Days in May: The Birth of the Lib DemConservative Coalition by David Laws review This account of the coalition's

s formation will appeal most to political trainspotters Jonathan Powell , The Observer, Sunday 5 December 2010 This book describes the negotiations between 7 and 11 May on the formation of Britain's first coalition government since the Second World War and David Laws's all too brief career as a cabinet minister, which ended with his resignation on the 29th of the month. The negotiations may have seemed important to the participants at the time, but Ten Days That Shook the World John Reed's firsthand account of the Russian revolution they were not. This book will appeal more to political trainspotters like me than to the average reader, replete as it is with verbatim accounts of meetings and full supporting documents. It is hard not to warm to Laws himself, his self-deprecating comments and his wide-eyed wonder at everything in government from kissing the Queen's hand to his special sealed box for top secret intelligence. The sense of Alice in Wonderland is compounded by a misprint when he describes two Lib Dem officials "wondering nonchalantly through the corridor" of Number 10. His account of the first coalition cabinet meeting is almost more of a parody than Private Eye's New Coalition Academy: "I watched David Cameron chair the meeting crisply, concisely, and with a clear command of all the topics being discussed. I concluded that he was not only rather enjoying being prime minister, but appeared to be rather good at it. Nick Clegg also made some important contributions." The trouble with writing an instant book like this when you want to go back into government is that you have to be unrelentingly nice about pretty much everyone. And yet, if it is to have value, you need to have some candour about your friends as well as your enemies. The only two people who come across as anything other than thoroughly decent in the whole saga are Gordon Brown and Ed Balls; Laws, who clearly can't stand either, describes them as belonging to the thuggish tendency of politics. He even blames Labour for not getting rid of Brown as leader before the 2010 election so that it could have a prospect of winning enough seats to form a coalition with the Lib Dems. I found myself warming to his theme. The importance of the book lies in his detailed description on the coalition negotiations. It is likely that absolute majorities will be hard to come by in future and that these will not be the last coalition negotiations in Britain. The Lib Dem talks with the Tories moved remarkably quickly and smoothly, certainly far faster than equivalent negotiations elsewhere in Europe, and they gave both party leaders the opportunity to jettison their party's most ludicrous policies, to their evident relief. A few fascinating details pop out, like the advice from the Treasury that tax rises as well as spending cuts will be necessary before the next election and the casual way the two parties stumbled into the 55% threshold for ending five-year, fixed-term parliaments. Laws also tells us that he and Nick Clegg were always dubious about the pledge on tuition fees. Laws's central thesis is that the Lib Dems did not enter the negotiations with their minds already made up. By his account, what stopped an alliance with Labour was the rudeness of Ed Balls and the indifference of Ed Miliband and Harriet Harman and their failure to make enough concessions to the Lib Dems. They had expected a charm offensive from Labour and all they got was a negotiating team that was, with the exception of Peter Mandelson and Andrew Adonis, charmless and offensive. Laws seems almost too anxious to prove that he and Nick Clegg were not crypto-Tories set from the outset on an alliance with David Cameron. And yet, when you read the book, there are little clues all the way through that there is something to the charge. The most unconvincing part is Laws's description of why he became a Lib Dem: it was not for any reasons of ideology but just because he felt comfortable in the party. He says that the coalition could only happen because Clegg was the first Lib Dem leader to be truly equidistant between the parties, by which he means open to the Conservatives. And he reveals that George Osborne suddenly popped up in his office in 2001 proposing that he defect to the Tories. Instead of reacting with anger, he seems to have been mildly pleased with a cold call more reminiscent of the Soviet-era KGB than modern politics.
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His thesis is not therefore terribly convincing even on the evidence of his own account of events. In fact, a Lib-Lab coalition was never realistic. The numbers just weren't there in Parliament. The electorate would not have stood for propping up Gordon Brown in government for another six months after he had been defeated. And a large part of the Labour party would not have accepted such a coalition of the losers. The Lib Dems' negotiating team clearly did not think such a coalition was realistic, but used the theoretical threat of it skilfully as a negotiating lever to squeeze their main demand a referendum on AV out of Cameron. Laws refers a number of times to the possibility of forming a Lib-Lab coalition in 1997, bringing together the progressive forces in British politics, which he says didn't happen because of the size of Tony Blair's majority. That is wrong. The reason it didn't happen was because Gordon Brown and other Labour leaders were at the time opposed to such an alliance and to any concessions on AV. It is paradoxical, therefore, that in 2010 the Labour party ran on an explicit promise of AV and then, according to this account, Gordon Brown virtually begged Nick Clegg to form a coalition after the election. One thing that leaps out of the book is the bifurcated nature of the Lib Dems. The party is, in fact, two parties made up of both old-fashioned liberal conservatives like Laws and Clegg and social democrats like Paddy Ashdown and Charles Kennedy. That sort of division is easy to manage in opposition but much more difficult in government. If they survive the test, as I expect them to do, they will still face the problem that always faces the junior party in German coalition governments when they get to the next election: how to differentiate yourself from the larger partner while still claiming credit for what the government has achieved. Anyone hoping for a candid account of Laws's resignation from government will be disappointed. He covers the event in less than half a page and tells us even less than we already know. He is clearly a very private man but also clearly decent and extremely able. I hope he does get back into government as we know he will since David Cameron has said he wants him back as soon as possible and that he enjoys it as much as he did the first time. David Laws's account of the coalition negotiations is interesting and valuable for future generations but it is, as he himself says, one sided. For a more balanced view, the book I am dying to read is an account of the period by Andrew Adonis, the one person who had been a Lib Dem and yet was at the centre of the Labour negotiating team. Only then will we get a clear view of what it was all about. Unfortunately, we may have to wait for some time. Jonathan Powell's The New Machiavelli: How to Wield Power in the Modern World is published by Bodley Head

The making of the coalition

IAN BIRRELL

SATURDAY, 4TH DECEMBER 2010 David Cameron was despondent on the evening of 10 May. David Cameron was despondent on the evening of 10 May. Although the election result was pretty much as he had predicted privately, he feared that his big, open and comprehensive offer of coalition with the Liberal Democrats was about to be rejected in favour of a deal with Labour. When we talked that night he feared another spell in opposition, and he ended by suggesting I went into the office the next day since he would have time on his hands. But as we spoke, the Lib Dem negotiating team was reporting back to Nick Clegg on another disastrous set of discussions with Labour, ensuring that long-held hopes of the so-called progressive alliance were shrivelling by the hour. Even Vince Cable accepted the reality of the situation. So the next day passed in feverish activity as the coalition agreement was sealed, and that evening Mr Cameron and his hastily summoned wife were clapped out of his office on their way to the Palace. After 13 years, the Conservatives were back in Downing Street in the most unlikely circumstances. The excitement of those febrile five days is captured in these two fine accounts of the birth of the coalition. Both read almost like thrillers, such were the twists and turns as sleep-deprived men and women played a game of poker with the highest stakes imaginable. Unlike many books by politicians, they are stuffed with nuggets of genuine revelation, although some of the biggest questions remain unsolved. Since David Laws was one of the central figures, 22 Days in May is inevitably the more absorbing, despite a slightly bland writing style and failure adequately to explain his sudden downfall. The book is designed to set in stone the Lib Dem case that there was no alternative to joining the Conservatives in full-blown coalition. Laws calls it the Sherlock Holmes strategy after a late-night discussion with the hyper- active Paddy Ashdown, who refers to a story in which the great detective eliminates all available options until there is only one possible solution. Whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth. This is precisely what happens. The three other options were tested, then eliminated. Firstly, the idea of staying in opposition, then supporting a minority Conservative government, and finally a Coalition of the losers with Labour and the smaller parties. To their credit the Lib Dems took the right decision, endorsing the electorates verdict, despite the potentially devastating ramifications and the hostility of previous leaders. Laws recalls how at one meeting he sat down next to Menzies Campbell, who was so angry he would not talk to him. The account by Tory MP Rob Wilson is a more probing work, examining mysteries such as the sidelining of Vince Cable a wise move since, in the first meeting of the negotiating teams, George Osborne asked if it was possible to discuss deficit reduction without his presence and the unresolved issue of precisely when Cameron and Clegg agreed to a referendum on electoral reform. The picture that emerges from both books is of two parties that were prepared for coalition and conducted negotiations with the seriousness they demanded, while the third was in disarray. We would not be establishing a new government, we would be chaining ourselves to a decaying corpse, concluded Laws after one meeting. There can be little doubt that Labour threw away their slim chance of staying in government with a display of muddle and inflexibility. So Gordon Brown alienates Clegg with his battering-ram style of diplomacy, then in desperation seemingly offers him half of all government posts and total control over European policy. Harriet Harman insults Chris Huhne by being unaware of his portfolio. And while the two peers Adonis and Mandelson valiantly struggle to hold the coalition talks together, the two Eds Balls and Miliband appear detached and even subversive, focused instead on their imminent leadership battle. There was a remarkable fluidity to politics during those tense days. Parties ditched key policies left, right and centre just days after fighting for them in an election although even the Tories were
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surprised by the speed with which the Lib Dems changed tack on the economy. One moment the coalition agreement proposed four-year fixed terms of government, then it was five years; such is the ease with which our constitution is changed. And Laws himself was clearly lined up to oversee transport, presumably with Philip Hammond as Chief Secretary to the Treasury, until he lobbied successfully to work alongside Osborne. As a first draft of those dramatic days, these accounts offer a fascinating glimpse into events that will shape the nations history, when a new generation of Liberals in two parties united in pursuit of power. Nothing unfolds as you expect, one of the key players tells Wilson, a statement that remains just as true for the coalition today as it did in May.

Pretty soon people will be asking 'who the hell is running this country?': David Laws gives the first account of the five days that changed Britain... By David Laws Last updated at 6:49 PM on 20th November 2010 Liberal Democrat MP David Laws was at the heart of talks with the Conservatives and Labour as a Coalition Government deal was thrashed out against the clock in May. Here, in an extract from his compelling new book, based on transcripts from all key meetings, is the first eyewitness account of the power struggles, drama and despair of those crucial hours... Friday, May 7 The day after the General Election, the MPs asked by Nick Clegg to be part of a negotiating team to deal with a hung Parliament met at party headquarters at Cowley Street. We were ensuring that party communications were rather more effective than they were in the hung Parliament of 1974, when Edward Heath's office tried to contact Liberal Party leader Jeremy Thorpe on Election night, only to be told: 'He's not available right now. He's leading a candlelight procession through the streets of Barnstaple.' There was myself, Danny Alexander, Chris Huhne and Andrew Stunell. Danny was Nick's chief of staff. Chris was our Home Affairs spokesman. Andrew is an expert on green issues, political reform and campaigning. I have seen transcripts of some of the discussions that followed, but not all were formally recorded. I have put into quotation marks some of the words used by the key players, but only where I have been able to rely on the written transcripts, or my own notes, or indeed my clear recollections. Where these sources are not available, I have sought to summarise the conversations that took place. Nick arrived at around 10.40am and made an announcement to the Press. Behind him, a large number of party staff had gathered under instructions to look happy, upbeat and positive. Nick said he would hold to his Election campaign commitment to talk first to the party with the largest number of seats - the Conservatives. Inside, in the 'war room', he told us: 'Gordon Brown has already been in contact with Vince Cable, and he is talking about forming an anti-Tory "rainbow coalition". I'm not sure that the numbers really work for that - do they?' The general view was that they didn't, but Chris said: 'It's vital to strengthen our bargaining position by making the rainbow coalition a real possibility. If we can do this, we might even persuade David Cameron to accept a referendum on voting reform.' It was agreed that Nick would speak to Cameron after a planned 2.30pm statement by the Conservative leader. Saturday would start with meetings of the Lib Dem Shadow Cabinet and the parliamentary party. The federal executive of the party would also meet in the afternoon. My view was that we needed to get on with negotiations as soon as possible but I did not relish the prospect of trying to get a quick decision out of the Lib Dem Party. Lib Dems love consultation. Cameron's afternoon statement signalled his openness to 'a new politics' and the possibility of a full coalition. But was it a bluff? At around 4pm, he and Nick spoke on the telephone. 'I just want to say that I believe that you and I can get on,' Cameron said. 'I believe that this is do-able, and for the good of the country we need a decent government that delivers stability.' Nick replied: 'I am very happy to explore the scope for agreement further but there are some key issues that will be very difficult for both sides to agree on.' 'I understand,' said Cameron. 'I am not one of the "old guard" - I favour doing things differently. We are ready to start talking to you on a formal basis. I will throw in my top four people. My negotiating team will consist of William Hague, George Osborne and Oliver Letwin, as well as Ed Llewellyn.

'We really need to start the talks this evening. Pretty soon people are going to say, "Who the hell is running this country?" We must try to conclude things by Monday morning, for when the markets open. Can we aim for that? That would be pretty powerful.' Nick replied: 'I'm happy to start this evening. But I have a meeting of my parliamentary party tomorrow morning and we cannot decide anything until I have consulted people. You should also know that I have been contacted by the other side.' Cameron responded: 'Well, I just wanted to reassure you that Gordon hasn't been in contact with us! I think it would be ridiculous if Gordon Brown stayed in Downing Street, after losing 100 seats. Let's press ahead.' The conversation, which lasted 12 minutes, closed with agreement for the two leaders to meet over the weekend, and for the negotiators to meet within a few hours. Brown's call came through an hour later. The discussion started well enough. 'Hi, Nick. Well, history never quite repeats itself in quite the same way, does it? Well done, this was a triumph for you. You got your message across. You presented yourself very well,' said Brown, with one of his charmless and double-edged comments. Nick replied: 'That's nice of you to say so, but I don't seem to have delivered the seats we wanted.' Brown continued in measured tones: 'Now, you know the Civil Service will be available to offer their support to us?' Nick explained that the Conservative and Lib Dem teams would meet that evening. 'Look, Nick,' said Brown, 'whatever the Conservatives are offering on policy, I am sure we could match them immediately. I have already prepared a note on our policies, another note on the policy differences between us and a third note on the constitutional process moving forward. 'I want you to understand my commitment to the political reform process. I would not want you to undervalue my commitment on this but I do think a referendum would be needed.' By this stage there was no holding Brown back. 'Look, Nick, on tax, spending and the economy, there are not big ideological differences between us. We both want to help the low-paid on tax, the issue is how. We can look at property taxes, but that will take a bit of time on the revaluation. 'Turning to civil liberties. ID cards and "28 days" (the current maximum pre-charge detention period for terror suspects), I think we can thrash it out. 'Nick, the recent political scandals have really changed my view on political reform. Now, perhaps I could also go through all the other issues that came up during the recent campaign as well if...' A desperate-sounding Nick swiftly interrupted: 'No! No! Don't. Please don't! I think I know where you are heading. I just need to say that there is a chronology to this. I have to start with the Conservatives, I gave that pledge...' Brown interrupted: 'But I am worried about the constitutional precedent here...anyway, I am not going to argue.' Nick said: 'How could our parties overcome the accusations about two parties which came second and third forming a government, and could we actually form a stable government?' Brown plunged in: 'Yes, I have thought about all this. Nick, people want change, and two parties working together would mean change. Also, we have together over 50 per cent of the vote. The Conservatives received about 36 per cent. And, yes, we can command support in the Commons. We can form an understanding with all the Northern Ireland-parties, based on the economic needs of Northern Ireland. 'Nick, I could prove to you that this would work. I understand you have said you will talk to David Cameron first, but can you also talk to us on policy today?' Nick replied: 'I have said I will talk to the Tories first. Let's see tomorrow how those talks go.' Brown started to press more insistently: 'It would surely be worthwhile to have parallel discussions?' Nick said: 'Gordon, I know how you feel, but I don't want to trip up over my own shoelaces on this. Who are you thinking of on your team anyway?'
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'Peter Mandelson. Andrew Adonis and Ed Miliband. With Alistair (Darling) or Ed Balls, depending on the issues. 'I really want to honour the constitutional process here. I have studied history. I know that the future of our country is a progressive alliance between two progressive political parties. The Election has provided a moment of opportunity which will not return. We could miss this opportunity for ever. It is an opportunity . . .' It sounded like a script that someone else had written. The great Labour tribalist was making a deathbed conversion to the benefits of co-operation with another party. On and on he went: 'The possibility has eluded us before, Nick, for various historic reasons' - for example, his own determined opposition. 'You would get electoral reform, it would be a pro-Europe government and we would have a progressive economic policy. There is a real prize here.' Nick was frustrated by being lectured: 'Yes, I see the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow but...' Brown cut in again: 'But I can deliver on this, Nick. I can deliver my party, and a majority in the Commons and the constitutional change.' Nick, increasingly exasperated, said: 'Yes, but Gordon, I can't sit down to discuss this at 8am tomorrow. I have to meet my party. I have to talk to the Conservatives.' 'But Nick,' Brown continued, 'There is a problem all over Europe. We will be hit too if we cannot deliver a stable government. Look, I am aware that I cannot control events. But I am anxious to meet.' Nick tried to sum up: 'I will go away and talk to my folk to see when we can discuss all this. Danny Alexander will fix it with Peter.' Brown made one last pitch: 'Don't be disappointed by your results, Nick. You have made a huge impact. The agenda of the future has been set by this election. We need to work closely...' 'Yes, yes, yes, that's very helpful,' Nick said. After a final exchange of pleasantries Nick put the phone down and groaned, 'That man!' The call had lasted 23 minutes. The Lib-Lab discussions had not got off to a good start. At 7.30pm, talks with the Conservatives began at the Cabinet Office. We arrived first and Chris sent out an early signal of his serious intentions by leafing through a volume containing photographs of the Government art collection, available to decorate the offices of Ministers. When the Conservative team arrived, we shook hands with each other. We sat around a conference table surveying each other with the surprise of people who had known each other for years and suddenly found themselves at the altar, having never quite seen the possibility. William Hague started off the meeting by assuring us of the Conservatives' serious intent. 'We sincerely want this to work,' he said, 'and we think each side needs to understand the other's internal processes.' I hardly dared say that I had been a Lib Dem for 25 years and was still struggling to understand our party's internal processes. Danny explained our procedures, including consultation with our Shadow Cabinet, parliamentary party, federal executive and perhaps even a special conference. Hague tried not to look too appalled. Oliver Letwin proposed that the Conservatives draft a response to each of our four key issues: a 10,000 personal tax allowance; a properly funded pupil premium (money to fund the education of the most disadvantaged pupils); deficit reduction; and electoral reform. We made some progress but voting reform was the sticking point. We decided to let the leaders discuss it, and agreed to meet on Sunday. Saturday, May 8 I woke with a sense of impending gloom - a day of 'consultation' within the Lib Dems. During the negotiations, Hague joked that the Conservative Party is 'like an absolute monarchy, moderated by regicide'. Well, the Lib Dems can be rather like an absolute democracy, moderated by very little. I expected a sizeable minority of our party to completely oppose a coalition option. The rest I expected to be split between those favouring Labour and those favouring the Conservatives.
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However, at the meeting of the Lib Dem Shadow Cabinet, and then the subsequent meeting of the parliamentary party, there was much more unity than I expected. People seemed very pragmatic. Danny had agreed with Peter Mandelson that we would meet informally and secretly with Labour's team that afternoon. By the time I arrived, Mandelson, Adonis, Balls and Ed Miliband were seated on one side of the table, with us on the other. Mandelson was setting out Labour's position. I detected a modest degree of detachment, scepticism even, from him. I guessed that Balls would be willing to deal with the Lib Dems only if absolutely necessary, and while holding his nose. With Miliband, the closer you looked, the more you realised that he was actually quite a long way to the Left in the Labour Party. We talked through some of the key issues. There was one uncomfortable point when Chris raised the issue of Brown's future. 'We have yet to discuss,' he said, 'how we deal with the Gordon Brown problem.' Mandelson pretended to look surprised. However, this was not the right environment to discuss such a sensitive issue. Danny intervened to say: 'No Chris, that is not a matter that we are discussing,' which put an end to the conversation. Ed Balls and Ed Miliband grimaced, clearly unhappy with the idea that Brown should have to step down. The meeting lasted an hour and we made clear that this was more of a 'listening' opportunity. That night Nick met Cameron at Admiralty House for an hour and 15 minutes. Later, he took another call from a hyperactive Gordon Brown. Sunday, May 9 The first substantive talks with the Conservative team started at 11am. We began by dealing with political reform and reached agreement quickly on some issues, including fixed-term Parliaments. Voting reform was always going to be the toughest issue and the Conservatives were now offering what amounted to an all-party inquiry, which would draw up a list of possible voting systems. This would then be voted on in the Commons. Such a proposal had as much chance of being approved by Lib Dem MPs as a plan to build 1,000 coal-fired power stations in South-West England. Danny suggested a referendum on the most modest form of electoral reform - the Alternative Vote (AV), which allowed candidates to be ranked in preference order and required MPs to secure 50 per cent of the vote to be elected - linked to Lib Dem support for the Conservatives' own reform plan, which was to reduce the number of parliamentary seats and to remove Labour over-representation. However the Conservatives insisted that the furthest they could go was to consider offering a free vote in the House of Commons on a referendum on AV. We moved on to economic policy, concluding at 5.30pm and we agreed to meet again on Monday morning. We went to brief Nick, who then updated us on discussions with Brown. They had met in the Foreign Office. 'They are obviously pretty desperate,' Nick said. 'Brown says he will do anything we want to secure a coalition, including standing down as Labour leader. In the meantime, he said I could make all the announcements on new policy so that the Government has a new "feel" to it!' When Nick spoke to Brown again at 9.30pm the Labour leader had changed his tune and was now talking about going 'sometime later in the Parliament'. Nick told him: 'Please understand that I have no personal animosity, but a Lib-Lab coalition will not be sellable unless you move on swiftly, in a dignified way.' The Prime Minister replied: 'Look, if I stay on I can help with the referendum campaign on AV.' An exasperated Danny Alexander, also present, said: 'But we will never win a referendum with you in charge!' Brown looked rather taken aback. 'Gordon is just impossible to deal with,' Nick told us.
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We agreed to continue to explore our options with both Labour and the Conservatives, and to report back to the parliamentary party the next day. Monday, May 10 At sunrise there was all to play for. By sundown the die was cast. Paddy Ashdown (Lib Dem leader from 1988 to 1999) had phoned on Sunday afternoon insisting that I call at his house in Kennington, South London, on the way home, regardless of the time. I arrived at around 1am. By now, he was of the view that the Lib - Lab option needed to be our first priority. Paddy had spoken to Nick earlier, when Brown was offering a swift resignation. I told Paddy that Brown was now talking about hanging on for months. 'God, the man is impossible,' said Paddy. 'I'll call Mandelson or Adonis. They have to get Gordon to see sense.' Paddy phoned 'switch', the Downing Street switchboard, which can track down senior politicians anywhere in the world, but neither Mandelson nor Adonis could be reached. 'I'll call Blair,' Paddy said suddenly. He called Tony Blair's home, waking Cherie, who told him that Tony was in the Middle East where it was 3am or 4am. After a couple of calls, a sleepy Blair came on to the phone. 'You won't believe what Gordon is up to,' said Paddy. 'First he promised to stand down as leader, then a few hours later he said he wanted to stay on for up to an extra year.' I could hear Blair chuckling. He could doubtless see the irony of Brown being pressed for an early exit date. Blair promised to phone Brown. Across London, a few hours later, Vince Cable was woken by Brown on the telephone at 6am. Vince managed to spell out to him that the price of a Lib-Lab deal was likely to be his immediate resignation. A morning phone call between Mandelson and Danny Alexander finally confirmed Labour agreement to the Lib Dem requirement for Brown to announce his resignation. At talks in Whitehall with the Conservatives, Hague started the meeting by saying that no further voting reform concessions were possible. The Conservatives were now offering a confidence and supply agreement (in exchange for an agreement on key policies, the Lib Dems would promise to support the Government on economic issues and on confidence votes, while remaining on the Opposition benches) to support a Conservative minority administration. What was being offered was most of what had been agreed, but without a coalition, without direct Lib Dem involvement in government, and without a pledge to deliver an AV referendum. The Lib Dem parliamentary party met at around 1.30pm. There was a strong view that both the country and the Lib Dems would be better off with a coalition. Half-way through the meeting we learned that the Conservative whips were asking their own MPs whether they would be willing to accept a referendum on AV as the price of a coalition with the Lib Dems. They were thawing on voting reform. By the end of the meeting it was decided that we would pursue a full coalition option. We would enter talks with Labour if Brown announced he was standing down. In addition, Nick would tell Cameron that we were interested only in a full coalition, and only on the condition that Conservative MPs would back a referendum on AV. At 5.05pm Brown announced that he would resign, opening up the real possibility of the 'progressive alliance' dreamed of for so long by so many in our party. Our talks with Labour now moved to 'formal' status and we met their team at Portcullis House that evening. They were late and while we waited, rumours - later confirmed - reached us that the Conservatives were to make a new offer to us to hold a whipped vote in the Commons on an AV referendum, in return for a full coalition. Eventually, Mandelson, Adonis, Balls and Miliband arrived, joined on this occasion by Deputy Leader Harriet Harman. It was interesting to watch the body language of the Labour team. Mandelson was
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engaged and serious, Adonis was committed and professional, but between these and the other three there was a gulf of attitude and enthusiasm. We appeared to be negotiating with two separate Labour teams. One wanted a deal, the other didn't. Balls was already rumoured to be committed to taking Labour into Opposition. He stared into the distance as Mandelson talked, occasionally wincing at comments. Miliband, who had often stopped me to talk about the importance of keeping the door open to Lib-Lab co-operation, now gave the impression of being at best indifferent to the success of the talks. Harman said little but wore a smile that was simultaneously pained, patronising and sceptical. When talking to Chris Huhne about ID cards she said: 'Look, Alan Johnson really needs to talk this through with whoever the Lib Dem Home Affairs spokesman is.' 'That would be Chris,' Danny retorted. Labour had brought with them a new policy paper that seemed to indicate tougher action on deficit reduction than the party had previously planned. However, Balls stuck to the line that the deficit could not be reduced any faster than outlined in existing plans. I started a discussion about some of our other proposals - the 10,000 personal allowance, the pupil premium and the restoration of the pension earnings link. Tuesday, May 11 'We have all these expensive Lib Dem pledges,' said Balls, 'but how do we fund them, and cut the deficit?' I said: 'Look, Ed, as you know we are proposing that the higher personal allowance is funded by progressive tax reforms of the type I would have thought Labour would support - higher capital gains tax, a new mansion tax and reform of pensions taxation.' Mandelson frowned: 'Surely the rich have suffered enough?' Andrew Adonis chipped in: ' Perhaps Vince and Alistair can meet tomorrow?' Danny pointed out, as we had already done several times, that we were able to negotiate on these issues, and we assumed the Labour team was empowered to do so. I suggested establishing a commission to review the affordability of public sector pensions. Mandelson and Adonis looked sympathetic but Balls, Miliband and Harman recoiled in horror. If they were to negotiate an agreement with us, the Labour team first needed to agree among themselves. The Conservatives had treated us as another Opposition party on an equal footing. The Labour team, certainly the Eds and Harriet, treated us to policy lectures. Danny asked: 'Can we rely on Labour MPs supporting an AV referendum?' 'That is what is guaranteed in our manifesto,' said Mandelson. Then Balls intervened: 'The Chief Whip thinks it could be difficult to get the AV referendum through. Many of our colleagues are opposed to it. It cannot be guaranteed.' It was a deadly intervention and, I felt, a calculated wrecking device. If a hotchpotch deal with Labour and various other parties could not deliver on our policy prospectus, on economic stability or even on the most modest form of electoral reform legislation, what on the earth was the point of it? The talks broke up with Mandelson suggesting further discussions the next morning. I believe Balls, Miliband and Harman achieved what they set out to deliver: the planting of significant doubts in our mind about the likelihood of a Lib-Lab coalition. It was clear that if we went into coalition with Labour, we would not be establishing a new government, we would be chaining ourselves to a decaying corpse. 'God, this is going to make life very tough indeed,' said Nick later when we briefed him. 'I have just had Paddy Ashdown, Ming [Sir Menzies] Campbell and Charles Kennedy all talking to me separately and all wanting us to support the possibility of a deal with Labour. 'I am going to have to insist that you meet the Labour team tomorrow morning.' The four of us groaned, in a 'do we really have to?' sort of way.

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After briefing the parliamentary party, I gave a statement to the Press waiting in Westminster Hall but stuck by the usual line about the importance of any agreement delivering 'economic stability and a credible deficit reduction plan'. My soundbites were beginning to bore even me. Make your mind up time. Our first meeting was with Labour. Before we left, we received a message that Brown was now asking all Labour Cabinet Ministers to contact their Lib Dem opposite numbers to discuss agreement on policy issues. 'This is absolutely barmy,' said Danny. We paged senior colleagues to warn them not to get involved. The next call was more extraordinary still. It was from Vince Cable who told us that Alistair Darling's government car was on the way to collect him to take him to the Treasury for talks with the Chancellor. Danny asked that a message be sent immediately to Vince, saying that he should send Darling's car back to the Treasury. We arrived at Portcullis House and the Labour team trooped in. We expected that the truculent trio Balls, Miliband and Harman - would be on better behaviour. Someone suggested that we needed some refreshments, and Miliband stumped up the money for teas and pastries. It was about the first financial concession that Labour had made to us. Mandelson began the talks. 'I think we can leave the economic issues to one side,' he said, 'for Vince and Alistair to sort out during their meeting at the Treasury.' Danny interrupted: 'Vince has cancelled the meeting. There must be only one set of negotiations. We will get in a muddle if we start having bilaterals all over the place.' We later discovered that although Vince had sent the car back, he had decided to go by rail instead to see Darling. He thought the objection was to the ministerial car, not to the meeting. Vince was determined to find out where the Chancellor stood. But when he met Darling, they both agreed that there was not much they could do and, after a brief discussion, the meeting came to an end. We had agreed that Andrew should explain that we had been disappointed by yesterday's negotiation and expected a more positive approach. He did this, with the air of a disappointed deputy head teacher, ticking off a group of sixth-formers. The Labour team did their best to look hurt. The discussions began. Danny received a text message. It was from Mandelson, on the other side of the table. It read: 'We need to get a more positive atmosphere if these talks are to be worthwhile.' Labour did make some concessions - agreeing to reform of the House of Commons, to axe the third Heathrow runway and the National Identity Register - but there was little movement on anything else. When I raised public sector pensions reform, Miliband looked horrified. 'Oh no,' he said. 'We cannot go further than our existing agreements with the unions.' 'That sounds like a line from your Labour leadership campaign!' joked Danny. Miliband tried to look mystified. We finished the meeting with a promise to stay in touch, but neither side can have considered that enough progress had been made. Other than Brown, Mandelson and Adonis, it was not clear to us which other senior Labour politicians actually wanted to stay in office. Early in the day, Paddy Ashdown had again telephoned Blair, urging him to secure David Miliband's public backing for a coalition. But this was snubbed by Miliband, who wanted to lie low. Darling was also said to be opposed to a coalition. Nevertheless, at around 1.15pm, Brown met Nick and urged him to think again. 'It was quite embarrassing actually,' Nick reported to us later. 'I was very uncomfortable. He was passionate about the whole thing, and seemed to be pleading with me. 'We need to move on with the talks with the Conservatives. We must get on with all this, because there has to be an agreement today. And as soon as I tell Brown that a deal with Labour is off, he may just go to the Palace and resign.' If Brown resigned, the Queen would be obliged to send for Cameron to ask him to form a government. The pressure was on to deliver as quickly as possible.
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At 2pm, talks with the Conservatives resumed. While we talked, Nick had discussions with Cameron and more chats with an increasingly frustrated Brown. Everyone wanted Brown to hang on until a deal had been agreed. Britain was not supposed to be left without a government. The Civil Service, the Palace, the Lib Dems and the Conservatives all wanted Gordon Brown to remain in place so that the handover of power happened seamlessly. It just about worked. As the afternoon ticked by, there was give and take on both sides. Our tables were covered in drafts and redrafts of the coalition agreement. Then, at around 7.15pm, Gordon Brown emerged into Downing Street. We broke off the talks and switched on a television. As the final drafts of our agreed text were coming off the Cabinet Office printers, we watched Brown make a brief, dignified and emotional statement. Then the former Prime Minister and his wife Sarah opened the door to Downing Street to collect their two young boys. Whether friend or foe, it is always an emotional moment for those of us who care about politics when a Prime Minister leaves office. I felt sad rather than elated, but tried not to show it. George Osborne reached out and slapped me on the back in friendly alliance and celebration. Who wants to be George Osborne's axeman? I DO! After all I am one of Britain's leading Lib DUMS... A mocking note from Labour, rows over a ministerial Jag - and a dramatic fall from grace...concluding David Laws' compelling Coalition diaries By David Laws Last updated at 1:44 AM on 23rd November 2010 Last week Lib Dem MP David Laws exclusively revealed how his party rejected desperate pleas from Gordon Brown and reached a Coalition deal with the Conservatives. Now, in the second extract from his new book, he tells how the Lib Dems reacted to the agreement - and describes the 'toughest time' of his life as he resigned from his Treasury post after just two weeks... Tuesday, May 11 The Grand Committee Room, off Westminster Hall, was packed with Liberal Democrat MPs, peers, and senior staff and the mood was one of elation. My fears that a Lib Dem-Conservative coalition might split the party seemed unfounded. Nick Clegg came in to a standing ovation. He said he was recommending acceptance of the deal negotiated with the Conservatives earlier that day. Copies of the agreement were circulated and afterwards there was discussion, and then there was a very unusual outbreak of demands that the discussion be cut short and cries of 'Let's vote now'. In 16 years of Lib Dem meetings, I cannot ever remember such suggestions being made. Paddy Ashdown, one of the most loved and respected members of the party, spoke. Nick looked down nervously from the platform. Paddy said that he found it difficult to support an arrangement that would mean abandoning his great dream of a realignment with the Left. He said that his inclination was to throw in his involvement in politics and go back to his garden and his grandchildren. It threatened to be a huge blow to the Coalition. But then he went on: ' However, after telling Nick my decision earlier today, I took the time to actually read the document that you have negotiated. I have to say that it is magnificent. Amazing. F*** it. How can I stay out of this fight? You know that I cannot resist a battle, not least in the company of my friends.' There was huge relief and then applause. All Lib Dem MPs and Lords, and all members of the federal executive bar one, voted to accept the agreement. We had formed the Coalition. Wednesday, May 12 The portfolio I wanted was that of Chief Secretary to the Treasury. 'Who wants to be George Osborne's axeman?' one Lib Dem MP was quoted, anonymously, as saying to a newspaper. But who wants to be in a coalition and have no influence?
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I had no idea what Nick's view of this would be but I hoped that this was what the missed call from him of the previous evening had been about. I called him. He was still at home at around 8am, getting his children ready for school. 'I don't like to be presumptuous,' I said, 'and it may be that I am not actually going to be in the Cabinet, but if I am I really think we need someone at the Treasury.' Nick mentioned the Department for Transport. I pointed out that the Treasury is the engine room of any government and that there was a real risk that if we were excluded from it, it would be more difficult to deliver on our priorities and on the Coalition pledges. Nick said that he would be talking to David Cameron, but in the meantime had to sort out the top priority - getting his children to school. In my office, I waited for that call all MPs hope for when governments are being formed. Eventually I had a pager message: 'Please call Downing Street.' One of David Cameron's private secretaries told me: 'The Prime Minister would like to see you sometime in the next half-hour or so. Do you think you could be available?' In a calm voice, which sought to strike a balance between over-enthusiasm and nonchalance, I said: 'Yes, of course. Just let me know when.' 'The PM is just speaking to the French President, then he'll talk to you.' This seemed only reasonable I waited about an hour, checking my phone to ensure that Downing Street had not somehow been put through automatically to the answerphone. Eventually the same young lady called and said: 'The Prime Minister will see you in about a half an hour.' I strolled up Downing Street in as relaxed but businesslike way as I could manage. I have always thought that new members of the Cabinet look insufferably smug as they make their way up Downing Street and are feted by the camera crews, so I got out my pager and read through old messages as I walked to No 10. The door opened and I was escorted inside. Behind the entrance the doorman had taped an aidememoire to the side window so he could recognise some of the lesser-known members of the new Government. This appeared to have been cut out of a newspaper. I was one of six members of my party who appeared under the uninspiring headline: Britain's Leading Lib Dums. A young lady greeted me. 'The Prime Minister is just speaking to the President of France,' she said, 'and then he will speak to you.' This seemed only reasonable. After a brief wait I was escorted to the Cabinet Room. The Prime Minister was sitting in his chair. He welcomed me and I sat down opposite him. A photographer dashed around us to record the great event for posterity. As I had expected, and hoped, the Prime Minister asked me to become Chief Secretary to the Treasury. I thanked him for the opportunity. The meeting was over in a couple of minutes. The plan was for me to head straight over to the Treasury building to meet my new boss, George Osborne. Even though it was only a short walk, a black ministerial Jaguar was awaiting me outside. Once again, as the doors of Downing Street opened I did my best to look serious and unemotional, as befits a new Chief Secretary with a tough job to do. It was all going to plan until, as I got in the door of the waiting Jaguar, one of the Press photographers shouted out: 'For God's sake smile, you miserable b******!' He then caught me in shot smiling, as I looked back over my shoulder. The Jaguar dropped me off at the Treasury. George and I shook hands, and made brief statements to the Press saying how much we looked forward to working with each other. And thus was born what was termed, for its all too brief existence, the Treasury team of 'Osborne and Little', a reference to our respective heights and to George's family firm. This was a moment of huge satisfaction for me. When I was first becoming involved in politics in the mid-Nineties, Tatler magazine had tipped me as one of the Lib Dems 'to watch for' in 20 years' time. I was Lib Dem prospective parliamentary candidate in Folkestone and Hythe at the time and I bought up every local copy of the magazine I could find (two).
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When I left my job as a well-paid managing director in the City of London to join the Lib Dems in 1994, we had not many more than 20 MPs, and little or no influence in Parliament. It seemed to many an eccentric decision. Indeed, when I applied to become an economics researcher for the party on 14,000 per year, the party hierarchy found it difficult to believe my story, and assumed that I must be a Conservative spy! My story had to be 'checked out' before I was allowed to take up even this lowly position. And now here I was, coming to the Treasury to be the first Liberal Treasury Minister in almost 80 years. Later, I took some early decisions to cut public spending. I had already discovered that I was to have a chauffeur-driven black Jaguar at my beck and call. I could not imagine being the public-spending 'axeman' while travelling around in a chauffeurdriven Jaguar. I enquired how much this had cost my predecessor's budget and was told that it was more than 110,000 per year. I told Chris, my private secretary, that this luxury had to go. Thursday, May 13 I ploughed through various papers at my desk, and after a while Chris came in with a sealed letter, which he said I might want to see. It had been left by my predecessor, Liam Byrne MP. It said simply: 'Dear Chief Secretary, I'm afraid there is no money. Kind regards - and good luck! Liam.' My initial reaction was to laugh. But I then felt that perhaps the joke was in rather poor taste. The first Cabinet meeting was that morning and the only decision-making item on the agenda was the proposal to cut five per cent from ministerial pay and to accept a pay freeze for the rest of the Parliament. That afternoon, the new Cabinet was due to see Her Majesty the Queen at Buckingham Palace, to receive seals of office and to be sworn into the Privy Council. My office suggested that I should use my chauffeur-driven Jaguar to get to Buckingham Palace. 'Oh, I thought I had cancelled that,' I said. 'Well, sort of,' said Chris. 'But the Government car service has told us we must give something like three months' notice, so we have the car for the time being anyway.' Feeling a little guilty at the indulgence, I clambered into the back of the ministerial Jaguar, and we set off down The Mall. My driver made no reference to my decision to axe the car, but soon moved on to selling me the virtues of the Government car service. It seemed that there was no problem in my ministerial life that could not be resolved if only I had access to this service. I had spent much of the weekend in the Treasury discussing the announcement to be made today on the introduction of the Office for Budget Responsibility, which removed from politicians the power to fix the economic growth forecasts in the Budget. George Osborne made the OBR announcement in the conference room downstairs on the first floor of the Treasury. George also revealed that the 6billion of 'in-year' cuts in spending in 2010-11 would be unveiled in just one week. In the question-and-answer session for journalists that followed, I then inadvertently gave the media the headline that they would be looking for, when I made reference to Liam Byrne's letter to me. I was later to discover that Liam did not much appreciate this exercise in open government, but I was too busy to worry about his nose being put a little out of joint. I now had 6billion of cuts to find, and less than a week to do it in. We were to send out a letter to each department (except overseas aid, health and defence) telling them how much we wanted them to cut from their budgets. Some departments might 'settle' with us at the suggested figures. Others could arrange to have their Secretaries of State to meet me. In a meeting with Treasury civil servants I threw in a few ideas of my own. Why should civil servants continue to take first-class travel, I asked, when MPs were now more or less banned from doing so? One civil servant said: 'But Chief Secretary, the revenue from firstclass ticket sales goes to the trainoperating companies, under their contracts. So if there were fewer first-class ticket sales, and the
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revenue fell, it might simply mean greater subsidy payments to the train operators to make up the difference. That would therefore save the Exchequer little or nothing. It could turn out not to be a real economy at all, Chief Secretary.' It was an ingenious defence, worthy of Sir Humphrey Appleby, but not one I was prepared to accept. Yet I found that this savings proposal somehow always seemed to fall off the list of agreed cuts. With George away there was another meeting that I had to attend - that of the new National Security Council. This was chaired by the Prime Minister and included senior Cabinet Ministers, the heads of the security services and the top brass from our Armed Forces. A large pile of briefing papers awaited me in a sealed box, which had to be opened with a special key. The papers were then to be returned to the box by me. The material was 'Top Secret Classified'. Some of the papers made even more frightening reading than those on the proposed cuts. All my papers indicated the Treasury 'lines to take'. They basically all came to the same thing. Whatever country we were looking at, whatever issue, whether it was the Middle East or the handling of the fallout from the volcanic ash cloud disrupting air travel, the Treasury line was always: 'We don't believe that any extra money can or should be spent on this.' Wednesday, May 19 --Sunday, May 23 The next three days were spent trying to secure the agreement of various departments to their settlements. By 11pm on Friday we had agreed all the figures. On Sunday evening I drafted my speech for Monday's Press conference. Tuesday, May 25 The reaction to yesterday's statement on the 6.25billion of spending cuts seemed to be generally favourable. I spoke at a meeting of Treasury officials from the spending directorate, joking that my eyes were set on a date in July when I would no longer be the shortest serving Chief Secretary. I noted that Thomas Boardman, Chief Secretary in 1974, had served for barely two months. It was a joke I would soon come to regret. Wednesday, May 26 The Chancellor was tied up in meetings so this was my first appearance at the Dispatch Box. I took an hour of questions and rather enjoyed it. I returned to my office feeling satisfied with my first performance as a Treasury Minister. Thursday, May 27 I was pleasantly surprised by the favourable coverage of my performance. However, The Guardian claimed I 'made Lizzie Borden [the American spinster tried and acquitted in 1893 for the axe murders of her father and stepmother] look like Pollyanna'. The Times reported a Conservative MP as saying: 'He's the biggest Tory in the Cabinet.' I left my office in the Treasury late on Thursday evening. I was not to know it, but I had worked my last day as a Treasury Minister. Friday, May 28 In the morning I returned to my Yeovil constituency office. I was contacted at around 11am by The Daily Telegraph about my private life, my sexuality and my parliamentary expenses. It was undoubtedly the toughest time of my life, made all the more testing by having to discuss in a few short hours and over a telephone line an issue that I had kept private from my family and closest friends. I felt I could not remain Chief Secretary. After a stressful 36 hours, I resigned from the Cabinet on Saturday evening. This was my decision alone, and one I would have taken more swiftly without the support and representations of senior political friends and colleagues. Danny Alexander was appointed as my successor. He made a magnificent start as Chief Secretary, so the work of the Treasury has gone on smoothly without me.
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We all discover some time in life that none of us is indispensable. David Laws 22 Days In May by David Laws is published by Biteback, priced 9.99. To order your copy at the special price of 8.99 with free p&p, please call The Review Bookstore on 0845 155 0713 or visit www.MailLife.co.uk/books. Nick Clegg 'propped up' Gordon Brown to seal Tory deal: Insider account reveals Lib Dems never wanted Coalition with Labour By Simon Walters Last updated at 10:23 AM on 14th November 2010 Buckingham Palace helped David Cameron and Nick Clegg keep Gordon Brown in Downing Street in the days after he lost the Election to make it easier for the Coalition to take power, a former Cabinet Minister claims tonight. The Palace, together with the Conservative and Liberal Democrat leaders, made Mr Brown believe he still had a chance of clinging to power even though they knew he didnt because it was feared he might resign too quickly and leave Britain without a Government. The ploy to prop up Mr Brown gave Mr Cameron and Mr Clegg vital extra hours to seal their political alliance and avoided plunging the Queen into a constitutional crisis, with no Prime Minister. The disclosure comes in a new book by former Chief Secretary to the Treasury David Laws, based on secret notes of the dramatic talks between the three parties after the Election failed to produce an overall winner. Mr Laws, a senior Liberal Democrat who was present throughout the discussions, gives the first blowby-blow insiders account of the high-octane and often acrimonious exchanges between the party leaders and rival negotiating teams. His book, 22 Days In May, exclusively serialised in The Mail on Sunday from today, reveals how: The Lib Dems never really wanted to do a deal with Mr Brown and be chained to the Labour Governments decaying corpse. Ed Miliband was reduced to the role of tea boy in the talks and revealed that he could not upset the unions. Peter Mandelson responded to Mr Lawss support for a mansion tax on 2 million-plus houses by protesting: Surely the rich have suffered enough? When the Coalition talks stalled, panicking David Cameron exclaimed: People will soon be asking who the hell is running the country. After being harangued by impossible Mr Brown, Mr Clegg cried out: That man! and fellow Lib Dem Danny Alexander called the former Prime Minister absolutely barmy. Ed Balls, Ed Miliband and Harriet Harman deliberately sabotaged any prospect of a Lib-Lab pact. The book, which makes extensive use of a near-verbatim record of the talks kept by long-serving Lib Dem aide Alison Suttie, marks Mr Lawss return to the political limelight following his shock resignation from the Cabinet just weeks into the Coalition. He was forced to step down when it emerged that the secretly gay MP had claimed 40,000 in secondhome expenses for renting a room from his partner, James Lundie, a lobbyist. As long as Mr Laws is not censured too severely when the results of an official inquiry are published, he is widely expected to return to the Cabinet within months. Mr Cameron has called him a very effective politician. In his book, Mr Laws gives a vivid description of the scene as desperate Mr Brown begged Mr Clegg to let Labour stay in power, not realising that exasperated Mr Clegg had already decided to do a deal with Mr Cameron. Brown urged Nick to think again, writes Mr Laws. It was quite embarrassing actually, Nick reported to us later. I was very uncomfortable. He seemed to be pleading with me. It was at this point that Mr Brown was led to think falsely that Labour still had a chance of hanging on, so he did not go to the Palace and resign.
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Everyone wanted Brown to hang on until a deal had been agreed. Britain was not supposed to be left without a Government, Mr Laws writes. Nor was it just Cameron and Clegg who pulled the wool over Mr Browns eyes: the Palace and Cabinet Secretary Sir Gus ODonnell were involved too. The Civil Service, the Palace, the Lib Dems and the Conservatives all wanted Brown to remain in place so that the handover of power happened seamlessly. It just about worked. The Queens linkman to the negotiations was her private secretary Christopher Geidt, who was monitoring the progress of the Tory-Lib Dem talks in the Cabinet Office. Mr Geidt, a former Foreign Office mandarin, was briefed to observe proceedings and keep the Queen informed. He was to protect her by advising her to appoint a new Prime Minister only when a decision was clear and uncontroversial. By mid-afternoon on the Tuesday, when Mr Brown realised that the Lib Dems were heading for a deal with the Tories, he was impatient to resign but Mr Geidt told him that, constitutionally, he had to hold off until a formal pact had been confirmed. When Mr Brown finally went to the Queen later that day to resign, Mr Geidt was waiting to meet him. Even from the very start of the negotiations, Mr Clegg was irritated by the way Mr Brown went on and on at him. As the former Prime Minister listed Labour policies, Mr Clegg interrupted him: No! No! Dont. Please dont! I know where you are heading. I have to start with the Conservatives, I gave that pledge. Mr Clegg made it clear to Mr Brown that a Lib-Lab deal was unlikely. How could our parties overcome the accusations about two parties which came second and third forming a government, and could we actually form a stable government? I dont want to trip up over my own shoelaces on this, he said. After another bout of hectoring by Mr Brown, Nick put the phone down and groaned, That man! Mr Laws derides Mr Browns claim that he could work with the Lib Dems. It sounded like a script that someone else had written. The great Labour tribalist was making a deathbed conversion to the benefits of co-operation with another party. By contrast, Mr Clegg and Mr Cameron hit it off straight away. Mr Laws says of the talks with the Tories: We sat around a conference table surveying each other with the surprise of people who had known each other for years and suddenly found themselves at the altar, having never quite seen the possibility. On top of the difficulty of dealing with Mr Brown, Mr Laws says the Labour negotiating team was split into two separate teams one wanted a deal, the other didnt. Lord Mandelson was sceptical though amenable and Lord Adonis was keen. But there was a gulf of enthusiasm between them and Ed Miliband, Ed Balls and Harriet Harman. Mr Laws says Mr Balls killed off any chance of Labour backing voting reforms, calling it a calculated wrecking device. He writes: It was clear that if we went into coalition with Labour, we would not be establishing a new government, we would be chaining ourselves to a decaying corpse. The Conservatives had treated us as another Opposition party on an equal footing. The Labour team, certainly the Eds and Harriet, treated us to policy lectures. Ed Miliband was reduced to tea boy during the talks. Someone suggested we needed refreshments, and Miliband stumped up the money for teas and pastries. It was about the first financial concession that Labour had made to us, Mr Laws writes. More embarrassingly, Mr Laws reveals how the talks highlighted Mr Milibands close links with the unions, whose votes got him elected as Labour leader. When I raised public sector pensions reform, Miliband looked horrified. Oh no, he said. We cannot go further than our existing agreements with the unions. The disclosures by Mr Laws follow separate damaging claims that Mr Clegg secretly planned to drop his pledge to scrap university tuition fees months before polling day.
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libdemvoice.org/in-government-for-all-the-right-reasons-the-david-laws-interview-22174.html In Government for all the right reasons: the David Laws interview By Helen Duffett | Published 23rd November 2010 - 4:41 pm Yesterday I interviewed David Laws, on the day his book 22 Days in May was published. I asked him about the book, his views on the Coalition Government, as well as about the focus of his current work, plus his thoughts on the Ireland bailout. In the introduction to the book, David Laws writes that its purpose is to inform those who are interested in this important period of British politics, and to make sure that an accurate account is left of what really happened in May 2010, before memories fade, myths grow and evidence is lost. Why have you published this book now? You said you wanted to get matters on the record, but why not write it now and publish it in ten years? Thats the way memoirs used to work, so why so keen to publish after only six months? Isnt history better judged from a distance? I think its important for us now that people in the country understand how we made the decisions we made in May 2010, and what factors were uppermost in our minds. And also that we nail some of the misrepresentations that have come out from some of the others involved in the talks, particularly on the Labour side, where people have attempted to claim that we went into the negotiations with some sort of preconception about what type of deal we wanted. And actually what the book shows is that if we went in with any preconceptions at all, it was that a coalition with Labour would be considerably easier to deliver if the electoral maths enabled it, than a coalition with the Conservative party. So I think that the book demonstrates that we went in without some sort of pre-agenda of who we would and who we wouldnt deal with, and its very clear that we were putting the policies in our manifesto and what was right for the country as the key determinants of what we were going to do once we had discovered there was a hung Parliament. Firstly its important to get down a historic record, given that this was a very important period in British politics, and having got the time to do it imposed on me in some ways, I have that opportunity. And I think its also important for where we are now in politics, given how controversial the coalition has been with some people that people should understand the decision-making process, and should understand why we did what we did in May. With cuts on the way, is this an expectation-management exercise, then? I dont think its expectation-management, but I think its fact-management in the sense that some people in the Labour party have claimed that we werent serious about the option of negotiating with Labour and I think that what this makes clear is that we did engage in a very serious way over that, and actually if there are any problems in terms of trying to get an agreement or make an agreement with Labour viable, it was really because of the lack of willingness of the Labour party rather than the Lib Dems to engage seriously in a negotiation; their lack of preparedness, the fact that their negotiating team was almost certainly split in their attitudes towards us. And the fact that on the main economic tack, the economic policy issues, that they didnt make any of the concessions that would have been necessary in order to make coalition a viable option for us. So the book performs two functions: it can inform the general public about the Lib Dems and Tories intentions, but it can also rebut the things that Labour are saying about us Thats right. Was it your idea to write the book, or were you getting offers from publishers and newspapers? No, it was entirely my idea, and I thought from the very earliest time, even while I was still in Government that it was important for us to get our version of this factually on the record. I clearly wouldnt have had the opportunity to do that if I had been in Government, given how long it takes to do something like this. And I thought about it when I left the Government. I originally decided that it probably wasnt the right time, and then, in July when I thought about it again, people said Yes, this would be useful from the party, and useful to make sure that the public record of all these events is correct. And so I just used the time that I had, particularly in August, to get the account down.
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The coalition negotiations were gruelling. Wouldnt you have rather had a break before diving in? Many, including the media, were pushing for a quick resolution: what was it like being caught up in the pace of all of that? I think we were always conscious that there would be a lot of pressure for a quick resolution. Werent you exhausted after the General Election? I wasnt, no, because a) the pressures on most MPs are nothing like those on the party leaders they must have been pretty exhausted, but for the rest of us its not the same scale of pressure. And b) undoubtedly there is a bit of an adrenaline rush when you suddenly find yourself pitched into something which is about forming a government and deciding upon which policies should and shouldnt be implemented. So I didnt really find it all that tiring, and I thought that it was inevitable that there would be pressure to do things quickly. I thought that it would be a mistake to drag our heels and insist on doing things very slowly. And while you cant create a government and sort out a policy agreement overnight, I always thought that if we failed to deliver one by about the Wednesday after the Thursday General Election, then we would begin to face a lot of criticism. And it would be inevitable that we as the third party, and the party with the greater democratic accountability, would be more likely to bear the burden of criticism from the other two parties. For stalling, perhaps? Yeah, it was more likely, I thought that we would be the ones blamed for not having a Government, and for any market instability that could follow. And obviously there was a lot of market nervousness and instability around that time, because of what was happening in Greece, Portugal and Spain, so I think we did have to do things quite quickly and not everybody on our negotiating team, as I report in the book, took that view. There were some others who took a different view and thought that we needed to take our time but I dont think we had that option. In future, when people get used to the process of coalition-forming it may be that there isnt the same degree of pressure, but on this occasion, I think it was important to do it quite quickly. And I dont think that much was sacrificed by doing it in the timescale we did. You talk about people getting used to the process of coalition-forming I was interested to read your article in the Telegraph: The Coalition must aim higher than merely balancing the books. I was dissecting it a bit; you keep on dropping in references to judging results over the next ten years: you said that a couple of times, and also talking about stretching out the era of austerity throughout the entire decade, I wondered: is that a hint? Are you hoping for or expecting a second term of coalition? No, I think thats highly uncertain, but I think that its inevitable that the parties will go into the next election fighting as independent parties with candidates in every seat. But my point in the article was firstly that we are doing the process of eliminating the deficit over a reasonably long period. People are saying its all rushed, but the fact is were taking five years to do it. Its hardly a rushed process, and Im not sure that it would help the country or economic confidence if we were stretching out this process of austerity for 7, 8, 9, 10 years. I mean people want to see some kind of light at the end of the tunnel. So its not with the General Election in mind..? The reason I refer to 10 years on education and welfare reform was they just are very big pieces of work and if you expect to see some big impact on welfare reform and education, you are not going to see it just in one Parliament. I mean some of the welfare reform stuff wont start until the end of the Parliament because of the cost of delivering, so that all this can only be judged over time and years. Who knows? In the five to ten year period, who will be running the country is highly uncertain and it could either be a coalition or it could be one party. I know that overnight change can take five, ten years, and more. But I especially saw your article today as putting a Liberal Democrat stamp on what could have been just Conservative
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policies. Do you think the input on social policies is distinctly Liberal Democrat? Or do you think that actually the Conservatives are just as keen on the social side? I think there clearly has been a strong strain of commitment to the social recovery, broken society element of policy in Conservative thinking, but its then translating that into the decisions that are made, and the hard commitments. Later on in the Parliament there will be some choices to make when the deficit is brought back under control, about how were going to invest some of the proceeds of growth that there then are that dont need to go to deficit reduction. All Im trying to signal is that we then have to be ready to take action to make sure that there is enough money going into education, welfare reform, and the NHS, to make sure that those services are improved. Do you think that therell be conflict further down the line if the Tories want to reduce the size of the State, will we be clawing things back for our agenda, or do you think theres a will there ..? I think there is the intention, at least the scope for making sure that the Coalition delivers on those priorities jointly, but well have to cross that bridge when it comes, not least because at the moment everybody is focusing simply on the process of deficit reduction and therefore in a sense its almost easier to get both parties to agree on the big strategy. The big strategy is deficit reduction, but we dont want to lose sight over the Parliament of the fact that were not just in politics to reduce the deficit and to restore good economic management, but that we also want the education system to be improved and to see real social mobility in the country. We want the health system to get better and more responsive to consumers. We want a decent pension system and a welfare system that actually assists those people who want to get back into employment. All those are very strong areas where there are Liberal Democrat commitments and where the policies may be slightly different from those of the Conservative Party. After the unhappy events in May, are you still fully invested in politics? Do you hope to be more than a backbench MP in the future? I leave the speculation for another day, really. Ive had a difficult year, and Im just focusing on the job Im doing as a backbench MP, which I am really enjoying, Ive got plenty of time to focus on lots of policy issues that Im concerned about, and can lobby my colleagues about . When you see the work theyre doing, arent you dying to get more involved? My colleagues are doing a damn good job, so I cant say that Im sitting there thinking, Goodness me, they should have done this, that and the other. The big judgments that Nick and Danny and the others are making, I think, are the right judgments. So that is a lot easier than it would be if I somehow felt that things were all going wrong. Like all Lib Dem MPs Ive got the opportunity to talk to Nick and others and communicate with them and theyre doing a good job of listening to the party. What do you think of giving all 7bn were saving this year to Ireland, to bail them out? Well, were not going to give it to them, were going to potentially advance a loan. At the moment because the coalition has restored confidence in our economic prospects, were having no problems at all raising finance. Our interest rates are incredibly low, even though we have a large deficit, we cant afford to take that for granted, but it does mean that were in a stronger position than we might otherwise be. And I think that the biggest threat to our economy at the moment is not the difficult position that were having to deal with within the UK there are problems and pressures there but that I think is gradually going to work itself out over time. The biggest threat would be if the world economy and the European economy in particular the people were trading with, took a big downturn again, and so stopping the financial chaos and contagion from spreading, I think is incredibly important. Do you think well have to bail out anyone else, in that case? I dont think so, but I think what we learnt from 2008 and 2009 is that if you dont act quickly to protect big organisations banks, countries when these things happen, you can pay a very big price
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down the line. And so this time I think we are being proactive in not allowing countries like Ireland and the banking system to go down the pan. Weve got, as you know, a huge economic network of interests with Ireland and the Irish banks, and if that was allowed to topple over I think it would be extremely bad for our economy and it would then lead to people saying, Well whats the next target we can go for? And that then would be the type of environment where we would risk the economic recovery that were now seeing. Its just essential that that doesnt happen. So, however frustrating it is, at a time when were having to borrow a lot of money, were also having to help other countries. I think it is terribly important that we dont allow any major country or bank to topple over. The meme is that were overly sympathetic [to Ireland] and that charity should begin at home. Is that just a tabloid construct? Yeah, and probably more over things like overseas development, whereas over Ireland, its not as if the Irish have been crying out for the money for the best part of the last couple of weeks theyve been resisting taking these loans from the EU and the IMF. So I think people can see that whats been done is not just in the Irish interest but its actually been done by all these countries because we think its in the European interest, including Britain. Sometimes you get what you want; Sometimes you get what you need; Sometimes you get what you get: What are you overall thoughts on the way the Liberal Democrats entered a coalition with the Conservatives? The book shows that there was no great plot to go with one party or the other, that we were genuinely making a decision as a party on what was best for the country and what was most likely to advance the prospects of getting the policies that we stood on in the election manifesto into government, and obviously a lot of people will criticise us for the decisions that we made. The honest truth is that we didnt have a great deal of choice. A coalition with the Conservatives not only offered us the best prospect of delivering many of the Lib Dem policies that we regarded as important, but it was probably the only prospect of having a stable government that could deliver for Britain and the British economy. Had we not been willing to go into coalition with the Conservatives I suspect that there would have been a lot of economic instability. There would have been higher interest rates, there would have been more speculation about the UK. And ultimately there would have had to be a second General Election, which I think would have resulted in us doing quite badly if we were seen to be to blame for there being no Government, which I think there probably would have been. We would then have had an outright Conservative majority with no Lib Dem voice in it. Which I think most people in the country would regard as definitely an inferior option to the one that weve got. So this is the government that weve now formed for all the right reasons, and weve got to be active in making it as successful as possible and ensuring that it delivers as much Liberal policy as possible. And if you were going to choose your moment to go into government, not having been in for 70 years, you wouldnt choose a borrowing requirement of 150bn. But we cant choose our time. These are the circumstances thrown into our lap and we can only do our best for the country and the party with the hand that weve been dealt. People are giving us some credit for having established a coalition which does seem to be able to make decisions, which is so far viewed by many people as quite successful . The opinion polling seems to suggest that people do believe that Lib Dem involvement has made a difference to the nature of the Coalition in the things were doing.

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How Osborne's small, select team helped Cameron do the unthinkable Extracts from Tory ex-whip Rob Wilson's book Five Days to Power, The Journey To Coalition Britain, which gives vivid account of five dramatic days of coalition talks Nicholas Watt guardian.co.uk, Friday 12 November 2010 21.30 GMT Britain's first peacetime coalition in 70 years, which celebrates its six-month anniversary today, was formed after five dramatic days of negotiations in May. Rob Wilson, a Tory whip at the time who has spoken to all sides about the talks with the Liberal Democrats, has written a vivid account of the discussions. In this edited extract Wilson describes how George Osborne persuaded David Cameron two weeks before the election on 6 May to do the unthinkable and make discreet preparations for a hung parliament. The extract ends with Cameron's offer of a "big, open and comprehensive offer" to the Liberal Democrats on the afternoon of Friday 7 May. Cameron agreed to let a small but high-powered team, consisting of Osborne himself, Oliver Letwin, Ed Llewellyn and William Hague, work through all the likely scenarios, and to consider the responses that each might trigger. It was done covertly, with Osborne selecting a team that would have needed to know what had been agreed with Cameron: Letwin, because he was head of policy, Llewellyn as Cameron's representative on the group and Hague as de facto deputy leader and an ex-leader well aware of all the sensitivities involved and a wise head to boot. Planning for a hung parliament therefore began halfway through the election campaign and was approved by the party leader. On one thing, though, Cameron was adamant: he as leader must be kept at arm's length. He was firm that his focus must remain the winning of an outright majority, and that any sense that he was resigned to failing in this objective might prove disastrous to his party's prospects. Don't report back to me, was his message to Osborne, unless specific decisions were urgently required the less he knew the better. The team met twice, both times on Sundays, and analysed what Nick Clegg had said in speeches and television interviews about his approach to a hung parliament: what he would want and his key policy demands. Letwin pored over the Liberal Democrat manifesto and policy documents, looking for areas of overlap or likely deadlock. By the end of the second meeting Letwin had a firm outline of the agreements and disagreements between the two parties that would be the ultimate source of the coalition agreement although at the time, it seemed likely to be used for a minority Tory government wishing to have a confidence and supply arrangement. In the early hours of Friday 7 May, the Tory leadership realised it had failed to secure an overall parliamentary majority. But Cameron and Osborne initially differed on what to do next. The Tory leader firmly believed the time had come to make contact with Danny Alexander, chief of staff to Clegg. Cameron's instinct was strong that an early call should be made to the Lib Dems. Osborne had his doubts, feeling that the party should tread carefully his view was that their focus should be on getting Gordon Brown out of Downing Street. Cameron was calm but determined, aides remember, and was clear that the time had come. He declared: "You should get hold of Danny, now!" In all their minds was the knowledge that a political bidding war would soon commence, in which the early moves would be critical. Cameron now knew he was involved in a struggle where time was of the essence, and he was determined to take the initiative. Already, his strategy to take power was becoming well developed in his own mind. Andy Coulson [Cameron's director of communications]was worried. Brown, he felt, was appearing prime ministerial. It was, according to one who witnessed it, a tense meeting. There was "a lot of argument, I suppose creative tension, between Steve [Hilton, the director of strategy] and George [Osborne] about what to
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do next. George thought the Liberals [sic] would go with Labour and they would be difficult to get some kind of decision from. It was the first time for a long time he wasn't quite certain." Cameron decided to draw a line under it and said: "Enough I'm going to my hotel," which would give everyone the opportunity to get some rest. He left for the Westminster Plaza just after 6am, ordering his team to reconvene at 10am (Friday) in his hotel suite. Hague had a chaotic start to Friday. At key points in the intense conversations at the Westminster Plaza, he would have to call into motorway services in search of a decent phone signal that would allow him to join in discussion of the issues at hand. There were three separate conference calls with a group of people, initially Cameron, Osborne and Hague, which grew as they spoke to people such as Ken Clarke and Liam Fox, whose approval was important to a coalition agreement. It ended up with the shadow cabinet on a conference call. For those on the road it was all rather surreal. "It sticks in my memory," Hague recalls, "[that] we were deciding the potential future government while I was at some curious places like a Little Chef and a McDonald's car park." At the hotel, as one of those present remembers, Cameron was on impressive form in spite of the long night. He "was firing on all cylinders. He accepted what he had to do and how he had to go about it. He was completely in command". The path he wanted to take forward was now clearly mapped out in his mind: he was absolutely clear that he was going to make a very bold and generous offer to the Liberal Democrats. Cameron had had the seed of an idea about coalition in his mind for several weeks, but was focused on victory. The exact mathematics of the result, having discussed pursuing a minority government with his team only 24 hours earlier, made him focus. The result had left the prospect of a non-Conservative government as a reality and he determined that for both the political and national interest he must not allow it to happen. Therefore before he slept he had been turning the option of coalition in his mind, and when he awoke he had decided the best thing to do was to aim high, as he said, "to pitch for a partnership government". It was, he felt, a twin-track approach, because if a formal coalition proved impossible to construct, he hoped for a minority government. Either way it would give the Tory party the moral high ground. Discussions with Osborne about this strategy confirmed Cameron's view, and as one who witnessed events said: "After a bit of sleep, George was back as the old George. He said we needed to make a generous offer, we needed to offer 'the top price for the Turkish carpet'." Osborne had a new focus and determination, and a very firm sense of purpose. When Letwin began describing to the assembled team the policy issues and the overlaps, he did it from a basis of painstaking preparation. Going through issue after issue, he described the detailed positions of each side. Meanwhile Coulson had reappraised his early-morning view on Brown. The press, he observed, were "now treating Brown like a squatter". As the discussions continued, Ed Llewellyn kept in touch with Danny Alexander, who was ensuring that Cameron broadly knew what Clegg was expected to say in his statement. Neither team appeared to want any surprises, so it appeared as if the Liberal Democrat and Conservative pronouncements were almost choreographed. Clegg made his live TV appearance [confirming that the Lib Dems would open coalition negotiations with the Tories]. The activity was now focused on drafting Cameron's response to Clegg. Hilton retired to a separate room to draft what Cameron wanted. His first draft was rejected as too stark in its offer of a coalition. Hilton retired to put together several further versions as Osborne, Llewellyn and Coulson made suggestions. Letwin also reviewed a late draft. The work put into getting the Cameron statement right paid off handsomely the statement, as one Labour MP reluctantly admitted, was "a blinder, hitting all the right notes". Rob Wilson, Tory MP for Reading East, is parliamentary private secretary to the culture secretary, Jeremy Hunt. Wilson, 45, served as an opposition whip until the formation of the coalition
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government. During the coalition negotiations he was one of the whips who briefed Tory MPs on the talks. Wilson interviewed 60 people, including past and present cabinet ministers, for his book, which chronicles what he describes as "a momentous event in British political life". In the introduction he writes that his book's main aim "is to document faithfully and historically what happened the order things happened, the meetings, conversations, the documents and firsthand memories of the key participants". Extracted from Five Days to Power, The Journey To Coalition Britain, by Rob Wilson, published by Biteback on 15 November (9.99)

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conservativehome.blogs.com/thetorydiary/2010/11/has-david-laws-let-slip-the-truth-behind-the-libdems-motivations-on-av.html Has David Laws let slip the truth behind the Lib Dems' motivations on AV? Last night Lib Dem MP and former Chief Secretary David Laws and Tory MP Rob Wilson appeared on a platform together with Total Politics editor Ben Duckworth to discuss their new books about the formation of the Coalition after the general election. 22 Days in May by Laws is very much the version of events from the Lib Dem perspective (he was of course part of their four-man negotiating team) and also covers his brief tenure of ministerial office at the Treasury. Wilson's 5 Days to Power, meanwhile, is a highly detailed account of the negotiation process, for which he spoke to all the key players involved in the process on all sides (apart from, I gather, Gordon Brown). At the event in Portcullis House the duo discussed the events of those frantic five days in the aftermath of the general election, giving a flavour of the ground they cover in their books. Here are a few things that stood out last night: Danny Alexander had anticipated the Lib Dems winning 85 seats. Oliver Letwin had been tasked with going through the Lib Dem manifesto with a toothcomb, meaning that the Lib Dems felt he knew their policies even better than they did. The Lib Dems had a particular fear of electoral decimation at a second, autumn election if they did not enter a formal Coalition. Rob Wilson is convinced that the seeds of the Coalition were sown in David Cameron's mind when ex-broadcaster and one-time Labour MP Brian Walden told a Tory MPs' awayday four years ago that a Tory-Lib Dem coalition was the obvious course of action in a hung parliament. George Osborne insisted multiples use of the word Coalition were deleted from David Cameron's "big, generous offer" speech on the Friday after the election. The Lib Dem negotiating team had been established in January/February this year. In his last ditch offer to the Lib Dems, Gordon Brown offered Nick Clegg total control of European policy and Cabinet seats allocated on a 50:50 basis. There was also agreement between the pair as to how "staggeringly awful" (Laws' words) the Labour negotiating team were in terms of their lack of preparations and conduct during the process. Lib Dem blog Spiderplant Land carries a very full account of last night's event, but the thing that really sticks out for me is what David Laws said in answer to my question about the extent to which the Lib Dems considered the potential electoral consequences of entering a Coalition. I have maintained that the course of action they took was their least worst option: the public would not have tolerated the Lib Dems propping up the corpse of the Labour Government and it would have been laughable for a political party out of office for generations to have refused the chance to be in government again and exercise some power. Yet there was always the danger of alienating Labour voters who had been voting tactically for the Lib Dems - as evidenced by the fact that Lib Dem poll ratings have now dropped to 10% or thereabouts. And it was in this context that Laws made his telling admission. He said that for the Lib Dems the prospect of the introduction of Alternative Vote was a "protection against the reduction of our individuality" and a "shield against the loss of support we would suffer". Is this not evidence that the positive case in favour of AV (insofar as there ever was one) appears weaker than ever?

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Revealed: Lib Dems planned before election to abandon tuition fees pledge Exclusive: Documents show Nick Clegg's public claim was at odds with secret decision made by party in March Nicholas Watt, chief political correspondent, guardian.co.uk, Friday 12 November 2010 In addition to the party's manifesto pledge, Nick Clegg signed an NUS pledge in April to vote against any increase in tuition fees. Photograph: NUS press office The Liberal Democrats were drawing up plans to abandon Nick Clegg's flagship policy to scrap university tuition fees two months before the general election, secret party documents reveal. As the Lib Dem leader faces a growing revolt after this week's violent protest against fee rises, internal documents show the party was drawing up proposals for coalition negotiations which contrasted sharply with Clegg's public pronouncements. A month before Clegg pledged in April to scrap the "dead weight of debt", a secret team of key Lib Dems made clear that, in the event of a hung parliament, the party would not waste political capital defending its manifesto pledge to abolish university tuition fees within six years. In a document marked "confidential" and dated 16 March, the head of the secret pre-election coalition negotiating team, Danny Alexander, wrote: "On tuition fees we should seek agreement on part-time students and leave the rest. We will have clear yellow water with the other [parties] on raising the tuition fee cap, so let us not cause ourselves more headaches." The document is likely to fuel criticism among Lib Dem backbenchers and in the National Union of Students that the party courted the university vote in the full knowledge that its pledge would have to be abandoned as the party sought to achieve a foot in government. Within a month of the secret document, Clegg recorded a YouTube video for the annual NUS conference on 13 April in which he pledged to abolish fees within six years. "You've got people leaving university with this dead weight of debt, around 24,000, round their neck," the future deputy PM said in the video. Clegg also joined all other Lib Dem MPs in signing an NUS pledge to "vote against any increase in fees". The leaked document showed that during the preparations for a hung parliament the Lib Dems still intended to fulfil that commitment. The Lib Dems, who are now under intense pressure after agreeing in government that tuition fees should be allowed to rise, said the document was designed to work out how to reach agreement with the Tories and Labour, who were "diametrically" opposed to them. As the party was isolated, the negotiators concentrated on trying to win ground where they could find consensus. Sources say that, in government, they have succeeded in tackling the discrimination against part-time students identified in the secret document. The Lib Dem document is disclosed in a new book on the coalition negotiations by Rob Wilson, Conservative MP for Reading East. Wilson, who interviewed 60 key figures from the main parties for Five Days to Power, reveals that: The Lib Dems made no attempt to stand by their two key economic election pledges no deficit reduction this year and opposition to a VAT increase in the coalition negotiations. A Clegg aide told Wilson: "The thing that changed minds was George Osborne saying that he had seen the figures and it was quite horrific in real life as opposed to spin life." Alexander, appointed by Clegg last year to lead a secret four-strong coalition negotiating team, had thought the Lib Dems would only support a minority Tory government and not a coalition because of a "substantial gulf" between the two parties. In his confidential document on 16 March, Alexander wrote that it "would make it all but impossible for a coalition to be sustainable if it were formed, and extremely difficult to form without splitting the party." Chris Huhne, a member of the secret team, wrote a dissenting report to Clegg saying the Lib Dems would have to form a full-blown coalition with the Tories, and not prop up a minority government. He warned there was no precedent for a minority government delivering a fiscal consolidation, raising the
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prospect both parties would face a backlash. "Financial crises are catastrophic for the political parties that are blamed, and we should avoid this at all costs." George Osborne, who had long feared the Tories would struggle to win an overall parliamentary majority, persuaded David Cameron to allow him to form the Tories' own secret coalition negotiating team two weeks before the election. The Tory leader demanded total secrecy and asked only to be given the barest details for fear that he would blurt it out "unplanned in an interview". David Laws, a member of the secret Lib Dem negotiating team who briefly served in the cabinet, predicted on 24 February 2010 that the Tories would make a "very early offer of co-operation or coalition" in the event of a hung parliament. Laws told Wilson that he has a high regard for Osborne who tried to persuade him to join the Tories in 2006. Gordon Brown was so keen to form a coalition with the Lib Dems that on Monday 10 May, the day before his resignation, he offered to form "a completely new sort of government" in which Clegg would run EU policy. The Lib Dems understood they would take half of the seats in cabinet. A Lib Dem spokesman said tonight: "These are selective extracts of documents which discussed a range of options ahead of any possible negotiations. As the Liberal Democrats made clear throughout the election and in negotiations, they had four key priorities which were set out on the front page of the manifesto. All of these priorities were agreed in the coalition document. The nature of the coalition agreement has meant we were able to set the foundations for a stable five-year government that will deliver many of the priorities the Liberal Democrats have long supported." Clegg tried to downgrade the pledge to abolish tuition fees at the 2009 party conference, prompting a backlash from the left. A plan to abolish them over six years was included in the general election manifesto.

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Secret documents show Liberal Democrats drew up plans to drop flagship student pledge before election New book on coalition negotiations shows contrast between private and public stances of Lib Dems on abolishing university tuition fees Posted by Nicholas Watt Friday 12 November 2010 21.32 GMT guardian.co.uk Nick Clegg always knew that forming a coalition with the Tories would be a perilous step for his party. Some critics, who believe Clegg abandoned his Liberal values in favour of an armoured ministerial Jaguar, fail to appreciate two key reasons why he joined forces with David Cameron: The national interest argument. Britain needed a stable government during a bumpy economic period. A Lib Dem coalition with the Tories was the only way to achieve this because a deal with Labour woud have amounted to a "coalition of the losers". A minority Tory administration, propped up by the Lib Dems, would have been deeply unstable. The party interest argument. A central Liberal argument in wooing voters over recent decades that they are more than a protest party and are serious about governing Britain would have been shot to pieces if they had spurned the "big, open and comprehensive offer" David Cameron made on the day after the election. Clegg is, however, experiencing a bumpy time himself after shedding what had appeared to be pretty sacred commitments. A new book on the coalition negotiations by the former Tory whip Rob Wilson, serialised in Saturday's Guardian, shows that the Lib Dems accepted two months before the general election they would have to scrap their pledge to abolish tuition fees. A secret document by Danny Alexander, dated 16 March, indicated that the party would stand by its commitment to oppose an increase in the cap on tuition fees. But the Lib Dems were so isolated from Labour and the Tories on the issue that they agreed in private that they would have to forego their pledge to abolish the fees within six years. This is what Alexander wrote: On tuition fees we should seek agreement on part time students and leave the rest. We will have clear yellow water with the other [parties] on raising the tuition fee cap, so let us not cause ourselves more headaches. Had Clegg stuck to the famous written NUS pledge to oppose any rise in tuition fees he would not have a problem. The Alexander document made clear the party was determined to maintain that pledge. But the abolition pledge was in the party's election manifesto. Clegg also recorded a YouTube video for the NUS annual conference, screened on 13 April, in which he stuck by his abolition pledge. Less than a month after Alexander made clear in private that the abolition pledge would be abandoned during hung parliament negotiations, this is what Clegg told the NUS conference: Hello I'm Nick Clegg, leader of the Liberal Democrats. I hope your conference is going to go well. You've certainly chosen a great time to hold it slap bang in the middle of a general election campaign. I wish you success in the conference but more broadly I really hope that you and so many other young people in this country will shout loud for what you believe in and what you need to get through to politicians because life is just too unfair for too many young people today. You've got people leaving university with this dead weight of debt, around 24,000, round their neck. One of the things I want us to do, the Liberal Democrats that is, is to join forces with you and make it plain that we've got to turn things round in a big way to provide the fairness, the optimism, the opportunity that you deserve. What does that mean? Well it means dealing with debt. I think the plans that, as far I can make out, both the Conservatives and Labour parties are cooking up in one way or another to raise the cap on tuition fees is wrong. We will resist, vote against, campaign against any lifting of that cap. At the same time we think you have got to do something about how student finance works. We used to want to be able to scrap tuition fees overnight. Because money is tight it is going to take
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a little longer. We have a plan to do that over six years. But it is a plan that works. It would start by removing the tuition fees for undergraduates in a first degree course in their last year of study. And then it would broaden out over the six year period to others too. The video makes it difficult for Clegg to launch what could have been a strong defence. He moved to downgrade the pledge to abolish tuition fees at the 2009 Lib Dem conference. A commitment to abolish them over six years was included in the election manifesto. Had Clegg not used such stark language in the NUS video he might have won a greater hearing for this defence. At the end of a difficult week for Clegg, in which he was mocked in the Commons by Harriet Harman for his U-turn and was the subject of taunts on the student protest, let's consider the Lib Dem defence: The Alexander document was part of prudent preparations for a hung parliament. It would have been irresponsible of the Lib Dems not to make such preparations. The Lib Dems had no choice but to prepare to drop their pledge because they were completely isolated. This is what one source told me: These documents set out to deal with parties whose policies were diametrically opposed to ours. So what lessons cn Clegg draw from this? He will probably reflect that one of his strengths his passion served him well in opposition as he signed student pledges and electrified the leaders' television debates. Such a simple approach does not fit well with the business of government, however. The challenge for Clegg is to maintain the passion but in a way that is credible when you are driven around in an armour plated Jag.

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