CHUA KENG GIAP VS IAC FACTS: the petitioner, Chua Keng Giap insists that he is the son of the

he deceased Sy Kao and that it was error for the respondent court to reject his claim. He also says his motion for reconsideration should not have been denied for tardiness because it was in fact filed on time under the Habaluyas ruling. This case arose when Chua Keng Giap filed, a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Sy Kao in the regional trial court The private respondent moved to dismiss for lack of a cause of action and of the petitioner's capacity to file the petition. The latter, it was claimed, had been declared as not the son of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao, for the settlement of the estate of the late Chua Bing Guan. The decision in that case had long become final and executory. The motion was denied by Judge Jose P. Castro, who held that the case invoked decided the paternity and not the maternity of the petitioner. Holding that this was mere quibbling, the respondent court reversed the trial judge in a petition for certiorari filed by the private respondent. The motion for reconsideration was denied for late filing

LIM VS IAC FACTS:

Who better than Sy Kao herself would know of Chua Keng Giap was really her son? More than any one else, it was Sy Kao who could say as indeed she has said these many years that Chua Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

ISSUE: WON Chua Keng Giap is the child of Sy kao HELD: NO The issue of his claimed filiation has long been settled, and with finality, by no less than this Court. That issue cannot be resurrected now because it has been laid to rest in Sy Kao v. Court of Appeals, 8 decided on September 28, 1984. In that case, Sy Kao flatly and unequivocally declared that she was not the petitioner's mother. "Petitioner Sy Kao denies that respondent Chua Keng Giap is her son by the deceased Chua Bing Guan. Thus, petitioner's opposition is based principally on the ground that the respondent was not the son of Sy Kao and the deceased but of a certain Chua Eng Kun and his wife Tan Kuy. "After hearing on the merits which lasted for ten years, the court dismissed the respondent's petition on a finding that be it not a son of petitioner Sy Kao and the deceased, and therefore, had no lawful interest in the estate of the latter and no right to institute the intestacy proceedings.

This is a contest over the estate of the late Dra Esperanza Cabatbat. The petitioner is Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be her only child and respondents are the sisters of the doctor and the children of her deceased brothers. Petitioner Violeta, her husband Lim Biak Chiao and the Calasiao Bijon Factory assail IACs and TCs decision finding her not to be the offspring of the Doctor and hence, not a legal heir of the late Dra Cabatbat. Respondents allege that Violeta is merely a ward (ampon) of the sps Esperanza and Proceso who sheltered and supported her from childhood, w/o the benefit of formal adoption proceedings. They present as evidence on the non-filiation of Violeta theff: 1. Absence of any record that Esperanza was admitted to the hospital where Violeta was born on the day of her birth 2. Absence of birth cert of Violeta in the files of certs of live births in the hosp from 1947-48 3. Cert of the Civil Registrar Gen saying that his office has no birth record of Violeta 4. Cert from Violeta school that in her files, the sps were listed only as guardians and not as parents 5. Testimony of one Amparo Reside who was at the hosp at the time of Violetasbirth and that she met a patient named Benita Lastimosa who gave birth to a baby girl who grew up to be known as Violeta Cabatbat. Petitioner denied the allegations and presented her birth record stating that she is the legitimate child of the sps. and her marriage contract wherein Esperanza appeared as her mother and a Deed of Abs Sale wherein she was assisted and represented by her father Proceso.

ISSUES: 1.WON TCs and CAs finding that Violeta is not born of Esperanza Cabatbat isconclusive on the Supreme Court 2.WON complaint is an action to impugn legitimacy and Art 263 CC can be applied

HELD: 1.Yes, the factual findings of the courts are entitled to great respect. Moreover, the absence of a record of birth of petitioner Violeta in the Office of the Civil Registrar General puts a cloud on the genuineness of her birth record. The records of the hospital show that only one woman by the name of Benita Lastimosa gave birth to an illegitimate child on the date of Violetas birth. 2.No, because this is an action to claim inheritance of the respondents as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that Violeta is illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedents child at all. Being neither a legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor achild by legal fiction of Dra Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased. This is very strange and odd because the Registry Book of admission of the hospital does not show that Esperanza Frianeza was ever a patient on May 26, 1948. Indeed, Esperanza Frianeza was never admitted in the hospital as an obstetrics case before or after May 26, 1948 On May 26, 1948, the day defendant Violeta Cabatbat was alleged to have been delivered by Esperanza Frianeza in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, the records of the hospital show that only one woman by the name of the Benita Lastimosa of Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, not Esperanza Frianeza, gave birth to an illegitimate child who was named by her mother Benita Lastimosa as Baby Girl Lastimosa Furthermore, the record of birth certificates of Pangasinan Provincial Hospital for the years 1947 and 1948 does not carry the birth certificate of defendant Violeta Cabatbat and the only birth certificate in the file of birth certificates of the hospital for May 26, 1948 is that of Baby Girl Lastimosa whose mother's name is Benita Lastimosa. Furthermore, the absence of a record of the birth of petitioner Violeta Cabatbat in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, puts a cloud on the genuineness of her Exhibit 5. Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code is not welltaken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither a legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased. LLphil

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.

DE JESUS VS THE ESTATE OF JUAN GAMBOA DIZON FACTS: petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who, having been born in lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce their respective shares in the latter's estate under the rules on succession. Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus are married It was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born In notarized document, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment that petitioners filed a complaint for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The court dismissed the petition CA affirmed in toto

ISSUE: WON petitioners can be recognized as illegitimate children of the decedent based on the notarized document HELD: NO The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by 1. the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or 2. an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by

the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; 2. any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 3. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgment. records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to o the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; o the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or o serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, 3 or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.

1.

Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected. petitioners hardly could find succor in Divinagracia because It was not a case of legitimate children asserting to be somebody else's illegitimate children. Petitioners totally ignored the fact that it was not for them, given the attendant circumstances particularly, to declare that they could not have been the legitimate children, clearly opposed to the entries in their respective birth certificates, of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus. The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioner's alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e., whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress. WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED.

LIYAO VS LIYAO FACTS: William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed an action for compulsory recognition as "the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao" against herein respondents, who are the legitimate children of William Sr.. Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William's untimely demise Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the signature of her husband, Ramon Yulo, to show his consent to the aforesaid sale.

he failed to secure his signature and, had never been in touch with him despite the necessity to meet him Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billy's birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company 4 and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein. 5 William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together. 6 During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing, among others, William Liyao and Corazon together with Billy's godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz, William Liyao's legal staff and their wives while on vacation in Baguio. 7 Corazon also presented pictures in court to prove that that she usually accompanied William Liyao while attending various social gatherings and other important meetings. During the occasion of William Liyao's last birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket, William Liyao expressly acknowledged Billy as his son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends and said, "Hey, look I am still young, I can still make a good looking son." Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latter's direct and overt acts. William Liyao supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs. However, after William Liyao's death, it was Corazon who provided sole support to Billy and took care of his tuition fees at La Salle, Greenhills. William Liyao left his personal belongings, collections, clothing, old newspaper clippings and laminations at the house in White Plains where he shared his last moments with Corazon Testifying for the petitioner were a friend, owner of a beauty parlor and Enrique Yulo On the other hand, respondents stated that her parents, William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married. Her father lived at their house in San Lorenzo Village and came home regularly. Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo. Corazon was not legally separated from her husband

Linda added that Corazon, while still a vice-president of the company, was able to take out documents, clothes and several laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office. Tita Rose stated that after assuming the position of President of the company, Tita Rose did not come across any check signed by her late father representing payment to lessors as rentals for the house occupied by Corazon Garcia. The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda, driver and bodyguard of William Liyao, declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the employees of the Republic Supermarket. People in the office knew that she was married. Her husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go to the office to fetch Corazon Garcia. The court ruled in favor of the petitioners CA reversed it.

ISSUE: WON petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao? HELD: NO Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. 22 The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. 23 The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code 24 provides: Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be caused: o By the impotence of the husband; o By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible; o By the serious illness of the husband.

Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim, petitioner presented a document entitled, "Contract of Separation," executed and signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims on any property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future. The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. 27 Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. 28 It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory. 29 It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother's alleged paramour. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings.

REYES VS CA FACTS:

It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

private respondents as plaintiffs a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas praying that the defendant Irene Reyes, alias Irene Ramero or Irene Delgado, be ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance in favor of plaintiffs Placida Delgado, Domingo Delgado, and Paula Delgado over four parcels of land It was alleged in the complaint 1. that the defendants thru abuse of confidence, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and other falsifications succeed in registering in the offices of the Register of Deeds of Quezon and Batangas a document of self-adjudication, wherein defendant Irene Delgado alleged that she was the sole child of the deceased Francisco Delgado and entitled to inherit the parcels of lands described in the complaint; that defendant Irene Delgado is not the illegitimate daughter of Francisco Delgado, who died without issue, but is the legitimate daughter of Genoveva Ramero and Justino Reyes; that plaintiffs Placida Delgado, Domingo Delgado and Paula Delgado, sisters and brother of the deceased Francisco Delgado are the heirs entitled to inherit from Francisco Delgado; and that Paula, Placido and Domingo Delgado defrayed the expenses of the last illness and the funeral expenses of Francisco Delgado and for the purpose they borrowed the sum of P 7,000.00 from their niece, plaintiff Maximina Delgado, and to pay Maximina Delgado they conveyed to her the three parcels of land described in subparagraphs (f) to (g) of paragraph 9 of the complaint. They also alleged that the defendant spouses Irene and Moises Villanueva borrowed from plaintiffs common fund the sum of P23,000.00 which they used in the purchase of a parcel of land

2. 3.

4.

defendant Irene Delgado, one of the petitioners herein, filed an answer to the complaint and set up the affirmative defense 1. 2. that she is the illegitimate daughter of the defendant Genoveva Ramero and the deceased Francisco Delgado; that for several years preceding the birth of Irene Delgado, her mother Genoveva Ramero had separated from her lawful husband Justino Reyes and never reconciled since then; and that Irene was

3. 4. 5.

born during the cohabitation of Francisco Delgado and Genoveva Ramero as common law husband and wife, and since her birth, lived with Francisco Delgado and Genoveva Ramero, who reared and treated her as their child, maintaining her and sending her through college. Defendants also denied having contracted a debt of P 23,000.00 from plaintiffs, or that plaintiffs spent for the last illness and funeral of Francisco Delgado. Irene Delgado likewise set up a counterclaim, alleging that, as the illegitimate daughter of Francisco Delgado, she has the right to represent her father to the inheritance left by her grandmother

The court ruled in favor of the petitioners CA reversed it.

ISSUE: WON Irene Delgado was legally acknowledged by her father Francisco Delgado HELD: NO The doctrine that for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit must be first recognized voluntarily or by court action is well settled in Our jurisprudence There are two (2) general classifications of illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock. 1. They may be either natural (actually or by fiction) or spurious (the incestuous, adulterous or illicit). Natural children are defined as those born outside of wedlock of parents, who at the time of conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (Article 269, New Civil Code). On the other hand, spurious children are those born of parents, who at the time of their conception, are disqualified to marry each other on account of certain impediment. Because of this basic distinction between these children, it is not legally possible to classify unrecognized natural children under the class of spurious children. Besides, commentators construe the phrase "illegitimate children other than natural" as excluding from the grants of rights under Article 287 of the New Civil Code those children who are natural child proper by birth and who have not secured voluntary or compulsory recognition (They fag within the scope of the definition of natural children enumerated in .Article 269, New Civil Code.

2.

Lastly, to follow petitioners' contention win not be in accordance with the consistent pronouncements of this Court. It is an elementary and basic principle under the old and new Civil Code, that an unrecognized natural child has no rights whatsoever against his parent or his estate. His rights

spring not from the filiation itself, but from the child's acknowledgment by the natural parent It can be seen from the record of birth that the name of the petitioner was Irene Ramero, and signed by Genoveva Ramero and of an unknown father. Another certified copy of another birth certificate issued by the municipal treasurer and local civil registrar of the municipality of Alitagtag (Exhibit "20") stated therein that the name of the child is Irene Ramero, and the name of the father is "Francisco" and the mother "Genoveva Ramero." Any of these records of birth cannot be sufficient recognition under the law. The birth certificate, to be sufficient recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses, otherwise she may be penalized and if the alleged father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, or doctor or registrar, is incompetent evidence of paternity of said child Since any of the certificates of birth presented were not signed by Francisco Delgado, it cannot be taken as record of birth to prove recognition of Irene Delgado; nor can this birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument. Irene's certificate of baptism cannot be taken as proof of recognition this Court said that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk. Irene's secondary student permanent nor the written consent given by Irene to the operation of her alleged father cannot be taken as an authentic writing. An authentic writing does not have to be a public instrument; it is sufficient that it is genuine and not a forgery. It must generally be signed by the alleged parent unless the whole instrument is in the handwriting of the alleged parent and the facts mentioned therein correspond to actual and real facts Thus, Irene's secondary student permanent record and her written consent to the operation of her father, not being signed nor written in the handwriting of Francisco Delgado, cannot be taken as an authentic writing to prove her recognition by her alleged father. The marriage contract of Irene Delgado and Moises Villanueva, wherein it was stated that Francisco Delgado gave his consent or advice for Irene Delgado to marry, and that he was her father cannot be also taken as recognition in an authentic document because it was not signed nor in the handwriting of Francisco Delgado According to Article 1216 of the Civil Code of 1889, Public documents 'are those authenticated by a notary or by a competent public official, with the formalities required by law.' The family pictures presented by Irene, showing Irene posing with Francisco Delgado, cannot be a sufficient proof of recognition. What Irene may have proved is that she had been in continuous possession of a status of an illegitimate child who is not natural.

But such fact alone without a valid recognition in a record of birth, will statement before a court of record, or authentic writing does not make Irene a recognized illegitimate child who is not natural. Article 285 of the New Civil Code provides "that the action for the. recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except when the father or mother dies during the minority of the child, the action shall be brought within four years from the age of majority, or if after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child, the action shag be brought within four years from the finding of the document." Since Irene was already of age (35 years old) when her alleged father died, and she had not presented any discovered document wherein her presumed father recognized her, the action to compel recognition is already barred WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE THEN COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN TOTO

CASTRO VS CA FACTS: Petitioners Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro are the brother and sister of the late Eustaquio Castro respondent Benita Castro Naval is the only child of Eustaquio, Cipriano Naval is the husband of Benita Castro. Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro v. Benita Castro, the plaintiffs filed an action for partition of properties against the defendant alleging, among other things, that they are the forced heirs of Pedro Castro Marcelina Bautista also filed an action for partition of properties against defendant Benita Castro Naval alleging, among other things, that they are also compulsory heirs of Eustaquio Castro defendants in their amended answer in both cases allege that Benita Castro Naval is the only child of the deceased Eustaquio and that said Eustaquio Castro is the son of Pedro Castro, therefore, the complaint for partition has no cause of action "The evidence on record shows that Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro, and Eustaquio Castro who was already dead were the children of the deceased spouses Pedro Castro and Cornelia Santiago. Marcelina Bautista, one of the plaintiffs is the surviving spouse of the deceased Eustaquio Castro. Eustaquio Castro died on August 23, 1961 and Pricola Maregmen died on September 11, 1924. defendant Benita Castro Naval, a child of Eustaquio Castro and Pricola Maregmen, was born on March 27, 1919

Eustaquio Castro, who caused the registration of said birth gave the date indicated in the civil registry that he was the father. Benita Castro was later baptized in the Roman Catholic Church of, wherein the baptismal certificate appeared that her parents are deceased Eustaquio Castro and Pricola Maregmen When Eustaquio Castro died, pictures were taken wherein the immediate members of the family in mourning were present, among whom was Benita Castro Naval. The evidence further shows that Pricola Maregmen, the natural mother of Benita C. Naval, was wedded to Felix de Maya While the celebration of the wedding was going on, the guests soon found out that Pricola Maregmen surreptitiously left the party and went to the house of her first cousin Bernarda Pagarigan at Barrio Malacampa, and there she cried that she did not want to get married to Felix de Maya. That evening Pricola proceeded to Barrio San Bartolome, Mayantoc, Tarlac, where she united with her real sweetheart, Eustaquio Castro, the father of Benita Castro Naval. Pricola's parents merely submitted to their daughter's wishes, so Eustaquio Castro and Pricola Maregmen lived as husband and wife until the death of Pricola There is no dispute that Eustaquio Castro at the time he lived with Pricola Maregmen, was a widower, and was, therefore, free to marry Pricola. As a result of their cohabitation Benita Castro Naval, herein defendant, was born After the death of her mother, when she was only five years old, she continued to live with her father Eustaquio Castro until his death Moreover, when Benita Castro Naval got married to Cipriano Naval, it was Eustaquio Castro who gave her away in marriage. Even after Benita's marriage, she was taken care of by her father.

ISSUE: whether or not respondent Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro HELD: YES 1. CIVIL LAW; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; UNDER THE NEW AND OLD CIVIL CODE, ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN ARE EITHER NATURAL OR SPURIOUS. Under the Civil Code, whether "new" or "old", illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into two groups: (1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other. (Article 119, old Civil Code; Article 269, new Civil Code) and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous,

adulterous or illicit, were those born of parents who, at the time of conception, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENT IS NATURAL CHILD OF WIDOWER AND A SPURIOUS CHILD OF MOTHER WHO HAD A SUBSISTING MARRIAGE. Since Eustaquio Castro was a widower when Benita was conceived, Benita is his natural child. (See Borres and Barza v. Municipality of Panay, 42 Phil. 643, 647 [1922]). However, from the viewpoint of the mother who had a subsisting marriage to Felix de Maya, Benita was her spurious child. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION OR COURT ACTION NECESSARY FOR AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD OTHER THAN NATURAL TO INHERIT, REASON. Under the Civil Code, for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit, she must first be recognized voluntarily or by court action. (Berciles v. Government Service Insurance System, 128 SCRA 53 [1984] and other cases cited.) This arises from the legal principle that an unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has no rights from her parents or to their estate because her rights spring not from the filiation or blood relationship but from the child's acknowledgment by the parent. (Alabat v. Vda. de Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479 [1967] and other cases cited.) In other words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose not because she was the true or real child of her parents but because under the law, she had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child. 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACKNOWLEDGMENT; VOLUNTARY AND COMPULSORY; APPLIES TO NATURAL AND SPURIOUS CHILDREN. Under the Civil Code, there are two kinds of acknowledgment voluntary and compulsory. The provisions on acknowledgement are applied to natural as well as spurious children (Clemena v. Clemena, supra; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, supra). Article 131 of the old Civil Code provides for voluntary acknowledgment by the father or mother, while Article 135 and Article 136 of the same Code provide for the compulsory acknowledgment by the father and mother respectively. 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; A BIRTH CERTIFICATE MAY BE SUFFICIENT FOR PURPOSES OF RECOGNIZING A CHILD THROUGH THE JOINT SIGNATURE OF BOTH PARENTS. Strictly speaking, a birth certificate to be sufficient for purposes of recognizing a child must be signed by the father and mother jointly and if the father refuses, by the mother alone otherwise she may be penalized. (Section 5, Article 3753; Madridejo v. de Leon, 55 Phil. 1 [1930]). 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULING IN ROCES AND BERCILES CASES, NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR WHERE FATHER HIMSELF WENT TO THE MUNICIPAL BUILDING AND GAVE ALL THE DATA ABOUT HIS DAUGHTER'S BIRTH. The ruling in Roces v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila (102 Phil. 1050 [1958]) and Berciles v. Government Service Insurance System (128 SCRA 53 [1984]) that if the father did not sign in the

birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity does not apply to this case because it was Eustaquio himself who went to the municipal building and gave all the data about his daughter's birth. In Berciles we find no participation whatsoever in the registration by Judge Pascual Berciles, the alleged father. 7. ID.; ID.; ID.; STATEMENT IN MADRIDEJO CASE THAT FATHER MUST SIGN BIRTH CERTIFICATE, NOT APPLICABLE TO INSTANT CASE. We likewise see no application of the statement in Madridejo v. de Leon (supra), that the father, apart from furnishing the necessary data must also sign the certificate itself. In that case, Pedro Madridejo, the father was still alive when the 1930 case was brought to court. Pedro himself testified that Melecio Madridejo was conceived and born to him, a bachelor, and Flaviana Perez, a widow. The two were validly married when Flaviana was about to die. If the situation of Benita Castro Naval were similar, there would be no need to even discuss whether or not the father signed the birth certificate. Under the present law, the subsequent wedding of a man and woman whose child was conceived when there were no legal impediments to a valid marriage gives that child the rights of a legitimate offspring. The situation is different in the present case. 8. ID.; FAMILY CODE; RETROACTIVE EFFECT GIVEN AS RESPONDENTS HAVE NO VESTED RIGHT. To remove any possible doubts about the correctness of the findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we, therefore, apply the provision of the Family Code which states that it shall have retroactive effect since the respondents have no clear vested rights in their favor. 9. ID.; ID.; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; TWO CLASSES OF CHILDREN ARE ONLY LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE. Under the Code's Title VI on Paternity and Filiation, there are only two classes of children-legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated. 10. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR IS SIMILAR TO AN ACTION TO CLAIM LEGITIMACY BROUGHT DURING LIFETIME OF THE CHILD. There can be no dispute that Benita Castro enjoyed the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro and that the action of Benita in defending her status in this case is similar to an "action to claim legitimacy" brought during her lifetime. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. MENDOZA VS IAC FACTS: [3] complaints were filed

1] instituted by herein petitioners-spouses Mendoza against private respondents-spouses Buenaventura Gabuya and Severa Fernandez for partition of Lot No. 3597 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu, 2] commenced by spouses Modesta Gabuya and Dominador Delima, likewise against private respondents-spouses Buenaventura Gabuya and Severa Fernandez for partition of Lot No. 3506 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu 3] filed by private respondents-spouses Buenaventura Gabuya and Severa Fernandez against the spouses Modesta Gabuya and Dominador Delima and petitioners-spouses Mendoza for the annulment of: a) the extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the late Evaristo Gabuya,. Because they involved the same parties and properties, the cases were heard and tried jointly. the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: "1] Declaring null and void and without force and effect: o The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Evaristo Gabuya insofar as the shares of defendant Modesta Gabuya in Lot Nos. 3506 and 3597 are concerned; o The Deed of Absolute Sale Modesta Gabuya executed on December 31, 1968 in favor of her co-defendants-spouses Atty. Elias S. Mendoza and Eustiquia S. Mendoza, covering Lot No. 3597 without prejudice to the rights of the latter spouses-vendors to demand from Modesta Gabuya reimbursement of any amounts they have paid on account of the sale; o Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 43909 and 43910 insofar as the respective recorded one-half [1/2] undivided shares of the spouses Modesta Gabuya married to Dominador Delima and Atty. Elias S. Mendoza married to Eustiquia S. Mendoza in each of Lot Nos. 3506 and 3597 with plaintiff Buenaventura Gabuya married to Severa Fernandez are concerned; CA affirmed its decision Atty. Paterno S. Compra filed Notice of Death of sps Buenaventura Gabuya and Severa Fernandez, allegedly leaving no legal heirs except Modesta Gabuya. the Court resolved "to Direct the legal representatives of the deceased respondents Buenaventura Gabuya and Severa Fernandez to appear and to be substituted for the latter, within a period of thirty [30] days from notice; Venerando Gabuya, a sixth degree collateral relative of Buenaventura Gabuya, filed a motion to substitute the latter in the case at bar. While the motion itself does not appear in the rollo, the same was granted by the Court the petitioners filed an Amended Petition, naming the spouses Modesta Gabuya and Dominador Delima as co-petitioners therein.

Said "petitioners" Modesta Gabuya and Dominador Delima prayed in the Amended Petition that Modesta Gabuya be declared the sole legal heir of Buenaventura Gabuya. Said spouses Delima likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of November 27, 1985, which granted Venerando Gabuya's motion for substitution. 1. "That Buenaventura, Nicolasa and Teresa, all surnamed Gabuya, are the legitimate children of the spouses Evaristo Gabuya and Susana Sabandija, who died intestate many years ago, 2. both Nicolasa and Teresa died single 3. that Modesta Gabuya is the illegitimate daughter 4. that Lot Nos. 3506 and 3597 of the Cebu Cadastre were some of the original properties left by the late Evaristo Gabuya 5. that sometime in February, 1969, Modesta Gabuya accompanied by Atty. Elias S. Mendoza went to the house of Buenaventura Gabuya who wanted to see the titles of these two parcels of land and Buenaventura was instructed by Modesta to look for them so that they be reconstituted; 6. that some days later the two, Modesta Gabuya and Elias S. Mendoza visited him again at his house and Modesta took the titles but this time Buenaventura went with them to the Cebu Capitol Building; 7. that Buenaventura and Modesta signed a document and acknowledged before Atty. Salvador B. Mendoza but the latter did not read to the signatories the contents of the document; 8. that this document turned out to be an Extra-judicial settlement of the Estate of Evaristo Gabuya whereby Buenaventura and Modesta appear to have divided and partitioned between themselves pro indiviso and share and share alike [1/2 each 9. that prior to the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement document, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Modesta Gabuya in favor of the spouses Atty. and Mrs. Elias S. Mendoza covering her alleged one-half [1/2] undivided share 10. The first in the names of spouses Buenaventura Gabuya married to Severa Fernandez, and Modesta Gabuya married to Dominador Delima; and the second, in the names of Buenaventura Gabuya married to Severa Fernandez and Atty. Elias S. Mendoza married to Eustiquia S. Mendoza; 11. that Atty. Elias S. Mendoza and Modesta Gabuya have respectively asked from Buenaventura Gabuya the partition of the lots which they are coowners of the undivided one-half [1/2] portions; and 12. that Buenaventura refused to do so claiming that Modesta Gabuya is not entitled to inherit from the estate of his late father Evaristo Gabuya.

ISSUE: Whether or not under the Civil Code of Spain, a natural child without any judicial decree or deed of acknowledgment in his favor by his natural parent may succeed said natural parent under certain circumstances. HELD: YES 1. CIVIL LAW; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILDREN; GRANTED LIMITED SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS UNDER THE CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN. Under the Civil Code of Spain, the law in force at the time of the death in 1943 of Nicolasa Gabuya, the mother of Modesta, full successional rights were granted only to legitimate and legitimated children [Arts. 114 and 122, respectively]. Acknowledged natural children were given limited successional rights in that they were entitled to inherit only from the acknowledging parent [Art. 134], while illegitimate children who did not possess the status of natural children had no successional rights whatsoever [Art. 139] The latter were only entitled to support. Adopted children become heirs of the adopting parents only if the adopting parents had agreed to confer the adopted children such rights in the deed of adoption, or had instituted them as heirs in a will. 2. ID.; ID.; ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF NATURAL CHILDREN; CERTIFICATE OF BAPTISM, NOT SUFFICIENT TO PROVE RECOGNITION. Recognition or acknowledgment of a natural child under said Code must be made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in some other public document. In the case at bar, the only document presented by Modesta Gabuya to prove that she was recognized by her mother was the certificate of birth and baptism signed by Rev. Fr. Filomeno Singson, Assistant Parish Priest of Pardo, Cebu City, stating therein that Modesta Gabuya is an illegitimate daughter of Nicolasa Gabuya. However, Philippine jurisprudence is consistent and uniform in ruling that the canonical certificate of baptism is not sufficient to prove recognition. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. The rationale for this ruling, enunciated in the case of Cid v. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434, is that while the baptismal certificate in the parish records was a public document before the effectivity of General Order No. 68 and Act 190, this certificate did not constitute a sufficient act of acknowledgment, since the latter must be executed by the child's father or mother, and the parish priest can not acknowledge in their stead. 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; POSSESSION OF STATUS OF NATURAL CHILD PER SE, NOT SUFFICIENT OPERATIVE ACKNOWLEDGMENT. Neither could the alleged continuous possession by Modesta Gabuya of the status of a natural child improve her condition. In Alabat v. vda. de Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479, 1481, it was stressed that: "It is an elementary and basic principle in our law of succession that the rights of a natural child spring not from the filiation itself but from the child's acknowledgment by the natural parent, made voluntarily or by court decree. Equally basic and

elementary . . . is the fact that possession or enjoyment of the status of natural child is per se not a sufficient operative acknowledgment but only a ground to compel the parent to acknowledge the child." 5. ID.; DIFFERENT MODES TO ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP; SUCCESSION; EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION IN FAVOR OF A PERSON BELIEVED TO BE AN HEIR BUT WHO IS NOT IS NULL AND VOID. That this petition must fail is a foregone conclusion. Modesta Gabuya, not having been acknowledged in the manner provided by law by her mother, Nicolasa, was not entitled to succeed the latter. The extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Evaristo Gabuya is, therefore, null and void insofar as Modesta Gabuya is concerned per Article 1105 of the New Civil Code which states: "A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person." Since the ownership of the one-half [1/2] pro indiviso portion of Lot No. 3597 never passed on to Modesta Gabuya, it follows that the sale thereof to petitioners-spouses Elias and Eustiquia Mendoza is likewise null and void WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby denied RAMOS VS RAMOS FACTS: The spouses Martin Ramos and Candida Tanate died on October 4, 1906 and October 26, 1888, respectively. They were survived by their three legitimate children named Jose, Agustin and Granada. Martin Ramos was also survived by his seven natural children named Atanacia, Timoteo, Modesto, Manuel, Emiliano, Maria and Federico. special proceeding was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for the settlement of the intestate estate of the said spouses. Rafael O. Ramos, a brother of Martin, was appointed administrator. A project of partition was submitted. It was signed by the three legitimate children, Jose, Agustin and Granada; by the two natural children, Atanacia and Timoteo, and by Timoteo Zayco in representation of the other five natural children who were minors. It was agreed in the project of partition that Jose Ramos would pay the cash adjudications to Atanacia, Timoteo and Manuel, while Agustin Ramos would pay the cash adjudications to Modesto, Federico, Emiliano and Maria. It was further agreed that Jose Ramos and Agustin Ramos would pay their sister, Granada, the sums of P3,302.36 and P14,213,78, respectively (Exh. 3). The partition was made in accordance with the old Civil Code which provides: "ART. 840. When the testator leaves legitimate children or descendants, and also natural children, legally acknowledged, each of the

latter shall be entitled to one-half of the portion pertaining to each of the legitimate children not bettered, provided that it can be included within the third for free disposal, from which it must be taken, after deducting the burial and funeral expenses. "All the children of Martin Ramos, whether legitimate or acknowledged natural, lived together in Hacienda Ylaya during his lifetime and were under his care. Even defendant Gregoria Ramos, widow of Jose Ramos, admitted that she dealt with plaintiffs as family relations, especially seeing them during Sundays in church as they lived with their father, and maintained close and harmonious relations with them even after the death of their father. All said children continued to live in said house of their father for years even after his death. "Upon their father's death, his properties were left under the administration of Rafael Ramos, the younger brother of their father and their uncle. Rafael Ramos continued to administer those properties of their father, giving plaintiffs money as their shares of the produce of said properties but plaintiffs not receiving any property or piece of land however, until 1913 when Rafael Ramos gathered all the heirs, including plaintiffs, in the house of their father, saying he would return the administration of the properties. He turned over Hacienda Ylaya to Agustin Ramos and Hacienda Calaza to Jose Ramos. "All said children, defendants and plaintiffs alike, continued to live in the same house of their father in Hacienda Ylaya, now under the support of Agustin Ramos. Plaintiff Modesto Ramos who 'could understand Spanish a little', only left said house in 1911; plaintiff Manuel stayed there for one year and lived later with Jose Ramos for four years. Plaintiff Maria Ramos, who herself testified that she has 'a very low educational attainment', lived there until 1916 when she got married. Plaintiff Emiliano lived there with Agustin, helping him supervise the work in Hacienda Ylaya, until he transferred to Hacienda Calaza where he helped Jose Ramos supervise the work in said hacienda. "Agustin Ramos supported plaintiffs, getting the money from the produce of Hacienda Ylaya, the only source of income of Agustin coming from said hacienda. "Upon Jose Ramos death his widow Gregoria Ramos, herself, his first cousin, their father and mother, respectively being brother and sister, continued to give plaintiffs money pertaining to their shares in the products of Hacienda Calaza. She however stopped doing so in 1951, telling them that the lessee Estanislao Lacson was not able to pay the lease rental.

Plaintiffs did not file any cadastral answer because defendants Jose and Agustin told them 'not to worry about it as they have to answer for all the heirs'. Plaintiffs were 'assured' by defendants brothers. "Plaintiffs did not know that intestate proceedings were instituted for the distribution of the estate of their father. Neither did plaintiffs Modesto, Manuel, Emiliano and Maria know (that) Timoteo Zayco, their uncle and brother-in-law of defendant widow Gregoria was appointed their guardian. There was an express admission by defendant Gregoria Ramos that Timoteo Zayco was her brother-in-law. "Plaintiffs were thus constrained to bring the present suit before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental on September 5, 1957 seeking for the reconveyance in their favor by defendants Gregoria and daughter Candida and husband Jose Bayot of their corresponding participations in said parcels of land in accordance with article 840 of the old Civil Code the lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata.

ISSUE: WON the plaintiffs, as acknowledged natural children, were grievously prejudiced by the partition and that the doctrine of res judicata should not bar their action. HELD: NO We hold that the trial court's conclusion is correct. It is true that the acknowledgement of the plaintiffs is not evidenced by a record of birth, will or other public document (Art. 131, Old Civil Code). But the record, which is relied upon by the defendants to support their defense of res judicata, indubitably shows that the plaintiffs were treated as acknowledged natural children of Martin Ramos. The reasonable inference is that they were in the continuous possession of the status of natural children of Martin Ramos, as evidenced by his direct acts and the acts of his family (Art. 135, Old Civil Code). Unacknowledged natural children have no rights whatsoever. The fact that the plaintiffs, as natural children of Martin Ramos, received shares in his estate implies that they were acknowledged. Obviously, defendants Agustin Ramos and Granada Ramos and the late Jose Ramos accorded successional rights to the plaintiffs because Martin Ramos and members of his family had treated them as his children. Presumably, that fact was well-known in the community. Under the circumstances, Agustin Ramos and Granada Ramos and the heirs of Jose Ramos are estopped from attacking plaintiffs' status as acknowledged natural children

Even the lower court, after treating the plaintiffs in 1913 in the intestate proceeding as acknowledged natural children, had no choice but to reaffirm that same holding in its 1961 decision in this case. On its face, the partition agreement was theoretically correct since the seven natural children were given their full legitime, which under article 942 of the old Civil Code was their share as legal heirs. the plaintiffs contend that the partition was not binding on them (Note that their brother, Timoteo, considered himself bound by that partition). They ask that the case be remanded to the lower court for the determination and adjudication of their rightful shares. All those contentions would have a semblance of cogency and would deserve serious consideration if the plaintiffs had not slept on their rights. They allowed more than forty years to elapse before they woke up and complained that they were much aggrieved by the partition. Under the circumstances, their claims can hardly evoke judicial compassion. The plaintiffs have only themselves to blame if the courts at this late hour can no longer afford them relief against the inequities allegedly vitiating the partition of their father's estate. WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed with the clarification that defendants' counterclaim is dismissed.