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House of Representatives,
Mr. WELDON. This afternoon the Military Research and Development Subcommittee
of the National Security Committee is truly privileged to meet with an honored
guest, a man of international reputation and perhaps the next President of Russia,
Aleksandr Lebed.
General Lebed has agreed to share with us today his views and to answer
questions on a broad range of issues affecting United States-Russian relations and
international security, including, for example, the safety of the Russian nuclear
arsenal, the condition and stability of the Russian Armed Forces, and the
implications of NATO enlargement.
I have had the opportunity for indepth discussions with General Lebed on three
different occasions, most recently last evening.
General Lebed resigned from the military in 1995 to run for President, where
he played perhaps a pivotal role in history. Many scholars credit Aleksandr
Lebed's political support of Boris Yeltsin's bid for reelection in a close race
against the Communist candidate, Gennadiy Zyuganov, with preserving Yeltsin's
Presidency and, indeed, with saving Russian democracy.
But history was still not done with Aleksandr Lebed. While serving President
Yeltsin as Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Aleksandr Lebed, again
acting largely on his own, negotiated an end to the bloody war in Chechnya.
Thus, a war that the Russian Government had been unable to end after several
years, Lebed successfully terminated after a few months.
Westerners support Yeltsin who helped start the war in Moldova. I stopped it.
He started the war in Chechnya. I stopped it. Who is the greater democrat then, he
or I? Is democracy war or peace? I think it is the latter.
Three months after Aleksandr Lebed ended the war in Chechnya, on October 17,
1996, President Yeltsin dismissed him from the Government. Nonetheless, opinion
polls show that Lebed remains one of the most popular figures in Russia and the
man who someday soon may be called upon to lead that still great nation.
I would wish him good luck, but that might be misconstrued as interference in
a strictly internal Russian matter.
Because the future of Russian democracy is not yet set, and the future of
United States-Russian relations is still shrouded in uncertainty, meetings like
this providing an opportunity for dialog between Americans and Russians are
vitally important.
Trust can be built between the sides only if we talk and work together and
only if we make a real effort to understand each other's problems and perspectives
on the world. I am afraid that our two nations are not making enough effort to
understand each other, to reassure each other.
Let me stress, because this has been misconstrued in the American and the
Russian media, this was a private meeting between General Lebed and eight Members
of Congress. There was no effort at that time, or later, to generate any press in
this story by the General or by Members of Congress. And those who have said
General Lebed attempted to use this as an opportunity to generate media are
patently wrong.
The story did not surface in America until 2 months after our visit when ''60
Minutes'' found out about the conversation and, in fact, did an interview and
reported both General Lebed's comments and my comments. But in no way was this
meeting an attempt by General Lebed or Members of Congress to somehow use this
fact to generate a story.
In fact, that issue itself was a very small part, perhaps 10 minutes, of a
much broader discussion about our relationship from a security standpoint between
the United States and Russia. This is very important to clarify, because the
General has been misstated in both the American media and the Russian media, and I
want to set the record straight.
The suitcase nuclear weapons, which both the United States and Russia produced
at one time, were designed for sabotage operations and could be ideal for
terrorist attacks.
Indeed, after Dr. Yablokov returned to Moscow, he was summoned to the Kremlin
to meet with senior Defense Ministry officials who sought Yablokov's help in
drafting a decree to be issued by President Yeltsin.
The decree, as Dr. Yablokov explained it, would admit the existence of these
weapons, outline a plan to ensure the security of all man-portable nuclear
weapons, and order their destruction once they had been accounted for.
General Lebed, we welcome you, and we thank you for being here. However,
before I turn the floor over to you, I want to call upon Mr. Pickett, the ranking
Democrat on the subcommittee, respectfully. I should point out that Mr. Pickett
was a member of our delegation and cochaired the meeting with General Lebed, as
well as other meetings, during our May trip last year.
Mr. Pickett.
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our special
guest today and he is going to be a witness for our committee.
I know that during our meeting last May we found a most interesting and
informative session with General Lebed. We talked at that time about the
consequences of handling weapons of mass destruction, and that will be another
issue that I am sure some of our members will want to pursue today.
And you have already mentioned the issue about nuclear warheads and the
proliferation of nuclear materials and nuclear technical expertise.
But I will also have some questions looking to not only the military security
of your country but also your economic security, the success that you are having
in moving your nation toward a market-based economy, what is happening to make
your country develop a more capable judicial system to make sure that a market
economy is going to be able to function in your country, and also that you will be
moving toward a law enforcement system that is going to be fair and effective to
make sure that the underpinnings of order that are necessary for a market economy
to function are going to be present.
So, we welcome you here today. We look forward to your testimony, and I thank
you for this opportunity to have a chance to offer you some questions.
I would remind our colleagues today that we are doing simultaneous translation
for General Lebed. So, please, when you speak, and this is especially important to
myself, we must slow down our statements so that the translator can effectively do
his job.
I would like to now turn to the distinguished chairman of our full committee,
the Honorable Floyd Spence.
Mr. SPENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not have any comments except just to
welcome our distinguished guest at our meeting today.
Thank you.
This truly is a historic day for this subcommittee and this committee. In the
12 years that I have been in Congress, I have only seen one general from Russia or
the former Soviet Union appear before this committee, and that was when Chairman
Aspin had General Akromayov here. Today is the first time we have had a Russian
general appear before our committee, and it is truly a historic day for us.
Let me thank the American Foreign Policy Council, and in particular Herman
Perchner, who is here with us today, for his cooperation in this effort.
Where are you, Herman. I want to acknowledge you. Thank you very much for your
cooperation.
I would remind our colleagues that you can listen to the General's testimony
on channel 3. Turn on your device and turn it to channel 3. His statement you
have, I believe, before you. It has been translated into English, so the press has
a copy of it.
The cold war outcome, defeat or victory for Russia? For 45 years after the end
of World War II, the confrontation of our two countries had driven the political
climate of the globe. Today the situation has changed.
On the other hand, some people say that Russia lost the cold war and therefore
should be treated as a defeated nation. Now, this is a mistake. And according to
Mikel Veli, a mistake is worse than a crime.
Now, the cold war was lost by the totalitarian Soviet system, while Russia
only benefited from the collapse of the rotten regime and from the emerging
opportunity to join civilized democratic nations. This is a victory for the forces
of democracy, our common victory.
Now, what are the threats to Russia's security? Well, Russia is not perceiving
serious military threats to herself and does not intend to threaten anyone. We
have neither muscle nor will to do so. Having lost in the 20th century 70 to 75
million human lives, we have exhausted our quotas of revolutions of peoples and
other stupid things.
Overall there are fewer and fewer problems left in the world that could be
resolved with brute force. I would like to hope that the era of the great wars is
over.
Vietnam for the United States of America, Afghanistan and Chechnya for Russia,
shows that even smaller wars against smaller nations do not guarantee victory to
the seemingly stronger side. All-out wars have not been won by anyone. Now we have
been vaccinated against imperial ambitions.
The principal threats to Russia's security come from within. They include
political instability, economic crisis, corruption, and crime, separatist leanings
in the provinces. In such conditions, the West can hardly count on Russia as a
reliable partner.
Such ideas have some currency in the United States among other places.
However, a weaker Russia is unlikely to strengthen America. Such policy, if
pursued, would only reignite mistrust and tension between our nations, playing in
the hands of those opposing democratic evolution of Russia.
I do not think that the United States of America would like to deal with a
Russia shaken by domestic conflicts, embittered and cornered Russia.
I would like to repeat once again, Russia is the center of Eurasia, and
Krasnoyarsk Krai is the center of Russia. And it is there that a new power center
should be created from where genuinely democratic reconstruction of Russia would
start.
But I can guarantee you that within a month the book will be professionally
translated and made available in the United States, made available to the Congress
in general, and your committee, Mr. Chairman, in particular.
Whom Russia regards as her allies and opponents, it depends on the political
vector of Russia. I count myself and my supporters among those forces that stand
for a strong democratic Russia relying on market economy and respecting the rules
of international law. I hope that soon such forces might claim a decisive victory
in Russia.
The natural allies of such a new Russia would include the nations with full-
fledged democracy and, above all, the countries of European culture, among whom
Russia belongs. For the West, the most farsighted policy would be consistent
assistance to Russia in the implementation of this development scenario.
Now, as regards opponents, we are not recruiting any a priori. The Russians
have a wise saying, which translates into English as: Do not measure others with
your own yardstick. The literal translation of that is: Do not impose your set of
rules on others. It is not for us to determine whether the political regime in
this or that country is good or bad, it is the internal affair of that nation and
its people.
We are prepared for mutually beneficial cooperation with America and Europe,
Asia and the Islamic world. The only possible obstacle in the way of such
cooperation may arise if any country violates the accepted rules of international
law, existing treaties, and human rights. This is a universal principle of all
democratic nations, and Russia will be no exception there.
Now, as a serviceman who has been through a whole number of armed conflicts, I
take the problem of preventing and ending wars very close to heart. Our shrinking
global village known as Earth is too fragile and vulnerable to afford even
relatively petty skirmishes.
The creation of such mobile armed forces could become an example of mutual
trust of the partner nations and become a bright symbol of a new era in
understanding and maintenance of national and international security.
The difference from the past, though, boils down to the fact that, for a
growing number of countries, maintenance of international stability and order is
claiming higher priority among its national interests. Sooner or later, all
nations will come to recognize that fact. Russia is recognizing it already.
I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, thank you esteemed members of the
committee.
[The prepared statement of General Lebed can be found in the appendix on page
32]
We will now proceed to questions. And, General Lebed, I will ask two
questions, and then we will move through the entire committee to give each member
a chance to ask their own questions with the goal of finishing the hearing by 4
p.m.
We have discussed a number of topics related to this issue, including the poor
morale and the wage arrearages for soldiers and sailors, the lack of compassion
for what many of you is a defeated army, the penetration of the military by
organized crime, the impact of drastically reduced funding on the readiness of key
military systems, including strategic systems, the physical deterioration of
military installations, especially as it relates to security of weapons of all
sorts.
All of these concerns, and I know many on the committee share these concerns,
are inextricably related to what I feel is the major issue confronting Russian and
American policymakers, and that is the security of Russian nuclear material,
nuclear weapons, and their means of delivery.
I know much has been written and said about the issue of man-portable tactical
nukes, the so-called nuclear suitcases. I do not wish to dwell simply on that
narrow subject. But rather, I want to discuss with you the broader issue of the
security of nuclear material and weapons.
So my question is: America is greatly concerned about this issue and has
backed up our concerns with American resources to help improve the security of
nuclear material and nuclear weapons. How concerned are you about the security of
Russian nuclear material and weapons? What can you tell us about the current
security?
Currently, a scandal is coming aflare in this state turmoil of Russia with the
support of the control chamber.
The essence of it is as follows: The General Prosecutor's Office has been
funded by 146 percent, yet the conversion of the military industrial complex has
been funded from the budget only by 2.5 percent against the planned volumes.
Supplies of material and equipment to the Armed Forces have been funded only by 11
percent against the planned figures.
Now, since this is the budget, it is the Government who is responsible for it,
and personally Mr. Chernomyrdin. And it is the General Procurator's Office who is
supposed to monitor compliance with the budget. So the deputies are asking a
legitimate question: Esteemed prosecutors, did you get a bribe to turn a blind eye
on what has not been funded and financed?
So, behind those figures is the entire essence of the current politics of the
Russian politically toward the Russian Armed Forces. Now, everything has been done
so that excellently prepared trained professionals, when leaving the Armed Forces,
will join the criminal ranks for them to trade arms and ammunition so that nukes
would be lost or biological or chemical weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction.
I would like to remind you that one of the reasons for the 1917 revolution
became the degradation of a huge Russian army.
So, I asked them a question: Does Russia have portable nuclear devices? The
firm answer was ''no.'' In that case, I asked, why am I here? What secret have I
leaked? And everybody there felt very awkward.
But, frankly speaking, I am not so much concerned with those nuclear devices
themselves. For purely technical reasons, they are losing their capacity very
fast.
Since 1996, I have been trying to resolve another issue. In closed cities
where unique technologies were, know-hows were created, including nuclear know-
hows, now have a very miserable existence. They are not financed everywhere. And
unique experts are seeking their fortune around the globe.
And there are no guarantees against the possibility that say a rich dictator
would buy somewhere, say in Africa, 3 square miles of land. And disguised as a
farm, there will be a laboratory built who will gather together those often unique
experts, would pay them handsomely, and gratefully they would do what they can do.
And the world will face the problem of nuclear terrorism and nuclear blackmail.
Then there would be a show, a nuclear explosion of one device, that would
level to the ground a large village somewhere. And then they can call Moscow, New
York, Tokyo, and demand any money.
There is a common principle, a general principle, that nuclear charges can be
dismantled by those who assembled them. Well, these should be precisely the people
who service those charges. They should organize storage of the nuclear waste from
those devices.
These people must be gathered. Jobs must be given to these people. These
people should be paid for loyalty. Only then can we sleep calmly.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you, General. I have one additional question, and then I
will turn to my colleague.
General, as you know, and I discussed this with you last evening, there has
been increasing public attention in the United States and around the world
regarding a January 1995 incident in which a Norwegian scientific research rocket,
launched from an island in the Bering Sea, was detected by the Russian early
warning system and mistakenly determined to be a United States submarine-launched
missile.
This set in motion the entire Russian nuclear command structure which went on
nuclear alert. A nuclear alert in this instance meant the notification of
President Yeltsin and the activation of the Chegatz, the briefcase-sized devices
used for authorizing the launch of Russia's significant nuclear arsenal.
I should note that up to this point these devices had never been activated for
an emergency. In the language of arms controllers, President Yeltsin was one
decision point away, or in more plain English, less than several minutes away from
launching an all-out nuclear attack on the United States.
According to many experts, this was the closest the United States and Russia
have ever come to nuclear Armageddon, far closer than during past incidences of
increased international tension, like the Cuban missile crisis. The idea that we
came so perilously close to nuclear war as a result of a miscalculation, rather
than any sort of provocative action, should be cause for considerable concern,
both in Russia and the United States.
In your view, how likely is it that we could see a repeat of this sort of
miscalculation or even possibly, heaven forbid, an accidental launch? Simply put,
how concerned should we be about this sort of thing? And, second, what can you
tell us about the changes, if any, that were made by the Ministry of Defense and
President Yeltsin in response to this incident?
I know from our previous meetings you are concerned about the decline of the
Russian military, both in terms of welfare and morale of the troops and the
readiness of key systems like early warning radars. Do you think either of these
problems could contribute to another incident of this type?
Thank you.
General LEBED. Thank God, Mr. Chairman, you are not quite right. Each system
that can respect itself should have one feature, and that is to be fool resistant
so a missile can be launched only by a coordinated effort of the supreme
commander, this is the President, the Minister of Defense, and head of the general
staff.
But bearing in mind some statements made by the supreme commander in the past
few months—for example, to reduce the Armed Forces by 3 million men, whereas now
we have only 1.7 million serving in the forces, and listing Germany and Japan
among the great nuclear nations, and a number of others, will indicate certain
inadequacy of the supreme commander.
Of course, it is quite dangerous when one component of the system, that is,
the nuclear button, is with a person like that. And being the commander-in-chief,
he can easily make the other two elements agree.
This nuclear suitcase that is carried for the President, which is with him all
the time, it has another function. Now it is the symbol of power; whereas, in the
past Russian monarchs would be depicted with a crown, with a scepter, and an orb.
Now this device replaces that all.
Thank you.
Mr. Pickett.
And how long do you think it will take for this conversion to reach a point
where you can say that you do indeed have a market economy?
General LEBED. Thank you. Perhaps I was not quite clear in my words. But I
never mentioned that we do have well-developed market economic relationships. I
only said that I am a proponent, that I am a supporter of market economy.
Mr. Weldon kindly informed me today of the scope and volume of American aid,
including financial aid, to Russia. And I was sitting and sadly thinking that
first American humanitarian aid was stolen. Now the same is happening to the
American money. Equally with the French money or German money and the like.
Well, all the miracles I know of, like the so-called Japanese miracle, Korean
miracle, took, say, 5 years. At least within 5 years it became clear to those
nations that they were on the right track.
Now, we have been in this transformation process for 7 years now, and the only
result is that 85 percent of the population is around the poverty line. Huge
amounts of foreign money was stolen and pocketed. As a result, I say we are
further from the market reforms and democratic transformations than we were in
1991.
So, I would like simply to ask you once again to stop financing people who
simply are not decent and who steal your money. If you stop financing them, you
will help Russia become a civilized nation. And then there will be no alternative
to the market.
Then Russia will tear off the mask that it is sick and tired of, the mask of a
country which is making believe that it has democracy, a nation pretending that it
has market relations and trying to show to the world and would at long last
commence the real democratic market reforms.
Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much, and welcome to our committee.
And it will take Russia a long time to become a real competitor for the West,
if that can happen at all, even if it starts doing everything correctly tomorrow
on. And again, because of its very poor economic conditions, Russia cannot even
think about any form of aggression.
That is why I would like to put it this way. If the NATO member countries and
the United States have spare cash to burn, if the smart Western politicians and
military strategists believe that their military might would grow tremendously by
including in NATO the Czech Republic, and if the Western taxpayers, who I think
can count money very well, if they do not object, go ahead, expand. They will each
have their follies, no problem.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to wish our guest a big
aloha. That is a Hawaiian word that means you are welcome here.
Mr. Chairman, this is a unique day. And, again with your permission, I would
like to present General Lebed with a gift from Hawaii.
I would like to say to you, General, that I consider this one of the best
experiences I have had in the Congress, and I am very grateful to you and to
Chairman Weldon for it. I think that this is going to prove to be a major step in
the relationship between Russia and the United States.
To be able to speak with you in person is not just an honor, but I think we
will find, as a result of the hearing today, Members of Congress having a new and
deeper understanding of the necessity of the relationship between Russia and the
United States.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say in Hawaiian to General Lebed, (in
Hawaiian); (in English) ''If you have salt, you have a meal.''
I would like to present you with a gift of salt from all of the islands in the
Hawaiian chain as a measure of the hospitality that we would like to extend to you
one day and that we know the Russian people are famous for.
And I would like to present to you as well, because I know this is a long day
and you need energy, chocolate-covered Macadamia nuts from the Hawaiian islands.
[Applause.]
Mr. WELDON. Now we are going to ask Mr. Abercrombie to do the hula.
[Laughter.]
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am sure you will agree, General, that it is the human
equation that is the most important one. And in Hawaii we extend our hospitality
to people all over the world, and we most certainly extend it to you as members of
this subcommittee.
I just got back from Bosnia on a congressional delegation under the Defense
appropriations chair, Mr. Young, of Florida, a bipartisan Republican and Democrat
delegation.
While there, we saw in operation the development of a police force that would
command the respect of the various communities, Serbian, Croatian, Christian,
Muslim, in the area of the zone of separation between the Federated States and the
Republic of Serbska.
While your remarks in your testimony indicate that you are thinking along the
lines of an international force which may be able to go into difficult political
situations and command respect, I would like to know, in the present circumstances
facing the former Yugoslavia, in the area in which Russia obviously has a very
profound interest, the conflict with the Serbs, the Croats, maybe extending into
Cosavo now, I would like your opinion as to whether or not the international
police task force, as envisioned by the Dayton agreement, is a possible fruitful
first step in the creation of this kind of force and that it would help to prevent
hostilities and difficulties?
General LEBED. Thank you for the kind words. Thank you for the very nice
present.
Now, your question. I have fought a lot in my life. And I have come to the
conclusion that the supreme weapon given to us by God is the reason or
intelligence. It is a weapon second to none. Actually, it is indeed the supreme
weapon. So using it, we can resolve any problem whatsoever.
And the force that has taken shape in Bosnia, the like of it will be capable
of resolving almost any task, provided two conditions are met. One, this fist will
be with brains and behind this force there will be law, or it will be backed by
law.
Thank you.
And let me add a word of welcome to General Lebed. We are very pleased and
privileged to have you before us today and to have you share your views with us.
Let me, if I may, comment that I fervently, and I think this is a view that
most of the people that I represent share, that Russia will be able to resolve the
systemic crisis, as you describe it. It is certainly completely consistent with
the best interest not only of your country but I fervently believe also our
country.
I am interested in hearing you share your views further on how you think
Russia will be able to get through the systemic crisis and whether or not you see
any risk of a coup of some kind, either from the military or other factions within
the Russian society, as you try to resolve this crisis and bring about, hopefully,
a democratic free market-oriented society.
General LEBED. Thank you. Unfortunately, we are all dealing with a vicious
circle in our relationships. Quite logically, all the democratic at heart
Congressmen and Senators of the United States are telling us Russians: First set
your house in order and then we shall talk.
Your legislation is wild, your taxes are huge, your criminals are ubiquitous.
You have more bureaucrats than gangsters. You are a rock which is impossible to
understand. No matter from which side you are approached, something is bound to
happen to you. You will either be cheated or robbed or they will beat you up or
they will even kill you.
In short, first have your problems resolved and then we shall talk. On the
other hand, the volume of problems facing Russia is such that it is almost
impossible to resolve them on our own. Probably we can, but then those methods of
putting the house in order will be far from democratic.
As far as those instances of aid and assistance provided to Russia that Gilmer
informed me of today, are elements of an unconcerted action. They were all
performed not in accordance with a single comprehensive plan.
Let us put it this way. It is like trying to make a democratic hit with an
open fist. Now, he who strikes with an open fist, he breaks his fingers. However,
if we look hard into the history of our relationship since 1985, when Peristroika
was declared, no comparable to Marshall plan program was ever offered to Russia.
And if the Western countries pursue their policy of closing their nose in
disgust, that they do not feel like helping Russia now because of its internal
problems, what they can get is a hugely criminalized territory embittered to the
possible human limits population.
I would say that the Marshall plan was a stroke of genius that helped the
United States turn their former enemies into partners, allies, and ultimately
friends.
Once again do I turn to this book. And once again I would like to repeat that
within a month this book will be delivered here, and we have here all the possible
scenarios of development.
We, Members of Congress, welcome you in our attempts to try to put some of the
ugly and dangerous legacies of the cold war between our Nation and the former
Soviet Union to rest.
Something that I had hoped would occur as a result of the demise of the Soviet
Union, but have not yet seen coming from the Government of Russia, is a full
accounting of those American servicemen who it is commonly believed were brought
to the Soviet Union at a different time, a different conflict, a conflict that is
over.
In order to bring some peace to those people's hearts and let them know their
whereabouts if they are alive and fate if they are not, I would ask you as the
former head of the Soviet military if you have any knowledge, or anyone you know
has any knowledge, of Americans who are still in Russia, either of their own free
will or against their will.
General LEBED. Thank you for raising this very humane topic. A nation which
has self-respect when sending its soldiers to war is obliged to ensure that all
the live soldiers, when the war is over, would get home, and all of those fallen
would have an individual grave.
I support this approach, and I have always been guided by these thoughts in my
life. And I am prepared to give my full support to such sacred matters. I feel
ashamed for my country.
I understand the issue you raised. It has been raised many times. Two-and-a-
half years ago we discussed this issue with the then Ambassador of the United
States, Mr. Pickering. You will agree that it is insane to keep a soldier, a
private, in prison simply because he was sent by his mother country to war.
So, when the Soviet Union was collapsing, when the doors of the prisons were
thrown open and prisoners were released, and if the people you mentioned were not
found there, we must acknowledge that probably they are not alive. But we are
obligated. We must try and find their graves.
In this matter, I am at one with you, and I am prepared to give you my full
support. Thank you.
Mr. TAYLOR. General, I very much appreciate your comments. But it is not every
day that I get the opportunity to speak with the former head of the Russian
military, and it will probably be a long time before I get another chance.
So, specifically, my question would be: Are you either now, or were you ever,
personally aware of Americans being held captive in the former Soviet Union or
now?
Mr. WELDON. Before the General answers that question, just let me repeat for
the record that General Lebed was not the head of the entire Russian military, the
Soviet military. He was a senior general who commanded certain divisions in the
Russian military and was never Defense Minister. So we just need to note that for
the record.
General LEBED. I am very grateful to the chairman, who came to help me. In
Afghanistan I was a battalion commander, in Moldova I was an army commander. But
then I was visiting all the hot beds of tension. With full responsibility, I can
tell you that I have never crossed roads with American soldiers or servicemen or
prisoners.
I have never fought them, and I can assume that they never fought me. So, we
have never dealt with any prisoners of war or wounded American servicemen. And I
can assure you that I have never heard from the people who I have dealt with about
such instances.
Thank you.
Mr. TAYLOR. If I may thank the General for his responding to the question. And
I think he knows of my request to him. I have clearly heard his request of this
committee, and I will do what I can to honor his request, and I would hope that he
would honor mine.
General, I would like to, of course, add my words of welcome to you and thanks
to you for being here. When I grew up and when you grew up, we had American
weapons pointed at your country, and you had Soviet weapons pointed at our
country.
Certainly, many years ago, when I was a young man, I never thought that we
would have this experience together. So, I appreciate this moment very much.
Let me ask you a specific question about an issue that the chairman discussed
in a general sense, and that you did as well. General, since the fall of 1997, an
intense debate has been taking place here in Washington in official circles, the
statement that you made some months ago that several nuclear suitcase bombs
disappeared from the Russian arsenal. And subsequent Senate testimony of Professor
Yablokov, who was a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and a
former aide to President Yeltsin, confirmed the loss.
Since that time accumulating evidence strongly suggests that at least some ex-
Soviet nuclear weapons are, in fact, unaccounted for. Several of these weapons,
both tactical warheads for Scud-type ballistic missiles and aerial bombs for
tactical fighter bombers, are known or, at least, strongly believed to have found
their way to Iran and North Korea.
Both of these regimes, that is Iran and North Korea, may not be the only
customers of missing nuclear bombs from your arsenal. And particularly in the case
of suitcase bombs, which cause us a great deal of concern as well, because as you
have pointed out correctly, they make very effective terrorist devices and
weapons.
In November 1997, Professor Yablokov asserted that the PLO has twice said that
it has weapons allegedly illegally purchased from Russia. Actually, to my
knowledge, the PLO has never made such a claim, although I certainly defer to
others who may have other information.
Since around 1993 and 1994 Russian intelligence and security forces have been
investigating persistent reports that, in fact, a Palestinian, whose name I have
in front of me but will not use in this forum because of the wide media coverage,
actually purchased such weapons for Palestinian use.
Many believe that there should be no doubt that this individual, or others,
have been trying to procure these suitcase bombs and that there is ample evidence
that a lot of money has changed hands in this regard. However, I can find in my
efforts no independent hard evidence that these weapons were actually acquired by
the PLO.
General LEBED. Thank you. Well, to the information you have given, I can only
say that this person is a Jordanian by nationality and he, until recently, was
publishing an issue called Alkord, and now it is called a Duell.
I checked this information from the information channels that I have access
to, and I received no confirmation. I cannot guarantee that I have checked
everything. But if I have the authority and power to do that, I will resolve this
problem.
We have come to the stage when we can destroy each other without any war. We
can destroy ourselves just because of those stockpiles of nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons because of the lack of elementary order in the country, for the
lack of responsibility of the top bureaucrats in the country.
So, I am not denying your information nor can I confirm it. Thank you.
We have three more members who are here to ask questions. And I would like to
go additionally, but I understand the time constraint we are under. By the order
of arrival when the gavel went down, we have Mr. Hilleary from Tennessee, and we
will follow that with Mr. Turner from Texas and Mr. Snyder from Arkansas.
Mr. Hilleary.
This may be a simplified question, but I have always just wanted to ask
someone in your position this question. I have never understood why the Russians,
or the Soviets, have thought that the Americans were a huge threat from an
offensive or from an aggressive standpoint.
From our point of view, and part of this hearing is about learning more about
each other, and I just want to share with you from the American point of view that
there is not many aggressive bones in our body over here.
Recently there was some talk about maybe bombing Iraq. And the big argument
over here was we do not ever do that without first being bombed ourselves. And, of
course, it never happened. And, of course, it would take much more to make an
aggressive decision to make some aggression against a powerful country like the
Soviet Union or Russia.
Anyway, I have always wondered from your perspective what it was exactly that
made the Russians think that we were going to get them and therefore it was a big
problem. And I would be interested to know what we could do to fix that
perception, if that perception still exists.
But following on with that very quickly, you talked about sending assistance
to Russia, you talked about the Marshall Plan being a great idea. But you also
talked about assistance that already goes to Russia goes into black market hands,
et cetera. What motivation can you give us that would be positive, what safeguards
could you put in place if assistance was sent.
That is a bunch of questions. Answer any one you want to. Thank you very much,
General.
General LEBED. Thank you. I am surprised that you are surprised. How can we
otherwise account for the 70 years of brainwashing and propaganda when day in and
day out newspapers, radio, magazines, television would, you know, depict the image
of a beastly scowl of imperialism. And this scowl, to look more convincing, it is
supported with a map.
On the map, you can see that the Soviet Union is surrounded by hundreds of
American military bases. And in great detail it is written there what armaments
and material was located in each military base. How many Pershings are located on
the territory of Western Germany, how many nuclear silos there are.
And then this information is supported by hard facts of life. Grenada has been
hit hard by the United States, and so has been Panama. I am just giving you a few
examples.
So that is why I told you that the old thinking is still very strong. The
inertia of the old thinking is very strong. But I say it is mutual. I believe it
was President Reagan who coined the phrase ''the evil empire.'' So I suppose he
was also properly ideologically indoctrinated.
So we simply got used to admiring each other through the rifle site. And it is
our joint psychological mission to get rid of this psychological habit.
Now, stop believing scoundrels at their words, stop taking them at their face
value: We are very progressive, we are very democratically minded, please give us
something. It sounds funny, but people give them money. So let us put an end to
such strange practices and then this problem will disappear.
Thank you.
General Lebed, thank you so much for being here with us today. It certainly, I
think, gives each of us on this committee, and perhaps in the entire room, a sense
of history to see you here.
So we all come here today grateful that we are able to sit across the table
and dialog. And I think it is certainly a dialog that needed to take place, and I
think you have done a very outstanding job of opening that dialog up for us.
As Members of Congress who stand for election every 2 years, I can certainly
tell you that each of us can appreciate why you are so personally popular in
Russia. Your candor and your demeanor today has certainly been impressive to all
of us, and we appreciate your willingness to be here.
One of our former Presidents from Texas, where I am from, President Johnson,
used to cite as one of his favorite scriptures from the Bible: ''Come let us
reason together.''
And I was impressed with your comment that you felt one of the supreme gifts
from God is our ability to reason. And perhaps some of the problems you have
raised today are a reflection of our lack of willingness to sit down and reason
with our friends in Russia.
I know that you laid out for us your belief that we should have a Marshall
plan for Russia. And I know each of us on this committee understand that it is in
our national interest in the United States to be sure we have a strong and
prosperous Russia.
Our history over a brief span of 200 years has been a good one because we have
always been able to assure our children and our grandchildren that their economic
status would be better than it was for us. And you, too, must be able to assure
your people of that to have the stability that you want for your people.
I suppose that we did not have a Marshall plan for maybe several reasons for
Russia. First of all, I think we had such confidence in the free enterprise system
that we thought once Russia moved to a democracy and to capitalism that it would
happen automatically. Our faith in that system is so great that maybe we did not
realize the difficulty you would face.
And perhaps we did not perceive, as you do, that we still believe Russia to be
a powerful nation. Oftentimes I hear comments made by people from Russia that they
think that the United States looks upon Russia now as a second-class nation. I do
not think that is the perception. I think we still hold to the old views of the
power of the Soviet Empire and that Russia continues to be a nation of some
strength.
We read about the difficulties of your military, but still I do not think
those stories have sunk through to us that you are struggling to try to put
capitalism and democracy in place. And, of course, here in the United States we
struggle with our own budget.
We have finally come to the point where we want to balance our budget, not
spend more money every year than we take in. And we do not have a lot of extra
funds, I think, to be as generous in programs as you would suggest in a Marshall
plan for Russia.
But I do think that you need to help us here today, and you have touched upon
it a couple of times, because I think we are left somewhat perplexed as to what to
do from here. Because you have told us that the investments and the aid that we
have been giving to Russia, that it falls into the wrong hands, and that if we are
going to be true partners in helping build a strong and prosperous system of
capitalism and democracy for Russia, that we have to be sure the money that we
give gets into the right hands.
And I think the same would probably apply to investments from the private
sector. In the United States today we have many people who are enjoying a
prosperous economy. We have money to invest, our stock market is reaching new
heights.
I am sure American businessmen would look, and do look, with favor upon
investment opportunities. And yet I would suppose you would tell me today that
even those investments may be falling into the wrong hands.
So, it would be easy for us to say you need to help us, because we want to be
a partner. But how do we tell the good guys from the bad guys in terms of how we
are to proceed from here.
We want the dollars that we sent to help to be used wisely, and we want
American investors who desire to be a part of what we hope to be a growing economy
in Russia, we want them to have confidence that their investments will return a
reasonable profit.
So, is there any additional advice that you can give us here that might lead
us on to the right path?
So, running for Governor in the Province of Krasnoyarsk, I would like to set a
model. I want to make a system that would be predictable, that one would be able
to understand, so that there would be a system of guarantees and privileges to
investors, both domestic and international.
Thank you.
Mr. TURNER. Thank you, General Lebed. We wish you well and God speed.
Mr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for arranging this hearing.
General, in your statement, in your list of what you call serious threats to
Russian security, you put at the top of the list the problem of proliferation and
the use of weapons of mass destruction. From your perspective as a military
leader, what nations do you see that put Russia at risk if these weapons of mass
destruction were to proliferate too?
Now, naming some country, I may indirectly turn some countries into enemies.
So, with your question, you are directly forcing me to do it. It is not too good.
Mr. SNYDER. I understand. We had the former Secretary of Defense here that
says if you call someone an enemy often enough, they eventually become their
enemy. And I understand what you are saying.
The second question, given the problems that you have articulated that the
Russian economy is having, how much economic pressure do you think there is to
export military technology that Russia would otherwise prefer not to export except
for the economic pressures?
If I might perhaps clarify. Arms sales have always been a good cash crop for
certain countries. Is Russia now in a position of having to sell arms and
technology that otherwise it would not be selling except for the status of the
economy?
General LEBED. The Soviet Union had a very powerful military industrial
complex. The military industrial complex of the Sertenian, for dozens of years it
accumulated the best minds, and enormous money was invested in it.
I can assure you once again that no serious work was done to carry out a well
thought through scientific conversion plan. What was offered was to start
producing pens or survive as you can. Our people, as we say, have nine lives as
cats. So we started surviving.
A military transport plane fell on Irkutsk, and inside there were two
fighters. The value of those fighters was $54 million. Well, no one quite can make
out how they got there.
The most sophisticated weapon systems are being sold to China, the full
nomenclature. What does China pay back with? With underpants, socks,
handkerchiefs, so-called barter deals.
Thank you.
Mr. SNYDER. Thank you, General. I appreciate you being here today and hope you
enjoy the rest of your trip in the United States.
Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman, and I thank the General for being here.
General, I told you we would try to keep you until approximately 4 o'clock. We
have one quick question from Congressman Bartlett, and then I will wrap it up and
end the session.
I am sure that each of our countries does things that mystifies the other. I
would like to mention a few things that are reported in our papers about what is
going on in Russia and ask if you can help us understand.
You frequently sail to our coast undetected. Your submarines are really quite
good. You continue, we are told, to build biological weapons. And you continue to
spend perhaps as much as $4 billion on Yamantau Mountain, which is the world's
largest most nuclear-secure facility.
You do this while, as you admit, you have very large internal needs,
infrastructure needs. You cannot pay your soldiers. You cannot meet your
obligations on the space station. And yet you continue to make these expenditures.
Can you help us understand?
General LEBED. Thank you. I find myself somewhat confused. I would like to ask
you, whose lives are supposed to be saved by those underground facilities? Bill
Clinton's big friend, Boris Yeltsin, and his family of servants? The Vice
President's big friend, Victor Chernomyrdin's family, with whom he has been
clapping hands in the joint commission for 5 years?
I wasn't invited there. What prevented you from asking Mr. Chernomyrdin. I
understand he recently visited Washington. I know about the underground facilities
built under Stalin. My headache in 1996 was to find money to mothball that
construction so that it wouldn't be flooded or destroyed by the ground shifts.
Now, I dealt with the problem, but the problem was to mothball those
facilities. And that was a big headache. I have tackled quite a few problems. But
now in the naval bases, we have 132 nuclear submarines with not dismantled nuclear
reactors, decommissioned nuclear submarines. And it is not clear where to get huge
amounts of money to disassemble and dismantle those nuclear reactors.
I don't know, it may well be that that information is just another myth about
the Soviet military threat. I think that what is being done is very strongly the
American taxpayers are being ideologically brainwashed. You see how treacherous
those Russians are. So you really must pay for NATO's expansion.
Let me just say, General, before I close, that I have over the past year on at
least nine separate occasions asked the current administration of Russia to
provide transparency on Yamantau Mountain so that we can understand.
And it is exactly for the reason that you mentioned, because it has raised so
much to me in my efforts to work with Russia that I do not have an answer. And the
way to get beyond this is to be honest and just talk about what it is, if it is a
public works project, get beyond it and focus on ways that we can cooperate
together.
But we have tried, and we have gotten several different answers on what the
purpose is. In 1991, the general in charge of the project, Sirkinov, said it was
an ore mining facility. In 1992, he said it was a site for storing food and
clothing. And in 1993 and 1994, the intelligence community in Russia said that
Russia was entitled to State secrets, which they are.
But the point is that our intelligence has no idea what the complex is, and it
is a growing concern among Members of Congress as to why this huge project
involving two closed cities, Baliretzk 15 and Baliretzk 16, would continue with
the economic problems that Russia has today. But that is an issue we have to
continue to work.
Let me just say in closing that your testimony has been candid, forthright.
You have been very open, and we appreciate that. We asked you here and invited you
here to learn, to learn your perspectives on the state of Russia, especially from
a national security standpoint.
And we understand that on many occasions you have disagreed with the current
administration in Russia, an administration that I have a great deal of respect
for and that I will continue to work with. We also respect the democracy in Russia
and your right to run for public office and to seek the support of the voters in
Russia as you are doing.
Let me also add that you have provided some very interesting ideas for us. The
need for a Marshall plan. In fact, before the hearing, since you outlined this to
us last evening, one of our former national security advisors who has sat through
this entire hearing, Sven Kramer, suggested perhaps you ought to rename that and
we ought to call it the Lebed plan, a plan to work with Russia and with you to
look for ways that we can more aggressively help Russia stabilize itself.
Over the past year I have traveled to your country 4 times out of my 14 visits
to your nation, and have been working with colleagues to try to provide a housing
mortgage financing system for the average Russian family, bypassing your banks
that take too much interest from the people and that will not loan money for long
periods of time.
On one day we will discuss the housing initiative, which I have discussed with
Speaker Selisniov and the factional leaders of the various factions in the State
Duma, even Chirnovsky. And on another day we will discuss the formation of a
nuclear waste commission to deal with the nuclear waste problem, as you have
outlined it, that both Russia and the United States have, especially that of
decommissioned nuclear submarines.
So, I say to you at the conclusion of your visit, you have sparked some new
ideas. You have sparked some new feelings, and I think you have created a new
effort at working more aggressively with you, particularly you as a leader, and we
look forward to continuing that dialog.
So, I thank you for being here, and I thank the American Foreign Policy
Council for its support of this effort, and all the staff of the National Security
Committee, who have worked so tirelessly along with my staff to make sure this
hearing has come off without a glitch.