1. RELOVA VS.

LAVAREZ FACTS: Relova owns a rice land cultivated by water from River Bangcabangca through an aqueduct which passes over Lavarezs land. A dam controls the flow of water in Lavarez land and this dam was destroyed. Water escaped by the drainage ditch and no water then flowed on Relovas land. Because of this, Relova was unable to raise his crops. TC: Found that the dam and aqueduct had been in use by Relova for more than 30 years and that he had an easement in the land of Lavarez for the maintenance of the said aqueduct and dam. It restrained Lavarez from interfering with the Relovas right to use of water in the aqueduct. Lavarez alleges that Relova is not the owner of any lands watered by the aqueduct of the class known as padagat (May). Also that Relova didnt suffer damages by the destruction of the dam because all the lands cultivated by the water are binangbang (August and September). The destruction of the dam on May could not have damaged Relovas land at that time. Also there is no servitude established in favor of the land of Relova. ISSUE: W/N there was servitude established on Lavarezs land in favor of Relova. HELD: Yes, there is servitude established on Lavarezs land. The aqueduct and dam have been in existence for more than 30 years during which the owner of the land in question has always exercised the right to reasonable use of the water in the aqueduct for irrigation purposes. Art. 530 of the Civil Code states that the existence of servitude cannot be established unless it appears that a benefit was or might be derived by the plaintiff landowner. The aperture in the dam is used to control the flow of water in the aqueduct and to prevent damage to the lowlands. The aqueduct could never have been for the benefit of Relova because his land was higher than Lavarezs. These contentions cannot be maintained. Lavarez may have the right to open the aperture in the dam to prevent destructive flow of water but this doesnt give them the right to stop the flow of water. Relova is entitled to the benefit of reasonable use of water from the aqueduct provided the flow of water was properly regulated by the opening of the aperture of the dam.

2. SOLID MANILA VS. BIO HONG FACTS: Solid owns a land in Ermita which is in the vicinity of a parcel registered in Bio Hongs name. Bio Hong got its title from a prior owner who reserved as an easement of way 914 sqm converted into a private alley for the benefit of neighboring estates. This is annotated on Bio Hongs title. Solid and other residents claim that they made use of the private alley ever since and contributed to its upkeep. Bio Hong constructed steel gates that deprived Solid, etc. from using the alley. Solid then filed an injunction against Bio Hong to have the gates removed and allow full access to the easement. Court a quo ordered Bio Hong to open the gates. Bio Hong contends that the easement has been extinguished by merger in the same person of the dominant and servient estates upon purchase of the property from its former owner, that Solid has another adequate outlet, has not paid indemnity and it has not shown that the right-of-way lies at the point least prejudicial to the servient etate. ISSUE: 1. W/N there was an easement. 2. W/N the easement has been extinguished by a merger. HELD: 1. An easement has been constituted on Bio Hongs property as described and annotated in the deed of sale. Conditions: open at all times and no obstructions should be placed thereon, the p ublic should be able to use the private alley and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage purposes and shall not ask for any indemnity. Erecting the steel gates is a defiance of these conditions. Injunction is proper. Petitioner is not claiming the easement or the property but only that Bio Hong respect the eaement already existing. Art. 617 states that easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong. Even if Bio Hong owns the land, it didnt have the right t o close the alley. 2. No genuine merger took place as a result of the sale in favor of Bio Hong. It requires full ownership of both estates. The servitude in this case is a personal one constituted not in favor of another immovable but for the benefit of the general public (Art. 614). In a personal servitude, there is no owner of the dominant estate to speak of and the easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate. Merger presupposes the existence of prior servient-dominant owner relationship and termination of that relation leaves easement of no use. Unless the owner conveys property in favor of the public, no genuine merger can take place that would terminate a personal easement.

3. CID VS. JAVIER FACTS: Trial court and CA declared that Javier acquired the easement. The windows in question are admittedly in Javiers building erected in their own lot. It is a negative easement. The prohibition is made in 1913 or 1914 therefore the applicable provision is Article 538 of the Spanish CC which states that negative easements can be acquired through prescription from the day on which the owner of the dominate estate has by a formal act, forbidden the owner of the servient estate to perform any act which would be lawful without the easement. The issue hinges on the proper interpretation of the term formal act. The lower court and the CA considered any prohibition made by the owner of the dominant estate, be it oral or written, sufficient compliance with the law. ISSUE: W/N Javier had acquired prescription an enforceable easement of light and view arising from a verbal prohibition. HELD: The law is explicit that it requires a formal act, not any form of prohibition. It would require one that is executed in due form and/or with solemnity. Article 621 states that the prohibition should be in an instrument acknowledged before a notary public. Cid and Javiers lot are both covered with OCTs. In both OCTs, it does not appear that any annotation in respect to the easement supposedly acquired by prescription which, counting 20 years from 1913 or 1914, would have already ripened by 1937, date of decrees of registration. Even if an easement were acquired, it had been cut off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate under the Torrens System without the easement being annotated on the CoT (Sec 39 of the LRA). 4. CORTES VS. YU-TIBO FACTS: House No. 65 Calle Rosario is owned by plaintiff Cortes wife. It has certain windows (in existence since 1843) through which it receives light and air. The windows open on House No. 63 of the adjacent street. Defendant Yu-Tibo, owner of House 63 raised the roof of the house which resulted to covering half of the windows House 65 therefore depriving the building of the large part of the air and light formerly received through the window. Cortes did not formally prohibit Yu-Tibo from making improvements of any kind prior to the complaint. Cortes contends that he acquired the easement of light through prescription by the constant and uninterrupted use of the windows for 59 years and that he had the right to restrain the making of any improvements in House 63 which might be prejudicial to the easement. He also says that easement of light is positive, therefore, the period of possession is to begin from the date on which the enjoyment of the easement commenced or from the time the windows

were opened with the knowledge of House 63 and without opposition on his part. Defendant Yu-Tibo contends that there was a negative easement and therefore the period of possession must begin from the date the owner of the dominant estate have formally prohibited the owner of the servient estate from doing something which would be lawful if not for the easement. ISSUE: W/N Cortes acquired the easement by prescription. HELD: No, because the easement of light in this case is a negative easement and cannot be acquired by prescription (Art. 538 of the CC) except by counting the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate formally prohibited the owner of the servient estate to do an act which would be lawful if not for the easement. Cortes did not execute any formal act of opposition so he did not acquire the easement of light through prescription no matter how long a time had elapsed since the windows were opened in the wall of House 65 because the period for prescription did not start to run in the absence of the act that necessarily needs to be performed. When a person opens windows in his own building he exercises an act of ownership inherent in the right of property and is not limited to its use. It does not establish any easement. Coexistent with this right is the right of the owner of the adjacent property to cover up such windows by building on his own land and raising a wall to the wall in which the windows are opened. In the absence of an agreement, the use of windows opened in a wall on ones own property is a mere act of tolerance on the part of the owner of the adjacent property. It does not create a right to maintain the windows to the prejudice of the adjacent property owner. Mere toleration is not a waiver of the adjacent property owners right to freely build upon his land as high as he may see fit nor does it avail the owner of the windows the effects of possession because it is a mere possession at will. The prescription of the easement of lights does not take place unless there has been some act of opposition on the part of the person attempting to obstruct its enjoyment. It is error to give the mere existence or use of windows in a wall standing wholly on the land of one proprietor the creative force of a true easement, although they may have existed since time immemorial.

5. ABELLANA VS. CA FACTS: Abellana and other petitioners live on a parcel of land in Nonoc Homes Subdivision. They sued to establish an easement of right of way over a subdivision road which used to be a mere footpath which they and their ancestors had been using since time immemorial and hence they had acquired it through prescription. The Municipal Govt of Cebu constructed a wall around the subdivision which deprived petitioners the use of the subdivision road which gives access to the public highway. Petitioners ask that the high concrete walls be removed and the road be opened to them. Mun. of Cebu denied there was an existing footpath in the place before it was developed into a subdivision and stated that the Nonoc Subdivision roads were not the shortest way to a public road for there is a more direct route from petitioners land to the public highway. ISSUE: W/N petitioners acquired the easement of right of way through prescription. HELD: No. A right of way is not acquirable by prescription. The use of a footpath or road may be apparent but it is not a continuous easement because its use is at intervals and depends upon the acts of man. It can be exercised only if a man passes or puts his feet over somebody elses land. Petitioners also cannot invoke Sec. 29 of PD 957 which provides that the owner or developer of a subdivision without access to any existing public road or street must secure a right of way to a public road or street and such must be developed and maintained according to the requirement of the govt authorities concerned. The petitioners are not owners or developers of a subdivision. Municipal ordinances which declared subdivision roads open to public use when deemed necessary by the proper authorities simply allow persons other than residents of the subdivision to use the roads when they are inside the subdivision but does not give outsiders the right to open the walls so they can enter the subdivision from the back. Therefore, the closure of the dead ends in the subdivision is a legal exercise of proprietary rights for the protection of the residents from night prowlers and thieves.

6. RONQUILLO VS. ROCO FACTS: Plaintiff Ronquillos have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use for 20 years of a road or passage way which traversed the land of the defendant Rocos in going to Igualdad Street and the market place of Naga City from their residential land and back. The Rocos respected the private legal easement of the road right of way of Ronquillos. Subsequently, the Rocos constructed a chapel in the middle of the right of way which obstructed and disturbed the continuous exercise of rights of the Ronquillos. The Rocos also by means of force, intimidation and threats, illegally and violently placed wooden posts, fenced with barbed wires and closed the road passage way preventing Ronquillos from passing through. ISSUE: W/N Ronquillos have acquired the right of way through prescription. HELD: No. An easement of right of way, though apparent, is discontinuous or intermittent, therefore cannot be acquired through prescription but only by title. Cuayong vs. Benedicto: No vested right by user from time immemorial had been acquired. No discontinuous easement can be acquired by prescription (Art. 539). Mun. of Dumangas vs. Bishop of Jaro: Continued use by the public of a path over land adjoining Catholic Church has given the church the right to use by prescription and because of public use, an easement of right of way has been acquired by prescription, not only by the church, but also the public. Minority opinion: Easement of right of way can now be acquired by prescription. There would be no valid reason that the continued use of a path, specially by the public for 10 years or more, through adverse use cannot give the party a vested right to such right of way through prescription. The uninterrupted and continuous use does not require everyday use but simply the exercise of the right more or less frequently (Am Jur).

7. AMOR VS. FLORENTINO (from Internet) FACTS: It appears that over 50 years ago, Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin or warehouse in Vigan, Ilocos Sur. The house had and still has, on the north side, three windows on the upper story, and a fourth one on the ground floor. Through these windows the house receives light and air from the lot where the camarin stands. On September 6, 1885, Maria Florentino made a will, devising the house and the land on which it is situated to Gabriel Florentino, one of the respondents herein, and to Jose Florentino, father of the other respondents. In said will, the testatrix also devised the warehouse and the lot where it is situated to Maria Encarnacion Florentino. Upon the death of the testatrix in 1892, nothing was said or done by the devisees in regard to the windows in question. On July 14, 1911, Maria Encarnacion Florentino sold her lot and the warehouse thereon to the petitioner, Severo Amor, the deed of sale stating that the vendor had inherited the property from her aunt, Maria Florentino. In January, 1938, petitioner destroyed the old warehouse and started to build instead a two-story house. On March 1st of that year, respondents filed an action to prohibit petitioner herein from building higher than the original structure and from executing any work which would shut off the light and air that had for many years been received through the four windows referred to. The Court of First Instance found on the 15th of the same month that the construction of the new house had almost been completed, so the court denied the writ of preliminary injunction. "Art. 541. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established by the proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to disappear before the instrument is executed." ISSUE: Whether or not Article 541 applies to a division of property by succession. AFFIRMATIVE. there is an implied contract between them that the easements in question should be constituted. HELD: These two easements necessarily go together because an easement of light and view requires that the owner of the servient estate shall not build to a height that will obstruct the window. They are, as it were, the two sides of the same coin. While an easement of light and view is positive, that of altius non tollendi is negative. Clemente de Diego states that when article 538 speaks of the time for the commencement of prescription for negative easements, "it refers to those negative easements which are the result and consequence of others that are positive, such as the easement not to build higher, or not to construct, which is indispensable to the easement of light."

It will thus be seen that under article 541 the existence of the apparent sign in the instant case, to wit, the four windows under consideration, had for all legal purposes the same character and effect as a title of acquisition of the easement of light and view by the respondents upon the death of the original owner, Maria Florentino. Upon the establishment of that easement of light and view, the concomitant and concurrent easement of altius non tollendi was also constituted, the heir of the camarin and its lot, Maria Encarnacion Florentino, not having objected to the existence of the windows. The theory of article 541, of making the existence of the apparent sign equivalent to a title, when nothing to the contrary is said or done by the two owners, is sound and correct, because as it happens in this case, there is an implied contract between them that the easements in question should be constituted. If we do not apply article 541 of the Civil Code and we cannot apply it because Maria Florentino died in 1885 there is really a gap in the case for the respondents, but none in the case for the petitioner. 1 Under the Partidas, or rather in the absence of an express provision therein similar to article 541, the petitioner should win; and since the parties litigant herein are entitled to have their case decided in accordance with the pre-Civil Code legislation in force in the Philippines as provided in the transitory provisions, since that legislation without any "gap-filling" is in favor of the petitioner, and since to "fill the gap" would prejudice him and unduly favor the respondents, the Court should abstain from so doing as a matter of law and justice. First, as to the modes of establishing and acquiring easements. According to Article 536, easements are established by law or by will of the owners. Acquisition of easements is first by title or its equivalent and secondly by prescription. What acts take the place of title? They are mentioned in Articles 540 and 541, namely, (1) a deed of recognition by the owner of the servient estate; (2) a final judgment; and (3) an apparent sign between two estates, established by the owner of both, which is the case of article 541. Sanchez Roman calls such apparent sign under article 541 "supletoria del titulo constitutivo de la servidumbre." standpoint of justice and public policy When Maria Encarnacion Florentino, as one of of the devisees, accepted the camarin and the lot, she could not in fairness receive the benefit without assuming the burden of the legacy. That burden consisted of the service in fact during the lifetime of the original owner, which service became a true easement upon her death. It is not just to allow Maria Encarnacion Florentino or her successor in interest to repudiate her own undertaking, implied, it is true, but binding nevertheless. This easement is therefore a burden which Maria Encarnacion Florentino and her successor in interest willingly accepted. They cannot now murmur against any inconvenience consequent upon their own agreement.

8. GARGANTOS VS. TAN YANON During the construction of the new house by the petitioner, the respondents filed an action to stop the work. But petitioner continued the construction, so that when the Court of First Instance was ready to pass upon the preliminary injunction, the work had almost been finished. Petitioner, therefore, cannot complain if he is now ordered to tear down part of the new structure so as not to shut off the light from respondents' windows. When petitioner bought this lot from the original coheir, Maria Encarnacion Florentino, the windows on respondents' house were visible. It was petitioner's duty to inquire into the significance of those windows. Having failed to do so, he cannot now question the easement against the property which he purchased. VI Recapitulating, we believe the easement of light and view has been established in favor of the property of respondents, for these reasons: 1. Maria Florentino having died in 1892, according to a finding of fact of the Court of Appeals, which we cannot review, Article 541 of the Civil Code is applicable to this case. 2. Granting, arguendo, that Maria Florentino died in 1885, nevertheless the same principle embodied in article 541 of the Civil Code was already an integral part of the Spanish law before the promulgation of the Civil Code in 1889, and therefore, even if the instant case should be governed by the Spanish law prior to the Civil Code, the easement in question would also have to be upheld. 3. The easement under review has been acquired by respondents through prescription. 4. The petitioner was not an innocent purchaser, as he was in duty bound to inquire into the significance of the windows. 5. Justice and public policy are on the side of the respondents. FACTS: The late Francisco Sanz owns a land in Romblon. He subdivided the lot into 3 and sold each portion to different persons. Guillermo Tengtio bought one portion. He sold this to Vicente Uy Veza. Tan Yanon bought another portion with a house of strong materials on it. This has doors and windows overlooking the third portion (with a camarin and small building) which is acquired by Juan Gargantos. Gargantos was granted a permission to demolish the camarin. He also asked for another permit to construct a combined residential house and warehouse on the lot. Tan Yanon opposed this and filed an action to restrain Gargantos from constructing a building that would prevent him from receiving light and enjoying the view through the windows of his house, unless such building is erected not less than 3 meters from the boundary line between their lots and to enjoin the Mun. Council from issuing a permit to Gargantos. Gargantos argued that Tan Yanon never acquired any easement through prescription and title and no deed established the easement. Also, he never formally forbidden Tan Yanon from performing any act which would be lawful if not for the easement, thus the prescriptive period never started. ISSUE: W/N Tan Yanons property has an easement of light and view against the property of Gargantos. HELD: Yes. Gargantos cannot build unless he erects the building not less than 3 meters from the boundaries separating his estate from Tan Yanons. Art. 538 and the Yu-Tibo case is not applicable because the two estates in this case were formerly owned by just one person, Francisco Sanz. It was him who introduced improvements on both portions. The windows and doors existed when Tan Yanon purchased the house and lot from Sanz and the deed of sale did not provide an establishment of an easement. Art. 541 states that the existence of an apparent sign of easement bet. two estates, established by the proprietor, shall be considered, if one of them is alienated, as title so that the easement will continue actively and passively unless the contrary is stated or the sign is made to disappear before instrument is executed. The existence of the doors and windows is equivalent to title. The easement arose for the first time only upon alienation of either estate. Before that time, there is no easement to speak of, there being only one owner of both estates.

9. VALDERRAMA VS. NORTH NEGROS SUGAR FACTS: Several hacienda owners of Manapla, Negros Occ. entered into a milling contract with Miguel Osorio. The latter agreed to install a sugar central for grinding and milling all the sugar cane to be grown by the hacienda owners who in turn will furnish the central with all the cane they might produce in their estates for 30 years from the execution of the contract. North Negros acquired Osorios rights and interest in the milling contract. Two years after, Valderrama, Rodriguez, Urra, Huarte and Auzmendi made other milling contracts with North Negros but with new conditions. The hacienda owners could not furnish the required can for milling so North Negros made other milling contracts with hacienda owners in Cadiz, Negros Occ. Plaintiffs Valderrama, et al. filed a complaint alleging that the easement of way was only for the transportation through each hacienda of the sugar cane of the owner. North Negros maintains it had the right to transport to its central upon the railroad passing through the haciendas of the plaintiffs, not only the sugar cane harvested in the haciendas, but also that of the hacienda owners of Cadiz, Negros Occ. North Negros claims that plaintiffs granted it a period of 50 years an easement of way 7 meters wide upon their lands for the construction and operation of a railroad for the transportation of sugar cane. ISSUE: What is the extent of the easement of way which the plaintiffs have established in their respective haciendas in favor of North Negros? HELD: In the 3 contracts executed to Valderrama, Rodriguez and Urra, an easement of way 7 meters wide and for the period of 50 years is established in favor of North Negros, upon his estate, at such place as said corporation may see fit for the construction of a railroad. Said clause is clear enough and it is not ambiguous. To limit the use of the road exclusively to the cane of the plaintiffs and within their respective haciendas would make the contract ineffective. The milling contract is for the mutual benefit of the sugar cane producers and the corporation. Such benefit will not be produced if the easement of way is only going to be in favor of their haciendas. This is a case of easement for the benefit easement became apparent when the road owner of the central may cause its wagons to many times as it may deem fit according to the of a corporation. The was constructed. The pass upon the road as needs of the central. It

would be unjust to prohibit the central to obtain from another source sufficient cane with which to continue its business. The easement is also not made burdensome by transporting upon the road sugar cane form the planters of Cadiz. What is prohibited is extending the road or repairing it to occupy a greater area of the land of the servient estates or deposit excavations. This would alter the easement. Lastly, there was no intention to limit the use of the railroad to the transportation of cane grown by the plaintiffs in their haciendas. The duration of the milling contracts is 30 years but the easement is for 50 years so even if at the end of 30 years the plaintiffs should no longer desire to furnish canes for milling, North Negros still has the right to the easement for the remaining period but without transporting any cane for the central. 10. JAVELLANA VS. IAC FACTS: This case arose from a complaint of recovery of damages filed by Marsal and Co, Inc. and Marcelino Florete Sr. against defendants Hernani, Javellana, Demafils, Crusada and Sison for denying access to and use of a canal leading to Floretes property and to enjoin City Mayor and Engineer of Iloilo City from demolishing the existing structures in Floretes property serving as dike entrance gate to said canal. Marsal is the owner of a land adjoining the Iloilo River up to and adjacent the lot where L. Borres Elem School is located. When Florete was still the owner of the Marsal property, a main canal existed from the Iloilo River cutting across said property towards the lot where the said school is located and thru a canal that traverses the school premises going towards Lot 2344. Plaintiffs closed the dike entrance of the main canal. On petition of PTA officials of Brgy. Narvais, an ocular inspection was made. Plaintiffs had demolished the dike connecting the main canal in plaintiffs property with the canal running thru the school premises toward 2344. Director Hernani invited Floerte for conference concerning the complaint of the residents of Narvais. ISSUE: W/N Marsal and Florete has a right of easement upon the lot, not the school. HELD: No, the easement is for the school. The main canal had long been in existence even before plaintiff Marcelino Florete Sr. acquired ownership of the fishpond of the Maranons thru which the same passes. This canal served as passage of salt water from Iloilo River to the school fishpond and at the same time, as outlet and drainage canal or channel of rainwater from the school premises and adjacent lands that empties to the Iloilo River. An easement or servitude of water-

right of way had thus been constituted on the property of the plaintiffs as the servient estate in favor of the L. Borres Elementary School land and the nearby lands as the dominant estates. As testified by witnesses, Florete was not the one who constructed the canal but only made it deeper as testified by Regacho who was the one who worked on it. There are two canals within the school premises, one going towards the land of Florete and the other to Mirasols land. The two canals met at the place were Florete closed the canal. These canals serve to empty rainwater to the Iloilo River. Regacho confirmed that the school fishpond has no other source of salr water except from the canal that connects to the main canal that starts from the Iloilo River. Defendants closure of the dike entrance cause he flooding in the premise of the school and it vicinity because during the rainy season, the canal also serves as outlet of rain or flood waters that empties to the Iloilo River. (check other justifications in the original case pp. 290291) An easement or servitude of water-right-of-way had nonetheless been constituted on subject property because since then the same had been in continuous use for no less than fifteen (15) years by the school fishpond as well as by the adjacent lands. A positive easement (Art 616, New Civil Code) had thereby been created and plaintiffs have no right to terminate it unilaterally without violating Art. 629 of the NCC: Art. 629: The owner of the servient estate cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude. Nevertheless, if by reason of the place originally assigned or of the manner established for the use of the easement, the same should become very inconvenient to the owner of the servient estate, or should prevent him from making any important works, repairs or improvements thereon, it may be charged at his expense, provided he offers another place or manner equally convenient and in such a way that no injury is caused thereby to the owner of the dominant estate or to those who may have a right to the use of the easement. 11. BENEDICTO VS. CA FACTS: The adjoining properties of Heras and Benedicto were formely owned by Miriam Hendrick. The latter sold a portion of the property to Claro M. Recto. At the time of the sale, building were located on the respective properties of Recto and Hendrick. An easement of way was annotated on their respective titles. In order to carry the agreement out, Recto asked Marcial Zamora of the General Land Registration Office to issue a new tirle in his favor according to the new plan submitted by him. Hendrick also obtained a new and separate title whose technical description is based on the Cadastral Survey.

Hendricks property became the object of transfers to Chow Kwo Hsien, General Security and Investment Co. and Vicente Heras. Trial court found that there was an increase in area because of the use of the technical description based on the cadastral survey. It also found that the easement of way is entirely found within Benedictos property contrary to the stipulation that it should be between Hendrick and Rectos property. It directed the parties to contribute equally to the maintenance of a 3-4 meter wide passageway between their properties. It rejected Benedictos claim that the eaement had been extinguished by nonuser and by the cessation of the necessity of the passageway. Benedicto claims the easement was originally constituted because the buildings on H and Cs properties adjoined each other that the only way the back portions of the properties could be reached from San Marcelino Street was through the passageway. When Heras demolished his building, the property gained direct access to San Marcelino Street. ISSUE: W/N the easement has been extinguished by nonuser and by the cessation of the necessity for a passageway. HELD: No, there is no proof of nonuser. Benedicto merely assumes that the passageway had not been in use because the property of Heras has since gained direct access to San Marcelino Street with the demolition of his house. Even if the period of prescription for nonuser is 10 years, Benedictos testimony shows that the passageway was walled in by constructing a fence when the prescriptive period has not yet elapsed. There was also presumptive renunciation by Heras of the use of the passageway. The easement is a vehicular passageway and there is an obvious need for such to the rear portion of the projected apartment building. The easement is also perpetual in character and was annotated on all the TCTs issued in the series of transfers from Henrick. There is no mutual agreement to discontinue or obliterate the easement, therefore, the continued existence of the easement must be respected and upheld.

12. TANEDO VS. BERNAD FACTS: Cardenas owns 2 contiguous lands (Lot 7501-A) in Cebu which he inherited from Lourdes Cardenas. An apartment is constructed on Lot 7501-A while a four-door apartment, a two-storey house, a bodega and a septic tank for common use are built on Lot 7501-B. A small portion of the apartment also stands on Lot 7501-B. Tanedo bought Lot 7501-A. Cardenas mortgaged Lot 7501-B to Tanedo as security for a P10,000 loan. Cardenas further agreed to sell Lot 7501-B to Tanedo in case he should decide to sell it as the septic tank services Lot 7501A and the apartment building has a part standing in Lot 7501-B. This was confirmed in a letter where Cardenas asked Tanedo not to deduct the loan from the purchase price of Lot 7501-A because as agreed, Lot 7501-B will be sold to Tanedo. Cardenas however sold Lot B to Spouses Sim. Tanedo offered to redeem the property but Sim refused. Sim blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building of Tanedo on Lot A to the septic tank in Lot B and asked Tanedo to remove the portion of the apartment standing on Lot B. Tanedo filed an action for legal redemption and damages with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction before RTC Cebu against Spouses Sim, Cardenas, RD of Cebu and Banco Cebuano, Cebu City Devt Bank. ISSUE: W/N Tanedo has the right to use the septic tank. HELD: Yes, his right did not ceased upon subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners. The alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is not one of the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of the easement is continued by operation of law. Art. 624 of the NCC provides that the existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained by the owner of both shall be considered as title, should either of them be alienated in order that the easement may continue actively and passively. There is no statement abolishing the easement of drainage and the use of the drain pipe and septic tank in the deed of sale between Tanedo and Cardenas. The use is continued by operation of law and the Spouses Sim cannot impair the use of the servitude.

13. ALCANTARA VS. RETA FACTS: Plaintiffs Alcantara et al. filed with RTC of Davao a complaint against respondent Reta for the exercise of the right of right of first refusal under PD 1517, injunction with preliminary injunction, attorneys fees and nullity of amicable settlement. Plaintiffs claimed that they were legitimate tenants or lessees of the land in Brgy. Saasa owned by Reta. The land was converted into a commercial center and Reta is threatening to eject them from the land. They assert that they have the right of first refusal to purchase the land in accordance with Section 3(g) of PD 1517. They also claimed that the amicable settlement bet. Reta and Roble is void ab initio for being violative of the PD. Reta claimed that the land is not under PD 1517 because it has not been proclaimed as an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). The trial court ordered the plaintiffs to pay Reta unpaid rentals. The CA affirmed this decision. ISSUE: W/N petitioners have the right of first refusal. HELD: No, they dont. The area has not been proclaimed an ULRZ. Petitioners filed a petition requesting that the land be declared ULRZ. This request is not necessary had the land been a ULRZ in the first place. Petitioners cannot claim any right therefore. There is no lease agreement. There was, instead, a usufruct that allowed Roble (one of the petitioners) to use 62 coconut trees for P186 from where he gathered tuba. Roble was allowed to construct his house on the land because it would facilitate his gathering of tuba. This is a personal easement under Art. 614 of the NCC. Whether the amicable settlement is valid or not, the conclusion would still be the same. Petitioner Roble is not a legitimate tenant under PD 1517. Reta admitted that he had verbal agreements with the other petitioners but notwithstanding this fact, they are still not legitimate tenants who can exercise the right of refusal under PD 1517.