SAARC COUNTRIES : US$ 20 REST OF THE WORLD : US$ 25

JANUARY 2012

INDIA : ` 120
VOLUME 3 ISSUE 4

ISSN

0976-206X

9 770976 206003

Against a Nuclear Backdrop

editor-in-chief

he 26 November attack on Pakistan Armys post in Mohmand Agency is a seminal event in a troubled relationship between allies in a constant spat. Whatever the spin put out by the Pakistan Army, or United States military spokespersons, the truth of the matter will remain confined by the differing perceptions generated out of this vexed relationship. Stories of vastly different interpretations abound, as they are expected to when the occasion is of such magnitude. And it is of enormous magnitude, one that cannot be measured by merely the statistical recourse to the number of casualties. 26 dead and at least half as many injured is a significant figure by any stretch of imagination. Even in the realms of South Asian negligence of the value of human life this is an enormous calamity that has hit the Pakistan Army.

Pakistani spin masters have been quick to point to various loopholes in their domestic airspace management, rules of engagement and the unequal nature of the relationship with the United States of America. What matters more to them is that the convoluted justifications find news space, not that they necessarily absolve the Pakistan Army of all its wrongdoings. And the list of wrongdoings are legendary in their audacity, myopia and the sheer subversion of law and good relations with all. The relations with the United States has been the bedrock as far as the Pakistani state is concerned and more so its military. Beneficiaries of arms sales and slush funds by the billions the Pakistani military machine was on hire to the United States for the longest time. Both looked the other way when it came to protecting core interests. If the Pakistani state allowed itself to become the frontline of anti-communist subversion it did so on its own volition. And if the United States slept over Pakistans nuclear shenanigans it did so with its eyes wide open. The problem, however, with looking the other way is that the earth is round and there comes a point when the two opposing visions are bound to collide.

Which is precisely the basis of the ongoing tensions over happenings on both sides of the Durand Line. Even as they may claim to be allies in the War On Terror, there is nothing to suggest that Pakistan and United States have interests anywhere near being common. The facts on ground clearly point to the fact that there is not convergence of interests between the two. In fact even as Pakistan draws coalition support funds from the United States its actions have clearly been subversive of NATO / ISAF interests. In that Pakistan has always been consistent, especially adept at pulling wool over the eyes. But such tactics have a limited shelf life and the expiry date was clearly crossed on 13 September 2011 when the militant attack on US interests in Kabul left a trail leading directly to the ISI. The Rubicon was crossed that day by Pakistan and 26 November is a direct outcome of that game. Suffice to say, the final whistle is a long way off.

manvendra singh

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

publishers view

executive editor

An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

T h e E r a o f L i m i t e d Wa r s

Vo l u m e 3 I s s u e 4 J a n u a r y 2 0 1 2
chairman shyam sunder publisher & ceo pawan agrawal editor-in-chief manvendra singh executive editor maj gen (dr) g d bakshi SM, VSM (retd) director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london corporate communications tejinder singh ad-sales pranesh vadhera anupama singh creative vivek anand pant administration shveta gupta representative (Jammu and Kashmir) salil sharma correspondent (Europe) dominika cosic production dilshad & dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographer subhash circulation & distribution mithlesh tiwari ranjeet amit e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscription: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial & business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002 (India) t: +91-011-23243999, 23287999,9958382999 f: +91-11-23259666 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

his months theme Limited Wars in South Asia: Against a Nuclear Backdrop is by itself a controversial topic given that Pakistan believes it has shut any window of opportunity that may have existed for a conventionally stronger India to exploit by officially unveiling its bomb-in-the-basement programme in May, 1998 and threatening that its nukes will be used in a First Strike mode.

The country comes first - always and every time.

The onset of limited wars

India, on the other hand had clearly followed every major move by Pakistan to go nuclear at any cost including, as the progenitor of the concept of Islamic Bomb former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto put it, eating grass if necessary. It was acutely aware of the transfer of nuclear weapons technology from China to Pakistan, including blueprints for miniaturised warheads to be fitted on surface-to-surface missiles to be supplied by North Korea. Hence its unequivocal refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that would have foreclosed Indias nuclear option and left the China-Pakistan collusive intent to hold sway in the emerging geopolitics. One cannot but recall with clarity the steely delivery of Indias Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament Arundhati Ghosh who told the world in no uncertain terms that India would not sign the CTBT Not now, not ever! Keeping a sharp eye on the ongoing China-Pak nuclear collusion, successive Indian governments from Indira Gandhi, who ordered the first nuclear test in 1974 to ensure that India had got it right, up to the moment the Atal Behari Vajpayee led BJP coalition government decided to keep its election promise to exercise the nuclear option, with three underground tests in Pokhran in the Rajasthan desert on 11 May 1998 followed by two on 13 May, all had made sure that India would not be caught napping. The final straw may well have been the testing by Pakistan of a North Korean supplied missile in April, 1998. It illustrated that Pakistan now had both the bomb and the means of delivery. In the face of American and its western allies attempt to put pressure on India to sign the CTBT even in the presence of so much evidence that Pakistan had been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons programme with extensive help from foreign sources India remained steadfast on its nuclear option. The fact that Pakistan conducted five tests on 28 May showed that American expert Leonard Spector who had said as early as in 1987 that Pakistans bomb-in-the-basement project was just two screwdriver turns away from completion was bang on target and that the Indian tests forced Pakistan to also go public. With proven nuclear warheads and the means of delivery in its arsenal Pakistans military establishment which has exclusive control of the project decided to take advantage of its newfound nuclear parity with India. Gen Musharraf dusted out an old plan to occupy the Kargil heights and threaten to disrupt the Leh supply line to the Siachen Glacier. He did just that and India did not discover the treachery for several months. When it did, it responded with all its conventional weapons and within two months had rolled back the Pakistani Army Northern Light Infantry troops with devastating effect on the Pakistani psyche. The Kargil campaign highlighted the possibility of a limited war between nations armed with nuclear weapons. Since then there has been heated debate and cold-blooded analyses about how deep Indian troops could penetrate Pakistani territory before Islamabad responds with nuclear weapons; how long would it be that the war escalated into a nuclear exchange between the two countries leading to what is known as Mutual Assured Destruction or, appropriately, MAD. In this edition DSA has once again brought before the Indian public a consolidated ready backgrounder on the whole gamut of issues involved in the concept of limited war in the sub-continental context including one that says that for too long we have allowed Pakistans nuclear deterrence to work to the detriment of Indian national interests in Jammu and Kashmir. Wishing our readers happy reading and an even happier and secure 2012. Jai Hind!

n the eve of its second Anniversary the DSA had held a path breaking Seminar on Limited Wars in South Asia: Against a Nuclear Backdrop. Three former Service Chiefs, a former Foreign Secretary and Director, Centre for Air Power Studies had participated. The Seminar was attended by young parliamentarians and a host of serving and retired service officers to include the CISC, DGMT and DGPP. In this Issue we are publishing the highlights of the Seminar and a number of incisive articles on this theme by very senior retired officers and well known academics including one from the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. This is a live and burning issue. We may well have to fight Limited Wars against Pakistan or China or both. These wars will be fought against a Nuclear backdrop. The formulation that we will continue to prepare for a general conflict (like the two World Wars) and that preparation can take care of any lesser contingency will not work anymore. Gen Maxwell Taylor of the US Army was emphatic on this subject. A Limited War fought against a nuclear backdrop has its own characteristics and limitations and requires very specific force structuring and preparation. A generalised, one size fits all, solution does not work in all cases related to limited wars. The Chinese are crystal clear on this subject. Since 1978, paramount leader Deng Xiaoping had come to the clear-cut determination that general global wars were a thing of the past and henceforth China would structure its armed forces and prepare to fight only Local Wars. The nature of these Local (or Limited Wars) evolved in the Chinese perception to first "local wars fought under high-tech conditions" and now under what is termed "conditions of informatisation". Today there is a vital need for wide-ranging and participative debate in India about the nature and characteristics of the wars that we are likely to fight. There is a need to enunciate a Declaratory Doctrine for Limited wars that spells out our determination to uphold our vital national interests even against a nuclear backdrop and synergises the response of not just the three services but ensures a whole of the government approach to such situations. We need to war game a series of response options and escalation ladders for such Limited Conflicts. The CCS will have to accord approval in principle for such contingencies in peacetime itself so that the transition to a limited war is smooth and well thought through and Escalation Dominance is ensured. There is an urgent need for India to field dominant conventional war fighting capabalities in South Asia to generate credible response options to Pakistans asymmetric adventurism or Chinese attempts at hegemonism. Our response so far has been characterised by an unexplicable meekness and timidity. Our arms acquisition process has been badly hobbled by inordinate delays and huge time and cost overruns and is proceeding at a glacial pace. This process will need to be speeded up urgently. The deliberations of the Seminar and articles by many retired senior officers on this issue provide food for thought that will help us crystallise a Doctrine for Limited wars which is long overdue. We will have to go beyond Cold Starts Land Power centric approach and examine conflict initiation options that rely more on the far more flexible assets of Air Power and Sea Power to set the stage for such a conflict. We need to examine the nature of such a conflict, its modus operandi and desired end states. We need to war game scenarios as escalation ladder generators and help our political class overcome its astonishing diffidence and meekness in the face of external challenges. Cold Fusion presents a revolutionary new form of energy which we must exploit to create a demassified / distributed energy grid that takes us beyond the fossil fuel era. As a vibrant civilisation we need to invest in this path breaking future now. This issue has a very interesting article on Table Top Fusion. 16th December was the 40th Anniversary of our landmark victory in the 1971 war that led to the birth of Bangladesh. We need to learn our lessons from that seminal conflict which has crystallised the Indian way of war characterised by information dominance, the offensive use of asymmetric warfare to break the adversaries balance, methodical preparation and a rapid execution based on shock and awe generated by massing effects. Lt Gen Jacob, one of the prime architects of the victory recounts the inside details of the war in this issue.

disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence and Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts.
defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: manvendra singh.

We would avidly look forward to your feedback on all these vital subjects and hope to kick-start a participative and wide-ranging debate in the country.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

pawan agrawal

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

contents
Limited Wars in South Asia ISSUE January 2012

An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

Volume 3 Issue 4 January 2012

A R T I C L E S limited wars in South Asia: 8 against a nuclear backdrop

General V P Malik PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd)

break the steel collar

Cecil Victor

82 89

sub-continental dilemma F E A T U R E S

Maj Gen (Dr) Sheru Thapliyal SM (retd)

limited wars in South Asia: a civilian perspective

Amb Dr Kanwal Sibal

13

limited war: some doctrinal issues

Air Cmde Jasjit Singh AVSM, VrC, VM (retd)

16 20

Roger Rose - Chief Executive Lockheed Martin India Private Ltd

Interview

42

nuclear neighbourhood: challenges for India

Amb Arundhati Ghosh

exercise sudarshan shakti: validating doctrine

Nitin Gokhale

86

limited wars in South Asia: 24 against a nuclear backdrop

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

post show report: IFSEC homeland security India

91

Indias nuclear dilemma

Lt Gen Shantonu Choudhry (retd)

28 32 44 50 56 64 68 72 76 79

limited war and escalation in South Asia conventional wars and the shadow face

Lt Gen V R Raghavan PVSM, UYSM, AVSM (retd) Vice Admiral Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM (retd)

preventing armageddon: search for a new strategy

Dr Rajendra Prasad Dr M Srinivasan

silent revolution in nuclear science talking trade, not war

Anna Louise Strachan

the lie of the limited war

Vice Adm Barry Bharathan (retd)

remembering Bangladesh: a historic victory

Lt Gen J F R Jacob PVSM (retd) Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd)

limited war in the Indian context limited wars in South Asia: against the nuclear backdrop
Dr Rajiv Nayan

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DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT DSALERT

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

S R A W D LIMITE Ae fe n c e a n D f o r a in m e S ry a A n n iv e rs

I S A H T U IN SO NUCLEAR BACKDROP
04 No
d S e c u ri ty A le rt

A the Constitution Club, New Delhi INST20 AGA (D S A ) m a g a zi n e vember 11 at

n the spectral en ee tw be a si A th ou S Limited War in ? Is there space for a tional provocations en nv co bsu d an Nuclear exchange d ld be the desired en ou w t ha W ? ke ta ar ld such a Limited W should be the t ou ha sh W rm ? fo ns t tio ha w ita lim so If imary in hat would be the pr W ? es iv ct je calation dominance ob es d re su en state an to ns ea hat would be the m W ? rms? di an er op us od m rmination on our te te t ic nfl co re su en do we such a conflict. How for India would prepare at th ed at st ve ha ts istrys Annual Repor d take care of any ul co n io at ar ep Indias Defence Min pr ch rent ld War I or II) and su or W la a ( ar d Wars have a diffe w l ite ra m Li . ch a gene oa pr ap ed d training. The This is a deeply flaw an es ur ct ru st e rc fo lesser contingency. ation, ited ific doctrine, prepar ec sp ed ne d Local Wars or Lim r an fo tic ed ur ct dialec ru st d an ecifically preparing Chinese PLA is sp Wars. y unciate a declarator en to a di In r fo ed ne in view is there a ld be the essential ou sh t ha W ? op Keeping the above dr r back ar against a nuclea W d ite m Li r fo e in tr Doc doctrine? contours of such a

address e m o lc e w e h t rom Some excerpts f ds of all out

limited wars

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Following is the text of the keynote address given by General V P Malik, Former Chief of Army Staff during the Kargil conflict at Anniversary Seminar of DSA on Limited Wars in South Asia: Against a Nuclear Backdrop.
General V P Malik PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd) General Ved Prakash Malik assumed charge of the Indian Army, as the 19th Chief of Army Staff, on 30 September 1997. He was decorated with the Param Vishisht Seva Medal (PVSM) in 1996. He took over as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee with effect from 01 January 1999. He coordinated and oversaw the planning and execution of Operation Vijay to successfully defeat Pakistans attempted intrusion in the Kargil sector during May to July 1999.

LIMITED WARS IN SOUTH ASIA: AGAINST A NUCLEAR BACKDROP

There may be several situations where both the initiator and the affected nation are tempted to use conventional weapons and forces. The initiator is tempted to give it a greater push with conventional forces to achieve the desired results, as it happened in 1947, 1965. In the 1999 Kargil war, it did so despite our nuclear weapons capability. On the other hand, the affected nation, when pushed to the wall, may use its conventional forces to bring the proxy war into the open rather than fight with all the limitations of a no war no peace situation. Pakistan did in 1971. We almost did in 2002.

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

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limited wars

LIMITED OPTIONS

Limited Wars in South Asia:

A civilian Perspective

Amb Dr Kanwal Sibal Amb Dr Kanwal Sibal joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1966. He reached the highest position in the Indian Foreign Service on his appointment as Foreign Secretary to the Government of India from July 2002 to November 2003. He is a member of Indias National Security Advisory Board. He is on the Board of Directors of the New York based East-West Institute. He is on the Advisory Board of the Vivekanand International Foundation. He has received the high distinction of Grand Officier of the Ordre du Merite from France.

This is the text of the talk by Ambassador (Dr) Kanwal Sibal, former Foreign Secretary. It is remarkable for its analytical and very clear-headed approach to the subject of limited wars in South Asia whether against China or Pakistan or both and provides an invaluable civilian perspective to this vital issue.

India has been bled by terrorism from Pakistan for almost two decades and a half. Even when dramatic attacks took place against our Parliament and later in Mumbai, India could not take even limited retaliatory military action for fear of the conflict escalating into a nuclear stand-off. This gives Pakistan a fairly free hand theoretically to use the terrorist weapon against us at a time of its choosing

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limited wars

theoretical aspects

Following is the text of the talk given by Air Cmde Jasjit Singh AVSM, VrC, VM (retd), Director of Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi at Anniversary Seminar of DSA on Limited Wars in South Asia: Against a Nuclear Backdrop.
Air Cmde Jasjit Singh AVSM, VrC, VM (retd) The writer is Director of Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. He is Fellow of World Academy of Science and Art and has been awarded the Padma Bhushan for a life-times contribution to national security and defence.

LIMITED WAR: Some Doctrinal Issues

Given the present trends in Chinas military modernisation, it can be concluded with a degree of confidence that its future wars are unlikely to remain in keeping with the centrality of local-border war in its military doctrine; and its much more likely to shift toward a limited war where its air and missile power are much more likely to be employed on long-range strikes with precision weapons, though on land it may stick to the local-border war doctrine

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limited wars

PRAGMATIc engagement
An excellent civilian perspective on the aspect of Limited wars against a Nuclear backdrop. India is perhaps the only country that faces the challenges arising from having two nuclear neighbours, who closely cooperate with each others nuclear programmes and who maintain adversarial relations with her. A nuclear-weapon enabled terrorist threat is supported by strong and consistent denials of culpability for any such non-state attack and a reliance on its protector and mentor, China, to handle the inevitable diplomatic furore that is bound to rise if the taboo on nuclear weapons is broken with however limited an application. It would appear that Pakistan has adopted a policy of battlefield use of its nuclear weapons, a likely escalation of a conventional confrontation to a nuclear level, arrangements for rapid deployment which could entail pre-delegation to unit commanders in the event of a loss of communications, (which is what apparently happened at Salala recently when 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed in an ISAF air attack on two border posts). She asserts that there is a need to slightly tweak our nuclear doctrine; the objective would be not to change our No First Use policy, but to revert to the language of the Draft doctrine on the question of retaliatory strikes - these should be punitive rather than massive as now exists. Lastly, she makes the very bold assertion that in order to disillusion the adversary of our intent to retaliate, the control of the weapons should be placed squarely with the Strategic Forces Command.

nuclear neighbourhood:

Amb Arundhati Ghosh The writer joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1963 and served in various capacities in the Ministry of External Affairs and in Indian missions abroad. She was incharge of economic relations when economic reforms were launched in 1991. Served in the Branch Secretariat of the Ministry to liaise with the Bangladesh Government - in - exile in Calcutta during the birthpangs of that nation-state. Served as Ambassador in Egypt, South Korea and as Permanent Representative to UNESCO and to the UN Offices in Geneva. As Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva she etched in indelible words the sovereign resolve of the Indian nation never to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Her words reverberate in Indian hearts to this day. She told the world in measured, authoritative tones that India would never sign the CTBT. Not now! Not ever!.

challenges for India

The already friable situation could be exacerbated to intolerable levels if the state itself, following the trends within Pakistani society, becomes a theocratic intolerant state, bent on the establishment of a Caliphate in the region. The military and non-state groups are certain to have been emboldened by India having been deterred in 1999, following the Kargil attack, in 2001 after the attack on Parliament and Operation Parakram and more so, after 2008, after the attack on Mumbai. Would India react differently in the event of another Mumbai-type attack?

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limited wars

Welcome address
This is the text of the welcome Address delivered by the Executive Editor of the DSA at the inauguration of the Seminar on Limited Wars in South Asia. It sets out the issues for debate and discussion in perspective and flags the aspects that merit much deeper study and analysis. It highlights the crying need for India to enunciate a Declaratory Doctrine for Limited Wars Against a Nuclear Backdrop. It also decries the, one size fits all approach of preparing for a general, total conflict that can cater for any lesser contingencies. The Chinese have emphatically recognised that the era of general wars is over and we need to prepare today for Local / Limited wars under conditions of nuclear symmetry.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts. He has served two tenures at the highly prestigious Directorate General of Military Operations. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 24 books and over 100 papers in many prestigious research journals. He is also Executive Editor of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine. The key is the rapid fielding of overmatching conventional capabilities. These will undo Pakistans conventional deterrence dialectic and forge the realistic mind space for waging a Limited War. What should be the aim of such a Limited War? It should be simply to raise costs for asymmetric adventurism to achieve deterrence by punishment. The aim should not be terrain oriented but force oriented. It should aim to bring the adversarys strategic and operational reserves to battle in his own territory and degrade them seriously. It should aim at destroying / degrading his infrastructure of terror and decimating the ISI

IN SOUTH ASIA:
AGAINST A NUCLEAR BACKDROP

LIMITED WARS

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limited wars

tactical nukes
A highly cerebral former Vice Chief of the Army reflects upon the recent introduction of Nasr Tactical Nuclear Missiles by the Pak Army. He feels this constitutes a paradigm shift which calls for a rethinking of our nuclear and conventional warfighting Doctrines. Pakistan has enough land based missiles to carry out such a first strike by launching Tactical Nuclear Weapons, either as a demonstrative one or on a tactical target to inflict sufficient damage to own troops and concentrations which are purely military in nature and thus be termed as Counter Troop. In all likelihood such a strike would be on Indian soil but be termed as defensive. He feels that the current Indian doctrinal position of a full fledged Indian counter value response to such tactical nuclear use may not be viable. He recommends instead a matching response with own tactical warheads which will enable own conventional offensives to proceed apace.

Lt Gen Shantonu Choudhry (retd) The writer retired as Vice Chief of Army Staff in January 2005. He has served in Military Operations and Military Intelligence Directorates and has been an instructor in Defence Services Staff College. He is a widely read officer who writes regularly on national security.

By some guesstimate Pakistan has approximately 90 to 120 warheads with adequate number of delivery systems in the shape of aircraft and different varieties of nuclear capable missiles including the latest Shaheen I and Shaheen II. Besides they have developed / been gifted cruise missiles Babur and Raad which are nuclear capable. With enhanced capacity of production of weapon grade plutonium they are in a position to add four to six warheads every year to their stockpile. To these the latest vector which has been added is a Tactical Missile System Nasr which Pakistan claims is nuclear capable. This missile has been tested during a recent exercise by Pak forces. Obviously this also implies that they have in all likelihood, carried out miniaturisation of the nuclear systems to be fitted into The Nasr Missile which are claimed to be highly mobile and vehicle mounted

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DOCTRINAL CONTRADICTIONS
A highly perceptive article by a former DGMO and well known Military analyst on the theme of Limited wars in South Asia. This article examines the possibility of limited war between India and Pakistan and the potential of such a conflict triggering a nuclear war. It examines the considerations that could push each of the two countries to fight a limited war. It discusses how such a war might be waged and the circumstances that would likely precipitate an escalation to a nuclear exchange. The doctrinal beliefs and decision making processes of the two countries are examined to trace the likely escalatory spiral towards a nuclear war. The article concludes that the probability of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan is high in the event the two countries engage in a direct military conflict.

Limited War and Escalation in

Lt Gen V R Raghavan PVSM, UYSM, AVSM (retd) The writer was Indias Director General of Military Operations from 1992 to 1994. He is currently a Director at the Delhi Policy Group. He has been a visiting fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, USA.

South Asia

Osgood pointed out that while rapid escalation to win the war would probably risk wider conflict, gradual escalation would involve the United States in a protracted and costly war. He offered no solutions, but effectively pointed out the fallacy of getting into the Vietnam War without a clear purpose. Perhaps the most important analysis of Vietnam came from Harry G Summers. His main argument concerning limited war was that in Korea, while the United States limited its objectives, it did not limit its means to attain those objectives. It used every resource available other than nuclear weapons. On the other hand, in Vietnam, the United States reversed the equation and consequently paid the price of a long war and eventual defeat

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interview
potential as a manufacturing hub in the aerospace and defence sector is just being realised. India is a very important and attractive destination for a company such as Lockheed Martin which is interested in a long-term partnership with Indian industry and services. We share the thirst for technological innovation The Indian software industry has developed skills and expertise which are applied to such varied sectors as banking, insurance, financial applications and artificial intelligence. We recognise that Indian industry and research facilities are promising partners for us in this strategically critical field. Lockheed Martin is committed to a long-term partnership in technology development, manufacturing and strategic collaboration in third markets with Indian companies from both the public and private sectors. Its broad-based portfolio can address important Indian requirements in defence, security and delivery of vital public services. Lockheed Martin has an unmatched performance record in establishing partnerships with industry.

Roger Rose took over as Chief Executive, Lockheed Martin India Private Ltd in August 2009. In this position, he is responsible for all Lockheed Martin corporate business in the South Asia region that includes India, Sri Lanka, Nepal and the Maldives.
DSA: You have been the Chief Executive Officer, Lockheed Martin India Private Limited, since 2009. How do you visualise the business opportunities in the Indian Market? Roger Rose: Lockheed Martin is pursuing a range of programmes in India and sees business opportunities across sectors. Our priority is to execute the contracts that we have signed. We have delivered the C-130J to the Indian Air Force ahead of schedule and significantly under-budget. This was an FMS sale. We have received a request for additional six C-130Js. Lockheed is part of the Apache team in which Boeing is the lead. We have the mission and missile systems on the platform. We are looking forward to a closure on that contract. We are also part of the team with Raytheon on Javelin missiles. This will be another FMS programme and we are currently at the Letter of Request (LoR) stage. The Indian Army has not only seen the missile firing during Exercise Yudh Abhyaas in which the US Army had brought the Javelin, but also fired it. There is a lot of interest in Javelin in the Indian Army. Lockheed is also looking at offerings for Coastal and Homeland Security. We have also offered the MH60R to the Indian Navy. We have been talking about naval combat system. The Indian Navy has been looking at creating aircraft carrier battle groups. The best system to protect a carrier battle group is the Aegis Combat System. It is a mature, developed system which has been there for 30 years and the only one that can stop an incoming modern missile system. DSA: Lockheed Martins presence in the Indian market is more than 20 years now. What measures and strategies are being formulated to strengthen and better support Indias Military Sector? RR: Lockheed Martin has maintained a presence in New Delhi for more than 20 years. With the Indian economy growing at more than 8 per cent and the simultaneous strengthening of the Indo-US relationship in the past decade, Lockheed Martin has increased its presence in India. In 2005, the Corporation expanded its office to better support the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) and its global security needs. Recently, Lockheed Martin has aggressively pursued opportunities for all three military services (Navy, Army and Air Force) apart from civil applications in the fields of renewable energy and civil aviation. Lockheed Martins sale of six C-130J special mission transports to the Indian Air Force (IAF) in 2008 represented the first major military deal between the two countries. DSA: India is strenuously trying to build a Military Industrial Complex in the Private sector. What role can LM play in actualising this vision. What partnerships, if any, do you have in mind? RR: Tata LM Aerostructures Pvt Ltd, our joint venture with Tata Group, is our first initiative in this direction. This will add significantly to defence manufacturing capabilities in the country. We are always looking at more opportunities where we can partner with domestic industry to build lasting partnerships. DSA: Indias Offset Policy is designed to help build capacities for military production in our private sector. How effective is this policy? What can LM do to promote the growth of a Military Industrial Complex in our Private sector via this route? RR: Indias offset policy is evolving. We at Lockheed Martin have a lot of experience in executing offsets and I am sure that we can work with Indian industry to create a win-win situation for all stakeholders. India is fast becoming part of the global supply chain of some of the biggest defence suppliers in the world. Indias

DSA: Lockheed Martins sale of six C-130J special mission transports to the Indian Air Force (IAF) in 2008 represented the first major military deal between the two countries. What are the other deals in the pipeline? RR: In addition to the sale of six C-130J special mission aircraft, LM also provided turnkey infrastructure to the IAF under a separate commercial contract. We have since then sold equipment for a Naval programme to MDL and are close to contract award with the IAF on two other programmes - as prime in one case and jointly with another US company in second case but with substantial LM work share. Beside these, we are also looking at contract award for additional six C 130J special mission aircraft under FMS programme for which a letter of request was received on 16 September. DSA: What are the prospects of LM in the Civil Aviation Sector in India, considering the increasing fleet size and emerging private airlines? RR: Every day across the globe, 60 per cent of the worlds commercial air traffic is monitored and controlled by Lockheed Martin air traffic control systems - systems that are powerful, advanced and completely reliable. Lockheed Martin knows how to work with governments worldwide in a way thats fiscally sound and we are accountable for generating strong results. We provide the experience, technology and financing to bring the most modern and efficient operations to our air traffic customers in the United States and worldwide. To meet tomorrows growth in global travel, we are developing next-generation systems today to modernise airspace management. Our systems offer air traffic controllers flexible routing, collaborative decision-making, conflict resolution tools and more accurate and timely surveillance information, all of which leads to safer skies. Lockheed Martin provides tools for ground surveillance monitoring, coordination between airport service personnel and the air navigation and management of aircraft in the taxiways and runways. Our hub and ramp management system integrates surveillance data, collaborative decision making tools and airline legacy systems into a single automated system. The system helps airline operations managers and air traffic controllers improve the efficiency of their operations. Our security systems protect the entire aviation infrastructure. DSA: The US, which lost a bid for US$ 11 billion contract for 126 war planes, has now offered India partnership in the development of the worlds most advanced flying machine, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Can you elaborate on this offer? RR: Sale of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is an issue to be addressed by the Indian and US governments. As an OEM of the aircraft, we will be happy to support the decision made by the two governments. DSA: In a recent development the Pentagon has notified the US Congress about the possibility of a US$ 1.2 billion deal with India for six more C-130J Super Hercules heavy-lift aircraft in addition to six ordered for the same price in 2008. Your comments RR: The original programme to provide India with a highly advanced airlift capability set a new benchmark in international defence cooperation. The acquisition, under the US Foreign Military Sales programme, of six C-130J Super Hercules called for the highest levels of cooperation between our countries governments, the United States Air Force and Lockheed Martin. I am happy to say that the levels of cooperation achieved resulted in India receiving its original six aircraft well ahead of schedule and under cost. As we see the capabilities and flexibility of this proven aircraft put to the test by the Indian Air Force, I know there are many more roles and missions out there that can be met by the C-130J and we look forward to many decades of IAF C-130 operations around the world. DSA: Where do you place LM in the next 5 years in India? RR: We expect much larger footprint for LM in India in the next five years with our top end solutions for the Indian Air Force, Navy, Army and the Coast Guard. In addition, we also hope to work with Paramilitary organisations, National Disaster Management Organisation, DPSUs and the private sector defence industry to meet the emerging requirements in the fields of aerospace, defence and internal security.
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ASPEROUS REALITIES
A former C-in-C of the Strategic Forces Command reflects upon the linkages between conventional warfare and nuclear warfare. He avers that the dynamics that condition military conflicts are largely predicated on the two faces of warfare. The primary face as defined by conventional forces and the shadow face as circumscribed by strategic nuclear forces. Application of the former is an active art while the latter scripts the perimeter and imposes cut-offs. To bring about a modicum of stability given a tinderbox situation, diplomacy backed by military force would provide the necessary means of arbitration. The coming of non state actors into the picture muddies the waters. Since their stakes in orthodox relations between states do not exist, their potential to cause destruction is extremely high. In dealing with such conditions the state must be prepared to take pre-emptive action and should the need arise, enable counterforce capabilities to prevent nuclear weapons falling into wrong hands.

Vice Admiral Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM (retd) The writer holds an MSc in Defence Studies and is a graduate of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, USA. He is the former C-in-C of the Andaman and Nicobar Command, C-in-C of the Strategic Forces Command and Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet. His Command and operational experience are comprehensive and include Command of INS Viraat the aircraft carrier. He is a member of the adjunct faculty of the National Institute of Advanced Studies and he currently tenants the Admiral Katari Chair of Excellence at the United Services Institute. The emergence of the fourth generation of warfare in our calculus and how its coming has twisted the very nature of warfare. In the absence of stakes normal to societies, non state actors bring with them disproportionate destructive powers. They pose a primordial threat that can only be countered by pre-emptive action

Conventional Wars and the Shadow Face

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limited wars

CARDINAL OBJECTIVES
Indian formulations of limited war are to a great extent based on the same consensus that the limited war theorists of the United States had in the 1950s and 60s. According to Kissinger, a Limited War is fought for specific political objectives, which by their existence, tend to establish a relationship between the force employed and the goal to be attained. It reflects an attempt to affect the opponents will not to crush it, to make the conditions imposed seem more attractive than continued resistance, to strive for specific goals and not for complete annihilation. The concept of India engaging in a Limited War with Pakistan gained primacy following the Kargil conflict in the nuclearised politico-strategic milieu of South Asia. The primary aim of Limited War is to inflict damages or to pose risks for the enemy out of proportion to the objectives under contention. Henry Kissinger aptly argues that the restraint which keeps a war limited is a psychological one; the consequences of a limited victory or a limited defeat or a stalemate - the three possible outcomes of a limited war - must seem preferable to the consequences of an all-out war. If Pakistan could initiate and finalise a limited war on Indian soil, could the latter repeat the same on the formers soil? Indias success [in Kargil] was due to the ability of our defence forces to fight and win such a limited war at a time, ground and means of fighting chosen by the aggressor. Success would be more likely if the initiative lay with India.

Preventing Armageddon:

Dr Rajendra Prasad The writer is Professor in the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies (DDSS) and Dean, Faculty of Science, DDU Gorakhpur University, UP, India.

Search for a New Strategy

The limited war theorists have many times emphasised that the risks of escalation would keep a war limited. Arguably, however, contradictory it may appear, the danger of escalation is one of the underlying reasons why a strategy of Limited War adds to Deterrence and also why, if Deterrence fails, there is a possibility of holding a conflict limited. A strategy of limited war contributes to Deterrence for the very reason generally raised against it

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TABLE-TOP NUCLEAR ENERGY!

Silent Revolution in Nuclear Science

Dr M Srinivasan Formerly Associate Director, Physics Group, BARC, Mumbai the writer is from the first batch of the BARC training school. He served as a Reactor Physicist and an experimental Nuclear Physicist at BARC, Mumbai for 40 years (1957 to 1997). His specialisation was in the general area of Nuclear Science and Technology, focusing on the Physics of Fission Chain Reactions and Fusioning Plasmas. At the time of his retirement he was Head, Neutron Physics Division of BARC and also Associate Director of its Physics Group. His main contributions were in the design, construction and experimentation with the three Purnima series of experimental nuclear reactors at Trombay and played a key role in the 1974 Pokhran nuclear explosion experiment. He was responsible for initiating Fusion Plasma experiments culminating in the building of the huge 500 KJ Capacitor Bank Facility at Purnima laboratories. During the last seven years of his research career at BARC he was deeply involved in the study of the controversial new field of Cold Fusion.

The writer of this article has just learnt that Dr P K Iyengar, former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, passed away on 21st December 2011. He would like to dedicate this article to the memory of Dr Iyengar as he had the courage and conviction to stand by the early BARC results (1989 to 1995) which confirmed the occurrence of Nuclear reactions in deuterated metallic samples. In recent months he was very happy to learn of the development of the Ni-H Rossi reactor and the imminent commercialisation of Cold Fusion / LENR and has thus passed on with the feeling that his stand has been fully vindicated!

A path breaking article on Table-Top Nuclear power via Cold Fusion or Low Energy Nuclear Reactions which could generate a revolution in Energy generation. A maverick Italian engineer-inventor Andrea Rossi had demonstrated a 10 KWth cold fusion reactor at the University of Bologna, in Italy on 14th January 2011. This novel Ni-H LENR reactor which has been named by Rossi as Energy Catalyser or E-Cat for short, was fuelled with just one gram of Nickel nano powder exposed to pressurised hydrogen gas. A practical embodiment of the inventive apparatus, installed on October 16, 2007, is at present perfectly operating 24 hours per day and provides an amount of heat sufficient to heat the factory of the Company EON at Bondeno in Italy. Imagine having a new source of clean energy which is decentralised (needs no electrical grid), does not require Uranium or Plutonium, does not produce any radioactive waste products nor nuclear radiation, does not leave any carbon footprint and is mass manufactured and sold in the market place as a common consumer product! A Silent Revolution in Nuclear Science appears to have indeed taken place behind the backs of our nuclear scientists. In the USA the Defense Advanced Projects Agency (DARPA), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) have all been quietly funding Cold Fusion / LENR research for the past several years. This could turn out to be a significant game changer that can revolutionise the field of Energy and take us beyond the fossil fuel era to a new and de-massified energy future. DRDO must take a look at this breakthrough technology.

The term Low Energy Nuclear Reactions (LENR) is increasingly being used as a more appropriate name to refer to nuclear reactions which take place under special conditions when certain metals (or their mixtures) such as Palladium, Nickel, Titanium, Zirconium etc. are made to absorb large quantities of Deuterium or Hydrogen on the surface

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limited wars

CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM
A cogently argued article that suggests that there are chances of peace breaking out between India and Pakistan and as such the option of a Limited Conventional War can be ruled out. Some argue that this is the only way to compel Pakistan to contain jihadi elements undertaking terrorist activities within Indias borders. However, the writer cites Ganguly and Kapur to point out, Pakistan may simply be lacking the capacity to eliminate jihadi groups. She feels it is much wiser to create a situation whereby the economic costs of supporting jihadi groups far outweigh the benefits of supporting them. Economic and Commercial Cooperation talks between the countries, she feels have been progressing at an unprecedented rate. She concludes cautiously that there are likely to be many setbacks and given the intractable nature of the India-Pakistan conflict the road to peace will be a long one. However, she feels that at a time when there is room for cautious optimism it makes sense to embrace the possibility of a peaceful resolution. The editors are constrained to point out that far too many previous Indian attempts to seek peace have ended up on the battlefield due to the intransigence of the Military-ISI complex of Pakistan and hence keeping ones options open may be far more prudent. Pak militarys current endorsement of the peace process may be purely Tactical to seek a free hand in shaping Post-US withdrawal Afghanistan to Indias extreme discomfiture.

Anna Louise Strachan The writer is a PhD scholar at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. She also holds an MSc in Asian Politics from SOAS and a BA in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Exeter in the UK. Her research interests include conflict resolution, electoral politics and UN peacekeeping. Following India and Pakistans nuclear tests in 1998 the stakes in the conflict between the two countries were significantly raised. However, few believe that there is a real prospect of nuclear conflict unless terrorist elements are able to acquire a nuclear weapon. Following the nuclear weapons tests, India and Pakistan became embroiled in the 1999 Kargil War. According to Chandran, this conflict constituted a limited conventional war and served to highlight the fact that a limited war between India and Pakistan was possible

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limited wars

GROUND REALITIES
South Asia is like a wounded, lumbering, mad elephant unsure of where it is going. It often tramples itself. There are many mahouts with different kinds of ankus, anlius or in the vernacular ankusa for controlling the pachyderm. The two most inimical neighbours, India and Pakistan are declared nuclear weapons states. However they are still nascent nuclear militaries. China is a robust military nuclear / conventional power in comparison. It has the unique ability of being the most strident of the mahouts, with pervasive influence in the region. The current security environment is simmering, just at the boil thanks to the unstable, volatile, Nobody really in charge situation in Pakistan. The degraded Afghan angst, the ham handed American / NATO approach, USPakistan misperceptions, Taliban resurgence, the high probability of nuclear installations falling into terrorist hands and lastly the Indo-Afghanistan stand alone relationship seem to vindicate THE LIE OF THE LIMITED WAR in the Sub-continent. The enigmatic Chinese keep every one guessing including their ally Pakistan. The Americans would eventually bid good bye and leave behind a sordid, squalid mess that is already oozing through the pores of the Sub-continent. South Asian Leadership has simply changed to pleader-ship and dealer-ship. The writers appeal: This article needs to be read purely on the narrow context of limited war and security in a nuclear weapons environment. Lie means falsity. It is also a golfing term signifying the position of the golf ball with reference to the grass beneath it. Both these are relevant to the concept of Limited war.

Vice Adm Barry Bharathan (retd) The writer is former Vice Chief of Naval Staff. He also served as Indian Naval Attache in Washington DC, USA.

Hitherto not a single conflict has vindicated the reason for its initiation. All players perhaps realise that military engagement would perforce be of short duration with enormous economic impact along with the ever present possibility of escalation into the nuclear dimension. More critically intercession, by USA, Russia and other countries is bound to have an inhibiting influence on a military to miitary engagement. It is bad to have a battle. It is worse to have a futile one with no gains for any one

The writer, a former Vice Admiral with a penchant for out of the box solutions, contends that there is no scope for a Limited war in South Asia. He asserts that hitherto not a single conflict has vindicated the reason for its initiation. All players perhaps realise that military engagement would perforce be of short duration with enormous economic impact along with the ever present possibility of escalation into the nuclear dimension. More critically intercession, by USA, Russia and other countries is bound to have an inhibiting influence on a military to military engagement. It is bad to have a battle. It is worse to have a futile one with no gains for any one. He avers that economic development alone is the panacea for our ills.

THE LIE OF THE LIMITED WAR

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HEROIC CAMPAIGN
The 40th anniversary of the historic victory in Bangladesh fell on 16 December this year. Lt Gen Jacob, former Army Cdr Eastern Command and one of the prime architects of this victory, reminiscences about that text book campaign. It was a classic campaign that saw Indias political and military leadership at its inspired best. In a blitzkrieg of just 14 days, a new nation state was created with the force of arms and over 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war were taken. Gen Jacob highlights the vital role played by the Mukti Bahini Guerillas, as also the in-house debates of what should be the centres of gravity of this campaign. Army HQ felt it should be the entry ports of Khulna and Chittagong, whereas Gen Jacob insisted it should be the capital city of Dacca. He gives a graphic first hand account of the climactic events leading to the Pakistani surrender at Dacca.

Remembering Bangladesh:

Lt Gen J F R Jacob PVSM (retd) The writer was the Chief of Staff of Eastern Command during the 1971 war for the liberation of Bangladesh. He is widely regarded as one of the key architects of that spectacular victory. Post retirement, he has served as the Governor of the states of Punjab and Goa. We divided the area of operations for the freedom fighters into sectors. Maj Zia was to be responsible for the Chittagong sector. Major Khalid Musharaf for Comilla, Maj Saifullah for Mymensingh, Wing Commander Bashar for Rangpur, Lt Col Zaman for Rajshahi, Major Usman for Kushtia, Maj Jalil for Khulna. Tiger Siddiqui was to operate from Tangail as did Noorul Kadar and Toha

A Historic Victory

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limited wars

PRECLUDING ESCALATION
Today when nations carry out a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the achievement of national aims is commensurate with the likely costs of waging a major war, prudence invariably dictates that if war is unavoidable, it must remain limited in scope and conduct. It is now well accepted in India that future wars in the Indian context are likely to be limited wars. These will be predominantly land battles that will spin out of ongoing conflicts on land like the proxy war being waged by Pakistan against India in Jammu and Kashmir and the half-century old military stand-off along the Line of Control. The Indian doctrine for limited war must emphasise massive asymmetries of firepower to achieve destruction and degradation of the adversarys war waging potential in a strategic context.

Limited War

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd) The writer is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. Views are personal.

in the Indian Context

The major aim of launching conventionally armed military forces into action will change from defeating the enemy to creating a militarily stable favourable situation so that negotiations, or even mediation, can be resumed. Traditional military principles and aims, that centred around planning for launching large-scale offensive operations to defeat the enemy, are likely to change to limiting military action to inflicting devastating damage on the enemys field forces and thus containing them, rather than defeating them comprehensively. The long-term emerging trend in inter-state warfare clearly points towards limited wars

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NEW PERSPECTIVE

Limited Wars
Another civilian perspective on the issue of Limited wars in South Asia. Though the writer rules out a limited Nuclear war as an obvious absurdity, his view on a conventional conflict against a backdrop of nuclear symmetry is more nuanced.

in South Asia: Against the Nuclear Backdrop

Dr Rajiv Nayan The writer is a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi since 1993, where he specialises in export control, non-proliferation and arms control. He was a Visiting Research Fellow at Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, where he published his monograph Non-Proliferation Issues in South Asia.

In 1953, Ralf Lapps technical work was the first published literature which analysed the possibility of nuclear weapons in limited war. However, the most popular and authoritative work was produced by Bernard Brodie in 1954. He argued for limited and tactical role of nuclear weapons in war in Europe to scuttle the communist advantage in the region

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UNLIMITED THREATS

An out of the box civilian view of breaking the Stabilty-Instability Paradox in South Asia. The writer suggests attacking the China-Pakistan linkage via the Karakoram Highway in PoK. Would this trigger a two-front war?
Cecil Victor The writer has covered all wars with Pakistan as War Correspondent and reported from the conflict zones in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in Southeast Asia as well as from Afghanistan. He is author of India: The Security Dilemma.

BREAK THE STEEL COLLAR -------------------------------

The Karakoram Highway built across Pakistan-occupied Kashmir is soon to be turned into a steel collar around Indias neck with the addition of a rail link and pipelines to fuel Chinese expansionism

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limited wars

TRANSFORMATION
Exercise Sudarshan Shakti was a major Air-Land battle exercise that would help synergise the resources of the Army and Air Force and enable the actualisation of capabilities envisioned during the recent Transformation study conducted by the present Army Chief prior to assuming charge. Over 60,000 troops and 300 tanks are participating in the exercise. For the first time the Army successfully used its satellites and UAVs during Sudarshan Shakti to provide a real-time picture and information of the war zone to battlefield commanders. The shift in outlook and the matching changes in the Army structure are based on a Transformation Study, carried out by a group of senior generals over the past two years. The new shift is aimed at strengthening the Armys capabilities to fight a war on two and a half fronts. The Indian Army will move from a Command-based deployment to a theatre command format where the front or the spearhead will be seamlessly integrated with resources in the depth or the rear.

EXERCISE SUDARSHAN SHAKTI:

VALIDATING DOCTRINE

Nitin Gokhale The writer, a journalist with 28 years of experience behind him in various conflict theatres, is currently NDTVs Security and Strategic Affairs Editor.

The new shift is aimed at strengthening the Armys capabilities to fight what a serving general calls a war on two and a half fronts - a reference to possible simultaneous confrontation with Pakistan and China in addition to being deployed in counterinsurgency situation internally

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limited wars

UNIQUE SCENARIO

DILEMMA
Indias Unique Security Situation Two Nuclear Armed Adversaries as Immediate Neighbours. A succinct article that highlights the dilemmas India would be faced with in a Limited war scenario in South Asia which could emerge from a collusive threat by China and Pakistan. The writer avers that Pak would be keen to use Tactical Nuclear weapons and the onus would be on India to prevent such an escalation.

SUB-CONTINENTAL

Maj Gen (Dr) Sheru Thapliyal SM (retd) The writer is working for a multinational information technology company after his retirement. He is PhD in Sino-Indian Relations and contributes regularly to magazines, periodicals and newspapers on Strategy, Security and Defence related issues. A future Indo-Pak conflict will be a scary scenario. On one hand use of tactical nuclear weapons by Pak is a distinct possibility while on the other our failure will reduce us to the status of a minor in Asia and we will remain confined to south Asia - exactly what China wants. Our aim should be to gain a clear tactical victory by thwarting Pak designs on the valley while at the same time not inviting a nuclear strike. A nightmarish scenario indeed

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IFSEC India / Homeland Security India 2011 a resounding success !!! IFSEC India 2011 was held at Pragati Maidan, New Delhi, India from 08 - 10 December 2011.
Delhi, December 2011: The fifth security exhibition, IFSEC India 2011, turned out to be a thunderous success with thousands of security professionals from all over the globe descending on Pragati Maidan, New Delhi, India, during December 8-10. The Union Minister for Home Affairs, Mr P Chidambaram, inaugurated the event. The exhibition, which was spread over three days from 8th to 10th December, saw over 11,684 trade visitors, which comprised leading names from over 250 exhibitors taking the opportunity to present their latest developments to the market, present and also gather market intelligence from the various international pavilions from countries such as UK, USA, France, Sweden, Taiwan and China. This year IFSEC India, in partnership with the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (Assocham), featured a Homeland Security India conference titled, War against terror- A challenge to our Homeland Security. The conference was a vital event for all homeland and commercial security professionals in both the public and private sector in India. Mr D R Karthikeyan, Padma Shri, Chairman, ASSOCHAMs National Council on Installations, Premises & Personnel Security (IPPS) delivered the welcome address. The conference focused on the advice, solutions and systems required for vigilance and security. In his welcome address, Shri Karthikeyan said, Homeland Security is the most important aspect that sets the agenda to a secure future of the country. The event as always has received very positive responses from the industry and I am very excited with the way the industry is reacting towards the event. Various associations, supporters, members and sponsors and domestic and international participants along with the strong visitor support contributed to the one of a kind B2B exhibition, which has gained a stronger foothold as the most prominent and important exhibition on the commercial and homeland security sector in the country. Amongst the prominent and most reputed industry names in the business of safety and security that were present at the exhibition viz. ADI, Aditya, ANG India, Arise, Axis, BGI, BOSCH, DVTel, Everfocus, FAAC, Godrej, Gunnebo, HID, HIKVISION, Honeywell Security, Indigo Vision, Kores, Kufra, LG, Matrix, Miscrosoft, Morpho, NEC, Neural, Panasonic, Samriddhi Automation (SPARSH), Turbo, Tyco, Vectra Glosec, Verint etc. HIGHLIGHTS of IFSEC India and Homeland Security India 2011 Indias Largest Exhibition for Commercial, Homeland Security and Fire Technology. Supported by UK Trade & Investments & APSA- Asian professional Security Association. Certified by US Commercial Services. Country pavilions this year from USA, UK, Sweden, France, Taiwan and China. Over 250 leading Security & Fire Technology Companies exhibiting. Spread over 15,000 sq mts area. IFSEC India 2011 aimed at bringing together the security experts from various industries including financial services, infrastructure, public safety, law enforcement retail, realty and hospitality all searching for the latest products and services in the security market. Next edition of IFSEC India is scheduled from 03-05 October 2012 at Greater Noida, Delhi NCR. For more information please contact Mr Pankaj Jain, T- 011-23765553, E: pankaj.jain@ubm.com or login to: www.ifsecindia.com / www.homelandsecurityindia.in