ESTRADA, vs CASEDA G.R. No.

L-1560 Facts: On September 5, 1945, plaintiff brought this suit, for unlawful detainer, because one of her married daughters was going to occupy them by the first of the following month; that defendant refused to leave. On October 13, 1945, Judge Mariano Nable, then of the municipal court, gave judgment for plaintiff with order for defendant to pay the rent from October 1, 1945, at the rate of P26 a month. On the case being appealed to the CFI, Judge Rafael Dinglasan presiding, cited "Commonwealth Act No. 689. The court correctly held that the fact that the premises under lease were needed by plaintiff's married daughter was not comprehended in the said Act. The requirements to evict occupants were provided in above-mentioned Act, which was approved on October 15, 1945. Section 14 of that Act provided that the same "shall be in force for a period of two years after its approval." Republic Act No. 66, approved on October 18, 1946, amended section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689 so as to read as follows: "Section 14. This Act shall be in force for a period of four years after its approval." Issue: Whether or not there is retroactivity of the amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 689 By RA No. 66. Held: Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by Republic Act No. 66, cannot be given retroactive effect. The provision of Republic Act No. 66 amending section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689, related back to, and should be computed from the date of the approval of the amended act, that is October 15, 1945. The period as thus construed expired on October 15, 1949. The cause of action in the case at bar arose before the passage of the Acts. An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute had been repealed, and a new and independent act in the amended form had been adopted in its stead.

Manila Jockey Club v. Games and Amusement Board

Facts: The authorized racing days specifically designated and distributed in Section 4 of RA 309 the basic law on horse racing in the Philippines amended by RA 983 are as follows: (1) Philippine Anti-TB Society for 12 Sundays, (2) PCSO - 6 Sundays (3) White Cross - 4 Sundays (4) Grand Derby Race of PATS - 1 Sunday (5) Private Individuals and entities - 29 Sundays. However, RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races of the PCSO from 6 to 12 Sundays, but without specifying the days on which they are to be run. To accommodate these additional races, GAB resolved to reduce the number of Sundays assigned to private individuals and entities by six. Appellants protested that the said increase should be taken from the 12 Saturdays reserved to the President, for charitable relief OR should be assigned to any day of the week besides Sunday, Saturday and Legal Holiday. Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitioner has a vested right to the unreserved Sundays. (2) Whether or not the additional sweepstakes races must be inserted in club races as debated in the House of Representatives in the voting of HB 5732/RA1502. Held: (1) No, the appellant has no vested right to the unreserved Sundays, or even to the 24 Saturdays (except holidays) because their holding on races for these days are merely permissive, subject to the licensing and determination by the GAB. When, therefore, RA 1502 was enacted increasing by 6 the sweepstakes draw and races but without specifying the days for holding them, the GAB had no alternative except to make room for the additional races, as it did, form among the only available racing days unreserved by any law - the Sundays on which the private individuals and entities have been permitted to hold their races, subject to licensing and determination by GAB. (2) No. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 1502, as it was finally enacted, which would indicate that such an understanding on the part of these two members of the Lower House of Congress were received the sanction or conformity of their colleagues, for the law is absolutely devoid of any such indication. In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute, unlike in the interpretation of an ordinary written document, it is not enough to obtain information to the intention or meaning of the author or authors, but also to see whether the intention or meaning has been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and validity. In short, the purpose of the inquiry, is not only to know what the author meant by the language he used, but also to see that the language used sufficiently expresses that meaning. The language of Republic Act No. 1502 in authorizing the increase, clearly speaks of regular sweepstakes draws and races. If the intention of Congress were to authorize additional sweepstakes draws only which could, admittedly, be inserted in the club races, the law would not have included regular races; and since regular sweepstakes races were specifically authorized, and it would be confusing, inconvenient, if not impossible to mix these sweepstakes races with the regular club races all on the same day (and it has never been done before), the conclusion seems inevitable that the additional sweepstakes draws and races were intended to be held on a whole day, separate and apart from the club races.

DOMINGO SARCOS, as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur petitioners vs HON. RECARELO CASTILLO, Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur & the Hon. Provincial Board of Surigao del Sur respondents FACTS: Sarcos, an independent candidate, won in the 14 November 1967 elections, as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur. Castillo charged Sarcos with misconduct and dishonesty in office. Such act alleged constituted connivance with certain private individuals, to cut and fell timber and selling of the timber cut, for own use and benefit, within the communcal forest reserve of the municipality of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, to the damage and prejudice of the public and the government. As early as 18 April 196 there was already a charge under oath for abuse of official power in consenting to and authorizing the violations of forestry laws was filed against petitioner by Municipal Council of Barobo. It was on the basis of this administrative complaint that the Castillo filed petition ordering the immediate suspension of Sarcos from position as Mayor saying that the acts committed by mayor Sarcos affects his official integrity, the petition was in accordance with the Sec.5 of RA 5185- Decentralization Act of 1967. ISSUES: WON Provincial Governor is vested power to order preventive suspension of Mayor Sarcos under RA 5185 HELD / RATIONALE: No. Castillo as governor lacks authority to order the preventive suspension of the Petitioner, Sarcos. According to the Decentralization Act of 1967, particularly the paragraph dealing with preventive suspension: "The President, Provincial Board and City or Municipality Council, as the case may be, shall hear and investigate the truth or falsity if the charges within 1- days after receipt of such notice." It was the former law Sec. 2188 of Rev. Adm. Code which gives power to the Governor to order preventive suspension, however, it was already repealed by the Decentralization Act of 1967. The court was also lead to the suspicion that politics was a cause for the order by Governor of the preventive suspension of the Mayor, being an independent candidate thus of a different political persuasion. The writs of certiorari and prohibition are then granted. The preventive suspension order by Castillo is annulled and set aside. Mayor Sarcos to be reinstated to his position. *The Decentralization Act, to which the decision in this case is based, amended / repealed Sec. 2188, Rev. Adm. Code. The former law provides that the provicnicla gorvernor, if the charge against a munucupola officaial was municipal official was one affecting his official integrity, could order his preventive suspension. It was repealed by the RA NO. 5185 Sec. 5 which provides that now it is the provincial board which has been granted the power to order preventive suspension.

Erectors, Inc., v. NLRC

Full Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/may1996/104215.htm Facts: In September 1979, Erectors recruited Florencio Burgos to work as Service Contract Driver in Saudi Arabia for 12 months with a salary of $165 and an allowance of $165 per month. Burgos will also be entitled a bonus of $1ooo if after the 12-month period, he renews/extends his contract without availing his vacation or home leave His contract was approved by the Ministry of Labor and Employment. However, the contract was not implemented. In December 1979, Erectors notified Burgos that the position of Service Driver was no longer available. On December 14, 1979, they executed another contract changing his position from driver to laborer with a salary of $105 and an allowance of $105 per month. This contract was not submitted to the MLE. On December 1979, Burgos left the country and worked at Erectors Buraidah Sports Complex project in Saudi Arabia as a laborer. He received a monthly salary and allowance of $210. Burgos renewed his contract after one year and his salary and allowance were increased to $231. Burgos returned to Philippines on August 1981. He then invoked his first employment contract. He demanded the difference between his salary and allowance in teh said contract and the amount paid to him. On March 1982, Burgos filed wiht the Labor Arbiter a complaint for underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime pay and bonus. While his case was still in conciliation stage, EO 797 creating POEA was established Sec 4(a) of E) 797 vested the POEA with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases including money claims, involving employer-employee relationship arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." Despite EO 797, Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the case and rendered judgement in favor of Burgos. In view of EO 797, Erectors questioned the jurisdiction of the LA in NLRC. NLRC dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the LA's jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not EO 797 applies retroactively to affect pending cases, including the complaint filed by Burgos. Held: No. The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691 and Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employeremployee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same.