Philosophy 100 Samuel Carey 4491871

Compatiblism is the view that free will (and moral responsibility) is

compatible with determinism. State this view as clearly as you can,

in part by explaining what “determinism” stands for. Then discuss

its plausibility. Is it a reasonable doctrine? Give reasons for your

answer.

The view that free will is compatible with determinism is a heavily

contested argument with many differing views. In order to come to a

conclusion of the plausibility of whether free will is compatible with

determinism one must review the philosophical concept of compatibilism

and its main arguments for why and how moral responsibility and free

will can be reconciled with determinism.

Compatibilism is the philosophical doctrine in which the notion of free will

is compatible with determinism, otherwise known as the reconciliation

between moral responsibility and determinism*1. Determinism is a

philosophical doctrine that denotes the idea that there is only one

physically possible future and that this future is determined by the casual

laws of nature and prior occurrences.

Therefore, before I began the action of writing this essay, I was already

predisposed to writing this essay by prior occurrences, for example the

1
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Compatibilism

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Philosophy 100 Samuel Carey 4491871

occurrence of choosing to take philosophy, then choosing to take

metaphysics, and promising myself to achieve academic merit in all

areas of study. It is these prior occurrences that according to

determinism have made this essay possible.

There are many arguments for the plausibility of determinism, and it

being compatible with free will. The traditional view of determinism is

that if all events are predetermined by the past, and there is only one

discernable future, then we do not hold moral responsibility for our

actions as they were not actions of our own free will2. The main obstacle

to the compatibilists approach is that if the laws of nature and the past

determine one possible future, and free will needs two possible choices

to make an action free, it would mean that more than one future is

necessary for free will.

Compatibilist theory attempts to reconcile these two positions though an

analysis of the main factors of free will. Some of these would include the

questions what is it to act freely and without constraint? What is an

unfree action and what are the possible circumstances that arise to

make a certain action unfree? Furthermore they would propose the

question what it means to have acted differently3.

2
Folke Tersman Lecture Notes, Free Will
3
ibid

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Philosophy 100 Samuel Carey 4491871

Some defenders of compatibilism, like A. J. Ayer have continued the

Humean4 approach to determinism that the laws of causation are in

themselves enough to believe that determinism is true as it seems

logically sound to propose that every cause will have an effect, therefore

ever action in the past, will have an effect in the future5.

Ayer suggests that causality is the main point which proves that the

positions of determinism and free will are compatible. If we do not have

determinism, then our actions are not predisposed to our actions in the

past, therefore our actions would be entirely random. Furthermore, if

ones actions were just a matter of chance, then his actions may be

considered free, but not morally responsible. So, if it is considered

unreasonable to hold someone’s actions accountable if those actions

were a matter of chance, then an action that is not based on the chance

that I do one thing rather than another, has to have some casual

explanation for it, and so we are lead back to determinism6.

Furthermore, Ayer suggests that it is a person’s character that

establishes ones moral responsibility. If I am said to be acting in

character, I am presumed to be morally responsible for my actions.

Therefore my character has to be based on some of the prior actions of

the past that I was considered morally responsible for. So moral

responsibility seems to presuppose any arguments of the incompatibility

4
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Compatibilism
5
Ayer, Freedom and Necessity, p. 116
6
Ayer, Freedom and Necessity, p. 113

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Philosophy 100 Samuel Carey 4491871

of determinism with free will, as my past actions of free will have

determined my future actions7. Ayer goes around the principle of

alternate possibilities by proposing our actions of the past create our

moral responsibility.

Ayer proposes that an action is only unfree when the agent inciting the

action is under constraints of coercion8. Therefore, even in the presence

of a deterministic universe, our actions are of our own free will, and it is

not the prior occurrences that cause this constraint, but rather physical

actions of others. For example, say a man of no prior intentions to

commit violent acts was coerced by a terrorist to perform an action

under duress; let that action be assassinating a foreign leader. Under

the duress of a terrorist, who threatens the man with death if he does not

comply with the demands, if the man was to commit the action he is not

morally responsible for his action, as it was not an act of free will, rather

an act of coercion.

The argument for the compatibilism of determinism is heightened by the

positions asserted by Harry Frankfurt, in which he refutes the principle of

alternative possibilities. It must be shown that the principle of alternate

possibilities idea that an agent is morally responsible for his action only if

he could have done otherwise is false9. Frankfurt does this by proposing

7
Ayer, Freedom and Necessity, p. 113
8
Ayer, Freedom and Necessity, p. 117
9
Frankfurt, Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, p. 156

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Philosophy 100 Samuel Carey 4491871

that we can still be morally responsible for our actions even if the

circumstances made it unavoidable to perform it10.

Such a refutation of the principle of alternate possibilities can be seen in

the Frankfurts counter examples. An interpretation of his examples is

shown in; If two brothers where at there local pub, and both were

expected home by a certain time for a prior arrangement. B1 wants to go

home and see his wife, while B2 would rather stay at the pub and

continue drinking. If the whether changes and the pub and surrounding

roads are snowed in, it would be reasonable to say that B1 as he in the

situation he could only stay at the pub. In contrast, B2 willed to stay at

the pub, and because of the snow storm was unable to meet his wife.

Therefore, B2 could be considered morally responsible for his actions as

if he was not constrained by the snow storm, he would have still stayed

at the pub.

This shows that free will and moral responsibility is in fact compatible

with determinism. Therefore according to Frankfurt a person would not

be morally responsible for an action if he performed the action only

because he could not have done otherwise11. Moreover, this overcomes

the problem of having free will without two options for an agent to do

otherwise, further enforcing the argument that determinism is compatible

with free will.

10
ibid
11
Frankfurt, Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, p. 165

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Philosophy 100 Samuel Carey 4491871

The plausibility of compatibilism hinges on the reconciliation between

determinism and free will. The arguments of Ayer, which entail that

causation is enough for the plausibility of determinism, and of Frankfurt,

which refutes the principle of alternative possibilities seem to establish

that though it may not be a truth of the world that determinism and free

will exist, in theory, the compatibilism between determinism and free will

is logically plausible.

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Philosophy 100 Samuel Carey 4491871

Bibliography

Readings:

• A.J. Ayer, Freedom and Necessity, from Philosophical Essays

(pp. 217-84), first published 1954
• Harry Frankfurt, Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
from Journal of Philosophy (pp. 829-39) published 1969
• Peter Van Inwagen, The Incompatibility of Free Will and
Determinism from Philosophical Studies 27 (pp. 185-99)
published 1975

Online Material:

• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Compatibilism,

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/