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American Foreign Policy Viotti P Armed Intervention and Warfare Ch.3 pp77-95 Viotti P

Name of Publisher: Polity Cambridge 2010 Publication Year/Isbn: 2010 ISBN9780745642413

Designated Person(s) authorising scanning:

Updated: 19/12/2012 Our ref: CP0480

J Henson

lutionary in its am

an regime in Kabul

ed not just against th

resort to terrorism as a

41ese grerips a s d e , an e\en d e r ~ e +as\ance r :rt tl:c'r minds !a) \\:GI oppoz:i"~n ~ro >.:!.el~,~n .$nil \4 ~cterr; 9:s~EJT.~:S ef gie3al~za~or.i - hber ai \ 3l~erkai. &re?-ex.izl&rto::=.! 1s-d:r,rc c.i*!;~:lc-s I n the Xllddic. Easx 2x2 Soi:ih ;ill4 S;,!lheast Asla. Adding fiwl to these i e d c r 0 ~ 6 n 51ec % a s 13<es:?n3p:e~. Sure for i13e~tll~a"~)11 O L SC~L!~! p l s C T . l i i TkPY C C ; I S ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ \ regiz-es, couylecj, vV3-til mcrezang knt.ncd.- Entlsh ::~d other Europeark rni!itaq presence ;;I tke regior~ R e a d l r ~their pubilc, self-iust~ficatc~? qtatt?.::ienrs rn I h e jess both behre asid a5er rhe artdcks) L : is !lot ha113 to ?denaiy mcr:ues held bj al-Qaedn !eadt.rs for 2~aiki::g tkie Lil~ted Stdtes and other regllnes see?; as >elringtheir 07,n in:erests i t h Amencar, poll(\ ehtes Pa~tiiuldrl!~ ofrecii: t. in iaalltlon w ir3 the Ieadeiship of al-Qaeda and otlners oflike rnlrid .rcino supportec! them la-as the presence a t the bme ofAmei~cari nulitan r r Mecca aud sascs ITS Sdud: Arabla - home to sacled sinrln~s Medlna - or elsewhere m the 41ab G u l l G k e n these p e v a l ~ c e sthe , choice of 3, Ir t3rgets was not arbltrall?: the LYorld Trade Center represented ~~lcseas~ngl> t he U111ted Srates is the globallzed, l~beral cxprtafalisrn m ~ h i c h dorninarrt player and the I-'crliagorr the military mstrurnent used to advance 4rnencan mterests i.iorld.\lil~deHad thcv been successful in attacking the Capitol 01 d ~ While e i-Io~1s? etruck a blou to al-Qaeda operahves, 111 their Flew would h ~ v s the polibcal center of the globalizabon project, the conlmarid centers fox the use of military folce, and the support base fox the state of lsraei. Successful regime change effected by armed nlterventiori against the Tallban I n Afghanistan began with alr attacks In October 2001, followed by a ground invasloii and defeat of the Talibail by m~d-November, a nd lnstallarlon of an nlterrrn goverlirnellt in December. G i ~ e n these successes gained by ~r~tervening militarily in Afhanlstan, there were mcreassllg calls w t h m the neoconsentahve policy ellte for similarly

decisive a d o n im.Bqhdad,

+oxau ir~c!ude;! f i i e ;-.cc ~rez:?en: d;iCi sectem\ d d a f e n s ~ 5 ~2pi?l?eC by neOcsn>er\ ZiE! t?s hold?;;$ ::;3'3Cl ids: ~:Slkdir 7cslrims m QIC J~parr::~ecrc T D e f e n 5 ~ {i3oC'i, T:.ar DUI?~,,CT&S ran iri ~ i 3' S ~ O L37 ~ siovi i i e ;n:pTe;1:e11-t r , -,,. , ~ of ~ ~ new paiiuei i \ : i \\hi&&."-el n a\ disaplee l u s Seen well estaolisked Sa"t:ia,- \\as r-io sltclz ctppcs:t~nn or .. b~leaucldnc seek ekrierar m : ? i t defenstt se,leta:>'s oiilces AX-ougb n-st wlc?elt reported, 1 : addicon tc :lie ad;:?inr>tr&@on'spolitlcai appoxriaes. career ci~l!S i ' i \ d ~ i t S s t ~ , a a i h e t i ~ 1 3 necjcolaservahvt- %ilea_; - smle p ~ , :% :: rhe~r p oil~ior~s Jt:lsng the Reagan-Bush aclm~c~stratrons - formed 3;: tnlpor::n?t bt~reaucraticbase, pamcu:drly iil rile Offic: of t!,e S e c ~ e c ~ i of Defense (OSD), \g.ln~d-i fai~iitatecipolrct nl1p1e!12e1ic~bo11 {ietics,nbtd. Tilose elsewhere in DoD \g.ko registered opposi~g 51) sn the Depd~~rnerit of the 4rm1, ~ e r :elnu\ c ed f r o m t!!e~: ~~abon tlius s,~ sending a clear anti unan~blgiiuuss~gl~,al io any who would stand m the W ~ of L \vllat l i d bec~l-ne a solibs-s\ adrnlnlsl-ratioli and DoD policy posiiion bltich "to rlre dlsma? of the %Ice president and sruetarv of defense, who feaied polla revers~lthe irmtiorxtl seculrr;)!acivisou, Condoleezra Rice. cilct use her position of i ~ l h e n c e ixp1tll the president to arrange a plrvate dli~neruith 111s secretar? of stnte - ~ f f o r d ~ n the g sentor cabmet officer an oppor~wvQ to express hls resen-dt~ons before the plesrdent finalrzed h ~ s deds101-ito mvade. Not\~\ill~stalldirig his best effor-ts, Secretar) of State Ponell proved tlnpers-uasrve a n d lost this eleventhllour polibcal battle on the Potuinac to the Cheney-Rumsfeld s he complied wltli the declsion coclhtion Havlng had h ~ say, and s~~bseijuently defe~~ded the adrn~nistrcltion's posltion 111 the UN Secu~~r). Counal. The team-plqer behailor lle e-xhlblted was also conslatent wit12 expectatrons found 11.1 the profess~oa.~al mrlitary culkl~e from ~ h i c h lie hdd colmc - a de~nocratic o r particlpdt~ve centrallsrn lnter nalrzed by r n l l l t q officers that ,illows responsible dlssent pnor t o the making of
1 ,
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Armed latT&&i&%

since doing so also removed a significant regional threat to Iranian leaders previously posed by Saddam Hussein's regime irs Baghdad. Be that as it may, the invasion did establish seategic bases in Iraq and expansion of others in the region that could be used to defend American oil and other interests. To many observers, particularly those wearing realist lenses, this Brasthe decisive rationale for intervention, albeit under a dual cover: the search for weapons of mass destruction and the promotion of American liberalism, using the democratic tansition in Iraq as a model for all of Araby.

The Neoconservative Turn

Conservative thought, at least in the Burkean sense of the term,, counsels a careful, cautionary, incremental approach Kissinger to changes in policy. As noted in Chapter I, H e n ~ y draws an important distinction between risk-averse consewative powers at the top of the heap who have a vested interest in the status quo - maintaining constancy if they can to their relative advantage - and revolutionary powers that are willing to put caution to the wind, even risking their position in doing ~0.4 Calling themselves neoconservatives, the policy elite that came to power in 2001 with President George \X'. Bush had, from what they said, more revolutionary purposes in mind transforming the geopolitics of the Middle East not only to serve their understanding of Arner~caninterests, but also to constitute a more favorable,less hostile regional environment for the state of Israel. The attacks on September r I , z o o ~ provided the opportunity to act on these ideas.5 Times had changed after the 9/11 attacks - at least in the minds of President Bush and his closest advisors. They frequently said so, invoking the new, dangerous circumstances confronting them to justif) a dramatic policy shift. Gone was the conservative mantra revived in the 1990s that the United

Seatea :s nnl {a:~? skm i??! riot cel d?e crIL'h ;5011~e21~!_ '-a d' -r i &t';reglcenf ~ Z re~2;ted Z EGCF,. ~ I I ~ Z iri ~his S ~amph;gr lor -ce"K;?;re I - r c ~ i e12 :I": pSrii'e afier ~ , ' I I\\as * Iha1 s c ~ e cai! frsr global demi?c:snz;idor~. _~,~rre : oc i a ~eo-iviiionlan Conirwnng authaalnnan legrnes peacei-dl? ~f?ossrb:e, SLL: ne:_rig a:meC force as nee3 b?, de-'ir?et!the neiv order =if rne dx- e n a post-9; i r av~r"; P:eerr?~i!p~g eve3 i n the absstice oi'rfimied?ate danger - , n effect ?gkting grevenhve wars - acquired ~ephrn2c)pamctilady ;insong %.i3 self-described neoconsemdhce foreign-polrcg elite la: i%asli~ngton,, for whom Prrsldent Bus]: became cliref s3&espessor, Tile pres~dcnt undesscored Arnmcan wilingae3s to use foice preemp:Ively :XI defen?;e of h e horneland : m h ~ Tune s zoo2 speechat the L S Mihtary Acacierny at \TJes: Pot-,[, ~hhlch Ism that year was incoaporated formdlt; ln the House's fo~mulht~on of U S national secwitj stlategy. Vf7,'hlie Another important component of long-term strategy ararticuiated by the pres~dentwas a commitment to do vrhate~erlt took to presene American primacy oker cowilng decades should the c o u r n J spreeminent poslrion in norld afTalrs be challenged by such nslng powers as China, Russia, or India Felv Amencalls object to expoang or spreading democratic or liberal values, although many do objecr to armed InterLention as the means used lo a ~ a l t n hem. Ll'ueratmg peoples fi-on1 oppression 1s a noble goal rn the Arnerlca~l vie&, one enlertained from tlme ro %methroughout the earlier histoq of the tepublic, before and dunng the Cold War, and since Acting on 'CJ119 impulse ~ i t t h he use of force, however, w ~ always s subje~?to consbalnts iriiposed b) polrcjrnakers abroad, notably the Soviet U1lio11dunng the Cold War, whicli was understood b j pol~cy elltes in Wasli~ngtoii as quite capable of challenging ally s t ~ American h moves. Tlie demise of the Sovlet Union in Iggr left the leadersh~p of a truncated Russian Fedelation and post-Sobiet rtpubhcs
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p p p n e n t , Containment, and Armed 1tlterventjon

this neoconservative point of new. The public heard calls for assassination - taking certain persons "out" - as if it were a legitimate instrument of state policy, %'hat may previousip have been 1n the shadows of covert actions or "special" operations came seemingly into the full light of day. Asserilveness by American leaders -particularly by the president, vice president, and secretary of defense - became the new order. To the extent that multilaterallsm mattered, it was only a means to ends determined to be in the US interest, certainly never an end in itself. The unilateral impulse was strong, particularly when neither allies nor ad hoc coalition partners were considered essential to achieving US objectives. At most, policymakers worked unilaterally within a multilateral context, adding partners to the US bandwagon as need be. As the secretary of defense put it in earlier discussions on what to do about Iraq, the mission (i.e., the US agenda) should drive the coalition, not the coalition the mission. From h s perspective, American foreign pollcy did not need to get bogged down in multilateral efforts to forge broad-based consensus or seek positive-sum gains for diverse parties in any international agreement. Where there was will to act, US policymakers could find a way to serve American interests and objectives mthout being limited by others, much less self-constrained,

Armed Intervention, Sovereignty,and

International Law

Understandings of international law or the rule of law matter when policymakers internalize them as _guides to the making and implementation of foreign policy. Otherwise laws stand as abstractions (or distractions) "out there" and do not enter the decisionmaking policy space unless others push them "in here." Certainly the decision to invade Iraq was not the first

Armed fntervedi

(nor likely %dl it be the last) time legal c o n s t r a m were pen. ceived as contrary to objectives seen as senring the national interest. Consistent with past practices, US decisionrnakers did turn successfully to the UN and &AT0 to secure backing for the invasion of Afghanistan In 2002, which unseated the Taliban regime in Kabul that had given sanctuary to al-Qaeda, The story was dectdedly different, however, when it came to mustering international support for invading Iraq o n t-he premise that the regime in Baghdad was acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Notwithstanding an exea0rdinal-y effort by &the secretary of state, the director of the CIA, and other officials to make the case for invading Iraq on these grounds, UN Security Council members passed resolutions limited only to condemning violations of or non-compliance with earliea Security Council resolutions and warning that unspeafied actions might be taken in the absence of Iraqi compliance. Led by President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, policpakers from the United States and the United fingdom coalesced, albeit not without substantial resel-vations, particularly on the British slde. The July 2002 "Downing Street" documents of a meeting of the prime minister and other British officials, leaked to the London Sunday Times on May r, 2005, give us an interpretive understanding of their American policymaking counterparts, The memo prepared for the meeting complained that "the US Government's military planning for action against Iraq . . . lacks a political fiamework. In particular, little thought has been given to creating the political conditions for military action, or the aftermath and how to shape it." The Brltish Identified the aim of US military planning as s~mply "the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime, followed by elimination of Iraq1 WMD." There was concern, however, that "a post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-bullding

, \ 't ,i k r+ lt *te~,==~&f;'' saeec&.rj*>- since "he)'L.S r,'tilji211: nlanls . ;]b 3$Silt 51; 3oint." >,has,: i l ~ f r ~ r e s G~lor inn ;?urposes J
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jntel-j2:iliona] jli.;:
i : S v i p a r ~~f i:;tenlati$:.naj !ass. vasv fiOrfi L+~:ofthe c I (and :he intsr1:alicnsI asrn~:uniq. Regirne change per se is not a ?roper bask for r ~ i l l ~ action ry uncier inter~atiunallaw. But regi%e cltange cedd :~s>JT 5~ix action that is otherwise < . ~ a x t u lWe . wodd regard the use a2ozc2 against Iraq, or any other state, as ia~a'ft~l if exercised in right of indi~i.id:;mior ,* . . c.oi;ect+:e se!f-de;'c-nie, :r ot;t to avert a11 ove:-+:h&n. . . , ~ r , gi.,nrflani:r;na!; catashophe, or autkol-lsed by the t i K
t

Sec~jrlt-y Cotiricil.

"

At dce :yieehng on jul) 23, 2002,SIT Richard Dearlovs the head of Br~trshsecret lnrefl~gence(MIG), observed thai in "his T~Cenktalks In '\Siasksngtc;n . . mditaiy acnon xias now seen as ~nec-itablle. Bush wanted to semove Saddam, tlirwugh rnilrtan. amon, lustliied by the conjunction of terrorism and %/%tD,' m b ~ i g that "the inteillgence ancl facts were lserng fixed a r o w d the polic~.'~ He observed that the US Tu'abonal Security Oouncrl "had no patience with the UN xoute" and that "here was little discussion in R'ashington of the aftermath aAer rnllitaq actlon." For hrs paxt. the ibre~gn secretary added h d i .'lt seemed clear that Bush had made up hls mind to idlie mil~tarv acbon, even ~f'the t~rn~n was g not yet decided. B u t the case was thin ' -411of t h ~ p s osed a dlrect challenge to the corpus of ~nterna'Ilona1 law, parbc~~larly that relatlng to sovereignty and armed ~ntervention.Although senror pohcy~nakers in the B~ish adrnln~strabonmay have cared less ti~ali their Brihsh counterparts about these legal considerations, securing Bri-itrsh cooperation as a coaiit~on partner did lead the US to take &em more seriously than tiley othei~vlsehkely \vould have felt

arl.rish :.~ ? b ; L x hza;!tka!l~;~;~~ far he mterz.e~;tior;,a pas:hon 2-1153 fi~i22:ngS ' ~ _ C P C T 5 ) ~ p h i rn:d:ers iii the L'S Depcr:i:r?en.: of State. A broad i n t e ~ ~ r e t a 5 orii n ~ k e s~!~-defe~zse t.\icp'non as dc;!~orizing preempw~e :nrerien~cz~as ri.vo;v:t:cr;ary 121 1 . 3 ~ ~ ~ E I ~ E ~ ~ I o C~rihcs xs. X I oiE?~-: FC~CY eh-tes ~ 2 3ttri1itije 3 put.1 ~ expressed s cozxerr, that csn!;ln~at!o:~ of a L S ~ro-pzcsiti* TO %men ene v;r?ilatera!Ey undermmed any srsid~adi co;~s:r:,~l!Ing :~:flite~lce that soverelgnw retampd. n;e concer~~ !*as 5x1 the precedent set -c+o~rld become iorrz~ion?racrice 11ot just by )i_grea? powers, but aha b, othel states engage6 m region*! conflrcts. From !his p a n t of t-ie\i, extending the self-defease excephon \%e]il beyond its cuhtoinary ~nbcxpretadon lo ~nc!tlde a generalized ~ i g h to t preempt could have destablilzing consequences adverse to a cansenrdrive ~riterrstIn sastainir~g the exi,ting order oi'it~tematnonalrelations. To borl.1 Irberaiinternatia~lahst and conservative-internario11al1stpolic? elites, ch:;nging establisl~ed norms to establish a iwitrally u-dettered right of preen~ptiveintervenilon IS fraught with problems. Put another way, the status q ~ t ill ~ : i ~ h ~ cVS l l poi~ymakers and those of other great poxers have so vested an interest is put I n jeopardt when xesort lo armed interventlola becomes

cblgeJ to d ~'*]la: .

commonplace.
Calculations of what is in the nahonal Interest (nor to mention vital interest) of the United States v a q substantially as different administrations in Washir~gton formulate then foreign-policy objectives. Human rights and l~wrnanrt~nan objectives, whether understood as part of nahonal ~ntel-est or not, have also ~nfluenced American foreign-policy cho~ces from time to time. As noted above, there 1s also an identifiable ideahonal rnotlve for some mterventlons. such as spreading form. In Chapter liberal thought or delnocracy as its polit~cal 5, we summarize, by no means exhaustively, a strong histoncal propens@ in American foreign polla*to use force not only

Factors Tnfiarencing J#P,ether or Not to

InCemene X4ilitarily

'ki;eii:e~ or xiot :rj m e n i e n e isritil amled fsrce or eilg~ge in % a r k r e is ccinda:ror~ed b) sebera! cons~derationst b t ;ar> 1 1 1 rjeglet. aad !iir!d acwss poiicy elites and i:i tile minds of iridii,d~ia'3 i.asrcjs~yla~ters In 11105t con:;ngencres LS poilan?~kess h aw not se6a fnex?~se::es as parr1ili"lriy constr~ined 12 ?n.inc:al 01. e i 0 3 0 m ; ~capacit? jnd ~ n l i i l ~ capabiIiaei, q whicl? ;he country has enjoyed in h i 1 mneasure. B) contl-dst. poiicyuiakelx in most other stares coniempIatirig aimed inrerveri:~rslisnccessardv confine rhpir act~ities regonaIly dose to home, findnciag and utJ~zing izmil~ta~-): forces at subreanhall? lotqer ievels rhan then i i n e r ~ c a n counterparts ale prolie to do in a given cont~ngency ai~ywhele in the \i.orld. Nevertlieless, even GS pohc~makcrssee upward econornlc and military llrn~ts imposed on tl~eln by thehe t ~ factors, o particularl) as 112 Afghanistan a i d Iraq, where the cuuntr). has engaged m marc than one Intenenffion m r i t h r n a relatively short span of bme or when forces deployed to a countr?. must zerniun there for a SLIbstantld perlod measured In years, lf not decades AS deieloped in greatel detail I n Chapter 8,11ndt.rstancllngs of popular support for (or opposrt-lon to) d sltting president dncl the arlmmistrabon's pollcy c11olct.s lclating to armed lntelurntzori and warfare 3150 matter as a thlrd factor, oAen dccislvel~. Presidents ernpo~ered by strong popular support (for exdn?ple, Lyndon Johnson, following hls lalzdslide elecover Senator Bang Goldwdter ~nXovenlber 1964 tola1 \lctoq~ and George \?I". Bush, inimedlately afier Septelnber rr, zooi) enjoy greater legrtirnacy 1 1 1 office and wlth ~t see the~nselves
?

3s having more freedom to make policy choices

- a greater

faah? and perhaps higher ldcelihood to use force when faced 'it1th contingenc~esthey see demanding a response of one kind or another Less popular presidents at a lot?]point i n-their legrtimacy, particularly those for whom mterventions have gone badly or have been too prolonged, tend to face sqpficant publlc or congressional opposition to armed intervenhons as well as other initiatives a president might entertam. Given the unpopularity of the war in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal that led to President Nhon's reslgnatlon from odiice i n August 1974, it was a particularly weak polnt for the presidency. Congressional leaders and other members selzed the moment with the passage of the War Powers Resolution in an effort to constrain presidents from using the executive's u a r power without 1eg;lsla.hveconcurrence. A fourth factor is the understanding policymakrng elites have of external constramts. In ~ t prosecution s of the war In Vietnam, policy elltes in the Kennedy, lohnson, and Nkon presidencies saw themselves as hmited in what they might do by the distinct possibility of Chnese or Sovlet intervention - a constra~nt that kept the United States from s t r h g certain targets m North Vietnam, much less intervening on the ground to overthrow the regime ~n Hanol Avoidlng escalatron of the conflict to a war with China (as had occurred m Korea) or the Sovlet Union effectively reduced the war to one of attnhon, mostly In the South, wlth vlctory finally achieved by Hanol m 1975 By sharp contrast, Ples~dent Bush and his advisors dld not feel constraned by external powers when they intervened m either Afghanistan or Iraq - In their assessment there belng none judged able or ~ l l i n to g use milrtary force or pull economlc or financial levers to stop them from pursuing this policy course. Moreover, they felt emboldened by what they understood as the American advantage In high-technology,

;rsc:;~or: A ~ e 2 tzpo:~? (re!)125ri31-i::vr-!v less on D wst:ca fqfrec tbar! rj-e;-i . : e i : ~ ~ 2)la: . d E beel: me CajeI, h4;lcrrp ~ v e d i:e-:s*ii? r- tcair,~:,,~i in ,,:son. t'n!liis S.;':~ma~l;, n nere L"ic fittid - --" st~ Ci:;UT_JY!i-?~adtls&~ u~ er7.a e6 s broad base sfpcpk,. i -- F s~epp~"": eii3n :n me saektk, Iraq was i ~ 1 6 rernd~risj a deep: c!!~iia?,l poy:kce %lrh sqalate ~ d e ~ n t 3i1d e s o ~ ~ ~ ? ~ ~ J ::O ;oIIs the ~ a g ~ d regtme dd S ~ m drno?:g d ill? Kurds rn the north, the h ~ n nl ii lihe ,erxer, arid rlze Shia 181 i h ~ scutk Pvtting end :~c--.p:g30s'-war i;aq :ggethex has csnsequentl1 jeen bj no i;3ez:;s a :e25> td>k In tile abbeace c i me;r::ngi,rf ?_r,te~nal or eliteifid reshalrirj r,?rrrilaitzed by poLcvrnakers, cairtdzidtkon oi ranonal (or u~:;i_t ~.akanaij:r:terests - a fi5h :actor - 1s Inole prone ao make inten.~nt-,on a vlable opn~onfor an adrnllriisttah~~i hem o : ~ puis:Anlg strck; po!:c;e; lr,tervention advoidtes ale likely TO Oxcco~;nithose \%hosee such assertiveness (0.1 arrogance) as In; h i ~ g dd\ el se consequences brp!oir?_aticcillj,e c o ~ ~ o m l ~ a l l y or rn othri %,bays\ t i i d t irmtenellrlon adlocates tend to see as by rts oppoi~elits a5 hegemony decisive leadership is t l e ~ e d (01. ci n e rmper~dlrsm), ~ I eadng pol~c)elltes in tl~osc states. paxt-acm'iarl) ~fthey are also great powers, to seek ways to cotinter OL balance artions of h4s solt A sixth fdctor is the degree to i+h~ch p ol~r~makers feel the and constlam~ng irlfluence oi lnternatlolid la\$ sovere~gnty, the noii-lntel-cent~on prilac~plerelated to rr all of wP31~11ale by one or another pollcy elite. subject to bemg d~scounted Tliesc nolms matter when pollcy elites have internallzed them ds guides or const]-amts on thelr actions, clec~dedly less so when viewed only as obstacles 1x1 the wav. Reflectilig vaqmg degrees of colnli1itment to these norms, great efhr ts 111 the past Nere made to just~fy Asner~canuztervenlions legdlty clen rf the lust~fications appedrrd disingenuous to opponents of this or that lntelventlon. Failure diplorndhcully to secure a ~esolut~oiz L n the Security Council explicrtly authorlzlng the
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$e\e7: cortse,ltir:!<rxc' \ st?~urit\C'<\II~ILE' l'<tit'~l:h~il~n 1 4 3 1 Pollc~pl:le.i, il l;iidl of ~ 1 1 ~ 1 pollciet 1 LOIXS~ i i d l r l ~that i: cltis~on of 1.r:teln,lt:v:': !egal restrai~li or? tllr LISC \>itnric in arrned ~n.~er\.~:?t:anr;iai ]lave as yct rrnfort~sri~ri ,t.inscquences within ha: :t.mGt1r,s a 1 er\ fr,lgl!e gioh,,i c:vil ~ i h ~ \%cdkiyrestirkg ~ ~ t y (,I? o r i Qa ~ c;och..l.~il? i\i :tcii;r"al:cc tot the rrik of law Arno;lg ncorc>nsendh\c i w j l i L clltc-, el 2nd : h e use of folce were seen as lt?glt~:nacrr , i e . l i i i r l -c'~'r: i s , of their t~~-~cic~st~~lChi:~gs of nahollal rnrrre~i as :hi, iicc:\lic <lrbiteru u i coilflict 111 a stdl vel y nnari hie worici t:c.ri. ;c ,i distant echo of r!l~~eydidi.s' anciclit assc'sslntXnt, rlic stlorig do what they bill ~ n cthe l %eak do lVli,it lilt%)~nllsl. Not all a l i ~ e d mtervcntior~snlc so probictnatic As q e to lescue cillzens ol o'ihc~ have drscussed, those undclt,~kcri pcmons often hdve strong mordl a11d legal jtsst~hcationsmi-?]li~lrzeciby poll~yrriake~s Comrlaltr~lt~ilt to l~iimanrtdrlaiila\\ or human nghts, then, 1s a seventh factor that i e s p o i ~ d t~ ~~ >h c lilgltirn~te ticcc!s oi thc Irllrn~n cond~tro~i, whether or rzolr lust1 hed by a nar I owl) cr~nhtsi~cd u~lrlerstrinding of ~ a ~ ~ t i o111l;~lit~st ~~,il (much less vital I I I ~ C I V S ~ )TO tl~escpoli~yrnal;ers, stoppi~ig genoude, to1 turc, stal vatJon, and other groresquc vlolatioris often crles out for irnrnedrdtc rer,~ccl~cs, per of humarl rlgl~ls haps recluir lng ; I I ~ L ~ intervent;orls to cease the bloodshed or cull:, 4 j a ~ n l ~ rn i e a couritry d ~ v ~ d e by d clvll strife. Iriteneriing to assst local ,luthorittes in the rescue of people lia~rnrdor put 1 ~ 1 jeolxudy l ~ y natural disasters t~plcally1 s by ul\Ilt,itlcm of thc govcnllncnt in question dnd usually relies on ' 4 ~ r n c d ~ O L L C : , p1111~11>;111y f'o1 loglst~calsupport opelatlons. I3cyonci l n c ~ r n ll ust~ficnt~on and claims to authority ui~deicustol-rldry lntcrnational law, wl~eii policymaltcrs see such conlmgcnc.rtas mterndtrolaal peace and secur~ly tl~cl-c rs sulxt,rnthr-eate~i~ng tlnl legal ground for the UN Security Counril to t'ikr. ncllun
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2-r this, m e RIA\* a j d an egkth :",c:i:enoc or i'actcr - <!e ex-,,n:reC: ne* eEect or! tk,z ~ u u I T CO~~I;:OZ; ~;?~ ~ ~ i i c ~ ~ s ~ ~ reaso-i;abIb: can ~ n h u p a t e fior-i: n planned interveri:ion. T!I~:; CsnEoi h~o.nj \wtk ~rcr-lsion, afcotrrse &e posrcc e er nega"i!\ e conseqt.-~:ci_.s of'; svoulci-be arrneJ i:liesl.enbon stet S U I ~ ~ : S irrg!~, cec:s,c-~r&e:s :cad LO al.old ior~i.,~encies lir, i\lxrck drrfied ;r;rervent?or, seems to the-nz ikeij to make Ihe s:%:ahon (01 le?d to ibs?ropoui:ol~are death OL desi:ucrionj an the sther hand ii the kupl~ancosts ~f anx:ed ~nteniennor! tc the ~O;>U-JCC as \sreli as to those being sent In are exyected or_ balz~ictr to be xiable as a remedy, the31 armcd lntervenuon f3n m:ch pusposes r n q seem to &err1 to Lc a Iegiornate op"ion v~~oithy of serious consideration. Y Y h t matters 1s h e e>rter?t r : , iilhid~dec~sionrrmaiiers hate ~nternzairzedthe irnportarlce of ~rteigixng the likely moral alrd iegal cullsequences of their achoris. Frnali:, poilci-ehte predisposltlons toward the land and degree of mttl"il!dterai~snl to be entesiaincd in a given alined lllter-aientron is a uinth factor of substantldl importance As noled above, niultifateral actlolis deerned appropnate, zncictdlng the use of d~meclforce, can proceed ch~ectly under U'N Secunty Gounal ausplces or, consistent ~ 7 t h Art-iclcs 51 and j2 of the Charter, I n tlie ~lzstitutlonalframeworks established m regional organrzations, Pol~hcdlPeaclers in great pou ers (and lesser powers llnked to them) have proven quite capable of'hndlng cornmon ground, but thls requires patlence and a persistent onentatlon to burldlng international consensus as d bas~s far actloll Beyond gallis to be had from a divtsion and sharing of Idbor, of course, 1s the legitimacy earned from greater rnulldateralisrn. Altho~nglimost accept the prernlse that tiiele 1s a place for drmed intervention when circurnstances mandate such a response, at the same time the norms

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fellow members of the poli f i e ideas they have and the

when met by armed resistance or. attack.