1. MERCADO vs. MANZANO FACTS: Ernesto S. Mercado and Eduardo B.

Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. In the results of the elections, Manzano obtained the highest number of votes, however his was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Sec 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is considered in American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998. Pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 3044, the BOC tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner. On May 19, 1998, Mercado sought to intervene in the case for disqualification (case filed by Mamaril) it was however opposed by Manzano. Aug. 31, 1998, COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, it declared Manzano qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States. It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship. Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the BOC, Manzano as vice mayor of the City of Makati. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: 1. WON Mercado has the right to bring suit? 2. WON dual citizenship a ground for disqualification? 3. WON there was a valid election of citizenship? HELD: I. Right to bring suit. At the time Mercado filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective local position" under Sec 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was Marcado since the he was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

Mercado had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from Sec 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. II. Dual citizenship as ground for disqualification The disqualification of Manzano is being sought under Sec 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 those with dual citizenship. It is contended that through Sec 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has "command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office." Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition. The phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, Sec 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, Sec 20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. III. Election of Philippine Citizenship Mercado argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age of majority. COMELEC, pursuant to Sec 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that "A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by:(e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory." To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, Manzano elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Manzanos certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made under oath: 6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR "NATURALIZED") NATURAL-BORN xxx xxx xxx

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. Petition is DISMISSED.

2. Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente Ching B.M No. 914, October 1, 1999. Facts: Vicente Chin, born from a Filipino mother and a father of Chinese national on April 11, 1964. He took the bar exam, subject upon submission of proof of his Phil. Citizenship. He passed the bar at the age of 35. There was a question regarding his citizenship therefore he was not allowed to take oath. The Solicitor General was asked to give comment on the case at bar. ISSUE: WON Ching can be admitted to take oath in consideration of the status of his citizenship. RULING: The court ruled that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother and was born on 1964 where the governing Charter was the 1935 Constitution, and pursuant to Art IV Sec 1(3), the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father unless upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship . was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" and in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." He should elect his Phil. Citizenship within a reasonable period of time upon reaching the age of majority which is 21 years old at that time. With almost 14 years that elapsed upon reaching his age of majority, Ching failed to exercise such right of citizenship election beyond a reasonable period of time therefore he cannot be admitted in the Phil. Rolls of atty. for being a Chinese citizen.

3. US Vs. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487 Facts: The USA had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the military bases agreement between the Philippines and the US. The US invited the submission of bids where Eligio de Guzman & Co. Inc., responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Eventually upon confirmation of the price proposal requested by the US, he was awarded the project. But a month after the confirmation the US wrote him saying he is not qualified to receive the award because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract previously given to him, further saying that the projects has already been awarded to another company. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US. Subsequently the US filed a motion to dismiss complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. TC denied motion and issued the writ.

Issue: Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity. Held: The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietary acts, the result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued, only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contracts relates the exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the project are integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both US and Philippines, indisputably, a function of the government of highest order, they are not utilized for , nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. 4. CITIZENSHIP "No person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen." ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents. FACTS: Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. On November 5, 1985, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for re-election. Petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution. On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. ISSUE : Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. RULING: The petition is without merit. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No.(C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. If he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

5. Estrada v. Desierto Facts: This is a petition to question the legitimacy of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos assumption as President of the Philippines, filed by her immediate predecessor Joseph Estrada. Events: 1. May 11, 1998: Estrada wins the presidency with an overwhelming lead. Arroyo is elected as VicePresident. 2. October 4, 2000: Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson publicly accuses Estrada and his family of receiving jueteng payoffs. 3. October 5, 2000: Echoes of Singsons accusations resound in both the Senate and House of Representatives, mainly through opposition members /members of the Minority. 4. October 11-November, 2000: Several advisers resign, including Department of Social Welfare and Development Secretary Arroyo. Estradas allies in the Majority defect to the other camp. Past presidents and Archbishop Cardinal Sin call for Estradas resignation. 5. November 13, 2000: House Speaker Manuel Villar transmits the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. 6. November 20, 2000: the Impeachment Process formally starts, with 21 Senators as judges, and Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. presiding. 7. December 7, 2000-January 11, 2001: the Impeachment trial proper. Presentation of evidence. On January 11, 11 senators voted against the opening of the second envelope, which allegedly contains evidence to prove that Estrada indeed kept a secret bank account worth 3.3 billion pesos under the name Jose Velarde.These 11 outnumbered the 10 senators who wanted to have the envelope opened. 8. January 17, 2001: Public prosecutors resign, and the impeachment proceedings, postponed indefinitely. 9. January 18, 2001: Hundreds of people march to EDSA in a mass movement calling for Estradas resignation (dubbed the EDSA II Movement). 10. January 19, 2001: the Military withdraws support from Estrada, and more members of the Executive branch resigned. Estrada agrees to hold a snap election for President and he is not a candidate. 11. January 20, 2001: Advisers of Estrada and Arroyo start negotiations on a peaceful and orderly transfer of power, only to be cut short by Arroyos oathtaking as the 14th President of the Philippines. That same day, Estradaand his family left Malacaang. Estrada releases a statement which says he was leaving Malacaang for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He also sends a letter to both chambers of Congress saying that he [is] unable to exercise the powers and duties of[his] office. 12. January 22, 2001: Congress issues a Resolution recognizing and expressing support to the Arroyo presidency. Other countries expressed the same. 13. February 6, 2001: Sen. Teofisto Guingona is nominated by Arroyo to be her Vice-President 14. February 7, 2001: Senate passed Resolution No. 83 terminating the Impeachment Court. What the parties to this case did: 1. February 5, 2001: Estrada files a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ or preliminary injunction to enjoin Ombudsman Desierto from continuing the probe on the criminal cases filed against him (OMB Case No. 0-00-1629,1754-1758), supposedly until his term as President is over. 2. February 6, 2001: Estrada files another petition, this time a quo warranto petition, against Arroyo. He wanted to be confirmed as the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines and Arroyo only as temporary / acting president until he is able to resume his duties. 3. February 24, 2001: Respondents filed their replies to Estradas consolidated petitions. Petitioners Arguments: He has not resigned as President, and Arroyos presidency was void since the position was not vacant at the time she was sworn in. He is only temporarily unable to fulfill his duties as President, and that he is merely on leave.

 Given the above arguments, Estrada is still President, especially since he was never impeached, and he thus enjoys Presidential Immunity from all kinds of suit. The Ombudsman has to stop the investigation since he had already developed a bias against him (Estrada) from the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. Respondents Argument: The cases pose a political question (the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration) and are therefore out of the Courts jurisdiction, especially since Arroyo became president through people power, and has already been recognized as such by other governments. They compare the present case with Aquinos revolutionary government (Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino). Issue: Whether or not Estrada is merely a President on leave, which makes Arroyo just an Acting President. (Whether Estrada resigned from his position) Held: Estrada resigned from his position. There are two elements that must be present to consider someone to have resigned: first, the intent to resign, and second, the act/s of relinquishment. Both elements were evident in Estradas actuations before he left Malacaang, and so he must be considered to have resigned. Using the Totality Test (i.e., the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing material relevance on the issue), the Court found that Estradas acts to be tantamount to his resignation. For intent: the Court mainly used Angaras Diary, Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in order to intuit Estradas intent. The Diary, which was published in a major publication, described Estradas acts following the massive withdrawal of support by former Estrada allies. Estrada is quoted to have proposed a snap election of which he would not be a part. He was also shown to have conceded to the idea that he had to resign. For acts of relinquishment: the Court enumerated: a. Estrada acknowledged Arroyos oath-taking as President of the Republic. b. He said he was leaving the seat of presidency for the sake of peace but did not say that he would return or that he was leaving only temporarily. He did not specify what kind of inability it was that prevented him from discharging his presidential duties at that time. c. He thanked the people for the opportunity to serve them. The Court took this as a past opportunity. d. He also said he was ready for any future challenge, and the Court took to mean a future challenge after occupying the [presidency]. e. He called on his supporters to join efforts at reconciliation and solidarity. The Court said that these would not be possible if Estrada refuses to give up the presidency. Estrada also argues that he could not have resigned, since Section 12 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) prohibits the resignation or retirement of any public officer pending a criminal or administrative investigation for any case filed against him under RA 3019 or the Revised Penal Codes provisions on bribery. The Court interpreted this provision according to the intent of the lawmakers, and that is that the provision was included supposedly to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under [RA 3019]Estrada therefore cannot invoke this provision to violate the very practice it was supposed to prevent. 6. G.R. No. 115044 January 27, 1995 HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, and the City of Manila, petitioners, vs.

HON. FELIPE G. PACQUING, as Judge, branch 40, Regional Trial Court of Manila and ASSOCIATED CORPORATION, respondents. G.R. No. 117263 January 27, 1995 TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR. and DOMINADOR R. CEPEDA, petitioners, vs. HON. VETINO REYES and ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. These 2 cases are interrelated FACTS: The petition in G.R. No. 115044 was dismissed by the First Division of this Court on 01 September 1994 based on a finding that there was "no abuse of discretion, much less lack of or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of respondent Judge [Pacquing]", in issuing the following orders which were assailed by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim: a. order dated 28 March 1994 directing Manila Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to issue the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in favor of Associated Development Corporation (ADC). b. order dated 11 April 1994 directing mayor Lim to explain why he should not be cited for contempt for non-compliance with the order dated 28 March 1994. c. order dated 20 April 1994 reiterating the previous order directing Mayor Lim to immediately issue the permit/license to Associated Development Corporation (ADC). The order dated 28 March 1994 was in turn issued upon motion by ADC for execution of a final judgment rendered on 9 September 1988 which ordered the Manila Mayor to immediately issue to ADC the permit/ license to operate the jai-alai in Manila, under Manila Ordinance No. 7065. On 13 September 1994, petitioner Guingona (as executive secretary) issued a directive to then chairman of the Games and Amusements Board (GAB) Francisco R. Sumulong, Jr. to hold in abeyance the grant of authority, or if any had been issued, to withdraw such grant of authority, to Associated Development Corporation to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila, until the following legal questions are resolved: 1. Whether P.D. 771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai franchisers issued by local governments as of 20 August 1975 is unconstitutional. 2. Assuming that the City of Manila had the power on 7 September 1971 to issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated Development Corporation, whether the franchise granted is valid considering that the franchise has no duration, and appears to be granted perpetuity. 3. Whether the City of Manila had the power to issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated Development Corporation on 7 September 1971 in view of executive Order No. 392 dated 1 January 1951 which transferred from local governments to the Games and Amusements Board the power to regulate JaiAlai. The national government contends that Manila Ordinance No. 7065 which purported to grant to ADC a franchise to conduct jai-alai operations is void and ultra vires since Republic Act No. 954, approved on 20 June 1953, or very much earlier than said Ordinance No. 7065, the latter approved 7 September 1971, in Section 4 thereof, requires a legislative franchise, not a municipal franchise, for the operation of jai-alai. Additionally, the national government argues that even assuming, arguendo, that the abovementioned ordinance is valid, ADC's franchise was nonetheless effectively revoked by Presidential decree No. 771, issued on 20 August 1975, Sec. 3 of which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including the jai-alai) issued by local governments. On the other hand, ADC's position is that Ordinance No. 7065 was validly enacted by the City of Manila pursuant to its delegated powers under it charter, Republic Act No. 409. ADC also squarely assails the constitutionality of PD No. 771 as violative of the equal protection and non-impairment clauses

of the Constitution. In this connection, counsel for ADC contends that this Court should really rule on the validity of PD No. 771 to be able to determine whether ADC continues to possess a valid franchise. ISSUE: WON the Associated Development Corporation has a valid franchise to maintain and operate jai-alai. HELD NO. Respondent ADC does not possess the required congressional franchise to operate and conduct the jai-alai under RA 954 and PD 771. Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power "to franchise" wagers or betting, including the jai-alai, but retained for itself such power "to franchise". What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in Rep. Act No. 409, with respect to wagers or betting, was the power to "license, permit, or regulate" which therefore means that a license or permit issued by the City of Manila to operate a wager or betting activity, such as the jai-alai where bets are accepted, would not amount to something meaningful UNLESS the holder of the permit or license was also FRANCHISED by the national government to so operate. Moreover, even this power to license, permit, or regulate wagers or betting on jai-alai was removed from local governments, including the City of Manila, and transferred to the GAB on 1 January 1951 by Executive Order No. 392. The net result is that the authority to grant franchises for the operation of jai-alai frontons is in Congress, while the regulatory function is vested in the GAB. Since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila. Republic Act No. 409 (the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) which was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 gave the Municipal Board certain delegated legislative powers under Section 18. A perusal of the powers enumerated under Section 18 shows that these powers are basically regulatory in nature. The regulatory nature of these powers finds support not only in the plain words of the enumerations under Section 28 but also in this Court's ruling in People v. Vera (65 Phil. 56). - In Vera, this Court declared that a law which gives the Provincial Board the discretion to determine whether or not a law of general application (such as, the Probation law-Act No. 4221) would or would not be operative within the province, is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power. The relevant provisions of Rep. Acts Nos. 409 and 954 and Ordinance No. 7065 should be taken together and it should then be clear that the legislative powers of the Municipal Board should be understood to be regulatory in nature and that Republic Act No. 954 should be understood to refer to congressional franchises, as a necessity for the operation of jai-alai. 8. 2008-02-26 OPOSA vs. FACTORAN FACTS: The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to order the respondent, then Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. They alleged that the massive commercial logging in the country is causing vast abuses on rainforest. They furthered the rights of their generation and the rights of the generations yet unborn to a balanced and healthful ecology. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi. Held: Locus standi means the right of the litigant to act or to be heard. The SC decided in the affirmative. Under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 constitution , it states that:

The state shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Petitioners, minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded considers the rhythm and harmony of nature. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters fisheries, wildlife, off- shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. This landmark case has been ruled as a class suit because the subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest, not just for several but for ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Regalian Doctrine Valenton vs. Murciano FACTS: In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v. Murciano. Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-time occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation of the subject land in 1860. Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand, purchased the land from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground that they had lost all rights to the land by not objecting to the administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting that their 30-year adverse possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription in the Partidas and the Civil Code, had given them title to the land as against everyone, including the State; and that the State, not owning the land, could not validly transmit it. The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of "those special laws which from earliest time have regulated the disposition of the public lands in the colonies." ISSUE: "Did these special laws recognize any right of prescriptionas against the State as to these lands; and if so, to what extent was it recognized? HELD: "Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the disposition of land in the Philippines. However, it was understood that in the absence of any special law to govern a specific colony, the Laws of the Indies would be followed. Indeed, in the Royal Order of July 5, 1862, it was decreed that until regulations on the subject could be prepared, the authorities of the Philippine Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of 1786, and the Royal Cedula of 1754. Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, the court interpreted it as follows:"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands belong to the Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him. This statement excludes the idea that there might be lands not so granted, that did not belong to the king. It excludes the idea that the king was not still the owner of all ungranted lands, because some private person had been in the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law all the occupants of the public lands are required to produce before the authorities named, and within a time to be fixed by them, their title papers. And those who had good title or showed prescription were to be protected in their holdings. It is apparent that it was not the intention of the law that mere possession

for a length of time should make the possessors the owners of the land possessed by them without any action on the part of the authorities." The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him, belonged to the Crown. For those lands granted by the king, the decree provided for a system of assignment of such lands. It also ordered that all possessors of agricultural land should exhibit their title deed, otherwise, the land would be restored to the Crown. The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered the Crown's principal subdelegate to issue a general order directing the publication of the Crown's instructions:"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of the promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not x x x cultivated or tenanted, may x x x appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue of which said lands are occupied. x x x. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties interested that in case of their failure to present their title deeds within the term designated, without a just and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and they will be granted to others." On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands "wrongfully occupied" by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. Valenton construed these regulations together with contemporaneous legislative and executive interpretations of the law, and concluded that plaintiffs' case fared no better under the 1880 decree and other laws which followed it, than it did under the earlier ones. Thus as a general doctrine, the Court stated:"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did that the State remained the absolute owner.