Page 1 ofl

Joanne Accolla

From: Tom Eldridge

Sent: Tuesday, February 10, 2004 3:07 PM
To: Joanne Accolla
Cc: Susan Ginsburg
Subject: Telephone interview with Mary Ryan

February 10,2004

Joanne -

Please add this to Mary Ryan's file. I just spoke with her over the phone and asked her a series of questions about the intelligence
she received while the Assistant Secretary of CA.
She told me that her staff assistants would have collected the information from INR in the morning before she arrived (she usually
arrived at around 7 a.m.). She would read it, and then her staff assistants would coordinate getting it back to INR by day's end.

To her recollection, she only received and read the Secretary's Morning Summary. She did not recall ever reading the UBL dailies
or weeklies. She believed that this was the same summary read by other high-level policy makers at State although she could not
be sure. She used materials she read in this document to initiate a meeting with other State bureaus on, e.g., a threat warning to
American citizens.

- Tom Eldridge

2/10/2004
Government Executive Magazine - 7/15/02 <font size=-l>Border and Transportation Sec... Page 3 of 5

Bonner told members of the House Government Reform

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human
Resources in April.

The Border Patrol also is one of the major agencies being

folded into the administration's proposed new Homeland
Security Department. De La Vina, a 1999 recipient of the
president's award for distinguished senior executives—the
government's top honor for civil servants—will need to
embrace inevitable change while stabilizing the Border
Patrol's workforce.
—Kellie Lunney

Mary Ryan
Assistant Secretary of State for
Consular Affairs
State Department
(202) 647-9576

the people who issue visas to foreigners at American

embassies around the world, the 900 consular officers who
work for Mary Ryan are the first line of defense against
terrorists intent on getting into the country.

Under Ryan's decade-long tenure as head of the State

Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs, consular officers
have been outfitted with better tools to catch would-be
attackers. Most notable is a sophisticated name-checking
system that can, for example, check variations in spelling of
Arabic names against the U.S. government's terrorist watch
lists. Domestically, the passport agencies that Ryan oversees
have beefed up the anti-fraud features of American
passports, which are replacing easily manipulated cut-and-
paste photos with digitized ones.

The improvements have been funded partly from visa fees

that the bureau has been allowed to reinvest—rather than
return to the Treasury— since 1994.

Despite these improvements, Ryan's bureau is part of the

overall system that failed to stop the 19 Sept. 1 1 hijackers
from entering the country and completing their terrorist
mission. Fiercely defensive of her employees, Ryan lashed
out in the weeks following Sept. 1 1 against law enforcement
and intelligence agencies that had been reluctant to share
information with consular officers, who are not themselves
law enforcement officers. In response to Ryan's vitriol,
Congress ordered those agencies to better share information

http://www.govexec.com/features/0702/HSborder.htm 12/5/2003
 1 Of 120 DOCUMENTS I

Copyright 2001 eMediaMi11Works, Inc.

(f/k/a Federal Document Clearing House, Inc.)

FDCH Political Transcripts

October 12, 2001, Friday

r^O)
TYPE: COMMITTEE HEARING A .\7SOV

LENGTH: 27399 words

COMMITTEE: TERRORISM AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SUBCOMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEE: SENATE JUDICIARY TECHNOLOGY

HEADLINE: U.S. SENATOR DIANE FEINSTEIN (D-CA) HOLDS HEARING ON TECHNOLOGICAL

HELP FOR BORDER SECURITY

SPEAKER:
U.S. SENATOR DIANE FEINSTEIN (D-CA), CHAIRMAN

LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

WITNESSES:
JAMES ZIGLAR, COMMISSIONER, INS
GLENN FINE, INSPECTOR GENERAL, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
MARY RYAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, FOR CONSULAR AFFAIRS
STEVEN CAMAROTA, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES
TONY DOONAN, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR, AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION
SYSTEMS, NEC TECHNOLOGIES
GREG SPADORCIO, AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT INDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS
PAUL COLLIER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, BIOMETRICS FOUNDATION
DAVID WARD, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION

BODY:

U.S. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY,

TERRORISM AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION HOLDS A HEARING ON
TECHNOLOGICAL HELP FOR BORDER SECURITY

OCTOBER 12, 2001

SPEAKERS:
U.S. SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN (D-CA)
CHAIRWOMAN
U.S. SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR. (D-DE)
U.S. SENATOR HERBERT KOHL (D-WI)
U.S. SENATOR MARIA CANTWELL (D-WA)

U.S. SENATOR JON KYL (R-AZ)

RANKING MEMBER
U.S. SENATOR MIKE DEWINE (R-OH)
U.S. SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS (R-AL)
U.S. SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL (R-KY)

LEXIS-NEXIS' LEXIS-NEXIS' LEXIS-NEXIS

 PAGE 1

1 of 120 DOCUMENTS

Copyright 2001 eMediaMillWorks, Inc.

(f/k/a Federal Document Clearing House, Inc.)

FDCH Political Transcripts

October 17, 2001, Wednesday

TYPE: COMMITTEE HEARING

LENGTH: 20396 words

COMMITTEE: SENATE JUDICIARY IMMIGRATION SUBCOMMITTEE

HEADLINE: U.S. SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY (D-MA) HOLDS HEARING ON ANTI- TERRORISM
BORDER CONTROLS

SPEAKER:
U.S. SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY (D-MA), CHAIRMAN

LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

WITNESSES:
JAMES ZIGLAR, INS COMMISSIONER
MARY RYAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
LINO GUTIERREZ, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
JEANNE BUTTERFIELD, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS,
ASSOCIATION
DEMETRIOS PAPADEMETRIOU, CO-DIRECTOR OF THE MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE
RICK NORTON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL BIOMETRIC, INDUSTRY
ASSOCIATION

BODY:

U.S. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION

HOLDS A HEARING ON ANTI-TERRORISM BORDER
CONTROLS

OCTOBER 17, 2001

SPEAKERS:
U.S. SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY (D-MA)
CHAIRMAN
U.S. SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN (D-CA)
U.S. SENATOR CHARLES E. SCHUMER (D-NY)
U.S. SENATOR RICHARD J. DURBIN (D-IL)
U.S. SENATOR MARIA CANTWELL (D-WA)

U.S. SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK (R-KS)

RANKING MEMBER
U.S. SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER (R-PA)
U.S. SENATOR CHARLES E. GRASSLEY (R-IA)
U.S. SENATOR JON KYL (R-AZ)
U.S. SENATOR MIKE DEWINE (R-OH)

LEXIS-NEXIS LEXIS-NEXIS* LEXIS-NEXIS

 Presentation to the AIVD

Karl Williams

ISA EXPO 2003 Houston

22 October 2003

©Crown copyright 2003

Critical Infrastructure Protection policy

announced January 1999
Built on existing CT protection
1. In public sector
2. In private sector
3. Response arrangements

CT - counter Terrorism
©Crown copyright 2003

7 March 2003
 Questions
for
Ambassador Mary Ryan

Visa processing.

Q. Ambassador Ryan, the Department of State in general, and the Bureau of Consular
Affairs in particular, was criticized heavily after September 11 for creating a so-called
"courtesy culture" in which - it was alleged — the interests of foreign travelers were
favored over the national security interests of the United States. Why do you think some
people have this perception, and why are they wrong?

Q. The Foreign Affairs Manual before September 11 stated: "it is the policy of the U.S.
government to give the [visa] applicant every reasonable opportunity to establish
eligibility. " Who wrote this policy, and did anyone in any branch of the USG question it
as sound policy before September 11, 2001?

Q. What role did Vice President Gore's Reinventing Government initiative and what role
did Congress have on the approach to customer service taken by the Bureau of Consular
Affairs?

Q. The GAO in their report (p. 18) noted that none of the visa applications of the
hijackers were filled out completely. Why did the State Department accept applications
like this before September 11, 2001? Were applicants' signatures on visa applications a
strict requirement?

Interviewing rate.

Q. The GAO, in their report, concluded that the interview rate for Saudi Arabian citizen
visa applicants was approximately 2 %. Why was the interview rate for visa applicants
who were Saudi Arabian citizens so low before September 11, 2001?

Q. In retrospect, do you think it was a mistake to not have interviewed more visa
applicants from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere before 9-11?

Visa Express.

Q. The GAO found that the Visa Express Program "did not affect the likelihood that
Saudi visa applicants would be interviewed. " (p. 19, fn. 29) . To your knowledge, did
Visa Express do anything to increase the chances that a Saudi applicant's visa would be
approved?

Q. Were Travel Agency Referral programs such as Visa Express designed, in part, to
improve security around embassies and consulates?
Congress and budget issues

Q. As the Assistant Secretary in charge of Consular Affairs, I am sure you dealt

frequently with members of Congress. Tell us, how many letters and phone calls do you
think you got from members of Congress before September 11 complaining about the
fact that you had issued a particular visa?

Q. Did you ever get the impression during your tenure in the 1990s that the budget
situation for Consular Affairs would improve, and there would be new resources devoted
to hiring consular officers?

Q. What was the effect on your staffing levels from the fact that CA was an entirely
domestic bureau and the Department's regional bureaus controlled the overseas consular
officers?

Post 9-11 response by CA

Q. CA was criticized for not performing an after-action inquiry on the visas issued to the
9-11 hijackers. For many people involved, the first time they were interviewed formally
was by the GAO or the State Inspector General in 2002. Why didn't CA perform such an
after-action review when it was clear the pivotal role they played in the 9-11 chain of
events?

INS information at consular posts

Q. Did overseas consular officials receive - in a systematic manner - any information

from the INS before September 11, 2001? In other words, did consular officials get data
they could use to reliably inform themselves about the visa overstay rates of visa
applicants from their country?

FBI

Q. What information on criminals or terrorists in the possession of the FBI did the State
Department try and include in its watch list before September 11?

Q. What efforts did State make to get this information, and what did the FBI respond
when these requests were made?

Q. When and how did the State Department get access to NCIC data?
 Questions
for
Russell Travers
Deputy Director for Information Sharing and Knowledge Development
Terrorist Threat Integration Center

Q. Nominations. You have discussed the increase in names provided to the TIPOFF
database since September 11. Are you satisfied that all agencies have nominated
the names they have maintained in their own files?

Q. Challenges. Your statement provides examples of continuing progress related to

information sharing, but alludes to continuing challenges. Why is this so hard to
fix?

Q. FBI nominations. We have learned that the FBI historically nominated very few
names to TIPOFF, because it did not focus primarily on non-U.S. person residing
abroad, and that after 9-11 has increased its submissions over 100percent. Do
you have a timetable for ensuring that the FBI submits all the names it has in its
files to the terrorist database? What is TTIC's experience with FBI and
information sharing?

Q. Nominations process. Please discuss the standards the Community uses for
including people on a watchlist and for forwarding names to the Terrorist
Screening Center.

Q. Removal of names. Is there a process for removing names from the database
who are demonstrated not to be terrorists?

Q. TTIC authorization. You have described TTIC 's authority as based on a

presidential directive and a memorandum of understanding. There seem to be a
lot of competing ideas about how the U.S. government does terrorism analysis. Is
TTIC working properly and, if so, should it be legislated?

Q. Watchlisting training. You state the watchlisting training is mandatory for all
line offices in the Counterterrorism Center. Does that include mandatory training
for intelligence officers going overseas? Intelligence officers in DIA, NSA, and
the other military human and criminal investigative services? For the FBI? Does
TTIC have the authority to ensure that proper training is conducted by all
agencies that may encounter terrorists?

Q. Names-based watchlisting. Your statement suggests that there are limitations

associated with names based watchlisting. Would you discuss some of those
limitations and provide examples of what the Community is doing to overcome
them?
Q. TIDE and biometrics. You state that the TIDE system will replace TIPOFF,
and that it will include biometrics to form true identities. What kind of biometrics
will be included? How will TIDE relate to the biometrics being captured by the
new U.S. VISIT entry program being installed by the Department of Homeland
Security?

Q. Aliases. We heard this morning that Khaled Sheik Mohamed was able to obtain a
passport using an alias. How big a problem do alias passports present in your
view? How frequent are they among al Qaeda and similar groups? How will the
new U.S. VISIT system affect terrorists' ability to use alias passports?

Q. Lost and stolen passports. We heard this morning that lost and stolen passports
play an important role in al Qaeda travel. Do you receive lost and stolen
passport information from foreign governments? Should more be done in this
area?

Q. Al Qaeda in the U.S.? Will TIDE contain information on the known locations of
terrorists? Have you received any information that terrorists are in the U.S.?

Q. Privacy. Your statement addressed advanced analytic tools and the role they can
play in watchlisting. Is TTIC reinventing Total Information Awareness?

Q. Challenges. What are the biggest challenges TTIC faces as it confronts its
mission?
 Questions
For
Donna Bucella
Director, Terrorist Screening Center

Q. Personal. Would you tell us about your background and how you came to take
the job as the director of the Terrorist Screening Center?

Q. Authority, budget, and oversight. You state that the authority for the TSC
comes from a Presidential directive. Who authorizes your budget? Which
department funds the TSC? Who provides your personnel? Do you see the need
for legislation and Congressional oversight for the TSC?

Q. Accountability. My understanding is that you are a DHS employee who reports

to the Director of the FBI. Your second in command is a DHS employee who
reports to DHS. Who is accountable for the activities of the TSC?

Q. FBI or DHS? Would you explain why the TSC is located in the FBI and not the
Department of Homeland Security? Do you think it should stay in the FBI?

Q. Al Qaeda in the U.S.? Since the TSC was established in December, have you
learned of any Al Qaeda terrorists in the U.S. through call-ins from state and local
officials?

Q. Response time. Would you describe TSC rules for response time? Has there
been any change in the response time for queries from State Department offices?

Q. Advanced passenger screening/Paris flights. Would you describe the process

by which airlines send advance passenger manifests to the National Targeting
Center and the TSC also becomes involved with that information? In December,
a flight was halted from Paris due in part to concerns that passengers may have
had links to terrorism. Was that a result of the passenger manifest being
forwarded and analyzed in the usual manner?

Q. Misidentification and Deletion Process. Please describe the misidentification

and deletion process. Have you had to delete any names so far? How does your
process of misidentification and deletion relate to the equivalent process for the
TTIC's Terrorist Identities database?

Q. Users. Which agencies are the biggest users of the TSC so far?

Q. Nomination process. Do you accept names directly into the TSC database or is
the decision about what is included in your databases made by the TTIC Terrorist
Identities Group?
 Questions
For
Peter Verga
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense,
Department of Defense

Q. National Guard support. Did you see a national security benefit to the country
from the presence of the Guard at the airports and border ports of entry following
September 11? Was this National Guard support paid for by the military or by
civilian agencies? To what extent is your office prepared to provide funding
support for national emergencies in the future?

Q. Terrorism strategy. Would you describe your understanding of the respective

strategic roles of the military and civilian border agencies in counterterrorism?

Q. Funding and staffing of border authorities. In your view, is the funding and
staffing model for civilian border authorities commensurate with their national
security responsibilities in detecting and preventing terrorist entries? Do our
border inspection agencies have the staffing to protect our borders and deal with
terrorist emergencies?

Q. Training by the military at our borders. Can you describe the military's
support to civilian agencies with respect to technologies that may be useful to
detecting illegal entries between the ports of entry staffed by inspectors from
Customs and Border Protection?

Q. Colorado Springs center. What is the role of your office in relation to

NORTHCOM's intelligence center in Colorado Springs? What is the relationship
between the terrorist intelligence obtained and disseminated there and the TTIC
Terrorist Identities database and the Terrorist Screening Center? Does the
Colorado Springs center have information flowing to and from state and local
authorities?

Q. Counternarcotics support. A representative of one of the families' groups has

asked about the existence of interagency agreements prior to 9-11, in which the
Defense Department supported Customs, INS, and the Coast Guards'
counterdrug activities. Are you familiar with such agreements? Did counterdrug
support by the military to civilian agencies assist in keeping narcotics trafficker's
airplanes out of the U.S.? Is similar support being provided to civilian authorities
engaged in counterterrorism and if not, why not?

Q. Navy arrests at sea. The media reported that the Navy halted two vessels with al
Qaeda members transporting illegal drugs. Can you confirm those reports? Does
the Navy have a plan to address terrorist access to the U.S. by sea?
 Questions
for
Assistant Secretary of State Maura Harry

Visa processing.

Q. In your testimony you refer to a "rules based process." What do you mean by
"rules based process"?

Interviews.

Q. The 9-11 families have questioned why visa applicants in Saudi Arabia were
rarely interviewed. What is different today about the interview policy for visa
applicants?

Q. Now that we are interviewing far more visa applicants, are there any examples
where expanded interviewing led to our finding terrorists and stopping them from
getting visas?

Q. How have the changes to the interview policy since 9-11 affected consular
resources?

Waiting times.

Q. What is the average waiting time for a South Korean businessperson applying for
a U.S. visa? Are there other consulates with similar waiting times? Do you see a
solution to these long waits?

Incomplete applications.

Q. One of the major concerns of the 9-11 families is that the hijackers acquired visas
without filling out their applications completely or truthfully. Is visa policy
different today on these issues such that, were the hijackers to submit their
applications today, they would be rejected for their incompleteness?

Lies on the applications.

Q. Would the kinds of lies on the hijackers' applications - about having applied for a
visa previously and about having traveled to the U.S. previously - be detected
today?

Q. What databases are automatically checked when a person applies for a visa? Do
we search for prior visa approvals before adjudicating a visa? Do we search for
prior admissions to the U.S. before adjudicating a visa?
Foreign Service Nationals.

Q. What is the current policy on the use of FSNs in visa adjudication - are they being
phased out? What security advantages are there for using FSNs with knowledge
of local conditions, populations, and documents?

Passport scrutiny.

Q. What facility and process is there for careful scrutiny of applicants' passports at
post?

The law

Q. You mentioned that you now provide consular officers with training on the use of
21(a)(3)(b). What are you telling consular trainees on the use of this provision
that was not told to them before September 11, 2001?

Q. Does the law allow a consular officer to deny a visa to someone if they believe,
based solely on an interview with the person, that the person is a terrorist? If not,
what level of evidence is required to deny a visa based on terrorism?

Q. Can a consular officer deny a visa to someone solely because they believe the
person is lying to them? If so, what provision of law do they use?

Intelligence information and Consular Affairs

Q. What steps have you taken to improve the availability to consular officers of
specific terrorist intelligence relevant to their post?

Q. How is intelligence on terrorist document fraud practices communicated to

consular officers at post?

Q. Has information been conveyed to consular officers in SA about fraud associated

with Saudi passports?

TIPQFF

Q. Have we stopped terrorists from getting visas since 9-11 using TIPOFF? How
many true TIPOFF hits have there been?

Q. What are the key aspects of TIPOFF that need to be preserved as it moves to the
TSC?

Q. What would your ideal watchlist contain, and how would it work?
DBS

Q. Is the new relationship with DHS on policy formulation working?

Q. What is DHS doing at posts and are they adding value? To your knowledge, has
DHS identified any terrorists that were not identified by TIPOFF or consular
officers during interviews?

Q. What is State's position on the DHS budget request to increase significantly their
overseas personnel involved with visa adjudication and why? If you don't favor
significant DHS increases, what do you favor for increasing border security?

Q. Should Section 428 of the Homeland Security be repealed?

Q. Should consular personnel include among them, law enforcement personnel,

among them, DS?

Q. Should fraud prevention and the law enforcement functions associated now with
DS be more incorporated into the work of CA?

Condor

Q. We now have a terrorist screening center, run out of the FBI, to screen visa
applicants against terrorist watchlists. At the same time, we have the FBI
performing a separate name check on certain visa applicants through what is
known as the Condor program. You have testified previously that there have been
125,000 Condor name checks, and that not a single applicant has been denied a
visa based on one of these checks. In addition, the CIA has declined to
participate in this program, we understand, on grounds that it adds no value
beyond that of the terrorist watchlists run by the TSC. Given these facts, is the
Condor name check program a waste of resources that makes us no safer?

Visa Waiver

Q. Are we going to make the October 4, 2004 deadline for biometric passports by the
Visa Waiver Program countries?

Q. If the Visa Waiver countries do not make the deadline, what will be the
implications for CA in terms of visas that will need to be issued to visa waiver
country citizens?

Q. Do you think that the passport requirements are enough to ensure full screening of
visa waiver country travelers? Are there other steps that could or should be
taken?
 Q. Why is pre-clearance and pre-inspection - currently used in Dublin, Montreal,
and a few other locations — not more broadly in place to move out our borders in
places such as visa waiver countries?

Western Hemishpere

Q. The fact that citizens of the U.S. and Canada are not required to present their
passport in order to cross into the United States from Canada is a significant
vulnerability in the U.S. border security system. It is widely acknowledged that
many Islamic extremist groups, including Al Qaeda, have terrorist cells in
Canada. What is the current state of study on this issue — to determine how many
U.S. and Canadian citizens cross the border each year — and what would the State
Department have to do to accommodate demand for U.S. passports in the event
such a requirement were imposed?

National Security

Q. Are we safer than we were before 9-11, and if so, why?

 PANEL ONE
Questions for Ambassador Mary Ryan and INS Commissioner Doris Meissner

1. Border management role in countering terrorism.

a. How did each of you in your capacities view the role of the consular
officer and the INS border inspector or Border Patrol in countering
terrorism?
b. What happened to the Red Book outlined in the video we just saw? Why
was production stopped and never taken up again after the 1993 WTC
bombing?
c. How well trained and how well informed were border officers for tasks
involving national security in 2000 and 2001?

2. Government organization on border management. Both of you were

responsible for key aspects of border management, Ambassador Ryan for the
consular offices overseas, and Ms. Meissner for admission through ports of entry
and preventing illegal entry along our borders, as well as both enforcing and
providing benefits under our immigration laws.
a. To what degree did the White House insist upon cohesive strategies in
border management between the State Department and the INS?
b. Should the border management functions be elevated to a cabinet level
position?

3. Border management information interdependency. You have both discussed

your efforts to support each other in the development and sharing of information
relevant to preventing entry by terrorists. Would each of you explain for us today
what type of information your counterpart had that was a priority for your
mission, and the success or failures of your efforts to share this information?
(For example, INS sought and received TIPOFF. DOS sought INS refusals at
ports of entry and benefits adjudication results, but received these types of
information inconsistently.)
 PANEL ONE
Questions for former INS Commissioner Doris Meissner (1994-2000)

1. Student tracking. As stated in the staff statement this morning, the INS did not
fund its student tracking pilot with the $800 million technology monies
appropriated by Congress, and ultimately deferred launching of a biometric
student identification card and developing the pilot program nationally.
a. Why did you not use the significant funding from Congress for technology
improvements to develop and launch the student tracking program?
b. Considering the widespread and known fraud that existed throughout the
student visa process, why was development and testing of the biometric
student identification card deferred from 1998 on? What was your view of
the use of biometrics for foreign students?
c. hi your conversation with White House counterterrorism advisor Dick
Clarke about student tracking, what were his interests and how did you
respond?

2. Entry-exit. Congress mandated that INS automate arrival and departure

information for all aliens twice before September 11, 2001. The first time was
in 1996. Congress appropriated about $40 million over three years to get the
project done. It did not get done.
a. Please tell us what action you did take to get the program developed.
b. Why did you decide to only automate entry and not exit? Overstays of
legal entrants were estimated to be in the millions.
c. You told us during the course of Commission staff interviews that you, as
well as key constituencies on the northern and southern borders, opposed
an entry-exit program on the land borders. Why?

3. Intelligence access. You stated during your interviews with Commission staff
that you did not require staff to provide you with regular intelligence briefings,
and therefore had no knowledge of the activities ofal Qaeda during your tenure
as INS Commissioner. You also told us that you did not have regular
intelligence briefings because they weren 't of good enough quality to inform
your day-to-day decisions. You stated that the poor quality was due to a number
of reasons, including the INS' limited access to timely intelligence from the
intelligence community.
a. If you had had access to timely intelligence on al Qaeda activities, how
would this information have informed INS strategy on the border (ports of
entry and Border Patrol), in the interior, and in benefits adjudications?
b. Both interior enforcement policy planners and the National Security Unit,
which was created in 1997, prepared and submitted counterterrorism
strategies to their senior managers. However, these senior managers
never responded. Several INS personnel interviewed by the Commission
have stated that, in fact, you were generally anti-enforcement and that
therefore such documents would not have received your attention or
approval. Please respond.
4. Length of permitted stay for B2 tourists. Seventeen of the 19 hijackers were
admitted for six months. This allowed them to enter in the spring of 2001 and
remain legal through the hijackings. One hijacker only requested 20 days, but
was still authorized for a six month stay. Our understanding is that the length
of permitted stay of six months for B2 tourists dated back to the 1980s, before
you became Commissioner.
a. What was the reasoning behind establishing a six month length of stay rule
for a tourist?
b. The Visa Waiver Pilot Program included a review process for countries
that sought to be brought into that program. National security was
considered. Did you or anyone with whom you worked ever raise the
issue of the six month tourist length of stay being too long? Did you or
anyone with whom you worked ever consider a rigorous country-by-
country review process for length of stay, similar to that used for visa
waiver decisions?

5. Use of immigration law to remove terrorists pre-9-11. Much has been made
since September 11 about the use of immigration law in the war on terror.
However, not much has been discussed publicly about the role of the INS in
removing terrorists via the use immigration law prior to September 11.
a. Would you outline for us how immigration law was used to remove
terrorists prior to September 11, and any special problems posed by
terrorist cases?
b. What is your view of how immigration law was used post-9/11 in the war
on terror?
 PANEL THREE
Questions for former INS Commissioner (8/01-12/02) James Ziglar

1. Entry-Exit and Student Tracking status when became commissioner. Kevin

Rooney, Acting INS Commissioner during the spring and summer of 2001, told
the Commission in his interview that he doesn 't recall entry-exit being an issue
and that the student tracking program was not in good shape during his tenure.
Please describe your knowledge of the status of these two programs when you
took over on August 6, 2001 as Commissioner.

2. Chatter in the summer of 2001. During the summer of 2001 it has been widely
reported there was much "chatter" in the air that certain persons in the
administration were aware that al Qaeda may attempt an attack, and called
meetings. Both Kevin Rooney and you told Commission staff during interviews
that neither of you recall any meetings or discussions with any other persons in
the administration in which you were told of a potential threat.

a. With 20/20 hindsight, if you had known of such information, what

resources would or could you have put forward to address the threat?
b. Describe your intelligence access after the attacks of September 11.

3. INS role in counterterrorism. What role did you see for the INS in countering
terrorism, before and after September 11th?

4. The September 11 detainees. You were tasked with helping the FBI search for
aliens with immigration violations that may have been connected to September
11. Please explain how the INS was tasked with the effort, as well as your view of
the process at the time. I note that the use of immigration law as a
counterterrorism tool changed after 9/11. Prior to 9/11, specific information was
developed about the terrorist activity and then a decision was made to include
immigration charges in the investigation if they were available. After the attacks,
immigration violators on a terrorism "tip " were arrested and held until a
determination was made whether there was a genuine nexus to terrorism or
immigration violation to further pursue.
a. hi retrospect, did this effort provide any value to the war on terror?
b. Were any terrorists caught in this manner?

Questions for James Ziglar and Commissioner Robert Bonner

1. Cooperation at ports of entry. Please describe how September 11 changed

operations at ports of entry in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. What
decisions, if any, required joint consideration?

2. Challenges on the border. Both of you have been in charge of the border
inspection process.
a. Mr. Ziglar, what do you think the biggest challenges are in ensuring
legitimate travel while assuring national security?
b. Commissioner Bonner, what are your biggest challenges today in ensuring
legitimate travel while assuring national security?
 PANEL TWO
Questions for Customs and Border Protection Inspector Jose Melendez-Perez

1. Atta and Al Shehhi's January 2001 entries. In the staff statement presented
earlier, the facts concerning Atta and Al Shehhi 's entries were presented. In your
experience and training as an 11 year veteran of the INS, I would like to run a
couple of hypotheticals by you.
a. First, if a B2 tourist applicant for admission shows an 1-20 school form
upon entry, states that he is going to school and has adjusted his status
previously from B2 to Ml vocational student, what would you do? (The
INS Field Manual says if a B2 conies in with a legitimate lack of
paperwork for schooling, he may be deferred.)
b. What happens in secondary when you check INS databases and learn that
he was an overstay by a month upon his last departure the week prior; he
has not adjusted his status to student, rather his application was still
pending when he departed; and further that he has completed his
schooling. What would you do with these facts?

2. Hazmi and Midhar's lookouts in August 2001. The Customs database TECS
and the INS lookout system NAILS did not contain records on hijackers Hazmi
and Mihdhar until late August 2001. What procedures were in place pre-9/11 if a
terrorist or criminal lookout appeared at primary inspection? What were the
procedures in place at secondary? Would the lookout, pre-9/11, have resulted in
an expedited removal? What were the other possibilities?

3. Law enforcement follow-up on Kahtani. Has anyone from the FBI, CIA or the
military officer ever discussed with you your interview and removal of Kahtani?

4. Six month length of stay for tourists. Tell us how a B2 tourist permitted length
of stay of six months is adjudicated. Does this rule curtail the inspector's
discretion to determine the appropriate length of stay for a tourist?
 PANEL FOUR
Questions for Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Robert Bonner
Former Customs Commissioner (9/20/01-3/02)

1. Student tracking and US Visit. Your agency is a client of the new student
tracking and US VISIT systems. We have seen their potential importance to
national security. Can you tell us of the successes so far with both of them?
What more work needs to be done before they are fully operational?

2. Customs practices. As we have heard, there were 33 hijacker entries, and two
referrals to Customs secondary inspection. (One (pilot Marwan Al Shehhi) upon
his first entry at JFK by a roving inspector, and the other (Waleed AlShehri) when
he went through pre-clearance in the Bahamas on May 16 2001). For Al Shehhi,
the Customs secondary inspection report simply states that a random check was
done and the inspection complete. For Al Shehri, the secondary inspection report
states that a secondary inspection was complete and Al Shehri was not permitted
entry into the Bahamas and returned to Florida by Bahamian immigration.
a. Please explain the Customs secondary inspection process and the purpose
of a rover; the purpose of pre-clearance; and the difference between self-
referrals, watchlist referrals, and random checks.
b. If Customs found an incoming passenger who showed up on a watchlist
before 9/11, was there an internal policy that required Customs officials to
alert INS inspectors at primary? What would have been the Customs
procedures in such an event?

3. One face at the border. You have talked about the importance of having "one
face at the border", referring to the merging of the immigration, customs, and
agricultural functions at the borders. You have appointed legacy Customs
officers to head nearly all of the major air ports of entry. We hear that morale is
low, especially among legacy INS employees, and that legacy employees from
both agencies are balking at being cross trained. Both Customs and INS rules
are famously complicated.
a. Can you reassure us that immigration expertise and ability to detect
terrorists at primary is greater than on September 11, 2001?
b. What training are customs inspectors receiving who are now assigned to
primary immigration inspection lines?

4. Length of permitted stay. Today at ports of entry, inspectors swipe machine

readable passports when they are presented. The computer then prompts the
inspector to enter the visa type. The computer tells the inspector to give the
B1/B2 applicant six months to stay. The hjacker Waleed Al Shehri, for instance,
only requested 20 days but was given six months.
a. Do you think the automatic six month tourist length of stay is the right
length?
b. The Visa Waiver Pilot Program includes a review process for countries
that sought to be brought into that program. National security is
considered. Have you ever considered a rigorous country-by-country
 Mary A. Ryan

Mary A. Ryan was the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs from May 1993
until July 2002.

Ambassador Ryan, who entered the Foreign Service in 1966, began her career as
Rotational Officer in Naples. She then served as Personnel Officer in Tegucigalpa,
Honduras, and as Consular Officer at the Consulate General in Monterrey, Mexico. Her
succeeding tours of duty were as Roving Administrative Officer for Africa and as Post
Management Officer in the Bureau of African Affairs in Washington. She went on to
become Career Development Officer in the Bureau of Personnel also in Washington.
Returning overseas in 1980, she served as Administrative Counselor at U.S. embassies in
Abidjan and Khartoum. Ambassador Ryan has also been a Foreign Service Inspector and
the Executive Director of the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs. She was
Executive Assistant to the Under Secretary for Management for three years immediately
before being assigned as Ambassador to Swaziland in 1988.

Returning to Washington in 1990, Ambassador Ryan served as Principal Deputy

Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Consular Affairs. Assigned as Director of the
Kuwait Task Force following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, she served in this capacity
until her assignment to the United Nations Special Commission on the Elimination of
Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, as the Commission's first Director of Operations.
She returned from New York to take up her duties as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs in the fall of 1991.

Ambassador Ryan was the recipient of the Presidential Distinguished Service Award in
1998 and 1992, the Arnold L. Raphel Award in 1996 and the Award for Outstanding
Public Service in 2001. She was promoted to Career Minister in 1992 and Career
Ambassador in 1999.

She retired from the department of State in September 2002.

Ambassador Ryan was born in New York City and has a BA and MA from
St. John's University in New York.
 STATEMENT
BY
MARY A. RYAN
BEFORE THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES

January 26, 2004

Mr. Chairman and Commissioners:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to describe the role of
the Bureau of Consular Affairs of the Department of State in our country's border
security program. My remarks will cover the period from May 1993 until July 2002, the
years I was the Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs (CA). I retired from the
Department of State in September 2002 after 36-!/2 years as a career Foreign Service
Officer during which I served eight Presidents: Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan,
Bush, Clinton and Bush.

My responsibilities as Assistant Secretary can be grouped under three general

headings: American Citizen Services, Visa Services and Passport Services. I will begin
by discussing Visa Services which I believe are of the most interest to the Commission.

When I assumed my duties as Assistant Secretary, very few posts had on-line
name checking capability, hi fact, most were still using microfiche to check the look-out
system.

The Congress, recognizing this as a serious vulnerability, authorized the

Department in FY-94 to charge a fee for machine-readable visa applications (MRV) and
for the first time in the Department's history, to keep that money. The Congress ordered
CA to "automate the world." When we were reliant on appropriated funds we were able
to automate about 6 posts a year. With MRV fee authorization and thanks to a very
talented and dedicated consular systems staff, we automated the world in 18 months.

During my tenure as Assistant Secretary, the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA)

was continually engaged in efforts to design, deploy and improve the systems that help
flag for consular officers terrorists and criminals among visa applicants. We worked hard
to make ours a state of the art system. We were constantly seeking new technologies to
strengthen our capabilities. However, if there is a single point that I want to leave with
the Commission, it is that any name check system is and will be only as good as the
information that is in it. One lesson of 9/11 is that CA had no information on any of the
19 terrorists.
Joanne Accolla
From: sdunne@9-11commission.gov
Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2003 4:03 PM
To: team5@9-11commission.gov; dcampagna@9-11commission.gov
Subject: Fwd: Interview Requests

Mary Ryan.doc (59

KB)
The attached letter to Mary Ryan is approved, except that I would change the
potential dates to the weeks of Sep 29 and Oct 6, and I believe it should all
be left justified. Team 5 should put it in final form on letterhead and then
Dianna can autopen it; Joanne and Dianna can consult on the logistics.
Thanks. Steve

Forwarded message from Joanne Accolla <jaccolla@9-llcommission.gov>

Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2003 15:52:31 -0400
From: Joanne Accolla <jaccolla@9-llcommission.gov>
Reply-To: Joanne Accolla <jaccolla@9-llcommission.gov>
Subject: Interview Requests
To: "" <sdunne@9-llcommission.gov>

Steve - attached are 2 interview requests: John Arriza, current DOS; Mary Ryan - former
DOS. The contact on team 5 is Susan Ginsburg. We also have a CIA interview request
(classified) that we will hand to you tomorrow at the staff meeting; Susan is the contact
for this request. Thanks.

Joanne M. Accolla

Staff Assistant

National Commission on Terrorist

Attacks Upon the United States

202 .401.1774

jaccolla@9-llcommission.gov

End forwarded message

Government Executive Magazine - 10/12/01 State Department official blasts intelligence agencies Page 1 of 3

Gov
Daily Briefing

October 12, 2001

State Department official blasts intelligence agencies

By Brian Friel
bfriel@govexec.com

A State Department official on Friday blasted U.S. intelligence agencies,

saying their failure to provide the agency's visa officers with information
about the suspected Sept. 11 hijackers' links to terrorists was to blame for the
hijackers' entry into the United States.

Ambassador Mary Ryan, head of the State Department's Bureau of Consular

Affairs, told members of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology,
Terrorism and Government Information, that consular officers in American
embassies and consulates could have stopped some of the terrorists from
entering the country if agencies such as the CIA and FBI shared more
information with the State Department.

"It is a colossal intelligence failure, or there was information that wasn't

shared with us," Ryan told subcommittee chairman Diane Feinstein, D-Calif,
and other senators. "What went wrong is we had no information on [the
hijackers] from intelligence and law enforcement."

Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner James Ziglar said

Thursday that 13 of the 19 suspected hijackers were issued legal visas. INS
has no record of the other six terrorist suspects.

Ryan said that Mohamed Atta, suspected to be a leader of the Sept. 11

hijackers, received a visa in May 2000. But intelligence agencies know now,
and possibly knew before May 2000, that Atta had met with operatives
associated with Osama Bin Laden in January 2000. "I'm surprised how much
we learned in the immediate aftermath" of Sept. 11, she said.

The Bureau of Consular Affairs issues visas to people who wish to enter the
United States. The INS then processes people with visas at border entry
points, and is responsible for tracking people who overstay their visas. The
FBI, CIA and other law enforcement and intelligence agencies are supposed to
provide information to the INS and the Bureau of Consular Affairs so that
their officers can block potential terrorists from entering the country.

When Feinstein said the Sept. 11 attacks revealed a failure of the visa system,
Ryan interrupted the senator and defended consular officers, reiterating her
contention that the attacks demonstrated a failure of intelligence, not visa
issuance.

http://www.govexec.com/news/index.cfm ?mode=report&articleid=21336&printerfriendlyVers=l & 9/10/2003

NewsMax.com: Inside Cover Story Page 1 of 5

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With Carl Limbacher and NewsMax.com Staff

For the story behind the story...

Sunday, July 14, 2002

State Department Detains National

Review Reporter
A reporter for National Review magazine whose
story on a controversial State Department
program described by a department official as
"an open-door policy for terrorists," was
detained by security personnel yesterday after a
contentious briefing in which he challenged a
department spokesman.

According to National Review Online (NRO), when

contributor Joel Mowbray challenged top State
Department press spokesman Richard Boucher on
his account of events at State this week,
Mowbray was detained. As he was about to leave
the briefing, a State Department official,
accompanied by four guards, asked him to stay
"to answer a few questions." When Mowbray said
he's come back later, the official said, no,
they wanted him to answer a few questions
immediately.

When Mowbray realized he was being barred from

leaving, he asked "Am I being detained?" When a
diplomatic security official who suddenly
appeared told him he wasn't being detained, he
said he was leaving. At that point, NRO said, a
guard stepped in front of him and said, "Now
you're being detained."

http://www.newsmax.com/showinside.shtml?a=2002/7/13/202600 9/10/2003
Letter to the State Department Regarding SEVIS Page 1 of3

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About the Division Letter to the State Department

of Government
& Public Affairs Regarding SEVIS
Welcome
Division Staff
March 26, 2002

Frequently Asked The Honorable Grant S. Greene, Jr.

Questions Under Secretary for Management
Site Mop Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Room 7207
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Greene:

Last Wednesday morning, the higher education community met with the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for an update on the
implementation of the Student and Exchange Visitor Information
System (SEVIS). While most of the issues surrounding SEVIS
implementation are technical and operational, there is one important
policy matter—the collection of a fee to pay for the operation of the
system—that remains to be resolved.

I wrote to Assistant Secretary of State Mary Ryan on the fee collection

issue on February 12. Ambassador Ryan rejected the recommendations
we put forward on behalf of the higher education community. Recent
events, however, have demonstrated how critical it is that we reach a
resolution and I write in hopes of arranging a meeting to discuss this
issue with you as soon as possible.

The INS is considering a fee collection system that would require

potential students to pay either with a credit card via the Internet or to
make a payment by certified check in U.S. dollars. While such a system
may work satisfactorily for visitors from some countries, it would
impose considerable hardship on potential international students from
many parts of the world. We fear that the proposed system will engender
confusion and delay for applicants, and will encourage international
students to study in countries other than the United States. The resulting
losses to our nationis long-term strategic interests will be considerable.

We believe that a better and more effective system can be implemented

http://www.acenet.edu/washington/letters/2002/03march/state.sevis.cfm 9/10/2003
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STATEMENT OF MARY A. RYAN

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CONSULAR AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BEFORE THE

Subcommittees on 21st Century Competitiveness and Select Education

Committee on Education and the Workforce
United States House of Representatives
Concerning International Students

October 31, 2001

Mister Chairman and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to explain the role of the Bureau of Consular
Affairs, and most particularly our visa processing system, in documenting foreign students to study in
the United States. I am keenly aware that the events of September 11 have heightened congressional
attention on this issue. My testimony will focus on the process and criteria we use to determine the
eligibility of applicants by foreign nationals to study in the United States. I will also note how our
activities and those of the INS are designed to complement each other.

It is a tribute to the quality of the educational system in the United States that so many foreign
nationals seek to pursue their studies here. Our student visa policy is based on the democratic values
of an open society and the general perception of the American public that foreign students make a
tremendous contribution to our nation's intellectual and academic climate as well as to our nation's
economy. In addition, a U.S. education plays an invaluable role in spreading American values
overseas and in strengthening our bilateral and person-to-person ties with countries throughout the
world.

The criteria of U.S. immigration law have for many years made it relatively easy for bona fide students
to pursue study in the U.S. There are no quotas and few restrictions. Prospective students can freely
contact U.S. academic institutions to find a program that suits their interests and financial
circumstances in very much the same manner as U.S. students.

Many of our overseas consular and public diplomacy sections, Fulbright Institutions, and other
educational organizations go to great lengths to meet the demand for information from prospective
students through outreach programs, web sites, and handouts. These generally reflect our nation's
long-standing interest in promoting study in the United States.

Consular officers evaluate student visa applications as they do all nonimmigrant visa applications - by
looking at the full range of criteria established by U.S. immigration law. The most pertinent elements
are the credibility of applicants' plans to study in the United States and whether they have the financial
means to pay for their education. As further required under U.S. law, the officer also determines
whether a student visa applicant has a residence abroad that he or she has no intention of
abandoning, and intends to depart from the U.S. upon completion of the course of study.

Every prospective student must present Form I-20A-B, Certificate of Eligibility For Nonimmigrant (F-1)
Student Status - for academic and language students, or Form

I-20M-N, Certificate of Eligibility for Nonimmigrant (M-1) Student Status - for vocational students,

http://www.ilw.com/cgi-shl/pr.pl 9/10/2003
 WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Series: Team 5 Files

Folder: Ryan, Mary

Date: 2003-2004

Pages: 51

Description: Notes and summaries of interviews with Mary Ryan

Reason for withdrawal: law enforcement sensitive; national security

classified

Box 4

Withdrawn by: kw, 12/23/2008