II.

Special Rules
Laws:
Civil Code Article 1173 The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time, and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. Article 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students to apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Article 2182 If a minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardians, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. Article 2185 Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Article 2187 Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries

Family Code
Article 221 Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. Revised Penal Code Article 12 Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. the following are exempt from criminal liability: 1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court. 2. A person under nine years of age. 3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against

in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code. When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformably with the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his family who shall be charged with his surveillance and education otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some institution or person mentioned in said Art. 80. 4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. 5. Any person who acts under the compulsion of irresistible force. 6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. 7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful insuperable cause. Article 100 Civil Liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

guilty of contributory negligence, absolving Manila Electric Co. from paying damages? H: No, Manila Electric Co. did not overcome the presumption of negligence; Alberto del Rosario cannot be guilty of contributory negligence; Judgment of lower court REVERSED R: The Court is of the opinion that the presumption of negligence on the part of the company from the breakage of this wire ahs not been overcome, and the defendant is responsible for the accident. More than an hour and a half passed before anyone representing the company appeared on the scene, which resulted in Alberto del Rosarios death. Further, owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity which a child would feel to do something out of the ordinary, and the mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a companion of the age of 8 years does not, in our opinion alter the case. But even supposing that contributory negligence could in some measure be properly imputed to the deceased, - a proposition upon which the members of the court do not all agree, - yet such negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case, not having been the determining cause of the accident (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil 359).
Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co.,

Cases:
Good Father of a Family Julian del Rosario v. Manila Electric Co., No. 35283, November 5, 1932 F: The charged end of a wire fell to the ground in shrubbery close to a walkway in the City of Manila. The lighting company received a phone call about this incident at 2:25p.m. and promised to send an inspector. At 4p.m. the neighboring school turned out and as children went home, one of the boys, 9 years old, touched the wire with his hand and received a shock, which resulted in death. Petitioner, Julian del Rosario (DEL ROSARIO) is the father of Alberto del Rosario, the 9-year old boy who died from the incident. DEL ROSARIO filed an action for the purpose of recovering damages. The trial court absolved Manila Electric Co. Hence, petitioners appeal. I: Whether or not the Manila Electric Co. overcame the presumption of negligence from the breakage of the wire? Whether or not Alberto del Rosario is

G.R. No. L-4977, March 22, 1910 F: This case stems from an action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest relative. I: Whether or not Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., leaving the caps in its premises was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by David Taylor? H: No. Judgment AFFIRMED R: But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the

negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. Federico Ylarde v. Edgardo Aquino, No. L-33722, July 29, 1988 F: In 1963, private respondent Mariano Soriano (PRINCIPAL SORIANO) was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School, a public educational institution located in Tayug, Pangasinan. Private respondent Edgardo Aquino (AQUINO) was a teacher therein. At that time, Gabaldon Primary School was littered with several concrete blocks, which were acknowledged as serious hazards to the schoolchildren by another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez (BANEZ). In 1962, BANEZ started burying the huge stones one by one. Thereafter, AQUINO, gathered eighteen of his male pupils, aged ten to eleven, after class dismissal, ordering them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. The work was left unfinished. The following day, also after classes, Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue digging, one of them was Novelito Ylarde. At one point, AQUINO left the children, allegedly to get some rope. Before he left, he told them not to touch the stone. Minutes after AQUINO left, the children began to playfully jump into the pit, which resulted in a concrete block falling into the hole they had dug, trapping NOVELITO inside, pinned to the wall in a standing position. Three days later, after sustaining severe injuries, NOVELITO died. Petitioners are SPS YLARDE, and parents of NOVELITO. They filed a suit for damages against AQUINO and PRINCIPAL SORIANO. The lower court dismissed the complaint by SPS YLARDE on the following grounds: 1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education; 2) that Aquino

exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person; 3) that the demise of NOVELITO was due to his own reckless imprudence. SPS YLARDE base their action against AQUINO on Article 2176 of the Civil Code, while the complaint against PRINCIPAL SORIANO is founded on Article 2180 of the same Code. I: Whether or not under the cited provisions, both PRINCIPAL SORIANO and AQUINO can be held liable for damages? Whether or not there were acts and omissions on the part of AQUINO amounting to fault or negligence which have direct causal relation to the death of NOVELITO? H: Only AQUINO may be held liable for damages; Yes; Petition GRANTED R: The Court held that PRINCIPAL SORIANO cannot be made responsible for the death of NOVELITO. PRINCIPAL SORIANO was the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. The Court cited its ruling in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, wherein the Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a general rule, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. The exception is in the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is only the head of a school, who can be held liable. Applying said doctrine, PRINCIPAL SORIANO, cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Besides, PRINCIPAL SORIANO did not give any instruction regarding the digging. From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that AQUINO can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligence in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons. From a review of the record of the case, it is very clear that AQUINO acted with fault and gross negligence when he (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task; (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could easily be pushed or kicked

aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the childrens safety; and (5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance. In ruling that the child NOVELITO was imprudent, it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity. This should not be the case. The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for him. The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. A truly careful and cautious person would have acted in all contrast to the way AQUINO did. Were it not for his gross negligence, the unfortunate incident would not have occurred and NOVELITO would have been a grown-man of thirty-five. Jarco Marketing v. CA, GR No. 129792, December 21, 1999 F: CRISELDA and ZHIENETH were at the 2 nd floor of Syvels Department Store, in Makati City. CRISELDA was signing her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind her and found her daughter ZHIENETH crying and screaming on the floor, pinned by the bulk of the stores gift wrapping counter/structure. ZHIENETH was rushed to Makati Medical Center. Fourteen days after the incident, on 22 May 1983, she died. She was six years old. Private respondents are the parents of ZHIENETH (THE PARENTS). Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvels Department store. The stores branch manager, operations manager, and supervisor are also petitioners in this case. Petitioners will hereinafter be referred to as JARCO, et.al. THE PARENTS filed a complaint for damages against JARCO et.al.. In their answer with counterclaim, JARCO et.al, denied any liability of the injuries and consequent death of ZHIENETH. They claim that ZHIENETHs mother, CRISELDA was negligent in

exercising care and diligence over her daughter. They also claim that ZHIENETH was guilty of contributory negligence, alleging that she climbed the counter, triggering its eventual collapse. JARCO et.al., also claims that the counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong support; it never fell nor collapsed for the past fifteen years since its construction. The RTC dismissed the complaint filed by the PARENTS, ruling that 1) the proximate cause of the fall of the counter on ZHIENETH was her own misbehavior; 2) CRISELDA was negligent in her care of ZHIENETH; 3) JARCO, et.al., was not negligent in the maintenance of the counter; and 4) JARCO et.al, are not liable for the death of ZHIENETH. The PARENTS appealed, asserting that ZHIENETH should be entitled to the conclusive presumption that a child below nine years old is incapable of contributory negligence. And even if ZHIENETH was already capable of contributory negligence, it was physically impossible for her to have propped herself on the counter. In addition, the PARENTS highlighted the testimony of GERARDO GONZALES, who claimed that ZHIENETH told the doctor the counter had merely fallen on her. Moreover, the parents asserted that negligence could not be imputed to CRISELDA for it was reasonable for her to have let go of ZHIENETH at the precise moment she was signing the credit card slip. The CA decided in favor of the PARENTS, it found that JARCO et.al., were negligent in maintain a structurally dangerous counter. The CA faulted JARCO et.al. for omitting their knowledge of the dangerous counter which was brought to their attention by two former employees. The CA concluded that the incident that befell ZHIENETH could have been avoided had JARCO et.al repaired the defective counter. In addition, the CA declared that ZHIENETH, who was below seven years old at the time, was absolutely incapable of negligence or other tort. I: Whether or not the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence? H: Yes; Attributable to negligence of JARCO et.al.; Petition DENIED R: The Court distinguished the difference between accident and negligence. Accident is a

fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens. Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury (U.S. v. Barias, 23 Phil 434, 437 [1912] citing Judge Cooleys work on Torts, 3rd ed., 1324). The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the case of Picart v. Smith, Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The Court applied the test from Picart v. Smith, and concluded that without doubt, JARCO et.al., were personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the stores employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation JARCO et.al miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family. Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, the Court cited Judge Cezar S. Sangco, and applied the conclusive presumption that favors children below nine years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence.

In the course of the preliminary work upon the carburetor and its connections, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding, and that the gasoline, or other fuel was trickling freely from the lower part of the carburetor to the floor. This fact was called to QUESTs attention, but he appeared to think lightly of the matter. During a trial run, a backfire occurred on the boat, which caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames. The wreck of the Gwendoline was sold for only P150. The value of the boat before the incident occurred was P10,000. I: Whether or not Quest is free from blame? H: No; Judgment AFFIRMED R: A study of the testimony led the Court to the conclusion that the loss of this boat was chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill of Quest. Ordinarily a backfire from an engine would not be followed by any disaster, but in this case the leak along the pipeline and the flooding of the carburetor had created a dangerous situation, which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken precautions to avoid. The Court reiterated that it must be remembered when a person hold himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. The proof shows that QUEST had had ampble experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors but it does not appear that he was experienced in doing similar works on boats. QUEST did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. Such a person would have been sufficiently warned from the circumstances on the boat to cause him to take greater and adequate precautions against danger. The Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occurred but for Quests carelessness or lack of skill. As a rule, workmen who make repairs on a ship in its owners yard, or a mechanic who repairs a coach without taking it to his shop, are not bailees, and their rights and liabilities are determined by the general rules of law, under their

Experts and Professionals

Culion Ice, Fish and Electric v. PHL Motors Corp.,

G.R. No. 32611, November 3, 1930 F: The plaintiff and defendant are domestic corporations. The Philippine Motors Corporation was at this time engaged in business as an automobile agency, but, under its charter, it had authority to deal in all sorts of machinery engines and motors, as well as to build, operate, buy and sell the same and the equipment thereof. C.E. Quest, (QUEST) was at the time, the manager of Philippine Motors Corporation (PHIL MOTORS) who agreed to change the engine on the motor schooner Gwendoline, owned by Culion Ice, Fish & Electric (CULION).

contract. Though defendant cannot be held liable on the supposition that the burden of proof has not been sustained by it in disproving the negligence of its manager, the Court was nevertheless of the opinion that the proof shows by a clear preponderance that the accident to the Gwendoline and the damages resulting therefrom are chargeable to the negligence of lack of skill of Quest. US v. Pineda, No. 12858, January 22, 1918 F: Santiago Pineda (PINEDA) is a registered pharmacist of long standing and the owner of a drug store in the City of Manila. Feliciano Santos, (SANTOS) having some sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription to PINEDA for potassium chlorate. Under the supervision of PINEDA, the prescription was prepared and returned to SANTOS, who gave the doses to his sick horses. The sick horses died shortly afterwards. SANTOS submitted the remaining packages from PINEDAs pharmacy to the Bureau of Science for examination. An analysis found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate. Barium chlorate is a poison; potassium chlorate is not. An autopsy revealed that the death of the horses was the result of poisoning. Thereafter, two chemists from the Bureau of Science went to the PINEDAs drugstore and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was also found to be barium chlorate. The lower court found in favor of SANTOS. Hence this appeal, which required a construction and an application for the first time, of the penal provisions of the Pharmacy Law. I: Whether or not accident or mistake is a defense for pharmacists? H: No; Judgment AFFIRMED R: Responsibility for the quality of drugs is fixed by section 17 of the Pharmacy Law, as mended (now Administrative Code [1917], section 751): it shall be unlawful for any persontosellany prescription, drug, chemical, medicine, or position under any fraudulent name As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisions which he sells. And finally it is provided that it shall be unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison under any

fraudulent name. A literal construction of fraudulent name would strip the law of at least much of its force. It would leave the innocent purchaser of drugs, who must blindly trust in the good faith and vigilance of a pharmacist, at the mercy of any unscrupulous vendor. As to the care required of a pharmacist, it is a well-settled rule that the care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of that business which the law demands. The responsibility of the druggist to use care has been variously qualified as ordinary care, care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to practical men. In Fleet vs. Hollenkemp, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that for owners of drug stores, or persons engaged in vending of drugs and medicines by retail, the legal maxim applicable is caveat venditor that is to say, let him be certain that he does not sell to a purchaser or send to a patient one drug for another. If he does these things, he cannot escape civil responsibility, upon the alleged pretexts that it was accidental or an innocent mistake. Such excuses will not avail him. Thus, in reality, for the druggist, mistake is negligence and care is no defense. The law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be through negligence of mistake. NOTE: There is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. CA, G.R. No. 102383, November 26, 1992 F: The facts of the case begin with a phone call to BPIs Money Market Department by a woman who identified herself as Eligia G. Fernando (IMPOSTER FERNANDO) who had a money market placement as evidenced by a promissory note with a maturity date of November 11, 1981, and a maturity value of P2,464,243.19. The caller wanted to preterminate the placement. Reginaldo Eustaquio (EUSTAQUIO), Dealer Trainee in BPIs Money Market Department attended to the IMPOSTER FERNANDOs request. Details given by IMPOSTER FERNANDO matched the details in the ledger/folder of the account. But neither EUSTAQUIO nor Penelope Bulan, the officer who handles ACTUAL FERNANDOs account, or anyone else at BPI, bothered to call up ACTUAL

FERNANDO at her Philamlife office to verify the request for pretermination. IMPOSTER FERNANDO requested two checks be issued for the proceeds, one for P1,800,000 and the other for the balance, to be delivered to her office at Philamlife on October 12, 1981. Later on, IMPOSTER FERNANDO called again to change the delivery instructions; instead of the checks being delivered to her office, she would pick the checks up herself or send her alleged niece, Rosemarie Fernando, to pick them up. IMPOSTER FERNANDO impersonated the alleged neice, Rosemarie Fernando and picked up the checks. Although the checks represented the termination proceeds of ACTUAL FERNANDOs placement, not just a roll-over of the placement, the dispatcher failed to get or to require the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the placement. There is also no showing that the signature on the letter requesting the pretermination and the letter authorizing Rosemarie Fernando to pick up the two checks both of which were letters presumably handed to the dispatcher were compared or verified with ACTUAL FERNANDOs signature in BPIs file. The next day, IMPOSTER FERNANDO applied at China Banking Corporations Head Office for the opening of a current account. She was accompanied and introduced to Emily Sylianco Cuaso, Cash Supervisor, by Antonio Concepcion whom Cuaso knew to have opened, earlier that year, an account upon the introduction of Valentin Co, a long-standing valued client of CBC. The next day after that, IMPOSTER FERNANDO deposited the two checks from BPI. CBCs guaranty of prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement was then stamped on the two checks, which CBC forthwith sent to clearing and which BPI cleared on the same day. In the days following, several withdrawals were made by IMPOSTER FERNAND, all of which were allowed on the basis of the verification of the drawers signature with the specimen signature on file and the sufficiency of the funds in the account. However, the balance shown in the computerized teller terminal when a withdrawal is serviced at the counter, unlike the ledger or usual statement prepared at month-end, does not show the accounts historical data such as the accounts opening date, the amounts and dates of deposits and withdrawals. The last withdrawal left the account with a balance of only P571.61.

The day of reckoning came when ACTUAL FERNANDO went to BPI for the roll-over of her placement. She disclaimed having pre-terminated her placement on October 12, 1981. On November 12, 1981, BPI returned the two checks in controversy to CBC for the reason Payees endorsement forged. A ping-pong started when CBC in turn, returned the checks for reason Beyond Clearning Time and the stoppage of this ping pong, prompted the filing of this case. Investigation of the fraud by the Presidential Security Command led to the filing of criminal actions against four employees of BPI. BPI claimed, among other things, that CBC had the last clear chance to avoid loss occasioned by the fraudulent acts involved in the fraudulent case. Further, BPI claims that the acts and omissions of CBC are the cause that set into motion the actual and continuous sequence of events that produced the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. The Arbitration Committee ruled in favor of BPI. The Arbitration Committee belittled petitioner BPIs negligence compared to that of CBC which it declared as graver and the proximate cause of the loss of the subject checks to the imposter. The PCHC reversed the Arbitration Committees decision. BPI filed a petition for review with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Trial Court dismissed the petition but modified the order. BPI filed a petition for review under certiorari. I: Whether or not the negligence of BPI or CBC was the proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an imposter? H: BPI; Petition DENIED R: In the present petition, BPI, as drawee bank and CBC as representing or collecting bank were both negligent resulting in the encashment of the forged checks. The banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. In the present case, there is no question that the banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees. The Court applied the test from Picart v. Smith: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable case and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? The Court held that

CBC had no prior notice of the fraud perpetrated by BPIs employees, and that CBC had no way to discover the fraud at all. The Court also cited Vda. De Bataclan, et. al. v. Medina, wherein the doctrine of proximate cause was discussed at length. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. Applying the doctrine of proximate cause, BPIs contention that CBC alone should bear the loss must fail. It is not unnatural or unexpected that after taking the risk of impersonating FERNANDO with the connivance of BPIs employees, the imposter would complete her deception by encashing the forged checks. There is therefore a greater reason to rule that the proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an imposter was due to the negligence of BPI. However, while it is true that BPIs negligence may have been the proximate cause of the loss, CBCs negligence contributed equally to the success of the imposter in encashing the proceeds of the forged checks. Under these circumstances, the Court applied Article 2179 of the Civil Code to the effect that while CBC may recover its losses, such losses are subject to the mitigation of the courts. The costs shall thus be on a 60-40 ratio. BPI shall be responsible for 60% and CBC shall be responsible for 40%. NOTES: In Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Equitable Banking Corporation, wherein the Court discussed the effect of Banco de Oros (representing or collecting bank) guarantee of all prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsements at the back of the checks. In said case, the Court reiterated the rule that if the drawee-bank discovers that the signature of the payee was forged after it has paid the amount of the check to the holder thereof, it can recover the amount paid from the collecting bank. As between the drawee bank and

the representing or collecting bank the latter was negligent and thus responsible for undue payment. As to Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, the general rule is to the effect that forged signature is wholly inoperative and payment made through or under such signature is ineffectual or does not discharge the instrument. The exception to this rule is when the party relying on the forgery is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority. In this jurisdiction, we recognize negligence of the party invoking forgery as an exception to the general rule.

Fernando v. CA, G.R. No. 92087 G.R. No. 92087, May 8, 1992 F: On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurers Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued. Feliciano Bascon won the bid. However, on November 22, 1975, BERTULANO, who had lost the bid, was found dead with four other companions in the subject septic tank. They died due to asphyxia caused by the diminution of oxygen supply in the body working below normal conditions. The petitioners claim that Davao City is guilty of negligence for the following reasons: 1) that it has failed to clean a septic tank for the period of 19 years resulting to an accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas which killed the laborers; 2) that a any ventilation pipe in the toilet is lacking in the septic tank; and 3) that there was a failure by the market master to supervise the area where the septic tank is located. The trial court rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint filed by parents, guardians, and spouses of those deceased. They appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial courts decision, granting damages to the petitioners. However, the Court of Appeals rendered an Amended Decision following the filing of separate motions for reconsideration, reversing its earlier decision. I: Whether or not Davao City is guilty of negligence in the case at bar and if so, whether or not such negligence is the immediate and proximate cause of deaths of the victims hereof?

H: No; No; Judgment AFFIRMED R: The Supreme Court defined negligence as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance, which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury (Corliss v. Manila Railroad Company). The Court also defined proximate cause as that cause, which, in intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred (Vda. De. Bataclan, et.al., v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186) The Court also cited its decision in Picart v. Smith, wherein it identified the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences. To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a claimant must establish the relation between the omission and the damage. He must prove under Article 2179 of the Civil Code that the defendants negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. Further, the septic tank was constructed in 1956, since then, no accident has befallen any who have passed by or used subject septic tank, reaffirming the compliance by Davao City with the sanitary and plumbing specifications in constructing the toilet and the septic tank. The accident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on their own and without authority from Davao City opened the septic tank. An ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the risks. The victims are no exception; more so Mr. BERTULANO, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. In Culion Ice, Fish, and Elect. Co vs. Philippine Motors Corporation, the Court held that when a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. The fatal accident in this case would not have happened but for the victims negligence. Wright v. Manila Electric, No. 7760, October 1, 1914 F: Manila Electric R. R. & Light Co. (MANILA ELECTRIC) is a domestic corporation operating an electric street railway in Manila. Mr. WRIGHT drove home in a calesa one night and in crossing the tracks to enter his premises the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing the vehicle to strike one of the rails with great force. The fall of the horse and the collision of the vehicle with the rails, resulting in a sudden stop, threw Mr. WRIGHT from the vehicle and caused the injuries complained of. It is undisputed that at the point where Mr. WRIGHT crossed the tracks on the night in question not only the rails were above-ground, but that the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground, thus making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the street. It is admitted that MANILA ELECTRIC is negligent in maintaining its tracks as described, but it is contended by MANILA ELECTRIC that MR. WRIGHT was also negligent in that he was intoxicated to such an extent at the time of the accident that he was unable to take care of himself properly and that such intoxication was the primary cause of the accident. The trial court held that both parties were negligent but that Mr. WRIGHTs negligence was not as great as MANILA ELECTRICs. I: Whether or not Mr. WRIGHT was negligent by being intoxicated on the night in question? H: No; JUDGMENT AFFIRMED R: The Court held that mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does the mere fact of intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. It is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required to be exercised by an intoxicated man for his own protection than by a sober one. If ones conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober. It is impossible to say

Intoxication

that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions described. A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling, the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, this might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what his condition.

Insanity US v. Baggay 20 Phil 142 No. 6659, September 1, 1911 F: Baggay, a non-Christian, without provocation suddenly attacked Bil-liingan, with a bolo, inflicting a serious wound on her head from which she expired immediately. With the same bolo he likewise inflicted various wounds on other women, including his own mother. A complaint was filed in the court of Ilocos Sur. The same court found that Baggay was suffering from mental aberration. I: Whether or not Baggay, jr. notwithstanding that he was held exempt from criminal liability, has nevertheless incurred civil liability, with obligation to indemnify the heirs of the murdered woman and to pay costs? H: Yes; JUDGMENT AFFIRMED R: Civil liability generally accompanies criminal liability, because every person liable criminally is also liable for reparation of damage and for indemnification for harm done; but by express provision of the penal laws there may be civil liability even when the perpetrator is held to be exempt from criminal liability. Such is the case of a lunatic or demented person who in spite of his deranged mind, is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for the consequences of his acts, even though they be performed unwittingly. Calculation of risk Valenzuela v. CA, GR No. 115024, February 7, 1996

F: Ma. Lourdes Valenzeula (VALENZUELA) was driving with a companion when she noticed something wrong with her tires. She thus pulled over to the side of the road, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. As she was standing outside of the car pointing to the tools to a man who was about to help her fix the tire, she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li, (LI) the defendant in this case. VALENZUELA suffered a traumatic amputation and was confined in the hospital for twenty days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. LI denies that he was negligent, and claims that it was VALENZUELA who was negligent in the instant case. The trial court found LI guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court also found Alexander Commercial Inc (ALEXANDER INC.) jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180. The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court, but absolved ALEXANDER INC of any liability. I: Whether or not VALENZUELA was likewise guilty of contributory negligence in parking her car alongside Aurora Blvd, which is a no parking zone? H: No; REINSTATEMENT of the JUDGMENT of the RTC R: The Court agreed with the respondent court that VALENZUELA was not guilty of contributory negligence. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation. Under the emergency rule adopted by this Court in Gan v. Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly find himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without must time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear

to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. As to the liability of LIs employer, ALEXANDER INC, the Court held that the same is jointly and severally liable for damages caused. The relationship in question is based on the principle of pater familias. The primaruy liability under the concept of pater familias embodied by Art 2180 (in relation to Art 2176) of the Civil Code is quasidelictual or tortious in character. It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of their employees with courtesy vehicles. In other words, like a good father of a family, they entrust the company vehicle only after they are satisfied that the employee to whom the car has been given full use of the said company are for company or private purposes will not be a threat or menace to himself, the company, or to others. In the instant case, LI was assigned a service car by ALEXANDER INC. And the Court determined that ALEXANDER INC did not demonstrate to their satisfaction that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in entrusting its company car to LI. The Court agreed with the respondent court that the relationship in question is based not on the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees. It is only up that point however, that the agreement with the respondent court ends. Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the Court is of the opinion that ALEXANDER INC is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused by the accident. The employers liability under the concept of pater familias embodied by Article 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasidelictual or tortious in character. His liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Once evidence is introduced showing that the employer exercised the required amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the employers burden is overcome. The question of diligent supervision however depends on the circumstances of employment. Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of its

employee during the performance of the latters assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The employer is not expected to exercise supervision over either the employees private activities or during the performance of other tasks either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the employees tasks. The case at bench presents a situation of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with either their employees of managerial rank or their representatives. It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of their employees with courtesy vehicles. In other words, like a good father of a family, they entrust the company vehicle only after they are satisfied that the employee to whom the car has been given full use of the said company car for company or private purposes will not be a threat or menace to himself, the company, or to others. When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to its employee, it in effect guarantees that it is, like every good father, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege reasonably and responsively. Since most important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car, the managerial employee or company sales agent. A company owes a responsibility then to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly. The service car enabled Li to perform work outside the office. ALEXANDER INC has not demonstrated to the Courts satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in entrusting its company car to Li.