Personality and Social Psychology Review 2000, Vol. 4, No.

3, 255277

Copyright 2000 by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

A Rose by Any Name? The Values Construct

Meg J. Rohan
School of Psychology University of New South Wales Definitional inconsistency has been epidemic in values theory and research. An abbreviated review of values-related theory and research is provided, and 5 aspects of the values construct that may have contributed to this inconsistency and the resulting lack of synthesis are discussed. A proposal for the process by which value priorities influence attitudinal and behavioral decisions also is outlined. Attitudinal and behavioral decisions are shown to be traceable to personal value priorities, although the link is indirect. The importance of 4 constructs in this process is highlighted. In the past, personal value systems, social value systems, worldviews, and ideologies each may have been given the generic label values.
When I use a word, Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, it means just what I choose it to meanneither more nor less. The question is, said Alice, whether you can make words mean different things. The question is, said Humpty Dumpty, which is to be masterthats all. (Carroll, 1865/1966, p. 185)

Important theorists in a variety of fields have emphasized the importance of peoples value priorities in understanding and predicting attitudinal and behavioral decisions. For example, Gordon Allport (1961) suggested that value priorities were the dominating force in life (p. 543) because they directed all of a persons activity toward their realization. Elsewhere, Allport (1955) berated psychologists for failing to consider that peoples value priorities influence their perception of reality (p. 89). Allports reprimand remains relevant even now because value theory and research are at the fringe of the field. For example, no discussion of value theory appears in a sample of introductory social psychology and personality textbooks published in this decade (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 1997; Baron & Byrne, 1997; Burger, 1997; Carducci, 1998; Cloninger, 1996; Hewstone, Stroebe, & Stephenson, 1996; Liebert & Liebert, 1998; Myers, 1996; Pervin, 1996; E. R. Smith & Mackie, 1995). Although Allports enthusiasm for the construct lost its influence with the rise of behaviorism (behaviorists would have looked with disfavor at this unobservable
Preparation of this article was supported in part by an Australian Research Council Small Grant to Meg Rohan. Thanks to Mark Zanna, David A. Kenny, Felicia Pratto, and Shalom Schwartz for their insightful comments and suggestions. Requests for reprints should be sent to Meg J. Rohan, School of Psychology, The University of New South Wales, Sydney 2052, Australia. E-mail: m.rohan@unsw.edu.au.

construct), it does not explain why enthusiastic attention to the values construct has not been revived now that there is a willingness to discuss and investigate other latent constructs such as schemas (e.g., Reich & Weary, 1998) and working models (e.g., Mikulincer, 1998). Or, does the values construct exist in contemporary research under other names? The status of values theory and research suffers because the word values is open to abuse and overuse by nonpsychologists and psychologists alike. For example, consider politicians (and others) moaning about the erosion of family values. What do they mean by family values? Peopleincluding psychologists, anthropologists, political scientists, and sociologistsseem to use the word values in Humpty Dumpty fashion: They make it mean just what they choose it to mean. However, the problem is not new. Adler (1956), for example, suggested that as a result of definitional confusion, the emphasis on values has slowed down the advancement of the social sciences rather than furthered it (p. 279). One popular strategy for settling confusion is to invent new names for the construct. Clyde Kluckhohn (1951), whom Levitin (1968) described as having offered one of the most comprehensive analyses of the values construct, described the result of this strategy:
Reading the voluminous, and often vague and diffuse, literature on the subject in the various fields of learning, one finds values considered as attitudes, motivations, objects, measurable quantities, substantive areas of behavior, affect-laden customs or traditions, and relationships such as those between individuals, groups, objects, events. (C. K. M. Kluckhohn, 1951, p. 390)

M. B. Smith (1969) also bemoaned the proliferation of concepts akin to values that were labeled, for example, 255

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as core attitudes or sentiments, preferences, cathexes, and valences (p. 98). D. T. Campbell (1963) provided a list of 76 concepts that included value, attitude, and motive to illustrate that superficially quite dissimilar terminologies may be describing essentially the same facts and processes (pp. 100101). D. T. Campbell (1963) suggested that the common characteristic of these concepts was that each could be viewed as coordinators of behavior. However, conceptualizing the abstract, trans-situational, implicit nature of these fundamental coordinators of behavior is difficult. The purpose of this article is to review briefly work in the area of values, to propose a definition of the values construct that distinguishes it from other related constructs, and to propose a process by which value priorities coordinate peoples attitudinal and behavioral decisions. In tracing the link between value priorities and decisions, I highlight the importance of two constructsworldviews and ideologiesthat are often labeled as values. Before presenting this proposal, I discuss aspects of the values construct that are at the heart of definitional diversity and confusion.

the goodness or badness of the stimuli in their environments (a drive to evaluate, Festinger, 1954; see also Pratto, 1994). Norman Feathers (1996) comment sheds light on what may be taking place in the valuing process: We relate possible actions and outcomes within particular situations to our value systems, testing them against our general conceptions about what we believe is desirable or undesirable in terms of our own value priorities (p. 224). Perhaps as a result of the lack of theoretical (and empirical) attention to the valuing process itself, programs designed to change peoples value priorities (e.g., the value self-confrontation method; Rokeach, 1973) have met with limited success, and long-term changes are disappointingly rare (e.g., see Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996). Investigation of the valuing process may benefit from work such as Tetlocks (1986) examinations of ideological reasoning and work on the processing of information (e.g., the heuristicsystematic model and the elaboration likelihood model; see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Value as a noun. A dilemma that early values theorists and researchers faced was whether values (noun) should be investigated from the perspective of the entity being evaluated (e.g., How much value does the entity have?) or from the perspective of the person doing the valuing (e.g., What does this person value?; see Feather, 1975, p. 3, for a discussion of this point). However, this issue essentially has been settled: Contemporary values theorists investigate the values construct from the perspective of the person who evaluates the entities in his or her environment, and they seek to measure peoples priorities on various values in an effort to understand the underlying motivations of peoples responses to their environments (see Rohan & Zanna, in press). An aid to peoples constant evaluation of the stimuli in their environments (value as a verb) would be a cognitive structure in which information about past evaluations could be collected (see Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992). This information, if organized, then could serve as a kind of analogical principle to use in evaluating and imbuing meaning to newly encountered objects and events. Humans ability to use analogy to imbue meaning and coherence to their experiences is highly developed. Indeed, some cognitive scientists (e.g., Holyoak & Thagard, 1995, 1997; Thagard & Shelley, in press) have considered it so much a part of human experience that they have used computer simulations to demonstrate the ease with which analogies are used. Because these analogical principles are relevant across situations and time, they may be what are generally referred to as values (noun). The values construct described this way, then, seems not unlike schemata that were defined by Bartlett (1932) as being active organizations of past experience (p. 201).

At the Heart of the Confusion? Five Aspects of the Values Construct Aspect 1: Nouns and Verbs Use of the word value as a noun is recorded in the Compact Oxford English Dictionary (1991) as early as 1303, to refer to the fairness and equivalence of the amount of a commodity in an exchange, and in 1398 to mean a standard of estimation. Use of value as a verb is registered at a similar time, to describe the act of appraising the worthin terms of its appropriateness for exchangeof a commodity. However, its meaning was later expanded to incorporate more abstract exchanges and standards. Thomas and Znanieki (1918/1958) focused on this latter meaning in their famous The Polish Peasant work. Value as a verb. The use of value as a verb implies that some higher level evaluation has taken place. When people say that they value (verb) a thing, person, action, or activity, they are expressing a deeper meaning associated with that entity. So, they do not simply like the entity; they feel that it is good (the meaning of good is discussed later) and relates to or somehow expresses their underlying values (noun). The link between peoples liking for an entity and their value priorities has been demonstrated empirically (see Feather, 1995; see also Feather, 1982s). Little specific attention has been paid to the valuing process, but it has been suggested, for example, that people chronically and effortlessly engage in ascertaining 256

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Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) found that five features of the values construct are recurrently mentioned in the values literature: that the values construct concerns (a) beliefs, (b) desirable end states or behaviors, (c) trans-situational guides, (d) selection and evaluation of behavior and events, and (e) the relative ordering of beliefs, desirable end states or behavior, or guides. These features are all consistent with the suggestion that the value system is a stable meaning-producing superordinate cognitive structure. Considering its analogical nature, the value system may provide the basic architecture of what has been referred to as the narrative mode of human understanding that deals in human or human-like intention and action and the vicissitudes and consequences that mark their course (Bruner, 1986, p. 13; see also McAdams, 1999). The value system also may provide organization for what Hazel Markus (1977) and her colleagues (e.g., Fong &Markus, 1982) have investigated as self-schemata. It is a well-supported suggestion that value systems are cognitive structures, and often it is implied in value definitions (see Table 1 for a selection of definitions) and in explanations about the function of value systems. For example, this suggestion is implied in Allports (1961) contention that value systems were schemata of comprehensibility (p. 544) and in C. K. M. Kluckhohns (1951) answer to the question Why are there values?: Because without value systems individuals could not get what they want and need from other individuals in personal and emotional terms, nor could they feel within themselves the requisite measure of order and unified purpose (p. 400). Others have stated it more clearly. For example, Rokeach
Table 1. A Selection of Values Definitions
Theorist Lewin (1952, p. 41)

(1968) suggested that value priorities occupy central positions in cognitive networks of attitudes and beliefs. Feather (1971, 1980, 1999) also clearly described the cognitive structure status of value systems and described them as abstract structures or associative networks. However, he highlighted an important featurethat the networks are linked to the affective system. As a result, these abstract structuresorganized summaries of experienceprovide continuity and meaning under changing environmental circumstances (Feather, 1980, p. 249). Silvan Tomkinss (e.g., 1979) script theory seems relevant. Tomkins suggested that from the earliest weeks of life, humans store scenes containing at least one affect and one object of that affect (see Carlson, 1981). These scenes are collected into scripts so that sense can be made of the relations among various scenes. An assumption implicit in discussions of affective links to value systems is that people will be motivated to engage in situations that are similar to other situations that resulted in positive affect (or an absence of negative affect), to be with people who enable positive affect (or minimize negative affect), and to behave in ways that will produce positive affect (or reduce negative affect). These motivations may then produce what Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) described as the motivational goals that underlie value prioritiespeople may have preferences for particular types of emotion (and there is some indirect evidence for this; see work on self-regulatory focus by Higgins, e.g., 1997). For example, according to Schwartz and Bilsky (e.g., 1987) the defining goal of self-direction values is independent thought and action; thinking and behaving in independent ways may provide feelings that can be described as positively

Definition Values influence behavior but have not the character of a goal (i.e., of a force field). For example, the individual does not try to reach the value of fairness, but fairness is guiding his behavior. It is probably correct to say that values determine which types of activity have a positive and which have a negative valence for an individual in a given situation. In other words, values are not force fields but they induce force fields. That means values are constructs that have the same psychological dimension as power fields. A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable that influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of actions. We shall use the term value as meaning the property of an entity (x has values) or as meaning a class of entities (x is a value) with the connotation of being objectively positive in some way. A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence. I regard values as beliefs about desirable or undesirable ways of behaving or about the desirability or otherwise of general goals. I define values as desirable transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity. I define values as conceptions of the desirable that guide the way social actors (e.g., organizational leaders, policy-makers, individual persons) select actions, evaluate people and events, and explain their actions and evaluations.

C. K. M. Kluckhohn (1951, p. 395)

Heider (1958, p. 223) Rokeach (1973, p. 5)

Feather (1996, p. 222) Schwartz (1994, p. 21) Schwartz (1999, p. 24)

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valenced, high arousal (e.g., excited, elated). The defining goal of security values is stated as safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self; behaving in ways that enable such safety, harmony, and security may provide a feeling that can be described as positively valenced, low arousal (e.g., calm, relaxed; see Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1998, for an affect structure model in which the distinction between high and low arousal is described). Feathers (e.g., 1999) suggestion that some value types may be relatively undifferentiated with a limited network of associations, whereas others have a high degree of differentiation with a complex network of associations, may provide direction for further research into the development of values and value change. The importance of particular value types may be driven by repeated confirmation of particular entityoutcome sequences. Repeated disconfirmation of such sequences may stimulate modification, and the provision of experiences (either direct or vicarious) may build up the entityoutcome sequences in less elaborated value types. Values versus attitudes. When the values construct is viewed in terms of an abstract meaning-producing cognitive structure, the divide between value priorities and evaluations of specific entities seems wide indeed. However, people not only use the words I value in talking about their evaluations of specific or tangible entities, they also use them in describing their evaluations of abstract trans-situational guides. For example, people not only may say I value that ring but also may say I value security. The problem is that security can be labeled as a value, but it seems inappropriate to label a persons attachment to a ring as a value. The term attitude may provide a temporary solution to the problem of the abstractness or specificity of peoples judgments. Allport (e.g., 1935), as well as others (e.g., see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), used the word attitude to describe specific judgments as well as abstract judgments that could be labeled as values. However, attitudes that have some kind of value-related implication are often discussed in terms of having an ego defensive function (e.g., Katz, 1960; Ostrom & Brock, 1968, 1969; Sherif & Cantril, 1947; M.B. Smith, Bruner, & White, 1956; see also Johnson & Eagly, 1990). Work by David Sears and his colleagues on symbolic racism (e.g., Sears & Kinder, 1985) and work by Mark Zanna and his colleagues (e.g., Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Zanna, Haddock, & Esses, 1990; see also Biernat, Vescio, Theno, & Crandall, 1996) in which the violation of symbolic beliefs was found to be an important factor in prejudiced attitudes can be viewed as another perspective on the value-related implications of attitudes. Although the term attitude has remained popular (e.g., see the much-quoted passage in Allport, 1935, p. 258

798), empirical focus on the values construct has become somewhat obscured. To allow the values construct a chance to come back into the limelight, I propose that the term attitude is used only for evaluations of specific entities. The term values then can be reserved for discussions of abstract trans-situational guides. Already, this seems to be the convention in discussions of what are labeled value-expressive attitudes (e.g., see Maio & Olson, 2000a, 2000b). Summary. Used as a verb, value refers to the process of ascertaining the merit of an entity with reference to an abstract value system structure. Used as a noun, value refers to the result of this process. These value judgments may be formed or amended when people encounter new entities or existing judgments are challenged. Rather than use attitude to refer to evaluations of either specific or more abstract entities, I propose that attitude is reserved for describing evaluations of specific entities. In view of the conceptualization of the value system as an affectively charged cognitive structure, more attention to affect value system links seems warranted.

Aspect 2: Values, Value Types, Value Priorities, and Value Systems Not only is the word values used in reference to peoples value priorities and the organization of those value priorities, their value systems, it is also used to describe judgments and categories of judgments. For example, broad-mindedness is a judgment that concerns acceptance of diversity, and self-direction refers to a category of judgments that concern independence and free thinking. The ensuing confusion not only leads to misunderstandings and misinterpretations but also obscures an important assumption that has been characteristic of all value theories and for which there is now empirical support: Although people differ in terms of their value priorities, the structure of the human value system is universal (e.g., Schwartz, 1992, 1994, 1996). That is, people differ only in terms of the relative importance they place on a set of universally important value types. The assumption that value system structure is universal may be lost in phrases such as people attach great importance to their values (Maio & Olson, 1998, p. 294) that are meant to describe peoples tendency to defend their value priorities. It also may be lost in discussions of how children acquire values (i.e., how childrens value priorities undergo change; see Grusec & Kuczynski, 1997). A review of value theories is presented next to provide an overview of past and contemporary focus on the value system, value types, and value priorities.

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Early value theories. In general, early theorists focused on individual differences in the organization of some universally relevant set of human features. For example, Alexander Shand (1896, 1914) proposed a theory of character in which different configurations in the organization of sentiments (a concept somewhat consistent with the values construct) resulted in differences in peoples attitudinal and behavioral responses to the world. Eduard Spranger (1928), a philosopher who also focused on organization, suggested that six attitudes (i.e., value types) were present in everyone in different proportions with one dominating. So, for example, Spranger suggested that for the self-affirming rhetorician, political value priorities dominated, whereas economic value priorities dominated the practical type. Sprangers (1928) work inspired the first (1931) version of the Study of Values instrument (Allport, Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960). This instrument provided an indication of the relative priorities people placed on the six value types by measuring the effect of peoples value priorities on their answers to questions. The Study of Values instrument was one of the most popular measures of human value priorities for many years. Also guided by the assumption that a value system contains a finite number of universally relevant value types on which people place relative importance, Morris (1956) presented people with 13 ways to live and asked them to rate each of the descriptive paragraphs to show how much they liked or disliked each of them (see Dempsey & Dukes, 1966, for a shortened, revised version). Morris (1956) found that five general value types were contained in the ways to live descriptions (see pp. 3234): social restraint and self-control, enjoyment and progress in action, withdrawal and self-sufficiency, receptivity and sympathetic concern, and self-indulgence (or sensuous enjoyment). Each way seems to describe the implications of a high priority on one value for priorities on other values. For example, the following way can be viewed as a description of the effects that a high priority on hedonistic values has for other value priorities:
Life is something to be enjoyedsensuously enjoyed, enjoyed with relish and abandonment. The aim in life should not be to control the course of the world or society or the lives of others, but to be open and receptive to things and personas, and to delight in them. Life is more a festival than a workshop or a school for moral discipline. To let oneself go, to let things and persons affect oneself, is more important than to door to do good. Such enjoyment, however, requires that one be self-centered enough to be keenly aware of what is happening and free for new happenings. So one should avoid entanglements, should not be too dependent on particular people or things, should not be self-sacrificing; one should be alone a lot, should have time for med-

itation and awareness of oneself. Solitude and sociality together are both necessary in the good life. (Morris, 1956, p. 16)

In measurement terms, Morris can be viewed as being ahead of his timehis approach has been labeled the prototype approach and it has been used, for example, in assessing attachment style (e.g., see Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994), parenting style (Rohan & Zanna, 1996), and self-esteem (Rohan, 2000). The logic of this approach is that people in general (both novices and experts) primarily understand the world by assessing diverse configurations of characteristics and comparing this assessment with a prototype (see Broughton, Boyes, & Mitchell, 1993; Cantor, Smith, French, & Mezzich, 1980; Mayer & Bower, 1986; Setterlund & Niedenthal, 1993).

Rokeachs (1973) value theory. Milton Rokeach (1973)who has been accorded the major credit for providing an impetus for values research after behaviorisms heyday (see Mayton, Ball-Rokeach, & Loges, 1994)used a somewhat different approach to measurement. He named values, briefly explained their meaning, and asked people to arrange the value words in order of importance to YOU, as guiding principles in YOUR life (e.g., Rokeach, 1973, p. 27). There were two types of value words in the list: goals (terminal values) and modes of conduct (instrumental values). The list of goals included such things as a comfortable life (a prosperous life) and self-respect (self-esteem), and the mode of conduct list included such things as broad-minded (open-minded), forgiving (willing to pardon others), and helpful (working for the welfare of others) (see Rokeach, 1973, pp. 359361). Respondents then arranged the list of value words in terms of the relative importance they placed on them. The set of values named was created on the basis of intuition (see Rokeach, 1973, p. 30) and was meant to be a reasonably comprehensive sample of possible human values. However, Braithwaite and Law (1985) identified four omissions in this list: values relating to physical development and well-being (e.g., physical fitness, good health), individual rights (e.g., privacy, dignity), thriftiness (e.g., care with money, taking advantage of opportunities), and carefreeness (acting on impulse, spontaneity). Nevertheless, Rokeachs (1973) list of value words was produced with the assumption that all men everywhere possess the same values to different degrees (p. 3). Incidentally, Schwartz (e.g., 1992) was unable to find support for the usefulness of the terminalinstrumental distinction. Since its development, the Rokeach Value Survey (Rokeach, 1973) has been perhaps the most popular method of measuring value priorities. Unfortunately, 259

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no theory about the underlying value system structure was proposed, and therefore the Rokeach Value Survey is essentially a list of unconnected value words. Without a theory about underlying value system structure, it is impossible to understand the consequences of high priorities on one value type for priorities on other value types (see Schwartz, 1996, for further discussion of the problems that result when an integrated system of value priorities is not considered). Attention to the consequences of one value priority for other value priorities surely is critical to understanding patterns of responses that seem, at first glance, to be unrelated. Such attention may be important for understanding consistency in response patterns. Response consistency already has received a huge amount of theoretical and empirical attention (e.g., see Aronson, 1969, 1992; Festinger, 1957). Schwartzs (e.g., 1992) value theory. Schwartz and Bilsky (e.g., 1987, 1990) developed a theory about value system structure by focusing on the motivational concern embodied in each value. They revived the assumption that people differ only in the relative importance they place on a universally important set of value types, and because they focused on the motivational goal each value type embodies, the implications of priorities on one value type for priorities on others within an integrated system could be proposed. In a revision of the original theory, Schwartz (1992) suggested that two motivational dimensions structure the value system. These are cast in terms of conflicts, and the two dimensions can be understood in terms of two fundamental human problems that need to be solved (Rohan, 1998; see also F. R. Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961, who suggested there were five fundamental human problems). One dimension, labeled openness to changeconservation, relates to the conflict between being motivated to follow their own intellectual and emotional interests in unpredictable and uncertain directions or to preserve the status quo and the certainty it provides in relationships with close others, institutions, and traditions (Schwartz, 1992, p. 43). The second dimension, labeled self-enhancementself-transcendence, relates to the conflict between concern for the consequences of own and others actions for the self and concern for the consequences of own and others actions in the social context. Ten value types are arranged along these two dimensions (see Table 2 for definitions and representative values for each type): power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, conformity, tradition, and security. In Figure 1, the location of these value types along the two dimensions is shown. New labels for these two dimensions are provided. Use of these labels not only may avoid evaluative misinterpretation (e.g., it may 260

seem that openness to change is somehow better than conservation) but also may direct attention to the myriad of ways in which these motivations can be expressed. For example, the funky-looking new wave aromatherapist who adheres religiously to his or her regime of essential oil applications may well be motivated by a focus on organization rather than on opportunity (the conservation end of the openness to changeconservation dimension); the osteopath who relishes in his or her status as a miracle worker may be strongly motivated by his or her focus on individual outcomes rather than on social context outcomes (the self-enhancement end of the self-enhancementselftranscendence dimension). The focus on the individualsocial context outcomes dimension (i.e., the self-enhancementself-transcendence dimension) may reflect peoples beliefs about human nature (see Wrightsman, 1991): People who have a greater focus on social context outcomes than on individual outcomes may believe that humans are essentially good, whereas people who have a greater focus on individual outcomes than on social context outcomes may be less positive about others essential goodness (Schwartz has made similar suggestions, e.g., personal communication, April 3, 1999). Indirect support for this suggestion was provided by de St. Aubin (1996), who found that people who were highly humanistic were more likely to report high priorities on values that Schwartz (e.g., 1992) classified as relevant to the social context outcomes end of the individualsocial context outcomes dimension (e.g., broad-mindedness, world of beauty; see Table 2). The focus on the opportunityorganization dimension (i.e., the openness to changeconservation dimension) seems conceptually similar (or even identical) to the Big Five personality factor Openness to Experience as described and discussed by McCrae (1996). According to McCrae, this factor is best understood as a fundamental way of approaching the world that affects not only internal experience but also interpersonal interactions and social behavior (p. 323). The focus on the opportunityorganization dimension also may relate to temperament (Rohan, 1998; see also Kochanska & Thompson, 1997, who discuss its role in childrens internalization of parental values). For example, on the basis of their response to novelty, Kagan and his colleagues (e.g, Kagan, Reznick, & Gibbons, 1989) identified what seems to be a stable temperament style; it may be expected that those who focus on opportunity will be less anxious in response to novelty than will those who focus on organization. Links between the focus on the opportunityorganization dimension and what Carol Dweck and her colleagues (e.g., Dweck & Leggett, 1988) described in terms of incremental self-theories (personal attributes are relatively malleable) and entity self-theories (personal at-

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Table 2. Value Types, Definitions, and Representative Values (See, e.g., Schwartz, 1992, 1996)
Value Types and Definitions Power: Social Status and Prestige, Control or Dominance Over People and Resources. Representative Values Social power: Control over others, dominance. Authority: The right to lead or command. Wealth: Material possessions, money. Success: Achieving goals. Capability: Competence, effectiveness, efficiency. Ambition: Hard work, aspirations. Influence: Have an impact on people and events. Pleasure: Gratification of desires. Enjoyment in life: Enjoyment of food, sex, leisure, and so on. Daringness: Adventure-seeking, risktaking. A varied life: Filled with challenge, novelty, change. An exciting life: Stimulating experiences. Creativity: Uniqueness, imagination. Freedom: Freedom of action and thought. Independence: Self-reliance, self-sufficiency. Curiosity: Interest in everything, exploration. Choose own goals: Select own purposes. Broadminded: Tolerant of different ideas and beliefs. Wisdom: A mature understanding of life. Social justice: Correcting injustice, care for the weak. Equality: Equal opportunity for all. A world at peace: Free of war and conflict. A world of beauty: Beauty of nature and the arts. Unity with nature: Fitting into nature. Protecting the environment: Preserving nature. Helpful: Working for the welfare of others. Honesty: Genuineness, sincerity. Forgivingness: Willingness to pardon others. Loyalty: Faithful to my friends, group. Responsibility: Dependable, reliable. Humility: Modesty, self-effacement. Acceptance of my portion in life: Submission to lifes circumstances. Devotion: Hold to religious faith and belief. Respect for tradition: Preservation of time-honored customs. Moderate: Avoiding extremes of feeling or action. Politeness: Courtesy, good manners. Obedience: Dutiful, meet obligations. Self-discipline: Self-restraint, resistance to temptation. Honor parents and elders: Showing respect. Family security: Safety for loved ones. National security: Protection of my nation from enemies. Social order: Stability of society. Cleanliness: Neatness, tidiness. Reciprocation of favors: Avoidance of indebtedness.

Achievement: Personal Success Through Demonstrating Competence According to Social Standards.

Hedonism: Pleasure and Sensuous Gratification for Oneself.

Stimulation: Excitement, Novelty, and Challenge in Life.

Self-Direction: Independent Thought and Action-Choosing, Creating, Exploring.

Universalism: Understanding, Appreciation, Tolerance, and Protection for the Welfare of all People and for Nature.

Benevolence: Preservation and Enhancement of the Welfare of People With Whom One is in Frequent Personal Contact.

Tradition: Respect, Commitment, and Acceptance of the Customs and Ideas That Traditional Culture or Religion Provide the Self.

Conformity: Restraint of Actions, Inclinations, and Impulses Likely to Upset or Harm Others and Violate Social Expectations or Norms.

Security: Safety, Harmony, and Stability of Society, of Relationships, and of Self.

tributes are relatively fixed) also could be explored. Further, the promotion versus prevention self-regulatory focus proposed by Tory Higgins (1997) also seems somewhat consistent with the focus on the opportunityorganization dimension (see Rohan & Zanna, 1998, for a discussion of the links between value priorities and self-regulatory focus).

Identification of the underlying value system structure allowed Schwartz (1992) to specify the relations among the value types in the value system: Peoples priorities on adjacent value types will be similar, whereas maximum differences in priorities will occur when value types are opposite each other. For example, because human rights activists are likely to have high pri261

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Figure 1. Location of 10 value types in a two-dimensional space.

orities on equality valuesthese are representative of the universalism value typethey are likely also to have high priorities on self-direction because universalism and self-direction are adjacent in the system. Further, because the power value type is in direct opposition to universalism, activists lowest value priorities are likely to be on power. Thus, activists very negative reaction to a show of police strength and power at a street rally could be predicted. According to Schwartz (1996), value priorities are responses to three universal requirements of human existence: biological needs, requisites for coordinated social interaction, and demands of group survival and functioning (p. 2). As mentioned earlier, this comment highlights the assumption that has been characteristic of value theories: All of the value types in the human value system are important in some way to human functioningotherwise, why would they be part of the universally shared value system structure? The relative importance people place on each value type reflects their choices about what they are prepared to lose a little of to gain a little more of something else. For example, although all people are likely to see the positive aspects of adhering to traditional standards, the structure of the value system (see Figure 1) is such that to have higher priorities on a tradition value type means lower priorities on stimulation and hedonism value types: less excitement in exchange for predictability. Measurement of value priorities is in the style of the Rokeach Value Survey (Rokeach, 1973). In the Schwartz Value Inventory (Schwartz, 1996), respondents are asked to rate the importance (after choosing 262

the two most important and two least important value words to provide an anchor for ratings) of 44 value words (see Table 2) that relate to the 10 value types in the value system. Summary. To avoid confusion, use of the terms value priority, value type, and value system is encouraged to clarify the assumption (which has theoretical support) that all humans have a value system that contains a finite number of universally important value types, but differ in terms of the relative importance they place on each of these value typespeoples value prioritiescan be kept clearly in mind. The Schwartz value theory (1992) is a contribution to understanding not only the components of the human value system but also how people differ in terms of the dynamic organization of value priorities on the 10 value types contained in the value system. Value-neutral labels for the two motivational dimensions described in the Schwartz theory as structuring the value systemfocus on individual outcomesfocus on social context outcomes, and focus on opportunityfocus on organizationwere proposed, and links between these dimensions and other constructs were highlighted. Aspect 3: Value Priorities Are a Function of What Type of Judgments? Braithwaite and Scott (1991) cast this problem in terms of the controversy about whether value priorities are conceptions of the desirable (what people ought to do) and the desired (what people want to do). They

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suggested that this question had been settled, and there was some consensus that value priorities concerned the desired rather than the desirable. However, Schwartz and Bilskys (1987) value definition can be viewed in terms of both the desired and the desirable: They described the values construct in terms of the cognitive representations of three types of universal human requirements: biologically based needs of the organism, social interactional demands for interpersonal coordination, and social institutional demands for group welfare and survival (p. 551). Thus, peoples value priorities can be viewed in terms of people doing what they ought because they want to survive in their social environments. But, do people want to do more than simply survive? The question of what value priorities are judgments of seems to require further attention. Values as guides for survival. If peoples value priorities are viewed in terms of survival in the social environment (i.e., in terms of satisfying requirements of existence), it is difficult to explain why people will ignore their personal safety to behave in ways they feel are consistent with their value priorities. For example, consider the person with high priorities on benevolence or universalism (see Table 2) who, as discussed earlier, can be understood in terms of a greater focus on social context outcomes than on individual outcomes. She or he may do as the unidentified passenger did in 1982 when he altruistically passed the helicopter winch to others so that they could escape the freezing Washington River after their plane crashed (Kelly, 1982): provide others with a means of survival to his or her own detriment. Or, consider people who embrace a religion and likely have high priorities on tradition (see Schwartz, 1992), who would rather die than give up their religion. Patrick Henrys proclamation, Give me liberty or give me death, provides another example. When people give up their lives to uphold their value priorities, they make exceptionally strong statements that without this entity, life is not worth living. Value priorities surely are more than survival guides. Values as guides for goodness. Returning to the notion that value priorities concern the ought rather than want, value priorities may provide guides for goodness. The ability to live by such guides rather than simple drives has been discussed at length as the feature that separates animals from humans (e.g., see Tomkins, 1962), and some believe that humans essentially strive to be moral or ethical (e.g., Aronson, 1992; Kagan, 1999). Therefore, value priorities provide the principles for moral and ethical living (e.g., Hart, 1962). However, judgments of goodness are idiosyncratic (e.g., see Ichheiser, 1949; Kendler, 1993). In 1644, Spinoza (1644/1985) explained the idiosyncratic nature of the judgment of goodness: From all this, then,

it is clear that we neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it, and desire it (Postulate IX, p. 160). Spinozas wisdom leads to a suggestion for the integration of the ought and want aspects of value priorities in a way that reference to disputable notions of good can be avoided. Often in early research, what was good and moral was assumed to be consensual (e.g., see Peck & Havinghurst, 1960, who focused on character development). Roger Brown (1965) provided an example in which people generally might not agree about the goodness and badness of particular types of people: He reported that in 1938, a psychologist (E. R. Jaensch), who was also a Nazi supporter, discovered an ideal type (the J-Type) who would make a good Nazi party member because he (and presumably she) would recognize that human behavior is fixed by blood, soil and national tradition (Brown, 1965, p. 478) and an anti-type who would be an irritant to the Nazi cause as a result of liberal views that the environment and education were the determinants of behavior. Value priorities as guides to best possible living. The ought and want aspects can be integrated if value priorities are viewed as evidencing the dynamic organization of judgments about the capacity of entities (i.e., things, people, actions, activities) to enable best possible living. This means (consistent with arguments made by many theorists and researchers) that people are not simply driven to satisfy their basic survival needs (e.g., see Lee, 1948) or to avoid pain (e.g., see Higgins, 1997, 1998) but are driven to live as pleasantly and productively as possible. This proposal is grounded in the Aristotelian (Aristotle, circa 350 BCE/1980) wisdom that eudaimonia is the ultimate human goal. The Greek word eudaimonia has been misleadingly translated as happiness. However, by eudaimonia, Aristotle meant human flourishing (i.e., actualizing potential) rather than mere positive affect. This point was taken up by Waterman (1993), who translated eudaimonia as personal expressiveness, linked it to optimal psychological functioning, and successfully distinguished between two conceptions of happiness: Aristotles eudaimonia and hedonic enjoyment. According to Aristotle, flourishing is the ultimate goal towards which all human action is directed (see Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1, Section VII, Aristotle, circa 350 BCE/1980). Value priorities can provide guides for living the best way possible. The value system, therefore, can be understood as concerning the aspects of the environment to which humans must pay attention. This is consistent with the idea, discussed earlier, that the two motivational dimensions structuring the value system concern the two fundamental human problems humans must solve. 263

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Peoples failure to distinguish between wants and survival needs may reflect their value priorities. So, by saying I need rather than I want, a person may be expressing that an object is somehow related to his or her high priorities on a particular value type. Consider, for example, I need a new car. People with high priorities on the power value type (defined in terms of a motivation toward social status and prestige; see Table 2) may see a new car as absolutely necessary to maintain their social superiority. To these people, losing their social superiority would mean feeling unable to live the best way possible. Although people may be motivated to live the best way possible, a multitude of personal and environmental constraints mean that people do not always behave in ways consistent with their value priorities. Furthermore, because people generally use what has been described as the fast and frugal satisficing strategy labeled the take the best strategy (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996)they may not always make decisions that lead to best possible living. Peoples evaluations of their progress in negotiating their social environment in a way that enables them to adhere to their value priorities, that is, their progress in living the best way possible, can be understood as the evaluation that underlies self-esteem (see Rohan, 2000, in which self-esteem is described as resulting from an estimate of personal progress in living the best way possible). Ordering the importance of requirements and desires. From this perspective, the value system can be viewed as providing a way to order which requirements or desires are more or less important to best possible living. So, for example, people who have high priorities on tradition and conformity value types can be viewed as having judged that best possible living means that personal desires are less important than the requirements of being a cooperative group member. In contrast, people who have high priorities on the hedonism value type can be viewed as having judged that best possible living means that personal desires are more important than are the requirements of group membership. Psychologists have described humans psychological requirements at length. For example, Aronson (1992) suggested that people strive to view themselves in three ways: as competent, predictable and consistent, and moral. Other basic human needs have been discussed. For example, the need for relatedness always has been a popular topic (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Bowlby, 1969). What these things mean to people, and the primacy of each, are likely to be dictated by peoples value priorities. For example, morality to a person who has high priorities on tradition may mean following traditional practice, whereas it may mean being true to oneself to someone who has high 264

priorities on self-direction. Though this may be a universal human requirement, peoples value priorities may dictate the primacy of relatedness over other human requirements. So, for example, the need for relatedness may be primary for those who have high priorities on value types motivated by a focus on social context outcomes but less important for those who have high priorities on value types motivated by a focus on individual outcomes. For the latter people, the need for power may be primary (see Baumeister, 1998, who discussed the needs for belongingness and power as fundamental interpersonal motives). If value priorities are understood as guides to best possible living that provide a way to order requirements and desires, it is easy to explain why people in the same environment differ in terms of their value priorities if value systems concern universal human requirements (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987) or if value systems concern conceptions of what is desirable that have been learned in the social environment. Though they share an environment, particular configurations of experiences and personal attributes will result in variations in peoples views of what best possible living means to them; this will be reflected in their value priorities that evidence the dynamic organization of peoples judgments about the capacity of entities to enable best possible living. Furthermore, value priorities are likely to change as peoples judgments are amended in response to changes in circumstances and personal attributes (e.g., skill level). For example, consider the finding that people tend to become more conservative when they become parents (e.g., see Altemeyer, 1988). For a parent, best possible living now may include having a happy and successful child, and planning for this happiness and success may mean that the importance of value types motivated by a focus on organization (tradition, conformity, security) will be increased. Summary. In response to the confusion about the nature of the judgments that give rise to value priorities, it was proposed that judgments concern the capacity of entities to enable best possible living. Best possible living is viewed in Aristotelian terms and was explained to mean flourishing or personal expressivenessnot just surviving (Aristotle, circa 350 BCE/1980). This view builds on the suggestion that peoples value priorities will change in response to changes in their environments: As peoples circumstances change, so too will their judgments about what best possible living means to them. This view is consistent with the consensus described by Braithwaite and Scott (1991) that personal value priorities have to do with the desired, or what people want, rather than with the desirable, or what people ought to do.

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Aspect 4: Personal, Social, or Cultural Value Systems? People have not only their own value system but perceptions of others value systems, and groups (e.g., clubs, religious congregations, corporations, societies, cultures) can be described in terms of the values they endorse or promote. Whereas peoples own value system and their perceptions of others value systems are intrapsychic cognitive structures, descriptions of groups value systems are not. Although a distinction is often made between personal value systems and descriptions of groups value systems (cultural value systems), there has been little or no attention to the distinction between two intrapsychic value systems, what will be referred to here as personal and social value systems. Descriptions of the values that groups endorse can be understood as being ideological value systems. The difficulty in conceptualizing these value systems is beyond the scope of this article, but suffice it to say that there is no consensus about whether to understand these in terms of the average of the group members personal value priorities or, for example, group leaders or other significant members beliefs about what the groups value priorities should be (see Rokeach, 1979, for a discussion). In focus here are intrapsychic value systems. Making a distinction between two intrapsychic value systems, the personal and the social, introduces new complications. Attention to at least four of these is required. First, a layer of complication is added to the problem of definition. Whereas personal value systems can be defined as judgments of the capacity of entities to enable best possible living, what are social value systems? It is proposed that social value systems contain peoples perceptions of others judgments about best possible living or functioning, that is, others (e.g., other people, groups, institutions, cultures) value priorities. Social value systems, therefore, organize peoples perceptions of others. Second is the issue of whether personal and social value systems are similarly or differently structured. Rules of parsimonyand research (e.g., Schwartz, 1999; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995)support the proposal that personal and social value systems will be structured similarly. Furthermore, if personal value system structure is universal (although value priorities differ, the underlying structure is the same for all people; see earlier), then others value priorities surely also would be organized according to this universal structure. Third, what does the personal versus social value system distinction mean for the number of intrapsychic value systems? It seems reasonable to propose that people have only one personal value system. Logically, it would be impossible for people to have more than one personal value system if they are to feel that their thoughts do not fly about loose, but seem each to belong to some one thinker and not to another

(James, 1890/1950, p. 330). However, people may have more than one social value systemthey may have perceptions of the value systems of all people and groups with whom they interact. However, in view of peoples ability to categorize (e.g., Cantor & Mischel, 1979), it is likely that people will have a limited number of prototypical social value systems that will allow categorization of their perceptions of others value priorities. Fourth, if both personal and social value systems exist, then attitudinal and behavioral decisions may be traced to either system. This is discussed further later. Some of the confusion about the difference between peoples personal value systems and their perceptions of others value prioritiespeoples social value systemsstems from the tendency to discuss peoples stable tendencies to deal with others in their social environments in particular ways as social values (e.g., Beggan & Allison, 1994; Liebrand & Dehue, 1996; McClintock, 1978; Rokeach, 1973; Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). Schwartz (1992) provided evidence that such tendencies can be understood in terms of what has been labeled the focus on individualsocial context outcomes dimension of the personal value system. The strength and replicability of the finding that personal value priorities influence perceptions and behavior (see Postman, Bruner, & McGinnies, 1948, for an early study) has been discussed at length (e.g., Allport, 1955). Distinguishing between personal and social value priorities is grounded in the assumption that not only will personal value priorities influence perceptions and behavior, but so too will social value priorities influence perceptions and behavior. Indirect evidence for this assumption comes from studies that show people who identify with groups often behave similarly in response to a stimulus. For example, perhaps the Dartmouth and Princeton football fans football club social value priorities were highly salient and therefore influenced their perceptions of the football game made famous by Hastorf and Cantril (1954). Perhaps salient ethnic group social value priorities also produced the finding (Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985) that pro-Arab and pro-Israeli television viewers saw different things in the same programs. Peoples social value systems may have idiosyncratic aspects when they do not involve actual individuals. For example, the way people perform role-related behavior may relate to idiosyncratic aspects of their social value systems. For example, one persons perceptions of a prison guards value priorities may differ from anothers, and these differences are likely to be reflected in different role-playing behavior. Not all the guards in Zimbardos prison study (Zimbardo, Haney, Banks, & Jaffe, 1982) behaved similarly. Work in the area of intercultural stereotyping also is relevant to the idiosyncratic nature of social value systems. For exam265

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ple, Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo (1996) showed that there were identifiable individual differences in peoples beliefs about Black people; social value priorities are likely to have inspired these beliefs. When social value systems involve actual individuals, accuracy and clarity become an issue. Relevant to this issue is Grusec and Goodnows (1994) work in which childrens accurate or inaccurate perceptions of parental value priorities and other messages influenced subsequent behavior (see also Grusec, 1997). Inaccuracy or confusion about social value systems may be important to understanding social anxiety (e.g., see Leary & Kowalski, 1995, who suggest that lack of knowledge about social rules will lead to social anxiety). Social intelligence (e.g., Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987) also may relate to social value system accuracy and clarity. If personal and social value systems exist, then people must decide whether to behave in line with others expectationsconsistent with social value prioritiesor in line with their own value priorities. There is no shortage of research showing that people use information about others needs, desires, and expectations in regulating their behavior (e.g., Moretti & Higgins, 1999), and the notion that people need to reconcile satisfaction of their own value priorities with conformity to others value priorities is not a new issue. For example, Allport (1955) acknowledged the problem. He discussed the difference between the tribal and the personal and suggested that although opportunistic modes of adjusting (p. 39) are dictated by the social (tribal) environment, individuals develop other standards of conduct for themselves. Allport (1955) suggested that attempting to reconcile these two modes of becoming, the tribal and the personal, was a lifelong process. Permanent reconciliation between the tribal and the personal may take the form of what has been described as internalizationpeople then have similar value priorities to those of an important social group, such as the family or a religious organization (e.g., see Deci & Ryan, 1995; Emler, Ohana, & Dickinson, 1990; Goodnow, 1990; Rohan, 1998; Rohan & Zanna, 1998). Theory and research in which it is suggested that personal autonomy is important for psychological health (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1995) implies an optimal reconciliation for daily conflicts between personal and social value priorities: Behave according to personal value priorities. However, for some (e.g., those with high priorities on the conformity value type), behaving in ways that are in line with others value priorities is in line with their own value priorities. Highest priorities on a particular value type may be associated with a particular optimal reconciliation. For example, for the person with highest priorities on hedonism, optimal reconciliation may be something like whatever gives me the most pleasure (or, perhaps, the least pain). However, for people who have highest priorities on power, optimal 266

reconciliation may be total adherence to personal value priority standards. Diary study methods (see Wheeler & Reis, 1991) may be most useful for examining this problem, as suggested by a pilot study (Rohan & Harris, 1999) using this methodology. It was found, for example, that peoples personal value priorities were related to the relative number of occasions in which their own, others, or both own and others value priorities were viewed as being an issue: Although all participants reported more instances in which both own and others value priorities were involved, participants motivated both by a focus on organization and social context outcomes (high priorities on benevolence, tradition, and conformity) reported the greatest number. Research in the area of self-presentation may be useful to investigations of the daily reconciliation between personal and social value priorities. Two main kinds of motivations for seeking to present particular information or images about self to others have been proposed (see Baumeister, 1982): as a means to gain practical and material rewards or to claim an identity. Whereas the first can be understood as a delayed-gratification reconciliation solution (behaving according to social value priorities for later personal value priority satisfaction), the second (often observed in studies on reactance) can be understood in terms of a personal value priority reconciliation solution. Past research into value fit has acknowledged the benefits associated with compatibility between personal and social value priorities (e.g., see Bills, 1952; Feather, 1975; Furnham & Bochner, 1986; Triandis, 1990). The difficulty of conceptualizing and measuring what were labeled earlier as ideological value systems is an important factor in interpreting such research. In recent research (Rohan & Maiden, 2000), a modified Schwartz Value Inventory was used to measure teachers perceptions of their schools ideological value system (i.e., their school-related social value priorities), and it was shown that the fit between teachers personal value priorities and their social value priorities (using within-subject correlations) strongly predicted, for example, reported stress, job commitment, and satisfaction. Neither an index of fit constructed on the basis of personal value priorities and the schools value priorities according to the school principal nor an index constructed on the basis of fit between personal value priorities and the average of all teachers social value priorities could match this prediction. There is an unmistakable similarity between the notion that people need to reconcile personal and social value priorities and the concept of agendas (individual, interpersonal, relationship, group) discussed by Snyder and Cantor (1998) in their proposal that a functionalist strategy could be used productively to understand personality and social behavior. Use of a values approach will provide a way to understand the structure of the

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agendas and will provide a way to understand how well-being is influenced by the satisfaction of each type of agenda or only one type of agenda to the detriment of others. In short, the values approach may serve as a unifying foundation for carrying out Snyder and Cantors suggestions for investigation. Summary. To settle the confusion generated by the existence of different types of value systems, in discussions of peoples own value priorities it should be specified that personal value priorities are at issue; in discussions of peoples perceptions of others (e.g., other individuals, groups, institutions, societies) value priorities, it should be specified that social value priorities are at issue; and when descriptions of the value priorities endorsed or promoted by groups are discussed, they should be identified as ideological value systems. Personal and social value systems are located within the person (i.e., are both intrapsychic value systems). Although people will have only one personal value system, they are likely to have more than one social value system. Social value systems will have the same structure as the personal value system. A major issue that the personalsocial distinction highlights is how people reconcile what they want with what others want, and whether optimal reconciliation is related to peoples personal value priorities requires consideration. Investigations of this issue could use diary study methods and strategies suggested by psychologists who promote a functionalist approach to understanding personality and social behavior. Aspect 5: Value Systems, Worldviews, and Ideologies Not only is the word values often used to refer to cognitive structures that now have been labeled as value systems, but it also has been applied to peoples conscious beliefs about the way the world is or should be, as well as to the value-laden constructions people use when deliberating about, justifying, or promoting their attitudinal or behavioral decisions. To settle the resulting confusion, I propose the following guidelines so that the values construct can be distinguished from two other related constructs: identify focus on the cognitive structure in terms of value systems (or value types, or value priorities), use the term worldviews to describe peoples conscious beliefs about the world that are a function of their value priorities, and use the term ideologies to describe value-laden constructions people use in or after their decision making. A separate issue: Use of value language. A separate issue from naming and separately investigating the three very different constructs is the ease with which people use the language of values. Peoples facility with

value language reflects human capacity for metacognition (e.g., see Mischel, 1998). This metacognition not only means that people are capable of talking about their value priorities but also means that people are able to use value language to argue for one attitudinal or behavioral decision over another. Indeed, Perelman (1982) suggested, based on Aristotles wisdom, that convincing arguments require reference to the value system. As discussed later, arguments that contain value priority associations are referred to as ideologies. Humans capacity for metacognition concerning their value priorities is critical for measuring value priorities. Because the way people cognitively represent their value priorities is shared (although value priorities differ, the structure of the value system is universal), it seems unsurprising that the language of values is shared (see Schwartz, 1996, p. 2). However, individual differences are likely to exist in the ease with which people can (or want to) think and talk about their personal and social value priorities; that is, their metacognition concerning their value priorities may differ. People who suffer from a lack of what has been called self-concept clarity (J. D. Campbell, 1990) and self-certainty (Baumgardner, 1990) may suffer from difficulty in thinking and talking about their personal value priorities. (See also Fazio & Powell, 1997, who showed that attitude accessibility was related to students adjustment to collegeattitude accessibility is likely to be linked to the ease with which people can think and talk about value priorities.) Rokeach (1973) alerted researchers to this problem when he suggested that completion of his value survey was highly projective in nature, somewhat like the Rorschach or the Thematic Apperception Test (p. 27). Whether difficulty in reporting their personal value priorities is related to a habitual tendency to settle daily personalsocial value system conflicts (discussed earlier) in favor of social value priorities should be considered. Perhaps the developers of the early value priority measures were very aware that not all people would find it easy to think or talk about their value priorities. In the early measures, personal value priorities were indirectly measured by asking people about their attitudes or probable behavior (e.g., the study of values; Allport et al., 1960) or by asking them about their preferred ways of living (e.g., Morris, 1956). Because direct questions are asked about value priorities, Rokeachs (1973) and Schwartzs (1992) value inventories, as well as a new measurement tool designed to measure priorities according to the Schwartz (1992) value theory (Oishi, Schimmack, Diener, & Suh, 1998), seem to take less account of this problem. Schwartz and his colleagues have almost completed testing a new questionnaire for measuring personal value priorities that requires less abstract thought (Shalom Schwartz, personal communication, March 24, 267

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2000). Respondents are asked to compare themselves with individuals who are described in terms of what is important to them. The descriptions are theoretically linked to values that differ in terms of the two value system dimensions. For example, to measure priorities related to the conformity value type, male respondents are asked to rate their similarity to a person who is described in the following way: It is important to him to be polite to other people all the time. He believes he should always show respect to his parents and to older people. To reduce demands even further, another strategy may be to ask respondents questions that relate directly to the underlying motivational dimensions. For example, to find out whether people are more focused on individual or social context outcomes, they could be asked, Which do you think is better: to be respected or appreciated? Which do you think is worse: to be a selfish person or a dependent person? To find out whether people are more focused on opportunity or organization, they could be asked, Which would be better in the long run: to be consistent or be open to new experiences? Which would be worse: to have limited options or have no plans? This would enable identification of people in terms of the quadrant location of their highest value priorities with minimum decision making. Wolfgang Bilsky (1998a, 1998b), with whom Schwartz (e.g., Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987) developed the original version of his value theory, also has discussed peoples abilities to think about their value priorities. Bilsky (1998a, 1998b) suggested that the motivational concerns that underlie value priorities can be characterized according to an implicitexplicit continuum. So, for example, to the extent that value priorities are easily accessible to consciousness, they are explicit motives. He also suggested that the implicitexplicit distinction may allow integration of the values and motivation literatures. Value systems and ideologies. Demonstrations that peoples value priorities influence their perceptions (e.g., Postman et al., 1948) support the widely held assumption that the operation of peoples value systems in guiding their behavior often occurs effortlessly, without conscious awareness. However, more conscious thought is likely when making a decision that involves an entity that is not easily categorized in a way that enables swift analogical reasoning from value priorities, when a choice is between whether to behave in accord with ones own value priorities or anothers value priorities, or when the reconciliation process involves ones own and more than one others dissimilar value priorities (see Wegner & Bargh, 1998, for a review of automatic and controlled behavior theory and research). In such situations, people are likely to argue for one course of action over another. Because, as mentioned earlier, good arguments need reference to value priorities, argu268

ments will contain either implicit or explicit reference to value priorities. Thus, value priorities still guide attitudinal and behavioral decisions because they enable the decision to be framed in a particular way (see Pratto, in press; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; see also Conover & Feldmans 1984 discussion of the use of schemas in thinking through political issues). However, people use value priority-based arguments not only in deliberating about their decisions but also for self-justification purposes (see Aronson et al., 1997, who linked self-justification with the maintenance of self-esteem; recall that earlier, self-esteem was described as resulting from an estimate of progress in living the best way possible, i.e., according to personal value priorities). Both pre- and postdecisional value priority-relevant arguments can be labeled as ideologies (see Pratto, in press). The label ideology seems appropriate for these constructions that are learnedand maintainedin the social environment even though, as a terminology, it has about as much definitional diversity as the term values (e.g., see McLellan, 1986, p. 1: Ideology is the most elusive concept in the whole of social science). Rokeach (1973) described peoples postdecision use of ideologies (though not using that term) and suggested that this enabled a person to end up smelling himself, and being smelled by others, like a rose (p. 20). Rokeach (1973) expanded:
The language of values is an ingenious language admirably suited to the enlightenment of all kinds of self-interest, whether enlightened or unenlightened, selfish or altruistic. It permits rational justification of self-interest, and, insofar as it is necessary, the language of values can also be employed as an Aesopian language to permit rationalized justification of self-interest. (p. 168)

Because ideologies contain value priority associations, people will be able to feel they are making the best decision and will be able to convince themselves and others that they are good, moral, or ethical, that is, behaving according to a set of principles. (Morality from this point of view has been referred to as enlightened self-interest, see Ramm, 1998; see Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996 for a discussion of the value language use in self-evaluations of morality; see Kristiansen & Zanna, 1988, 1994, for discussion of value language use in justifying social and intergroup attitudes; and see Pratto, in press, for a discussion of legitimizing ideologies.) Whether the same ideology will be used in deliberating about and in explaining, justifying, or promoting the decision may depend on whether the context of decision making changes. The appropriate ideology in one context may not be appropriate in another. Because the rhetoric in ideologies can be manipulated to connect almost any thing, person, action, or ac-

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tivity to value priorities (i.e., to what constitutes best possible living), an ideology can be made relevant to a wide variety of situations by virtue of the value priority associations contained within it, and the attitudinal and behavioral decisions that result will depend on features of the situation in which it is applied (e.g., see Pratto, Tatar, & Conway-Lanz, 1999, who suggested that ideologies may have different implications for different social groups). However, the manipulation of the rhetoric in ideologies means that values are often viewed as remarkably slippery social constructions that take on different meanings over time and across political cultures (Tetlock, Peterson, & Lerner, 1996, p. 34). But, it is ideologies, not value priorities, that are remarkably slippery. Ideologies may contain a large number of value associations or a few. For example, a noblesse oblige ideologythose with more should help those with lesscontains implications for universalism value priorities but no obvious implication for stimulation value priorities (see Pratto, Stallworth, & Conway-Lanz, 1999, who examined use of this ideology in legitimizing guns rather than butter social policies). In contrast, political ideologies may contain a greater number of links (e.g., see Braithwaite, 1994, 1997; Rokeach, 1973). Whether the structure of ideologies can be mapped onto the value system will depend on the number of value system associations: Whereas broader ideologies may map onto value system structure, narrower ideologies will not. Tetlock (1986; see also Billig, 1991; Billig et al., 1988) focused on ideologies people use in decision making. His value pluralism model of ideological reasoning (as well as the revised model; Tetlock, Peterson, & Lerner, 1996) can be used in systematic investigations of the value priority-related reasoning connected to attitudinal and behavioral decisions. Tetlock et al. (1994) used the model to demonstrate, for example, that political ideologies differ in the degree to which they acknowledge conflicts among important value priorities, and thus the extent to which ideologies contain complex trade-off reasoning. Whether this model is relevant to understanding how people reconcile personal and social value priorities can be considered. In other research, Tetlock and his colleagues are investigating taboo trade-offs (e.g., Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000) trade-offs that people do not like to think about or discuss openly (e.g., trade-offs between friends and its monetary cost). In addition, these researchers are investigating the success of ideologies that do or do not acknowledge conflicts between value priorities. For example, Tetlock (in press) found that to the extent that a politician acknowledges value conflict (i.e., has engaged in more complex trade-off reasoning), she or he is trusted and respected less (the traitor effect).

Value systems and worldviews. Solomon Asch (1952) discussed the importance of knowing about the conscious mode in which things appeared to people (pp. 6465). Feather (1971) recognized that this conscious mode was distinct from value systems, and he described it as a perceived structure that represented the information immediately present in the environment. The term worldview can be used to distinguish between this conscious mode and the cognitive structure that has been described as the value system. Although the term worldview also is not without definitional diversity (see Mannheim, 1936/1972), it seems the most appropriate because it is defined as contemplation of the world, view of life (Compact Oxford English Dictionary, 1991, p. 2340). How do value systems relate to peoples worldviews? Parsons (1951) suggested an inescapable link between peoples personal value priorities and the way they viewed the world. Early research in which peoples (personal) value priorities influenced their perceptions (e.g., Postman et al., 1948) supported the suggestion that peoples worldviews directly evidence their personal value systems. Because of this strong link, the value system structure could be used to guide investigations of peoples worldviews. Beliefs relating to each value type should be found. There has been some research into the relation between personal value priorities and worldviews. For example, Altemeyer (1998) examined the relation between peoples worldviews and their personal value systems. He found, consistent with expectations and earlier research (e.g., Rohan & Zanna, 1996), that the strongest relations between the right-wing authoritarian worldview and the personal value system concerned priorities on tradition and conformity value types. He also found that the strongest relation between the social dominance orientation (SDO) worldview (see Pratto, in press; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) and the personal value system concerned priorities on the power value type. Altemeyer (1998) observed that
Right-wing authoritarians fear that authority and conventions are crumbling so quickly that civilization will collapse and they will be eaten in the resulting jungle. In contrast, high SDOs already see life as dog eat dog andcompared with most peopleare determined to do the eating. (p. 75)

How very different, then, is the conscious mode in which things appear to right-wing authoritarians and to people who have a strong SDO as a result of their personal value priorities. For each, it is clear that best possible living has a very different meaning (i.e., they have very different value priorities), and this controls the way each views the world. 269

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I mentioned earlier that if personal value priorities evidence judgments about the capacity of entities to enable best possible living, then personal value priorities will change when circumstances (or personal attributes) change. Changes in circumstances could be understood not only in terms of physical circumstances but also in terms of the people contained in ones social environments. Constant interaction with people who have different personal value priorities may change peoples beliefs about the world; changes in peoples beliefs about the world will be reflected in changes to their personal value priorities. Summary. I propose the following guidelines so that the values construct can be distinguished from two other related constructs: Use the term value system if the cognitive structures are in focus, use the term worldviews if investigating peoples beliefs about the way the world is or should be that are a function of their value priorities, and use the term ideologies to describe value-laden linguistic constructions that are used in or after decision making. In investigations of worldviews, beliefs that evidence each value type should be found because the way people view their worlds is a function of their personal value priorities. In contrast, ideologies will differ in terms of the number of value associations that can be identified. An ideology only will have links to value prioritieseither personal or socialby virtue of the references (implicit or explicit) to values contained in that ideology. What Does It All Mean for the ValuesAttitudinal and Behavioral Decision Link? To bring together the points made regarding the potentially confusing aspects of the values construct that relate to understanding how value priorities cause attitudinal and behavioral decisions, I now describe a proposal for this process. First, definitions for constructs relevant to the process are given. A value is an implicit analogical principle constructed from judgments about the capacity of things, people, actions, and activities to enable best possible living. Value priorities evidence the dynamic organization of these principles. Value systems are integrated structures within which there are stable and predictable relations among priorities on each value type. Personal value systems concern peoples own judgments about the capacity of entities to enable best possible living for themselves. Social value systems concern peoples perceptions about others judgments concerning the capacity of entities to enable best possible living, that is, others value priorities. A worldview is a collection of conscious beliefs about how things 270

are or should be. Thus, peoples worldviews constitute their version of actual or potential realities. An ideology is a rhetorical association or set of associations between things, people, actions, or activities and best possible living. Because value systems structure judgments about the capacity of entities to enable best possible living, ideologies will contain either implicit or explicit reference to value priorities. The Process If personal value priorities are intimately bound up with a persons sense of self (Feather, 1992, p. 112) and are a type of personality disposition (Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994, p. 178), then it seems logical to suggest that all attitudinal and behavioral decisions ultimately should be traceable to personal value priorities (see Figure 2). That is, personal value priorities cause decisions. People intuitively may operate under the assumption that personal values cause decisions, and this assumption may explain the (possibly) universal prohibition against hypocrisy (see Aronson, Fried, & Stone, 1991, who use this prohibition to change behavior). Thus, in Figure 2, the personal value system stands as the superordinate structure. Peoples personal value systems cause people to view the world in a particular way. However, as mentioned, constant interaction with people who have different personal value priorities may change peoples beliefs about the world; changes in peoples beliefs about the world will be reflected in changes to value priorities. In Figure 2, there are double arrows between personal value systems, worldviews, and social value systems to reflect this potential. This arrangement takes account of Rokeachs (1973) comments that a major advantage gained in thinking about a person as a system of values rather than a cluster of traits is that it becomes possible to conceive of his undergoing change as a result of changes in social conditions (p. 21; see also Tomkins, 1966; Young, 1946). The most direct path from personal value priorities (through worldviews) to attitudinal and behavioral decisions (see Figure 2) reflects the widely held and empirically supported assumption that peoples personal value priorities often guide their behavior effortlessly, with little or no conscious awareness. Relevant to this is the hypothesis put forward by Schwartz (1996): Associations with any outside variables will decrease monotonically as one moves around the circular structure of value types in both directions from the most positively associated value type to the least positively associated value type (p. 6). Sagiv and Schwartz (1995) found, for example, that interpersonal cooperation is related in the predicted way: Benevolence priorities were most strongly associated with interpersonal cooperation, and power priorities were least strongly as-

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Figure 2. Proposed relations among personal and social value priorties, worldviews, ideologies, and attitudinal and behavioral decisions.

sociated. Interpersonal cooperation behavior was chosen for study because the games that could be used to test hypotheses are constructed to tap behaviors that express relatively pure motivations straightforwardly (Schwartz, 1996, p. 6). Research in which these types of relatively pure motivations (i.e., those that are relatively unaffected by situational influences and therefore social value priorities) are investigated may be most relevant to the most direct path from personal value systems to attitudinal or behavioral decisions. If people are thoroughly immersed in their interactions with others, they may behave according to their social value priorities effortlessly. The path from social value systems to attitudinal decisions reflects this possibility. Perhaps relevant to this path is research (Ybarra & Trafimow, 1998) in which priming of what was described as the collective self (perhaps, social value priorities) produced different behavior than did priming of what was described as the private self (perhaps, personal value priorities). That such priming produced different behavior may be important to consider in discussions and investigation of interattitudinal

consistency (e.g., Lavine, Thomsen, & Gonzales, 1997)attitudes may be consistent with either personal or social value systems. When people use ideologies to help them make more complex decisionsthose that require conscious thoughtthe ideologies may be in line with either personal or social value priorities. A path from the personal value system (through worldview) to a personal value system linked ideology element, as well as a path from a social value system to a social value system linked ideology element, therefore, is included. Billigs (1991) discussion of discourse analysts who demonstrate peoples ability to take on different patterns of talk is relevant to the idea that people may use different ideologies in their decision making depending on whether personal or social value systems are salient. Somewhat similar is Lukers (1984) proposal that people differ in terms of the beliefs on which they base their attitudes. For example, Luker found that prolife activists based their abortion attitudes on statements such as the purpose of sex is procreation, whereas prochoice activists based their abortion attitudes on statements such as the purpose of 271

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sex is to foster intimacy and experience pleasure. Although Seligman and Katz (1996) suggested that people may construct value systems in the context of specific issues (p. 55), they made a point related to Lukers, namely that people associate particular value priorities with particular issues (see also Tourangeau, Rasinski, & DAndrade, 1991, who found that students who had different opinions also framed the relevant issue in different ways by linking the issue to different value priorities and premises). It is likely that when personal value priorities are salient, the ideology that feels right will be one that contains links to important personal value priorities; when social value priorities are salient, the ideology that feels right will be one that contains links to important social value priorities. People may change their beliefs about the world (i.e., their worldview) if they behave in particular ways often enough. This may be why stateways can change folkways (see Aronson, 1995). Consider as a simple example the change in attitudes and behavior regarding the wearing of seat belts (for a weightier example, see Deutsch & Collins, 1951). There is now general consensus that it is good to wear seat belts, although the ideologies people may use to justify their positive attitudes and seat belt wearing behavior may differ depending on value priorities (e.g., high priorities on conformity: because its the law; high priorities on security: because it keeps me safe). The arrow from attitudinal or behavioral decisions back to the worldview element was included to reflect this type of worldview change possibility (Figure 2). The arrow from decision explanation, justification, promotion back to the worldview element was included for the same reason. Whether or not they made a decision with full awareness, people are likely to use ideologies in explaining to themselves or others why they made a particular decision, in justifying their decision, or in promoting their decision. As mentioned, whether the ideology used in deliberating about decisions is the same one used in decision explanation, justification, or promotion may depend on whether the decision-relevant context (in terms of both physical circumstances and people involved) remains constant. Therefore, in Figure 2 there is an element from attitudinal and behavioral decision labeled situationally appropriate ideology. The only time decision making should not require use of an ideology is when people deny they had any choice: Involuntarily expressed attitudes or behaviors need not be explained or justified (this has been demonstrated extensively in dissonance research; e.g., Zanna & Cooper, 1974). If people use a different ideology in the course of explanation, justification, or promotion, they may change the decision (the arrow from situationally appropriate ideology back to attitudinal or behavioral decision). The potential for explanation, justification, or 272

promotion to alter decisions may underlie Maio and Olson s (1998) findings: They found change in attitudinal decisions (in this case, reports of value priorities) when people provided reasons for their previously reported attitudinal decisions. The major implication of the proposed process by which value prioritiesboth personal and social cause attitudinal and behavioral decisions is that the often-recorded failure to find strong valueattitude behavior relations (e.g., LaPiere, 1934; Wicker, 1969) can be explained. In Figure 2, four possible paths from personal value systems to decisions are proposed. Each of these paths may be associated with a different decision, even though the underlying value systems are stable. Specification of which path is being investigated may enhance understanding and prediction of the valueattitudebehavior relation. General Summary In discussing five confusion-producing aspects of the values construct, I presented a selection of theory and research in which the term values was not used but in which the construct under investigation seemed consistent with it. I also described work of earlier values theorists, and a contemporary value theory, the Schwartz (1992) value theory. Because it explains how peoples solutions to two of the most basic human problems influence their motivational focus, the Schwartz (1992) theory can provide the structure for investigating the fundamental coordinators of behavior. Confusion can be reduced greatly if social theorists and social scientists specify when they are talking about peoples value priorities and value systems rather than the category of judgment or set of judgments that can be described as values or value types. The term attitude, which sometimes has been used to describe a value priority, should be reserved for describing a specific evaluation of an entity. To distinguish it from the values construct, a worldview was described in terms of a persons conscious beliefswhich are a function of that persons value prioritiesabout the way the world is or should be. Value priority-based arguments people use to help them make decisions as well as explain, justify, or promote their decisions were labeled as ideologies, and an ideology was described as a rhetoric association or set of associations between entities and living the best way possible. Because judgments about how to live the best way possible are assumed to be what value systems organize so analogical reasoning can be used to provide meaning to experience and guide action, ideologies will contain either implicit or explicit reference to value priorities. I proposed a distinction between personal and social value systems. Both are intrapsychic structures, and social value systems contain organizations of peoples

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perceptions of others value priorities. Both can influence peoples attitudinal and behavioral decisions, and as Gordon Allport (1955) suggested, reconciliation between action to satisfy personal value priorities or conformity to social value priorities is likely to be a lifelong process. Personal and social value systems, worldviews, and ideology constructs were included in a proposal for the process by which personal value priorities cause attitudinal and behavioral decisions. I offer the framework as a starting point for researchers who, like Allport, believe that value systems are the fundamentally important construct for understanding and predicting peoples attitudes and behavior, but who have found that the confusion associated with the values area reduces the potential for focused, systematic investigations. For centuries, psychologists and others have sought to understand the fundamental coordinators of human behavior. The message embedded in this article is that by conceptualizing these fundamental coordinators as value systems, we may be able to synthesize and build on the knowledge produced by generations of theorists and researchers who have focused on this important construct, whether or not they have used the problematic term values. References
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