Multilateralism and World Order Author(s): Robert W. Cox Source: Review of International Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Apr.

, 1992), pp. 161-180 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097291 . Accessed: 12/09/2011 02:05
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Review

of International

Studies

(1992),

18, 161-180

Printed

in Great Britain

Multilateralism
ROBERT W. COX

and world

order*

'World order' has become a current catchphrase of political discourse and journalism. 'Multilateralism' has become something of a growth sector in academic studies. What current events have brought into prominence, to subject scholarship has an obligation to critical analysis. This article raises some of the questions that should be probed in this analysis. The two concepts are interrelated. Multilateralism in one aspect as the appears can subordinate Multilateralism be within the context in understood concept. only which it exists, and that context is the historical structure of world order. But is not just a passive, dependent multilateralism It can appear in another activity. as an active world force The order. is a dilemma aspect shaping agent/structure proposition. chicken-and-egg To understand the potential for change that multilateralism it is first holds, to the of multilateralism within the of necessary place study analysis global power I deliberately relations. avoid using a term like 'international relations' since it certain assumptions embodies about global power to be relations that need as 'International the state relations' its basic questioned. implies system Westphalian framework, and this may no longer be an entirely adequate basis since there are forms of power other than state power that enter into global relations. 'World order' is an neutral as regards the nature of the entities that constitute power; it designates of of whatever kind. power historically specific configuration The dominant tendencies in existing world order can be examined within a global system having three principal components?a global political economy, an inter-state or are both and the system, biosphere global ecosystem. These three components autonomous in having their own inherent dynamics, same at the and, time, inter are with each other. Contradictions within each of the three dependent generated arise in the interrelationships spheres, and contradictions among the three spheres. In conventional term the multilateral refers to states. It covers usage, diplomatic more some two states than to with among relationships respect specific issue or set of issues.1 Another of 'multilateral' has current been in international usage long economic i.e. the notion of multilateral and trade relations, payments. Multi was sense in this most with the favoured nation lateralism, synonymous principle in
* A first version multilateralism United Nations Science as of this article was prepared as part of the United Nations It was also System (MUNS). Association Buenos Aires, Congress, Stephen Gill, Michael and to three anonymous Conference Diplomacy a 'concept University on perspectives on paper' for a symposium on Multilateralism and the programme at the International and discussed Political presented to Edward July 1991.1 am especially grateful on the

Appathurai, early draft, 1 J. Kaufman.

and Pat Sewell for reading and commenting Schechter, readers for this Review for their helpful comments. (Leyden, 1968).

161

162

Robert W. Cox

and of currencies towards convertibility international trade and the movement freedom of capital flows.2 derives from the inter-state system. It is of'multilateral' The first of these meanings channels or inter-state organiz limited to relations among states through diplomatic actors of civil society ations. The second refers to relations among the economic It pertains to within a framework regulated by states and international organizations. an historically that in which civil society specific form of capitalist market economy, to is separate and distinct from the state, and the agents of civil society are presumed laws. It would have little or no act within a system of rationally deducible behavioural for the relationships among what Karl Polanyi called redistributive societies, meaning whether ancient empires or modern centrally planned economies.3 The specific context out of which the economic concept of multilateralism emerged was negotiation Britain for the constitution States and United between the essentially II economic States used its economic order. The United of the post-World War to trade and payments to abandon the Britain system pressure preferential leverage of the Ottawa under and the Commonwealth Agreements Empire encompassing was the one to with the world-wide of several of which cope 1933, attempts depression an economic these Anglo-American bloc. When within 1930s by protectionism took place, Europe and the Soviet Union were devastated by war and negotiations in international inarticulate what later became known as the Third World was in the definition of economic affairs. These countries were not effective participants the concept or in giving substance to it. meant the structure of world economy In that context, economic multilateralism most conducive to capital expansion on a world scale; and political multilateralism meant the institutionalized arrangements made at that time and in those conditions
for inter-state cooperation on common problems. There was, for some people, an

economic and political aspects of identity between implicit compatibility, as a the had multilateralism multilateralism: security and primary goal political of growth in the world the underpinning of economic multilateralism, maintenance Franklin D. This was the vision of Cordell Hull, President economy. capitalist saw economic and between State. contradiction of Others Roosevelt's Secretary to correct the existed for them multilateralism inequities political aspects: political in the 1960s, to a that resulted from the world economy, leading, for instance, Economic Order. This of a New International demand for the institutionalization view came to be expressed by leaders of Third World nations. The relative simplicity of the idea of a world order consisting of a state system and the totality of a capitalist world economy may, however, be inadequate to encompass forces capable of influencing structural change at the close of the twentieth century. include economic and social forces, of global society would An enlarged conception more or less institutionalized, of inter that cut across state boundaries?forces outside of and global finance that operate with great autonomy national production human state regulation, and other forces concerned with ecology, peace, gender, ethnicities, of the advantaged and the advancement rights, the defence of the dispossessed from the has to be considered of states. Multilateralism that also act independently
2 R. M. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Order (New York, 1969). Polanyi, 1957). C. Arensberg, Diplomacy. Pearson The Origins and Prospects and Market of our International in the Early Empire Economic (Chicago,

even

3 K.

and H. W.

(eds.), Trade

Multilateralism

and world order

163

standpoint of its ability to represent the forces at work in the world at the local level as well as at the global level. What for autonomy and a voice in about aspirations or fragments of existing states? How can the less world affairs by micro-regions for the biosphere which be represented effectively? Who will negotiate powerful with forms of life? shares other humanity interdependently To define a meaning of multilateralism for today and tomorrow, we must begin with an assessment of the present and emerging future condition of the world system, to the term. In the that will give contextual meaning with the power relationships most general statement of the problem of multilateralism, these questions are posed: What What What kinds of entities are involved inmultilateral relations? kind of system connects these entities? specific condition of the system gives the contextual meaning to understanding

to the terms of

multilateral and multilateralism? is appropriate What kind of knowledge multilateralism?

the phenomenon

from two main one, as the standpoints: as the of established the locus of order; other, regulation in practice, interactions for the transformation of existing order. Multilateralism, is two structure in these find their bases different of the overall but both, aspects parts of multilateralism and pursue different tactics. A comprehensive enquiry into multi lateralism at the present time cannot afford to focus on the one to the detriment of the is the more compelling of the two. other. Indeed, the question of transformation Multilateralism institutionalization can be examined and

The

'crisis of multilateralism9

Before tackling these questions, we must consider further the circumstances leading to on the threshold of the 1990s. Why this revived concern with multilateralism is a matter of such concern today? In a preface to a collection of articles multilateralism in 1988 entitled The UN Under Attack, Sir by Dutch officials and scholars published Shridath Ramphal, of the wrote: Commonwealth, Secretary-General
paradox?and of management [T]he has the become strongest whose more the relations manifest, whose tragedy?of between support position has recent nations for times and is that even as the need for better to global problems for a multilateral

internationalism them

approach has weakened?eroded its vanguard the structures

nations

behoves

to be at

by some of in the and who have

past acknowledged
States, recent

that obligation of leadership. This ismost

behaviour served actually to weaken

true, of course, of the United

of

multilateralism, Ramphal

including the United Nations then referred to some of

itself.4 the advances problems, cooperation, since Bretton Woods and San in international

particularly with reference and continued: Francisco,

because They were possible to the consciousness fashion needing 4 J. Harrod an ethic and N. of partnership Schrijver of

to Third World

consensus the emergence of a global which responded that we were all part of one world community?neighbours consensus for living together. That has enlightened Attack (Aldershot, 1988).

in some

become

(eds.), The UN Under

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Robert W. Cox
the ascendancy coordination of unilateralism of economic policy in world among affairs.

in the drift towards dominance and casualty . . . there have been moves towards Recently action. But within a directorate

leading industrial countries. This is, in principle, better than wholly uncoordinated
cooperation of of powerful countries is hardly

national
to the

the answer

world's needs, the needs of all its nations. In fact, it could well have the result of reinforcing
the dominance the few over the many.5

In this perspective, the crisis of multilateralism emerged in the 1980s in a tendency to reject the the part of the United States and some other powerful countries on the part as a vehicle for international United Nations action and a movement or collective of these countries in world towards either unilateralism dominance on economic economic willingness increased in which and political matters. The context this shift occurred was the crisis of the mid-1970s which led among other things to a reduced on the part of the rich countries to finance aid to the Third World, and an on to insist their and upon free-market, part tendency deregulating,

economic policies both at home and abroad. This was accompanied privatizing by their suspicion that the United Nations system was an unfriendly political forum and a potential obstacle to economic liberalization. a cleavage between the old economic There thus occurred multilateralism, a a as to liberal economic order and institutionally located in the support perceived western of the world dominated i.e. the International economy, principal agencies a more Fund and the World and Bank; Monetary (IMF) political multilateralism, and perceived by these powerful located in the UN General Assembly, symbolically an unfriendly Third World majority. states as harbouring the late 1980s and early 1990s, the configuration of power giving context to During The Soviet beset multilateralism Union, changed again. by economic crisis at home a major and undergoing transformation of its political 'new being, proclaimed and the United Nations system. In substance, the thinking' about world relationships Soviet Union became the maintenance of factor for the key friendly relations with the to civilian States and the corollaries United of a shift of resources from military a to inward face and economic crises within the union, and purposes, turning political a withdrawal to US international objectives. of support for Third World opposition to US power together balance The vacancy of Soviet power as a countervailing a new with the economic of the Third World and political weakening generated an UN the for the seized United States. Council, potential Security opportunity by between relationships Cooperative Council emerged significantly with France the new relationship among of the Security permanent members war. to the For Britain and regard Iran-Iraq to regain the permanent five was an opportunity the five

a privileged position at the centre of world power. They needed the United States but the new situation was a States also evidently needed them. For China, the United means of attenuating the relative ostracism it had suffered in the wake of the Tienamen Square incidents of 1989. The Gulf crisis of the summer of 1990 and the a new configuration action that followed delineated of forces that US military President George Bush has repeatedly referred to as the 'new world order'. From a position of reluctant member of the United Nations, little expecting in for its that the United Soviet with States, support organization, acquiesc policies ence, took initiative against Iraq and gained legitimacy for it from the Security Council. The reversals of attitude towards the United Nations by both the United
5 Harrod and Schrijver (eds.), The UN.

Multilateralism States and

and world order

165

to begin been followed by measures the Soviet Union had previously arrears states to both the the owed considerable UN, payment by although a continuing to constitute stretched out over time sufficiently repayments were leverage for compliant behaviour by the organization. in a The US success in the Security Council posed the problem of multilateralism in the passage different way, contrasting with the way it was presented by Ramphal the cited above. The problem was no longer how the UN could survive without of It and financial the United States. became the UN could whether support political if it came to be perceived as the instrument of its function as a world organization most powerful member. The Security Council's action could be seen as legitimating a US source of a genuinely not as the independent initiative already decided, of policy. the Third World countries that had wielded question concerns particularly This in the General Assembly. influence over United Nations decisions considerable structures in is the effect of economic strengthened by weakening apprehension global to the disciplinary the capacity for resistance by poor countries effects market an in forces of finance and economic system generated by global production This organized and sustained by the rich countries. If Third World countries can no longer seek even symbolic support through collective action in the United Nations, what recourse will they have to express an alternative vision of world order? context raises both potentially The present world political-economic and more and more explicitly a number of new issues for multilateralism. One concerns the process and the military coalition for the Gulf through which the Security Council majority war was put together. These were ad hoc diplomatic constructs built with country and incentives. The cost to the United States in material and pressures secure to votes concessions both Council and in the Security participation diplomatic was to extract of offset by the ability the United States military coalition funding from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Such measures could work in the Japan and Germany, but could hardly be expected to work in Security Council with its limited membership the larger General Assembly. The process hardly compares with the 'enlightened consensus' of a continuing character evoked by Ramphal with respect to the earlier to it between Would be lead to a polarization within UN multilateralism likely period. the between few and the relatively powerless many, eventually the dominant Security specific Council and the General Assembly? There is also the question how far a state can act militarily for the United Nations to the command and regular accountability in the absence of any United Nations or case Council of defined role for the The Gulf any Security Secretary-General. seemed to open an institutional void, creating an uncertain and potentially dangerous
precedent.

international

A further issue is the relationship between governments and domestic forces. In a number of countries in the Islamic world, sentiment in the streets favoured Iraq and fuelled resentment against US and other Western intervention forces in the heartland of Islam, despite the official positions of Arab government members of the coalition. for a more widespread Islamism may also be read as a metaphor Third Popular resentment against the economic World and political dominance of the capitalist of the Third World debt west, more forcibly felt since the 1980s as a consequence crisis among other causes. Furthermore, in the more powerful countries manifested to domestic opposition as well, including initially the war was in the United

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Robert W. Cox

far can the existence of widespread domestic opposition undermine the in function of the Is there United Nations? multilateral which any way legitimating ism can take account of the level of popular forces as well as the level of governments? The Gulf crisis also brought into focus the issue of the environmental consequences of scientists in of war. The warnings of environmental disaster from a conference London just prior to the beginning of hostilities were quickly realised by oil spills and some means of the problem of achieving fires. This particular disaster underscored States. How the relationship between and human actions the natural environment managing the of the which shares as a in interests determined by politics humanity biosphere nature. of extend The multilateralism of part beyond humanity, whether implications or or behaviour individual state at levels, to include non-human popular expressed forces which will affect prospects for human survival. in its two recent phases, Thus, the 'crisis of multilateralism' set of questions: How presents an additional

state be reconciled can national interest as perceived by the most powerful there be a choice between weakening multilateralism Must with multilateralism? of of a powerful state, and weakening through its rejection by the unilateralism state? multilateralism through its instrumental use by a powerful One for global consensus as a basis for multilateralism? What are the conditions in the leadership of a powerful state insofar form of consent may be acquiescence to embody universally as that state is widely perceived acceptable principles of of different value order. Another may be through recognition of the coexistence are to bear in the value each the of where system brought systems principles of a solution to common problems. achievement i.e. the processes of is the relationship between economic multilateralism, What most the structures sustained liberal economic capitalist by powerful global over or control consensual for the multilateralism and states; aspiration political as was less economic countries, e.g. processes privileged empowering global a Order? International Economic New for demands in abortive the envisaged either mobilized role could popular movements What by events or around or feminism), social issues environmentalism, peace, justice, (e.g. longer-term multilateralism? in play the biosphere between role does multilateralism What play in the relationship and human political and economic organization?

Intellectual The current

approaches

to multilateralism

the problematic of our study. This crisis of multilateralism presents can a number of be different viewed through lenses, each a different problematic are These differentiated and intellectual perspective. by epistemologies perspectives in of how affairs human knowledge ontologies. They express different conceptions can be acquired and for what purposes; and they posit different conceptions of what are. the field of enquiry, what the basic entities and basic relationships constitutes can be reviewed to illustrate this point. Some of the principal perspectives them as ideal To represent these different perspectives is, in practice, to construct types. Here, the perspective becomes separated from the perceiver. The work of

Multilateralism

and world order

167

certain authors helps to define the logically coherent forms of ideal types; but many intention is not to put people into authors share more than one perspective. My boxes. It is rather to show how a satisfactory perspective may draw upon several of the main theoretical traditions.

Realism

The starting point for contemporary theorizing about global power relations is the Realist tradition. Realism puts a primary emphasis upon states and the analysis of the historical of states but, I shall argue, does not limit its vision to behaviour states. Realism, in its more sophisticated manifestations, is also concerned with the economic and social underpinnings of states and how the nature of states changes. In classical realism, the state is no absolute; the state is historicized. let us begin by assuming a world inwhich states are the only significantly However, in global power relations, and in which entities engaged each state is powerful in its ambitions only by the threat of retaliation by other states. In such constrained a world, multilateralism at most as a series of transitory arrangements is conceivable to achieve collective purposes among a group of states that find a temporary designed common forces in such a system are changes in the relative interest. The moving powers
purposes.

of

the states

composition

of state interests. These could change the and redefinitions of groupings of states that are able to discover common or compatible

International institutions and general principles of international law and behaviour are not absent from the realist conception of world order, but they have what a Marxist might call a superstructural character. That is, they are not to be taken at face value but to be seen as means of achieving ends that derive from the real conflicts of interest at the heart of the system. E. H. Carr, whose work remains a classic of Realist thinking, wrote: 'Just as the ruling class in a community prays exposition for domestic its own security and predominance, and peace, which guarantees threaten them, so international peace becomes a class war, which might denounces Powers'.6 And: '[International is, government special vested interest of predominant in effect, government by that state which supplies the power necessary for the purpose
of governing'.7

In the Realist there is room for a considerable of perspective, proliferation room international but little for cumulative of institutions, any acquisition authority as International will have no real autonomy by these institutions. organizations resources of to collective and purposes agencies capable articulating mobilizing or these will remain mechanisms for into pursue purposes. They effect, putting merely for publicly endorsing, purposes that have been arrived at and are given effect by those states that dispose of the resources necessary for attaining them. International institutions
6

are a public

ritual designed

to legitimate privately

determined

measures.

E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939 (London, 1946), p. 82. Other notable authors who tradition include Hams Morgenthau, Reinhold could be included in the Realist Neibuhr, Raymond on the Aron and William T. R. Fox. They do, of course, differ in their relative emphasis, particularly role of morality in a common discourse. in politics; but they participate Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 107.

168

Robert W. Cox

in the enactment of ritual are The general principles used to legitimate these measures as The of rationalizations ulterior motives. critical Realist analyst is enjoined suspect so as to reveal the basic purposes at to strip away the cloak of public respectability on the ground of the principles work. Argument invoked would be an irrelevant to from the real issue is reveal the basic interests at work. Only by distraction which can effective counteracting forces be put together, forces laying bare these interests use of international institutions and principles of law and which, in turn, might make to further their different purposes. morality is capable of recognizing its own and these Realism Classical limitations; of moral sentiment. The fact that the powerful limitations arise with the phenomenon in order to secure acquiescence from the less powerful appeal to moral principles suggests that moral sentiments do have a certain force in human and even inter-state affairs. Even though the state is a purely fictitious person, the fact that people ascribe moral claims to state behaviour as though the state were a person has some effect in the state. Moreover, moral sentiments may enter into the formulation of constraining state purposes. The realist will, however, beware of placing too heavy a burden of sentiment and will be alive to the hypocrisy with which moral practice upon moral sentiment cloaks egoistic intents. in the extent to which it is capable of Realism remains remarkable Classical for the crisis of for the condition and in particular of multilateralism accounting an explanation for United It provides States multilateralism discussed above. aloofness from the UN system during the 1970s phase of the crisis, in the perception that a Soviet blocking ability in the Security Council and a Third World majority Meanwhile, the endorsement of US goals in these bodies. Assembly negated were interests remained predominant, forces in which US economic States could both the Soviet bloc and the Third World. The United weakening as a centre of multilateral activity and allow virtually ignore the United Nations economic forces to continue to shift power relations in its favour. for the second phase of the crisis of Classical Realism also provides an explanation to US power and of Soviet power as a counterweight The withdrawal multilateralism. in the General in the Security Council, the alignment of Soviet with US positions coupled with continuing financial pressures on Third World countries guaranteed a docile response to US initiative in the Security Council. Most Third World countries were constrained further to the of external debt to open their economies pressures by financial of the dominant forces in the world economy protected by the United penetration resources in that sought to control its economic States. A Third World country to the to external market forces posed a challenge its own interest in contradiction global system that, even if not substantively threatening, might become A were not to suffer the consequences. alone and Nicaragua contagious. that action would dominance could authorize under US Council military Security stand as a warning to any Third World country disposed to build a military challenge to the system. The real reasons for the US initiation of war against Iraq, in a Realist economic Chile

remained obscured by the public ritual in the Security Council. interpretation, are historicist and Realism of classical foundations The epistemological is a critical theory in that it does not accept appear Classical Realism hermeneutic. It takes account of ances at face value but seeks to penetrate to the meaning within. structures designates structures as well as of events. The term historical historical those persisting patterns of thought and actions that define the frameworks within

Multilateralism

and world order

169

which people and states act. These structures are shaped and reshaped slowly over realities of time?the longue dur?e of Fernand Braudel.8 They are the intersubjective is the process of discerning the world politics. The critical analysis of classical Realism of events within these historically determined frameworks for action. meaning A critical theory ismore at the service of the weak than of the strong. Machiavelli the status of first critical theorist of European may be accorded thought. (I would Ibn Islamic and that the scholar was the argue Khaldun, fourteenth-century diplomat first critical theorist of his civilization; and I expect other instances of critical theory can be discovered In form, Machiavelli's in other traditions of civilization.) Prince to to to In his be the the work instructs addressed effect, appears powerful, palazzo. the outsiders in the mechanisms of power?it enlightens the piazza. Classical Realism is to be seen as a means of empowerment of the less powerful, a means of d?mystifi cation of the manipulative instruments of power. of classical Realism There is a distortion called Neo-realism that severs Realism device for the foreign from its critical roots and converts it into a problem-solving which is very largely states.9 This Neo-realism, policy makers of the most powerful an American product of the Cold War,10 attempts to construct a technology of state of power of individual states, and assesses the the components power. It computes in the game of power politics. Its epistemology relative chances of moves is positivist of historical and it lacks any dimension structural change. The world of inter-state relations is a given world, identical in its basic structure over time. There are no changes of the system, only changes within the system.11

Liberal

institutionalism

From the moment of drafting of the UN Charter until the present time a different current of theories has centred attention to upon multilateralism, endeavouring discern in it the emergence of institutions that would transform world order by progressively bringing the state system within some form of authoritative regulation. This current has thrown up a whole each of sequence of theoretical formulations, which appears to have been superceded by its successor. The earliest formulation was the functionalism of David Mitrany.12 Functionalism, to constructing world of the world federalist progress through despairing approach
si?cle tome 1Les Structures ?conomie et capitalisme, XVe-XVIIF F. Braudel, Civilisation mat?rielle, et l'impossible le possible du quotidien: (Paris, 1979) and 'History and the Social Sciences: The longue trans. Sara Matthews 1980). (Chicago, dur?e, in Braudel, On History, 9 theories and critical theories in an earlier between problem-solving the distinction I have discussed International Relations States and World Order: Beyond 'Social Forces, article. See R. Cox, Theory', in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism. 10 Politics See, for example, K. Waltz, 1979); cf. R. Keohane (Reading, Mass, Theory of International and its Critics 1986). (New York, (ed.), Neorealism 11 am to represent a perspective in the work of Kenneth I perhaps best expressed using 'Neo-realism' to The term has also been used more broadly Waltz (see, for example, Keohane (ed.), Neorealism). states in such forms as 'regimes'. See, of cooperation include the theorizing among interest-pursuing I think this is the work of John Ruggie and Stephen Krasner. for example, Fox, who had inmind of liberal institutionalism it does show better treated as one of the modifications (below), although Cold War the influence of neo-realism tradition in American of the upon the liberal institutionalist scholarship era. (W. T. E. Fox, 'E. H. Carr and Political Realism: Vision of and Revision,' Department E. H. Carr Memorial of Wales, Aberstwyth, Lecture No. International Politics, University 1). College A Working (London, Peace 1943). System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International 8

12 D. Mitrany,

Organization

170

Robert W. Cox

route through the 'low polities' of functional envisaged an alternative Its agencies. principal argument was that by associating professionals and technicians who were primarily concerned with solving practical problems of on life?from mail to the time education and health, everyday delivering promoting welfare?in international the conflictual agencies charged with these matters, sphere of 'high polities' monopolized by diplomats and political leaders would be outflanked and diminished by the cooperative sphere of functionalism. World government would arrive by stealth rather than by design. Functionalism became embodied in the specialized agencies revived or established as component UN to gain of the it appeared parts system. The thought behind government, or technical its technical assistance system, from the 1960s, expanded relevancy when the UN work in less developed countries. The world system was, in a sense, helping to build the state structures upon which it formally was to rest. 'low' from 'high' politics in order Functionalism, however, though it distinguished to focus upon the former with the implication that in the long run low politics was the more offered no theory of how a more centralized world authority fundamental, come about. Neo-functionalist to its would theory filled this gap. According the scope and authority of international institutions would be increased proponents, strategy of leadership. Any major field of functional competence through a conscious entrusted to an international institution was likely to impinge upon linked fields in which no international had been assigned. Innovative authority leadership could an impasse in which action was blocked at the margin of an institution's manipulate into a consensus for the expansion of authority into the bordering existing authority to advance. This was called field that would enable action 'spill over'. Neo also expanded the range of relevant actors to include elements of civil consumer groups and other advocacy industrial associations, unions, society?trade of these various interests towards groups, and also political parties. The orientation international institutions would enhance the authority of these institutions. The broadening of scope and authority of international institutions was considered functionalism
by neo-functionalists as a process of integration. Karl W. Deutsch, in a somewhat

defined integration as the formation of a 'security community' different approach, institutions of a kind that within which groups of people enjoyed and practices that change would proceed by peaceful rather allowed for a reasonable expectation than violent means.13 Deutsch's approach gave more emphasis to modes of common and communication without the condition of integration placing understanding central power.14 necessarily upon the creation of an authoritative Neo-functionalism had its greatest success in studies of the process of European the Western economic European experience integration.15 The apparent fit with to non-European its adaptation situations. With prompted regard to Latin America, interest groups and political parties was replaced by the importance of autonomous was also applied, though an emphasis on the technocratic elites.16 Neo-functionalism to the world as a whole.17 with somewhat lesser plausibility,
13 K. W. Deutsch et al., Political Light of Historical Experience 14 K. W. Deutsch, Nationalism in the North Community 1957). (Princeton, and Social Communication. Atlantic Area: International Organization in the

An Enquiry into the Foundations of Nationality 1953). (New York, 15 E. B. Haas, The Uniting 1958). of Europe (Stanford, 16 Patterns of Political E. B. Haas and P. Schmitter, 'Economics and Differential Integration: in Latin America', about Unity 18 (1964), pp. 705-37. International Organization, Projections 17 Functionalism and International E. B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State. Organization (Stanford, 1964).

Multilateralism

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were challenged by events. The East Both functionalism and neo-functionalism West conflicts of the Cold War and the North-South issues that remained political after the decolonization of the 1960s (notably Southern African and the Arab-Israeli could not be set aside by technical cooperation. These issues kept re conflicts) as as within in well the UN General surfacing specialized agencies Assembly. Functionalism then appeared as an ideology of the western capitalist powers which sought to resist what they perceived as 'politicization' of technical work by Soviet and Third World diplomats. in the defeat encountered its negation Neo-functionalism of the proposed Defence in 1954 when the French National refused European Community Assembly to ratify the treaty establishing it. It was negated again during the 1960s in the of General Charles de Gaulle, who stood as an obstacle to the accumu personality in Brussels. Neo by the Community authority bureaucracy who had over' of analysts previously envisaged 'spill authority from one now to to functionalist write of back'.18 What had another, sphere began 'spill hitherto been represented as an irreversible process now appeared to be stalled and quite possibly reversed. As functionalism and neo-functionalism lost theoretical lustre, liberal institutional ism shifted ground. It focused less on the prospect of superceding the state though some larger regional or world process of integration, in order to concentrate more level are upon processes through which cooperative arrangements at the international functionalist
constructed.

lation

of

further

the early 1970s, interest shifted to transnational relations.19 This approach the emphasis neo-functionalism had placed upon civil society as a network magnified of linkages both extending and circumscribing in some ways the autonomy of state was action. The world economy the centre of attention, in terms both of the business that operated on a global scale and of the emergence of a transnational organizations those people most involved. Alongside interest among directly tradition has been placed more recently groups, emphasis in the liberal institutionalist on 'epistemic communities' or transnational networks of specialists who evolve a themselves in particular way of conceiving and defining global problems amongst form of society
spheres of concern.20

From

to this prominence of transnational civil society, came a stress on of the state. States, following the lead given by the 'bureaucratic politics' analysis of national policy making, were perceived as systems of competing agencies, where an agency in one state might build a coalition with like agencies in other states in order to enhance its domestic influence within its own state.21 International institutions now looked more complex: they were both constrained by the transnational of influence linkages of global civil society such as the networks Corresponding the fragmentation and global finance; generated by international production vehicles for transgovernmental coalitions constructed by within the various states.
18L. N.

and they had become bureaucratic segments

and S. A. Schiengold, in the European Europe's Would-be Policy: Patterns Lindberg of Change Cliffs, N.J., 1970). Community (Englewood 19 Relations and World Politics J. Nye and R. O. Keohane, Transnational (Cambridge, Mass., 1972). 20 M. P. International Environmental Protection Haas, Consensus', 'Obtaining through Epistemic Millennium 19 (1990), pp. 347-64. Journal of International Studies, 21 J. Nye and R. O. Keohane, Relations and World Polities', World Politics, 27, 1 Transgovernmental (October 1974).

172

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led to a fresh round of research into This vision of 'complex interdependence',22 international Without exhaustive definition of a regime, any 'regimes'.23 reproducing it is sufficient to describe it as a set of norms or rules accepted by a group of states as a means of dealing with a certain sphere of common concerns. The notion goes to is achieved and sustained, without the heart of the question of how cooperation to existence of this the formal international More necessarily tying organizations. not with superceding the state system as the over, it is concerned with cooperation, in 'rational actors' acting of authority. Regime theory focuses upon repository i.e. in the absence of the impossible conditions conditions of 'bounded rationality', of full information and continuous calculation of self-interest, relying rather on that have worked reasonably well in the past. One probable consequence procedures of the predominance of regime theory in recent liberal institutionalism has been a to states as the principal actors.24 shift of emphasis back more exclusively to A central issue in regime theory is the thesis of 'hegemonic stability' according under the protection of dominant powers. The which regimes have been constituted in such conditions is: can regimes founded survive the decline of such question an has constructed Robert Keohane argument based on rational choice powers? to that forms of argument suggest existing cooperation may indeed survive because to states with continue and flexible cost-saving, uncertainty-reducing they provide means of achieving the results of cooperation.25 Another theoretical basis of regime theory seems to be derived from Durkheim's that the growth of the division of labour bringing about inter increased to actors in will the lead among society disruptive consequences?he dependencies the growth of mentioned economic crises and class struggle?unless specifically to the is matched international interdependence by adequate regulation.26 Applied are means to what of the such level, regimes counterpart introducing regulation?the as In current in role national Durkheim the for the corporatism society. envisaged some spheres of activity have been covered by regimes that are being world economy, or amended more or less effectively, e.g. in trade with the GATT maintained (at any thesis rate pending the outcome of the Uruguay round), while other spheres of activity, e.g. are very largely unregulated. finance and production, answers to these current approach of liberal institutionalism This pursues a are some Do institutions make difference? international Why spheres of questions: are Does not? while others the activity internationally regulated density of trans in a particular area predict the formation of a regime in that area? border interactions in a regime?27 and non-membership What determines membership its various Liberal institutionalism through developmental phases has certain basic has remained both positivist and rational-deductive characteristics. Its epistemology and as it attempts insofar as its objects of inquiry are actors and interactions to account for their behaviour according to models of rational choice. It has lacked

J. Nye and R. O. Keohane, Power and Interdependence (Boston, 1977). 23 a special issue o? International S. Krasner 36 (1982). (ed.), 'International Regimes', Organization, 24 See above, footnote 12, p. 20. 25 R. Keohane, in the World Political and Discord After Hegemony. Cooperation Economy (Princeton, 1984). 26 E. Durkheim, in Society The Division of Labour (New York, 1984). 27 R. Keohane, 'Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research', International journal (Autumn, 1990); International O. Young, Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources (Ithaca, 1989).

22

Multilateralism the historical

and world order

173

structural dimension of Classical Realism which is concerned with the or take place and the structures within which actors and interactions frameworks of actions to the pre-existing whole. Liberal inherent in the relationship meanings to be made to work institutionalism takes the existing order as given, as something more smoothly, not as something to be criticized and changed. of state In effect, liberal institutionalism has its starting point in the coexistence are those of system and world capitalist economy. The problems with which it deals structures and of ensuring these two global stability and rendering compatible to say about to the world economy. Thus regime theory has much predictability of advanced economic among the G7 and other groupings cooperation capitalist less to say countries with regard to problems common to them. It has correspondingly about attempts to change the structure of world economy, e.g. in the Third World to demand for a New International Economic Order. Indeed, regimes are designed stabilize the world economy and have the effect, as Keohane in his has underlined states from initiating radical departures of inhibiting and deterring from work, economic orthodoxy, e.g. through socialism.28 are that new regimes or The current of liberal institutionalism implications international institutions may be more difficult to initiate or even to change in the of a dominant power able and willing to commit resources to them, but that existing regimes may survive and evolve to the extent that they provide information and facilities for dealing with matters These regimes and among their members. institutions facilitate the interaction of states and components of civil society within to multilateralism their spheres. This approach is consistent with a conservatively adaptive attitude towards the existing structures of world order. absence

World-system

structuralism

theories, unlike liberal institutionalist theories, have not been directed World-system towards the of international explicitly study though they do provide an organizations, multilateralism. These framework for theories explanatory begin with a conception of the totality of the world takes states for the constitutive system. This conception but sees these units as having a structural relationship pre units, as does Realism, determined in terms of core and by the world economy?a relationship expressed periphery, with an intermediate category of semiperiphery. The concept 'state' designates the political aspect of an entity conceived primarily are dominant over peripheral in economic terms. Core economies economies; they in which peripheral economies determine the conditions produce and they extract for the enhancement of the core.29 Thus, the core surplus from peripheral production in the periphery through the economic relations linking produces underdevelopment economies are strong enough to protect themselves from this the two.30 Semiperiphery kind of exploitation, and they struggle to attain core status. in place the States and inter-state relations are the political structures that maintain
28 Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 119-20, 254. 29 I.Wallerstein, The Modem World System (New York, 1974). 30 A. Gunder and Underdevelopment in Latin America. Frank, Capitalism Brazil (New York, 1969).

Historical

Studies

of Chile

and

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Robert W. Cox

of economies. Periphery states are weak in exploitative core-periphery relationship relation to core states and penetrated by them. A principal weapon in the struggle of to strengthen the semiperipheral countries states so is, accordingly, semiperipheral in relation to the core states. Economic that it can gain autonomy protectionism, economic nationalism, and national planning, whether socialist or state capitalist, are characteristic of the semiperipheral struggle for greater local control over develop
ment.31

structure of dominance The core-periphery not just by external is maintained pressures but also by support from dominant classes or elites in the periphery country who benefit from the relationship. and economic elites in the State, military, are in critical factors the country periphery maintaining relationship. They count on material from the core. They maintain their position support ideological or of the domestic social exclusion forces from political internally by manipulation or allowing only 'domesticated' and economic power, e.g. by suppressing opposition trade unions, etc. Where this peripheral parties, suppressing or controlling opposition can count on the resources of the structure of power is overthrown, its components core (financial, to destabilize and ultimately military) and subvert the intelligence, and

forces that have taken power from them. This political structure of domination structure that is coupled to a socio-economic orients the peripheral economies towards the world economy shaped by the core. The core requires that the periphery economy be open to foreign investment, to imports of core goods and services, and to export of profits. Peripheral structures of labour control differ from those in the core; they ensure a supply of docile and cheap labour, since the economic function of the periphery is to supply inputs to the higher value added production of the core as well as to absorb part of the core's output. This of periphery to maintaining relative subordination labour contributes terms of trade to the core while at the same time separating the interests of core labour favourable from periphery labour. Within (which benefits from the core-periphery relationship) a in the periphery economy, of labour under too, minority foreign-owned employed mass is into the while the of local labour networks, world-economy takings integrated remains relatively deprived. The structure perpetuates itself by dividing the potential forces. opposition Even though multilateralism in world-system has not the central position theory it in liberal this that has obvious for has institutionalism, analysis theory implications multilateralism. Multilateralism is seen, first, as an instrument for institutionalizing structure of domination. the core-periphery The role of the world-economy agencies, to the IMF and the World is to world enforce the practice of openness Bank, to maintain forces upon peripheral the outward economic economy economies, as orientation of periphery economic country policy against any locally-inspired tendencies towards autocentric development.32 economic agencies operate under majority These international control by the core countries. They have become the means of collective of core-oriented imposition policies
31

upon peripheral

countries,

while

financial

relations

among

core countries

are

for of the World Capitalist I.Wallerstein, 'The Rise and Future Demise System: Concepts in Society and History, 16 (1974), pp. 387-^115. Studies Comparative Analysis', Comparative 32 I. Hayter, Aidas 1971); C. Payer, The Debt Trap: The International Imperialism (Harmondsworth, 'International Monetary Fund and the Third World {New York, 1974); J. H. Mittelman, Monetary Are They Compatible? The Tarzanian of Socialism and Self-reliance: Institutions and Policies 47 (1980), pp. 141-65. Social Research, Experience',

Multilateralism dealt with

and world order

175

In effect, a two-tier system of economic through other mechanisms.33 was in the world economy put in place during the 1960s: a top level regulation comprising only the advanced capitalist countries, and a bottom level through which conditions the advanced countries upon collectively imposed financial capitalist Third World countries. technical assistance Moreover, through international agencies under the influence of core countries became a means of adjusting the internal structures of the periphery International and bilateral aid, in countries to the exigencies of the world economy. is seen as part of the total mechanism of the theory of the world-system structuralism, subordination
dependency

of the Third World,

reinforce external

in which

internal

structures

of dominance

and

pressures.34

in the world-system is seen as a however, multilateralism, Secondarily, perspective, terrain of struggle between core and periphery, a terrain in which the grievances of the into collective demands upon the core for structural periphery can be aggregated Inter change in the world economy. The demand raised in the 1970s for a New national Economic Order had this aspect.35 are explainable to a considerable The two phases in the crisis of multilateralism extent within the framework of world-economy structuralism. The quasi-withdrawal to the UN system during the late 1970s and of the United States from commitment that peripheral countries were the 1980s can be seen as a response to a perception in the major assemblies and conferences in disregard of world using their majority economy-oriented policy and behaviour. The United States and other core countries allowed the pressures of international finance to wreak their toll upon a debt-ridden to avoid any Third-World of the Third World, while offering palliatives disruption to destabilizing system. The United States also contributed revolutionary movements in Central America. By the threshold of the 1990s, economic discipline had very in to policies of Third where favourable been restored the World, widely regimes were to in the world The immediate threat of concerted economy adjustment place. core to within the international seemed country organizations goals major opposition abated. The longer-term problem remained one of sustaining favourable governments a deterrent warning in Third World countries and of mounting against particular The Gulf crisis signalled that the ultimate sanction instances of radical deviation. In these matters, is military. of the world-economy against defiance hierarchy is close to the critical analysis of Classical Realism. structuralism world-system In world-system formal multilateralism, that is what goes on structuralism, is only the institutionally visible part of a more through international organizations, total system of relationships linking First and Third worlds. The advanced capitalist countries dispose of many means of intervention (financial, intelligence, and military) within Third World countries and have the support of communications, class allies in these countries. A threat to any aspect of this complex structure of dependency would provoke retaliatory response, including response through multi lateral institutions. Classical Realism also probes the less visible processes of this complex
33 R. Cox and H. Jacobson et al., The Anatomy of Influence. Decision Out from Order: Making in International

Organization 1974). (New Haven, 34 B. Erler, L'aide qui tui (Lausanne, 1987); J. H. Mittelman, the Third World (London, 1988). 35 Economic International and the New R. Cox, 'Ideologies International Literature', Organization, Third World against Global Liberalism 33 (1979), (Berkeley,

Underdevelopment:

Prospects

for

Reflections S. Krasner,

on some Recent Structural Conflict. The

pp. 257-302; 1985).

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Robert W. Cox

in particular cases; but world-system structuralism offers a more relationship Both heuristic differ from and liberal institutional hypothesis. systematic generalized ism which more readily takes state actions and multilateral processes at face value. character. It Epistemologically, world-system analysis has a structural-functionist a are structure the existence of of that coherent and self posits relationships accounts Within that it for economic and social framework, reproducing. practices forces as well as states. Thus it embraces a larger sphere of human activity that does a realism which focuses more exclusively upon states. Realism does take account of state power, but tends to perceive capabilities as the resource underpinning as segmented into national compartments whereas world-system economics theory stresses the transnational of in economies relation linkages dominant-dependent economic of world-system is the limitation of functionalism. theory a can account for synchronie in relationships given system that has It cannot explain how that system came into existence; nor is it adequate coherence. to explain how itmay be transformed.36 What world-system theory lacks is an ability to explain to structural transformation. it is For this reason, explain change, as a to describe This structuralism. structuralism theory appropriate world-system can be contrasted with or complemented of historical transformation by a dialectical weakness
structures.

ships. The

Functionalism

Historical Historical

dialectic37

of realism, are persistent structures, as noted above in the discussion of human activity and thought that endure for relatively patterns long periods of time. They are the result of collective to certain common responses problems? whether these relate to the satisfaction of material wants (economics), the organiz or the explanation ation of cooperation and security (politics), of the human condition and purpose (religion and ideology)?which become congealed in practices, a and for of institutions, intersubjective meanings significant group people. These practices These historical

in turn constitute and meanings the objective world for these people. structures are historical because in particular they come into existence circumstances and can be explained as responses to these circumstances. Similarly, they are transformed when material circumstances have changed or prevail and purposes have been challenged by new practices. This historical ing meanings structures differentiates of them from the structural/sm that posits fixed malleability and immutable structures, e.g. like those of Neo-realism. to the understanding The dialectical of change was concisely expressed approach a The idea of Ralf which in its structure the Dahrendorf: by society produces that lead to its modification for the appears as an appropriate model antagonisms set forth here is thus both dialectical of in The method in analysis change general'.38 its explanation of change, and hermeneutic insofar as it enquires into purposes and
36 Social Science and Political W. G. Runciman, 1965), pp. 109-34; R. Brenner, Theory (Cambridge, New Left Review, A Critique of Neo-Smithian The Origins of Capitalism Marxism', Development: 104 (1977), pp. 25-92. 37 about Future I have discussed this concept more 'On Thinking fully in earlier articles. See R. Cox, 28 (1976), pp. 175-96 and 'Social Forces, World Order', World Politics, States, and World Orders; in Keohane, Relations International (ed.), Neorealism. Theory', Beyond 38 in Industrial Society R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict 1959), pp. 125-6. (Stanford,

Multilateralism

and world order

177

and links subjectivity and objectivity to explain a socially constructed world meanings order and multilateralism. This approach can be seen in one aspect as a deepening of classical Realism. Where Realism focuses upon the state and the state system, historical dialectic enquires into the social processes that create and transform forms of state and the state system in perceptions and meanings that constitute and itself, and into the alterations the objective world order. The approach, tendencies in therefore, begins with an assessment of the dominant an to world of and identification the order, existing antagonisms proceeds generated within that order which could develop into turning points for structural trans in this context, will be perceived as in part the institution formation. Multilateralism, alization and regulation of existing order, and in part the site of struggle between conservative and transformative forces. Multilateralism's and purposes, meanings and thus the new or changed structures which multilateralism may help to create, are to be derived from its relationship to the stresses and conflicts in world order. Karl Polanyi gave a dialectical of European economic and social interpretation a in in he the nineteenth what callled double The first movement.39 century history was movement of the introduction of the market?what phase self-regulating Polanyi saw as an Utopian vision backed by the force of the state. The second phase of move ment was society's unplanned and unpredicted response of self-preservation against of market-oriented behaviour. Society the disintegrating and alienating consequences to tame and civilize the market. The approach of historical dialectic discerns a recurrence of the double movement trend thrusts toward in the late twentieth century. A powerful globalizing economic the achievement of the market utopia on a world scale, opening national economies the protective and deregulating transactions. At the present moment, responses of a protective the while level are being weakened societies at the national trend, by to at form. Yet the has take elements of level of the yet response global society are The to of visible. the consequences globalization socially disruptive opposition as as to to whether how form these and what remains may take, open they question set about may become more coherent and more powerful, so that historical thesis and antithesis will become an arena of may lead to a new synthesis. In this context, multilateralism to buttress the freedom of movement of powerful the endeavour conflict between a new to structure of efforts build economic and forces, regulation homogenizing protecting diversity and the less powerful. economic The global economy has become something distinct from international to to state economic flows assumed be control i.e. from transborder relations, subject now distinct constitute and finance and regulation.40 Global global production spheres of power relations which constrain the state system at least as much as they are influenced by it.41They are bringing about a new social structure of production relations of the past. De the nation-centred relations labour-capital superseding mass from South and of migratory movements organizations centralizing production to North are generating global patterns of social cleavage and bringing new sources of conflict within national borders. to think of societies as confined within territorial limits,
Social

reconstitute

It is less and less pertinent

39 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation 1957). (Boston, 40 to International 'A New Approach and C.-A. Michalet, B. Madeuf Science Journal, 30 (1978), pp. 253-83. 41 S. Strange, States and Markets 1988). (London,

Economies',

International

178 more

Robert W. Cox

have

and more necessary to think of a stratified global society in which global elites it is in which the impetus in shaping the social order, including the ideology and other social groups are in a position of relative powerlessness, either grounded, or frustrated. The concepts of core and periphery, introduced by world acquiescent are coming more and more to have a system analysis with a geographical meaning,

of social differentiation within and across territorial boundaries.42 The elites meaning of globalization into a common structural force, even when merge they compete amongst themselves for primacy in the common movement.43 The relatively powerless are fragmented by nationality, obstacles to greater ethnicity, religion, and gender?all is a manifestation of global their subordination of the formation cohesion?but is critical for the future society. The problem of how their concerns will be articulated limits drastically the capacity of states to conduct autonomous The state system and social policies for the protection of their populations. of the late twentieth century is coming to act more as a support to the opening of the to global finance and global production, less as a means of defence of the world welfare of local populations. Indeed, where states try to act in the protective mode economic from the changed they face retaliation, initially financial, ultimately perhaps military, state system. The state system skews the distribution of benefits and costs of an the society in favour of the economically powerful within increasingly globalized states. (In this sense, world-system dominant retains within the analysis validity framework of historical dialectic.) The centres of financial power and military power are located in these states. These forms of power sustain the globalizing world even while the processes of global society are introducing the social economy, and latent conflicts of First and Third Worlds within these centres of world a process that has been called the 'peripheralization of the core'. power?in The biosphere suffers the impact of both the global economy and the state system. to has not been constrained The global economy, activated by profit maximization, no so is moderate its destructive effects. There authoritative far ecological regulator, on through the inter-state system to achieve agreement only several interventions cleavages of specific noxious practices. The state system itself is capable of massive destruction ecological through war. The ecosystem is no longer to be thought of as an inert, passive limit to human active force capable of dramatic activity. It has to be thought of as a non-human and survival. Humanity is only one contin interventions affecting human conditions gent element in the biosphere. A valid paradigm for the investigation of global change interaction of human organization with the other would need to include the historical elements in nature. The biosphere has its own automatic enforcers, for instance in the avoidance of global warming; but who will negotiate on behalf of the biosphere? consequences That must be one of the questions overshadowing future multilateralism. The dominant and tendencies are accompanied economically-based globalizing centres that from the accelerated by a process of cultural homogenization emanating are to the world and sustained media, They by give impetus spread by globalization. a convergence inmodes of thought and practices among business and political elites. Yet this homogenizing tendency is countered by the affirmation of distinct identities
R. Cox, Production, Power and World Order. Social Forces 1987), chapter 9. 43 S. Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission, 1984). Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class (London, 42 in theMaking (Cambridge, of History (New York, der Pijl, The

of multilateralism. Global finance

1990); K. Van

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and world order

179

in state roles in the and distinct traditions. The changes cultural taking place for self-expression that economy give new opportunity by nationalities globalizing and the for separation or autonomy; have no state of their own, in movements same tendencies encourage ethnicities and religiously-defined groups that straddle state boundaries to express their identities in global politics. Social movements like and the peace movement also transcend territorial feminism, environmentalism, their Transnational enhances among cooperation indigenous peoples of the augur modification particular states. These various developments that might be more pure Westphalian concept of inter-state system into something as a 'new medievalism', a multilevel like what Hedley Bull envisaged system of boundaries. force within political authorities with micro- and macro-regionalisms interacting in a more complex political process.44 The cultural challenge goes to the heart of the question is used here in the Gramscian of a structure of meaning about the nature of order that permeates a whole society, and transborder identities

of hegemony. 'Hegemony' values and understandings in this case a world society

of states and non-state order these corporate entities.45 In a hegemonic composed are relatively stable and unquestioned. values and understandings They appear to most actors as the natural order of things. They are the intersubjective meanings that is underpinned constitute the order itself. Such a structure of meanings by a structure is of power, in which most probably one state is dominant but that state's dominance not sufficient by itself to create hegemony. Hegemony derives from the ways of doing state or states insofar and thinking of the dominant social strata of the dominant or acquired as these ways of doing and thinking have inspired emulation the strata states. dominant social of other These social and of the practices acquiescence the foundation of the the ideologies that explain and legitimize them constitute frames thought and thereby circumscribes order. Hegemony action. an in is between which the there power, apparent disjunction military Today in which and economic the US advantage is United States is dominant, power, nor or even in Neither economic alone, power combination, military lessening. In the structure of hegemony, cultural and ideological necessarily implies hegemony. or not the hegemonic order of Pax Americana factors are decisive. Whether is in is a matter of current debate.46 The very fact that it is called in question decline, even if it proves of the ideological dimensions of hegemony, indicates a weakening nothing about the material power relations underpinning hegemony. to be in decline, several logical possibilities for the future are Supposing hegemony of the (b) a revival of the universals (a) a revival of the declining hegemony,47 not by one state but by an oligarchy of powerful declining hegemony underpinned states that would have to concert their powers;48 (c) the founding of a new hegemony its own principles of order;49 (d) a non by another state successfully universalizing hegemonic
44 45 H. Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order inWorld Politics and International Relations: An Essay R. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony 12 (1983), pp. 162-75. Studies, of International 46 On this, see for example, P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New Nye, Bound 41 International of Lost Hegemony', Persistent Myth Organization, American This would (New York, inMethod', Powers York, (1987), 1977), pp. 254-5. Millennium Journal

(New York, 1987); J. 'The 1990); S. Strange, pp. 551-74; and S. Gill,

and the Trilateral Commission 1990). Hegemony (Cambridge, seem to be Nye's thesis in Bound to Lead. 48 in Keohane, Envisaged notably After Hegemony. 49 For example, about a Pax Nipponica. 'Pax Nipponica?', See E. Vogel, Foreign Affairs, speculations and a sceptical comment (1986), pp. 752-67, by R. Cox, Japan, and Future 'Middlepowermanship, World Order', International Journal, 44 (1989). 47

64

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Robert W. Cox

hegemonic

as an order lacking effective universal principles of order and functioning states, each with their client states, most probably based interplay of rival powerful on an organization order of rival world regions;50 and (e) a counterhegemonic of power, anchored in a broader diffusion in which a large number of collective some agreement upon universal of an states, achieve forces, including principles

alternative order without dominance. Quite obviously, the likelihood of these logical seems weighted in favour of some more than others. Equally obviously, possibilities the role and possibilities of multilateralism would be very different in each. The most unlikely prospects are (a) and (c)?the era of dominant single powers founding seems now past; there are no plausible successors to Pax Britannica and hegemony Pax Americana. term, give most trend of the present would, at least in the medium globalizing in case of breakdown, to (b), with a distinct possibility, probability In the much financial of crisis, e.g. through major (d). longer run, (e) will remain a an for world's less the of and many aspiration. powerful, possibility, from the dominant their universals orders have derived Previous hegemonic a A order would dominant civilization. the of itself post-hegemonic society, product content in a search for common its normative have to derive among ground constituent traditions of civilization. What might be this common ground? The A first condition the most perhaps would be mutual recognition of distinct traditions of civilization, for those who have shared a common difficult step especially are to forsake the security of belief in a and who unprepared hegemonic perspective, from one position of power based on universalizing natural order that is historically in one form of civilization. The difficulty is underlined by the way political change to view in the West?the and reported is perceived tendency as an a can to conclusion which Western lead, concepts example, through everything of a late Western is upon us as the apotheosis that the 'end of history' capitalist others in civilization. Mutual implies a readiness to try to understand recognition their own terms. order would be to move beyond the point A second condition for a post-hegemonic a that would provide a kind of of mutual towards supra-intersubjectivity recognition outside the West of the different coexisting bridge among the distinct and separate intersubjectivities traditions of civilization. One can speculate that the grounds for this might be (1) in global ecology recognition of the requisites for survival and sustained equilibrium to from this remain be drawn inferences the may subjects of specific ?though discord; (2) mutual acceptance of restraint in the use of violence to decide conflicts? not that this would eliminate organized political violence, though it might raise the to costs of resort to violence; and (3) common agreement explore the sources of take account for coping with conflict that would conflict and to develop procedures of distinct coexisting normative perspectives. dialectic crosses the threshold of the present from past to future. Its Historical of reasoning moves from an appraisal of the forces that have historically mode to in interact the of the points of crisis and present, towards an anticipation developed for the future. It draws upon the three preceding perspectives? the real options and world-system liberal institutionalism, Realism, analysis?while appropriating It approaches of the problem its own hermeneutic method. their insights within as a problem in the making of a new world order. multilateralism
50 For example, R. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, 1987).