To facilitate the incorporation of the civilian population into the war effort

against international terrorists, the International Nuclear Emergency

Response Team (INERT), R.J. Godlewski, Right Truth Blog, and affiliated
parties are developing a volunteer training program to educate
interested individuals in the fields of counterinsurgency,
counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and counter-guerrilla warfare
operations.

Each monthly module will consist of a brief narrative by R.J. Godlewski,

appropriate federal military/civilian training manual/reports to review, and
review questions to stimulate debate. There are no fees associated with
these programs and no grades/certificates will be issued. This is strictly a
volunteer program for educational purposes.

Topics:

Counterinsurgency, Operations, Che Guevara, Intelligence and Analysis, Interrogation,

Explosive Ordnance Disposal, History of Terrorism, Castro and Terrorism, Psychology of
Terrorism, Urban Warfare, Medical and Trauma Education, Survival and Evasion,
Mine/Countermine Operations, Psychological Operations, Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield, Shooting and Personal Defense, Police Intelligence Operations, Special Forces
Intelligence, Combat and Operational Stress Control, Human Intelligence Collector
Operations, Carlos Marighella, Urban Threats from Guerrilla and Terrorist Organizations,
Nuclear Terrorism.

NOTICE:

Neither the author, INERT, nor any of its affiliated parties/individuals

assume any responsibility for the misuse of any information contained
within this training program. Seek competent legal advice before
engaging within any personal plan of action.

Military training
has three purposes:
(1) to save ourselves from becoming subject to others,
(2) to win for our own city a position of leadership,
exercised for the benefit of others
(3) to exercise the rule of a master over those who
deserve to be treated as slaves.
Aristotle, The Politics, Book VII
 THE INDEPENDENT COUNTERTERRORIST TRAINING MODULES
2007 R.J. Godlewski/International Nuclear Emergency Response Team [INERT]
2. Conditioning Yourself Mentally and
Physically
A New Beginning to Your Life
Quick!
QUESTION: Someone pulls
a gun on you. What do you do?
ANSWER: Take the gun
away and kill them.
Okay, so maybe that wasnt
the particular answer that you were
looking for. Staring at a gun pointed
directly at you is terrifying enough
without adding the prospects of
disarming the thug with only your
bare hands and ingenuity. Most
people, I am quite certain, would not
even consider my answer as a viable
option, but it is. You need only
condition yourself to see things from
such a different perspective:
First perceptions can be
deceiving and debilitating. Since
childhood, weve been conditioned to
think in a certain way, function in a
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certain manner, and believe in
certain beliefs. By itself, this is not
harmful; failing to adapt to situations
daily is. To survive within the world,
we need to break the prejudices that
weve carried along for the whole of
our lives.
When I began my trucking
business, I started within the
household goods industry and most
of our training program was solely to
teach us how to handle furniture and
to load the trailer properly. Because
we were required to load several
families possessions into one trailer
(sometimes including their
automobiles) and we owner-
operators were responsible for any
damages, we had to load our trailers
tight. This means fully-packed from
floor to ceiling, front to back, side to
side. If there was an inch of room, we
shoved in an inch of something be
it a broom handle, fishing pole, or
what have you.
Empty space meant that the
load could shift during transit and at
$800 per mattress, for example, I
didnt want to fork out that kind of
money because of my inability to
properly load the trailer (knowing
that the dissatisfied shipper got to
keep the damaged furniture and
probably used my money to go on a
cruise).
Few people, especially those
packing and shipping themselves
with a U-Haul truck, dont
understand the peculiarities of
moving. When we walked into the

              



 
    
     

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school as novices, we didnt think
twice about the situation either.
Whod think of standing a sofa on its This ones even easier. Can you find
end, stack a dryer on the top of a the man in the grass? Look hard
washer, and then both between the and dont be afraid to scrutinize
arms of the sofa? First-time every blade. When you find the
customers thought we were man, it will strike you as so blatantly
absolutely nuts. Same for those who obvious that the solution will leap
saw us load their precious Lexus out at you forever.
into the back of the trailer and then Eyes have a habit of playing
proceed to build a wooden deck just devilish tricks on our minds, for they
inches from their auto so that we aim to convince us of what they see
could take advantage of all of the and not what we detect. Consider the
space resting above their expensive next image:
vehicle.
To aid us in thinking outside
of the box, our instructors presented
us with a series of puzzles to keep us
imaginative in our loading. I have
reproduced some of these in the
foregoing picture. They are simple,
but most people do not understand
them until theyre told of the answer.
Are you ready for them? The
first one is reading between the lines.
The second, three degrees above
zero. The third is read: 1 ass to risk.
The fourth, walking backwards. Five
is jagged cliffs. Six, going overboard. Its a straightforward black
The final puzzle is rising prices. square. Nothing unusual in that. I
Simple, right? So is survival. At least once saw a T-Shirt with just such a
once youve been trained and black square on it with the caption
conditioned to see what it is youre Ogden, Utah at night. I thought
supposed to see. Now consider the that it was pretty funny, but not so
following image: much as to throw away my hard-
earned money on a simple T-Shirt
with nothing but a black square
decorating it. Well come back to the
significance of this black square in a
moment; I want to see if you found
the man yet.
Look at the image of the grass
again. THE MAN, in words, is
written across nearly the whole of
the picture. I bet that some of you
were looking for an individual person
hiding within the grass but I never

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said person you assumed that I received from the teller. What do you
meant living, breathing human being do?
and not a bit of the English language.
Dont jump to conclusions before ANSWER: In a split-second
youve thought out every possible you strike his right wrist with your
solution. right hand pushing his arm towards
Now, as for that ridiculous your left, holding his wrist with your
black square. Unbeknownst to most grip. Immediately, you use your left
eyes, the square isnt entirely black. hand to bend his gun backwards
Lets take a look at the inverse using the pivot point of his wrist
image: which you are currently holding
taking it away from him or knocking
it towards the ground.
Simultaneously, you deliver a
powerful kick to his groin disabling
the attacker.1 If he doesnt cease and
desist after youve acquired his gun,
you might consider shooting the
creep but I dont want you to turn
bloodthirsty on me. Thats not what
this entire program is about.
While this scenario is no
different than the first, what has
changed is that youve been given
more details on how to react. You
Wow, theres an outline of a person could have just as easily given him
within all of that blackness, right? the money and hoped that he
That person hiding in the dark wouldve taken off, but now you
is me. Actually, its a silhouette of know that theres the possibility of
me, but it could just as easily be a an alternative and that alternative
burglar or a terrorist lurking within may keep your money in your hands
the darkness instead of a simple and your life extended for another
outline. What we cant see can hurt day. That, is what this training
us as much as things we cant program is all about giving you
believe. Now that weve discovered options that otherwise might not be
that things arent always as they first considered by normal, everyday folks
appear or that our perceptions arent such as us.
always adequate, lets return to the Armed assailants are no
question that I posed at the different than we are and within the
beginning of this article and lets use foregoing, the robber probably
a little imagination: wouldve expected you to hand over
the money. The fact that you would
QUESTION: A man stops have, in the literal blink of an eye,
you leaving the confines of your struck his hand, pushed away his
bank, leveling a 9mm automatic at gun, and sent him singing into
your midsection with his right hand, another octave undoubtedly wasnt
and demands the cash that you just in his game plan. Where you lacked

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in weaponry (assuming that you you, as an innocent human being
werent armed already which is the living within the 21st Century,
state that I would always demand. Not the police. Not the
recommend), you made up for in military. Not the federal government
quickness and decisiveness of action. nor any of their international
He was probably less willing to die colleagues. You are your security
for your money than you were for analyst, recon team, and rapid
your life and this scares many bad response force all rolled into one.
people.
They want to scare you into Where your mind leads
doing things that you wouldnt
normally do. Had the person As we have already alluded to,
greeting you outside of the bank your precise mental state makes the
been someone collecting money for difference between life and death. It
the poor, you probably wouldnt have is your attitude that determines
wasted any time telling them to go whether you will likely survive a
mate with themselves. The same hazardous situation or are likely to
holds true for terrorists. die. People generally do not realize
For all of the devastation that that they hold such magical
Usama Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda powers, but we do.2 We can, should
cohorts unleash upon the world, we choose to do so, lift a rock from
their fundamental task is to convince the side of a trail and toss it within a
you to do things that you wouldnt matter of seconds to another location
normally do. They struck Spain and that eons of natural forces could not
convinced the voters to change their force it to accept. The only reason
government. They struck London that we do not view such efforts as
and convinced a substantial number miraculous is because of the
of people there to support troop frequency in our doing such
withdrawal from Iraq. Neither of extraordinary deeds.3
these things wouldve happened had Defending our lives against
the terrorists not killed innocent aggression, however, plays upon the
civilians through detonating bombs human psyche and this is perhaps
on public transit. the reason that when it comes to
What this means for you is combat, the average person freezes
that there are both people who want up. Volumes have been written on
you to change your life and others this subject, but I wish to focus on
who get in the way of your security. the 1960s research of Yales Dr.
The radical Islamist terrorists (either Stanley Milgram whose famous
al-Qaeda or copycats) want to studies of obedience and aggressive
impose their rule upon you and the behavior lend well to understanding
Brits and Spaniards have shown just terrorism.4
how easy it is to lose allies. Nobody Dr. Milgram discovered that
repeat, nobody is going to value over sixty-five percent of people
your life any higher than you yourself could be rather easily duped into
do. What this means, of course, is inflicting a lethal electrical charge on
that you can trust no one to provide a total stranger, despite pleas from
you with the level of protection that their victims.5 Although within a

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controlled laboratory environment,
these actions proved that sixty-five
percent of his subjects continued to
obey orders and increased voltage
until long after the screams had
stopped and there could be little
doubt that their victims were dead.6
If Yale subjects could be so duped
during an experiment, one can only
wonder about actual conditions
involving impressionable terrorist
recruits.
When faced with conflict,
there are only four options accorded
to an individual:
1.) FIGHT: A person can
defend themselves or in
the field of battle can take
offensive actions against
their enemy;
2.) POSTURING: A person
can flare up and present
an aggressive stance
without taking direct
action in the hope that
the enemy/aggressor may
be swayed by
threatening air about
you. This type of feint is
evident in the rather
flamboyant uniforms of
the ancients; the horrific
scream of the
Confederate Rebel Yell,
the high-pitched shrill of
Scottish bagpipes or even
the incessant barking of
your neighbors pet
Chihuahua. By
posturing, we hope to
scare our adversaries and
force them into:
3.) FLIGHT: A person
simply cuts and runs,
abandoning their own
position. Flight could be
destructive in that you
abandoned your
comrades or home or it
can be partially beneficial
in that you live to fight
again another day,
depending upon the
strategic value of the
tactical loss;
4.) SUBMIT: A person can
simply quit and
surrender to the enemy
and accept whatever
actions their adversaries
have planned for the
vanquished.
There may be various
combinations of these actions such
as posturing during fighting but
there are no other options available
while youre still alive. So it behooves
us to consider what makes a person
stand their ground and fight (I need
not ameliorate the actions of
submission or flight, for this would
be akin to lecturing a sports team on
a how best to lose).
Returning to Dr. Milgrams
research, there are two basic
factors which motivate soldiers
(and civilians) to fight and these are
the personal relationships between

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ones superiors or associates, and the teammates, being in a group has
physical and/or emotional distance definite advantages for success.
from ones intended victims. Everyone wants to win and few care
to be known as the weakest link,
the player that blew the Super Bowl
by dropping what wouldve been the
winning touchdown.
In ancient Sparta and Thebes
they carried this camaraderie a bit
further, placing homosexual lovers
side by side in battle in the hope that
they would stand firm (no pun
intended) and protect one another.7
Apparently, inability to fight well
would prove too unromantic to ones
mate. Sorry, I cannot consider the
plight of impotence on the battlefield
with a straight face, but I do know
Peer pressure, as any Junior that whenever Sara was near me I
High student understands, is a very was more motivated to conduct
powerful motivating factor. So, too, myself in a proper manner. On more
is obedience towards ones than one occasion, I stood tall in the
supervisors and both can command saddle whenever danger threatened
an otherwise apathetic individuals her.
attention. Lets consider some ways Groups of like-minded
in which each can empower us to do individuals empower us for both
things which we might not otherwise good and bad. Studies have shown,
do. for example, that terrible crimes can
First, lets discuss The Boss, occur within large crowds with a very
and Im not referencing Bruce low likelihood of bystander
Springsteen here. Whether on the interference a trait known as
battlefield or in the home office, we diffusion of responsibility.8 Such
tend to remain on our toes whenever situations grant us a feeling of
the boss is around. We just dont anonymity and when coupled with
want to screw up in their presence accountability upon the battlefield,
and become subject to their we can find ourselves more
insinuation that we lack ability to do acceptable to killing.9 This leads us
our jobs well. Some of you might to the other side of the equation,
actually like your bosses and this remaining distant from our
only compounds the situation. For adversaries in the hope that we can
example, we might work twice as overcome our resistance to killing.
hard for fear that if we screw up, Very, very few individuals can
theyll replace them with someone a freely take the life of another human
whole lot worse. Either way, we just person. It goes against the
dont want to buck the trend. preservation of species trait that
As for our co-workers, prevents like-species such as
shipmates, platoon pals, and charging elk from heading into

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extinction. So strong is this act of never see the brains explode when a
mutual self-preservation that many high-powered round sends a
soldiers during the American Civil headless corpse racing down the field
War routinely fired over the heads of as an infinite number of electrical
their enemies or even loaded their pulses flood to the bodys limbs
weapons repeatedly without firing in simultaneously. When physical
an attempt to look like they were distance can no longer be applied, we
fighting. In the world of animal try methods to increase the
activity, we are no different than emotional distance between us and
rattlesnakes that bite foes with our victims.
poisonous fangs but wrestle other We feel better about killing if
rattlers or piranhas that eat we cant see the faces of our victims
anything that moves but beat the and if launching attacks from afar
hell out of each other with their cant be achieved, we simply make
tails.10 Yet, humans do kill each other the victims look the other way.
without much concern for the Literally. Ever wonder why
preservation of our species. executions are carried out with a bag
We kill by distancing over ones head or a bullet to the
ourselves from our victims, either back of the skull?
physically or emotionally. The Forcing death upon another
further that we can remove ourselves individual seems to be easier if we,
from our enemies, the easier it is for the executioner, do not have to gaze
us to kill them. Nobody ever pays upon the eyes of the victim. We cover
much attention to a B-52 dropping the heads of those we hang, place the
thousands of tons of ordinance from gun to the back of a head, and even
six miles up and thousands of miles find it more acceptable to vanquish a
away, but a firefight within the fleeing enemy than a charging one.
rooms of some Iraqi home unnerves So long as we do not have to gaze
us. into ones eyes, we seem prepared to
One on one human conflict deliver the ultimate blow. Yet,
cannot be hidden and if it cannot be humanity does not simply stop there
hidden it cannot be denied. Few when it comes to distancing
soldiers through history have been ourselves emotionally from the
able to stare their foe straight in the enemy. Not by a long shot.
face and take them down. Those that We seem to service our sanity
do are known quite accurately as by dehumanizing our adversaries
warriors. The rest of us mere mortals through one or more of the
seek ways in which we can push a following:11
button here or click a mouse there
and read about the impersonal death Cultural Distance: By instituting
of X number of enemy soldiers at racial and ethnical differences, we
some bland and never visited plot of allow a feeling of superiority to
real estate. diminish our deeds;
Perhaps snipers are the only
foot soldiers who gaze upon their Moral Distance: Intense beliefs,
enemys expressions and we like to e.g., religiosity, create moral
employ them because our leaders superiority on the part of the

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aggressor and vengeful perhaps even We need to work from the ground
vigilante actions are undertaken up
during many civil wars;
your body follows.
Social Distance: When we think of
a particular social class either As a nation, were in poor
working or business as less than shape, both mentally and physically.
human, it is easier to maintain an Changing our mental attitude is
aggressive posture towards our fairly straightforward if not easy but
quarry; changing our physical condition is
decidedly more difficult. If this were
Mechanical Distance: Our not the case, then there wouldnt be a
Nintendo Generation provides multibillion dollar weight loss
many opportunities to remove our industry available to tease our
thoughts from the direct nature of interests.
human death, such as viewing our Regardless, if we cannot keep
actions solely through a TV screen, a a simple New Years resolution, we
sniper sight, or any other computer- wont be able to defend our lives
generated image that convinces us in against danger; this requires us to
the make-believe nature of what it is recondition our very being and this
precisely that we are really gazing means far more than mere lip
upon. service. Conscript armies are
notoriously inefficient and therefore
All of the foregoing permits are wholly unsuitable for battling
the mind to deny the reality of terrorists. We need dedicated
existence; the interminable condition volunteers professionals whove
that others, for whatever reason, trained themselves for the fight of
wish to inflict harm upon us. We their lives.
choose to deny this even when events Once weve decided to
suggest otherwise and it forces us to empower our minds to stand tall
react in predictable if pretentious against those who wish to kill us, our
ways. These are the thought families, and our friends, we must
processes that allowed us to consider make a conscious effort to tailor our
the need for a nuclear weapon to bodies for this task and this takes a
topple the World Trade Center little more than simply inhaling
towers before mere commercial Subway sandwiches during our
aircraft were proven to be a much lunch breaks. We need to shatter our
more economical method.12 sloppy, civilian selves and consider
Our minds simply associate what actions we might face in the
with the conditions that weve urban jungle of our lives.13
allowed them to develop within. We Fortunately, many of us can
act, think, and respond in ways condition our bodies within the
predetermined by our upbringing, confines of our home or office
our beliefs, and our environments. without the need for expensive gym
We can shatter these prejudices, but equipment. Much relies upon
we need to corral our very existence. common sense and practicality.

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Men and women between the must stop if we are to truly condition
ages of 18 and 55 have made up the ourselves. While I wouldnt do it
Israel Defense Forces (IDF), for today at twice the distance I used
example, and it goes without saying to walk a similar distance (four
that not all of them have access to miles, one way) to church in my
air-conditioned training facilities. business suit and heavy heel boots.
You, too, can undertake isometric On the contrary, when I took a cozy
exercises while positioned between office job with General Electric and
doorframes, lift yourself up on the partook of the local mall for lunch, I
arms of your chair, and do other went from 140 pounds to 180 nearly
repetitive exercises with the overnight. A simple shift to diet cola
14
furniture surrounding you. Even almost immediately brought me
while at home, you can use a broom, down to 160 pounds, proving beyond
a book, or your wooden rocking chair a reasonable doubt that slight
to undertake many of these same changes within our lifestyle bring
exercises.15 about near instantaneous benefits.
I watched in amazement as Those who live near the
Sara used to exercise while cleaning oceans are at a decided advantage as
the bathtub, cooking dinner, or swimming is the best exercise
vacuuming the floor and she taught imaginable. While serving within the
me techniques for these otherwise Navy, a daily one-mile run with my
boring tasks that aided me in buddy proved quite difficult for my
conditioning my own body. Her stamina. However, after having
advice, which I keep close to heart, is taken up scuba diving, which I did
that if I have to do something several nights per week fascinated
anyway, I might as well draw some by the underwater life of Hawaii to
benefit from doing so. This is sound the point where several hours worth
advice and I recommend it to others. of diving inspired me to ignore the
Back in the 1990s when I transition from weakling diver to
drove trucks, we didnt own an enthusiastic aquanaut my daily
automobile at that particular time runs increased to ten miles per day
and therefore we often had to walk to without effort.
town four miles, one way in For those of us stuck on land,
order to purchase groceries. We the best exercise is still to develop an
didnt mind too terribly much anaerobic, interval training running
and enjoyed the scenery, chats with program. Run in varying degrees of
friends along the way, and just being speed. Combine developing your
together whenever we walked as a oxygenic system through long
couple. Still, I couldnt believe how distance runs with the anaerobic
many people drove their vehicles to needs of burst or sprint
the local mall or hospital and then running.16 Warm up by running
walked around to gain exercise. Why short distances to loosen your
not walk somewhere with a meaning, muscles, then at random intervals
as we did for groceries or to visit the charge forward for a distance before
library, etc.? reducing your speed back to your
Too often today, we trade normal rhythm.
practicality for convenience and this

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Upon the conclusion of my reading, read things that are
aforementioned ten-mile runs, I educational and instructive instead
found that I could literally sprint of merely entertaining. When you
down the length of the pier (several watch television, watch historical or
hundred feet) at a rapid pace educational shows instead of
unheard of for me. If we run at fixed comedies or so-called reality
distances and prepared speeds, our programs. When you watch your
bodies will simply become favorite football teams play as
conditioned to function at these undoubtedly most of us will during
parameters. This does not bold well the holidays observe the plays with
for survival within this world of a tacticians eyes instead of a fans
unexpectedness that surrounds us. fanaticism. Evaluate various What
When running from danger means if? scenarios as if a simple loss
our lives, will a quarter mile be would mean loss of your very
sufficient or will we need to dash for freedoms.
a half of a mile? We simply do not I have tried to give you a brief,
know and therefore to merely but practical glimpse into preparing
condition ourselves for expectation is your mind and body for change, but
a recipe ripe for disaster. only you can affect that change. You
must begin to look deeply into your
Your new mind, your new particular situation often with the
body help of this training program, which
has only just begin and determine
This months training module what elements of your particular life
is therefore rather simple and is need to be changed, what conditions
being released in time for the best suit your environment, and what
holidays, a period in which both your dangers swirl around you.
mind and your physique are Do not compete with the
undoubtedly going to be sacrificed in person next to you. Be better than
the name of joy. Spend time with the person that you were yesterday.
your families, by all means, but take Learn something new each day and
care in that you dont sacrifice any of strive for remembrance of those
your futures by assuming that those things that you learn. Take notes of
who wish to see you harmed are everything, but write them in no
given free rein in which to corral that consistent order. Write diagonally,
future. vertically, and in different colors. We
When you go shopping, do not tend to read from left to right and
wait for the perfect parking space, from top to bottom. In other words,
try walking a further distance were conditioned to read in a
towards the mall interior. While at prescribed manner and predictive
work, use the stairs more often and natures are tantamount to danger.
avoid fatty foods while at lunch. Be While you are enjoying
observant of your surroundings; Thanksgiving, Christmas, and your
recognize that which does not seem football games; shopping at the local
quite normal. malls or visiting your family; while at
Speed your holiday breaks office parties or last minute
doing things differently. When assignments in school, remember the

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2007 R.J. Godlewski/International Nuclear Emergency Response Team [INERT]
following Principles
Defense. 17
Alertness: Be aware of your entire
surroundings (360 of awareness),
paying close attention to anything
that is out of place or otherwise
unusual. Trust your gut and never
allow yourself to become
complacent.
Decisiveness: Always select a
specific course of action and carry it
through to its completion without
hesitation or alteration. Never, ever
hesitate in any decision.
Aggressiveness: Never initiate but
respond to any hostile or dangerous
action with overwhelming force. If
attacked, respond with anger, not
fear; anger (and hatred) diminishes
the natural inclination to submit or
flee. Use this posturing to corral
your fight initiative and defeat your
threats.
Speed: Speed is the critical absolute
in any form of combat for the ideal
fight is usually over before the loser
understands whats happening.
Never lose a minute!
Coolness: Controlled anger is no
obstruction to safety; keeping your
head however may mean literally
keeping your head.
Ruthlessness: Every attack upon
your person must be stopped without
exception for your first concern is to
remain alive. Cease when the threat
is eliminated, but stop that threat
regardless!
Surprise: Surprise is the most
important function of combat. When
of Self- attacked, do what is least expected of
you. Your assailant probably doesnt
expect you to fight back and this
surprise may tip the situation into
your favor.
Strive to become, in my view,
a savage animal resting within the
skin of civility. Empower your
conscience to keep this savagery in
control, unnoticeable to all.
However, when situations warrant,
unleash this primal desire to survive
upon your foes and protect your life
and that of your family and friends.
There are many tools (and weapons)
available for you to use, but first you
must condition yourself both
mentally and physically to do so.
While at your favorite
restaurant, you may not be carrying a
gun, but do you know that salt
thrown into an assailants eyes
followed immediately by a fork (or
knife) can subdue the strongest
individual? Did you know that your
belt the one with that large metal
buckle can be used more effectively
than Davids slingshot to strike down
a knife-wielding thug?
As part of your personal
awareness program, spend at least
five minutes at every activity that you
undertake scouting out potential
sources of improvised weaponry that
may come in aid during times of
crisis. Just an occasional thought
here or there while you are waiting
for your spouse to return from the
restroom. Be as suspicious of that
rough-looking biker as you are of
the man in the $1000 suit. Respect
everyone, but trust not a living soul.
Weve only touched upon a
very insignificant fraction of the
knowledge that you need to know to
survive within this world, but the
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2007 R.J. Godlewski/International Nuclear Emergency Response Team [INERT]

basic foundation rests with your
ability to adapt and discover and this
is of paramount importance. Upon
returning from the holidays, you
need not only be slimmer and
trimmer, you need also to be a bit
more pragmatic and decisive.

Happy
Holidays!

- 14 -

              



 
          

2007 R.J. Godlewski/International Nuclear Emergency Response Team [INERT]

Recommended Additional Reading

1. Grossman, David A. 1993. Defeating the Enemys Will: The Psychological

Foundations of Maneuver Warfare. Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology,
edited by Richard D. Hooker, Jr. Presidio Press.
2. Lawrence, Erik. 2005. Tactical Pistol Shooting: Your guide to tactics that
work, Gun Digest Books.
3. Balor, Paul. 1988. Manual of the Mercenary Soldier: A Guide to
Mercenary War, Money, and Adventure, Paladin Press.
4. Ben-Asher, David. 1983. Fighting Fit: The Israel Defense Forces guide to
physical fitness and self-defense, Perigee Books.
5. Spear, Robert K. 1987. Survival on the Battlefield, Unique Publications.
6. Wilson, Jim & Paul Evans. 1983. Commando Fighting Techniques,
Paladin Press.

- 15 -

              



 
          

2007 R.J. Godlewski/International Nuclear Emergency Response Team [INERT]

1
Crawford, Steve. 1997. Deadly Fighting Skills of the World, Brown Books. Pgs. 14-15.
2
Kreeft, Peter. Everything that you ever wanted to know about Heaven, but never dreamed of asking,
Ignatius. Pg. 109.
3
Ibid. Pg. 110.
4
Grossman, David A. 1993. Defeating the Enemys Will: The Psychological Foundations of Maneuver
Warfare. Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology, edited by Richard D. Hooker, Jr. Presidio Press. Pgs. 164-165.
5
Ibid. Pg. 165.
6
Ibid.
7
Morkot, Robert. 1996. The Penguin Historical Atlas of Ancient Greece, Penguin Books. Pg. 109.
8
Grossman, David A. 1993. Defeating the Enemys Will: The Psychological Foundations of Maneuver
Warfare. Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology, edited by Richard D. Hooker, Jr. Presidio Press. Pg. 171.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid. Pg. 153.
11
Ibid. Pgs. 168-169.
12
Hughes, David. When Terrorists Go Nuclear, POPULAR MECHANICS, January, 1996. Pg. 56.
13
Balor, Paul. 1988. Manual of the Mercenary Soldier: A Guide to Mercenary War, Money, and Adventure,
Paladin Press. Pg. 84.
14
Ben-Asher, David. 1983. Fighting Fit: The Israel Defense Forces guide to physical fitness and self-
defense, Perigee Books. Pgs. 63-65.
15
Ibid. Pgs. 66-67.
16
Balor, Paul. 1988. Manual of the Mercenary Soldier: A Guide to Mercenary War, Money, and Adventure,
Paladin Press. Pgs. 86-87.
17
Lawrence, Erik. 2005. Tactical Pistol Shooting: Your guide to tactics that work, Gun Digest Books. Pgs.
17-18.

- 16 -
THE INDEPENDENT COUNTERTERRORIST Crossword Puzzle #1
1 2

3 4 5

6 7

9 10

11 12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19 20 21

22

23

24 25 26

27

28

29

30

EclipseCrossword.com
THE INDEPENDENT COUNTERTERRORIST Crossword Puzzle #1

Across
6. Effort to make one look more ferocious than they
really are.
10. Capital of Iraq.
12. English acronym for Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia.
15. Uninvited immigrant.
16. Marine Corps motto.
17. Fifty ______.
18. Bin Ladens Group.
19. Politically motivated act of indescriminate
mayhem.
22. Capital of Somalia.
23. The ______ Murders, R.J. Godlewskis latest
novel.
24. Year Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri declared war
upon America.
27. Ability to maintain ones beliefs.
28. Defending Super Bowl Champions during 2007
season.
29. Designer of the AK-47.
30. Century of the Peasants War.

Down
1. _______ Ahmadinejad.
2. Islamist terrorist group fighting in the Philippines.
3. Author of this training program.
4. _____________ Nuclear Emergency Response
Team.
5. God Bless _______.
7. Second, granting right to bear arms.
8. _________Citizen.
9. The ___________ Counterterrorist.
11. U.S. Flag.
13. Blog posting this training program.
14. What the U.S. must do in Iraq.
20. Personal ______________.
21. United Flight (on 9/11).
25. _______ Fission.
26. In ___ We Trust.
 FM 21-20
C1

HEADQUARTERS
CHANGE 1 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington, DC, 1 October 1998

PHYSICAL FITNESS TRAINING

1. Change FM 21-20, 30 September 1992, as follows:

REMOVE OLD PAGES INSERT NEW PAGES

14-3 to 14-8 14-3 to 14-8.2

14-21 to 14-22 14-21 to 14-22

2. A star (*) marks new or changed material.

3. File this transmittal sheet in front of this publication.

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: proved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

 (See Figure 14-1.) The unit will complete the
height and weight data.
Scorers record the raw score for each
event and initial the results. If a soldier fails
an event or finds it difficult to perform, the
scorer should write down the reasons and
See page 14-8.1 for instructions on completing DA Form 705.
ARMY PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST SCORECARD
*Figure 14-1
14-3
other pertinent information in the comment
block. After the entire APFT has been
completed, the event scorer will convert raw
scores to point scores using the scoring
standards on the back of the scorecards. (See
Figure 14-1.)
*Figure 14-1 (continued)

14-4
*Figure 14-1 (continued)

14-5
*Figure 14-1 (continued)

14-6
*Figure 14-1 (continued)

14-7
 SUPERVISION
The APFT must be properly
supervised to ensure that its
objectives are met. Proper
supervision ensures uniformity
in the following:
Scoring the test.
Training of supervisors and
scorers.
Preparing the test and
controlling performance
factors.
The goal of the APFT is to
get an accurate evaluation of the
soldiers fitness levels.
Preparations for administering
an accurate APFT include the
following:
Selecting and training
supervisors and scorers.
Briefing and orienting
administrators and partici-
pants.
Securing a location for the
events.
Commanders must strictly
control those factors which
influence test performance.
They must ensure that events,
scoring, clothing, and equip-
ment are uniform. Com-
manders should plan testing
which permits each soldier to
perform to his maximal level.
They should also ensure the
following:
Soldiers are not tested when
fatigued or ill.
Soldiers do not have tiring
duties just before taking the
APFT.
Weather and environ-
mental conditions do not
inhibit performance.
Safety is the first consid-
eration.
Duties of Test Personnel Supervise the scoring of events,
and ensure that they are done
Testers must be totally familiar correctly.
with the instructions for each event Rule on questions and scoring
and trained to administer the tests. discrepancies for their event.
Correctly supervising testees and
laying out the test area are essential SCORERS
duties. The group administering the
test must include the following: Scorers do the following:
OIC or NCOIC. Supervise the performance of
Event supervisor, scorers, and a testees.
demonstrator for each event. Enforce the test standards in this
Support personnel (safety, chapter.
control, and medical as Count the number of correctly
appropriate). There should be no performed repetitions aloud.
less than one scorer for each 15 Record the correct, raw score on
soldiers tested. Twelve to 15 each soldiers scorecard, and
scorers are required when a initial the scorecard block.
company-sized unit is tested. Perform other duties assigned by
the OIC or NCOIC.
OIC OR NCOIC Scorers must be thoroughly
trained to maintain uniform scoring
The OIC or NCOIC does the standards. They do not participate in
following: the test.
Administers the APFT.
Procures all necessary equipment
and supplies.
Arranges and lays out the test
area.
Trains the event supervisors,
scorers, and demonstrators.
(Training video tape No. 21-191 The goal of the APFT is to
should be used for training those get an accurate evaluation of the
who administer the APFT.) soldiers fitness levels.
Ensures the test is properly
administered and the events are
explained, demonstrated, and
scored according to the test
standards in this chapter.
Reports the results after the test.
EVENT SUPERVISORS
Event supervisors do the
following:
Administer the test events.
Ensure that necessary equipment
is on hand.
Read the test instructions, and
have the events demonstrated.
14-8
 ALTERNATE TEST STANDARDS BY EVENT, SEX, AND AGE

AGE
EVENT SEX
17-21 22-26 27-31 32-36 37-41 42-46 47-51 52-56 57-61 62+

800-YARD Men 20:00 20:30 21:00 21:30 22:00 22:30 23:00 24:00 24:30 25:00
SWIM Women 21:00 21:30 22:00 22:30 23:00 23:30 24:00 25:00 25:30 26:00

6.2-MILE
BIKE Men 24:00 24:30 25:00 25:30 26:00 27:00 28:00 30:00 31:00 32:00
(Stationary Women 25:00 25:30 26:00 26:30 27:00 28:00 30:00 32:00 33:00 34:00
and track)

2.5-MILE Men 34:00 34:30 35:00 35:30 36:00 36:30 37:00 37:30 38:00 38:30
WALK Women 37:00 37:30 38:00 38:30 39:00 39:30 40:00 40:30 41:00 41:30

*Figure 14-9

800-YARD-SWIM TEST WITH THE WALL OF THE POOL. ON

THE COMMAND GO, THE CLOCK
This event is used to assess cardio- WILL START. YOU SHOULD THEN
respiratory (aerobic) fitness. (See BEGIN SWIMMING AT YOUR OWN
Figure 14-10.) PACE, USING ANY STROKE OR
COMBINATION OF STROKES YOU
Equipment WISH. YOU MUST SWIM (tell the
number) LAPS TO COMPLETE THIS
Two stopwatches, one clipboard and pen DISTANCE. YOU MUST TOUCH THE
for each scorer, one copy each of the test WALL OF THE POOL AT EACH END
instructions and standards, and appropriate OF THE POOL AS YOU TURN. ANY
safety equipment are needed. TYPE OF TURN IS AUTHORIZED. YOU
WILL BE SCORED ON YOUR ABILITY
Facilities TO COMPLETE THE SWIM IN A TIME
EQUAL TO, OR LESS THAN, THAT
A swimming pool at least 25 yards long LISTED FOR YOUR AGE AND SEX.
and 3 feet deep, or an approved facility, is WALKING ON THE BOTTOM TO
needed. RECUPERATE IS AUTHORIZED.
SWIMMING GOGGLES ARE PER-
Personnel MITTED, BUT NO OTHER EQUIP-
MENT IS AUTHORIZED. WHAT ARE
One event supervisor and at least one YOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS
scorer for every soldier to be tested are EVENT?
required. Appropriate safety, control, and
medical personnel must also be present.

Instructions

The event supervisor must read the

following statement: THE 800-YARD
SWIM IS USED TO ASSESS YOUR
LEVEL OF AEROBIC FITNESS. YOU
WILL BEGIN IN THE WATER; NO
DIVING IS ALLOWED. AT THE START,
YOUR BODY MUST BE IN CONTACT

14-21

Administration
After reading the instructions, the event
supervisor answers only related questions.
He assigns one soldier to each lane and tells
the soldiers to enter the water. He gives
them a short warm-up period to acclimate to
the water temperature and loosen up. Above
all, the event supervisor must be alert to the
safety of the testees throughout the test.
Timing Techniques
The event supervisor is the timer. He
uses the commands Get set and Go.
Two stopwatches are used in case one fails.
As the soldiers near the finish, the event
supervisor begins calling off the elapsed
time in minutes and seconds (for example,
Nineteen-eleven, nineteen-twelve,
nineteen-thirteen, and so on). The time is
recorded when each soldier touches the end
of the pool on the final lap or crosses a line
set as the 800-yard mark.
ScorersDuties
Scorers must observe the swimmers
assigned to the. They must be sure that each
swimmer touches the bulkhead at every
turn. The scorers record each soldiers time
800-YARD SWIM
Figure 14-10
in the 2-mile-run block on the scorecard
and use the comment block to identify the
time as an 800-yard-swim time. If the pool
length is measured in meters, the scorers
convert the exact distance to yards. To
convert meters to yards, multiply the
number of meters by 39.37 and divide the
product by 36; that is, (meters x 39.37)/36
= yards. For example, 400 meters equals
437.4 yards; that is, (400 x 39.37)/36 =
437.4 yards.
6.2-MILE STATIONARY-BICYCLE
ERGOMETER TEST
This event is used to assess the soldiers
cardiorespiratory and leg-muscle
endurance. (See Figure 14-11.)
Equipment
Two stopwatches, one clipboard and
pen for each scorer, a copy of the test
instructions and standards, and one
stationary bicycle ergometer are
needed. The ergometers should measure
resistance in kiloponds or newtons. The
bicycle should be one that can be used
for training and testing. Its seat and
14-22
*Instructions for Completing DA Form 705, Army Physical Fitness Scorecard, June 1998.

NAME Print soldiers last name, first name and middle initial in NAME block.

SSN Print soldiers social security number in SSN block.

GENDER Print M for male or F for female in GENDER block.

UNIT Print soldiers unit designation in UNIT block.

DATE Print date the APFT is administered in DATE block.

GRADE Print soldiers grade in GRADE block.

AGE Print soldiers age on the date the APFT is administered in AGE block.

HEIGHT Print soldiers height in HEIGHT block. Height will be rounded to the nearest inch. If the height fraction is less than 1/2
inch, round down to the nearest whole number in inches. If the height fraction is greater than 1/2 inch, round up to the next highest
whole number in inches.

WEIGHT Print soldiers weight in WEIGHT block. Weight will be recorded to the nearest pound. If the weight fraction is less than
1/2 pound, round down to the nearest pound. If the weight fraction is 1/2 pound or greater, round up to the nearest pound. Circle
GO if soldier meets screening table weight IAW AR 600-9. Circle NO-GO if soldier exceeds screening table weight IAW AR 600-9.

BODY FAT If soldier exceeds screening table weight, print the soldiers body fat in the BODY FAT block. Percent body fat is
recorded from DA Form 5500-R, Body Fat Content Worksheet, Dec 85, for male soldiers and DA Form 5501-R, Body Fat Content
Worksheet, Dec 85, for female soldiers. Circle GO if soldier meets percent body fat for their age and gender IAW AR 600-9. Circle
NO-GO if soldier exceeds percent body fat for their age and gender IAW AR 600-9. If soldier does not exceed screening table
weight or does not appear to have excessive body fat IAW AR 600-9, print N/A (not applicable) in the BODY FAT block.

PU RAW SCORE The event scorer records the number of correctly performed repetitions of the push-up in the PU RAW SCORE
block and prints his or her initials in the INITIALS block.

SU RAW SCORE The event scorer records the number of correctly performed repetitions of the sit-up in the SU RAW SCORE
block and prints his or her initials in the INITIALS block.

2MR RAW SCORE The event scorer records the two-mile run time in the 2MR RAW SCORE block. The time is recorded in
minutes and seconds. The event scorer then determines the point value for the two-mile run using the scoring standards on the
reverse side of the scorecard. The point value is recorded in the 2MR POINTS block and the event scorer prints his or her initials in
the INITIALS block. In all cases when a point value falls between two point values, the lower point value is used and recorded.
The two-mile run event scorer also determines the point value for push-ups and sit-ups using the scoring standards on the reverse
side of the scorecard. The point values are recorded in the appropriate push-up and sit-up POINTS block and the event scorer
prints his or her initials in the INITIALS block. The two-mile run event scorer totals the points from the three events and records the
total APFT score in the TOTAL POINTS block.

ALTERNATE AEROBIC EVENT The event scorer prints the alternate aerobic event administered (800-yard swim, 6.2-mile-
stationary bicycle ergometer, 6.2-mile-bicycle test or 2.5-mile walk) in the ALTERNATE AEROBIC EVENT block. The time the
soldier completes the alternate aerobic event is recorded in minutes and seconds in the ALTERNATE AEROBIC EVENT block.
The standards for the alternate aerobic event tests are listed in FM 21-20, Chapter 14, Figure 14-9. Scoring for all alternate aerobic
events is on a GO or NO-GO basis. No point values are awarded. Circle GO if the soldier completes the alternate aerobic event
within the required time or less. Circle NO-GO if the soldier fails to complete the alternate aerobic event within the required time.
The alternate aerobic event scorer also determines the point value for push-ups and or sit-ups using the scoring standards on the
reverse side of the scorecard. The point values are recorded in the appropriate push-up and or sit -up POINTS block and the event
scorer prints his or her initials in the 2MR INITIALS block. The alternate aerobic event scorer totals the points from the push-up and
or sit-up events and records the total APFT score in the TOTAL POINTS block.

NCOIC/OIC Signature The NCOIC/OIC checks all test scores for accuracy and signs their name in the NCOIC/OIC Signature
block.

COMMENTS The event supervisor, event scorer, NCOIC, or OIC may record comments appropriate to the APFT in the
COMMENTS block. Appropriate comments may include: weather conditions, injury during APFT and or appeals.

14-8.1
(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.)

14-8.2
 TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT.)

PAGE PAGE

CHAPTER 13 INJURIES APPENDIX B POSITIVE PROFILE FORM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. B-0

Typical Injuries Associated with
Physical Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..13-1 APPENDIX C PHYSICAL FITNESS LOG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. C-I
Other Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..13-2

CHAPTER 14 ARMY PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST APPENDIX D STATIONARY BICYCLE TEST . . . . . . . . . . .. D-O

Methods of Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14-1

Over-Forty Cardiovascular Screening APPENDIX E SELECTING THE RIGHT
Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..14-l RUNNING SHOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..E-1
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..l4-2
Test Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..l4-2
Duties of Test Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...14-8
APPENDIX F CALCULATION OF V02MAX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. F-1
Test Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..i4-9
Test Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..l4-10 APPENDIX G PERCEIVED EXERTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .G-1
Test Sequence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..l4-11
Test Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..l4-18
Scores Above Maximum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..14-19 APPENDIX H THE MAJOR SKELETAL MUSCLES
Temporary Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...14-20 OF THE HUMAN BODY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. H-O
Permanent Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...14-20
Alternate Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...14-20 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Glossary-1

REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References-O
. . ..
APPENDIX A PHYSIOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE SEXES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..A-O INDEX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I.ndex-O

ii
 Preface On 5 July 1950, U.S. troops, who were unprepared
for the physical demands of war, were sent to battle. The
early days of the Korean war were nothing short of
disastrous, as U.S. soldiers were routed by a poorly
equipped, but well-trained, North Korean Peoples Army.
As American soldiers withdrew, they left behind
wounded comrades and valuable equipment their
training had not adequately prepared them to carry
heavy loads.
The costly lessons learned by Task Force Smith in
Korea are as important today as ever. If we fail to
prepare our soldiers for their physically demanding
wartime tasks, we are guilty of paying lip service to the
principle of Train as you fight. Our physical training
programs must do more for our soldiers than just get
them ready for the semiannual Army Physical Fitness
Test (APFT).
FM 21 -20 is directed at leaders who plan and
conduct physical fitness training. It provides guidelines
for developing programs which will improve and maintain physical fitness levels for all Army personnel.
These programs will help leaders prepare their soldiers to meet the physical demands of war. This manual can
also be used as a source book by all soldiers. FM 21-20 was written to conform to the principles outlined in
FM 25-100, Training the Force.
The benefits to be derived from a good physical fitness program are many. It can reduce the number of
soldiers on profile and sick call, invigorate training, and enhance productivity and mental alertness. A good
physical fitness program also promotes team cohesion and combat survivability. It will improve soldiers
combat readiness.
The proponent of this publication is HQ TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form
2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Headquarters, US Army Infantry
Center, US Army Physical Fitness School (ATZB-PF), Fort Benning, GA31905-5000.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

i i i
 A soldiers level of physical fitness'
has a direct impact on his combat
readiness. The many battles in which
American troops have fought under-
score the important role physical fit-
ness plays on the battlefield. The
renewed nationwide interest in fitness
has been accompanied by many re-
search studies on the effects of regular
participation in sound physical fitness
programs. The overwhelming conclu-
sion is that such programs enhance a
persons quality of life, improve pro-
ductivity, and bring about positive
physical and mental changes. Not only
are physically fit soldiers essential to
the Army, they are also more likely to
have enjoyable, productive lives.
This chapter provides an overview
of fitness. It defines physical fitness,
outlines the phases of fitness, and
discusses various types of fitness pro-
grams and fitness evaluation. Com-
manders and leaders can use this infor-
mation to develop intelligent, combat-
related, physical fitness programs.
Physical fitness, the emphasis of
this manual, is but one component of
total fitness. Some of the others are
weight control, diet and nutrition,
Components of physical stress management, dental health, and
fitness include weight spiritual and ethical fitness, as well as
control, diet, nutrition, the avoidance of hypertension, sub-
stress management, and stance abuse, and tobacco use. This
manual is primarily concerned with
spiritual and ethical
issues relating directly to the develop-
fitness. ment and maintenance of the five
components of physical fitness.
The Armys physical fitness train-
ing program extends to all branches of
the total Army. This includes the
USAR and ARNG and encompasses all
ages and ranks and both sexes. Its
purpose is to physically condition all
soldiers throughout their careers be-
ginning with initial entry training (IET).
It also includes soldiers with limiting
physical profiles who must also par-
ticipate in physical fitness training.
Commanders and leaders must en-
sure that all soldiers in their units
maintain the highest level of physical
1-1
fitness in accordance with this manual
and with AR 350-15 which prescribes
policies, procedures, and responsibili-
ties for the Army physical fitness
program.
Leadership Responsibilities
Effective leadership is critical to
the success of a good physical training
program. Leaders, especially senior
leaders, must understand and practice
the new Army doctrine of physical fit-
ness. They must be visible and active
participants in physical training pro-
grams. In short, leaders must lead PT!
Their example will emphasize the
importance of physical fitness training
and will highlight it as a key element
of the units training mission.
Leaders must emphasize the value
of physical training and clearly ex-
plain the objectives and benefits of the
program. Master Fitness Trainers
(MFTs), graduates of a special course
taught by the U.S. Army Physical
Fitness School, can help commanders
do this. However, regardless of the
level of technical experience MFTs
have, the sole responsibility for good
programs rests with leaders at every
level.
A poorly designed and executed
physical fitness program hurts morale.
A good program is well planned and
organized, has reasonable yet chal-
lenging requirements, and is competi-
tive and progressive. It also has
command presence at every level with
leaders setting the example for their
soldiers.
Leaders should also continually as-
sess their units to determine which
specific components of fitness they
lack. Once they identify the short-
comings, they should modify their
programs to correct the weaknesses.
Leaders should not punish soldiers
who fail to perform to standard.
Punishment, especially excessive repe-
titions or additional PT, often does
more harm than good. Leaders must
plan special training to help soldiers
who need it. The application of sound
leadership techniques is especially
important in bringing physically defi-
cient soldiers up to standard.
COMMAND FUNCTIONS
Commanders must evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of physical fitness training
and ensure that it is focused on the
units missions. They can evaluate its
effectiveness by participating in and
observing training, relating their fit-
ness programs to the units missions,
and analyzing individual and unit APFT
performance.
Leaders should regularly measure
the physical fitness level of every
soldier to evaluate his progress and de-
termine the success of the units pro-
gram.
Commanders should assure that
qualified leaders supervise and con-
duct fitness training and use their
MFTs, for they have received compre-
hensive training in this area.
Leaders can learn about fitness train-
ing in the following ways:
Attend the four-week MFT course
or one-week Exercise Leaders
Course.
Request a fitness workshop from
the Army Physical Fitness School.
Become familiar with the Army's
fitness publications. Important ex-
amples include this manual, AR
350-15, and DA Pamphlets 350-15,
350-18, and 350-22.
Commanders must provide adequate
facilities and funds to support a pro-
gram which will improve each soldiers
level of physical fitness. They must
also be sure that everyone participates,
since all individuals, regardless of rank,
age, or sex, benefit from regular exer-
cise. In some instances, leaders will
need to make special efforts to over-
come recurring problems which inter-
fere with regular training.
Leaders must also make special ef-
forts to provide the correct fitness
training for soldiers who are physi-
cally substandard. Positive profiling
(DA Form 3349) permits and encour-
ages profiled soldiers to do as much as
they can within the limits of their
profiles. Those who have been away
from the conditioning process because
of leave, sickness, injury, or travel
may also need special consideration.
Commanders must ensure that the Commanders must
time allotted for physical fitness train- ensure that the time
ing is used effectively. alloted for physical
Training times is wasted by the fol- fitness training is used
lowing: effectively.
Unprepared or unorganized lead-
ers.
Assignment fo a group which us too
large for one leader.
Insufficient training intensity: it
will result in no improvement.
Rates of progression that are too
slow or too fast.
Extreme faomality that usually
emphasizes form over substance.
An example would be too many
units runs at slow paces or "daily
dozen" activities that look impres-
sive but do not result in impove-
ment.
Inadequate facilities which cause
long waiting periods between exer-
cises during a workout and/or be-
tween workouts.
Long rest periods which interfere
with progress.
To foster a positive attitude, unit
leaders and instructors must be knowl-
edgeable, understanding, and fair, but
demanding. They must recognize
individual differences and motivate
soldiers to put forth their best efforts.
However, they must also emphasize
training to standard. Attaining a high
level of physical fitness cannot be
done simply by going through the mo-
tions. Hard training is essential.
Commanders must ensure that lead-
e r s a r e familiar with approved
1-2
techniques, directives, and publica-
tions and that they use them. The ob-
jective of every commander should be
to incorporate the most effective meth-
ods of physical training into a balanced
program. This program should result
in the improved physical fitness of
their soldiers and an enhanced ability
to perform mission-related tasks.
MFTs can help commanders formu-
late sound programs that will attain
their physical training goals, but com-
manders must know and apply the
doctrine. However, since the respon-
sibility for physical training is the
commanders, programs must be based
on his own training objectives. These
he must develop from his evaluation of
the units mission-essential task list
(METL). Chapter 10 describes the
development of the units program.
MASTER FITNESS TRAINERS
A Master Fitness Trainer (MFT) is
a soldier who has completed either the
four-week active-component, two-
week reserve-component, or U.S.
Military Academys MFT course work.
Although called masters, MFTs are
simply soldiers who know about all as-
pects of physical fitness training and
how soldiers bodies function. Most
importantly, since MFTs are taught to
design individual and unit programs,
they should be used by commanders as
special staff assistants for this purpose.
MFTs can do the following:
Assess the physical fitness levels of
individuals and units.
Analyze the unit's mission-related
tasks and develop sound fitness
training programs to support those
tasks.
Train other trainers to conduct sound,
safe physical training.
Understand the structure and func-
tion of the human body, especially
as it relates to exercise.
1-3
Components of Fitness
Physical fitness is the ability to func-
tion effectively in physical work, train-
ing, and other activities and still have
enough energy left over to handle any
emergencies which may arise.
The components of physical fitness
are as follows:
Cardiorespiratory (CR) endurance-
the efficiency with which the
body delivers oxygen and nutrients
needed for muscular activity and
transports waste products from the
cells.
Muscular strength - the greatest
amount of force a muscle or muscle
group can exert in a single effort.
Muscular endurance - the ability of
a muscle or muscle group to per-
form repeated movements with a
sub-maximal force for extended
periods of times.
Flexibility-the ability to move the
joints (for example, elbow, knee) or
any group of joints through an
entire, normal range of motion.
Body composition-the amount of
body fat a soldier has in compari-
son to his total body mass.
Improving the first three compo-
nents of fitness listed above will have
a positive impact on body composition
and will result in less fat. Excessive
body fat detracts from the other fit-
ness components, reduces perform-
ance, detracts from appearance, and
negatively affects ones health.
Factors such as speed, agility, muscle
power, eye-hand coordination, and
eye-foot coordination are classified as
components of motor fitness. These
factors affect a soldiers survivability
on the battlefield. Appropriate train-
ing can improve these factors within
the limits of each soldiers potential.
The Armys fitness program seeks to
improve or maintain all the compo-
nents of physical and motor fitness
through sound, progressive, mission-
specific physical training for indi-
viduals and units.
Principles of Exercise
Adherence to certain basic exercise
principles is important for developing
an effective program. The principles
of exercise apply to everyone at all
levels of physical training, from the
Olympic-caliber athlete to the week-
end jogger. They also apply to fitness
training for military personnel.
These basic principles of exercise
must be followed:
Regularity. To achieve a training
effect, a person must exercise of
ten. One should strive to exercise
each of the first four fitness com-
ponents at least three times a week.
Infrequent exercise can do more
harm than good. Regularity is
also important in resting, sleeping,
and following a good diet.
Progression. The intensity (how
hard) and/or duration (how long)
of exercise must gradually in-
crease to improve the level of fit-
ness.
e Balance. To be effective, a pro-
gram should include activities that
address all the fitness compo-
nents, since overemphasizing any
one of them may hurt the others.
Variety. Providing a variety of ac-
tivities reduces boredom and in-
creases motivation and progress.
Specificity. Training must be
geared toward specific goals. For
example, soldiers become better
runners if their training empha-
sizes running. Although swim-
ming is great exercise, it does not
improve a 2-mile-run time as
much as a running program does.
Recovery. A hard day of training
for a given component of fitness
should be followed by an easier
training day or rest day for that
component and/or muscle group(s)
to help permit recovery. Another
way to allow recovery is to alternate
the muscle groups exercised every
other day, especially when training
for strength and/or muscle endur-
ance.
Overload. The work load of each
exercise session must exceed the
normal demands placed on the body
in order to bring about a training
effect.
FITT Factors
Certain factors must be part of any Factors for a successful
fitness training program for it to be training program are
successful. These factors are Fre- Frequency, Intensity,
quency, Intensity, Time, and Type.
The acronym FITT makes it easier to Time, and Type;
remember them. (See Figure 1- 1.) "FITT".
FREQUENCY
Army Regulation 350-15 specifies
that vigorous physical fitness training
will be conducted 3 to 5 times per
week. For optimal results, command-
ers must strive to conduct 5 days of
physical training per week. Ideally, at
least three exercise sessions for CR
fitness, muscle endurance, muscle
strength, and flexibility should be
performed each week to improve fit-
ness levels. Thus, for example, to
obtain maximum gains in muscular
strength, soldiers should have at least
three strength-training sessions per
week. Three physical activity periods
a week, however, with only one session
each of cardiorespiratory, strength,
and flexibility training will not im-
prove any of these three components.
With some planning, a training pro-
gram for the average soldier can be
developed which provides fairly equal
emphasis on all the components of
physical fitness. The following train-
ing program serves as an example.
In the first week, Monday, Wednes-
day, and Friday are devoted to CR
fitness, and Tuesday and Thursday are
devoted to muscle endurance and
strength. During the second week, the
1-4
 Figure 1-1
training days are flip-flopped: muscle
endurance and strength are trained on
Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, and
CR fitness is trained on Tuesday and
Thursday. Stretching exercises are
done in every training session to en-
hance flexibility. By training continu-
ously in this manner, equal emphasis
1-5
can be given to developing muscular
endurance and strength and to CR
fitness while training five days per
week.
If the units mission requires it,
some muscular and some CR training
can be done during each daily training
session as long as a hard day/recovery
day approach is used. For example, if
a unit has a hard run on Monday,
Wednesday, and Friday, it may also
choose to run on Tuesday and Thurs-
day. However, on Tuesday and Thurs-
day the intensity and/or distance/time
should be reduced to allow recovery.
Depending on the time available for
each session and the way training
sessions are conducted, all components
of fitness can be developed using a
three-day-per-week schedule. How-
ever, a five-day-per-week program is
much better than three per week. (See
Training Program in Chapter 10.)
Numerous other approaches can be
taken when tailoring a fitness program
to meet a units mission as long as the
principles of exercise are not violated.
Such programs, when coupled with
good nutrition, will help keep soldiers
fit to win.
!NTENSITY
Training at the right intensity is the
biggest problem in unit programs. The
intensity should vary with the type of
exercise being done. Exercise for CR
development must be strenuous enough
to elevate the heart rate to between 60
and 90 percent of the heart rate reserve
(HRR). (The calculation of percent
HRR is explained in Chapter 2.) Those
with low fitness levels should start
exercising at a lower training heart
rate (THR) of about 60 percent of
HRR.
For muscular strength and endur-
ance, intensity refers to the percentage
of the maximum resistance that is used
for a given exercise. When determin-
ing intensity in a strength-training
program, it is easier to refer to a
repetition maximum or RM. For ratory endurance.
example, a 1O-RM is the maximum
weight that can be correctly lifted 10
times. An 8-12 RM is the weight that
can be lifted 8 to 12 times correctly.
Doing an exercise correctly means
moving the weight steadily and with
proper form without getting help from
other muscle groups by jerking, bend-
ing, or twisting the body. For the
average person who wants to improve
both muscular strength and endurance,
an 8-12 RM is best.
The person who wants to concen-
trate on muscular strength should use
weights which let him do three to seven
repetitions before his muscles fatigue.
Thus, for strength development, the
weight used should be a 3-7 RM. On
the other hand, the person who wants
to concentrate on muscular endurance
should use a 12+ RM. When using a 12+
RM as the training intensity, the more
repetitions performed per set, over
time, the greater will be the improve-
ment in muscular endurance. Con-
versely, the greater the number of
repetitions performed, the smaller will
be the gains in strength. For example,
a person who regularly trains with a
weight which lets him do 100 repeti-
tions per exercise (a 1OO-RM) greatly
increases his muscular endurance but
minimally improves his muscular
strength. (See Chapter 3 for informa-
tion on resistance training.)
All exercise sessions should include
stretching during the warm-up and
cool-down. One should stretch so All exercises sessions
there is slight discomfort, but no should include
pain, when the movement is taken
stretching during
beyond the normal range of motion.
(See Chapter 4 for information on the warm-up and cool-
stretching.) down.
TIME
Like intensity, the time spent exer-
cising depends on the type of exercise
being done. At least 20 to 30 continu-
ous minutes of intense exercise must be
used in order to improve cardiorespi-
For muscular endurance and strength,
exercise time equates to the number of
repetitions done. For the average
soldier, 8 to 12 repetitions with enough
resistance to cause muscle failure
improves both muscular endurance and
strength. As soldiers progress, they
1-6
will make better strength gains by
doing two or three sets of each resis-
tance exercise.
Flexibility exercises or stretches
should be held for varying times de-
pending on the objective of the session.
For warming-up, such as before a run,
each stretch should be held for 10 to 15
seconds. To improve flexibility, it is
best to do stretching during the cool-
down, with each stretch held for 30 to
60 seconds. If flexibility improvement
is a major goal, at least one session per
week should be devoted to developing
it.
TYPE
Type refers to the kind of exercise
performed. When choosing the type,
the commander should consider the
principle of specificity. For example,
to improve his soldiers levels of CR
fitness (the major fitness component in
the 2-mile run), he should have them
do CR types of exercises. These are
discussed in Chapter 2.
Ways to train for muscular strength
and endurance are addressed in Chap-
ter 3, while Chapter 4 discusses flexi-
bility. These chapters will help com-
manders design programs which are
tailor-made to their soldiers needs.
The basic rule is that to improve
performance, one must practice the
particular exercise, activity, or skill he
wants to improve. For example, to be
good at push-ups, one must do push-
ups. No other exercise will improve
push-up performance as effectively.
Warm-up and Cool-Down
One must prepare the body before
taking part in organized PT, unit sports
competition, or vigorous physical ac-
tivity. A warm-up may help prevent
injuries and maximize performance.
The warm-up increases the bodys
internal temperature and the heart rate.
The chance of getting injured
decreases when the heart, muscles,
1-7
ligaments, and tendons are properly
prepared for exertion. A warm-up
should include some running-in-place
or slow jogging, stretching, and calis-
thenics. It should last five to seven
minutes and should occur just before
the CR or muscular endurance and
strength part of the workout. After a
proper warm-up, soldiers are ready
for a more intense conditioning activ-
ity.
Soldiers should cool down properly
after each exercise period, regardless
of the type of workout. The cool-
down serves to gradually slow the
heart rate and helps prevent pooling of
the blood in the legs and feet. During
exercise, the muscles squeeze the blood
through the veins. This helps return
the blood to the heart. After exercise,
however, the muscles relax and no
longer do this, and the blood can
accumulate in the legs and feet. This
can cause a person to faint. A good
cool-down will help avoid this possi-
bility.
Soldiers should walk and stretch
until their heart rates return to less
than 100 beats per minute (BPM) and
heavy sweating stops. This usually
happens five to seven minutes after
the conditioning session.
Phases of
Fitness Conditioning
The physical fitness training pro-
gram is divided into three phases:
preparatory, conditioning, and main-
tenance. The starting phases for
different units or individuals vary
depending on their age, fitness levels,
and previous physical activity.
Young, healthy persons may be able
to start with the conditioning phase,
while those who have been exercising
regularly may already be in the main-
tenance phase. Factors such as ex-
tended field training, leave time, and
illness can cause soldiers to drop from
a maintenance to a conditioning phase.
Persons who have not been active,
especially if they are age 40 or older,
should start with the preparatory phase.
Many soldiers who fall into this cate-
gory may be recovering from illness or
injury, or they may be just out of high
school. Most units will have soldiers in
all three phases of training at the same
time.
PREPARATORY PHASE
The preparatory phase helps both
the cardiorespiratory and muscular
systems get used to exercise, preparing
the body to handle the conditioning
phase. The work load in the beginning
must be moderate. Progression from a
lower to a higher level of fitness
should be achieved by gradual, planned
increases in frequency, intensity, and
time.
Initially, poorly conditioned sol-
diers should run, or walk if need be,
three times a week at a comfortable
pace that elevates their heart rate to
about 60 percent HRR for 10 to 15
minutes. Recovery days should be
evenly distributed throughout the week,
and training should progress slowly.
Soldiers should continue at this or an
appropriate level until they have no
undue fatigue or muscle soreness the
day following the exercise. They
should then lengthen their exercise
session to 16 to 20 minutes and/or
elevate their heart rate to about 70
percent HRR by increasing their pace.
To be sure their pace is faster, they
should run a known distance and try to
cover it in less time. Those who feel
breathless or whose heart rate rises
beyond their training heart rate (THR)
while running should resume walking
until the heart rate returns to the cor-
rect training level. When they can
handle an intensity of 70 percent HRR
for 20 to 25 minutes, they should be
ready for the next phase. Chapter 2
shows how to determine the THR, that
is, the right training level during aero-
bic training.
The preparatory phase for improv-
ing muscular endurance and strength
through weight training should start
easily and progress gradually. Begin-
ning weight trainers should select about
8 to 12 exercises that work all the
bodys major muscle groups. They
should use only very light weights the
first week (that is, the first two to three
workouts). This is very important, as
they must first learn the proper form
for each exercise. Light weights will
also help minimize muscle soreness and
decrease the likelihood of injury to the
muscles, joints, and ligaments. During
the second week, they should use pro-
gressively heavier weights on each
resistance exercise. By the end of the
second week (four to six workouts),
they should know how much weight
will let them do 8 to 12 repetitions to
muscle failure for each exercise. At
this point the conditioning phase be-
gins.
CONDITIONING PHASE
To reach the desired level of fitness,
soldiers must increase the amount of
exercise and/or the workout intensity
as their strength and/or endurance
increases.
To improve cardiorespiratory en-
durance, for example, they must in-
crease the length of time they run.
They should start with the preparatory
phase and gradually increase the run-
ning time by one or two minutes each
week until they can run continuously
for 20 to 30 minutes. At this point,
they can increase the intensity until
they reach the desired level of fitness.
They should train at least three times a
week and take no more than two days
between workouts.
For weight trainers, the condition-
ing phase normally begins during the Soldiers and units
third week. They should do one set of should be encouraged to
8 to 12 repetitions for each of the progress beyond
selected resistance exercises. When minimum requirements.
they can do more than 12 repetitions of
any exercise, they should increase the
1-8
weight used on that exercise by about
five percent so they can again do only
8 to 12 repetitions. This process
continues throughout the conditioning
phase. As long as they continue to
progress and get stronger while doing
only one set of each exercise, it is not
necessary for them to do more than one
set per exercise. When they stop
making progress with one set, they
should add another set on those exer-
cises in which progress has slowed. As
training progresses, they may want to
increase the sets to three to help pro-
mote further increases in strength and/
or muscle mass.
For maximum benefit, soldiers should
do strength training three times a week
with 48 hours of rest between workouts
for any given muscle group. It helps to
periodically do a different type of
exercise for a given muscle or muscle
group. This adds variety and ensures
better strength development.
The conditioning phase ends when a
soldier is physically mission-capable
and all personal, strength-related goals
and unit-fitness goals have been met.
MAINTENANCE PHASE
The maintenance phase sustains the
high level of fitness achieved in the
conditioning phase. The emphasis here
is no longer on progression. A well-
designed, 45- to 60-minute workout
(including warm-up and cool-down) at
the right intensity three times a week
is enough to maintain almost any ap-
propriate level of physical fitness. These
workouts give soldiers time to stabalize
their flexibility, CR endurance, and
muscular endurance and strength.
However, more frequent training may
be needed to reach and maintain peak
fitness levels.
Soldiers and units should always be
encouraged to progress beyond mini-
mum requirements. Maintaining an
optimal level of fitness should become
part of every soldiers life-style and
1-9
should be continued throughout his
life.
An effective program uses a variety
of activities to develop muscular en-
durance and strength, CR endurance,
and flexibility, and to achieve good
body composition. It should also pro-
mote the development of coordination
as well as basic physical skills. (See
Chapter 10 for guidance in construct-
ing a unit program.)
Types of Fitness Programs
The Army has too many types of
units with different missions to have
one single fitness program for every-
one. Therefore, only broad categories
of programs and general considera-
tions are covered here. They are
classified as unit, individual, and special
programs.
UNIT PROGRAMS
Unit programs must support unit
missions. A single unit may require
several types of programs. Some units,
such as infantry companies, have gen-
erally the same types of soldiers and
MOSS. On the other hand, certain
combat--service-support units have
many different types of soldiers, each
with unique needs. Commanders can
develop programs for their own unit
by following the principles in this
chapter. MFTs know how to help
commanders develop programs for their
units/soldiers.
Commanders of units composed of
both men and women must also under-
stand the physiological differences
between the sexes. These are summa-
rized in Appendix A. Although women
are able to participate in the same
fitness programs as men, they must
work harder to perform at the same
absolute level of work or exercise.
The same holds true for poorly-con-
ditioned soldiers running with well-
conditioned soldiers.
To overcome this problem in the
case of running, for example, the unit
should use ability group runs rather
than unit runs. Soldiers in a given
ability group will run at a set pace,
with groups based on each soldiers
most recent 2-mile-run time. Three
to six groups per company-sized unit
are usually enough. Within each
group, each soldiers heart rate while
running should be at his own THR.
When the run is not intense enough to
bring one or more of the soldiers to
THR, it is time for those soldiers to
move up to the next ability group.
Ability group running does two
things more effectively than unit runs:
1) it lets soldiers improve to their
highest attainable fitness level; and, 2)
it more quickly brings subpar per-
formers up to minimum standards.
It also allows soldiers to train to
excel on the APFT which, in turn,
helps promotion opportunities. Hold-
ing a fit soldier back by making him
run at a slow, unit-run pace (normally
less than his minimum pace for the 2-
mile run on the APFT) hurts his
morale and violates the principle of
training to challenge.
initial Entry Training (lET)
The training program in basic train-
ing (BT) brings soldiers up to the level
of physical fitness they need to do
their jobs as soldiers. However, the
program requires good cadre leader-
ship to ensure that it is appropriate,
demanding, and challenging.
Trainees report to active duty at
various levels of physical fitness and
ability. During basic training they
pass through the preparatory into the
conditioning phase. During fill pe-
riods and the first week of training,
the focus is on learning and develop-
ing the basics of physical fitness.
Training emphasizes progressive
conditioning of the whole body. To
minimize the risk of injury, exercises
must be done properly, and the inten-
sity must progress at an appropriate
rate. Special training should be consid-
ered for soldiers who fail to maintain
the units or groups rate of progres-
sion. Commanders should evaluate
each basic trainee who falls below
standard and give him individualized,
special assistance to improve his defi-
ciencies.
Additional training should not be
used as punishment for a soldier's
inability to perform well.
More PT is not necessarily better.
Chapter 11 describes how to develop
physical training programs in IET units.
Advanced Individual Training (AIT)
Although AIT focuses on technical
and MOS-oriented subjects, physical
fitness must be emphasized throughout.
Most soldiers arriving from basic train-
ing are already well into the condition-
ing phase. Therefore, AIT unit training
should focus on preparing soldiers to
meet the physical requirements of their
initial duty assignments. (See TRA-
DOC Reg. 350-6, Chapter 4.)
Walking, running, and climbing
during unit training contribute to
physical fitness, but they are not enough.
Physical training in AIT requires con-
tinued, regular, vigorous exercise which
stresses the whole body and addresses
all the components of fitness.
By the end of AIT, soldiers must
meet APFT standards. With good pro-
grams and special training, all healthy By the end of AIT,
AIT graduates should easily be able to soldiers must meet
demonstrate that they, possess the re-
quired level of physical fitness. APFT standards.
1-10
 TOE and TDA UnitsActive
Component
There are many types of units in the
Army, and their missions often require
different levels of fitness. TOE and
TDA units must emphasize attaining
and maintaining the fitness level re-
quired for the mission.
The units standards may exceed the
Armys minimums. By regulation
(AR 350- 15), the units standards can
be established by the units commander,
based on mission requirements.
TOE and TDA Units--Reserve
Components
The considerations for the active
component also apply to reserve com-
ponents (RCS). However, since mem-
bers of RC units cannot participate
together in collective physical training
on a regular basis, RC unit programs
must focus on the individuals fitness
responsibilities and efforts. Com-
manders, however, must still ensure
that the units fitness level and indi-
vidual PT programs are maintained.
MFTs can give valuable assistance to
RC commanders and soldiers.
INDIVIDUAL PROGRAMS
There must be a Many soldiers are assigned to duty
positions that offer little opportunity
positive approach to to participate in collective unit PT
programs. Examples are HQDA,
all special fitness
MACOM staffs, hospitals, service school
t r a i n i n g . staff and faculty, recruiting, and ROTC.
In such organizations, commanders must
develop leadership environments that
encourage and motivate soldiers to
accept individual responsibility for their
own physical fitness. Fitness require-
ments are the same for these personnel
as for others. Section chiefs and indi-
vidual soldiers need to use the funda-
mental principles and techniques out-
lined in this manual to help them attain
and maintain a high level of physical
1-11
fitness. MFTs can help develop indi -
vidual fitness programs.
SPECIAL PROGRAMS
The day-to-day unit PT program
conducted for most soldiers may not
be appropriate for all unit members.
Some of them may not be able to ex-
ercise at the intensity or duration best
suited to their needs.
At least three groups of soldiers may
need special PT programs. They are as
follows:
Those who fail the APFT and do
not have medical profiles.
Those who are overweight/overfat
according to AR 600-9
Those who have either permanent
or temporary medical profiles.
Leaders must also give special con-
sideration to soldiers who are age 40 or
older and to recent arrivals who cannot
meet the standards of their new unit.
Special programs must be tailored
to each soldiers needs, and trained,
knowledgeable leaders should develop
and conduct them. This training
should be conducted with the unit, If
this is impossible, it should at least
occur at the same time.
There must be a positive approach
to all special fitness training. Soldiers
who lack enough upper body strength
to do a given number of push-ups or
enough stamina to pass the 2-mile run
should not be ridiculed. Instead, their
shortcomings should be assessed and
the information used to develop indi-
vidualized programs to help them
remedy their specific shortcomings. A
company-sized unit may have as many
as 20 soldiers who need special atten-
tion. Only smart planning will pro-
duce good programs for all of them.
Commanders must counsel soldiers,
explaining that special programs are
being developed in their best interests.
They must make it clear that standards
will be enforced. Next, they should
coordinate closely with medical per-
sonnel to develop programs that fit the
capabilities of soldiers with medical
limitations. Each soldier should then
begin an individualized program based
on his needs.
MFTs know how to assess CR en-
durance, muscular strength and
endurance, flexibility, and body
composition. They can also develop
thorough, tailor-made programs for
all of a units special population.
APFT Failures
Although it is not the heart of the
Armys physical fitness program, the
APFT is the primary instrument for
evaluating the fitness level of each
soldier. It is structured to assess the
muscular endurance of specific muscle
groups and the functional capacity of
the CR system.
Soldiers with reasonable levels of
overall physical fitness should easily
pass the APFT. Those whose fitness
levels are substandard will fail. Sol-
diers who fail the APFT must receive
special attention. Leaders should ana-
lyze their weaknesses and design pro-
grams to overcome them. For ex-
ample, if the soldier is overweight,
nutrition and dietary counseling may
be needed along with a special exercise
program. DA Pam 350-22 outlines
several ways to improve a soldiers
performance on each of the APFT
events.
When trying to improve APFT per-
formances, leaders must ensure that
soldiers are not overloaded to the point
where the fitness training becomes
counterproductive. They should use
ability groups for their running pro-
gram and, in addition to a total-body
strength-training program, should in-
clude exercises designed for push-up
and sit-up improvement. When deal-
ing with special populations, two very
important principles are overload and
recovery. The quality, not just the
quantity, of the workout should be
emphasized. Two-a-day sessions, un-
less designed extremely well, can be
counter-productive. More PT is not
always better.
Overweight Soldiers
Designers of weight loss and physi-
cal training programs for overweight
soldiers should remember this: even
though exercise is the key to sensible
weight loss, reducing the number of
calories consumed is equally impor-
tant. A combination of both actions is
best.
The type of exercise the soldier does
affects the amount and nature of the
weight loss. Both running and walking
burn about 100 calories per mile. One
pound of fat contains 3,500 calories.
Thus, burning one pound of fat through
exercise alone requires a great deal of
running or walking. On the other hand,
weight lost through dieting alone in-
cludes the loss of useful muscle tissue.
Those who participate in an exercise
program that emphasizes the develop-
ment of strength and muscular endur-
ance, however, can actually increase
their muscle mass while losing body
fat. These facts help explain why
exercise and good dietary practices
must be combined.
Unit MFTs can help a soldier deter-
mine the specific caloric requirement
he needs to safely and successfully lose
excess fat. They can devise a sound,
individualized plan to arrive at that
reduced caloric intake. Likewise, unit
MFTs can also develop training pro-
grams which will lead to fat loss
without the loss of useful muscle tissue.
Generally, overweight soldiers should
strive to reduce their fat weight by two
pounds per week. When a soldier loses
weight, either by diet or exercise or
both, a large initial weight loss is not
unusual. This may be due to water loss
associated with the using up of the
bodys carbohydrate stores. Although
these losses may be encouraging to the
1-12
 soldier, little of this initial weight loss
is due to the loss of fat.
Soldiers should be weighed under
similar circumstances and at the same
time each day. This helps avoid false
measurements due to normal fluctua-
tions in their body weight during the
day. As a soldier develops muscular
endurance and strength, lean muscle
mass generally increases. Because muscle
weighs more per unit of volume than
fat. caution is advised in assessing his
progress. Just because a soldier is not
losing weight rapidly does not neces-
sarily mean he is not losing fat. In fact,
a good fitness program often results in
gaining muscle mass while simultane-
ously losing fat weight. If there is
reasonable doubt, his percentage o f
body fat should be determined.
Soldiers with Profiles
This manual stresses what soldiers
can do while on medical profile rather
than what they cannot do.
DOD Directive 1308.1 requires that,
Those personnel identified with medi-
cally limiting defects shall be placed in
a physical fitness program consistent
with their limitations as advised by
medical authorities.
AR 350-15 states, For individuals
with limiting profiles, commanders
will develop physical fitness programs
in cooperation with health care per-
sonnel.
The Office of the Surgeon General
has developed DA Form 3349 to ease
the exchange of information between
health care personnel and the units. On
this form, health care personnel list,
along with limitations, those activities
that the profiled soldier can do to
maintain his fitness level. With this
All profiled soldiers
should do as much of information, the unit should direct
the regular fitness profiled soldiers to participate in the
activities they can do. (An example of
program as they can,
DA Form 3349 is in Appendix B.)
along with substitute All profiled soldiers should take
activities. part in as much of the regular fitness
1-13
program as they can. Appropriate ac-
tivities should be substituted to re-
place those regular activities in which
they cannot participate.
Chapter 2 describes some aerobic
activities the soldier can do to main-
tain cardiorespiratory fitness when he
cannot run. Chapter 3 shows how to
strengthen each body part. Applying
this information should allow some
strength training to continue even
when body parts are injured. The
same principle applies to flexibility
(Chapter 4).
Medical treatment and rehabilita-
tion should be aimed at restoring the
soldier to a suitable level of physical
fitness. Such treatment should use
appropriate, progressive physical ac-
tivities with medical or unit supervi-
sion.
MFTs can help profiled soldiers by
explaining alternative exercises and
how to do them safely under the
limitations of their profile. MFTs are
not, however, trained to diagnose in-
juries or prescribe rehabilitative exer-
cise programs. This is the domain of
qualified medical personnel.
The activity levels of soldiers usu-
ally decrease while they are recovering
from sickness or injury. As a result,
they should pay special attention to
their diets to avoid gaining body fat.
This guidance becomes more impor-
tant as soldiers grow older. With
medical supervision, proper diet, and
the right PT programs, soldiers should
be able to overcome their physical
profiles and quickly return to their
normal routines and fitness levels.
Age as a Factor in Physical
Fitness
Soldiers who are age 40 and older
represent the Armys senior leader-
ship. On the battlefield, they must
lead other soldiers under conditions of
severe stress. To meet this challenge
and set a good example, these leaders
must maintain and demonstrate a high
level of physical fitness. Since their
normal duties may be stressful but
nonphysical, they must take part regu-
larly in a physical fitness program. The
need to be physically fit does not
decrease with increased age.
People undergo many changes as
they grow older. For example, the
amount of blood the heart can pump
per beat and per minute decreases
during maximal exercise, as does the
maximum heart rate. This lowers a
persons physical ability, and per-
formance suffers. Also, the percent of
body weight composed of fat generally
increases, while total muscle mass de-
creases. The result is that muscular
strength and endurance, CR endur-
ance, and body composition suffer. A
decrease in flexibility also occurs.
Men tend to maintain their peak
levels of muscular strength and endur-
ance and CR fitness until age 30.
After 30 there is a gradual decline
throughout their lives. Women tend to
reach their peak in physical capability
shortly after puberty and then undergo
a progressive decline.
Although a decline in performance
normally occurs with aging, those who
stay physically active do not have the
same rate of decline as those who do
not. Decreases in muscular strength
and endurance, CR endurance, and
flexibility occur to a lesser extent in
those who regularly train these fitness
components.
Soldiers who are fit at age 40 and
continue to exercise show a lesser
decrease in many of the physiological
functions related to fitness than do
those who seldom exercise. A trained
60-year-old, for example, may have
the same level of CR fitness as a
sedentary 20-year-old. In short, regu-
lar exercise can help add life to your
years and years to your life.
The assessment phase of a program
is especially important for those age 40
and over. However, it is not necessary
or desirable to develop special fitness
programs for these soldiers. Those who
have been exercising regularly may
continue to exercise at the same level as
they did before reaching age 40. A
program based on the principles of ex-
ercise and the training concepts in this
manual will result in a safe, long-term
conditioning program for all soldiers.
Only those age 40 and over who have
not been exercising regularly may need
to start their exercise program at a
lower level and progress more slowly
than younger soldiers. Years of inac-
tivity and possible abuse of the body
cannot be corrected in a few weeks or
months.
As of 1 January 1989, soldiers reach-
ing age 40 are no longer required to get
clearance from a cardiovascular screen-
ing program before taking the APFT.
Only a medical profile will exempt
them from taking the biannual record
APFT. They must, however, have
periodic physical examinations in ac-
cordance with AR 40-501 and NGR
40-501. These include screening for
cardiovascular risk factors.
Evaluation
To evaluate their physical fitness
and the effectiveness of their physical
fitness training programs, all military
personnel are tested biannually using
the APFT in accordance with AR 350-
15. (Refer to Chapter 14.) However,
commanders may evaluate their physi-
cal fitness programs more frequently
than biannually.
SCORING CATEGORIES
There are two APFT categories of
testing for all military personnel Ini-
tial Entry Training (IET) and the Army
Standard.
1-14
 IET Standard
The APFT standard for basic train-
ing is a minimum of 50 points per
event and no less than 150 points
overall by the end of basic training.
Graduation requirements for AIT and
One Station Unit Training (OSUT)
require 60 points per event.
Safety is a major
consideration when Army Standard
planning and evaluating
All other Army personnel (active
physical training and reserve) who are non-IET soldiers
programs
must attain the minimum Army stan-
dard of at least 60 points per event. To
get credit for a record APFT, a medic-
cally profiled soldier must, as a mini-
mum, complete the 2-mile run or one
of the alternate aerobic events.
1-15
SAFETY
Safety is a major consideration
when planning and evaluating physi-
cal training programs. Commanders
must ensure that the programs do not
place their soldiers at undue risk of
injury or accident. They should ad-
dress the following items:
Environmental conditions (heat/
cold/traction).
Soldiers' levels of conditioning ( low/
high/age/sex).
Facilities (availability/instruction/
repair).
Traffic (routes/procedures/forma-
tions).
Emergency procedures (medical/
communication/transport).
The objective of physical training
in the Army is to enhance soldiers
abilities to meet the physical demands
of war. Any physical training which
results in numerous injuries or acci-
dents is detrimental to this goal. As in
most training, common sense must
prevail. Good, sound physical training
should challenge soldiers but should
not place them at undue risk nor lead
to situations where accidents or inju-
ries are likely to occur.
 To provide enough energy-producing
oxygen to the muscles, the following
Cardiorespiratory (CR) fitness, events occur:
sometimes called CR endurance, aero- Greater movement of air through
bic fitness, or aerobic capacity, is one the lungs.
of the five basic components of physi- Increased movement of oxygen from
cal fitness. CR fitness is a condition in the lungs into the blood stream.
which the bodys cardiovascular (cir- Increased delivery of oxygen-laden
culatory) and respiratory systems blood to the working muscles by the
function together, especially during heart's accelerated pumping action.
exercise or work, to ensure that ade- Regulation of the blood vessel's size
quate oxygen is supplied to the work- to distribute blood away from inac- CR fitness is needed for
ing muscles to produce energy. CR tive tissue to working muscle.
fitness is needed for prolonged, rhyth- Greater movemen t of oxygen from prolonged, rhythmic use
mic use of the bodys large muscle the blood into the muscle tissue. of the body's large
groups. A high level of CR fitness Accelerated return of veinous blood
permits continuous physical activity muscle groups.
to the heart.
without a decline in performance and
allows for rapid recovery following
fatiguing physical activity.
Activities such as running, road
marching, bicycling, swimming, cross-
country skiing, rowing, stair climbing,
and jumping rope place an extra demand
on the cardiovascular and respiratory
systems. During exercise, these sys-
tems attempt to supply oxygen to the
working muscles. Most of this oxygen
is used to produce energy for muscular
contraction. Any activity that con-
tinuously uses large muscle groups for
20 minutes or longer taxes these sys-
tems. Because of this, a wide variety
of training methods is used to improve
cardiorespiratory endurance.

Physiology of Aerobic Training

Aerobic exercise uses oxygen to

produce most of the bodys energy
needs. It also brings into play a fairly
complex set of physiological events.

2-0
 The best way to determine aerobic
capacity is to measure it in the labora-
tory. It is much easier, however, to es-
timate maximum oxygen uptake by
using other methods.
It is possible to determine a soldiers
CR fitness level and get an accurate
estimate of his aerobic capacity by us-
ing his APFT 2-mile-run time.
(Appendix F explains how to do this.)
Other tests - the bicycle, walk, and step
tests - may also be used to estimate
ones aerobic capacity and evaluate
ones CR fitness level.
Aerobic exercise is the In the presence of oxygen, muscle
cells produce energy by breaking down
best type of activity for carbohydrates and fats. In fact, fats
are only used as an energy source when
attaining and oxygen is present. Hence, aerobic
maintaining a low exercise is the best type of activity for
attaining and maintaining a low per-
percentage of body fat. centage of body fat.
A persons maximum aerobic capac-
ity can be modified through physical
training. To reach very high levels of
aerobic fitness, one must train hard.
The best way to improve CR fitness is
to participate regularly in a demanding
aerobic exercise program.
Many factors can negateively affect
one's ability to perform well aerobi-
cally. These include the following:
Age.
Anemia.
Carbon monoxide from tobacco smoke
or pollution.
High altitude (reduced oxygen pres-
sure).
Illness (heart disease).
Obesity.
Sedentary life-style.
Any condition that reduces the bodys
ability to bring in, transport, or use
oxygen reduces a persons ability to
perform aerobically. Inactivity causes
much of the decrease in physical fit-
ness that occurs with increasing age.
Some of this decrease in aerobic fitness
2-1
can be slowed by taking part in a
regular exercise program.
Certain medical conditions also
impair the transport of oxygen. They
include diseases of the lungs, which
interfere with breathing, and dis-
abling heart conditions. Another is
severe blocking of the arteries which
inhibits blood flow to the heart and
skeletal muscles.
Smoking can lead to any or all of the
above problems and can, in the long
and short term, adversely affect ones
ability to do aerobic exercise.
FITT Factors
As mentioned in Chapter 1, a person
must integrate several factors into any
successful fitness training program to
improve his fitness level. These fac-
tors are summarized by the following
words which form the acronym FITT.
Frequency, Intensity, Time, and Type.
They are described below as they
pertain to cardiorespiratory fitness. A
warm-up and cool-down should also
be part of each workout. Information
on warming up and cooling down is
given in Chapters 1 and 4.
FREQUENCY
Frequency refers to how often one
exercises. It is related to the intensity
and duration of the exercise session.
Conditioning the CR system can best
be accomplished by three adequately
intense workouts per week. Soldiers
should do these on alternate days. By
building up gradually, soldiers can get
even greater benefits from working
out five times a week. However,
leaders should recognize the need for
recovery between hard exercise peri-
ods and should adjust the training in-
tensity accordingly. They must also be
aware of the danger of overtraining
and recognize that the risk of injury
increases as the intensity and duration
of training increases.
 INTENSITY one can be sure that the intensity is
enough to improve his CR fitness level.
Intensity is related to how hard one
exercises. It represents the degree of
effort with which one trains and is
probably the single most important
factor for improving performance. Un-
fortunately, it is the factor many units
ignore.
Changes in CR fitness are directly
related to how hard an aerobic exercise
is performed. The more energy ex-
pended per unit of time, the greater
Percent MHR Method
the intensity of the exercise. Signifi-
cant changes in CR fitness are brought
With this method, the THR is fig-
about by sustaining training heart
ured using the estimated maximal heart
rates in the range of 60 to 90 percent
rate. A soldier determines his esti-
of the heart rate reserve (HRR). In- mated maximum heart rate by sub-
tensities of less than 60 percent HRR
tracting his age from 220. Thus, a 20-
are generally inadequate to produce a
year-old would have an estimated
training effect, and those that exceed
maximum heart rate (MHR) of 200
90 percent HRR can be dangerous.
beats per minute (220 -20 = 200).
Soldiers should gauge the intensity
of their workouts for CR fitness by
determining and exercising at their
training heart rate (THR). Using the
THR method lets them find and pre-
scribe the correct level of intensity
during CR exercise. By determining
ones maximum heart rate, resting
heart rate, and relative conditioning
level, an appropriate THR or intensity
can be prescribed.
Ones ability to monitor the heart
rate is the key to success in CR
training. (Note: Ability-group run-
ning is better than unit running be-
cause unit running does not accommo-
date the individual soldiers THR. For
example, some soldiers in a formation
may be training at 50 percent HRR When using the MHR method, one
and others at 95 percent HRR. As a must compensate for its built-in weak-
result, the unit run will be too intense ness. A person using this method may
for some and not intense enough for exercise at an intensity which is not
others.) high enough to cause a training effect.
The heart rate during work or exer- To compensate for this, a person who
cise is an excellent indicator of how is in poor shape should exercise at 70
much effort a person is exerting. percent of his MHR; if he is in
Keeping track of the heart rate lets one relatively good shape, at 80 percent
gauge the intensity of the CR exercise MHR; and, if he is in excellent shape,
being done. With this information, at 90 percent MHR.

2-2
 Percent HRR Method

A more accurate way to calculate

THR is the percent HRR method. The
range from 60 to 90 percent HRR is the
THR range in which people should
exercise to improve their CR fitness
levels. If a soldier knows his general
level of CR fitness, he can determine
which percentage of HRR is a good
starting point for him. For example, if
he is in excellent physical condition, he
could start at 85 percent of his HRR; if
he is in reasonably good shape, at 70
percent HRR; and, if he is in poor
shape, at 60 percent HRR.
Most CR workouts should be con-
ducted with the heart rate between 70
to 75 percent HRR to attain, or main-
tain, an adequate level of fitness. Soldiers
who have reached a high level of
fitness may derive more benefit from
working at a higher percentage of
HRR, particularly if they cannot find
more than 20 minutes for CR exercise.
Exercising at any lower percentage of
HRR does not give the heart, muscles,
and lungs an adequate training stimu-
lus.
Before anyone begins aerobic train-
ing, he should know his THR (the heart
rate at which he needs to exercise to get
a training effect).

2-3
 As shown, the percentage (70 per-
cent in this example) is converted to
the decimal form (0.70) before it is
multiplied by the HRR. The result is
then added to the resting heart rate
(RHR) to get the THR. Thus, the
product obtained by multiplying 0.70
and 131 is 91.7. When 91.7 is added to
the RHR of 69, a THR of 160.7 results.
When the calculations produce a frac-
tion of a heart beat, as in the example,
the value is rounded off to the nearest
whole number. In this case, 160.7
BPM is rounded off to give a THR of
161 BPM. In summary, a reasonably
fit 20-year-old soldier with a resting
heart rate of 69 BPM has a training
heart rate goal of 161 BPM. To de-
termine the RHR, or to see if one is
within the THR during and right after
exercise, place the tip of the third
finger lightly over one of the carotid
arteries in the neck. These arteries are
located to the left and right of the
Adams apple. (See Figure 2-1A.)
Another convenient spot from which
to monitor the pulse is on the radial
artery on the wrist just above the base
of the thumb. (See Figure 2-lB.) Yet
another way is to place the hand over
the heart and count the number of
heart beats. (See Figure 2-1 C.)
Figure 2-1
During aerobic exercise, the body
will usually have reached a "Steady
State" after five minutes of exercise,
and the heart rate will have leveled off.
At this time, and immediately after ex-
ercising, the soldier should monitor his
heart rate.
He should count his pulse for 10
seconds, then multiply this by six to get
his heart rate for one minute. This will
let him determine if his training inten-
sity is high enough to improve his CR
fitness level.
For example, use the THR of 161
BPM figured above. During the 10-
second period, the soldier should get a
count of 27 beats (161/6= 26.83 or 27)
if he is exercising at the right intensity.
If his pulse rate is below the THR, he
must exercise harder to increase his
pulse to the THR. If his pulse is above
the THR, he should normally exercise
at a lower intensity to reduce the pulse
rate to the prescribed THR. He should
count as accurately as possible, since
one missed beat during the 10-second
count, multiplied by six, gives an error
of six BPM.
2-4
 A soldier who maintains his THR
throughout a 20- to 30-minute exercise
A soldier who maintains period is doing well and can expect im-
his THR throughout a provement in his CR fitness level. He
20-30-minute exercise should check his exercise and post-
period is doing well and exercise pulse rate at least once each
can expect improvement workout. If he takes only one pulse
in his CR fitness level. check, he should do it five minutes into
the workout.
Figure 2-2 is a chart that makes it
easy to determine what a soldiers THR
should be during a 10-second count.
Using this figure, a soldier can easily
find his own THR just by knowing his
age and general fitness level. For
example, a 40-year-old soldier with a
low fitness level should, during aerobic
Figure 2-2
2-5
exercise. have a THR of 23 beats in 10
seconds. He can determine this from
the table by locating his age and then
tracking upward until he reaches the
percent HRR for his fitness level.
Again, those with a low fitness level
should work at about 60 percent HRR
and those with a good fitness level at
70 percent HRR. Those with a high
level of fitness may benefit most by
training at 80 to 90 percent HRR.
Another way to gauge exercise in-
tensity is perceived exertion. This
method relies on how difficult the
exercise seems to be and is described
in Appendix G.
 TIME
Time, or duration, refers to how
long one exercises. It is inversely
related to intensity. The more intense
the activity, the shorter the time needed
to produce or maintain a training
effect; the less intense the activity, the
longer the required duration. To
improve CR fitness, the soldier must
train for at least 20 to 30 minutes at his
THR.
TYPE
Only aerobic exercises that require
breathing in large volumes of air
improve CR fitness. Worthwhile aero-
bic activities must involve the use of
large muscle groups and must be rhyth-
mic. They must also be of sufficient
duration and intensity (60 to 90 per-
cent HRR). Examples of primary and
secondary exercises for improving CR
fitness are as follows:
PRIMARY
Running.
Rowing.
Jogging.
Skiing (cross-country).
Walking (vigorous).
Exercising to music.
Road marching.
Rope skipping.
Bicycling (stationary).
Swimming.
Bicycling (road/street).
Stair climbing.
SECONDARY (Done with partners or
opponents of equal or greater ability.)
Racquetball (singles).
Basketball (full court).
Handball (singles).
Tennis (singles).
The primary exercises are more ef-
fective than the secondary exercises in
producing positive changes in CR fit-
ness.
The secondary activities may briefly
elevate the heart rate but may not keep
it elevated to the THR throughout the
entire workout.
Every activity has its advantages and Every activity has its
disadvantages. Trainers must weigh advantages and
these and design programs that fit the disadvantages. Trainers
units needs. must design programs
that fit the units needs.
Running
Running enables the body to im-
prove the transport of blood and oxy-
gen to the working muscles and brings
about positive changes in the muscles
ability to produce energy. Running
fits well into any physical training pro-
gram because a training effect can be
attained with only three 20-minute
workouts per week.
Some soldiers may need instruction
to improve their running ability. The
following style of running is desired.
The head is erect with the body in a
straight line or slightly bent forward at
the waist. The elbows are bent so the
forearms are relaxed and held loosely
at waist level. The arms swing natu-
rally from front to rear in straight
lines. (Cross-body arm movements
waste energy. The faster the run, the
faster the arm action.) The toes point
straight ahead, and the feet strike on
the heel and push off at the big toe.
Besides learning running techniques,
soldiers need information on ways to
prevent running injuries. The most
common injuries associated with PT in
the Army result from running and
occur to the feet, ankles, knees, and
legs. Proper warm-up and cool-down,
along with stretching exercises and
wearing appropriate clothing and well-
fitting running shoes, help prevent Important information
injuries. Important information on on safety factors and
safety factors and common running in-
juries is presented in Chapter 13 and common running
Appendix E. injuries is presented in
Failure to allow recovery between C hapter 13 and
hard bouts of running cannot only lead
to overtraining, but can also be a major Appendix E .
2-6
 cause of injuries. A well-conditioned
soldier can run five to six times a week.
However, to do this safely, he should
do two things: 1) gradually buildup to
running that frequently; and, 2) vary
the intensity and/or duration of the
running sessions to allow recovery
between them.
ABILITY GROUP RUNNING
Traditionally, soldiers have run in
unit formations at a pace prescribed by
the PT leader. Commanders have used
unit runs to improve unit cohesion and
fitness levels. Unfortunately, too many
soldiers are not challenged enough by
the intensity or duration of the unit
run, and they do not receive a training
benefit. For example, take a company
that runs at a nine-minute-per-mile
pace for two miles. Only soldiers who
cannot run two miles in a time faster
than 18 minutes will receive a signifi-
cant training effect. Therefore, in
terms of conditioning, most soldiers
who can pass the 2-mile-run test are
wasting their time and losing the chance
to train hard to excel. Ability group
running (AGR) is the best way to
provide enough intensity so each sol-
dier can improve his own level of CR
fitness.
AGR lets soldiers train in groups of
near-equal ability. Each group runs at
a pace intense enough to produce a
training effect for that group and each
soldier in it. Leaders should program
these runs for specific lengths of time,
not miles to be run. This procedure lets
more-fit groups run a greater distance
than the less-fit groups in the same
time period thus enabling every soldier
to improve.
The best way to assign soldiers to
ability groups is to make a list, in
The best way to assign order, of the units most recent APFT
soldiers to ability 2-mile-run times. The number of
groups is to, make a list, groups depends on the unit size, num-
in order, of the units ber of leaders available to conduct the
most recent APFT runs, and range of 2-mile-run times.
2-mile-run times. A company-sized unit broken down
2-7
into four to six ability groups, each
with a leader, is best for aerobic
training, For activities like circuits,
strength training, and competitive
events, smaller groups are easier to
work with than one large group.
Because people progress at different
rates, soldiers should move to faster
groups when they are ready. To help
them train at their THR and enhance
their confidence, those who have a
hard time keeping up with a group
should be placed in a slower group. As
the units fitness level progresses, so
should the intensity at which each
group exercises. Good leadership will
prevent a constant shifting of soldiers
between groups due to lack of effort.
AGR is best conducted at the right
intensity at least three times a week.
As explained, the CR system should
not be exercised hard on consecutive
days. If AGR is used on hard CR-
training days, unit runs at lower inten-
sities are good for recovery days.
Using this rotation, soldiers can gain
the desired benefits of both unit and
ability-group runs. The problem comes
when units have a limited number of
days for PT and there is not enough
time for both. In this case, unit runs
should seldom, if ever, be used and
should be recognized for what they
are -- runs to build unit cohesion.
Leaders can use additional methods
to achieve both goals. The unit can
begin in formation and divide into
ability groups at a predetermined re-
lease point. The run can also begin
with soldiers divided into ability groups
which join at a link-up point. Alter-
nately, ability groups can be started
over the same route in a stagger, with
the slowest group first. Link-ups
occur as each faster group overtakes
slower groups.
With imagination and planning, AGR
will result in more effective training
workouts for each soldier. The argu-
ment that ability-group running de-
tracts from unit cohesion is invalid.
Good leadership and training in all
 Step 1. Determine (or estimate) the
areas promote unit cohesion and team
actual 1-mile-race pace. The soldier's
spirit; training that emphasizes form
over substance does not. 2-mile-run time is 16:00 minutes, and
his estimated pace for 1 mile is one half
INTERVAL TRAINING of this or 8:00 minutes.
Step 2. Using the time from Step 1,
Interval training also works the car- determine the time it took to run 440
diorespiratory system. It is an ad- yards by dividing the 1-mile-race pace
vanced form of exercise training which by four. (8:00 minutes/4 = 2:00 min-
helps a person significantly improve utes per 440 yards.)
his fitness level in a relatively short Step 3. Subtract one to four seconds
time and increase his running speed. from the 440-yard time in Step 2 to
In interval training, a soldier exer- find the time each 440-yard lap should
cises by running at a pace that is be run during an interval training
slightly faster than his race pace for session. (2:00 minutes - 1 to 4 seconds
short periods of time. This may be = 1:59 to 1:56.)
faster than the pace he wants to main- Thus, each 440-yard lap should be
tain during the next APFT 2-mile run. run in 1 munute, 56 seconds to 1
He does this repeatedly with periods of minute, 59 seconds during interval
recovery placed between periods of training based on the soldier's 16:00, 2-
fast running. In this way, the energy mile run time. Recovery periods,
systems used are allowed to recover, twice the length of the work-interval
and the exerciser can do more fast- periods. These recovery peri-
paced running in a given workout than ods, therefore, will be 3 minutes, 52
if he ran continuously without resting. seconds long (1:56 + 1:56 = 3:52).
This type of intermittent training can
also be used with activities such as
cycling, swimming, bicycling, rowing,
Using the work-interval time for
and road marching.
The following example illustrates each 440-yard lap from Step 3, the
how the proper work-interval times soldier can run six to eight repetitions
of 440 yards at a pace of 1 minute, 56
and recovery times can be calculated
seconds (1:56) for each 440-yard run.
for interval training so that it can be
This can be done on a 440-yard track
used to improve a soldiers 2-mile-run
(about 400 meters) as follows:
performance.
The work-interval time (the speed 1. Run six to eight 440-yard repeti-
at which a soldier should run each tions with each interval run at a 1:56
440-yard lap) depends on his actual pace.
race pace for one mile. If a soldiers 2. Follow each 440-yard run done in
actual 1-mile-race time is not known, 1 minute, 56 secons by an easy jog of
it can be estimated from his last APFT 440 yards for recovery. Each 440-yard
by taking one half of his 2-mile-run jog should take twice as much time as
time. Using a 2-mile-run time of the work interval (that is, 3:52). For
1600 minutes as an example, the pace each second of work, there are two
for an interval training workout is cal- seconds of recovery. Thus, the work-
culated as follows: to-rest ratio is 1:2.

2-8
 Table 2-1
To help determine the correct time
intervals for a wide range of fitness
levels, refer to Table 2-1. It shows
common 1 -mile times and the corre-
sponding 440-yard times.
Monitoring the heart-rate response
during interval training is not as im-
portant as making sure that the work
intervals are run at the proper speed.
Because of the intense nature of inter-
val training, during the work interval
the heart rate will generally climb to 85
or 90 percent of HRR. During the
recovery interval, the heart rate usu-
ally falls to around 120 to 140 beats per
minute. Because the heart rate is not
the major concern during interval train-
ing, monitoring THR and using it as a
training guide is not necessary.
As the soldier becomes more condi-
tioned, his recovery is quicker. As a
In Fartlek training, the result, he should either shorten the re-
covery interval (jogging time) or run
soldier varies the the work interval a few seconds faster.
After a soldier has reached a good
intensity (speed) of the CR fitness level using the THR method,
running throughout the he should be ready for interval train-
ing. As with any other new training
workout. method, interval training should be
introduced into his training program
gradually and progressively. At first,
he should do it once a week. If he
responds well, he may do it twice a
2-9
week at the most, with at least one
recovery day in between. He may also
do recovery workouts of easy jogging
on off days. It is recommended that
interval training be done two times a
week only during the last several
weeks before an APFT. Also, he should
rest the few days before the test by
doing no, or very easy, running.
As with any workout, soldiers should
start intervaI workouts with a warm-
up and end them with a cool-down.
FARTLEK TRAINING
In Fartlek training, another type of
CR training sometimes called speed
play, the soldier varies the intensity
(speed) of the running during the
workout. Instead of running at a con-
stant speed, he starts with veryslow
jogging. When ready, he runs hard for
a few minutes until he feels the need
to slow down. At this time he recovers
by jogging at an easy pace. This process
of alternating fast and recovery run-
ning (both of varying distances) gives
the same results as interval training.
However, neither the running nor re-
covery interval is timed, and the run-
ning is not done on a track. For these
reasons, many runners prefer Fartlek
training to interval training.
 LAST-MAN-UP RUNNING
This type of running, which in-
cludes both sprinting and paced run-
ning, improves CR endurance and
conditions the legs. It consists of 40-
to 50-yard sprints at near-maximum
effort. This type of running is best
done by squads and sections. Each
squad leader places the squad in an
evenly-spaced, single-file line on a
track or a smooth, flat course. During
a continuous 2- to 3-mile run of
moderate intensity, the squad leader,
running in the last position, sprints to
the front of the line and becomes the
leader. When he reaches the front, he
resumes the moderate pace of the
whole squad. After he reaches the
front, the next soldier, who is now at
the rear, immediately sprints to the
front. The rest of the soldiers continue
to run at a moderate pace. This pattern
of sprinting by the last person contin-
ues until each soldier has resumed his
original position in line. This pattern
of sprinting and running is repeated
several times during the run. The dis-
tance run and number of sprints per-
formed should increase as the soldiers
conditioning improves.
CROSS-COUNTRY RUNNING
Cross-country running conditions
the leg muscles and develops CR en-
durance. It consists of running a
certain distance on a course laid out
across fields, over hills, through woods,
or on any other irregular terrain. It
can be used as both a physical condi-
tioning activity and a competitive
event. The object is to cover the
distance in the shortest time.
The unit is divided into ability
groups using 2-mile-run times. Each
group starts its run at the same time.
This lets the better-conditioned groups
run farther and helps ensure that they
receive an adequate training stimulus.
The speed and distance can be
increased gradually as the soldiers
conditioning improves. At first, the
distance should be one mile or less,
depending on the terrain and fitness
level. It should then be gradually in- Cross-country runs can
creased to four miles. Cross-country
accommodate large
runs have several advantages: they
provide variety in physical fitness train- numbers of soldiers.
ing, and they can accommodate large
numbers of soldiers. Interest can be
stimulated by competitive runs after
soldiers attain a reasonable level of
fitness. These runs may also be com-
bined with other activities such as
compass work (orienteering).
Road Marches
The road or foot march is one of the
best ways to improve and maintain
fitness. Road marches are classified as
either administrative or tactical, and
they can be conducted in garrison or in
the field. Soldiers must be able to move
quickly, carry a load (rucksack) of
equipment, and be physically able to
perform their missions after extended
marching.
BENEFITS OF ROAD MARCHES
Road marches are an excellent aero-
bic activity. They also help develop
endurance in the muscles of the lower
body when soldiers carry a heavy load.
Road marches offer several benefits
Road marches help
when used as part of a fitness program.
troops acclimatize to
They are easy to organize, and large
new environments,
numbers of soldiers can participate. In
addition, when done in an intelligent,
systematic, and progressive manner,
they produce relatively few injuries.
Many soldier-related skills can be
integrated into road marches. They can
also help troops acclimatize to new
environments. They help train leaders
to develop skills in planning, prepara-
tion, and supervision and let leaders
make first-hand observations of the
soldiers physical stamina. Because
road marches are excellent fitness-
training activities, commanders should
make them a regular part of their units
PT program.
2-10
 TYPES OF MARCHES
The four types of road marches -
day, limited visibility, forced, and
shuttle - are described below. For
more information on marches, see
FM 21-18.
Day Marches
Day marches, which fit easily into
the daily training plan, are most con-
ducive to developing physical fitness.
They are characterized by dispersed
formations and ease of control and re-
connaissance.
Limited Visibility Marches
Limited visibility marches require
more detailed planning and supervi-
sion and are harder to control than day
marches. Because they move more
slowly and are in tighter formations,
soldiers may not exercise hard enough
to obtain a conditioning effect. Lim-
ited visibility marches do have some
advantages, however. They protect
soldiers from the heat of the day,
challenge the ability of NCOS and of-
ficers to control their soldiers, and
provide secrecy and surprise in tactical
situations.
Forced Marches
Soldiers should receive Forced marches require more than
the normal effort in speed and exer-
advance notcie before tion. Although they are excellent con-
going on a march, to ditioners, they may leave soldiers too
fatigued to do other required training
help morale and give
tasks.
them time to prepare. Shuttle Marches
Shuttle marches alternate riding and
marching, usually because there are
not enough vehicles to carry the entire
unit. These marches may be modified
and used as fitness activities. A shuttle
march can be planned to move troops
of various fitness levels from one point
to another, with all soldiers arriving at
2-11
about the same time. Soldiers who
have high fitness levels can generally
march for longer stretches than those
who are less fit.
PLANNING A ROAD MARCH
Any plan to conduct a road march to
improve physical fitness should con-
sider the following:
Load to be carried.
Discipline and supervision.
Distance to be marched.
Route reconnaissance.
Time allotted for movement.
Water stops.
Present level of fitness.
Rest stops.
Intensity of the march.
Provisions for injuries.
Terrain an weather conditions.
Safety precautions.
Soldiers should usually receive ad-
vance notice before going on a march.
This helps morale and gives them time
to prepare. The leader should choose
an experienced soldier as a pacesetter
to lead the march. The pacesetter
should carry the same load as the other
soldiers and should be of medium
height to ensure normal strides. The
normal stride for a foot march, ac-
cording to FM 21-18, is 30 inches.
This stride, and a cadence of 106 steps
per minute, results in a speed of 4.8
kilometers per hour (kph). When a 10-
minute rest is taken each hour, a net
speed of 4 kph results.
The pacesetter should keep in mind
that ground slope and footing affect
stride length. For example, the length
decreases when soldiers march up hills
or down steep slopes. Normal stride
and cadence are maintained easily on
moderate, gently rolling terrain unless
the footing is muddy, slippery, or
rough.
Personal hygiene is important in
preventing unnecessary injuries. Be-
fore the march, soldiers should cut
their toenails short and square them
 off, wash and dry their feet, and
lightly apply foot powder. They should
wear clean, dry socks that fit well and
have no holes. Each soldier should
take one or more extra pair of socks
depending on the length of the march.
Soldiers who have had problems with
blisters should apply a thin coating of
petroleum jelly over susceptible areas.
Leaders should check soldiers boots
before the march to make sure that
they fit well, are broken in and in good
repair, with heels that are even and not
worn down.
During halts soldiers should lie down
and elevate their feet. If time permits,
they should massage their feet, apply
powder, and change socks. Stretching
for a few minutes before resuming the
march may relieve cramps and sore-
ness and help prepare the muscles to
continue exercising. To help prevent
lower back strain, soldiers should help
each other reposition the rucksacks
and other loads following rest stops.
Soldiers can relieve swollen feet by
slightly loosening the laces across their
arches.
After marches, soldiers should again
care for their feet, wash and dry their
socks, and dry their boots.
PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE
LOAD-CARRYING ABILITY
The four generalized programs de-
scribed below can be used to improve
the soldiers load-carrying ability. Each
program is based on a different num-
ber of days per week available for a PT
program.
If only two days are available for PT,
both should include exercises for
improving CR fitness and muscular
endurance and strength. Roughly equal
emphasis should be given to each of
these fitness components.
If there are only three days available
for PT, they should be evenly dis-
persed throughout the week. Two of
the days should stress the development
of muscular endurance and strength
for the whole body. Although all of the
major muscle groups of the body should
be trained, emphasis should be placed
2-12
 on the leg (hamstrings and quadriceps),
hip (gluteal and hip flexors), low back
(spinal erector), and abdominal (rectus
abdominis) muscles. These two days
should also include brief (2-mile) CR
workouts of light to moderate intensity
(65 to 75 percent HRR). On the one
CR fitness day left, soldiers should
take a long distance run (4 to 6 miles)
at a moderate pace (70 percent HRR),
an interval workout, or an aerobic
circuit. They should also do some
strength work of light volume and
intensity. If four days are available, a
road march should be added to the
three-day program at least twice
monthly. The speed, load, distance,
and type of terrain should be varied.
If there are five days, leaders should
devote two of them to muscular strength
and endurance and two of them to CR
fitness. One CR fitness day will use
long distance runs; the other can stress
more intense workouts including in-
terval work, Fartlek running, or last-
man-up running. At least two times
per month, the remaining day should
Leaders must train and
include a road march.
march with their units Soldiers can usually begin road-
as much as possible. march training by carrying a total load
equal to 20 percent of their body
weight. This includes all clothing and
equipment. However, the gender make-
up and/or physical condition of a unit
may require using a different starting
load. Beginning distances should be
between five and six miles, and the
pace should be at 20 minutes per mile
over flat terrain with a hard surface.
Gradual increases should be made in
speed, load, and distance until soldiers
can do the anticipated, worst-case,
mission-related scenarios without ex-
cessive difficulty or exhaustion. Units
should take maintenance marches at
Units should do
least twice a month. Distances should
maintenance marches vary from six to eight miles, with loads
at least twice a month. of 30 to 40 percent of body weight.
The pace should be 15 to 20 minutes
per mile.
2-13
A recent Army study showed that
road-march training two times a month
and four times a month produced
similar improvements in road-march-
ing performance. Thus, twice-monthly
road marches appear to produce a
favorable improvement in soldiers
abilities to road march if they are
supported by a sound PT program
(five days per week)
Commanders must establish realis-
tic goals for road marching based on
assigned missions. They should also
allow newly assigned soldiers and those
coming off extended profiles to gradu-
ally build up to the units fitness level
before making them carry maximum
loads. This can be done with ability
groups.
Road marching should be integrated
into all other training. Perhaps the best
single way to improve Ioad-earring
capacity is to have a regular training
program which systematically increases
the load and distance. It must also let
the soldier regularly practice carrying
heavy loads over long distances.
As much as possible, leaders at all
levels must train and march with their
units. This participation enhances
leaders fitness levels and improves
team spirit and confidence, both vital
elements in accomplishing difficult
and demanding road marches.
Alternate Forms of
Aerobic Exercise
Some soldiers cannot run. In such
cases, they may use other activities as
supplements or alternatives. Swim-
ming, bicycling, and cross-country
skiing are all excellent endurance ex-
ercises and are good substitutes for
running. Their drawback is that they
require special equipment and facili-
ties that are not always available. As
with all exercise, soldiers should start
slowly and progress gradually. Those
who use non-running activities to
such training may not improve run-
ning ability. To prepare a soldier for
the APFT 2-mile run, there is no sub-
stitute for running.
SWIMMING
Swimming is a good alternative to
running. Some advantages of swim-
ming include the following:
o Involvement of all the major muscle
groups.
o Body position that enhances the
bloods return to the heart.
o Partial support of body weight by
the water, which minimizes lower
body stress in overweight soldiers.
Swimming may be used to improve
ones CR fitness level and to maintain
and improve CR fitness during recov-
ery from an injury. It is used to
supplement running and develop upper
body endurance and limited strength.
The swimmer should start slowly with
a restful stroke. After five minutes, he
should stop to check his pulse, com-
pare it with his THR and, if needed,
adjust the intensity.
Compared with all the other modes
of aerobic exercise presented in this
manual (e.g., running, walking, cy-
cling, cross-country skiing, rope
jumping, etc.) in swimming alone,
ones THR should be lower than while
doing the other forms of aerobic exer-
cise. This is because, in swimming, the
heart does not beat as fast as when
doing the other types of exercise at the
same work rate. Thus, in order to
effectively train the CR system during
swimming, a soldier should set his
THR about 10 bpm lower than while
running. For example, a soldier whose
THR while running is 150 bpm should
have a THR of about 140 bpm while
swimming. By modifying their THRs
in this manner while swimming, sol-
diers will help to ensure that they are
working at the proper intensity.
Non-swimmers can run in waist-to
chest-deep water, tread water, and do
pool-side kicking for an excellent
aerobic workout. They can also do
calisthenics in the water. Together
these activities combine walking and
running with moderate resistance work
for the upper body.
For injured soldiers, swimming and
aerobic water-training are excellent
for improving CR fitness without plac-
ing undue stress on injured weight-
bearing parts of the body.
CYCLING
Cycling is an excellent exercise for
developing CR fitness. Soldiers can
bicycle outdoors or on a stationary
cycling machine indoors. Road cycling
should be intense enough to allow the
soldier to reach and maintain THR at
least 30 minutes.
Soldiers can alter the cycling inten-
sity by changing gears, adding hill Cycling should be
work, and increasing velocity. Dis- intense enough to let the
tance can also be increased to enhance soldier reach and
CR fitness, but the distance covered is maintain THR at least
not as important as the amount of time 30 minutes.
spent training at THR. The intensity
of a workout can be increased by in-
creasing the resistance against the wheel
or increasing the pedaling cadence
(number of RPM), For interval train-
ing, the soldier can vary the speed and
resistance and use periods of active For swimming, a soldier
recovery at low speed and/or low should set his THR at
resistance. about 10 beats per
minute lower then when
WALKING running.
Walking is another way to develop
cardiorespiratory fitness. It is enjoy-
able, requires no equipment, and causes
few injuries. However, unless walking
is done for a long time at the correct
intensity, it will not produce any sig-
nificant CR conditioning.
Sedentary soldiers with a low degree
of fitness should begin slowly with 12
minutes of walking at a comfortable
pace. The heart rate should be moni-
tored to determine the intensity. The
soldier should walk at least four times
a week and add two minutes each week
2-14
 to every workout until the duration
reaches 45 to 60 minutes per workout.
He can increase the intensity by adding
hills or stairs.
As the walkers fitness increases, he
should walk 45 to 60 minutes at a faster
pace. A simple way to increase walk-
ing speed is to carry the arms the same
way as in running. With this technique
the soldier has a shorter arm swing and
takes steps at a faster rate. Swinging
the arms faster to increase the pace is
a modified form of race walking (power
walking) which allows for more upper-
body work. This method may also be
used during speed marches. After
about three months, even the most
unfit soldiers should reach a level of
conditioning that lets them move into
a running program.
CROSS-COUNTRY SKIING
Cross-country or Nordic skiing is
another excellent alternative to the
usual CR activities. It requires vigor-
ous movement of the arms and legs
Cross-country skiing which develops muscular and CR
requires vigorous endurance and coordination. Some of
movement of the arms the highest levels of aerobic fitness
and legs, developing ever measured have been found in
muscular and CR cross-country skiers.
endurance. Although some regions lack snow,
one form or another of cross-country
skiing can be done almost anywhere--
on country roads, golf courses, open
fields, and in parks and forests.
Cross-country skiing is easy to learn.
The action is similar to that used in
brisk walking, and the intensity may be
varied as in running. The work load is
determined by the difficulty of ter-
rain, the pace, and the frequency and
duration of rest periods. Equipment is
reasonably priced, with skis, boots,
and poles often obtainable from the
outdoor recreation services.
2-15
ROPE SKIPPING
Rope skipping is also a good exer-
cise for developing CR fitness. It
requires little equipment, is easily
learned, may be done almost any-
where, and is not affected by weather.
Some runners use it as a substitute for
running during bad weather.
A beginner should select a jump
rope that, when doubled and stood on,
reaches to the armpits. Weighted
handles or ropes may be used by
better-conditioned soldiers to improve
upper body strength. Rope skippers
should begin with five minutes of
jumping rope and then monitor their
heart rate. They should attain and
maintain their THR to ensure a train-
ing effect, and the time spent jumping
should be increased as the fitness level
improves.
Rope jumping, however, may be
stressful to the lower extremities and
therefore should be limited to no more
than three times a week. Soldiers
should skip rope on a cushioned sur-
face such as a mat or carpet and should
wear cushioned shoes.
HANDBALL AND
RACQUET SPORTS
Handball and the racquet sports
(tennis, squash, and racquetball) in-
volve bursts of intense activity for
short periods. They do not provide the
same degree of aerobic training as
exercises of longer duration done at
lower intensities. However, these
sports are good supplements and can
provide excellent aerobic benefits
depending on the skill of the players.
If played vigorously each day, they
may be an adequate substitute for low-
level aerobic training. Because run-
ning increases endurance, it helps
improve performance in racket sports,
but the reverse is not necessarily true.
EXERCISE TO MUSIC
Aerobic exercise done to music is
another excellent alternative to run-
ning. It is a motivating, challenging
activity that combines exercise and
rhythmic movements. There is no
prerequisite skill, and it can be totally
individualized to every fitness level by
varying the frequency, intensity, and
duration. One can move to various
tempos while jogging or doing
jumping jacks, hops, jumps, or many
other calisthenics.
Workouts can be done in a small
space by diverse groups of varying
fitness levels. Heart rates should be
taken during the conditioning phase to
be sure the workout is sufficiently
intense. If strengthening exercises are
included, the workout addresses every
component of fitness. Holding rela-
tively light dumbbells during the work-
out is one way to increase the intensity
for the upper body and improve mus-
cular endurance. Warm-up and cool-
down stretches should be included in
the aerobic workout.
2-16
 On today's battlefield, in addition to
cardiorespiratory fitness, soldiers need
a high level of muscular endurance and
strength. In a single day they may
carry injured comrades, move equip-
ment, lift heavy tank or artillery rounds,
push stalled vehicles, or do many other
strength-related tasks. For example,
based on computer-generated scenar-
ios of an invasion of Western Europe,
artillerymen may have to load from 300
to 500, 155mm-howitzer rounds (95-lb
rounds) while moving from 6 to 10
times each day over 8 to 12 days. In-
fantrymen may need to carry loads
exceeding 100 pounds over great dis-
tances, while supporting units will
deploy and displace many times. In-
deed, survival on the battlefield may,
in large part, depend on the muscular
endurance and strength of the individ-
ual soldier.
Muscular Fitness
Muscular fitness has two compo-
nents: muscular strength and muscular
endurance.
Muscular strength is the greatest
amount of force a muscle or muscle
group can exert in a single effort.
Muscular endurance is the ability of
a muscle or muscle group to do re-
peated contractions against a less-than-
maximum resistance for a given time.
Although muscular endurance and
strength are separate fitness compo-
nents, they are closely related. Pro-
gressively working against resistance
will produce gains in both of these
components.
Muscular Contractions
Isometric, isotonic, and isokinetic
muscular endurance and strength are
best produced by regularly doing each
specific kind of contraction. They are
described here.
3-1
Isometric contraction produces con-
traction but no movement, as when
pushing against a wall. Force is pro-
duced with no change in the angle of
the joint.
Isotonic contraction causes a joint
to move through a range of motion
against a constant resistance. Common
examples are push-ups, sit-ups, and
the lifting of weights.
Isokinetic contraction causes the
angle at the joint to change at a
constant rate, for example, at 180
degrees per second. To achieve a
constant speed of movement, the load
or resistance must change at different
joint angles to counter the varying
forces produced by the muscle(s) at
different angles. This requires the use
of isokinetic machines. There are
other resistance-training machines
which, while not precisely controlling
the speed of movement, affect it by
varying the resistance throughout the
range of motion. Some of these
devices are classified as pseudo-isoki-
netic and some as variable-resistance
machines.
Isotonic and isokinetic contractions
have two specific phases - the concen-
tric or positive phase and the eccen-
tric or negative phase. In the concen-
tric phase (shortening) the muscle
contracts, while in the eccentric phase
(elongation) the muscle returns to its
normal length. For example, on the
upward phase of the biceps curl, the
biceps are shortening. This is a con-
centric (positive) contraction. During
the lowering phase of the curl the
biceps are lengthening. This is an
eccentric (negative) contraction.
A muscle can control more weight
in the eccentric phase of contraction
than it can lift concentrically. As a
result, the muscle may be able to
handle more of an overload eccentri-
cally. This greater overload, in return,
may produce greater strength gains.
The nature of the eccentric contrac-
tion, however, makes the muscle and
connective tissue more susceptible to
damage, so there is more muscle sore-
ness following eccentric work.
When a muscle is overloaded, whether
by isometric, isotonic, or isokinetic
contractions, it adapts by becoming
stronger. Each type of contraction has
advantages and disadvantages, and each
will result in strength gains if done
properly.
The above descriptions are more
important to those who assess strength
than to average people trying to de-
velop strength and endurance. Actu-
ally, a properly designed weight train-
ing program with free weights or
resistance machines will result in
improvements in all three of these
categories.
Principles of Muscular
Training
To have a good exercise program,
the seven principles of exercise, de-
scribed in Chapter 1, must be applied
to all muscular endurance and strength
training. These principles are over-
load, progression, specificity, regular-
ity, recovery, balance, and variety.
OVERLOAD
The overload principle is the basis
for all exercise training programs. For
a muscle to increase in strength, the
workload to which it is subjected
during exercise must be increased
beyond what it normally experiences.
In other words, the muscle must be
overloaded. Muscles adapt to in-
creased workloads by becoming larger
and stronger and by developing greater
endurance.
To understand the principle of over-
load, it is important to know the
following strength-training terms:
Full range of motion. To obtain When a muscle is
optimal gains, the overload must be overloaded by isometric,
applied thoughout the full range of isotonic, or isokinetic
motion. Exercise a joint and its as- contractions, it adapts by
sociated muscles through its com-
plete range starting from the pre- becoming stronger.
stretched position (stretched past
the relaxed position) and ending in
a fully contratcted position. This is
crucial to strength development.
Repetition. When an exercise has
progressed through one complete
range of motion and back to the
beginning, one repetition has been
completed.
One-repetition maximum (1-RM).
This is a repetition performed against
the greatest possible resistance (the
maximum weight a person can lift
one time). A 10-RM is the maxi-
mum weight one can lift correctly
10 times. Similarly, an 8-12 RM is
that weight which allows a person
to do from 8 to 12 correct repeti-
tions. The intensity for muscular
endurance and strength training is
often expressed as a percentage of.
the 1-RM.
Set. This is a series of repetitions
done without rest.
Muscle Failure. This is the inabil-
ity of a person to do another correct
repetition in a set.
The minimum resistance needed to
obtain strength gains is 50 percent of
the 1 -RM. However, to achieve enough
overload, programs are designed to
require sets with 70 to 80 percent of
ones 1 -RM. (For example, if a sol-
diers 1 -RM is 200 pounds, multiply
200 pounds by 70 percent [200 X 0.70
= 140 pounds] to get 70 percent of the
1 -RM.)
3-2
 A better and easier method is the
repetition maximum (RM) method. The
exerciser finds and uses that weight
which lets him do the correct number
of repetitions. For example, to develop
both muscle endurance and strength, a
soldier should choose a weight for each
exercise which lets him do 8 to 12 repe-
titions to muscle failure. (See Figure
3-1.) The weight should be heavy
enough so that, after doing from 8 to 12
Figure 3-1
3-3
repetitions, he momentarily cannot
correctly do another repetition. This
weight is the 8-12 RM for that exer-
cise.
MUSCULAR ENDURANCE/
STRENGTH DEVELOPMENT
To develop muscle strength, the
weight selected should be heavier and
the RM will also be different. For ex-
ample, the soldier should find that
weight for each exercise which lets
him do 3 to 7 repetitions correctly.
This weight is the 3-7 RM for that
exercise. Although the greatest im-
provements seem to come from resis-
tances of about 6-RM, an effective
range is a 3-7 RM. The weight should
be heavy enough so that an eighth
repetition would be impossible be-
cause of muscle fatigue.
The weight should also not be too
heavy. If one cannot do at least three
repetitions of an exercise, the resis-
tance is too great and should be re-
duced. Soldiers who are just begin-
ning a resistance-training program
should not start with heavy weights.
They should first build an adequate
foundation by training with an 8-12
RM or a 12+ RM.
To develop muscular endurance,
the soldier should choose a resistance
that lets him do more than 12 repeti-
tions of a given exercise. This is his
12+ repetition maximum (12+ RM).
With continued training, the greater
the number of repetitions per set, the
greater will be the improvement in
muscle endurance and the smaller the
gains in strength. For example, when
a soldier trains with a 25-RM weight,
gains in muscular endurance will be
greater than when using a 15-RM
weight, but the gain in strength will
not be as great. To optimize a soldiers
performance, his RM should be deter-
mined from an analysis of the critical
tasks of his mission. However, most
soldiers will benefit most from a resis-
tance-training program with an 8-12
RM.
 Whichever RM range is selected,
the soldier must always strive to over-
load his muscles. The key to overload-
ing a muscle is to make that muscle
exercise harder than it normally does.
An overload may be achieved by any
of the following methods:
Increasing the resistance.
Increasing the number of repeti-
tions per set.
Increasing the number of sets.
Reducing the rest time between
sets.
Increasing the speed of movement
in the concentric phase.
(Good form is more important than
the speed of movement.)
Using any combination of the above.
PROGRESSION
When an overload is applied to a
muscle, it adapts by becoming stronger
and/or by improving its endurance.
Usually significant increases in strength
can be made in three to four weeks of
proper training depending on the in-
dividual. If the workload is not pro-
gressively increased to keep pace with
newly won strength, there will be no
further gains. When a soldier can cor-
rectly do the upper limit of repetitions
for the set without reaching muscle
failure, it is usually time to increase
the resistance. For most soldiers, this
upper limit should be 12 repetitions.
For example, if his plan is to do 12
repetitions in the bench press, the
soldier starts with a weight that causes
muscle failure at between 8 and 12
repetitions (8- 12 RM). He should
continue with that weight until he can
do 12 repetitions correctly. He then
should increase the weight by about 5
percent but no more than 10 percent.
In a multi-set routine, if his goal is to
do three sets of eight repetitions of an
exercise, he starts with a weight that
causes muscle failure before he com -
pletes the eighth repetition in one or
more of the sets. He continues to work
with that weight until he can complete
all eight repetitions in each set, then
increases the resistance by no more
than 10 percent.
SPECIFICITY
A resistance-training program should
provide resistance to the specific muscle
groups that need to be strengthened.
These groups can be identified by
doing a simple assessment. The soldier
slowly does work-related movements
he wants to improve and, at the same
time, he feels the muscles on each side
of the joints where motion occurs.
Those muscles that are contracting or
becoming tense during the movement
are the muscle groups involved. If the
soldiers performance of a task is not
adequate or if he wishes to improve,
strength training for the identified
muscle(s) will be beneficial. To im-
prove his muscular endurance and
strength. in a given task, the soldier
must do resistance movements that are
as similar as possible to those of doing
the task. In this way, he ensures
maximum carryover value to his sol-
diering tasks.
REGULARITY
Exercise must be done regularly to
produce a training effect. Sporadic
Exercise must be done
exercise may do more harm than good.
Soldiers can maintain a moderate level regularly to produce a
of strength by doing proper strength
workouts only once a week, but three training effect.
workouts per week are best for optimal
gains. The principle of regularity also
applies to the exercises for individual
muscle groups. A soldier can work out
three times a week, but when different
muscle groups are exercised at each
workout, the principle of regularity is
violated and gains in strength are
minimal.
3-4
 RECOVERY
Consecutive days of hard resistance
training for the same muscle group can
be detrimental. The muscles must be
allowed sufficient recovery time to
adapt. Strength training can be done
every day only if the exercised muscle
groups are rotated, so that the same
There should be at
muscle or muscle group is not exercised
least a 48-hour recovery on consecutive days. There should be
at least a 48-hour recovery period
period between workouts
between workouts for the same muscle
for the same muscle groups. For example, the legs can be
trained with weights on Monday,
group. Wednesday, and Friday and the upper
body muscles on Tuesday, Thursday,
and Saturday.
Recovery is also important within a
workout. The recovery time between
different exercises and sets depends, in
part, on the intensity of the workout.
Normally, the recovery time between
sets should be 30 to 180 seconds.
BALANCE
When developing a strength training
program, it is important to include
It is important to exercises that work all the major muscle
include exercises that groups in both the upper and lower
work all the major body. One should not work just the
muscle groups in both upper body, thinking that running will
the upper and lower strengthen the legs.
body. Most muscles are organized into
opposing pairs. Activating one muscle
results in a pulling motion, while acti-
vating the opposing muscle results in
the opposite, or pushing, movement.
When planning a training session, it is
best to follow a pushing exercise with
a pulling exercise which results in
movement at the same joint(s). For
example, follow an overhead press
with a lat pull-down exercise. This
technique helps ensure good strength
balance between opposing muscle groups
which may, in turn, reduce the risk of
injury. Sequence the program to exer-
cise the larger muscle groups first, then
3-5
the smaller muscIes. For example, the
lat pull-down stresses both the larger
latissimus dorsi muscle of the back and
the smaller biceps muscles of the arm.
If curls are done first, the smaller
muscle group will be exhausted and
too weak to handle the resistance
needed for the lat pull-down. As a
result, the soldier cannot do as many
repetitions with as much weight as he
normally could in the lat pull-down.
The latissimus dorsi muscles will not
be overloaded and, as a result, they
may not benefit very much from the
workout.
The best sequence to follow for a
total-body strength workout is to first
exercise the muscles of the hips and
legs, followed by the muscles of the
upper back and chest, then the arms,
abdominal, low back, and neck. As
long as all muscle groups are exercised
at the proper intensity, improvement
will occur.
VARIETY
A major challenge for all fitness
training programs is maintaining en-
thusiasm and interest. A poorly de-
signed strength- training program can
be very boring. Using different equip-
ment, changing the exercises, and al-
tering the volume and intensity are
good ways to add variety, and they
may also produce better results. The
soldier should periodically substitute
different exercises for a given muscle
group(s). For example, he can do
squats with a barbell instead of leg
presses on a weight machine. Also, for
variety or due to necessity (for ex-
ample, when in the field), he can
switch to partner-resisted exercises or
another form of resistance training.
However, frequent wholesale changes
should be avoided as soldiers may
become frustrated if they do not have
enough time to adapt or to see im-
provements in strength.
 Workout Techniques
Workouts for improving muscular
endurance or strength must follow the
principles just described. There are
also other factors to consider, namely,
safety, exercise selection, and phases
of conditioning.
SAFETY FACTORS
Major causes of injury when strength
training are improper lifting tech-
niques combined with lifting weights
that are too heavy. Each soldier must
understand how to do each lift cor-
rectly before he starts his strength
training program.
The soldier should always do weight
training with a partner, or spotter,
who can observe his performance as he
exercises. To ensure safety and the
best results, both should know how to
use the equipment and the proper
spotting technique for each exercise.
A natural tendency in strength train-
ing is to see how much weight one can
lift. Lifting too much weight forces a
compromise in form and may lead to
injury. All weights should be selected
so that proper form can be maintained
for the appropriate number of repeti-
tions.
Correct breathing is another safety
factor in strength training. Breathing
should be constant during exercise.
The soldier should never hold his
breath, as this can cause dizziness and
even loss of consciousness. As a
general rule, one should exhale during
the positive (concentric) phase of
contraction as the weight or weight
stack moves away from the floor, and
inhale during the negative (eccentric)
phase as the weight returns toward the
floor.
EXERCISE SELECTION
When beginning a resistance-train-
ing program, the soldier should choose
about 8 to 16 exercises that work all of
the bodys major muscle groups. Usu-
ally eight well-chosen exercises will
serve as a good starting point. They
should include those for the muscles of
the leg, low back, shoulders, and so
forth. The soldier should choose exer-
cises that work several muscle groups
and try to avoid those that isolate single
muscle groups. This will help him train
a greater number of muscles in a given
time. For example, doing lat pull-
downs on the lat machine works the
latissimus dorsi of the back and the
biceps muscles of the upper arm. On
the other hand, an exercise like con-
centration curls for the biceps muscles
of the upper arm, although an effective
exercise, only works the arm flexor
muscles. Also, the concentration curl
requires twice as much time as lat pull-
downs because only one arm is worked
at a time.
Perhaps a simpler way to select an
exercise is to determine the number of
joints in the body where movement oc-
curs during a repetition. For most
people, especially beginners, most of
the exercises in the program should be
multi-joint exercises. The exercise
should provide movement at more than
one joint. For example, the pull-down
exercise produces motion at both the
shoulder and elbow joints. The con-
centration curl, however, only involves
the elbow joint.
PHASES OF CONDITIONING
There are three phases of condition-
ing: preparatory, conditioning, and
maintenance. These are also described
in Chapter 1.
Preparatory Phase
The three phases of
The soldier should use very light conditioning are
weights during the first week (the
preparatory, conditioning,
preparatory phase) which includes the
first two to three workouts. This is and maintenance.
very important, because the beginner
must concentrate at first on learning
3-6
the proper form for each exercise.
Using light weights also helps mini-
mize muscle soreness and decreases the
likelihood of injury to the muscles,
joints, and ligaments. During the
second week, he should use progres-
sively heavier weights. By the end of
the second week (4 to 6 workouts), he
should know how much weight on each
exercise will allow him to do 8 to 12
repetitions to muscle failure. If he can
do only seven repetitions of an exer-
cise, the weight must be reduced; if he
can do more than 12, the weight should
be increased.
Conditioning Phase
The third week is normally the start
of the conditioning phase for the be-
ginning weight trainer. During this
phase, the soldier should increase the
amount of weight used and/or the
intensity of the workout as his muscu-
lar strength and/or endurance increases.
He should do one set of 8 to 12
repetitions for each of the heavy-
resistance exercises. When he can do
more than 12 repetitions of any exer-
cise, he should increase the weight
until he can again do only 8 to 12 repe-
titions. This usually involves an in-
crease in weight of about five percent.
This process continues indefinitely. As
long as he continues to progress and get
stronger, he does not need to do more
than one set per exercise. If he stops
making progress with one set of 8 to 12
repetitions per exercise, he may bene-
fit from adding another set of 8 to 12
repetitions on those exercises in which
progress has slowed. As time goes on
and he progresses, he may increase the
number to three sets of an exercise to
get even further gains in strength and/
or muscle mass. Three sets per exer-
cise is the maximum most soldiers will
ever need to do.
3-7
Maintenance Phase
Once the soldier reaches a high
level of fitness, the maintenance phase
is used to maintain that level. The
emphasis in this phase is no longer on
progression but on retention. Al-
though training three times a week for
muscle endurance and strength gives
the best results, one can maintain them
by training the major muscle groups
properly one or two times a week.
More frequent training, however, is
required to reach and maintain peak
fitness levels. Maintaining the optimal
level of fitness should become part of
each soldiers life-style and training
routine. The maintenance phase should
be continued throughout his career
and, ideally, throughout his life.
As with aerobic training, the sol-
dier should do strength training three
times a week and should allow at least
48 hours of rest from resistance train-
ing between workouts for any given
muscle group.
TIMED SETS
Timed sets refers to a method of
physical training in which as many
repetitions as possible of a given exer-
cise are performed in a specified pe-
riod of time. After an appropriate
period of rest, a second, third, and so
on, set of that exercise is done in an
equal or lesser time period. The
exercise period, recovery period, and
the number of sets done should be
selected to make sure that an overload
of the involved muscle groups occurs.
The use of timed sets, unlike exer-
cises performed in cadence or for a
specific number of repetitions, helps
to ensure that each soldier does as
many repetitions of an exercise as pos-
sible within a period of time. It
does not hold back the more capable
performer by restricting the number
of repetitions he may do. Instead, sol-
diers at all levels of fitness can indi-
vidually do the number of repetitions
they are capable of and thereby be
sure they obtain an adequate training
stimulus.
In this FM, timed sets will be
applied to improving soldiers sit-up
and push-up performance. (See Fig-
ures 3-2 and 3-3. ) Many different
but equally valid approaches can be
taken when using timed sets to im-
prove push-up and sit-up perform-
ance. Below, several of these will be
given.
It should first be stated that im-
proving sit-up and push-up perform-
ance, although important for the APFT,
should not be the main goal of an
Army physical training program. It
must be to develop an optimal level of
physical fitness which will help sol-
diers carry out their mission during
combat. Thus, when a soldier per-
forms a workout geared to develop
muscle endurance and strength, the
goal should be to develop sufficient
strength and/or muscle endurance in
all the muscle groups he will be called
upon to use as he performs his mission.
To meet this goal, and to be assured
that all emergencies can be met, a
training regimen which exercises all
the bodys major muscle groups must
Figure 3-2
be developed and followed. Thus, as
a general rule, a muscle endurance or
strength training workout should not
be designed to work exclusively, or
give priority to, those muscle groups
worked by the sit-up or push-up event.
For this reason, the best procedure
to follow when doing a resistance
exercise is as follows. First, perform a
workout to strengthen all of the bodys
major muscles. Then, do timed sets to
improve push-up and sit-up perform-
ance. Following this sequence ensures
that all major muscles are worked. At
the same time, it reduces the amount of
time and work that must be devoted to
push-ups and sit-ups. This is because
the muscles worked by those two exer-
cises will already be pre-exhausted.
The manner in which timed sets for
push-ups and sit-ups are conducted
should occasionally be varied. This
ensures continued gains and minimizes
boredom. This having been said, here
is a very time-efficient way of con-
ducting push-up/sit-up improvement.
Alternate timed sets of push-ups and
timed sets of sit-ups with little or no
time between sets allowed for recov-
ery. In this way, the muscle groups
used by the push-up can recover while
the muscles used in the sit-up are
exercised, and vice versa. The follow-
ing is an example of this type of
approach:
3-8
 If all soldiers exercise at the same
time, the above activity can be finished
in about 3.5 minutes. As the soldiers
levels of fitness improve, the difficulty
of the activity can be increased. This
is done by lengthening the time period
of any or all timed sets, by decreasing
any rest period between timed sets, by
increasing the number of timed sets
performed, or by any combination of
these.
To add variety and increase the
overall effectiveness of the activity,
different types of push-ups (regular,
feet-elevated, wide-hand, close-hand,
and so forth) and sit-ups (regular,
abdominal twists, abdominal curls, and
so forth) can be done. When perform-
ing this type of workout, pay attention
to how the soldiers are responding, and
make adjustments accordingly. For
example, the times listed in the chart
above may prove to be too long or too
short for some soldiers. In the same
way, because of the nature of the sit-
up, it may become apparent that some
soldiers can benefit by taking slightly
more time for timed sets of sit-ups
than for push-ups.
When using timed sets for push-up
and sit-up improvement, soldiers can
also perform all sets of one exercise
Figure 3-3
3-9
before doing the other. For example,
several timed sets of push-ups can be
done followed by several sets of sit-
ups, or vice versa. With this approach,
rest intervals must be placed between
timed sets. The following example can
be done after the regular strength
workout and is reasonable starting
routine for most soldiers.
During a timed set of push-ups, a
soldier may reach temporary muscle
failure at any time before the set is
over. If this happens, he should
immediately drop to his knees and
continue doing modified push-ups on
his knees.
Finally, as in any endeavor, soldiers
must set goals for themselves. This
applies when doing each timed set and
when planning for their next and
future APFTs.
Major Muscle Groups
In designing a workout it is impor-
tant to know the major muscle groups,
where they are located, and their pri-
mary action. (See Figure 3-4.)
To ensure a good, balanced work-
out, one must do at least one set of
exercises for each of the major muscle
groups.
Figure 3-4

Figure 3-5
The beginning weight-training pro-
gram shown at Figure 3-5 will work
most of the important, major muscle
groups. It is a good program for begin-
ners and for those whose time is
limited. The exercises should be done
in the order presented.
The weight-training program shown
at Figure 3-6 is a more comprehensive
program that works the major muscle
groups even more thoroughly. It has
some duplication
. with respect to the
muscles that are worked. For example,
the quadriceps are worked by the leg
press/squat and leg extensions, and the
biceps are worked by the seated row,
Figure 3-6
3-11
lat pull-down, and biceps curl. Thus,
for the beginner, this program may
overwork some muscle groups. How-
ever, for the more advanced lifter, it
will make the muscles work in differ-
ent ways and from different angles
thereby providing a better over-all
development of muscle strength. This
program also includes exercises to
strengthen the neck muscles.
When doing one set of each exercise
to muscle failure, the average soldier
should be able to complete this routine
and do a warm-up and cool-down
within the regular PT time.
 Key Points to Emphasize
Some key points to emphasize when
doing resistance training tire as fol-
lows
Train with a partner if possible,
This helps to increase motivation,
the intensity of the workout, and
safety,
Always breathe when lifting. Exhale
during the concentric (positive] phase
of contraction, and inhale during
the eccentric (negative) phase,
Accelerate the weight through the
concentric phase of contraction,
and return the weight to the starting
position in a controlled manner
during the eccentric phase,
Exercise the large muscle groups
first, then the smaller ones.
Perform all exercises through their
full range of motion. Begin from a
fully extended, relaxed position (pre-
stretched), and end the concentric
phase in a fully contracted position,
Always use strict form. Do not
twist, lurch, lunge, or arch the
body, This can cause serious in-
jury. These motions also detract
from the effectiveness of the exer-
cise because they take much of the
stress off the targeted muscle groups
and place it on other muscles.
Rest from 30 to 180 seconds be-
tween different exercises and sets
of a given exercise.
Allow at least 48 hours of recovery
between workouts, but not more
than 96 hours, to let the body re-
cover and help prevent over train-
ing and injury.
Progress slowly, Never increase the
resistance used by more than 10
percent at a time.
Alternate pulling and pushing exer-
cises. For example, follow triceps
extensions with biceps curls.
Ensure that every training program
is balanced. Train the whole body,
not just specific areas. Concentrat-
ing on weak areas is all right, but
the rest of the body must also be
trained.
Exercise Programs
When developing strength programs
for units, there are limits to the type of
training that can be done. The availa-
bility of facilities is always a major
concern. Although many installations
have excellent strength-training fa-
cilities, it is unreasonable to expect that
all units can use them on a regular
basis. However, the development of
strength does not require expensive
equipment. All that is required is for
the soldier, three times a week, to
progressively overload his muscles.
TRAINING WITHOUT SPECIAL
EQUIPMENT
Muscles do not care what is supply-
ing the resistance. Any regular resis-
tance exercise that makes the muscle
work harder than it is used to causes it
to adapt and become stronger. Whether
the training uses expensive machines,
sandbags, or partners, the result is
largely the same.
Sandbags are convenient for train-
ing large numbers of soldiers, as they
are available in all military units. The
weight of the bags can be varied
depending on the amount of fill.
Sandbag exercises are very effective in
strength-training circuits. Logs, ammo
boxes, dummy rounds, or other equip-
ment that is unique to a unit can also
be used to provide resistance for strength
training. Using a soldiers own body
weight as the resistive force is another
excellent alternative method of strength
training. Pull-ups, push-ups, dips, sit-
ups, and single-leg squats are examples
of exercises which use a persons body
weight. They can improve an un-
trained soldiers level of strength.
Partner-resisted exercises (PREs) are
another good way to develop muscular
strength without equipment, especially
when training large numbers of sol-
diers at one time. As with all training,
safety is a critical factor. Soldiers
should warm up, cool down, and follow
the principles of exercise previously
outlined.
3-12
 PARTNER-RESISTED EXERCISE
In partner-resisted exercises (PREs)
a person exercises against a partners
opposing resistance. The longer the
partners work together, the more
effective they should become in pro-
viding the proper resistance for each
exercise. They must communicate with
each other to ensure that neither too
much nor too little resistance is ap-
plied. The resister must apply enough
resistance to bring the exerciser to
muscle failure in 8 to 12 repetitions.
More resistance usual] y can and should
be applied during the eccentric (nega-
tive) phase of contraction (in other
words, the second half of each repe-
tition as the exerciser returns to the
starting position). The speed of move-
ment for PREs should always be slow
and controlled. As a general rule, the
negative part of each exercise should
3-13
take at least as long to complete as
the positive part. Proper exercise
form and regularity in perform-
ance are key ingredients when
using PREs for improving strength.
Following are descriptions and
illustrations of several PREs. They
should be done in the order given
to ensure that the exercising sol-
dier is working his muscle groups
from the largest to the smallest.
More than one exercise per muscle
group may be used. The PT leader
can select exercises which meet the
units specific goals while consid-
ering individual limitations:
A 36-to 48-inch stick or bar one
inch in diameter may be used for
some of the exercises. This gives
the resister a better grip and/or
leverage and also provides a feel
similar to that of free weights and
exercise machines.
3-14
3-15
3-16
3-17
3-18
3-19
3-20
 TRAINING WITH EQUIPMENT

Units in garrison usually have access to

weight rooms with basic equipment for
resistance-training exercises. The ex-
ercises described here require free
weights and supporting equipment.
Although not shown below for the sake
of simplicity, all exercises done with
free weights require a partner, or
spotter, to ensure proper form and the
safety of the lifter.

Free-Weight Exercises

3-21
3-22
3-23
3-24
3-25
 Exercises Performed with an
Exercise Machine

If exercise machines are available, eccentric (negative) phase of con-

the exercises described below are traction, should be done in a delib-
also good for strength training. All crate, controlled manner.
movements, particularly during the

3-26
3-27
3-28
3-29
3-30
3-31
3-32
 The following exercises can be per- obliques). As the soldier becomes
formed to condition the muscles of the more conditioned on these exer-
mid-section (erector spinae, rectus cises, resistance can be added.
abdominus and external and internal

3-33
3-34
 Exercise Chart
The chart labeled Figure 3-5 will help the
soldier select appropriate exercises for use in
developing a good muscular endurance and strength
workout. For example, if the soldier wants to
develop his upper leg muscles, he has several
options. He may choose from the following: 1)
PREs, concentrating on the split- or single-leg
squat; 2) exercises with equipment, doing free
weight squats; or, 3) exercises with a machine,
doing leg presses, leg curls, and leg extensions.

3-35
3-36
 Flexibility is a component of physi-
cal fitness. Developing and maintain-
ing it are important parts of a fitness
program. Good flexibility can help a
soldier accomplish such physical tasks
as lifting, loading, climbing, parachut-
ing, running, and rappelling with greater
efficiency and less risk of injury.
Flexibility is the range of movement
Flexibility refers to the
of a joint or series of joints and their
range of movement of a associated muscles. It involves the
ability to move a part of the body
joint. through the full range of motion al-
lowed by normal, disease-free joints.
No one test can measure total-body
flexibility. However, field tests can be
used to assess flexibility in the ham-
string and low-back areas. These areas
are commonly susceptible to injury
due, in part, to loss of flexibility. A
simple toe-touch test can be used.
Soldiers shouId stand with their legs
straight and feet together and bend
forward slowly at the waist. A soldier
who cannot touch his toes without
bouncing or bobbing needs work to
improve his flexibility in the muscle
groups stretched by this test. The
units Master Fitness Trainer can help
him design a stretching program to
improve his flexibility.
Stretching during the warm-up and
cool-down helps soldiers maintain
overall flexibility. Stretching should
not be painful, but it should cause some
discomfort because the muscles are
being stretched beyond their normal
length. Because people differ some-
what anatomically, comparing one
persons flexibility with anothers should
not be done. People with poor flexi-
bility who try to stretch as far as others
The four categories of may injure themselves.
stretching techniques are
Stretching Techniques
static,passive,
proprioceptive Using good stretching techniques
can improve flexibility. There are four
neuromuscular commonly recognized categories of
facilitation (PNF), and stretching techniques: static, passive,
proprioceptive neuromuscular facili-
ballistic. tation (PNF), and ballistic. These are
4-1
described here and shown later in this
chapter.
STATIC STRETCHING
Static stretching involves the grad-
ual lengthening of muscles and ten-
dons as a body part moves around a
joint. It is a safe and effective method
for improving flexibility. The soldier
assumes each stretching position slowly
until he feels tension or tightness. This
lengthens the muscles without causing
a reflex contraction in the stretched
muscles. He should hold each stretch
for ten seconds or longer. This lets the
lengthened muscles adjust to the stretch
without causing injury.
The longer a stretch is held, the
easier it is for the muscle to adapt to
that length. Static stretching should
not be painful. The soldier should feel
slight discomfort, but no pain. When
pain results from stretching, it is a sig-
nal that he is stretching a muscle or
tendon too much and may be causing
damage.
PASSIVE STRETCHING
Passive stretching involves the sol-
diers use of a partner or equipment,
such as a towel, pole, or rubber tubing,
to help him stretch. This produces a
safe stretch through a range of motion
he could not achieve without help. He
should talk with his partner to ensure
that each muscle is stretched safely
through the entire range of motion.
PNF STRETCHING
PNF stretching uses the neuromus-
cular patterns of each muscle group to
help improve flexibility. The soldier
performs a series of intense contrac-
tions and relaxations using a partner or
equipment to help him stretch. The
PNF technique allows for greater muscle
relaxation following each contraction
and increases the soldiers ability to
stretch through a greater range of
motion.
 BALLISTIC STRETCHING
Ballistic, or dynamic, stretching in-
volves movements such as bouncing or
bobbing to attain a greater range of
motion and stretch. Although this
method may improve flexibility, it
often forces a muscle to stretch too far
and may result in an injury. Individu-
als and units should not use ballistic
stretching.
FITT Factors
Commanders should include stretch-
ing exercises in all physical fitness
programs.
The following FITT factors apply
when developing a flexibility program.
Frequency: Do flexibility exercises
daily. Do them during the warm-up
to help prepare the muscles for vig-
orous activity and to help reduce in-
jury. Do them during the cool-
down to help maintain flexibility.
Intensity: Stretch a muscle beyond its
normal length to the point of tension
or slight discomfort, not pain.
Time: Hold stretches for 10 to 15 sec-
onds for warming up and cooling
down and for 30 seconds or longer
to improve flexibility.
Type: Use static stretches, assumed
slowly and gradually, as well as pas-
sive stretching and/or PNF stretch-
ing.
Warm-Up and Cool-Down
The warm-up and cool-down are
very important parts of a physical
training session, and stretching exer-
cises should be a major part of both.
THE WARM-UP
The warm-up warms the
Before beginning any vigorous
muscIes, increasing the
physical activity, one should prepare flow of blood and
the body for exercise. The warm-up
reducing the risk of
increases the flow of blood to the injury.
muscles and tendons, thus helping
reduce the risk of injury. It also
increases the joints range of motion
and positively affects the speed of
muscular contraction.
A recommended sequence of warm-
up activities follows. Soldiers should
do these for five to seven minutes
before vigorous exercise.
Slow joggin-in-place or walking
for one to two minutes. This causes
a gradual increase in the heart rate,
blood pressure, circulation, and in-
creases the temperature of the ac-
tive muscles.
Slow joint rotation exercises (for
example, arm circles, knee/ankle
rotations) to gradually increase the
joint's range of motion. Work each
major joint for 5 to 10 seconds.
Slow, static stretching of the muscles
to be used during the upcoming ac-
tivity. This will "loosen up" muscles
and tendons so they can achieve
greater ranges of motion with less
risk of injury. Hold each stretch
position for 10 to 15 seconds, and
do not bounce or bob.
Calisthenic exerciese, as described
in Chapter 7, to increase the inten-
sity level before the activity or con-
ditioning period.
Slowly mimic the activities to be
performed. For example, lift a
lighter weight to warm-up before
lifting a heavier one. This helps
prepare the neuromuscular path-
ways.
4-2
 THE COOL-DOWN The soldier should not limit flexi-
bility training to just the warm-up and
The following information explains cool-down periods. He should some-
the importance of cooling down and times use an entire PT session on a
how to do it correctly. "recovery" or "easy"training day to
Do not stop suddenly after vigorous work on flexibility improvement. He
exercise, as this can be very danger- may also work on it at home. Stretch-
ing is one form of exercise that takes
ous. Gradually bring the body back
very little time relative to the benefits
to its resting state by slowly de- gained.
creasing the intensity of the activ-
ity. After running, for example, Rotation Exercises
one should walk for one to two min-
utes. Stopping exercise suddenly
Rotation exercises are used to gen-
can cause blood to pool in the
tly stretch the tendons, ligments, and
muscles, thereby reducing blood
muscles associated with a joint and to
flow to the heart and brain. This
may cause fainting or abnormal stimulate lubrication of the joint with
rhythms in the heart which could synovial fluid. This may provide
lead to serious complications. better movement and less friction in
Repeat the stretches done in the the joint.
warm-up to help ease muscle ten- The following exercises should be
sion and any immediate feeling of performed slowly.
muscle soreness. Be careful not
to overstretch. The muscles are
warm from activity and can possibly
be overstretched to the point of
injury.
Hold stretches 30 seconds or more
during the cool-down to improve
flexiblity. Use partner-assisted or
PNF techniques, if possible.

4-3
4-4
Common Stretching Exercises
The following exercises improve
flexibility when performed slowly,
regularly, and with gradual progres-
sion. Static, passive and PNF stretches
are shown.
CAUTION Some of these exercises
may be difficult or too strenuous for
unfit or medically limited soldiers.
Common sense should be used ;n se-
lecting stretching exercises.
4-5
STATIC STRETCHES
Assume all stretching positions
slowly until you feel tension or slight
discomfort. Hold each position for at
least 10 to 15 seconds during the
warm-up and cool-down. Develop-
mental stretching to improve flexibil-
ity requires holding each stretch for
30 seconds or longer.
Choose the appropriate stretch for
the muscle groups which you will be
working.
4-6
4-7
4-8
4-9
4-10
4-11
4-12
4-13
 PASSIVE STRETCHES

Passive stretching is done with the help of a with a partner. When stretching alone, using a
partner or equipment. The examples in this chap- towel may help the exerciser achieve a greater
ter show passive stretching done with a towel or range of motion.

4-14
4-15
 Soldiers can do PNF (Propriocep-
tive Neuromuscular Facilitation)
stretches for most major muscle groups.
PNF stretches use a series of contrac-
tions, done against a partners resis-
tance, and relaxations.
Obtaining a safe stretch beyond the
muscles normal length requires a part-
ners assistance. The following four
steps provide general guidance as to
how PNF stretches are done. Both the
exerciser and partner should follow
these instructions:
1. Assume the stretch position slowly
with the partners help.
2. Isometrically contract the muscles
to be stretched. Hold the contraction
for 5 to 10 seconds against the partners
unyielding resistance.
3. Relax. Next, contract the antago-
nistic muscles for 5 to 10 seconds while
the partner helps the exerciser obtain a
greater stretch.
4. Repeat this sequence three times,
and try to stretch a little further each
time. (Caution: The exerciser should
not hold his breath. He should breathe
out during each contraction.)
Several examples of PNF stretches
are provided below in a stepwise fash-
ion. The numbers given above for each
step correspond to the general descrip-
tion listed below.
4-16
4-17

Body composition, which refers to
the bodys relative amounts of fat and
lean body mass (organs, bones, muscles),
is one of the five components of
physical fitness. Good body composi-
tion is best gained through proper diet
and exercise. Examples of poor body
composition are underdeveloped mus-
culature or excessive body fat. Being
overweight (that is, overly fat) is the
more common problem.
Poor body composition causes prob-
lems for the Army. Soldiers with
inadequate muscle development can-
not perform as well as soldiers with
good body composition. As a soldier
gets fat, his ability to perform physi-
cally declines, and his risk of develop-
ing disease increases. Soldiers with
high percentages of body fat often
have lower APFT scores than those
with lower percentages. Poor body
composition, especially obesity, has a
negative effect on appearance, self-
-esteem, and negatively influences at-
titude and morale.
The Armys weight control pro-
gram is described in AR 600-9. It ad-
dresses body composition standards,
programs for the overly fat, and re-
lated administrative actions.
The amount of fat on the body,
when expressed as a percentage of
total body weight, is referred to as the
percent body fat. The Armys maxi-
mum allowable percentages of body
fat, by age and sex, are listed in Figure
5-1.
Evaluation Methods
The Army determines body fat
percentage using the girth method.
(This is described in AR 600-9, pages
12 to 21.)
Body composition is influenced by
age, diet, fitness level, and genetic
factors (gender and body type). The
Armys screening charts for height and
weight (shown in AR 600-9) make al-
lowances for these differences. A
soldier whose weight exceeds the stan-
dard weight shown on the charts may
not necessarily be overfat. For ex-
ample, some well-muscled athletes have
body weights that far exceed the values
for weight listed on the charts for their Body composition is
age, gender, and height. Yet, only a
small percentage of their total body influenced by age,
mass may be fat. In such cases, the lean fitness level, and
body mass accounts for a large share of genetic factors.
their total body composition, while
only a small percentage of the total
body mass is composed of fat.
Soldiers who do not meet the weight
standards for their height and/or sol-
diers whose appearance suggests that
they have excessive fat are to be
evaluated using the circumference (girth
measurement) method described in
AR 600-9.
Figure 5-1
5-0
 A more accurate way to determine
body composition is by hydrostatic or
underwater weighing. However, this
method is very time-consuming and
expensive and usually done only at
hospitals and universities.
Soldiers who do not meet Army
body fat standards are placed on for-
mal, supervised weight (fat) loss pro-
grams as stipulated in AR 600-9. Such
programs include sensible diet and ex-
ercise regimens.
Diet and Exercise
A combination of exercise and diet
is the best way to lose excessive body
fat. Losing one to two pounds a week
is a realistic goal which is best accom-
plished by reducing caloric intake and
increasing energy expenditure. In
other words, one should eat less and
exercise more. Dieting alone can cause
the body to believe it is being starved.
In response, it tries to conserve its fat
reserves by slowing down its metabolic
rate and, as a result, it loses fat at a
slower rate.
A combination of Soldiers must consume a minimum
exercise and diet is the number of calories from all the major
food groups, with the calories distrib-
best way to lose uted over all the daily meals including
unwanted body fat. snacks. This ensures an adequate con-
sumption of necessary vitamins and
minerals. A male soldier who is not
under medical supervision when diet-
ing requires a caloric intake of at least
1 ,500; women require at least 1,200
calories. Soldiers should avoid diets
that fail to meet these criteria.
Trying to lose weight with fad diets
and devices or by skipping meals does
Aerobic exercise is best not work for long-term fat loss, since
weight lost through these practices is
for burning fat. mostly water and lean muscle tissue,
examples include not fat. Losing fat safely takes time
jogging, walking, swim-
ming, bicycling, cross-
country skiing, and
rowing.
5-1
and patience. There is no quick and
easy way to improve body composi-
tion.
The soldier who diets and does not
exercise loses not only fat but muscle
tissue as well. This can negatively
affect his physical readiness. Not only
does exercise burn calories, it helps the
body maintain its useful muscle mass,
and it may also help keep the bodys
metabolic rate high during dieting.
Fat can only be burned during
exercise if oxygen is used. Aerobic
exercise, which uses lots of oxygen, is
the best type of activity for burning
fat. Aerobic exercises include jog-
ging, walking, swimming, bicycling,
cross-country skiing, rowing, stair
climbing, exercise to music, and jump-
ing rope. Anaerobic activities, such as
sprinting or lifting heavy weights,
burn little, if any, fat.
Exercise alone is not the best way to
lose body fat, especially in large
amounts. For an average-sized per-
son, running or walking one mile
burns about 100 calories. Because
there are 3,500 calories in one pound
of fat, he needs to run or walk 35 miles
if pure fat were being burned. In re-
ality, fat is seldom the only source of
energy used during aerobic exercise.
Instead, a mixture of both fats and
carbohydrates is used. As a result,
most people would need to run or walk
over 50 miles to burn one pound of fat.
A combination of proper diet and
aerobic exercise is the proven way to
lose excessive body fat. Local dieti-
tians and nutritionists can help soldiers
who want to lose weight by suggesting
safe and sensible diet programs. In
addition, the units MFT can design
tailored exercise programs which will
help soldiers increase their caloric
expenditure and maintain their lean
body mass.

In addition to exercise, proper nu-
trition plays a major role in attaining
and maintaining total fitness. Good
dietary habits (see Figure 6-1 ) greatly
enhance the ability of soldiers to per-
form at their maximum potential. A
good diet alone, however, will not
make up for poor health and exercise
habits. This chapter gives basic nutri-
tional guidance for enhancing physical
performance. Soldiers must know and
follow the basic nutrition principles if
they hope to maintain weight control
as well as achieve maximum physical
fitness, good health, and mental alert-
ness.
Guidelines for Healthy Eating
Eating a variety of foods and main-
taining an energy balance are basic
guidelines for a healthy diet. Good
nutrition is not complicated for those
who understand these dietary guide-
lines.
To be properly nourished, soldiers
should regularly eat a wide variety of
foods fro-m the major food groups,
selecting a variety of foods from within
each group. (See Figure 6-2.) A well-
balanced diet provides all the nutrients
needed to keep one healthy.
Most healthy adults do not need
vitamin or mineral supplements if they
eat a proper variety of foods. There
are no known advantages in consuming
excessive amounts of any nutrient, and
there may be risks in doing so.
For soldiers to get enough fuel from
the food they eat and to obtain the
variety of foods needed for nutrient
balance, they should eat three meals a
day. Even snacking between meals can
contribute to good nutrition if the
right foods are eaten.
Another dietary guideline is to
consume enough calories to meet ones
energy needs. Weight is maintained as
long as the body is in energy balance,
Figure 6-1
6-0
 Figure 6-2
that is, when the number of calories
used equals the number of calories
consumed.
The most accurate way to control
caloric intake is to control the size of
food portions and thus the total amount
of food ingested. One can use standard
household measuring utensils and a
small kitchen scale to measure portions
of foods and beverages. Keeping a
daily record of all foods eaten and
physical activity done is also helpful.
Figure 6-3 shows the number of
calories burned during exercise periods
of different types, intensities, and
durations. For example, while partici-
pating in archery, a person will burn
0.034 calories per pound per minute.
Thus, a 150-pound person would burn
5.1 calories per minute (150 lbs. x 0.034
calories/minute/lb. = 5.1 calories/
minute) or about 305 calories/hour, as
6-1
shown in Figure 6-4. Similarly, a
person running at 6 miles per hour
(MPH) will burn 0.079 cal./min./lb.
and a typical, 150-pound male will
burn 11.85 calories/minute (150 lbs. x
0.079 cal./lb./min. = 11.85) or about
710 calories in one hour, as shown in
Figure 6-3.
To estimate the number of calories
you use in normal daily activity, multi-
ply your body weight by 13 if you are
sedentary, 14 if somewhat active, and
15 if moderately active. The result is
a rough estimate of the number of
calories you need to maintain your
present body weight. You will need
still more calories if you are more than
moderately active. By comparing
caloric intake with caloric expendi-
ture, the state of energy balance (posi-
tive, balanced, or negative) can be
determined.
Figure 6-3

6-2
 Avoiding an excessive intake of fats
Avoiding an excessive is another fundamental dietary guide-
intake of fats is an line. A high intake of fats, especially
saturated fats and cholesterol, has been
important fundamental associated with high levels of blood
of nutrition. cholesterol.
The blood cholesterol level in most
Americans is too high. Blood choles-
terol levels can be lowered by reducing
both body fat and the amount of fat in
the diet. Lowering elevated blood
cholesterol levels reduces the risk of
developing coronary artery disease
(CAD) and of having a heart attack.
CAD, a slow, progressive disease, re-
sults from the clogging of blood vessels
in the heart. Good dietary habits help
reduce the likelihood of developing
CAD.
It is recommended that all persons
over the age of two should reduce their
fat intake to 30 percent or less of their
Carbohydrates are the total caloric intake. The current na-
tional average is 38 percent. In addi-
primary fuel source for
tion, we should reduce our intake of
muscles during short- saturated fat to less than 10 percent of
term, high-intensity the total calories consumed. We should
activities. increase our intake of polyunsaturated
fat, but to no more than 10 percent of
our total calories. Finally, we should
reduce our daily cholesterol intake to
300 milligrams or less. Figure 6-4 sug-
gests actions commanders can take to
support sound dietary guidelines. Most
of these actions concern dining-facil-
ity management.
6-3
Concerns for Optimal
Physical Performance
Carbohydrates, in the form of gly -
cogen (a complex sugar), are the pri-
mary fuel source for muscles during
short-term, high-intensity activities.
Repetitive, vigorous activity can use
up most of the carbohydrate stores in
the exercised muscles.
The body uses fat to help provide
energy for extended activities such as
a one-hour run. Initially, the chief
fuel burned is carbohydrates, but as
the duration increases, the contribu-
tion from fat gradually increases.
The intensity of the exercise also
influences whether fats or carbohy-
drates are used to provide energy.
Very intense activities use more car-
bohydrates. Examples include weight
training and the APFT sit-up and
push-up events.
Eating foods rich in carbohydrates
helps maintain adequate muscle-gly -
cogen reserves while sparing amino
acids (critical building-blocks needed
for building proteins). At least 50
percent of the calories in the diet
should come from carbohydrates.
Individual caloric requirements vary,
depending on body size, sex, age, and
training mission. Foods rich in com-
plex carbohydrates (for example, pasta,
rice, whole wheat bread, potatoes) are
the best sources of energy for active
soldiers.
Figure 6-4

6-4
 Because foods eaten one to three
days before an activity provide part of
the fuel for that activity, it is impor-
tant to eat foods every day that are rich
in complex carbohydrates. It is also
important to avoid simple sugars, such
as candy, up to 60 minutes before ex-
ercising, because they can lead to low
blood sugar levels during exercise.
Soldiers often fail to drink enough
water, especially when training in the
heat. Water is an essential nutrient that
is critical to optimal physical perform-
ance. It plays an important role in
maintaining normal body temperature.
The evaporation of sweat helps cool the
body during exercise. As a result, wa-
ter lost through sweating must be
replaced or poor performance, and
possibly injury, can result. Sweat
consists primarily of water with small
quantities of minerals like sodium.
Cool, plain water is the best drink to
use to replace the fluid lost as sweat.
Soldiers should drink water before,
during, and after exercise to pre-
vent dehydration and help en-
hance performance. Figure 6-5 shows
recommendations for fluid intake when
exercising.
Figure 6-5
6-5
Sports drinks, which are usually
simple carbohydrates (sugars) and
electrolytes dissolved in water, are
helpful under certain circumstances.
There is evidence that solutions con-
taining up to 10 percent carbohydrate
will enter the blood fast enough to de-
liver additional glucose to the active
muscles. This can improve endurance.
During prolonged periods of exer-
cise (1.5+ hours) at intensities over 50
percent of heart rate reserve, one can
benefit from periodically drinking
sports drinks with a concentration of 5
to 10 percent carbohydrate. Soldiers
on extended road marches can also
benefit from drinking these types of
glucose-containing beverages. During
intense training, these beverages can
provide a source of carbohydrate for
working muscles. On the other hand,
drinks that exceed levels of 10 percent
carbohydrate, as do regular soda pops
and most fruit juices, can lead to ab-
dominal cramps, nausea, and diarrhea.
Therefore, these drinks should be used
with caution during intense endurance
training and other similar activities.
Many people believe that body
builders need large quantities of
protein to promote better muscle
growth. The primary functions of
protein are to build and repair body
tissue and to form enzymes. Protein is
believed to contribute little, if any, to
the total energy requirement of heavy-
resistance exercises. The recommended
dietary allowance of protein for adults
is 0.8 grams per kilogram of body
weight. Most people meet this level
when about 15 percent of their daily
caloric intake comes from protein.
During periods of intense aerobic train-
ing, ones need for protein might be
somewhat higher (for example, 1.0 to
1.5 grams per kilogram of body weight
per day). Weight lifters, who have a
high proportion of lean body mass, can
easily meet their protein requirement
with a well-balanced diet which has 15
to 20 percent of its calories provided
by protein. Recent research suggests
that weight trainers may need no more
protein per kilogram of body weight
than average, nonathletic people. Most
Americans routinely consume these
levels of protein, or more. The body
converts protein consumed in excess
of caloric needs to fat and stores it in
the body.
Nutrition in the Field
Soldiers in the field must eat enough
food to provide them with the energy
they need. They must also drink plenty
of water or other non-alcoholic bever-
ages. The meal, ready to eat (MRE)
supplies the needed amount of carbo-
hydrates, protein, fat, vitamins, and
minerals. It is a nutritionally adequate
ration when all of its components are
eaten and adequate amounts of water
are consumed. Because the foods are
enriched and fortified with vitamins
and minerals, each component is a
major source of nutrients. Soldiers
must eat all the components in order to
get the daily military recommended
dietary allowances (MRDA) and have
an adequate diet in the field. Soldiers
who are in weight control programs or
who are trying to lose weight can eat
part of each MRE item, as recom-
mended by dietitians.
6-6
 This chapter gives commanders and
trainers guidance in designing and
using exercise circuits. It describes
calisthenic exercises for developing
strength, endurance, coordination, and
flexibility. It also describes grass drills
and guerilla exercises which are closely
related to soldiering skills and should
be regularly included in the units
physical fitness program.
Circuit training is a term associated
with specific training routines. Com-
manders with a good understanding of
the principles of circuit training may
apply them to a wide variety of train-
ing situations and environments.
Circuits
A circuit is a group of A circuit is a group of stations or
areas where specific tasks or exercises
stations or areas where
are performed. The task or exercise
specific tasks or selected for each station and the ar-
exercises are performed. rangement of the stations is deter-
mined by the objective of the circuit.
Circuits are designed to provide ex-
ercise to groups of soldiers at intensi-
ties which suit each persons fitness
level. Circuits can promote fitness in
a broad range of physical and motor
fitness areas. These include CR endur-
ance, muscular endurance, strength,
flexibility, and speed. Circuits can also
be designed to concentrate on sports
skills, soldiers common tasks, or any
combination of these. In addition,
circuits can be organized to exercise all
the fitness components in a short pe-
riod of time. A little imagination can
make circuit training an excellent
addition to a units total physical fit-
ness program. At the same time, it can
provide both fun and a challenge to
soldiers physical and mental abilities.
Almost any area can be used, and any
number of soldiers can exercise for
various lengths of time.
7-1
TYPES OF CIRCUITS
The two basic types of circuits are
the free circuit and the fixed circuit.
Each has distinct advantages.
Free Circuit
In a free circuit, there is no set time
for staying at each station, and no
signal is given to move from one
station to the next. Soldiers work at
their own pace, doing a fixed number
of repetitions at each station. Progress
is measured by the time needed to
complete a circuit. Because soldiers
may do incomplete or fewer repeti-
tions than called for to reduce this
time, the quality and number of the
repetitions done should be monitored.
Aside from this, the free circuit re-
quires little supervision.
Fixed Circuit
In a fixed circuit, a specific length
of time is set for each station. The
time is monitored with a stopwatch,
and soldiers rotate through the stations
on command.
There are three basic ways to increase
the intensity or difficulty of a fixed
circuit:
Keep the time for completion the
same, but increase the number of
repetitions.
Increase the time per station along
with the number of repetitions.
Increase the number of times sol-
diers go through the circuit.
VARIABLES IN CIRCUIT TRAINING
Several variables in circuit training
must be considered. These include the
time, number of stations, number of
time, number of stations, number of
soldiers, number of times the circuit is
completed, and sequence of stations.
These are discussed below.
Time
One of the first things to consider is
how long it should take to complete the
circuit. When a fixed circuit is run, the
time at each station should always be
the same to avoid confusion and help
maintain control. Consider also the
time it takes to move from one station
to the next. Further, allow from five
to seven minutes both before and after
running a circuit for warming up and
cooling down, respectively.
Number of Stations
The objective of the circuit and
time and equipment available strongly
influence the number of stations. A
circuit geared for a limited objective
(for example, developing lower-body
strength) needs as few as six to eight
stations. On the other hand, circuits to
develop both strength and CR fitness
may have as many as 20 stations.
Number of Soldiers
If there are 10 stations and 40
soldiers to be trained, the soldiers
should be divided into 10 groups of
four each. Each station must then be
equipped to handle four soldiers. For
example, in this instance a rope jump-
ing station must have at least four jump
ropes. It is vital in a free circuit that
no soldier stand around waiting for
equipment. Having enough equipment
reduces bottlenecks, slowdowns, and
poor results.
Number of Times a Circuit is
Completed
To achieve the desired training effect,
soldiers may have to repeat the same
circuit several times. For example, a
circuit may have ten stations. Soldiers
may run through the circuit three
times, exercising for 30 seconds at
each station, and taking 15 seconds to
move between stations. The exercise
time at each station may be reduced to
20 seconds the second and third time
through. The whole workout takes less
than 45 minutes including warm-up
and cool-down. As soldiers become
better conditioned, exercise periods
may be increased to 30 seconds or
longer for all three rotations. Another
option is to have four rotations of the
circuit.
Sequence of Stations
Stations should be arranged in a se-
quence that allows soldiers some re-
covery time after exercising at strenu-
ous stations. Difficult exercises can be
alternated with less difficult ones.
After the warm-up, soldiers can start
a circuit at any station and still achieve
the objective by completing the full
circuit.
DESIGNING A CIRCUIT
The designer of a circuit must
consider many factors. The six steps
below cover the most important as-
pects of circuit development.
Determine Objectives
The designer must consider the
specific parts of the body and the
components of fitness on which sol- The designer must
diers need to concentrate. For ex- consider the specific
ample, increasing muscular strength
may be the primary objective, while parts of the body and
muscular endurance work may be the components of
secondary. On the other hand, im- fitness on which soldiers
proving cardiorespiratory endurance need to concentrate.
may be the top priority. The designer
must first identify the training objec-
tive in order to choose the appropriate
exercises.
7-2
 Select the Activities
The circuit designer should list all
the exercises or activities that can help
meet the objectives. Then he should
look at each item on the list and ask the
following questions:
Will equipment be needed? Is it
available?
Will supervision be needed? Is it
available?
Are there safety factors to consider?
Answering these questions helps the
designer decide which exercises to use.
He can choose from the exercises,
calisthenics, conditioning drills, grass
drills, and guerrilla drills described in
this chapter. However, he should not
limit the circuit to only these activities.
Imagination and field expediency are
important elements in developing cir-
cuits that hold the interest of soldiers.
(See Figures 7-1 through 7-3.)
Arrange the Stations
A circuit usually has 8 to 12 stations,
but it may have as many as 20. After
deciding how many stations to include,
the designer must decide how to ar-
range them. For example, in a circuit
for strength training, the same muscle
group should not be exercised at con-
secutive stations.
One approach is to alternate push-
ing exercises with pulling exercises stations which should be numbered
which involve movement at the same
joint(s). For example, in a strength
training circuit, exercisers may follow
the pushing motion of a bench press
with the pulling motion of the seated
row. This could be followed by the
pushing motion of the overhead press
The choice of exercises
which could be followed by the pulling
for circuit training motion of the lat pull-down. Another
depends on the objectives approach might be to alternate be-
of the circuit. tween upper and lower body exercises.
By not exercising the same muscle
group twice in a row, each muscle has
7-3
a chance to recover before it is used in
another exercise. If some exercises are
harder than others, soldiers can alter-
nate hard exercises with easier ones.
The choice of exercises depends on the
objectives of the circuit.
Select the Training Sites
Circuits may be conducted out-
doors or indoors. If the designer wants
to include running or jogging a certain
distance between stations, he may do
this in several ways. In the gymna-
sium, soldiers may run five laps or for
20 to 40 seconds between stations.
Outdoors, they may run laps or run
between spread-out stations if space is
available. However, spreading the
stations too far apart may cause prob-
lems with control and supervision.
Prepare a Sketch
The designer should draw a simple
sketch that shows the location of each
station in the training area. The sketch
should include the activity and length
of time at each station, the number of
stations, and all other useful informa-
tion.
Lay Out the Stations
The final step is to lay out the
and clearly marked by signs or cards.
In some cases, instructions for the
stations are written on the signs. The
necessary equipment is placed at each
station.
Sample Conditioning Circuits
Figures 7-1, 7-2, and 7-3 show
different types of conditioning cir-
cuits. Soldiers should work at each
station 45 seconds and have 15 seconds
to rotate to the next station.
Figure 7-1

7-4
Figure 7-2

7-5
Figure 7-3

7-6
 Calisthenics
Calisthenics can be used to exercise
most of the major muscle groups of the
Calisthenics can be
body. They can help develop coordi-
used to help develop nation, CR and muscular endurance,
coordination. CR and flexibility, and strength. Poorly-coor-
dinated soldiers, however, will derive
muscular encurance, the greatest benefit from many of these
flexibility, and strength. exercises
Although calisthenics have some
value when included in a CR circuit or
when exercising to music, for the
average soldier, calisthenics such as the
bend and reach, squat bender, lunger,
knee bender, and side-straddle hop can
best be used in the warm-up and cool-
down periods. Exercises such as the
push-up, sit-up, parallel bar dip, and
chin-up/pull-up, on the other hand,
can effectively be used in the condi-
tioning period to develop muscular en-
durance or muscular strength.
Please note that exercises such as the
bend and reach, lunger, and leg spreader,
which were once deleted from FM 21-
20 because of their potential risk to the
exerciser, have been modified and re-
introduced in this edition. All modi-
fications should be strictly adhered to.
Few exercises are inherently unsafe.
Nonetheless, some people, because of
predisposing conditions or injuries,
may find certain exercises less safe
than others. Leaders must consider
each of their soldiers physical limita-
tions and use good judgment before
letting a soldier perform these exer-
cises. However, for the average soldier
who is of sound body, following the
directions written below will produce
satisfactory results with a minimum
risk of injury.
Finally, some of the calisthenics
listed below may be done in cadence.
These calisthenics are noted, and di-
rections are provided below with re-
spect to the actions and cadence. When
doing exercises at a moderate cadence,
use 80 counts per minute. With a slow
7-7
cadence, use 50 counts per minute
unless otherwise directed.
SAFETY FACTORS
While injury is always possible in
any vigorous physical activity, few
calisthenic exercises are really unsafe
or dangerous. The keys to avoiding
injury while gaining training benefits
are using correct form and intensity.
Also, soldiers with low fitness levels,
such as trainees, shouId not do the ad-
vanced exercises highly fit soldiers can
do. For example, with the lower back
properly supported, flutter kicks are
an excellent way to condition the hip
flexor muscles. However, without sup-
port, the possibility of straining the
lower back increases. It is not sensible
to have recruits do multiple sets of
flutter kicks because they probably are
not conditioned for them. On the other
hand, a conditioned Ranger company
may use multiple sets of flutter kicks
with good results.
The key to doing calisthenic exer-
cises safely is to use common sense.
Also, ballistic (that is, quick-moving)
exercises that combine rotation and
bending of the spine increase the risk
of back injury and should be avoided.
This is especially true if someone has
had a previous injury to the back. If
this type of action is performed, slow
stretching exercises, not conditioning
drills done to cadence, should be used.
Some soldiers complain of shoulder
problems resulting from rope climb-
ing, horizontal ladder, wheelbarrow,
and crab-walk exercises. These exer-
cises are beneficial when the soldier is
fit and he does them in a regular,
progressive manner. However, a cer-
tain level of muscular strength is
needed to do them safely. Therefore,
soldiers should progressively train to
build up to these exercises. Using such
exercises for unconditioned soldiers
increases the risk of injury and acci-
dent.
 Progression and Recovery
Other important principles for avoid-
ing injury are progression and recov-
ery. Programs that try to do too much
too soon invite problems. The day
after a hard training day, if soldiers
are working the same muscle groups
and/or fitness components, they should
work them at a reduced intensity to
minimize stress and permit recovery.
The best technique is to train alter-
nate muscle groups and/or fitness
components on different days. For
example, if the Monday-Wednesday-
Friday (M-W-F) training objective is
CR fitness, soldiers can do ability
group running at THR with some light
calisthenics and stretching. If the
Tuesday-Thursday (T-Th) objective
is muscular endurance and strength,
soldiers can benefit from doing part-
ner-resisted exercises followed by a
slow run. To ensure balance and
regularity in the program, the next
week should have muscle endurance
and strength development on M-W-F
and training for CR endurance on T-
Th. Such a program has variety,
develops all the fitness components,
and follows the seven principles of
exercise while, at the same time, it
minimizes injuries caused by overuse.
Leaders should plan PT sessions to
get a positive training effect, not to
conduct gut checks. They should
know how to correctly do all the exer-
cises in their program and teach their
soldiers to train using good form to
help avoid injuries.
Key Points for Safety
Doing safe exercises correctly im-
proves a soldiers fitness with a mini-
mum risk of injury.
The following are key points for en-
suring safety during stretching and
calisthenic exercises:
Stretch slowly and without pain and
unnatural stress to a joint. Use
static (slow and sustained) stretch-
ing for warming up, cooling down,
ballistic (bouncy or jerky) stretch-
ing movements.
Do not allow the angle formed by
the upper and lower legs to become
less than 90 degrees when the legs
are bearing weight.
A combination of spinal rotation
and bending should generally be
avoided. However, if done, use
only slow, controlled movements
with little or no extra weight.
Leaders must be aware of the vari-
ety of methods they may use to attain
their physical training goals. The
units Master Fitness Trainer is schooled
to provide safe, effective training meth-
ods and answer questions about train-
ing techniques.
CALISTHENIC EXERCISES
The following are some common
calisthenic exercises.
7-8
7-9
7-10
7-11
7-12
7-13
7-14
7-15
7-16
 CONDITIONING DRILLS
Some large units prefer to use sets of
calisthenic exercises as part of their PT
sessions. Figure 7-4 shows three cal-
Conditioning drills are
intended to supplement isthenic conditioning drills for both
muscular strength and the poorly conditioned and physically
endurance training fit soldiers. The drills are designed to
sessions. be done progressively and are intended
to supplement muscular strength and
endurance training sessions.
Leaders can mix the exercises to
provide greater intensity, based on the
fitness level of the soldiers being trained.
However, they should choose and
sequence them to alternate the muscle
groups being worked. Soldiers should
do each exercise progressively from 15
to 40 or more repetitions (20 to 60 sec-
onds for timed sets) based on their
level of conditioning. They may also
do each exercise in cadence unless
timed sets are specified. For timed
7-17
sets, soldiers do as many repetitions of
an exercise as possible in the allowed
time. Using timed sets, both the well-
conditioned and less-fit soldiers can
work themselves to their limits.
The following conditioning drills
(Figure 7-4) are arranged according to
the phase of training.
Grass Drills
Grass drills are exercise movements
that feature rapid changes in body
position. These are vigorous drills
which, when properly done, exercise
all the major muscle groups. Soldiers
should respond to commands as fast as
possible and do all movements at top
speed. They continue to do multiple
repetitions of each exercise until the
next command is given. No cadence is
counted.

Performing grass drills can improve
CR endurance, help develop muscular
endurance and strength, and speed up
reaction time. Since these drills are
extremely strenuous, they should last
for short periods (30 to 45 seconds per
exercise). The two drills described
here each have four exercises. Leaders
can develop additional drills locally.
The soldiers should do a warm-up
before performing the drills and do a
cool-down afterward. The instructor
Figure 7-4
does all the activities so that he can
gauge the intensity of the session. The
commands for grass drills are given in
rapid succession without the usual
preparatory commands. To prevent
confusion, commands are given sharply Grass drills are exercise
to distinguish them from comments or movements that feature
words of encouragement. rapid changes in
As soon as the soldiers are familiar body position.
with the drill, they do all the exercises
as vigorously and rapidly as possible,
and they do each exercise until the
7-18
 next command is given. Anything less
than a top-speed performance de-
creases the effectiveness of the drills.
Once the drills start, soldiers do not
Soldiers should do a have to resume the position of atten-
-
warm -up before tion. The instructor uses the command
performing grass Up to halt the drill for instructions or
drills and do a cool- rest. At this command, soldiers assume
down afterward. a relaxed, standing position.
Grass drills can be done in a short
time. For example, they may be used
when only a few minutes are available
for exercise or when combined with
another activity. Sometimes, if time is
limited, they are a good substitute for
running.
Most movements are done in place.
The extended-rectangular formation is
best for a platoon- or company-sized
unit. The circle formation is more
suitable for squad- or section-sized
groups.
When soldiers are starting an exer-
cise program, a 10- to 15-minute
workout may be appropriate. Progres-
sion is made by a gradual increase in
the time devoted to the drills. As the
fitness of the soldiers improves, the
times should be gradually lengthened
to 20 minutes. The second drill is
harder than the first. Therefore, as
soldiers progress in the first drill, the
instructor should introduce the second.
If he sees that the drill needs to be
longer, he can repeat the exercises or
combine the two drills.
STARTING POSITIONS
After the warm-up, bring the sol-
diers to a position of ATTENTION.
Progression with grass The drills begin with the command
drills is made by a GO. Other basic commands are FRONT,
gradual increase in BACK, and STOP. (See Figure 7-5 for
the time devoted to the positions and actions associated
the drills. with these commands. )
ATTENTION: The position of at
tention is described in FM 22-5,
Drill and Ceremonies.
7-19
GO This involves running in place
at top speed on the balls of the feet.
The soldier raises his knees high,
pumps his arms, and bends forward
slightly at the waist.
FRONT The soldier lies prone
with elbows bent and palms di-
rectly under the shoulders as in the
down position of the push up. The
legs are straight and together with
the head toward the instructor.
BACK: The soldier lies flat on his
back with his arms extended along
his sides and his palms facing down
ward. His legs are straight and to
gether; his feet face the instructor.
STOP The soldier assumes the stance
of a football lineman with feet
spread and staggered. His left arm
is across his left thigh; his right arm
is straight. His knuckles are on the
ground; his head is up, and his back
is roughly parallel to the ground.
To assume the FRONT or BACK
position from the standing GO or
STOP positions, the soldier changes
positions vigorously and rapidly. (See
Figure 7-5.)
To change from the FRONT to the
BACK position (Figure 7-5), the sol-
dier does the following:
Takes several short steps to the
right or left.
Lifts his arm on the side toward
which his feet move.
Thrusts his legs vigorously to the
front.
To change from the BACK to the
FRONT position, the soldier sits up
quickly. He places both hands on the
ground to the right or left of his legs.
He takes several short steps to the rear
on the side opposite his hands. When
his feet are opposite his hands, he
thrusts his legs vigorously to the rear
and lowers his body to the ground.
(See Figure 7-5.)
Figure 7-5

7-20
 GRASS DRILL ONE
Exercises for grass drill one are
described below and shown in
Figure 7-6.
Bouncing Ball
From the FRONT position, push up
and support the body on the hands
(shoulder-width apart) and feet. Keep
the back and legs generally in line and
the knees straight. Bounce up and
down in a series of short, simultaneous,
upward springs from the hands, hips,
and feet.
Supine Bicycle
From the BACK position, flex the
hips and knees. Place the palms
directly on top of the head, and inter-
lace the fingers. Bring the knee of one
leg upward toward the chest. At the
same time, curl the trunk and head
upward while touching the opposite
elbow to the elevated knee. Repeat
with the other leg and elbow. Continue
these movements as opposite legs and
arms take turns.
Knee Bender
From the position of ATTENTION,
do half-knee bends with the feet in
line and the hands at the sides. Make
sure the knees do not bend to an angle
less than 90 degrees.
Roll Left and Right
From the FRONT position, con-
tinue to roll in the direction com-
manded until another command is
given. Then, return to the FRONT
position.
GRASS DRILL TWO
Exercises for grass drill two are
described below and shown in Figure
7-6.
7-21
The Swimmer
From the FRONT position, extend
the arms forward. Move the right arm
and left leg up and down; then, move
the left arm and right leg up and down.
Continue in an alternating manner.
Bounce and Clap Hands
The procedure is almost the same as
for the bouncing ball in grass drill one.
However, while in the air, clap the
hands. This action requires a more
vigorous bounce or spring. The push-
up may be substituted for this exercise.
Leg Spreader
From the BACK position, raise the
legs until the heels are no higher than
six inches off the ground. Spread the
legs apart as far as possible, then put
them back together. Keep the head off
the ground. Throughout, place the
hands under the upper part of the but-
tocks, and slightly bend the knees to
ease pressure on the lower back. Open
and close the legs as fast as possible.
The curl-up may be substituted for
this exercise.
Forward Roll
From the STOP position, place both
hands on the ground, tuck the head,
and roll forward. Keep the head
tucked while rolling.
Stationary Run
From the position of ATTENTION,
start running in place at the GO
command by lifting the left foot first.
Follow the instructor as he counts two
repetitions of cadence. For example,
One, two, three, four; one, two, three,
four. The instructor then gives infor-
mal commands such as the following:
Follow me, Run on the toes and balls
of your feet, Speed it up, Increase
to a sprint, raise your knees high, lean
forward at your waist, and pump your the left foot strikes the ground: One,
arms vigorously, and Slow it down. two, three, four, one, two, three,
To halt the exercise, the instructor HALT.
counts two repetitions of cadence as

Figure 7-6

7-22
 Guerilla Exercises
Guerrilla exercises, which can be
used to improve agility, CR endur-
ance, muscular endurance, and to some
degree muscular strength, combine
individual and partner exercises. These
drills require soldiers to change their
positions quickly and do various basic
skills while moving forward. Figures
7-7 and 7-8 show these exercises.
The instructor decides the duration
Soldiers progress with for each exercise by observing its
guerilla exercises by effect on the soldiers. Depending on
shortening the quick- how vigorously it is done, each exer-
time marching periods cise should be continued for 20 to 40
between exercises and seconds.
by doing all the The group moves in circle forma-
exercises a second time. tion while doing the exercises. If the
platoon exceeds 30 soldiers, concen-
tric circles may be used. A warm-up
activity should precede these exer-
cises, and a cool-down should follow
them. After the circle is formed, the
Figure 7-7
7-23
instructor steps into the center and
issues commands.
EXERCISE AND PROGRESSION
Soldiers progress by shortening the
quick-time marching periods between
exercises and by doing all exercises a
second time. This produces an over-
load that improves fitness.
Many soldiers have not had a chance
to do the simple skills involved in
guerrilla exercises. However, they can
do these exercises easily and quickly in
almost any situation.
The preparatory command is always
the name of the exercise, and the
command of execution is always March.
The command Quick time, march
ends each exercise.
For the double guerrilla exercises (in
circle formation) involving two sol-
diers, the commands for pairing are as
follows:
 Platoon halt.
From (soldier is designated), by
twos, count off. (For example: 1-
2, 1-2, 1-2.)
Even numbers, move up behind
odd numbers. (Pairs are adjusted
according to height and weight.)
You are now paired up for double
guerrillas. The command Change
is given to change the soldiers
positions.
After the exercises are completed,
the instructor halts the soldiers and
positions the base soldier or platoon
guide by commanding, Base man (or
platoon guide), post. He then com-
mands Fall out and fall in on the base
man (or platoon guide).
EXERCISE DESCRIPTIONS
Brief explanations of guerrilla ex-
ercises follow.
All-Fours Run
Face downward, supporting the body
on the hands and feet. Advance
forward as fast as possible by moving
the arms and legs forward in a coordi-
nated way.
Bottoms-Up Walk
Take the front-leaning rest posi-
tion, and move the feet toward the
hands in short steps while keeping the
knees locked. When the feet are as
close to the hands as possible, walk
forward on the hands to the front-
leaning-rest position.
Crab Walk
Assume a sitting position with the
hips off the ground and hands and feet
supporting the bodys weight. Walk
forward, feet first.
The Engine
Stand with the arms straight and in
front of the body. The arms should be
parallel to the ground with the palms
facing downward. While walking
forward, bring the left knee upward to
the left elbow. Return to the start
position. Continuing to walk forward,
touch the right knee to the right elbow.
Recover to the start position. Be sure
to keep the arms parallel to the ground
throughout the entire exercise.
Double Time
Do a double-time run while main-
taining the circle formation.
Broad Jump
Jump forward on both feet in a
series of broad jumps. Swing the arms
vigorously to help with the jumps.
Straddle Run
Run forward, leaping to the right
with the left foot and to the left with
the right foot.
Hobble Hopping
Hold one foot behind the back with
the opposite hand and hop forward.
On the command Change, grasp the
opposite foot with the opposite hand
and hop forward.
Two-Man Carry
For two-man carries, soldiers are
designated as number one (odd-num-
bered) and number two (even-num-
bered). A number-one and number-
two soldier work as partners.
7-24
 Firemans Carry
Two soldiers do the carry. On com-
mand, number-two soldier bends at
the waist, with feet apart in a balanced
stance. Number-one soldier moves
toward his partner. He places himself
by his partners left shoulder and bends
himself over his partners shoulders
and back. When in position, number-
two soldier, with his left hand, reaches
between his partners legs and grasps
his left wrist. On command, they move
forward until the command for change-
over. They then change positions. The
firemans carry can also be done from
the other side.
Single-Shoulder Carry
Two soldiers do the carry. On com-
mand, number-two soldier bends at the
waist with feet apart in a balanced
stance. At the same time, number-one
soldier moves toward his partner. He
places his abdominal area onto his part-
ners right or left shoulder and leans
over. Number-two soldier puts his
arms around the back of his partners
knees and stands up. On command,
they move forward until the command
for changeover. They then change
positions.
Cross Carry
On command, number-two soldier
bends over at the waist. He twists
7-25
slightly to the left with feet spread
apart in a balanced position. At the
same time, number-one soldier moves
toward his partners left side and leans
over his partners back. Number two
soldier, with his left arm, reaches
around his partners legs. At the same
time, he reaches around his partners
back with his right arm, being careful
not to grab his partners neck or head.
He then stands up straight, holding his
partner on his back. On command,
they move forward until the command
for changeover. They then change
positions.
Saddle-Back (Piggyback) Carry
On command, number-two soldier
bends at the waist and knees with his
hand on his knees and his head up. To
assume the piggyback position, num-
ber-one soldier moves behind his part-
ner, places his hands on his partners
shoulders, and climbs carefully onto
his partners hips. As number-one
soldier climbs on, number-two soldier
grasps his partners legs to help support
him. Number-one soldier places his
arms over his partners shoulders and
crosses his hands over his partners
upper chest. They move forward until
the command for changeover is given.
They then change positions.
Figure 7-8

7-26
 This chapter describes obstacle
courses as well as rifle drills, log drills,
and aquatic exercises. These are not
designed to develop specific compo-
nents of physical fitness. Commanders
should use them to add variety to their
PT programs and to help soldiers de-
velop motor fitness including speed,
agility, coordination, and related skills
and abilities. Many of these activities
also give soldiers the chance to plan
strategy, make split-second decisions,
learn teamwork, and demonstrate lead-
ership.
Obstacle Courses
Physical performance and success in
combat may depend on a soldiers
ability to perform skills like those
There are two types of required on the obstacle course. For
this reason, and because they help
obstacle courses-
develop and test basic motor skills,
conditioning and obstacle courses are valuable for physi-
confidence. cal training.
There are two types of obstacle
courses--conditioning and confidence.
The conditioning course has low ob-
stacles that must be negotiated quickly.
Running the course can be a test of the
soldiers basic motor skills and physical
condition. After soldiers receive in-
struction and practice the skills, they
run the course against time.
A confidence course has higher,
more difficult obstacles than a condi-
tioning course. It gives soldiers confi-
dence in their mental and physical
abilities and cultivates their spirit of
daring. Soldiers are encouraged, but
not forced, to go through it. Unlike
conditioning courses, confidence courses
are not run against time.
NONSTANDARD COURSES AND
OBSTACLES
Commanders may build obstacles
and courses that are nonstandard (that
is, not covered in this manual) in order
to create training situations based on
t h e i r u n i t ' s M E T L .
8-1
When planning and building such fa-
cilities, designers should, at a mini-
mum, consider the following guid-
ance:
Secure approval from the local in-
stallation's commander.
Prepare a safety and health-risk as-
sessment to support construction
o f e a c h o b s t a c l e .
Coordinate approval for each ob-
stacle with the local or supporting
safety office. Keep a copy of the
approval in the permanent records.
Monitor and analyze all injuries.
Inspect all existing safety precau-
tions on-site to verify their effec-
tiveness.
Review each obstacle to determine
the need for renewing its approval.
SAFETY PRECAUTIONS
Instructors must always be alert to
safety. They must take every precau-
tion to minimize injuries as soldiers go
through obstacle courses. Soldiers
must do warm-up exercises before
they begin. This prepares them for the
physically demanding tasks ahead and
helps minimize the chance of injury.
A cool-down after the obstacle course
is also necessary, as it helps the body
recover from strenuous exercise.
Commanders should use ingenuity
in building courses, making good use
of streams, hills, trees, rocks, and
other natural obstacles. They must
inspect courses for badly built ob-
stacles, protruding nails, rotten logs,
unsafe landing pits, and other safety
hazards.
There are steps which designers can
take to reduce injuries. For example,
at the approach to each obstacle, they
should post an instruction board or
sign with text and pictures showing
how to negotiate it. Landing pits for
jumps or vaults, and areas under or
around obstacles where soldiers may
fall from a height, should be filled
with loose sand or sawdust, All
landing areas should be raked and
refilled before each use. Puddles of
water under obstacles can cause a false
sense of security. These could result in
improper landing techniques and seri-
ous injuries. Leaders should postpone
training on obstacle courses when wet
weather makes them slippery.
Units should prepare their soldiers
to negotiate obstacle courses by doing
conditioning exercises beforehand. Sol-
diers should attain an adequate level of
conditioning before they run the con-
fidence course, Soldiers who have not
practiced the basic skills or run the
conditioning course should not be al-
lowed to use the confidence course.
Instructors must explain and dem-
onstrate the correct ways to negotiate
all obstacles before allowing soldiers to
run them. Assistant instructors should
supervise the negotiation of higher,
more dangerous obstacles. The em-
phasis is on avoiding injury. Soldiers
should practice each obstacle until they
are able to negotiate it. Before they run
the course against time, they should
make several slow runs while the in-
structor watches and makes needed
corrections. Soldiers should never be
allowed to run the course against time
until they have practiced on all the
obstacles.
CONDITIONING OBSTACLE COURSES
If possible, an obstacle course should
be shaped like a horseshoe or figure
eight so that the finish is close to the
start. Also, signs should be placed to
show the route.
A course usually ranges from 300 to
450 yards and has 15 to 25 obstacles
that are 20 to 30 yards apart. The
obstacles are arranged so that those
which exercise the same groups of
muscles are separated from one an-
other.
The obstacles must be solidly built.
Peeled logs that are six to eight inches
wide are ideal for most of them. Sharp
points and corners should be elimi-
nated, and landing pits for jumps or
vaults must be filled with sand or saw-
dust. Courses should be built and
marked so that soldiers cannot sidestep
obstacles or detour around them.
Sometimes, however, courses can pro-
vide alternate obstacles that vary in
difficulty.
Each course should be wide enough
for six to eight soldiers to use at the
same time, thus encouraging competi-
tion. The lanes for the first few
obstacles should be wider and the
obstacles easier than those that follow.
In this way, congestion is avoided and
soldiers can spread out on the course.
To minimize the possibility of falls
and injuries due to fatigue, the last
two or three obstacles should not be
too difficult or involve high climbing.
Trainers must always be aware that
falls from the high obstacles could
cause serious injury. Soldiers must be
in proper physical condition, closely Instructors must explain
supervised, and adequately instructed. and demonstrate the
The best way for the timer to time correct ways to
the runners is to stand at the finish and negotiate all obstacles
call out the minutes and seconds as before allowing soldiers
each soldier finishes. If several watches to run them.
are available, each wave of soldiers is
timed separately. If only one watch is
available, the waves are started at
regular intervals such as every 30
seconds. If a soldier fails to negotiate
an obstacle, a previously determined
penalty is imposed.
When the course is run against time,
stopwatches, pens, and a unit roster
are needed. Soldiers may run the
course with or without individual
equipment.
Obstacles for Jumping
These obstacles are ditches to clear
with one leap, trenches to jump into,
heights to jump from, or hurdles. (See
Figure 8-l.)
8-2
 Obstacles for Dodging
These obstacles are usually mazes of
posts set in the ground at irregular
intervals. (See Figure 8-2.) The spaces
Figure 8-1
Figure 8-2
8 - 3
between the posts are narrow so that
soldiers must pick their way carefully
through and around them. Lane guides
are built to guide soldiers in dodging
and changing direction.
Obstacles for Vertical Climbing and Obstacles for Horizontal Traversing
Surmounting
Horizontal obstacles may be ropes,
These obstacles are shown at Figure pipes, or beams. (See Figure 8-4.)
8-3 and include the following:
Climbing ropes that are 1 1/2 inches
wide and either straight or knotted.
Cargo nets.
Walls 7 or 8 feet high.
Vertical poles 15 feet high and 6 to
8 inches wide.

Figure 8-3

Figure 8-4

8-4
 Obstacles for Crawling Obstacles for Vaulting

These obstacles may be built of These obstacles should be 3 to

large pipe sections, low rails, or wire. 3 1/2 feet high. Examples are fences
(See Figure 8-5.) and low walls. (See Figure 8-6.)

Figure 8-5

Figure 8-6

8-5
 Obstacles for Balancing
Beams, logs, and planks may be
used. These may span water obstacles
and dry ditches, or they may be raised
off the ground to simulate natural de-
pressions. (See Figure 8-7.)
CONFIDENCE OBSTACLE COURSES
Confidence obstacle courses must
be built in accordance with Folio No.
1, Training Facilities, Corps of En-
gineers Drawing Number 28-13-95.
You can obtain this publication from
the Directorate of Facilities Engineer-
ing at most Army installations.
Confidence courses can develop
confidence and strength by using ob-
stacles that train and test balance and
muscular strength. Soldiers do not ne-
gotiate these obstacles at high speed or
against time. The obstacles vary from
fairly easy to difficult, and some are
high. For these, safety nets are pro-
vided. Soldiers progress through the
course without individual equipment.
Only one soldier at a time negotiates an
Figure 8-7
obstacle unless it is designed for use by
more than one.
Confidence courses should accom-
modate four platoons, one at each
group of six obstacles. Each platoon
begins at a different starting point. In
the example below, colors are used to
group the obstacles. Any similar method
may be used to spread a group over the
course. Soldiers are separated into
groups of 8 to 12 at each obstacle. At
the starting signal, they proceed through
the course.
Soldiers may skip any obstacle they
are unwilling to try. Instructors should
encourage fearful soldiers to try the
easier obstacles first. Gradually, as
their confidence improves, they can
8-6
take their places in the normal rotation.
Soldiers proceed from one obstacle to
the next until time is called. They then
assemble and move to the next group of
obstacles.
Rules for the Course
Supervisors should encourage, but
not force, soldiers to try every obstacle.
Soldiers who have not run the course
before should receive a brief orienta-
tion at each obstacle, including an ex-
planation and demonstration of the
best way to negotiate it. Instructors
should help those who have problems.
Trainers and soldiers should not try to
make obstacles more difficult by shak-
ing ropes, rolling logs, and so forth.
Close supervision and common sense
must be constantly used to enhance
safety and prevent injuries.
Soldiers need not conform to any
one method of negotiating obstacles,
but there is a uniformity in the general
approach. Recommended ways to ne-
gotiate obstacles are described below.
Figure 8-8
8-7
Red Group
This group contains the first six ob-
stacles. These are described below and
numbered 1 through 6 in Figure 8-8.
Belly Buster. Soldiers vault, jump, or
climb over the log. They must be
warned that it is not stationary. There-
fore, they should not roll or rock the
log while others are negotiating it.
Reverse Climb. Soldiers climb the re-
verse incline and go down the other
side to the ground.
Weaver. Soldiers move from one end
of the obstacle to the other by weav-
ing their bodies under one bar and
over the next.
Hip-Hip. Soldiers step over each bar;
they either alternate legs or use the
same lead leg each time.
Balancing Logs. Soldiers step up on a
log and walk or run along it while
keeping their balance.
Island Hopper. Soldiers jump from
one log to another until the obstacle is
negotiated.
 White Group
This group contains the second six
obstacles. These are described below
and numbered 7 through 12 in Figure
8-9.
Tough Nut. Soldiers step over each X
in the lane.
Inverted Rope Descent. Soldiers climb
the tower, grasp the rope firmly, and
swing their legs upward. They hold the
rope with their legs to distribute the
weight between their legs and arms.
Braking the slide with their feet and
legs, they proceed down the rope. Sol-
diers must be warned that they may get
rope burns on their hands. This ob-
stacle can be dangerous when the rope
is slippery. Soldiers leave the rope at
a clearly marked point of release.
Only one soldier at a time is allowed on
the rope. Soldiers should not shake or
bounce the ropes. This obstacle re-
quires two instructors--one on the
platform and the other at the base.
Low Belly-Over. Soldiers mount the
low log and jump onto the high log.
They grasp over the top of the log with
both arms, keeping the belly area in
contact with it. They swing their legs
over the log and lower themselves to
the ground.
Belly Crawl. Soldiers move forward
under the wire on their bellies to the
end of the obstacle. To reduce the ten-
dency to push the crawling surface, it
is filled with sand or sawdust to the far
end of the obstacle. The direction of
negotiating the crawl is reversed from
time to time.
Easy Balancer. Soldiers walk up one
inclined log and down the one on the
other side to the ground.
Tarzan. Soldiers mount the lowest log,
walk the length of it, then each higher
log until they reach the horizontal lad-
der. They grasp two rungs of the
ladder and swing themselves into the
air. They negotiate the length of the
ladder by releasing one hand at a time
and swinging forward, grasping a more
distant rung each time.
Figure 8-9
8-8
 Blue Group
This group contains the third six
obstacles. These are described below
and numbered 13 through 18 in Figure
8-10.
High Step-over. Soldiers step over
each log while alternating their lead
foot or using the same one.
Swinger. Soldiers climb over the swing
log to the ground on the opposite side.
Low Wire. Soldiers move under the
wire on their backs while raising the
wire with their hands to clear their
bodies. To reduce the tendency to push
the crawling surface, it is filled with
sand or sawdust to the far end of the
Figure 8-10
8-9
obstacle. The direction of negotiating
the obstacle is alternated.
Swing, Stop, and Jump. Soldiers gain
momentum with a short run, grasp the
rope, and swing their bodies forward
to the top of the wall. They release the
rope while standing on the wall and
jump to the ground.
Six Vaults. Soldiers vault over the logs
using one or both hands.
Wall Hanger. Soldiers walk up the
wall using the rope. From the top of
the wall, they grasp the bar and go
hand-over-hand to the rope on the op-
posite end. They use the rope to de-
scend,
 Black Group
This group contains the last six ob-
stacles. These are described below and
numbered 19 through 24 in Figure 8-
11.
Inclining Wall. Soldiers approach the
underside of the wall, jump up and
grasp the top, and pull themselves up
and over. They slide or jump down the
incline to the ground.
Skyscraper. Soldiers jump or climb to
the first floor and either climb the
corner posts or help one another to the
higher floors. They descend to the
ground individually or help one an-
other down. The top level or roof is
off limits, and the obstacle should not
be overloaded. A floor must not be-
come so crowded that soldiers are
bumped off. Soldiers should not jump
to the ground from above the first
level.
Jump and Land. Soldiers climb the
ladder to the platform and jump to the
ground.
Confidence Climb. Soldiers climb the
inclined ladder to the vertical ladder.
they go to the top of the vertical ladder,
then down the other side to the ground.
Belly Robber. Soldiers step on the
lower log and take a prone position on
the horizontal logs. They crawl over
the logs to the opposite end of the
obstacle. Rope gaskets must be tied to
the ends of each log to keep the hands
from being pinched and the logs from
falling.
The Tough One. Soldiers climb the
rope or pole on the lowest end of the
obstacle. They go over or between the
logs at the top of the rope. They move
across the log walkway, climb the
ladder to the high end, then climb
down the cargo net to the ground.
Figure 8-11
8-10
 Rifle Drills
return soldiers to attention is Position
Rifle drills are suitable activities for of attention, move.
In exercises that end in other than
fitness training while bivouacking or
during extended time in the field. In the rifle-downward position, soldiers
assume that position before executing
most situations, the time consumed in
port arms and order arms.
drawing weapons makes this activity
These movements are done without
cumbersome for garrison use. How-
command and need not be precise.
ever, it is a good conditioning activity,
and the use of individual weapons in Effective rifle exercises are strenuous
enough to tire the arms. When the
training fosters a warriors spirit.
There are four rifle-drill exercises arms are tired, moving them with
precision is difficult.
that develop the upper body. They are
numbered in a set pattern. The main
RIFLE DRILL EXERCISES
muscle groups strengthened by rifle
drills are those of the arms, shoulders,
The following exercises are for use
and back.
in rifle drills.
Rifle drill is a fast-moving method
of exercising that soldiers can do in as Up and Forward
little as 15 minutes. With imagination,
the number of steps and/or rifle exer- This is a four-count exercise done
cises can be expanded beyond those at a fast cadence. (See Figure 8-12.)
described here.
Fore-Up, Squat
EXERCISE PROGRESSION
This is a four-count exercise done
The rifle-drill exercise normally at a moderate cadence. (See Figure
begins with six repetitions and in- 8-13.)
creases by one repetition for each three
periods of exercise. This rate contin- Fore-Up, Behind Back
ues until soldiers can do 12 repetitions.
However, the number of repetitions This is a four-count exercise done
can be adjusted as the soldiers im- at a moderate cadence. (See Figure 8-
prove. 14.)
In exercises that start from the rifle-
downward position, on the command Fore-Up, Back Bend
Move, soldiers execute port arms and
assume the starting position. At the This is a four-count exercise done at
end of the exercise, the command to moderate cadence. (See Figure 8- 15.)

Figure 8-12

8-11
Figure 8-13

Figure 8-14

Figure 8-15

8-12
 Log Drills
Log drills are team-conditioning
Log drills are excellent exercises. They are excellent for de-
veloping strength and muscular endur-
for developing strength
ance because they require the muscles
and muscular endurance, to contract under heavy loads. They
because they require the also develop teamwork and add variety
muscles to contract to the PT program.
Log drills consist of six different
under heavy loads. exercises numbered in a set pattern.
The drills are intense, and teams should
complete them in 15 minutes. The
teams have six to eight soldiers per
team. A principal instructor is re-
quired to teach, demonstrate, and lead
the drill. He must be familiar with
leadership techniques for conditioning
exercises and techniques peculiar to log
drills.
AREA AND EQUIPMENT
Any level area is good for doing log
drills. All exercises are done from a
standing position. If the group is larger
than a platoon, an instructors stand
may be needed.
The logs should be from six to eight
inches thick, and they may vary from
14 to 18 feet long for six and eight sol-
diers, respectively. The logs should be
stripped, smoothed, and dried. The
14-foot logs weigh about 300 pounds,
the 18-foot logs about 400 pounds.
Rings should be painted on the logs to
show each soldiers position. When not
in use, the logs are stored on a rack
above the ground.
FORMATION
All soldiers assigned to a log team
should be about the same height at the
shoulders. The best way to divide a
platoon is to have them form a single
file or column with short soldiers in
front and tall soldiers at the rear. They
take their positions in the column ac-
cording to shoulder height, not head
height. When they are in position, they
are divided into teams of six or eight.
8-13
The command is Count off by sixes
(or eights), count off. Each team, in
turn, goes to the log rack, shoulders a
log, and carries it to the exercise area.
The teams form columns in front of
the instructor. Holding the logs in
chest position, they face the instructor
and ground the log. Ten yards should
separate log teams within the columns.
If more than one column is used, 10
yards should separate columns.
STARTING DOSAGE AND
PROGRESSION
The starting session is six repeti-
tions of each exercise. The progres-
sion rate is an increase of one repeti-
tion for each three periods of exercise.
Soldiers continue this rate until they
do 12 repetitions with no rest between
exercises. This level is maintained un-
til another drill is used.
START POSITIONS
The soldiers fall in facing their log,
with toes about four inches away.
Figure 8-16 shows the basic starting
positions and commands.
Right-Hand Start Position, Move
On the command Move, move the
left foot 12 inches to the left, and
lower the body into a flatfooted squat.
Keep the back straight, head up, and
arms between the legs. Encircle the
far side of the log with the left hand.
Place the right hand under the log.
(See 1, Figure 8-16.)
Left-Hand Start Position, Move
This command is done the same
way as the preceding command.
However, the left hand is under the
log, and the right hand encircles its far
side. (See 2, Figure 8-16.)
 Right-Shoulder Position, Move
This command is given from the
right-hand-start position. On the
command Move, pull the log upward
in one continuous motion to the right
shoulder. At the same time, move the
left foot to the rear and stand up,
facing left. Balance the log on the right
shoulder with both hands. (See 3,
Figure 8-16.) This movement cannot
be done from the left-hand-start posi-
tion because of the position of the
hands.
Figure 8-16
8-14
 Left-Shoulder Position, Move
This command is given from the
left-hand-start position. On the com-
mand Move, pull the log upward to
the left shoulder in one continuous
motion. At the same time, move the
right foot to the rear, and stand up
facing right. Balance the log on the left
shoulder with both hands. (See 4,
Figure 8-17.) This movement cannot
be done from the right-hand-start
position.
Waist Position, Move
From the right-hand-start position,
pull the log waist high. Keep the arms
straight and fingers laced under the
log. The body is inclined slightly to the
rear, and the chest is lifted and arched.
(See 5, Figure 8-17.)
Figure 8-17
8-15
Chest Position, Move
This command is given after taking
the waist position. On the command
Move, shift the log to a position high
on the chest, bring the left arm under
the log, and hold the log in the bend of
the arms. (See 6, figure 8-17.) Keep
the upper arms parallel to the ground.
To move the log from the right to
the left shoulder, the command is
Left-shoulder position, move. Push
the log overhead, and lower it to the
opposite shoulder.
To return the log to the ground
from any of the above positions, the
command is Start position, move. At
the command Move, slowly lower the
log to the ground. Position the hands
and fingers so they are not under the
log.
 LOG-DRILL EXERCISES
The following are log-drill exer-
cises.
Exercise 1. Two-Arm Push-Up
Start Position: Right- or left-
shoulder position, with feet about
shoulder-width apart. (See 1, Fig-
ure 8-18.)
Cadence: Moderate.
Movement: A four-count exercise;
at the count of --
One-Push the log overhead until
the elbows lock.
Two-Lower the log to the op-
posite shoulder.
Three-Repeat the action of count
one.
Four-Recover to the start posi-
tion.
Exercise 2. Forward Bender
Start Position: Chest position, with
feet about shoulder-width apart.
(See 2, Figure 8-18.)
Cadence: Moderate.
Movement A four-count exercise;
at the count of --
One-Bend forward at the waist
while keeping the back straight
and the knees slightly bent.
Two-Recover to the start posi-
tion.
Three-Repeat the action of count
one.
Four-Recover to the start posi-
tion.
Figure 8-18
8-16
Exercise 3. Straddle Jump Exercise 4. Side Bender
Start Position Right- or left-shoul- Start Position: Right-shoulder po-
der position, with feet together, sition with the feet about shoul-
and fingers locked on top of the log. der-width apart. (See 4, Figure
Pull the log down with both hands to 8- 19.)
keep it from bouncing on the shoul- Cadence Moderate.
der. (See 3, Figure 8-19.) Movement: A four-count exercise;
Cadence: Moderate. at the count of--
Movement A four-count exercise; One-Bend sideward to the left
at the count of-- as far as possible, bending the
One-Jump to a side straddle. left knee.
Two-Recover to the start posi- Two-Recover to the start posi-
tion. tion.
Three-Repeat the action of count Three-Repeat the action of
one. count one.
Four-Recover to the start posi- Four-Recover to the start posi-
tion. tion.
NOTE: After doing the required
number of repetitions, change shoul-
ders and do an equal number to the
right side.

Figure 8-19

8-17
Exercise 5. Half-Knee Bend
Start Position: Right- or left-
shoulder position, with feet about
shoulder-width apart, and fingers
locked on top of the log. (See 5,
Figure 8-20.)
Cadence: Slow.
Movement: A four-count exercise;
at the count of --
One-Flex the knees to a half-
knee bend.
Two-Recover to the start posi-
tion.
Three-Repeat the action of
count one.
Four-Recover to the start po-
sition.
(NOTE: Pull forward and down-
ward on the log throughout the exer-
cise. )
Exercise 6. Overhead Toss (NOTE:
Introduce this exercise only after
soldiers have gained experience and
strength by doing the other exercises
for several sessions.)
Start Position: Right-shoulder po-
sition with the feet about shoul-
der-width part. The knees are at a
quarter bend. (See 6, Figure 8-20.)
Cadence: Moderate.
Movement: A four-count exercise;
at the count of --
One-Straighten the knees and
toss the log about 12 inches
overhead. Catch the log with
both hands, and lower it toward
the opposite shoulder. As the log
is caught, lower the body into a
quarter bend.
Two-Again, toss the log into
the air and, when caught, return
it to the original shoulder.
Three-Repeat the action of count
one.
Four-Recover to the start posi-
tion.
Figure 8-20
8-18
 Aquatic Exercise
Aquatics is a mode of physical
training which helps one attain and
maintain physical fitness through ex-
ercises in the water. It is sometimes
called slimnastics. Aquatic training
can improve muscular endurance, CR
endurance, flexibility, coordination,
and muscular strength.
Because of its very low impact to the
body, an aquatic exercise program is
ideal for soldiers who are overweight
and those who are limited due to
painful joints, weak muscles, or pro-
files. The bodys buoyancy helps
minimize injuries to the joints of the
lower legs and feet. It exercises the
whole body without jarring the bones
and muscles. Leaders can tailor the
variety and intensity of the exercises to
the needs of all the soldiers in the unit.
Aquatic training is a good supple-
ment to a units PT program. Not only
is it fun, it exposes soldiers to water
and can make them more comfortable
around it. Most Army installations
have swimming pools for conducting
aquatic, physical training sessions.
SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
One qualified lifeguard is needed
for every 40 soldiers at all aquatic
training sessions. Nonswimmers must
remain in the shallow end of the pool.
They should never exercise in the deep
end with or without flotation devices.
EQUIPMENT
Soldiers normally wear swim suits
for aquatics, but they can wear boots
and fatigues to increase the intensity of
the activities. The following equip-
ment is optional for training:
Goggles.
Kickboard.
Pull buoy.
Ear/nose plugs.
Fins.
Hand paddles.
8-19
SAMPLE TRAINING PROGRAM
Warm-Up
As in any PT session, a warm-up is
required. It can be done in the water
or on the deck. Allow five to seven
minutes for the warm-up.
Conditioning Phase
Soldiers should exercise vigorously
to get a training effect. Energetic
music may be used to keep up the
tempo of the workout. The following
are some exercises that can be used in
an aquatic workout. (See Figure 8-21.)
Side Leg-Raises. Stand in chest to
shoulder-deep water with either side
of the body at arms length to the wall
of the pool, and grasp the edge with
the nearest hand. Raise the outside leg
sideward and upward from the hip.
Next, pull the leg down to the starting
position. Repeat these actions. Then,
turn the other side of the body to the
wall, and perform the exercise with
the other leg. DURATION: 30 seconds
(15 seconds per leg).
Leg-Over. Stand in chest-to shoul-
der-deep water, back facing the wall
of the pool. Reach backward with the
arms extended, and grasp the pools
edge. Next, raise one leg in front of
the body away from the wall, and
move it sideward toward the other leg
as far as it can go. Then, return the leg
to the front-extended position, and
lower it to the starting position. Repeat
these actions with the other leg, and
continue to alternate legs. DURA-
TION: 30 seconds ( 15 seconds per leg).
Rear Leg Lift. Stand in chest-to
shoulder-deep water with hands on
the pools edge, chest to the wall. Raise
one leg back and up from the hip,
extend it, and point the foot. Then,
pull the leg back to the starting posi-
tion. Alternate these actions back and
forth with each leg. DURATION: 20
seconds (10 seconds each leg).
Figure 8-21

8-20
 Alternate Toe Touch. Stand in
waist-deep water. Raise the left leg as
in kicking while touching the elevated
toe with the right hand. At the same
time, rotate the head toward the left
shoulder, and push the left arm back-
ward through the water. Alternate
these actions back and forth with each
leg and opposite hand. DURATION 2
minutes.
Side Straddle Hop. Stand in waist-
deep water with hands on hips and feet
together. Jump sideward and land with
feet about two feet apart. Then, return
to the starting position, and repeat the
jumping action. DURATION 2 min-
utes.
Stride Hop. Stand in waist-deep
water with hands on hips and feet
together. Jump, moving the left leg
forward and right leg backward. Then,
jump again moving the right leg for-
ward and left leg backward. Repeat
these actions. DURATION 2 minutes.
The Bounce. Stand in waist-deep
water with hands on hips and feet
together. Jump high with feet together.
Upon landing, use a bouncing motion,
and repeat the action. DURATION: 1
minute.
Rise on Toes. Stand in chest-to
shoulder-deep water with arms at sides
and feet together. Rise up using the
toes. Then, lower the body to the
starting position. Repeat the action.
DURATION: 1 minute.
Side Bender. Stand in waist-deep
water with the left arm at the side and
the right arm extended straight over-
head. Stretch slowly, bending to the
left. Recover to the starting position,
and repeat the action. Next, reverse to
the right arm at the side and the left
arm extended straight overhead. Re-
peat the stretching action to the right
side. DURATION: 1 minute.
Walking Crawl. Walk in waist- to
chest-deep water. Simulate the over-
hand crawl stroke by reaching out with
the left hand cupped and pressing the
water downward to the thigh. Repeat
the action with the right hand. Alter-
8-21
nate left and right arm action. DURA-
TION: 2 minutes.
Bouncing. Stand in chest-deep
water, arms at sides. Bounce on the left
foot while pushing down vigorously
with both hands. Repeat the action
with the right foot. Alternate bounc-
ing on the left and right foot. DURA-
TION: 2 minutes.
Bounding in Place with Alternate
Arm Stretch, Forward. Bound in
place in waist-deep water using high
knee action. Stretch the right arm far
forward when the left knee is high and
the left arm is stretched backward.
When the position of the arm is re-
versed, simulate the action of the
crawl stroke by pulling down and
through the water with the hand.
DURATION 1 minute.
Poolside Knees Up, Supine. Stand
in chest-to shoulder-deep water, back
against the wall of the pool. Extend
the arms backward, and grasp the
pools edge. With feet together, ex-
tend the legs in front of the torso, and
assume a supine position. Then with
the legs together, raise the knees to
the chin. Return to the starting posi-
tion, and repeat the action. DURA-
TION: 2 minutes (maximum effort).
Twisting Legs, Supine. Stand in
chest-to shoulder-deep water, back
against the wall of the pool. Extend the
arms backward, and grasp the pools
edge. With feet together, extend the
legs in front of the torso, and assume
a supine position. Then, twist the legs
slowly to the left, return to the starting
position, and twist the legs slowly to
the right. Repeat this twisting action.
DURATION: 1 minute (2 sets, 30
seconds each).
Scissor Kick. Float in chest- to
shoulder- deep water on either side of
the body with the top arm extended,
hand holding the pools edge. Brace
the bottom hand against the pools wall
with feet below the waters surface.
Next, assume a crouching position by
gringing the heels toward the hips by
bending the knees. Then, straighten The Engine. Stand in chest-to
and spread the legs with the top leg shoulder-deep water, arms straight and
extending backward. When the legs are in front of the body and parallel to the
extended and spread, squeeze them water with the palms facing down-
back together (scissoring). Pull with ward. While walking forward, raise
the top hand, and push with the the left knee to the left elbow, then
bottom hand. The propulsive force of return to the starting position. Con-
the kick will tend to cause the body to tinuing to walk forward, touch the
rise to the waters surface. DURA- right knee to the right elbow, and
TION 1 minute (2 sets, 30 seconds return to the starting position. Be sure
each, maximum effort). to keep the arms parallel to the water
Push Away. Stand in chest-to throughout the exercise. DURATION
shoulder-deep water facing the pools 1 to 2 minutes (2 sets).
wall and at arms length from it. Grasp
Cool-Down
the pools edge, and bend the arms so
that the body is leaning toward the
wall of the pool. Vigorously push the This is required to gradually bring
the body back to its pre-exercise state.
chest back from the wall by straight-
ening the arms. Then, with equal It should last from five to seven min-
vigor, pull the upper body back to the utes.
wall. Repeat these actions. DURA-
TION: 2 minutes (maximum effort).
Gutter Push-Ups. Stand in chest-
to shoulder- deep water facing the
pools wall. Place the hands on the edge
or gutter of the pool. Then, raise the
body up and out of the water while ex-
tending the arms. repeat this action.
DURATION: 2 minutes (4 sets, 30
seconds each with 5-second rests be-
tween sets).

Front Flutter Kick. Stand in chest-

to shoulder-deep water facing the pools
wall. Grasp the pools edge or gutter
and assume a prone position with legs
extended just below the waters sur-
face. Then, kick flutter style, toes
pointed, ankles flexible, knee joint
loose but straight. The Iegs should
simulate a whips action. DURATION
1 minute (2 sets, 30 seconds each).
Running. Move in a running gait
in chest-to shoulder-deep water with
arms and hands under the waters
surface. This activity can be stationary,
or the exerciser may run from poolside
to poolside. Runners must concentrate
on high knee action and good arm
movement. DURATION 10 to 20
minutes.

8-22
 Physical fitness is one of the foun-
dations of combat readiness, and main-
taining it must be an integral part of
every soldiers life. This chapter dis-
cusses competitive fitness activities
and athletic events that commanders
can use to add variety to a units
physical fitness program. There is also
a section on developing a unit intramu-
ral program. Athletic and competi-
tive fitness activities are sports events
which should only be used to supple-
ment the units PT program. They
should never replace physical training
and conditioning sessions but, rather,
should exist to give soldiers a chance
for healthy competition. Only through
consistent, systematic physical condi-
tioning can the fitness components be
developed and maintained.
Crucial to the success of any pro-
gram is the presence and enthusiasm of
the leaders who direct and participate
in it. The creativity of the physical
training planners also plays a large role.
Competitive fitness and athletic activi-
ties must be challenging. They must be
presented in the spirit of fair play and
good competition.
It is generally accepted that com-
petitive sports have a tremendous posi-
tive influence on the physical and
emotional development of the partici-
pants. Sports competition can enhance
Competitive fitness a soldiers combat readiness by pro-
activities help in the moting the development of coordina-
tion, agility, balance, and speed. Com-
development of petitive fitness activities also help de-
assets that are vital to velop assets that are vital to combat ef-
combat effectiveness. fectiveness. These include team spirit,
the will to win, confidence, toughness,
aggressiveness, and teamwork.
Intramural
The Armys sports mission is to give
all soldiers a chance to participate in
sports activities. A unit-level intra-
mural program can help achieve this
important goal. DA Pam 28-6 de-
scribes how to organize various unit-
level intramural programs.
9-1
Factors that affect the content of
the sports program differ at every
Army installation and unit. Initiative
and ingenuity in planning are the most
vital assets. They are encouraged in
the conduct of every program.
OBJECTIVES
A well-organized and executed
intramural program yields the follow-
ing:
Team spirit, the will to win, confi-
dence, aggressiveness, and team-
work. All are vital to combat effec-
tiveness.
A change from the routine PT pro-
gram.
The chance for all soldiers to take
part in organized athletics.
ORGANIZATION
The command level best suited to
organize and administer a broad intra-
mural program varies according to a
units situation. If the objective of
maximum participation is to be
achieved, organization should start at
company level and then provide com-
petition up through higher unit levels.
Each command level should have its
own program and support the next
higher program level.
To successfully organize and con-
duct an intramural program, develop-
ers should consider the following fac-
tors and elements.
Authority
The unit commander should pub-
lish and endorse a directive giving au-
thorization and guidance for a sports
program. A detailed SOP should also
be published.
Personnel
Leaders at all levels of the intramu-
ral program should plan, organize, and
supervise it. Appointments at all
echelons should be made for at least
one year to provide continuity. The
commander must appoint a qualified
person to be the director, regardless of
the local situation, type, and size of the
unit. The director must be a good or-
ganizer and administrator and must
have time to do the job correctly. He
should also have a sense of impartial-
ity and some athletic experience.
Commanders should form an intra-
mural sports council in units of battal-
ion size or larger and should appoint
members or require designated unit
representatives. The council should
meet at least once a month or as often
as the situation requires. The council
serves as an advisory body to the unit
commander and intramural director. It
gives guidance about the organization
and conduct of the program.
Facilities and Equipment
Adequate facilities and equipment
must be available. When facilities are
limited, leaders must plan activities to
ensure their maximum use. In all
cases, activities must be planned to
ensure the safety of participants and
spectators.
Funds and Budget
Adequate funds are essential to
successfully organize and operate a
sports program. Therefore, before-
hand, organizers must determine how
much money is available to support it.
To justify requests for funds they must
prepare a budget in which they justify
each sports activity separately. The
budget must include special equip-
ment, supplies, awards, pay for offi- Commanders can
cials, and other items and services.
Units can reduce many of their costs stimulate soldiers to
by being resourceful. participate in
competitive athletics by
AWARD SYSTEM
using an award system.
Commanders can stimulate units
and soldiers to participate in competi-
tive athletics by using an award sys-
tem. One type is a point-award system
where teams get points based on their
win/loss records and/or final league
standings. This reflects the units
standings in the overall intramural
sports program. The recognition will
help make units and individuals par-
ticipate throughout the year. Trophies
can then be given for overall perform-
ance and individual activities.
PROGRAM PLANNING
A successful program depends on
sound plans and close coordination
between the units involved. The
intramural director should meet with
subordinate commanders or a sports
representative to determine what pro-
gram of activities is compatible with
the mission and training activities of
each unit. Unless they resolve this
issue, they may not get command
support which, in turn, could result in
forfeitures or lack of participation.
The less-popular activities may not be
supported because of a lack of interest.
9-2
 Evaluations
Before the program is developed,
leaders must study the training and
availability situation at each unit level.
They should include the following
items in a survey to help them deter-
mine the scope of the program and to
develop plans:
General. Evaluate the commanders
attitude, philosophy, and policy
about the sports program. Under
stand the types of units to be
served, their location, the climate,
and military responsibilities.
Troops. Determine the following:
1) number and types of personnel;
2) training status and general duty
assignment; 3) special needs, inter-
ests, and attitudes.
Time available. Coordinate the
time available for the sports pro-
gram with the military mission.
Determine both the on-duty and
off-duty time soldiers have for taking
part in sports activities.
Equipment. Consider the equip-
ment that will be needed for each
sport.
Facilities. Determine the number,
type, and location of recreational
facilities both within the unit and in
those controlled by units at higher
levels.
9-3
Funds. Determine how much each
unit can spend on the intramural
program.
Personnel. Assess how many people
are needed to run the program. The
list should include a director and as
sistants, sports council, officials,
and team captains, as well as volun
teers for such tasks as setting up a
playing field.
Coordination. Coordinate with the
units operations sections to avoid
conflict with military training sched
ules.
Activities. The intramural director
should plan a tentative program of
activities based on the season, local
situation, and needs and interests of
the units. Both team and individual
sports should be included. Some
team sports are popular at all levels
and need little promotional effort
for success. Among these are vol-
leyball, touch football, basketball,
and softball. Some individual com-
petitive sports have direct military
value. They include boxing, wres-
tling, track and field, cross country,
triathlon, biathlon, and swimming.
While very popular, these sports are
harder to organize than team sports.
See Figures 9-1 and 9-2 for a list of
sports activities.
Figure 9-1

Figure 9-2

9-4
 Table 9-1
Functions
Once the evaluations have been
made, the following functions should
be performed:
Make a handbook. An intramural
handbook should be published at
each level of command from instal-
lation to company to serve as a
standing operating procedure (SOP).
This handbook should include the
essential elements listed in Table
9-1 above.
Plan the calendar. Local situations
and normal obstacles may conflict
with the intramural program. How
ever, a way can be found to provide
a scheduled program for every sea-
son of the year.
Choose the type of competition.
Intramural directors should be able
to choose the type of competition
best suited for the sport and local
circumstances. They should also
know how to draw up tournaments.
Unless the competition must take
place in a short time, elimination
tournaments should not be used.
The round-robin tournament has
the greatest advantage because indi-
viduals and teams are never elimi-
nated. This type of competition is
adaptable to both team and individ-
ual play. It is appropriate for small
numbers of entries and league play
in any sport.
9-5
Make a printed schedule. Using
scheduling forms makes this job
easier. The form should include
game number, time, date, court or
field, and home or visiting team.
Space for scores and officials is also
helpful. Championship games or
matches should be scheduled to
take place at the best facility.
Unit Activities
The following games and activities
may be included in the units PT
program, They are large-scale activi-
ties which can combine many compo-
nents of physical and motor fitness. In
addition, they require quick thinking
and the use of strategy. When played
vigorously, they are excellent activi-
ties for adding variety to the program.
NINE-BALL SOCCER
The object of this game is for each
of a teams five goalies to have one
ball.
Players
There are 25 to 50 players on each
team, five of whom are goalies. The
other players are divided into four
equal groups. The goalies play be-
tween the goal line and 5-yard line of
a standard football field. The other
four groups start the game between the
designated 10-yard segments of the
field. (See Figure 9-3.) The goalies
and all other players must stay in their
assigned areas throughout the game.
The only exceptions are midfielder
who stand between the 35- and 45-
yard lines. These players may occupy
both their assigned areas and the 10-
yard free space at the center of the
field.
The Game
The game starts with all players
inside their own areas and midfielder
on their own 40-yard line. The nine
balls are placed as follows. Four are on
each 45-yard line with at least five
yards between balls. One is centered
on the 50-yard line. The signal to start
play is one long whistle blast. Players
must pass the balls through the oppos-
ing teams defenses into the goal area
using only their feet or heads. The
first team whose goalies have five balls
wins a point. The game then stops, and
the balls are placed for the start of a
new set. The first team to score five
points wins.
There are no time-outs except in
case of injury, which is signaled by two
sharp whistle blasts. The teams change
positions on the field after each set.
Team members move to different zones
after the set.
Rules
A ball is played along the ground or
over any group or groups of players.
The ball may travel any distance if it is
played legally.
Goalies may use their hands in
playing the ball and may give a ball to
other goalies on their team. For a set
to officially end, each goalie must have
a ball.
If players engage in unnecessary
roughness or dangerous play, the refe-
ree removes them from the game for
the rest of the set and one additional
set. He also removes players for the
rest of the set if they step on or over a
boundary or sideline or use their hands
outside the goal area.
If a goalie steps on or over a
boundary or sideline, the referee takes
the ball being played plus another ball
from the goalies team and gives these
balls to the nearest opposing player. If
Figure 9-3
9-6
the team has no other ball in the goal
area, the referee limits the penalty to
the ball that is being played.
If a ball goes out of bounds, the
referee retrieves it. The team that
caused it to go out of bounds or over
the goal line loses possession. The
referee puts the ball back into play by
rolling it to the nearest opposing player.
PUSHBALL
This game requires a large pushball
that is five to six feet in diameter. It
also requires a level playing surface
that is 240 to 300 feet long and 120 to
150 feet wide. The length of the field
is divided equally by a center line.
Two more lines are marked 15 feet
from and parallel to the end lines and
extending across the entire field. (See
Figure 9-4.)
Players
There are 10 to 50 soldiers on each
of two teams.
Figure 9-4
9-7
The Game
The object of the game is to send
the ball over the opponents goal line
by pushing, rolling, passing, carrying,
or using any method other than kick-
ing the ball.
The game begins when the ball is
placed on the centerline with the op-
posing captains three feet away from
it. The other players line up 45 feet
from the ball on their half of the field.
At the referees starting whistle, the
captains immediately play the ball,
and their teams come to their aid.
At quarter time, the ball stays dead
for two minutes where it was when the
quarter ended. At halftime, the teams
exchange goals, and play resumes as if
the game were beginning.
A team scores a goal when it sends
the ball across the opposing teams end
line. A goal counts five points. The
team that scores a goal may then try
for an extra point. For the extra point,
the ball is placed on the opposing
teams 5-yard line, and the teams line
up across the field separated by the
width of the ball. Only one player may
place his hands on the ball. The player
who just scored is directly in front of
the ball. At the referees signal, the
ball is put into play for one minute. If
any part of the ball is driven across the
goal line in this period, the offense
scores one point. The defense may not
score during the extra point attempt.
The game continues until four 10-
minute quarters have been played.
Rest periods are allowed for two min-
utes between quarters and five min-
utes at halftime.
Rules
Players may use any means of
interfering with the opponents prog-
ress except striking and clipping.
Clipping is throwing ones body across
the back of an opponents legs as he is
running or standing. Force may le-
gally be applied to all opponents whether
they are playing the ball or not. A
player who strikes or clips an opponent
is removed from the game, and his
team is penalized half the distance to
its goal.
When any part of the ball goes out
of bounds, it is dead. The teams line
up at right angles to the sidelines.
They should be six feet apart at the
point where the ball went out. The
referee tosses the ball between the
teams.
When, for any reason, the ball is
tied up in one spot for more than 10
seconds, the referee declares it dead.
He returns the ball into play the same
way he does after it goes out of
bounds.
STRATEGY PUSHBALL
Strategy pushball is similar to push-
ball except that it is played on two
adjacent fields, and opposing teams
supply soldiers to the games on both
fields. Team commanders assess the
situation on the fields and distribute
their soldiers accordingly. The com-
mander decides the number of soldiers
used, within limits imposed by the
rules. This number may be adjusted
throughout the game. Play on both
fields occurs at the same time, but each
game progresses independently. At the
end of play, a teams points from both
fields are added together to determine
the overall winner.
This game requires two pushballs
that are five to six feet in diameter.
Pull-over vests or jerseys of two dif-
ferent colors are used by each team for
a total of four different colors. Start-
ers and reserves should be easily dis-
tinguishable. Starters and substitutes
should wear vests of one color, while
the team commander and reserves wear
vests of the second color.
Players may wear any type of ath-
letic shoes except those with metal
cleats. Combat boots may be worn, but
extra caution must be used to prevent
injuries caused by kicking or stepping
on other players. Soldiers wearing
illegal equipment may not play until
the problem has been corrected.
The playing area is two lined-off
fields. These are 240 to 300 feet long
by 120 to 150 feet wide. They are
separated lengthwise by a 20-foot-
wide divider strip. The length of each
field is divided equally by a centerline
that is parallel to the goal lines. Lines
are also marked 45 feet from each side
of the centerline and parallel to it. The
lines extend across both fields. Di-
mensions may be determined locally
based on available space and the number
of players. The space between the
fields is the team area. Each team
occupies the third of the team space
that immediately adjoins its initial
playing field.
Time periods should be adjusted to
suit weather conditions and soldiers
fitness levels.
9-8
 Players
There are 25 to 40 soldiers on each
team. A typical, 25-member team has
the following:
One team commander. He is respon-
sible for overall game strategy and
for determining the number and po-
sitions of players on the field.
Sixteen starting members. Eight are
on each field at all times; one is
appointed field captain.
Four reserve members. These are
players the team commander des-
ignates as reinforcements.
Three substitutes. These are re-
placements for starters or reserves.
One runner. He is designated to
convey messages from the team
commander to field captains.
The proportion of soldiers in each
category stays constant regardless of
the total number on a team. Before the
event, game organizers must coordi-
nate with participating units and agree
on the number on each team.
Figure 9-5
9-9
Runners serve at least one period;
they may not play during that period.
They are allowed on the field only
during breaks in play after a dead ball
or goal.
Reserves are used at any point in
the game on either field and are com-
mitted as individuals or groups. They
may enter or leave the playing field at
any time whether the ball is in play or
not. Team commanders may enter the
game as reserves if they see the need
for such action.
Reserves, substitutes, and starting
members may be redesignated into any
of the other components on a one-for-
one basis only during dead balls, in-
jury time-outs, or quarter- and half-
time breaks. A reserve may become
a starter by switching vests with an
original starter, who then becomes a
reserve.
When possible, senior NCOS and
officers from higher headquarters or
other units should be used as officials.
Players must not question an officials
authority during play. Otherwise, the
game can quickly get out of control.
Chain-of-command personnel
should act as team commanders and
field captains whenever possible.
The Game
The object is to propel the ball over
the opponents goal line by pushing,
rolling, passing, carrying, or using any
means other than kicking.
The game is officiated by two refe-
rees on each field, a chief umpire, and
a scorekeeper. Referees concentrate
on player actions so that they can
quickly detect fouls and assess penal-
ties. The chief umpire and score-
keeper occupy any area where they
can best officiate the games. The chief
umpire monitors the use of substitutes
and reserves and ensures smooth prog-
ress of the games on both fields. The
number of officials may be increased
if teams have more than 25 players.
Referees use their whistles to stop and
start play except at the start and end of
each quarter. The scorekeeper, who
times the game with a stopwatch, starts
and ends each quarter and stops play
for injuries with some noisemaker
other than a whistle. He may use such
devices as a starters pistol, klaxon, or
air horn.
The game begins after the ball is
placed on each fields center mark.
Opposing field captains are three feet
from the ball (six feet from the center-
line). The rest of the starters are lined
up 45 feet from the ball on their half
of the field. (See Figure 9-5.) At the
scorekeepers signal, field captains
immediately play the ball, and their
teams come to their aid.
Starters may be exchanged between
the fields if the minimum number of
starters or substitutes per field is
maintained.
Substitutes may enter the game only
during breaks in play after a dead
ball, goal, or time-out for injury.
A substitute may not start to play until
the player being replaced leaves the
field.
When any part of the ball goes out
of bounds, it is dead. The teams line
up at right angles to the sidelines; they
are 10 feet apart at the point where the
ball went out of bounds. The referee
places the ball between the teams at a
point 15 feet inside the sideline. Play
resumes when the referee blows the
whistle.
When the ball gets tied up in one
spot for more than 10 seconds for any
reason, the referee declares it dead. He
restarts play as with an out-of-bounds
dead ball, except that he puts the ball
on the spot where it was stopped.
Time does not stop for dead balls or
goals. Play continues on one field
while dead balls are restarted on the
other.
At each quarter break, the ball stays
on the spot where it was when the
quarter ended. The next quarter, sig-
naled by the scorekeeper, starts as it
does after a ball goes out of bounds. At
halftime the teams exchange goals, and
play resumes as if the game were
beginning.
A goal is scored when any part of
the ball breaks the plane of the goal
line between the sidelines. A goal
counts one point. At the end of the
fourth quarter, the points of each team
from both fields are added together to
determine the winner.
If there is a tie, a three-minute
overtime is played. It is played the
same as in regulation play, but only one
field is used, with starting squads from
both teams opposing each other. For
control purposes, no more than 15
players per team are allowed on the
field at once. The team with more
points at the end of the overtime wins
the game. If the game is still tied when
time expires, the winner is the team
that has gained more territory.
The game continues until four 10-
minute quarters have been played.
There is a 10-minute halftime between
9-10
the second and third quarters. The
clock stops at quarter breaks and
halftime. Time-out is allowed only for
serious injury. Play is then stopped on
both fields.
Rules
Players may use any means of inter-
fering with their opponents progress,
but they are penalized for striking or
clipping opponents or throwing them
to the ground. These penalties are
enforced by the referees. Force maybe
legally applied to any opponent whether
or not they are playing the ball. Block-
ing is allowed if blockers stay on their
feet and limit contact to the space
between waist and shoulders. Blockers
may not swing, throw, or flip their
elbows or forearms. Tackling opposing
soldiers who are playing the ball is
allowed. The chief umpire or any
referee may call infractions and im-
pose penalties for unsportsmanlike
conduct or personal fouls on either
field. Penalties may also be called for
infractions committed on the field or
sidelines during playing time, quarter-
and halftime breaks, and time-outs.
Personal fouls are called for the fol-
lowing:
Illegal blocking (below an oppo-
nents waist).
Clipping (throwing the body across
the back of the opponents legs as he
is running or standing).
Throwing an opponent to the ground
(that is, lifting and dropping or
slamming a player to the ground in
stead of tackling cleanly).
Spearing, tackling, or piling on an
opponent who is already on the
ground.
Striking or punching with closed
fist(s).
Grasping an opponents neck or
head.
Kicking.
Butting heads.
Unsportsmanlike conduct is called
for abusive or insulting language that
9-11
the referee judges to be excessive and
blatant. It is also called against a
player on the sidelines who interferes
with the ball or with his opponents on
the field. A player who violates these
rules should be removed from the
game and made to run one lap around
both playing fields. A penalized
player leaves the team shorthanded
until he completes the penalty lap and
the next break in play occurs on the
field from which he was removed.
The penalized player or a substitute
then enters the game. Referees and
the chief umpire may, at their discre-
tion, eject any player who is a chronic
violator or who is judged to be danger-
ous to other players, Once ejected, the
player must leave both the field of
play and team area. Substitutes for
ejected players may enter during the
next break in play that follows a goal
scored by either team. They enter on
the field from which the players were
ejected.
BROOM-BALL HOCKEY
This game is played on ice or a
frozen field using hockey rules. Play-
ers wear boots with normal soles and
carry broom-shaped sticks with which
they hit the ball into the goals.
The object of this game is for teams
to score goals through the opponents
defenses. Using only brooms, players
pass the ball through the opposing
team to reach its goal. The first team
to score five points wins. Broom ball
provides a good cardiorespiratory work-
out.
Players
There are 15 to 20 players on each
team. One is a goalie and the others are
divided into three equal groups. The
goalie plays in the goal area of a
standard soccer or hockey field or
along the goal line if the two opposing
goals are the same size. One soccer
ball, or some other type of inflated
ball, is used. The players need no
padding.
The three groups begin the game in
center field. All players must stay in
their designated space throughout the
game. A diagram of the field is shown
at Figure 9-6.
The Game
The face-off marks the start of the
game, the second half, and the restart
of play after goals. Each half lasts 15
minutes. For the face-off, each player
is on his own half of the field. All
players, except the two centers, are
outside the center circle. The referee
places the ball in the center of the
circle between the two centers. The
signal to begin play is one long blast on
the whistle. The ball must travel
forward and cross the center circle
before being played by another player.
There are no time-outs except for
injury. The time-out signal is two
sharp whistle blasts.
Rules
All players, including goalies, must
stay inside their legal boundaries at all
times. Only goalies may use their
hands to play the ball, but they must
always keep control of their sticks.
Other players must stay in their re-
spective zones of play (Attack, De-
fense, Centerfield). The ball is played
along the ground or over one or more
groups of players. It may travel any
distance as long as it is legally played.
The referee calls infractions and
imposes penalties. Basic penalties are
those called for the following:
Unnecessary roughness or danger-
ous play. (The player is removed
from the game; he stays in the
penalty box for two minutes.)
Ball out-of-bounds. (The team that
caused it to go out loses posses-
sion, and the opposing team puts the
ball back into play by hitting it to
the nearest player.)
Use of hands by a player other than
a goalie. (The player must stay in
the penalty box one minute.)
Improper crossing of boundaries.
(When a member of the team in pos-
session of the ball crosses the bound
ary line of his zone of play, posses-
sion will be awarded to the other
team.)
Figure 9-6
9-12
 Orienteering
Orienteering is a competitive form
of land navigation. It combines map
Orienteering combines reading, compass use, and terrain study
map reading, compass with strategy, competition, and exer-
cise. This makes it an excellent activity
use, and terrain study for any training schedule.
with strategy, An orienteering course is set up by
competition, and placing control points or marker signs
over a variety of terrain. The orienteer
exercise. or navigator uses a detailed topogra-
phical map and a compass to negotiate
the course. The map should be 1:25,000
scale or larger. A liquid-filled orien-
teering compass works best. The base
of the compass is transparent plastic,
and it gives accurate readings on the
run. The standard military, lensatic
compass will work even though it is not
specifically designed for the sport.
The best terrain for an orienteering
course is woodland that offers varied
terrain. Several different courses can
be setup in an area 2,000 to 4,000 yards
square. Courses can be short and
simple for training beginners or longer
and more difficult to challenge the
advanced competitors.
The various types of orienteering
are described below.
CROSS-COUNTRY ORIENTEERING
This popular type of orienteering is
used in all international and champi-
onship events. Participants navigate to
a set number of check or control points
in a designated order. Speed is impor-
tant since the winner is the one who
reaches all the control points in the
right order and returns to the finish
area in the least time.
SCORE ORIENTEERING
Quick thinking and strategy are
major factors in score orienteering. A
competitor selects the check-points to
find based on point value and location.
Point values throughout the course are
high or low depending on how hard the
9-13
markers are to reach. Whoever collects
the most points within a designated
time is the winner. Points are de-
ducted for returning late to the finish
area.
LINE ORIENTEERING
Line orienteering is excellent for
training new orienteers. The route is
premarked on the map, but check-
points are not shown. The navagator
tries to walk or run the exact map
route. While negotiating the course, he
looks for checkpoints or control-marker
signs. The winner is determined by
the time taken to run the course and
the accuracy of marking the control
points when they are found.
ROUTE ORIENTEERING
This variation is also excellent for
beginners. The navigator follows a
route that is clearly marked with signs
or streamers. While negotiating the
course, he records on the map the
route being taken. Speed and accuracy
of marking the route determine the
winner.
NIGHT ORIENTEERING
Competitors in this event carry
flashlights and navigate with map and
compass. The night course for cross-
country orienteering is usually shorter
than the day course. Control points are
marked with reflective material or dim
lights. Open, rolling terrain, which is
poor for day courses, is much more
challenging at night.
URBAN ORIENTEERING
Urban orienteering is very similar
to traditional types, but a compass,
topographical map, and navigation skills
are not needed. A course can be set up
on any installation by using a map of
the main post or cantonment area.
Soldiers run within this area looking
for coded location markers, which are
numbered and marked on the map
before the start. This eliminates the
need for a compass. Soldiers only need
a combination map-scorecard, a watch,
and a pencil. (Figure 9-7 shows a
sample scorecard.)
Urban orienteering adds variety
and competition to a units PT pro-
gram and is well suited for an intra-
mural program. It also provides a good
cardiovascular workout.
Participants and Rules
Urban orienteering is conducted
during daylight hours to ensure safety
and make the identification of check-
point markers easy. Soldiers form two-
man teams based on their APFT 2-
mile-run times. Team members should
have similar running ability. A handi-
cap is given to slower teams. (See Fig-
ure 9-8.) At the assembly area, each
team gets identical maps that show the
Figure 9-7
9-14
location of markers on the course.
Location markers are color-coded on
the map based on their point value.
The markers farthest from the assem-
bly area have the highest point values.
The maps are labeled with a location
number corresponding to the location
marker on the course. A time limit is
given, and teams finishing late are
penalized. Five points are deducted
for each minute a team is late. While
on the course, team members must stay
together and not separate to get two
markers at once. A team that separates
is disqualified. Any number of sol-
diers may participate, the limiting fac-
tors being space and the number of
points on the course.
Figure 9-8
9-15
Playing the Game
Once the soldiers have been as-
signed a partner, the orienteering
marshal briefs them on the rules and
objectives of the game. He gives them
their time limitations and a reminder
about the overtime penalty. He also
gives each team a combination map/
scorecard with a two-digit number on
it to identify their team. When a team
reaches a location marker, it records
on the scorecard the letters that corre-
spond to its two-digit number.
Point values of each location marker
are also annotated on the scorecard.
When the orienteering marshal signals
the start of the event, all competitors

leave the assembly area at the same
time. One to two hours is the optimal
time for conducting the activity. A
sample location marker is shown at
Figure 9-9.
For this example, team number 54
found the marker. The letters corre-
sponding to 54 are LD, so they place
LD on line 39 of their scorecard.
This line number corresponds to the
locations marker number. When the
location marker code is deciphered,
the team moves on to the next marker
of its choice. Each team goes to as
many markers as possible within the
allotted time. After all teams have
found as many location markers as
possible and have turned in their map/
scorecards, the points are computed by
the orienteering marshal to determine
the teams standings. He has the key
to all the points and can determine
each teams accuracy. Handicap points
are then added. Each soldier gets
points if his 2-mile-run time is slower
than 12 minutes. (See Figure 9-8.)
The teams standings are displayed
shortly after the activity ends.
Safety Briefing
The orienteering marshal gives a
safety briefing before the event starts.
He reminds soldiers to be cautious
Figure 9-9
while running across streets and to
emphasize that team members should
always stay together.
Set Up and Materials
The course must be well thought out
and set up in advance. Setting up
requires some man-hours, but the course
can be used many times. The major
tasks are making and installing location
markers and preparing map/scorecard
combinations. Once the location marker
numbers are marked and color coded
on the maps, they are covered with
combat acetate to keep them useful for
a long time. Combat acetate (also
called plastic sheet) can be purchased
in the self-service supply center store
under stock number 9330-00-618-7214.
The course organizer must decide
how many location markers to make
and where to put them. He should use
creativity to add excitement to the
course. Suggestions for locations to put
point markers are as follows: at inter-
sections, along roads in the tree line, on
building corners, and along creek beds
and trails. They should not be too hard
to find. To help teams negotiate the
course, all maps must be precisely
marked to correspond with the place-
ment of the course-location markers.
9-16
 Unit Olympics
The unit olympics is a multifaceted
event that can be tailored to any unit to
provide athletic participation for all
soldiers. The objective is to incorpo-
Unit olympics rate into a team-level competition
incorporate athletic athletic. events that represent all five
events that represent all fitness components. The competition
five fitness components. can be within a unit or between com-
peting units. When conducted with en-
thusiasm, it promotes team spirit and
provides a good workout. It is a good
diversion from the regular PT session.
A unit olympics, if well promoted
from the top and well staged by the
project NCO or officer, can be a good
precursor to an SDT or the EIB test.
TYPES OF EVENTS
The olympics should include events
that challenge the soldiers muscular
strength and endurance, aerobic en-
durance, flexibility, agility, speed, and
related sports skills.
Events can be held for both indi-
viduals and teams, and they should be
designed so that both male and female
soldiers can take part. Each soldier
should be required to do a minimum
number of events. Teams should wear
a distinctively marked item such as a
T-shirt or arm band. This adds char-
acter to the event and sets teams apart
from each other. A warm-up should
precede and a cool-down should follow
the events.
The following are examples of ath-
letic events that could be included in a
unit olympics:
Push-Up Derby
This is a timed event using four-
member teams. The objective is for the
team to do as many correct push-ups as
possible within a four-minute time
limit. Only one team member does
push-ups at a time. The four team
members may rotate as often as de-
sired,
9-17
Sandbag Relay
This event uses four-man teams for
a running relay around a quarter-mile
track carrying sandbags. One player
from each team lines up at the starting
line with a full sandbag in each hand.
He hands the sandbags off to a team-
mate when he finishes his part of the
race. This continues until the last team
player crosses the finish line. Placings
are determined by the teams order of
finish.
Team Flexibility
In this event, if teams are numeri-
cally equal, all members of each team
should participate. If not, as many
team members should participate as
possible. Each teams anchor person
places his foot against a wall or a curb.
He stretches his other foot as far away
as possible as in doing a split. The next
team member puts one foot against the
anchor mans extended foot and does a
split-stretch. This goes on until all
team members are stretched. They
cover as much distance as possible
keeping in contact with each other.
The team that stretches farthest from
the start point without a break in their
chain is the winner.
Medicine-Ball Throw
This event uses four-member teams.
The teams begin by throwing the ball
from the same starting line. When it
lands, the ball is marked for each team
thrower, and the next team player
throws from this spot. This is repeated
until all the teams players have thrown.
The team whose combined throws
cover the most distance is the winner.
Job-Related Events
The organizer should use his imagi-
nation when planning activities. He
may incorporate soldier skills required
of an MOS. For instance, he could
devise a timed land-navigation event
geared toward soldiers with an MOS of
11 C. The team would carry an 81 -mm
mortar (tube, tripod, and baseplate) to
three different locations, each a mile
apart, and set it up in a firing configu-
ration. This type of event is excellent
for fine-tuning job skills and is also
physically challenging.
OPENING CEREMONY
The commander, ranking person,
or ceremony host gives an inspira-
tional speech before the opening cere-
monies, welcoming competitors and
wishing them good luck. The olympics
is officially opened with a torch light-
ing. This is followed by a short
symbolic parade of all the teams. The
teams are then put back into forma-
tion, and team captains lead motivat-
ing chants. The master of ceremonies
(MC) announces the sequence of events
and rules for each event. The games
then begin.
JUDGING AND SCORING
The MC should have one assistant
per team who will judge that one team
during each event. Assistants give
input on events that need a numerical
count. The MC monitors the point
accumulation of each team. Points are
awarded for each event as follows:
First = 4 points.
Second = 3 points.
Third = 2 points.
Fourth = 1 point.
When two teams tie an event, the
points are added together and split
equally between them. After the
competition ends, the totaled point
scores for each team are figured. The
first- through fourth-place teams are
then recognized.
9-18

The goal of the Armys physical
fitness program is to improve each
soldiers physical ability so he can
survive and win on the battlefield.
Physical fitness includes all aspects of
physical performance, not just per-
formance on the APFT. Leaders must
understand the principles of exercise,
the FITT factors, and know how to
apply them in order to develop a sound
PT program that will improve all the
fitness components. To plan PT suc-
cessfully, the commander and MFT
must know the training management
system. (See FM 25-100.)
Commanders should not be satisfied
with merely meeting the minimum
requirements for physical training which
Commanders must is having all of their soldiers pass the
APFT. They must develop programs
develop prgrams that
that train soldiers to maximize their
train soldiers to physical performance. Leaders should
maximize their physical use incentives. More importantly, they
performance. must set the example through their own
participation.
The unit PT program is the com-
manders program. It must reflect his
goals and be based on sound, scientific
principles. The wise commander also
uses his PT program as a basis for
building team spirit and for enhancing
other training activities. Tough, real-
istic training is good. However, leaders
must be aware of the risks involved
with physical training and related ac-
tivities. They should, therefore, plan
wisely to minimize injuries and acci-
dents.
Steps in Planning
STEP 1: ANALYZE THE MISSION
When planning a physical fitness
program, the commander must con-
sider the type of unit and its mission.
Missions vary as do the physical re-
quirements necessary to complete them.
As stated in FM 25-100, The wartime
mission drives training. A careful
10-1
analysis of the mission, coupled with
the commanders intent, yields the
mission-essential task list (METL) a
unit must perform.
Regardless of the units size or
mission, reasonable goals are essential.
According to FM 25-100, the goals
should provide a common direction
for all the commanders programs and
systems. An example of a goal is as
follows because the exceptional physi-
cal fitness of the soldier is a critical
combat-multiplier in the division, it
must be our goal to ensure that our
soldiers are capable of roadmarching
12 miles with a 50-pound load in less
than three hours.
STEP 2: DEVELOP FITNESS
OBJECTIVES
Objectives direct the units efforts
by prescribing specific actions. The
commander, as tactician, and the MFT,
as physical fitness advisor, must ana-
lyze the METL and equate this to
specific fitness objectives. Examples
of fitness objectives are the following:
Improve the units overall level of
strength by ensuring that all sol-
diers in the unit can correctly per-
form at least one repetition with 50
percent of their bodyweight on the
overhead press using a barbell.
Improve the units average APFT
score through each soldier obtain-
ing a minimum score of 80 points
on the push-up and sit-up events
and 70 points on the 2-mile run.
Decrease the number of physical
training injuries by 25 percent
through properly conducted train-
ing.
The commander and MFT identify
and prioritize the objectives.
STEP 3: ASSESS THE UNIT
With the training objectives estab-
lished, the commander and MFT are
ready to find the units current fitness
level and measure it against the desired
level.
 Giving a diagnostic APFT is one
way to find the current level. Another
way is to have the soldiers road march
a certain distance within a set time
while carrying a specified load. Any
quantifiable, physically demanding,
mission-essential task can be used as an
assessment tool. Training records and
reports, as well as any previous
ARTEP, EDREs, and so forth, can also
provide invaluable information.
STEP 4: DETERMINE TRAINING
REQUIREMENTS
By possessing the units fitness capa-
bilities and comparing them to the
standards defined in training objec-
tives, leaders can determine fitness
training requirements. When, after
extensive training, soldiers cannot reach
the desired levels of fitness, training
requirements may be too idealistic.
Once training requirements are deter-
mined, the commander reviews higher
headquarters long- and short-range
training plans to identify training events
and allocations of resources which will
affect near-term planning.
STEP 5: DEVELOP FITNESS TASKS
Fitness tasks provide the framework
for accomplishing all training require-
ments. They identify what has to be
done to correct all deficiencies and
sustain all proficiencies. Fitness tasks
establish priorities, frequencies, and
the sequence for training requirements.
They must be adjusted for real world
constraints before they become a part
of the training plan. The essential
elements of fitness tasks can be cata-
loged into four groups:
(1) Collective tasks
(2) Individual tasks
(3) Leader tasks
(4) Resources required for training
Collective tasks. Collective tasks are
the training activities performed by
the unit. They are keyed to the units
specific fitness objectives. An ex-
ample would be to conduct training to
develop strength and muscular endur-
ance utilizing a sandbag circuit.
Individual tasks. Individual tasks are
activities that an individual soldier
must do to accomplish the collective
training task. For example, to improve
CR endurance the individual soldier
must do ability-group running, road
marching, Fartlek training, interval
training, and calculate/monitor his
THR when appropriate.
Leader tasks. Leader tasks are the
specific tasks leaders must do in order
for collective and individual training
to take place. These will involve pro-
curing resources, the setting up of
training, education of individual sol-
diers, and the supervision of the actual
training.
Resources. Identifying the necessary
equipment, facilities, and training aids
during the planning phase gives the
trainer ample time to prepare for the
training. The early identification and
acquisition of resources is necessary to
fully implement the training program.
The bottom line is that training pro-
grams must be developed using re-
sources which are available.
STEP 6: DEVELOP A TRAINING
SCHEDULE
The fitness training schedule re-
sults from leaders near-term plan-
ning. Leaders must emphasize the
development of all the fitness compo-
nents and follow the principles of
exercise and the FITT factors. The
training schedule shows the order, in-
tensity, and duration of activities for
PT. Figure 10-1 illustrates a typical
PT session and its component parts.
10-2
 There are three distinct steps in
planning a unit's daily physical train-
ing activities. They are as follows:
1. Determine the minimum frequency
of training. Ideally, it should in-
include three cardiorespiratory and
three muscular conditioning ses-
sions each weeks. (See the FITT
factors in Chapter 1.)
2. Determine the type of activity. This
depends on the specific purpose of
the training session. (See Figure 10-
2.) For more information on this
topic, see Chapters 1, 2, and 3.
3. Determine the intensity and time of
the selected activity. (See the FITT
factors in Chapter 1.)
Each activity period should include
a warm-up, a workout that develops
cardiorespiratory fitness and/or mus-
cular endurance and strength, and a
cool-down. (See Figure 10-1).
Figure 10-1
10-3
At the end of a well-planned and
executed PT session, all soldiers should
feel that they have been physically
stressed. They should also understand
the objective of the training session
and how it will help them improve
their fitness levels.
STEP 7: CONDUCT AND
EVALUATE TRAINING
The commander and MFT now
begin managing and supervising the
day-to-day training. They evaluate
how the training is performed by
monitoring its intensity, using THR or
muscle failure, along with the duration
of the daily workout.
The key to evaluating training is to
determine if the training being con-
ducted will result in improvements in
physical conditioning. If not, the
training needs revision. Leaders should

not be sidetracked by PT that is all
form and little substance. Such train-
ing defeats the concept of objective-
based training and results in little
benefit to soldiers.
Education
Teaching soldiers about physical
fitness is vital. It must be an ongoing
effort that uses trained experts like
MFTs. Soldiers must understand why
the program is organized the way it is
and what the basic fitness principles
are. When they know why they are
training in a certain way, they are
more likely to wholeheartedly take
part. This makes the training more ef-
fective.
Education also helps the Army
develop its total fitness concept. To-
tal fitness should be reinforced through-
out each soldiers career. Classroom
instruction in subjects such as prin-
ciples of exercise, diet and nutrition,
tobacco cessation, and stress manage-
ment should be held at regular
Figure 10-2
intervals. Local Fit to Win coordina-
tors (AR 600-63) can help develop
classes on such subjects.
Common Errors
There are some common errors in
unit programs. The most common
error concerns the use of unit runs.
When all soldiers must run at the same
pace as with a unit run, many do not
receive a training effect because they
do not reach their training heart rate
(THR). The least-fit soldiers of the
unit may be at risk because they may
be training at heart rates above their Total fitness should be
THR. Another error is exclusively reinforced throughout
using activities such as the daily dozen. each soldier's career by
These exercises emphasize form over classroom instruction.
substance and do little to improve
fitness.
Yet another error is failing to strike
a balance in a PT program between CR
endurance training and muscular en-
durance and strength training. In
addition, imbalances often stem from a
lack of variety in the program which
10-4
 leads to boredom. The principles of
exercise are described in Chapter 1,
and their application is shown in the
sample program below.
A Sample Program
The following sample program shows
a commanders thought processes as he
develops a 12-week fitness training
program for his unit.
Captain Frank Joness company has
just returned from the field where it
completed an ARTEP. Several injuries
occurred including a broken foot, re-
sulting from a dropped container, and
three low back strains. After evaluat-
ing his unit during this ARTEP, CPT
Jones concluded that its level of physi-
cal fitness was inadequate. He thought
this contributed to the injuries and
poor performance. The soldiers flexi-
bility was poor, and there was an
apparent lack of prior emphasis on,
and training in, good lifting tech-
niques. This, combined with poor
flexibility in the low back and ham-
strings, may have contributed to the
unacceptably high number of low back
strains. Captain Jones decided to ask
the battalions MFT to help him de-
velop a good unit program for the
company. They went through the
following steps.
7-STEP PLANNING PROCESS
ANALYZE THE MISSION
DEVELOP FITNESS OBJECTIVES
ASSESS THE UNIT
DETERMINE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
DESIGN FITNESS TASKS
DEVELOP A TRAINING SCHEDULE
CONDUCT AND EVALUATE TRAINING
ANALYZE THE MISSION
First, they analyzed the recently
completed ARTEP and reviewed the
1 0 - 5
ARTEP manual to find the most physi-
cally demanding, mission-oriented tasks
the unit performs. The analysis showed
that, typically, the company does a
tactical road march and then occupies
a position. It establishes a perimeter,
improves its positions, and selects and
prepares alternate positions. One of
the most demanding missions while in
position requires soldiers to move by
hand, for 15 to 30 minutes, equipment
weighing up to 95 pounds. If his unit
received artillery fire, it would need to
be able to move to alternate positions
as quickly as possible. This requires
much lifting, digging, loading, un-
loading, and moving of heavy equip-
ment. All of these tasks require good
muscular endurance and strength and
a reasonable level of cardiorespiratory
endurance.
DEVELOP FITNESS OBJECTIVES
Next, CPT Jones reviewed his bat-
talion commanders physical training
guidance. It showed that the com-
mander was aware that the units tasks
require muscular endurance and
strength and cardiorespiratory fitness.
The guidance and objectives issued are
as follows:
a. Units will do PT five days a week
(0600-0700) when in garrison. In the
field, organized PT will beat the com-
manders discretion.
Captain Jones determined that the
major PT emphasis should be to im-
prove muscular endurance and strength.
He based this on his units mission,
training schedule, available resources,
and on his commanders guidance and
objectives. With this information and
the MITs recommendations, CPT Jones
developed the following fitness objec-
tives.
Improve the units overall level of
muscular endurance and strength.
Improve the units overall level of
flexibility.
Improve the units average APFT
score. Each soldier will score at
least 80 points on the push-up and
 sit-up events and 70 points on the
2-mile run.
Improve the units road marching
capability so that 100 percent of the
unit can complete a 12-mile road
march with a 35-pound load in at
least 3.5 hours.
Decrease the number of profiles.
Reduce tobacco use.
ASSESS THE UNIT
The next step CPT Jones accom-
plished was to assess his unit.
The MFT studied the results of the
units latest APFT and came up with
the following information:
The average push-up score was 68
points.
The average sit-up score was 72
points.
The average number of points scored
on the 2-mile run was 74.
There were six failures, two on the
2-mile run and four on the push-
up.
The MFT also recommended that
the unit be assessed in the following
areas: road march performance,
strength, flexibility, substance abuse,
and profiled soldiers.
Following the MFTs recommenda-
tions, subordinate leaders made the
following assessments/determinations:
Eighty-eight percent of the com-
pany finished the 12-mile road
march with a 35-pound load in
under 3 hours 30 minutes.
A formation toe-touch test revealed
that over half the company could
not touch their toes while their
knees were extended.
Thirty percent of the unit uses to-
bacco.
Two soldiers are in the overweight
program.
Eight percent of the unit is now on
temporary profile, most from back
problems.
DETERMINE TRAINING
REQUIREMENTS
The next step CPT Jones accom-
plished was to determine the training
requirements.
Training requirements are deter-
mined by analyzing the training results
and the data obtained from the unit as-
sessment. The next step is to compare
this data to the standards identified in
the training objectives. When per-
formance is less than the established
standard, the problem must be ad-
dressed and corrected.
Captain Jones established the fol-
lowing training requirements.
Units will do flexibility exercises
during the warm-up and cool-down
phase of every PT session. During the
cool-down, emphasis on will be placed
on developing flexibility in the low
back, hamstrings, and hip extensor
muscle groups.
Each soldier will do 8 to 12 repeti-
tions of bent-leg, sandbag dead-lifts at
least two times a week to develop
strength. The section leader will su-
pervise lifts.
Each soldier will do heavy resis-
tance/weight training for all the muscle
groups of the body two to three times
a week.
Each soldier will perform timed sets
of push-ups and sit-ups.
Each soldier will train at least 20 to
30 minutes at THR two to three times
a week.
Road marches will be conducted at
least once every other week.
Tobacco cessation classes will be es-
tablished to reduce the number of
tobacco users.
DESIGN FITNESS TASKS
Once all training requirements are
identified, the next step is to use them
to design fitness tasks which relate to
10-6
the fitness objectives. In developing
the fitness tasks, CPT Jones must
address collective, individual, and leader
tasks as well as resources required.
Fitness tasks provide the framework
for accomplishing the training require-
ments. By accurately listing the fitness
tasks that must be done and the re-
sources required to do them, the sub-
sequent step of developing a training
schedule is greatly facilitated.
An example of designing fitness
tasks is provided in Figure 10-3 by
using the activities which might occur
during one week of physical training.
The collective tasks for the unit are
to perform the following: develop
muscular endurance and strength, im-
prove CR endurance, and improve
flexibility.
The individual tasks all soldiers
must perform during the week are as
follows. For developing strength and
muscular endurance, they must per-
form appropriate strength circuit exer-
cises, PREs, sandbag circuits, to in-
clude performing bent-leg dead lifts
exercises, and training for push-up/
sit-up improvement. To improve
cardiorespiratory endurance, they must
Figure 10-3
10-7
do ability-group runs, interval train-
ing, road marching, and they must cal-
culate their THR and monitor THR
when appropriate. To improve their
flexibility, they must do stretching ex-
ercises during their daily warm-up
and cool-down.
The leaders tasks are to organize
and supervise all strength- and muscle
endurance-training sessions and CR
training sessions so as to best meet all
related fitness objectives. Similarly,
the leader must organize and supervise
all warm-up and cool-down sessions
to best meet the fitness objectives for
the development and maintenance of
flexibility.
To provide specific examples of
leaders tasks in the area of training for
strength and muscle endurance, the
leader will ensure the following:
Each strength- and/or muscle en-
durance-training session works all
the major muscle groups of the
body.
High priority is given to training
those muscles and muscle groups
used in mission-essential tasks.
Areas where weaknesses exist,
with respect to strength/muscle
endurance, are targeted in all work-
outs.
Problem areas related to APFT per-
formance are addressed in appro-
priate workouts.
The duration of each strength train-
ing session is 20-40 minutes.
Soldiers train to muscle failure.
All the principles of exercise, to
include regularity, overload, re-
covery, progression, specificity, bal-
ance are used.
In a similar manner, the leader
would ensure that the guidelines and
principles outlined in this and earlier
chapters are used to organize training
sessions for improving CR endurance
and flexibility.
The resources needed for the one-
week period are as follows: a strength
room, a gym, a PT field, a running
track and/or running trails, and sand-
bags.
DEVELOP A TRAINING SCHEDULE
The next step was to develop a
fitness training schedule (shown at
Figure 10-4). It lists the daily activi-
ties and their intensity and duration.
Figure 10-4
10-8
 Figure 10-4 (continued)

10-9
Figure 10-4 (continued)

10-10
Figure 10-4 (continued)

10-11
 CONDUCT AND EVALUATE
TRAINING
Conducting and evaluating training
is the final phase of the training
process. This phase includes the evalu-
ation of performance, assessment of
capabilities, and feedback portions of
the training management cycle. These
portions of the cycle must be simulta-
neous and continuous. To be effec-
tive, the evaluation process must ad-
dress why weaknesses exist, and it
must identify corrective actions to be
taken. Evaluations should address the
following:
Assessment of proficiency in mis-
sion-essential tasks.
Status of training goals and objec-
tives.
Status of training in critical indi-
vidual and collective tasks.
Shortfalls in training.
Recommendations for next training
cycle (key in on correcting weak-
nesses).
Results of educational programs.
Using the Principles of
Exercise
As CPT Jones developed his pro-
gram, he made sure he used the seven
principles of exercise. He justified his
program as follows:
Balance. This program is balanced
because all the fitness components
are addressed. The emphasis is on
building muscular endurance and
strength in the skeletal muscular
system because of the many lifting
tasks the unit must do. The pro-
gram also trains cardiorespiratory
endurance and flexibility, and warm-
up and cool-down periods are in-
cluded in every workout.
Specificity. The units fitness goals
are met. The sand-bag lifting and
weight training programs help
develop muscular endurance and
strength. The movements should,
when possible, stress muscle groups
used in their job-related lifting tasks.
Developmental stretching should help
reduce work-related back injuries. The
different types of training in running
will help ensure that soldiers reach a
satisfactory level of CR fitness and
help each soldier score at least 70
points on the APFTs 2-mile run.
Soldiers do push-ups and sit-ups at
least two or three times a week to
improve the units performance in
these events. The competitive fitness
activities will help foster teamwork
and cohesion, both of which are essen-
tial to each sections functions.
Overload. Soldiers reach overload
in the weight circuit by doing each
exercise with an 8- to 12-RM lift
for a set time and/or until they
reach temporary muscle failure. For
the cardiorespiratory workout, THR
is calculated initially using 70 per-
cent of the HRR. They do push-ups
and sit-ups in multiple, timed sets
with short recovery periods to en-
sure that muscle failure is reached.
They also do PREs to muscle fail-
ure.
Progression. To help soldiers reach
adequate overload as they improve,
the program is made gradually more
difficult. Soldiers progress in their
CR workout by increasing the time
they spend at THR up to 30 to 45
minutes per session and by main-
taining THR. They progress on the
weight training circuit individually.
When a soldier can do an exercise
for a set time without reaching
muscle failure, the weight is in-
creased so that the soldier reaches
muscle failure between the 8th and
12th repetition again. Progression
in push-ups and sit-ups involves
slowly increasing the duration of
the work intervals.
Variety. There are many different
activities for variety. For strength
and muscular endurance training
the soldiers use weight circuits,
sandbag circuits, and PREs. Ability
group runs, intervals, Par courses,
10-12
Fartlek running, and guerrilla drills are
all used for CR training. Varied
stretching techniques, including static,
partner-assisted, and contract-relax,
are used for developmental stretching.
Regularity. Each component of
fitness is worked regularly. Soldiers
will spend at least two to three days
a week working each of the major
fitness components. They will also
do push-ups and sit-ups regularly to
help reach their peak performance
on the APFT.
Recovery. The muscular and cardi-
orespiratory systems are stressed in
alternate workouts. This allows one
10-13
system to recover on the day the
other is working hard.
Conclusion
CPT Joness step-by-step process
of developing a sound PT program for
his unit is an example of what each
commander should do in developing
his own unit program.
Good physical training takes no
more time to plan and execute than
does poor training. When commanders
use a systematic approach to develop
training, the planning process bears
sound results and the training will
succeed.

Soldiers report to initial entry train-
ing (IET) ranging widely in their levels
of physical fitness. Because of this,
there are special considerations when
designing a physical training program
for IET soldiers. Physical training
involves safely training and challeng-
ing all soldiers while improving their
fitness level to meet required stan-
dards. The regulations which govern
the conduct of physical training in IET
and explain the graduation require-
ments are TRADOC Reg. 350-6 and
AR 350-15.
The mission of physical training in
IET is twofold: to safely train soldiers
to meet the graduation requirements
of each course and to prepare soldiers
to meet the physical demands of their
future assignments.
Program Development
All physical training programs in
IET must do the following: 1 ) progres-
sively condition and toughen soldiers
for military duties; 2) develop soldiers
self-confidence, discipline, and team
spirit; 3) develop healthy life-styles
through education; and, 4) improve
physical fitness to the highest levels
possible in all five components of
physical fitness (cardiorespiratory
endurance, muscular strength, muscu-
lar endurance, flexibility, and body
composition).
Because each IET school is some-
what different, commanders must
examine the graduation requirements
for the course and establish appropri-
ate fitness objectives. They can then
design a program that attains these ob-
jectives. The seven principles of
exercise outlined in Chapter 1 are
universal, and they apply to all PT
programs including those in IET.
Commanders of initial entry training
should look beyond the graduation
requirements of their own training
course to ensure that their soldiers are
prepared for the physical challenges
of their future assignments. This
means developing safe training pro-
grams which will produce the maxi-
mum physical improvement possible.
MFTs are skilled at assessing sol-
diers capabilities. They use the five
components of physical fitness in de-
signing programs to reach the training
objectives established by the com-
mander. They also know how to
conduct exercise programs that are
effective and safe. MFTs are not,
however, trained to diagnose or treat
injuries.
The commanders latitude in pro-
gram development varies with the
length and type of the IET course.
For example, commanders of basic
combat training (BCT) may do a
standard PT program at one installa-
tion, while AIT commanders may
design their own programs. Regard-
less of the type of course, all leaders
must strive to train their soldiers to
attain the highest level of physical
fitness possible. This means using the
established principles of exercise to
develop a safe physical training pro-
gram.
Safety Considerations
Overuse injuries are common in
IET. However, they can be avoided by
carefully following the exercise prin-
ciples of recovery and progression.
Research suggests that soldiers are
more prone to injuries of the lower
extremities after the third week of
IET. High-impact activities, such as
road marching and running on hard
surfaces, should be carefully moni-
tored during at this time. During this
period, fixed circuits and other activi-
ties that develop CR fitness are good,
low-impact alternatives.
Properly fitted, high-quality run-
ning shoes are important, especially
when PT sessions require running
on hard surfaces. Court shoes, like
basketball or tennis shoes, are not
11-0
designed to absorb the repetitive shock
of running. Activities such as running
obstacle courses and road marching
require combat boots to protect and
support the feet and ankles. Naturally,
common sense dictates a reasonable
break-in period for new combat boots,
especially before long marches.
Examples of recommended PT ses-
sions and low-risk exercises are in
Chapter 7. Specific health and safety
considerations are in TRADOC Reg.
350-6, paragraph 4-2.
Road Marching
One road march should be con-
ducted weekly with the difficulty of
the marches progressing gradually
throughout IET.
In the first two weeks of IET,
soldiers can be expected to road march
Figure 11-1
11-1
up to 5 kilometers with light loads.
Loads should be restricted to the
standard LCE, kevlar helmet, and
weapon. Bones, ligaments, and ten-
dons respond slowly to training and
may be injured if the load and/or
duration are increased too quickly.
After the initial adaptations in the
early weeks of IET, soldiers can be
expected to carry progressively heav-
ier loads including a rucksack. By he
start of the fourth week, they should
be accustomed to marching in boots,
and their feet should be less prone to
blistering. By the sixth week, the load
may be increased to 40 pounds includ-
ing personal clothing and equipment.
At no time during IET or one-station
unit training (OSUT) should loads ex-
ceed 40 pounds.
A sample regimen for road marches
during IET is at Figure 11-1.

In todays Army, soldiers may deploy
anywhere in the world. They may go
into the tropical heat of Central
America, the deserts of the Middle
East, the frozen tundra of Alaska, or
the rolling hills of Western Europe.
Each environment presents unique
problems concerning soldiers physical
performance. Furthermore, physical
exertion in extreme environments can
be life-threatening. While recogniz-
ing such problems is important, pre-
venting them is even more important.
This requires an understanding of the
environmental factors which affect
physical performance and how the
body responds to those factors.
Temperature Regulation
The body constantly produces heat,
especially during exercise. To main-
tain a constant normal temperature, it
must pass this heat on to the environ-
ment. Life-threatening circumstances
can develop if the body becomes too
hot or too cold. Body temperature
must be maintained within fairly nar-
row limits, usually between 74 and 110
degrees Fahrenheit. However, hy-
pothermia and heat injuries can occur
within much narrower limits. There-
fore, extreme temperatures can have a
devastating effect on the bodys ability
to control its temperature.
Overheating is a serious threat to
health and physical performance.
During exercise, the body can produce
heat at a rate 10 to 20 times greater
than during rest. To survive, it must
get rid of the excess heat.
The four ways in which the body
can gain or lose heat are the following:
Conduction-the transfre of heat
from a warm object to a cool one
that is touching it. (Warming boots
by putting them on is an example.)
Convection-the transfer of heat by
circulation or movement
of air. (Using a fan on a hot day is
an example.)
Radiation-the transfer of heat by
electromagnetic waves. (Sitting un-
der a heat lamp is an example.)
Evaporation- the transfer of heat
by changing a liquid into a gas.
(Evaporating sweat cooling the skin
is an example.)
Heat moves from warm to cool
areas. During exercise, when the body
is extremely warm, heat can be lost by
a combination of the four methods.
Sweating, however, is the bodys most
important means for heat loss, espe-
cially during exercise. Any condition
that slows or blocks the transfer of heat
from the body by evaporation causes
heat storage which results in an in-
crease in body temperature.
The degree to which evaporative
cooling occurs is also directly related to
the airs relative humidity (a measure
of the amount of water vapor in the
air). When the relative humidity is 100
percent, the air is completely saturated
at its temperature. No more water can
evaporate into the surrounding air. As
a result, sweat does not evaporate, no
cooling effect takes place, and the
body temperature increases. This causes
even more sweating. During exercise
in the heat, sweat rates of up to two
quarts per hour are not uncommon.
12-0
 If the lost fluids are not replaced, de-
hydration can occur. This condition,
in turn, can result in severe heat
injuries.
Thus, in hot, humid conditions when
a soldiers sweat cannot evaporate,
there is no cooling effect through the
process of evaporation. High relative
humidities combined with high tem-
peratures can cause serious problems.
Weather of this type occurs in the
tropics and equatorial regions such as
Central America and southern Asia.
These are places where soldiers have
been or could be deployed.
Heat Injuries and Symptoms
The following are common types of
heat injuries and their symptoms.
Heat cramps-muscles cramps of the
abdomen, legs, or arms.
Heat exhaustion-headache, exces-
sive sweating, dizziness, nausea,
clammy skin.
Heat stroke-hot, dry skin, cessa-
tion of sweating, rapid pulse, men-
tal confusion, unconsciousness.
Adapting to differing
environmental conditions To prevent heat injuries while exer-
cising, trainers must adjust the inten-
is called acclimatization. sity to fit the temperature and humid-
ity. They must ensure that soldiers
drink enough water before and during
the exercise session. Body weight is a
good gauge of hydration. If rapid
weight loss occurs, dehydration should
be suspected. Plain water is the best
replacement fluid to use. Highly con-
centrated liquids such as soft drinks
and those with a high sugar content
may hurt the soldiers performance
because they slow the absorption of
water from the stomach.
12-1
To prevent heat injuries, the fol-
lowing hydration guidelines should be
used:
Type of drink: cool water (45 to 55
degrees F).
Before the activity: drink 13 to 20
ounces at least 30 minutes before.
During the activity: drink 3 to 6
ounces at 15 to 30 minute intervals.
After the activity: drink to satisfy
thirst, then drink a little more.
Acclimatization to Hot, Humid
Environments
Adapting to differing environmental
conditions is called acclimatization.
Soldiers who are newly introduced to
a hot, humid climate and are moder-
ately active in it can acclimatize in 8 to
14 days. Soldiers who are sedentary
take much longer. Until they are ac-
climatized, soldiers are much more
likely to develop heat injuries.
A soldiers ability to perform ef-
fectively in hot, humid conditions
depends on both his acclimatization
and level of fitness. The degree of
heat stress directly depends on the
relative workload. When two soldiers
do the same task, the heat stress is less
for the soldier who is in better physical
condition, and his performance is likely
to be better. Therefore, it is important
to maintain high levels of fitness.
Increased temperatures and humid-
ity cause increased heart rates. Con-
sequently, it takes much less effort to
elevate the heart rate into the training
zone, but the training effect is the
same. These facts underscore the need
to use combat-development running
and to monitor heart rates when run-
ning, especially in hot, humid condi-
tions.
Some important changes occur as a
result of acclimatization to a hot cli-
mate. The following physical adapta-
tions help the body cope with a hot
environment
Sweating occurs at a lower body
temperature.
Sweat production is increased.
Blood volume is increased.
Heart rate is less at any given work
rate.
Exercising in Cold
Environments
Contrary to popular belief, there are
few real dangers in exercising at tem-
peratures well below freezing. Since
the body produces large amounts of
heat during exercise, it has little trouble
maintaining a normal temperature.
There is no danger of freezing the
lungs. However, without proper pre-
cautions, hypothermia, frostbite, and
dehydration can occur.
GUIDELINES FOR DRESSING FOR EXERCISE IN THE COLD
Clothing for cold weather should protect,
insulate, and ventilate.
Protect by covering as large an area of
the body as possible.
Insulation will occur by trapping air
which has been warmed by the body
and holding it near the skin.
Ventilate by allowing a two-way
exchange of air through the various
layers of clothing.
Clothing should leave your body slightly
cool rather than hot.
Clothing should also be loose enough to
allow movement.
Clothing soaked with perspiration should
be removed if reasonably possible.
HYPOTHERMIA
If the bodys core temperature drops
below normal, its ability to regulate its
temperature can become impaired or
lost. This condition is called hypother-
mia. It develops because the body
cannot produce heat as fast as it is losing
it. This can lead to death. The chance
of a soldier becoming hypothermic is a
major threat any time he is exposed to
the cold.
Some symptoms of hypothermia are
shivering, loss of judgment, slurred Hypothermia develops
speech, drowsiness, and muscle weak- when the body cannot
ness. produce heat as fast as
During exercise in the cold, people it is losing it.
usually produce enough heat to maintain
normal body temperature. As they get
fatigued, however, they slow down and
their bodies produce less heat. Also,
people often overdress for exercise in
the cold. This makes the body sweat.
The sweat dampens the clothing next to
the skin making it a good conductor of
heat. The combination of decreased heat
production and increased heat loss can
cause a rapid onset of hypothermia.
Some guidelines for dressing for cold
weather exercise are shown in Figure
12-1.
40% HEAT LOSS THROUGH HEAD J:q(([l
AND NECK WHEN UNCOVERED t i= $
LIGHIWEIGHT
WARM-UPS
(NOT WATERPROOF)
\
/
/
i l l
FEET SHOULD
BE KEPT DRY J ! ! ! !
Figure 12-1
12-2
 FROSTBITE
Frostbite is the freezing of body
tissue. It commonly occurs in body
parts located away from the core and
exposed to the cold such as the nose,
ears, feet, hands, and skin. Severe
cases of frostbite may require amputa-
tion.
Factors which lead to frostbite are
cold temperatures combined with windy
conditions. The wind has a great
cooling effect because it causes rapid
convective heat transfer from the body.
For a given temperature, the higher the
wind speed, the greater the cooling
effect. Figure 12-2 shows how the
wind can affect cooling by providing
information on windchill factors.
A persons movement through the
air creates an effect similar to that
caused by wind. Riding a bicycle at 15
Figure 12-2
12-3
mph is the same as standing in a 15-
mph wind. If, in addition, there is a
5-mph headwind, the overall effect is
equivalent to a 20-mph wind. There-
fore, an exercising soldier must be
very cautious to avoid getting frost-
bite. Covering exposed parts of the
body will substantially reduce the
risks.
DEHYDRATION
Dehydration can result from losing
body fluids faster than they are re-
placed. Cold environments are often
dry, and water may be limited. As a
result, soldiers may in time become
dehydrated. While operating in ex-
tremely cold climates, trainers should
check the body weights of the soldiers
regularly and encourage them to drink
liquids whenever possible.
 Acclimatization to High
Altitudes
Elevations below 5,000 feet have
little noticeable effect on healthy people.
However, at higher elevations the
atmospheric pressure is reduced, and
the body tissues get less oxygen. This
means that soldiers cannot work or
exercise as well at high altitudes. The
limiting effects of high elevation are
often most pronounced in older sol-
diers and persons with low levels of
fitness.
Due to acclimatization, the longer a
soldier remains at high altitude, the
better his performance becomes.
Generally, however, he will not per-
form as well as at sea level and should
not be expected to. For normal activi-
ties, the time required to acclimatize
depends largely on the altitude. In
order to insure that soldiers who are
newly assigned to altitudes above 5,000
feet are not at a disadvantage, it is
recommended that 30 days of acclima-
tization, including regular physical
activity, be permitted before they are
administered a record APFT.
Before acclimatization is complete,
people at high altitudes may suffer
acute mountain sickness. This in-
cludes such symptoms as headache,
rapid pulse, nausea, loss of appetite,
and an inability to sleep. The primary
treatment is further acclimatization or
returning to a lower altitude.
Once soldiers are acclimatized to
altitudes above 5,000 feet, deacclima-
tization will occur if they spend 14 or
more days at lower altitudes. For this
reason, soldiers should be permitted
twice the length of their absence, not
to exceed 30 days, to reacclimatize
before being required to take a record
APFT. A period of 30 days is adequate
for any given reacclimatization.
Air Pollution and Exercise
Pollutants are substances in the en-
vironment which lower the environ-
ments quality. Originally, air pollut-
ants were thought to be only by-
products of the industrial revolution.
However, many pollutants are pro-
duced naturally. For example, volca-
noes emit sulfur oxides and ash, and
lightning produces ozone.
There are two classifications of air
pollutants - primary and secondary.
Primary pollutants are produced di-
rectly by industrial sources. These
include carbon monoxide (CO), sulfur
oxides (SO), hydrocarbons, and par-
ticulate (ash). Secondary pollutants
are created by the primary pollutants
interaction with the environment. Ex-
amples of these include ozone (03),
aldehydes, and sulfates. Smog is a
combination of primary and secondary
pollutants.
Some pollutants have negative ef-
fects on the body. For example, car-
bon monoxide binds to hemoglobin in
the red blood cells and reduces the
amount of oxygen carried in the blood. Pollutants can irritate
Ozone and the oxides irritate the air the respiratory tract
passageways in the lungs, while other and make the person
less able to perform
pollutants irritate the eyes.
When exercisers in high-pollution aerobically.
areas breathe through the mouth, the
nasal mucosas ability to remove impu-
rities is bypassed, and many pollutants
can be inhaled. This irritates the
respiratory tract and makes the person
less able to perform aerobically.
The following are some ways to deal
with air pollution while exercising:
Avoid exposure to pollutants before
and during exercise, if possible.
In areas of high ozone concentra-
tion, train early in the day and after
dark.
Avoid exercising near heavily trav-
eled streets and highways during
rush hours.
Consult your supporting preven-
tive-medicine activity for advice
in identifying or defining training
restrictions during periods of heavy
air pollution.
12-4
 Injuries are not an uncommon oc-
currence during intense physical train-
ing. It is, nonetheless, a primary
responsibility of all leaders to mini-
mize the risk of injury to soldiers.
Safety is always a major concern.
Most injuries can be prevented by
designing a well-balanced PT program
that does not overstress any body parts,
allows enough time for recovery, and
includes a warm-up and cool-down.
Using strengthening exercises and soft,
Most injuries can be level surfaces for stretching and run-
prevented by designing ning also helps prevent injuries. If,
a well-balanced PT however, injuries do occur, they should
program. be recognized and properly treated in
a timely fashion. If a soldier suspects
that he is injured, he should stop what
he is doing, report the injury, and seek
medical help.
Many common injuries are caused
by overuse, that is, soldiers often
exercise too much and too often and
with too rapid an increase in the work-
load. Most overuse injuries can be
treated with rest, ice, compression, and
elevation (RICE). Following any re-
quired first aid, health-care personnel
should evaluate the injured soldier.
Typical Injuries Associated
with Physical Training
Common injuries associated with
exercise are the following:
Abrasion (strawberry) - the rubbing
off of skin by friction.
Dislocation - the displacement of
one or more bones of a joint from
their natural positions.
Hot spot - a hot or irritated feeling
of the skin which occurs just before
a blister forms. These can be pre-
vented by using petroleum jelly
over friction-prone areas.
Blister - a raised spot on the skin
filled with liquid. These can gener-
ally be avoided by applying lubri-
cants such as petroleum jelly to
areas of friction, keeping footwear
13-1
(socks, shoes, boots) in good repair,
and wearing the proper size of
boot or shoe.
Shinsplints - a painful injury to the
soft tissues and bone in the shin
area. These are generally caused
by wearing shoes with inflexible
soles or inadequate shock absorp-
tion, running on the toes or on hard
surfaces, and/or having calf muscles
with a limited range of motion.
Sprain - a stretching or tearing of
the ligament(s) at a joint.
Muscle spasm (muscle cramp) - a
sudden, involuntary contraction of
one or more muscles.
Contusion - a bruise with bleeding
into the muscle tissue.
Strain - a stretching or tearing of
the muscles.
Bursitis - an inflammation of the
bursa (a sack-like structure where
tendons pass over bones). This
occurs at a joint and produces pain
when the joint is moved or touched.
Sometimes swelling occurs.
Tendinitis - an inflammation of a
tendon that produces pain when the
attached muscle contracts. Swelling
may not occur.
Stress fractures of the feet.
Tibial stress fractures - overuse
injuries which seem like shinsplints
except that the pain is in a specific
area.
Knee injuries - caused by running
on uneven surfaces or with worn
out shoes, overuse, and improper
body alignment. Soldiers who have
problems with their knees can bene-
fit from doing leg exercises
that strengthen the front (quadri-
ceps) and rear (hamstrings) thigh
muscles.
Low back problems - caused by
poor running, sitting, or lifting
techniques, and by failing to stretch
the back and hip-flexor muscles
and to strengthen the abdominal
muscles.
The most common running injuries
occur in the feet, ankles, knees, and
 legs. Although they are hard to
eliminate, much can be done to keep
them to a minimum. Preventive meas-
ures include proper warm-up and cool-
down along with stretching exercises.
Failure to allow recovery between hard
bouts of running can lead to overtrain-
ing and can also be a major cause of in-
juries. A well-conditioned soldier can
run five to six times a week. However,
to do this safely, he should do two
things: gradually build up to running
that frequently and vary the intensity
of the running sessions to allow recov-
ery between them.
Many running injuries can be pre-
vented by wearing proper footwear.
Soldiers should train in running shoes.
These are available in a wide range of
prices and styles. They should fit
properly and have flexible, multi-
layered soles with good arch and heel
support. Shoes made with leather and
nylon uppers are usually the most
comfortable. See Appendix E for more
information on running shoes.
Since injuries can also be caused by
running on hard surfaces, soldiers
should, if possible, avoid running on
concrete. Soft, even surfaces are best
for injury prevention. Whenever pos-
sible, soldiers should run on grass
paths, dirt paths, or park trails. How-
ever, with adequate footwear and re-
covery periods, running on roads and
other hard surfaces should pose no
problem.
Common running injuries include
the following:
Black toenails.
Ingrown toenails.
Stress fractures of the feet.
Ankle sprains and fractures.
Achilles tendinitis (caused by im-
proper stretching and shoes that do
not fit.
Upper leg and groin injuries (which
can usually be prevented by using
good technique in stretching and
doing strengthening exercises).
Tibial stress fractures, knee inju-
ries, low back problems, shinsplints,
and blisters, which were mentioned
earlier, are also injuries which com-
monly occur in runners.
Other Factors
Proper clothing can also help pre-
vent injuries. Clothes used for physi-
cal activity should be comfortable and Many running injuries
can be prevented by
fit loosely. A T-shirt or sleeveless
wearing proper
undershirt and gym shorts are best in footwear.
warm weather. In cold weather, cloth-
ing may be layered according to per-
sonal preference. For example, sol-
diers can wear a BDU, sweat suit,
jogging suit, or even Army-issued
long underwear. In very cold weather,
soldiers may need gloves or mittens
and ear-protecting caps. Rubberized
or plastic suits should never be worn
during exercise. They cause excessive
sweating which can lead to dehydra-
tion and a dangerous increase in body
temperature.
Army Regulation 385-55 (para-
graph B- 12, C) prohibits the use of
headphones or earphones while walk-
ing, jogging, skating, or bicycling on
the roads and streets of military instal-
lations. However, they may be worn
on tracks and running trails.
Road safety equipment is required
on administative-type walks, marches,
or runs which cross highways, roads,
or tank trails or which are conducted
on traffic ways. If there is reduced
visibility, control personnel must use
added caution to ensure the safety of
their soldiers.
13-2
 All soldiers in the Active Army,
Army National Guard, and Army
Reserve must take the Army Physical
Fitness Test (APFT) regardless of their
age. The APFT is a three-event
physical performance test used to as-
sess muscular endurance and cardi-
orespiratory (CR) fitness. It is a simple
way to measure a soldiers ability to ef-
The APFT is a three- fectively move his body by using his
event physical major muscle groups and CR system.
performance test used to Performance on the APFT is strongly
assess muscular linked to the soldiers fitness level and
endurance and his ability to do fitness-related tasks.
cardiorespiratory An APFT with alternate test events is
(CR) fitness . given to soldiers with permanent pro-
files and with temporary profiles greater
than three months duration.
While the APFT testing is an impor-
tant tool in determining the physical
readiness of individual soldiers and
units, it should not be the sole basis for
the units physical fitness training.
Commanders at every level must en-
sure that fitness training is designed to
develop physical abilities in a balanced
way, not just to help soldiers do well on
the APFT.
Commanders should use their units
APFT results to evaluate its physical
fitness level. APFT results may indi-
cate a need to modify the fitness
programs to attain higher fitness levels.
Performance on the However, mission-essential tasks, not
APFT is strongly linked
the APFT, should drive physical train-
to the soldier's fitness ing.
level and his ability to
Additional physical performance tests
do fitness-related tasks. and standards which serve as prerequi-
sites for Airborne/Ranger/Special
Forces/SCUBA qualification are pro-
vided in DA Pam 351-4.
Methods of Evaluation
Commanders are responsible for
ensuring that their soldiers are physi-
cally fit (AR 350- 15). There are
several ways they can assess fitness
including the following
Testing. This is an efficient way
to evaluate both the individuals
14-1
and the units physical performance
levels.
Inspection. This evaluates training
procedures and indicates the sound
ness of the units physical fitness
program.
Observation. This is an ongoing
way to review training but is not as
reliable as testing as an indicator of
the units level of fitness.
Medical examination. This detects
individual disabilities, health-re-
related problems, and physical prob-
lems.
Over-Forty Cardiovascular
Screening Program
The Armys over-40 cardiovascular
screening program (CVSP) does the
following:
Identifies soldiers with a risk of
coronary heart disease.
Provides guidelines for safe, regu-
lar CR exercise.
Gives advice and help in control-
ling heart-disease risk factors.
Uses treadmill testing only for high-
risk soldiers who need it. -
All soldiers, both active and reserve
component, must take the APFT for
record regardless of age unless prohib-
ited by a medical profile. For soldiers
who reached age 40 on or after 1
January 1989, there is no requirement
for clearance in the cardiovascular
screening program before taking a
record APFT. Soldiers who reached
age 40 before 1 January 1989 must be
cleared through the cardiovascular
screening program before taking a
record APFT. Prior to their CVSP
evaluation, however, they may still
take part in physical training to in-
clude diagnostic APFTs unless pro-
filed or contraindications to exercise
exist. All soldiers must undergo peri-
odic physical examinations in accor-
dance with AR 40-501 and NGR 40-
501. These include screening for
cardiovascular risk factors.
 Overview
As stated, APFT events assess mus-
cular endurance and CR fitness. The
lowest passing APFT standards reflect
the minimum acceptable fitness level
for all soldiers, regardless of MOS or
component. When applied to a com -
mand, APFT results show a units
overall level of physical fitness. How-
ever, they are not all-inclusive, overall
measures of physical-combat readi-
ness. To assess this, other physical
capabilities must be measured. The
APFT does, however, give a com-
mander a sound measurement of the
general fitness level of his unit.
Service schools, agencies, and units
may set performance goals which are
above the minimum APFT standards in
accordance with their missions (AR
350- 15). Individual soldiers are also
encouraged to set for themselves a
series of successively higher APFT
performance goals. They should al-
ways strive to improve themselves
physically and never be content with
meeting minimum standards. Compe-
tition on the APFT among soldiers or
units can also be used to motivate them
to improve their fitness levels.
Testing is not a substitute for a
regular, balanced exercise program.
Diagnostic testing is important in moni-
toring training progress but, when
done too often, may decrease motiva-
tion and waste training time.
The test period is defined as t h e
period of time which elapses from
starting to finishing the three events. It
must not take more than two hours.
Soldiers must do all three events in the
same test period.
Test Administration
The APFT must be administered
properly and to standard in order to
accurately evaluate a soldiers physical
fitness and to be fair to all soldiers.
(Test results are used for personnel
actions.)
Individual soldiers are not author-
ized to administer the APFT to them-
selves for the purpose of satisfying a
units diagnostic or record APFT re-
quirement.
REQUIRED EQUIPMENT
The OIC or NCOIC at the test site
must have a copy of FM 21-20 on
hand. The supervisor of each event
must have the event instructions and
standards. Scorers should have a
clipboard and an ink pen to record the
results on the soldiers scorecards.
Two stopwatches are needed. They
must be able to measure time in both
minutes and seconds.
Runners must wear numbers or
some other form of identification for
the 2-mile run. The numbers may be
stenciled or pinned onto pullover vests
or sleeveless, mesh pullovers or at-
tached to the runners themselves.
Soldiers should wear clothing that is
appropriate for PT such as shorts, T-
shirts, socks, and running shoes (not
tennis shoes). They should not wear
basketball shoes or other types of court
shoes. BDUs may be worn but may be
a hindrance on some events.
Anything that gives a soldier an
unfair advantage is not permitted during
the APFT. Wearing devices such as
weight belts or elastic bandages may or
may not provide an advantage. How-
ever, for standardization, such addi-
tional equipment is not authorized
unless prescribed by medical person-
nel. The only exception is gloves.
They may be worn in cold weather
when approved by the local com-
mander.
Each soldier needs a DA Form 705,
Army Physical Fitness Test Scorecard.
The soldier fills in his name, social
security number, grade, age, and sex.
14-2
(See Figure 14- 1.) The unit will com-
plete the height and weight data.
Scorers record the raw score for
each event and initial the results. If
a soldier fails an event or finds it
difficult to perform, the scorer should
write down the reasons and other
Figure 14-1
14-3
pertinent information in the comment
block. After the entire APFT has been
completed, the event scorer will con-
vert raw scores to point scores using
the scoring standards on the back of
the scorecards. (See Figure 14- 1.)
Figure 14-1 (continued)

14-4
Figure 14-1 (continued)

14-5
Figure 14-1 (continued)
14-6
Figure 14-1 (continued)
14-7
 SUPERVISION
The APFT must be properly super-
vised to ensure that its objectives are
met. Proper supervision ensures uni-
formity in the following:
Scoring the test.
Training of supervisors and scorers.
Preparing the test and controlling
performance factors.
The goal of the APFT is to get an
accurate evaluation of the soldiers
fitness levels. Preparations for ad-
ministering an accurate APFT include
the following:
Selecting and training supervisors
and scorers.
Briefing and orienting administra-
tors and participants.
Securing a location for the events.
Commanders must strictly control
those factors which influence test
performance. They must ensure that
events, scoring, clothing, and equip-
ment are uniform. Commanders should
plan testing which permits each soldier
to perform to his maximal level. They
should also ensure the following:
Soldiers are not tested when fa-
tigued or ill.
Soldiers do not have tiring duties
just before taking the APFT.
Weather and environmental condi-
tions do not inhibit performance.
Safety is the first consideration.
Duties of Test Personnel
Testers must be totally familiar
with the instructions for each event
and trained to administer the tests.
Correctly supervising testees and lay-
ing out the test area are essential
duties. The group administering the
test must include the following:
OIC or NCOIC.
Event supervisor, scorers, and a
demonstrator for each event.
Support personnel (safety, control,
and medical, as appropriate). There
should be no less than one scorer for
each 15 soldiers tested. Twelve to
15 scorers are required when a com-
pany-sized unit is tested.
OIC OR NCOIC
The OIC or NCOIC does the follow-
ing:
Administers the APFT. The goal of the APFT
Procures all necessary equipment
is to get an accurate
and supplies. evaluation of the
Arranges and lays out the test area.
soldiers fitness levels.
Trains the event supervisors, scor-
ers, and demonstrators.
(Training video tape No. 21-191
should be used for training those
who administer the APFT.)
Ensures the test is properly admini-
stered and the events are explained,
demonstrated, and scored accord-
ing to the test standards in this
chapter.
Reports the results after the test.
EVENT SUPERVISORS
Event supervisors do the following:
Administer the test events.
Ensure that necessary equipment is
on hand.
Read the test instructions, and have
the events demonstrated.
Supervise the scoring of events, and
ensure that they are done correctly.
Rule on questions and scoring dis-
crepancies for their event.
SCORERS
Scorers do the following:
Supervise the performance of testees.
Enforce the test standards in this
chapter.
Count the number of correctly per-
performed repetitions aloud.
Record the correct, raw score on
each soldiers scorecard, and initial
the scorecard block.
Perform other duties assigned by
the OIC or NCOIC.
Scorers must be thoroughly trained
to maintain uniform scoring stan-
dards. They do not participate in
the test.
14-8
 SUPPORT PERSONNEL
Safety and control people should be
at the test site, depending on local
policy and conditions. Medical per-
sonnel may also be there. However,
they do not have to be on site to have
the APFT conducted. At a minimum,
the OIC or NCOIC should have a plan,
known to all test personnel, for getting
medical help if needed.
Test Site
The test site should be fairly flat and
free of debris. It should have the fol-
lowing:
An area for stretching and warming
up.
A soft, flat, dry area for perform-
ing push-ups and sit-ups.
Figure 14-2
14-9
A flat, 2-mile running course with
a solid surface and no more than a
three-percent grade. (Commanders
must use good judgement; no one is
expected to survey terrain.)
No significant hazards, (for ex-
ample, traffic, slippery road sur-
faces, heavy pollution).
When necessary or expedient, a
quarter-mile running track can be
used. It can be marked with a series of
stakes along the inside edge. When the
track is laid out, a horizontal midline
279 feet, 9 3/4 inches long must be
marked in the center of a clear area. A
120-foot circle is marked at both ends
of this line. The track is formed when
the outermost points of the two circles
are connected with tangent lines. (See
Figure 14-2.)
 A 400-meter track may be used in
place of the standard quarter-mile
(440-yard) track for the 2-mile run,
However, one lap run on a 400-meter
track is 92 inches shorter than one lap
on a 440-yard track. Eight laps on a
400-meter track is 736 inches shorter
than eight laps (2 miles) on a 440-yard
track. Therefore, soldiers who run the
2-mile event on a 400-meter track
must run eight laps plus an additional
61 feet, 4 inches.
Test Procedures
On test day, soldiers are assembled
in a common area and briefed by the
test OIC or NCOIC about the purpose
and organization of the test. The OIC
or NCOIC then explains the scorecard,
scoring standards, and sequence of
events.
The instructions printed here in
large type must be read to the soldiers:
YOU ARE ABOUT TO TAKE THE
ARMY PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST,
A TEST THAT WILL MEASURE
YOUR MUSCULAR ENDURANCE
AND CARDIORESPIRATORY FIT-
NESS. THE RESULTS OF THIS
TEST WILL GIVE YOU AND YOUR
COMMANDERS AN INDICATION
OF YOUR STATE OF FITNESS AND
WILL ACT AS A GUIDE IN DETER-
MINING YOUR PHYSICAL TRAIN-
ING NEEDS. LISTEN CLOSELY TO
THE TEST INSTRUCTIONS, AND
DO THE BEST YOU CAN ON EACH
OF THE EVENTS.
If scorecards have not already been
issued, they are handed out at this
time. The OIC or NCOIC then says the
following: IN THE APPROPRIATE
SPACES, PRINT IN INK THE PER-
SONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED
ON THE SCORECARD. (If score-
cards have been issued to the soldiers
and filled out before they arrive at the
test site, this remark is omitted.)
The OIC or NCOIC pauses briefly to
give the soldiers time to check the
information. He then says the follow-
ing: YOU ARE TO CARRY THIS
CARD WITH YOU TO EACH EVENT.
BEFORE YOU BEGIN, HAND THE
CARD TO THE SCORER. AFTER
YOU COMPLETE THE EVENT, THE
SCORER WILL RECORD YOUR RAW
SCORE, INITIAL THE CARD, AND
RETURN IT TO YOU. (At this
point, the scoring tables are explained
so everyone understands how raw scores
are converted to point scores.) Next,
the OIC or NCOIC says the following
EACH OF YOU WILL BE ASSIGNED
TO A GROUP. STAY WITH YOUR
TEST GROUP FOR THE ENTIRE
TEST, WHAT ARE YOUR QUES-
TIONS ABOUT THE TEST AT THIS
POINT?
Groups are organized as required
and given final instructions including
what to do after the final event. The
test is then given.
RETAKING OF EVENTS
Soldiers who start an event incor-
rectly must be stopped by the scorer
before they complete 10 repetitions
and told what their errors are. They
are then sent to the end of the line to
await their turn to retake the event.
A soldier who has problems such as
muscle cramps while performing an
event may rest if he does not assume an
illegal position in the process. If he
continues, he receives credit for all
correctly done repetitions within the
two-minute period. If he does not
continue, he gets credit for the number
of correct repetitions he has performed
up to that time. If he has not done 10
correct repetitions, he is sent to the end
of the line to retake that event. He may
not retake the event if he has exceeded
10 repetitions. Soldiers who are unable
to perform 10 correct repetitions be-
cause of low fitness levels may not
retake an event.
14-10
 TEST FAILURES
Soldiers who stop to rest in an au-
thorized rest position continue to re-
ceive credit for correct repetitions per-
formed after their rest. Soldiers who
rest in an unauthorized rest position
will have their performance in that
event immediately terminated.
The records of soldiers who fail a
record APFT for the first time and
those who fail to take the APFT within
the required period (AR 350-15, para-
graph 11) must be flagged IAW AR
600-8-2 (Reference B).
RETESTING
Soldiers who fail any or all of the
events must retake the entire APFT. In
case of test failure, commanders may
allow soldiers to retake the test as soon
as the soldiers and commanders feel
they are ready. Soldiers without a
medical profile will be retested not-
later-than three months following the
initial APFT failure in accordance
with AR 350-15, paragraph 11.
Test Sequence
The test sequence is the push-up,
sit-up, and 2-mile run (or alternate,
aerobic event). The order of events
cannot be changed. There are no
exceptions to this sequence.
Soldiers should be allowed no less
than 10 minutes, but ideally no more
than 20 minutes, to recover between
each event. The OIC or NCOIC deter-
mines the time to be allotted between
events, as it will depend on the total
number of soldiers who are participat-
ing in the APFT. If many soldiers are
to be tested, staggered starting times
should be planned to allow the proper
intervals between events. Under no
circumstances is the APFT valid if a
soldier cannot begin and end all three
events in two hours or less.
The following paragraphs describe
the equipment, facilities, personnel,
14-11
instructions, administration, timing
techniques, and scorers duties for the
pushup, sit-up, and 2-mile-run events.
PUSH-UPS
Push-ups measure the endurance of
the chest, shoulder, and triceps muscles.
(See Figure 14-3.)
Equipment
One stopwatch is needed along with
one clipboard and pen for each scorer.
The event supervisor must have the
following the instructions in this chap-
ter on how to conduct the event and
one copy of the push-up scoring stan-
dards (DA Form 705).
Facilities
There must be at least one test
station for every 15 soldiers to be
tested. Each station is 6 feet wide and
15 feet deep.
Personnel
One event supervisor must beat the
test site and one scorer at each station.
The event supervisor may not be the
event scorer.
Instructions
The event supervisor must read the
following: THE PUSH-UP EVENT
MEASURES THE ENDURANCE OF
THE CHEST, SHOULDER, AND
TRICEPS MUSCLES. ON THE
COMMAND GET SET, ASSUME
THE FRONT-LEANING REST PO-
SITION BY PLACING YOUR HANDS
WHERE THEY ARE COMFORT-
ABLE FOR YOU. YOUR FEET
MAY BE TOGETHER OR UP TO 12
INCHES APART. WHEN VIEWED
FROM THE SIDE, YOUR BODY
SHOULD FORM A GENERALLY
STRAIGHT LINE FROM YOUR
SHOULDERS TO YOUR ANKLES.
ON THE COMMAND GO, BEGIN
THE PUSH-UP BY BENDING YOUR
ELBOWS AND LOWERING YOUR
ENTIRE BODY AS A SINGLE UNIT
UNTIL YOUR UPPER ARMS ARE
AT LEAST PARALLEL TO THE
GROUND. THEN, RETURN TO
THE STARTING POSITION BY
RAISING YOUR ENTIRE BODY
UNTIL YOUR ARMS ARE FULLY
EXTENDED. YOUR BODY MUST
REMAIN RIGID IN A GENERALLY
STRAIGHT LINE AND MOVE AS A
UNIT WHILE PERFORMING EACH
REPETITION. AT THE END OF
EACH REPETITION, THE SCORER
WILL STATE THE NUMBER OF
REPETITIONS YOU HAVE COM-
PLETED CORRECTLY. IF YOU
FAIL TO KEEP YOUR BODY GEN-
ERALLY STRAIGHT, TO LOWER
YOUR WHOLE BODY UNTIL YOUR
UPPER ARMS ARE AT LEAST PAR-
ALLEL TO THE GROUND, OR TO
EXTEND YOUR ARMS COM-
PLETELY, THAT REPETITION WILL
NOT COUNT, AND THE SCORER
WILL REPEAT THE NUMBER OF
THE LAST CORRECTLY PER-
FORMED REPETITION. IF YOU
FAIL TO PERFORM THE FIRST
TEN PUSH-UPS CORRECTLY, THE
SCORER WILL TELL YOU TO GO
TO YOUR KNEES AND WILL EX-
PLAIN TO YOU WHAT YOUR MIS-
TAKES ARE. YOU WILL THEN BE
SENT TO THE END OF THE LINE
TO BE RETESTED. AFTER THE
FIRST 10 PUSH-UPS HAVE BEEN
PERFORMED AND COUNTED,
HOWEVER, NO RESTARTS ARE
ALLOWED. THE TEST WILL CON-
TINUE, AND ANY INCORRECTLY
PERFORMED PUSH-UPS WILL NOT
BE COUNTED. AN ALTERED,
FRONT-LEANING REST POSITION
IS THE ONLY AUTHORIZED REST
POSITION. THAT IS, YOU MAY
14-12

SAG IN THE MIDDLE OR FLEX
YOUR BACK. WHEN FLEXING
YOUR BACK, YOU MAY BEND
YOUR KNEES, BUT NOT TO SUCH
AN EXTENT THAT YOU ARE
SUPPORTING MOST OF YOUR
BODY WEIGHT WITH YOUR LEGS.
IF THIS OCCURS, YOUR PERFORM-
ANCE WILL BE TERMINATED. YOU
MUST RETURN TO, AND PAUSE
IN, THE CORRECT STARTING
POSITION BEFORE CONTINUING.
IF YOU REST ON THE GROUND
OR RAISE EITHER HAND OR FOOT
FROM THE GROUND, YOUR
PERFORMANCE WILL BE TERMI-
NATED. YOU MAY REPOSITION
YOUR HANDS AND/OR FEET
DURING THE EVENT AS LONG AS
THEY REMAIN IN CONTACT WITH
THE GROUND AT ALL TIMES.
CORRECT PERFORMANCE IS IM-
PORTANT. YOU WILL HAVE TWO
MINUTES IN WHICH TO DO AS
MANY PUSH-UPS AS YOU CAN.
WATCH THIS DEMONSTRATION.
(The exercise is then demonstrated.
See Figure 14-4 for a list of points that
need to be made during the demonstra-
tion.) WHAT ARE -YOUR QUES-
TIONS?
Figure 14-4
14-13
Administration
After reading the instructions, the
supervisor answers questions. Then he
moves the groups to their testing sta-
tions. The event supervisor cannot be
ready to begin. Successive groups do
the event until all soldiers have com-
pleted it.
Timing Techniques
The event supervisor is the timer.
He calls out the time remaining every
30 seconds and every second for the
last 10 seconds of the two minutes. He
ends the event after two minutes by
the command Halt!
Scorers Duties
Scorers must allow for differences
in the body shape and structure of
each soldier. The scorer uses each
soldiers starting position as a guide
throughout the event to evaluate each
repetition. The scorer should talk to
the soldier before the event begins and
have him do a few repetitions as a
warm-up and reference to ensure he is
doing the exercise correctly.
 The scorer may either sit or kneel
about three feet from the testees
shoulder at a 45-degree angle in front
of it. The scorers head should be
about even with the testees shoulder
when the latter is in the front-leaning
rest position. Each scorer determines
for himself if he will sit or kneel when
scoring. He may not lie down or stand
while scoring. He counts out loud the
number of correct repetitions com-
pleted and repeats the number of the
last correct push-up if an incorrect
one is done. Scorers tell the testees
what they do wrong as it occurs dur-
ing the event. A critique of the
performance is done following the
test.
When the soldier completes the
event, the scorer records the number
of correctly performed repetitions,
initials the scorecard, and returns it to
the soldier.
SIT-UPS
This event measures the endurance
of the abdominal and hip-flexor
muscles. (See Figure 14-5.)
Equipment
One stopwatch is needed along with
one clipboard and pen for each scorer.
The event supervisor must have the
following: the instructions in this chap-
ter on how to conduct the event and
one copy of the sit-up scoring stan-
dards (DA Form 705).
Facilities
Each station is 6 feet wide and 15 feet
deep. Ensure that no more than 15
soldiers are tested at a station.
Personnel
One event supervisor must be at the
test site and one scorer at each station.
The event supervisor may not be the
event scorer.
Instructions
The event supervisor must read the
following: THE SIT-UP EVENT
MEASURES THE ENDURANCE OF
THE ABDOMINAL AND HIP-
FLEXOR MUSCLES. ON THE
Figure 14-5
14-14
COMMAND GET SET, ASSUME
THE STARTING POSITION BY
LYING ON YOUR BACK WITH
YOUR KNEES BENT AT A 90-
DEGREE ANGLE. YOUR FEET MAY
BE TOGETHER OR UP TO 12 INCHES
APART. ANOTHER PERSON WILL
HOLD YOUR ANKLES WITH THE
HANDS ONLY. NO OTHER METHOD
OF BRACING OR HOLDING THE
FEET IS AUTHORIZED. THE HEEL
IS THE ONLY PART OF YOUR
FOOT THAT MUST STAY IN CON-
TACT WITH THE GROUND. YOUR
FINGERS MUST BE INTERLOCKED
BEHIND YOUR HEAD AND THE
BACKS OF YOUR HANDS MUST
TOUCH THE GROUND. YOUR
ARMS AND ELBOWS NEED NOT
TOUCH THE GROUND. ON THE
COMMAND GO, BEGIN RAIS-
ING YOUR UPPER BODY FOR-
WARD TO, OR BEYOND, THE
Figure 14-6
14-15
VERTICAL POSITION. THE VER-
TICAL POSITION MEANS THAT
THE BASE OF YOUR NECK IS
ABOVE THE BASE OF YOUR SPINE.
AFTER YOU HAVE REACHED OR
SURPASSED THE VERTICAL POSI-
TION, LOWER YOUR BODY UNTIL
THE BOTTOM OF YOUR SHOUL-
DER BLADES TOUCH THE
GROUND. YOUR HEAD, HANDS,
ARMS, OR ELBOWS DO NOT HAVE
TO TOUCH THE GROUND. AT
THE END OF EACH REPETITION,
THE SCORER WILL STATE THE
NUMBER OF SIT-UPS YOU HAVE
CORRECTLY COMPLETED. A
REPETITION WILL NOT COUNT IF
YOU FAIL TO REACH THE VER-
TICAL POSITION, FAIL TO KEEP
YOUR FINGERS INTERLOCKED
BEHIND YOUR HEAD, ARCH OR
BOW YOUR BACK AND RAISE
YOUR BUTTOCKS OFF THE
GROUND TO RAISE YOUR UPPER
BODY, OR LET YOUR KNEES
EXCEED A 90-DEGREE ANGLE.
IF A REPETITION DOES NOT
COUNT, THE SCORER WILL RE-
PEAT THE NUMBER OF YOUR
LAST CORRECTLY PERFORMED
SIT-UP. THE UP POSITION IS THE
ONLY AUTHORIZED REST POSI-
TION. IF YOU STOP AND REST IN
THE DOWN (STARTING) POSITION,
THE EVENT WILL BE TERMI-
NATED. AS LONG AS YOU MAKE
A CONTINUOUS PHYSICAL EF-
FORT TO SIT UP, THE EVENT
WILL NOT BE TERMINATED. YOU
MAY NOT USE YOUR HANDS OR
ANY OTHER MEANS TO PULL OR
PUSH YOURSELF UP TO THE UP
(RESTING) POSITION OR TO HOLD
YOURSELF IN THE REST POSI-
TION. IF YOU DO SO, YOUR PER-
FORMANCE IN THE EVENT WILL
BE TERMINATED. CORRECT PER-
FORMANCE IS IMPORTANT. YOU
WILL HAVE TWO MINUTES TO
PERFORM AS MANY SIT-UPS AS
YOU CAN. WATCH THIS DEMON-
STRATION. (The exercise is then
demonstrated. See Figure 14-6 for a
list of points that need to be made
during the demonstration.) WHAT
ARE YOUR QUESTIONS?
Administration
After reading the instructions, the
supervisor answers questions. He then
moves the groups to their testing sta-
tions. The event supervisor cannot be
a scorer. At this point, the testing is
ready to begin. Successive groups do
the event until all soldiers have com-
pleted it.
Timing Techniques
The event supervisor is the timer.
He calls out the time remaining every
30 seconds and every second for the
last 10 seconds of the two minutes. He
ends the event after two minutes by the
command Halt!
Scorers Duties
The scorer may either kneel or sit
about three feet from the testees hip.
The scorers head should be about even
with the testees shoulder when the
latter is in the vertical (up) position.
Each scorer decides for himself whether
to sit or kneel down when scoring. He
may not lie down or stand while
scoring. The scorer counts aloud the
number of correctly performed sit-ups
and repeats the number of the last
correctly performed repetition if an
incorrect one is done. Scorers tell the
testees what they are doing wrong as it
occurs during the event. A critique of
his performance is given to each sol-
dier after the event. When the soldier
completes the event, the scorer records
the number of correctly performed sit-
ups, initials the scorecard, and returns
it to the soldier.
When checking for correct body
position, the scorer must be sure that at
a 90-degree angle is formed at each
knee by the soldiers upper and lower
leg. The angle to be measured is not the
one formed by the lower leg and the
ground. If, while performing the sit-
up event, this angle becomes greater
than 90 degrees, the scorer should
instruct the testee and holder to repo-
sition the legs to the proper angle and
obtain compliance before allowing the
testees performance to continue. The
loss of the proper angle does not
terminate the testees performance in
the event. When the soldier comes to
the vertical position, the scorer must be
sure that the base of the soldiers neck
is above or past the base of the spine.
A soldier who simply touches his knees
with his elbows may not come to a
completely vertical position. The scorer
must ensure that the holder uses only
his hands to brace the exercisers feet.
14-16
 TWO-MILE RUN
This event tests cardiorespiratory
(aerobic) endurance and the endurance
of the leg muscles. (See Figure 14-7.)
Equipment
Two stopwatches for the event
supervisor, one clipboard and pen for
each scorer, copies of the events in-
structions and standards, and numbers
for the testees are needed.
Facilities
There must be a level area with no
more than a three-degree slope on
which a measured course has been
marked. An oval-shaped track of
known length may be used. If a road
course is used, the start and finish and
one-mile (half way) point must be clearly
marked.
Personnel
One event supervisor and at least
one scorer for every 15 runners are
required.
Figure 14-7
14-17
Instructions
The event supervisor must read the
following: THE TWO-MILE RUN IS
USED TO ASSESS YOUR AEROBIC
FITNESS AND YOUR LEG
MUSCLES ENDURANCE. You
MUST COMPLETE THE RUN WITH-
OUT ANY PHYSICAL HELP. AT
THE START, ALL SOLDIERS WILL
LINE UP BEHIND THE STARTING
LINE. ON THE COMMAND GO,
THE CLOCK WILL START. YOU
WILL BEGIN RUNNING AT YOUR
OWN PACE. TO RUN THE RE-
QUIRED TWO MILES, YOU MUST
COMPLETE (describe the number of
laps, start and finish points, and course
layout). YOU ARE BEING TESTED
ON YOUR ABILITY TO COMPLETE
THE 2-MILE COURSE IN THE
SHORTEST TIME POSSIBLE. AL-
THOUGH WALKING IS AUTHOR-
IZED, IT IS STRONGLY DISCOUR-
AGED. IF YOU ARE PHYSICALLY
HELPED IN ANY WAY (FOR EX-
AMPLE, PULLED, PUSHED,
PICKED UP, AND/OR CARRIED)
OR LEAVE THE DESIGNATED
RUNNING COURSE FOR ANY
REASON, YOU WILL BE DISQUALI-
FIED. (IT IS LEGAL TO PACE A
SOLDIER DURING THE 2-MILE
RUN. AS LONG AS THERE IS NO
PHYSICAL CONTACT WITH THE
PACED SOLDIER AND IT DOES
NOT PHYSICALLY HINDER OTHER
SOLDIERS TAKING THE TEST, THE
PRACTICE OF RUNNING AHEAD
OF, ALONG SIDE OF, OR BEHIND
THE TESTED SOLDIER, WHILE
SERVING AS A PACER, IS PER-
MITTED. CHEERING OR CALL-
ING OUT THE ELAPSED TIME IS
ALSO PERMITTED.) THE NUM-
BER ON YOUR CHEST IS FOR
IDENTIFICATION. YOU MUST
MAKE SURE IT IS VISIBLE AT ALL
TIMES. TURN IN YOUR NUMBER
WHEN YOU FINISH THE RUN.
THEN, GO TO THE AREA DESIG-
NATED FOR THE COOL-DOWN
AND STRETCH. DO NOT STAY
NEAR THE SCORERS OR THE
FINISH LINE AS THIS MAY IN-
TERFERE WITH THE TESTING.
WHAT ARE YOUR QUESTIONS ON
THIS EVENT?
Administration
After reading the instructions, the
supervisor answers questions. He then
organizes the soldiers into groups of no
more than 10. The scorer for each
group assigns a number to each soldier
in the group. At the same time, the
scorer collects the scorecards and rec-
ords each soldiers number.
Timing Techniques
The event supervisor is the timer.
He uses the commands Get set and
Go. Two stopwatches are used in
case one fails. As the soldiers near the
finish line, the event supervisor calls
off the time in minutes and seconds
(for example, Fifteen-thirty, fifteen-
thirty-one, fifteen-thirty -two, and
so on).
Scorers Duties
The scorers observe those runners in
their groups, monitor their laps (if
appropriate), and record their times as
they cross the finish line. (It is often
helpful to record the soldiers numbers
and times on a separate sheet of paper
or card. This simplifies the recording
of finish times when large groups of
soldiers are simultaneously tested.) After
all runners have completed the run, the
scorers determine the point value for
each soldiers run time, record the
point values on the scorecards, and
enter their initials in the scorers blocks.
In all cases, when a time falls between
two point values, the lower point value
is used and recorded. For example, if
a female soldier, age 17 to 21, runs the
two miles in 15 minutes and 19 sec-
onds, the score awarded is 95 points.
At this time, the scorers for the 2-
mile run also convert the raw scores for
the push-up and sit-up events by using
the scoring standards on the back side
of the scorecard. They enter those
point values on the scorecards and
determine the total APFT score for
each soldier before giving the score-
cards to the tests OIC or NCOIC.
After the test scores have been checked,
the tests OIC or NCOIC signs all
scorecards and returns them to the
units commander or designated repre-
sentative.
Test Results
The soldiers fitness performance
for each APFT event is determined by
converting the raw score for each event
to a point score.
Properly interpreted, performance
on the APFT shows the following:
Each soldiers level of physical fit-
ness.
The entire units level of physical
fitness.
Deficiencies in physical fitness.
Soldiers who need special attention.
14-18
 (Leaders must develop special pro-
grams to improve the performance
of soldiers who are below the re-
quired standards.)
Commanders should not try to de-
termine the individuals or the units
strengths and weaknesses in fitness by
using only the total scores. A detailed
study of the results on each event is
more important. For a proper analysis
of the units performance, event scores
should be used. They are corrected for
age and sex. Therefore, a females 80-
point push-up score should be con-
sidered the same as a males 80-point
push-up score. Using the total point
value or raw scores may distort the
interpretation.
Scores Above Maximum
Even though some soldiers exceed
the maximum score on one or more
Figure 14-8
14-19
APFT events, the official, maximum
score on the APFT must remain at 300
(100 points per event). Some com-
manders, however, want to know
unofficial point scores to reward sol-
diers for their extra effort.
Only those soldiers who score 100
points in all three events are eligible to
determine their score on an extended
scale. To fairly determine the points
earned, extra points are awarded at the
same rate as points obtained for scores
at or below the 100 point level. Each
push-up and sit-up beyond the maxi-
mum is worth one point as is every six-
second decrease in the run time. Take,
for example, the following case shown
in Figure 14-8. A male soldier per-
forms above the maximum in the 17-21
age group by doing 87 push-ups and
98 sit-ups and by running the two
miles in 11 minutes and 12 seconds.
His score would be calculated as fol-
lows:
 The calculations on the previous
page, give the soldier a total score of
318 points. This method lets the com-
mander easily determine the scores for
performances that are above the maxi-
mum. He may recognize soldiers for
their outstanding fitness achievements,
not only on the APFT but also for
other, unofficial fitness challenges.
Using this method ensures that each
soldier has an equal chance to be
recognized for any of the tested fitness
components. Commanders may also
establish their own incentive programs
and set their own units standards (AR
350-15).
Temporary Profiles
A soldier with a temporary profile
must take the regular three-event APFT
after the profile has expired. (Soldiers
with temporary profiles of more than
three months may take an alternate test
as determined by the commander with
input from health-care personnel. )
Once the profile is lifted, the soldier
must be given twice the time of the
profile (but not more than 90 days) to
train for the APFT. For example, if
the profile period was 7 days, the
soldier has 14 days to train for the
APFT after the profile period ends. If
a normally scheduled APFT occurs
during the profile period, the soldier
should be given a mandatory make-up
date.
Permanent Profiles
A permanently profiled soldier is
given a physical training program by
the profiling officer using the positive
profile form DA 3349 (see Appendix
B). The profiling officer gives the
units commander a list of physical
activities that are suitable for the
profiled soldier. He also indicates the
events and/or alternate aerobic event
that the soldier will do on the APFT.
This recommendation, made after
consultation with the profiled soldier,
should address the soldiers abilities
and preference and the equipment
available. (See DA Form 3349, Physi-
cal Profile, referenced in AR 40-501.)
The profiled soldier must perform
all the regular APFT events his medi-
cal profile permits. Each soldier must
earn at least 60 points on the regular
events to receive a go. He must also
complete the alternate event in a time
equal to or less than the one listed for
his age group. For example, a soldier
whose profile forbids only running will
do the push-up and sit-up events and
an alternate aerobic event. He must get
at least a minimum passing score on
each event to earn a go for the test. A
soldier whose profile prevents two or
more APFT events must complete the
2-mile run or an alternate aerobic
event to earn a go on the test. Soldiers
who cannot do any of the aerobic
events due to a profile cannot be tested.
Such information will be recorded in
their official military record.
The standards for alternate events
are listed in Figure 14-9. Scoring for
all alternate events is on a go/no go
basis. Soldiers who do push-up and
sit-up events but who take an alternate
aerobic event are not awarded promo-
tion points for APFT performance.
Alternate Events
Alternate APFT events assess the
aerobic fitness and muscular endur-
ance of soldiers with permanent medi-
cal profiles or long-term (greater than
three months) temporary profiles who
cannot take the regular, three-event
APFT.
The alternate aerobic APFT events
are the following:
800-yard-swim test.
6.2-mile-stationary- bicycle ergome-
ter test with a resistance setting
of 2 kiloponds (2 kilograms) or
20 newtons.
6.2-mile-bicycle test on a conven-
tional bicycle using one speed.
2.5-mile-walk test.
14-20
 Figure 14-9

800-YARD-SWIM TEST YARD SWIM IS USED TO ASSESS

This event is used to assess cardi-
orespiratory (aerobic) fitness. (See
Figure 14-10.)
Equipment
Two stopwatches, one clipboard and
pen for each scorer, one copy each of
the test instructions and standards, and
appropriate safety equipment are
needed.
Facilities
A swimming pool at least 25 yards
long and 3 feet deep, or an approved
facility, is needed.
Personnel
One event supervisor and at least
control, and medical personnel must
Instructions
The event supervisor must read the
following statement THE 800-
YOUR LEVEL OF AEROBIC FIT-
NESS. YOU WILL BEGIN IN THE
WATER; NO DIVING IS ALLOWED.
AT THE START, YOUR BODY MUST
BE IN CONTACT WITH THE WALL
OF THE POOL. ON THE COM-
MAND GO, THE CLOCK WILL
START. YOU SHOULD THEN
BEGIN SWIMMING AT YOUR OWN
PACE, USING ANY STROKE OR
COMBINATION OF STROKES YOU
WISH. YOU MUST SWIM (tell the
number) LAPS TO COMPLETE THIS
DISTANCE. YOU MUST TOUCH
THE WALL OF THE POOL AT EACH
END OF THE POOL AS YOU TURN.
ANY TYPE OF TURN IS AUTHOR-
IZED. YOU WILL BE SCORED ON
YOUR ABILITY TO COMPLETE THE
SWIM IN A TIME EQUAL TO, OR
LESS THAN, THAT LISTED FOR
YOUR AGE AND SEX. WALKING
ON THE BOTTOM TO RECUPER-
ATE IS AUTHORIZED. SWIMMING
GOGGLES ARE PERMITTED. BUT
NO OTHER EQUIPMENT IS AU-
THORIZED. WHAT ARE YOUR
QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS EVENT?

14-21

Administration
After reading the instructions, the
event supervisor answers only related
questions. He assigns one soldier to
each lane and tells the soldiers to enter
the water. He gives them a short
warm-up period to acclimate to the
water temperature and loosen up. Above
all, the event supervisor must be alert
to the safety of the testees throughout
the test.
Timing Techniques
The event supervisor is the timer.
He uses the commands Get set and
Go. Two stopwatches are used in
case one fails. As the soldiers near the
finish, the event supervisor begins
calling off the elapsed time in minutes
and seconds (for example, Nineteen-
eleven, nineteen-twelve, nineteen-thir-
teen, and so on.) The time is recorded
when each soldier touches the end of
the pool on the final lap or crosses a
line set as the 800-yard mark.
Scorers Duties
Scorers must observe the swimmers
assigned to them. They must be sure
Figure 14-10
that each swimmer touches the bulk-
head at every turn. The scorers record
each soldiers time in the 2-mile-run
block on the scorecard and use the
comment block to identify the time as
an 800-yard-swim time. If the pool
length is measured in meters, the scor-
ers convert the exact distance to yards.
To convert meters to yards, multiply
the number of meters by 39.37 and di-
vide the product by 36, that is, (meters
x 39.37)/36 = yards. For example, 400
meters equals 437.4 yards, that is, (400
x 39.37)/36 = 437.4 yards.
6.2-MILE STATIONARY-BICYCLE
ERGOMETER TEST
This event is used to assess the
soldiers cardiorespiratory and leg-
muscle endurance. (See Figure 14- 11.)
Equipment
Two stopwatches, one clipboard and
pen for each scorer, a copy of the test
instructions and standards, and one
stationary bicycle ergometer are needed.
The ergometers should measure resis-
tance in kiloponds or newtons. The
bicycle should be one that can be used
for training and testing. Its seat and
14-22
 Figure 14-11
handlebars must be adjustable to let the
soldier fully extend his legs when
pedaling. It should have an adjustable
tension setting and an odometer. The
resistance is usually set by a tension
strap on a weighted pendulum con-
nected to the flywheel. See Appendix
D for guidance on using various types
of stationary bikes.
Facilities
The test site can be any place where
there is an approved bicycle ergometer.
This could be the posts fitness facility
or the hospitals therapy clinic. Each
test station must be two yards wide and
four yards deep.
Personnel
One event supervisor and at least
one scorer for every three soldiers to be
tested are required. Appropriate safety,
control, and medical personnel should
also be present.
14-23
Instructions
The event supervisor must read the
following: THE 6.2-MILE STA-
TIONARY-BICYCLE ERGOMETER
EVENT TESTS YOUR CARDI-
ORESPIRATORY FITNESS AND LEG
MUSCLE ENDURANCE. THE
ERGOMETERS RESISTANCE MUST
BE SET AT TWO KILOPOUNDS (20
NEWTONS). ON THE COMMAND
GO, THE CLOCK WILL START,
AND YOU WILL BEGIN PEDAL-
ING AT YOUR OWN PACE WHILE
MAINTAINING THE RESISTANCE
INDICATOR AT TWO POUNDS.
YOU WILL BE SCORED ON YOUR
ABILITY TO COMPLETE 6.2 MILES
(10 KILOMETERS), AS SHOWN ON
THE ODOMETER, IN A TIME
EQUAL TO OR LESS THAN THAT
LISTED FOR YOUR AGE AND SEX.
WHAT ARE YOUR QUESTIONS
ABOUT THIS EVENT?
 Administration
After reading the instructions, the
event supervisor answers any related
questions. Each soldier is given a short
warm-up period and allowed to adjust
the seat and handlebar height.
Timing Techniques
The event supervisor is the timer.
He uses the commands Get set and
Go. Two stopwatches are used in
case one fails. As the soldiers pedal the
last two-tenths of the test distance, the
event supervisor should start calling
off the time in minutes and seconds
(for example, Twenty-thirty-one,
twenty -thirty -two, twenty-thirty-
three, and so on). He calls the time
remaining every 30 seconds for the last
two minutes of the allowable time and
every second during the last ten sec-
onds.
Scorers Duties
Scorers must ensure that the bicycle
ergometer is functioning properly. They
must then make sure that the bicycle
ergometers tension settings have been
calibrated and are accurate and that
the resistance of the ergometers has
been set at two kiloponds (20 new-
tons). The scorers must observe the
soldiers throughout the event. From
time to time the scorer may need to
make small adjustments to the resis-
tance control to ensure that a continu-
ous resistance of exactly 2 kiloponds
(20 newtons) is maintained throughout
the test. At the end of the test, they
record each soldiers time on the score-
card in the 2-mile-run block, initial
the appropriate block, and note in the
comment block that the time is for a
6.2-mile stationary-bicycle ergometer
test.
6.2-MILE BICYCLE TEST
This event is used to assess the
soldiers cardiorespiratory and leg-
muscle endurance.
Equipment
Two stopwatches, one clipboard and
pen for each scorer, a copy of the test
instructions and standards, and num-
bers are needed. Although one-speed
bicycles are preferred for this event,
multispeed bicycles may be used. If a
multispeed bicycle is used, measures
must be taken to ensure that only one
gear is used throughout the test. (This
can usually be done by taping the gear
shifters at the setting preferred by the
testee.)
Facilities
A relatively flat course with a uni-
form surface and no obstacles must be
used. It must also be clearly marked.
Soldiers should not be tested on a
quarter-mile track, and they should
never be out of the scorers sight. The
course should be completely free of
runners and walkers.
Personnel
One event supervisor and at least
one scorer for every 10 soldiers are re-
quired. Safety, control, and medical
personnel should also be present as
appropriate.
instructions
The event supervisor must read the
following: THE 6.2-MILE BICYCLE
TEST IS USED TO ASSESS YOUR
CARDIORESPIRATORY FITNESS
AND LEG MUSCLES ENDURANCE.
YOU MUST COMPLETE THE 6.2
14-24
MILES WITHOUT ANY PHYSICAL
HELP FROM OTHERS. YOU MUST
KEEP YOUR BICYCLE IN ONE
GEAR OF YOUR CHOOSING FOR
THE ENTIRE TEST. CHANGING
GEARS IS NOT PERMITTED AND
WILL RESULT IN DISQUALIFICA-
TION. TO BEGIN, YOU WILL LINE
UP BEHIND THE STARTING LINE.
ON THE COMMAND GO, THE
CLOCK WILL START, AND YOU
WILL BEGIN PEDALING AT YOUR
OWN PACE. TO COMPLETE THE
REQUIRED DISTANCE OF 6.2
MILES, YOU MUST COMPLETE
(describe the number of laps, start and
finish points, and course layout). YOU
WILL BE SCORED ON YOUR ABIL-
ITY TO COMPLETE THE DISTANCE-
OF 6.2 MILES ( 10 KILOMETERS) IN
A TIME EQUAL TO OR LESS THAN
THAT LISTED FOR YOUR AGE
AND SEX. IF YOU LEAVE THE
DESIGNATED COURSE FOR ANY
14-25
REASON, YOU WILL BE DISQUALI-
FIED. WHAT ARE YOUR QUES-
TIONS ABOUT THIS EVENT?
Administration
After reading the instructions, the
event supervisor answers any related
questions. He then organizes the sol-
diers into groups of no more than ten
and assigns each group to a scorer.
Scorers assign numbers to the soldiers
in their groups and record each sol-
diers number on the appropriate score-
card.
Timing Techniques
The event supervisor is the timer.
He uses the commands Get set and
Go. Two stopwatches are used in
case one fails. As soldiers near the end
of the 6.2-mile ride, the event super-
visor starts calling off the time in
minutes and seconds (for example, Equipment
Thirty-twenty-one, thirty- twenty-
two, thirty -twenty-three, and so on). Two stopwatches, one clipboard and
pen for each scorer, numbers, and
Scorers Duties copies of the test instructions and
standards are needed.
When the event is over, scorers
record each soldiers time in the 2-
Facilities
mile-run block. They initial the ap-
propriate block and note in the
This event uses the same course as
comment block that the time is for a
the 2-mile run.
6.2-mile-bicycle test and whether or
not the testee met the required stan-
Personnel
dards for his age and sex.
One event supervisor and at least
2.5-MILE WALK
one scorer for every three soldiers to be
tested are required. Appropriate safety,
This event serves to assess cardi-
control, and medical personnel should
orespiratory and leg-muscle endur-
be present.
ance.

14-26
 Instructions
The event supervisor must read the
following: THE 2.5-MILE WALK IS
USED TO ASSESS YOUR CARDI-
ORESPIRATORY FITNESS AND
LEG-MUSCLE ENDURANCE. ON
THE COMMAND GO, THE CLOCK
WILL START, AND YOU WILL
BEGIN WALKING AT YOUR OWN
PACE. YOU MUST COMPLETE
(describe the number of laps, start and
finish points, and course layout). ONE
FOOT MUST BE IN CONTACT WITH
THE GROUND AT ALL TIMES. IF
YOU BREAK INTO A RUNNING
STRIDE AT ANY TIME OR HAVE
BOTH FEET OFF THE GROUND AT
THE SAME TIME, YOUR PERFORM-
ANCE IN THE EVENT WILL BE
TERMINATED. YOU WILL BE
SCORED ON YOUR ABILITY TO
COMPLETE THE 2.5-MILE COURSE
IN A TIME EQUAL TO OR LESS
THAN THAT LISTED FOR YOUR
AGE AND SEX. WHAT ARE YOUR
QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS EVENT?
Administration
After reading the instructions, the
event supervisor answers any related
questions. He then divides the soldiers
14-27
into groups of no more than three and
assigns each group to a scorer. Each
soldier is issued a number which the
scorer records on the scorecard.
Timing Techniques
The event supervisor is the
timer. He uses the commands Get set
and Go. Two stopwatches are used in
case one fails. As the soldiers near the
end of the 2.5-mile walk, the event
supervisor starts calling off the elapsed
time in minutes and seconds (for
example,"Thirty-three-twenty-two,
thirty -three -twenty -three, thirty-
three-twenty -four, and so on).
Scorers Duties
Scorers must observe the soldiers
during the entire event and must en-
sure that the soldiers maintain a walk-
ing stride. Soldiers who break into any
type of running stride will be termi-
nated from the event and given a no
go. When the event is over, scorers
record the time in the 2-mile-run
block on the scorecard, initial the ap-
propriate block, and note in the com-
ment block that the time is for a 2.5-
mile walk and whether or not the
testee received a "go" or "no go."
 APPENDIX A

PHYSIOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SEXES

Soldiers vary in their physical makeup. Each body reacts differently to varying degrees of physical stress,
and no two bodies react exactly the same way to the same physical stress. For everyone to get the maximum
benefit from training, leaders must be aware of these differences and plan the training to provide maximum
benefit for everyone. They must also be aware of the physiological differences between men and women.
While leaders must require equal efforts of men and women during the training period, they must also realize
that women have physiological limitations which generally preclude equal performance. The following
paragraphs describe the most important physical and physiological differences between men and women.

SIZE

The average 18- year-old man is 70.2 inches tall and weighs 144.8 pounds, whereas the average woman
of the same age is 64.4 inches tall and weighs 126.6 pounds. This difference in size affects the absolute
amount of physical work that can be performed by men and women.

MUSCLES

Men have 50 percent greater total muscle mass, based on weight, than do women. A woman who is the
same size as her male counterpart is generally only 80 percent as strong. Therefore, men usually have an
advantage in strength, speed, and power over women.

FAT

Women carry about 10 percentage points more body fat than do men of the same age. Men accumulate
fat primarily in the back, chest, and abdomen; women gain fat in the buttocks, arms, and thighs. Also,
because the center of gravity is lower in women than in men, women must overcome more resistance in
activities that require movement of the lower body.

BONES

Women have less bone mass than men, but their pelvic structure is wider. This difference gives men an
advantage in running efficiency.

HEART SIZE AND RATE

The average womans heart is 25 percent smaller than the average mans. Thus, the mans heart can pump
more blood with each beat. The larger heart size contributes to the slower resting heart rate (five to eight
beats a minute slower) in males. This lower rate is evident both at rest and at any given level of submaximal
exercise. Thus, for any given work rate, the faster heart rate means that most women will become fatigued
sooner than men.

FLEXIBILITY

Women generally are more flexible than men.

A-O
 LUNGS

The lung capacity of men is 25 to 30 percent greater than that of women. This gives men still another
advantage in the processing of oxygen and in doing aerobic work such as running.

RESPONSE TO HEAT

A womans response to heat stress differs somewhat from a mans. Women sweat less, lose less heat through
evaporation, and reach higher body temperatures before sweating starts. Nevertheless, women can adapt
to heat stress as well as men. Regardless of gender, soldiers with a higher level of physical fitness generally
better tolerate, and adapt more readily to, heat stress than do less fit soldiers.

OTHER FACTORS

Knowing the physiological differences between men and women is just the first step in planning physical
training for a unit. Leaders need to understand other factors too.
Women can exercise during menstruation; it is, in fact, encouraged. However, any unusual discomfort,
cramps, or pains while menstruating should be medically evaluated.
Pregnant soldiers cannot be required to exercise without a doctors approval. Generally, pregnant women
may exercise until they are close to childbirth if they follow their doctors instructions. The Army agrees
with the position of the American College of obstetricians and Gynecologists regarding exercise and
pregnancy. This guidance is available from medical authorities and the U.S. Army Physical Fitness School
(USAPFS). The safety and health of the mother and fetus are primary concerns when dealing with exercise
programs.
Vigorous activity does not harm womens reproductive organs or cause menstrual problems. Also, physical
fitness training need not damage the breasts. Properly fitted and adjusted bras, however, should be worn
to avoid potential injury to unsupported breast tissue that may result from prolonged jarring during exer-
cise.
Although female soldiers must sometimes be treated differently from males, women can reach high levels
of physical performance. Leaders must use common sense to help both male and female soldiers achieve
acceptable levels of fitness. For example, ability-group running alleviates gender-based differences between
men and women. Unit runs, however, do not.

A-1
 APPENDIX B

POSITIVE PROFILE FORM

Figure B-1

B-0
 APPENDIX C
PHYSICAL FITNESS LOG

Soldiers can use a physical fitness log to record their fitness goals. The log will serve as a diary of
how well they achieve them. Fitness goals are determined before the training begins. The results should
closely parallel or exceed the units goals. While this is not a requirement, the log may also be used by
commanders and supervisors as a record of physical fitness training. Figure C-1 shows an example of a
physical fitness log that could be reproduced locally.

Figure C-1

C-1
 APPENDIX D

STATIONARY BICYCLE TEST

Only stationary bicycles which can be calibrated and which have mechanically adjustable resistances may
be used to test profiled soldiers on the 6.2-mile (l O-kilometer), alternate APFT event. Therefore, the event
supervisor or scorer must be sure that the stationary bicycle can be accurately adjusted to ensure that the
soldier pedals against the correct resistance (force) of 2 kiloponds or 20 newtons. If the stationary bicycle
cannot be properly calibrated and adjusted, the soldier may end up pedalling against a resistance which is
too great or not great enough. In either case, the test would not provide an accurate indication of the soldiers
level of cardiorespiratory fitness.
The best type of stationary bicycle for testing has the following features:
Calibration adjustment.
Adjustable resistance displayed in kiloponds or newtons.
Odometer which accurately measures the distance traveled in either miles or tenths of miles or in
kilometers and tenths of kilometers.
Examples of stationary bicycles which meet the above criteria are the mechanically braked Bodyguard
990 and Monark 868. Such bicycles can be used to accurately measure a persons rate of work or the total
amount of work. They are often called bicycle ergometers.

If the stationary bicycle has an odometer, the soldier must pedal 6.2 miles (10.0 kilometers or 10,000
meters) against a resistance set at 2 kiloponds or 20 newtons. The test is completed when the soldier pedals
6.2 miles (10.0 kilometers). He receives a Go if he is below or at the time allotted for his particular age
group and gender. Care should be taken to ensure that, when using a stationary bicycle which measures
distance in kilometers, the test is ended at 10 kilometers, not 6.2 kilometers.

There are many electrically operated, stationary bicycles (EOSBS) on the market and in gymnasiums on
Army installations. Most of them are designed for physical fitness training. Only a limited number of EOSB
models are designed to accurately assess a persons energy expenditure during exercise. Such EOSBS are
relatively expensive and are generally found in medical and scientific laboratories. Very few, if any, are
found in gymnasiums on Army installations.

Because most of the more common training EOSBS were not designed to accurately assess energy
expenditure, they should not be used for the alternate, cardiorespiratory APFT event.

For the sake of accuracy and ease of administration, soldiers designated to be tested on either of the two
bicycle protocols should be tested using a moving bicycle IAW the guidelines provided elsewhere in this field
manuel. If the mechanical y- braked Bodyguard 990 or Monark 868 is used, however, the tester must ensure
that the equipment has been properly calibrated prior to each test.

D-0
D-1
 APPENDIX E

SELECTING THE RIGHT RUNNING SHOE

Choosing a running shoe that is suitable for your particular type of foot can help you avoid some common
running- related injuries. It can also make running more enjoyable and let you get more mileage out of your
shoes.

Shoe manufacturers are aware that, anatomically, feet usually fall into one of three categories. Some
people have floppy feet that are very loose- jointed. Because feet like this are too mobile, they give
when they hit the ground. These people need shoes that are built to control the foots motion. At the other
extreme are people with rigid feet. These feet are very tight-jointed and do not yield enough upon impact.
To help avoid impact-related injuries, these people need shoes that cushion the impact of running. Finally,
the third type, or normal foot, falls somewhere between mobile and rigid. This type of foot can use any
running shoe that is stable and properly cushioned. Use the chart at Figure E-1 to help you determine what
kind of foot you have. Then, read the information on special features you should look for in a shoe.

When shopping for running shoes, keep the following in mind:

Expect to spend between $30 and $100 for a pair of good shoes.
Discuss your foot type, foot problems, and shoe needs with a knowledgeable salesperson.
Check the PX for available brands and their prices before shopping at other stores.
Buy a training shoe, not a racing shoe.
When trying on shoes, wear socks that are as similar as possible to those in which you will run.
Also, be sure to try on both shoes.
Look at more than one model of shoe.
Choose a pair of shoes that fit both feet well while you are standing.
Ask if you can try running in the shoes on a non-carpeted surface. This gives you a feel for the
shoes.
Carefully inspect the shoes for defects that might have been missed by quality control. Do the
following:
-Place the shoes on a flat surface and check the heel from behind to see that the heel cup
is perpendicular to the sole of the shoe.
-Feel the seams inside the shoe to determine if they are smooth, even, and well-stitched.
-Check for loose threads or extra glue spots; they are usually signs of poor construction.

The shoes' ability to protect you from injury decreases as the mileage on them increases. Record the
number of miles you run with them on a regular basis, and replace the shoes when they have accumulated
500 to 700 miles even if they show little wear.

E-1
Figure E-1

E-2
F-2
 APPENDIX G

PERCEIVED EXERTION

The heart rate has traditionally been used to estimate exercise intensity. However, evidence shows that
a persons own perception of the intensity of his exercise can often be just as accurate as the heart rate in
gauging his exercise intensity.
The scale in Figure G-1 lets a soldier rate his degree of perceived exertion .(PE).
. This scale consists of
numerical ratings for physical exercise followed by their associated descriptive ratings.

Figure G-1

To judge perceived exertion, estimate how difficult it feels to do the exercise. Do not be concerned
with any one single factor such as shortness of breath or work intensity. Instead, try to concentrate on
the total inner feeling of exertion.
Multiplying the rating of perceived exertion by 10 roughly approximates the heart rate during exercise.
For example, a PE of 14, when multiplied by 10, equals 140.
Most soldiers with THRs between 130 and 170 BPM would exercise between a PE of 13 (somewhat
hard) and 17 (very hard).
Although either percent of maximum heart rate or perceived exertion may be used during exercise,
the most valid method for calculating THR is percent HRR.

G-1
 APPENDIX H

THE MAJOR SKELETAL MUSCLES OF THE HUMAN BODY

Figure H-1

The iliopoas muscle (a hip flexor) cannot be seen as it lies beneath other muscles. It attaches to the
lumbar vertebrae and the femur.

H-O
 GLOSSARY

Section 1: Acronyms and Abbreviations

AC Active Component
AGR ability group run
A IT advanced individual training
APFT Army Physical Fitness Test
AR Army regulation
ARNG Army National Guard
ARTEP Army Training and Evaluation Program
ATP adenosine triphosphate

BCT basic combat training

BDU battle dress uniform
BPM beats per minute
BT basic training
BTMS Battalion Training Management System

c centigrade
CAD coronary artery disease
CPR cardiopulmonary resuscitation
CPT captain
CR cardiorespiratory
CVSP cardiovascular screening program

DA Department of the Army

DOD Department of Defense

EDRE emergency deployment readiness exercise

EIB Expert Infantryman Badge
EOSB electrically operated, stationary bicycle

F Fahrenheit
FITT frequency, intensity, time, type
FM field manual
FTX field training exercise

HDL high-density lipoprotein

HQ headquarters
HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army
HRR heart rate reserve

ID identification
IET initial entry training
IG inspector general

kph kilometers per hour

Glossary-1
lat latissimus dorsi
LCE load-carrying equipment
LDL low-density lipoprotein

MACOM major Army command

MEDDAC medical department activity
METL mission-essential task list
MFT master fitness trainer
MHR maximum heart rate
min minute(s)
MOS military occupational specialty
MPH miles per hour
MRDA military recommended dietary allowance
MRE meal, ready to eat

NCO noncommissioned officer

NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge
NGR National Guard regulation
No. number

OIC officer in charge

OST one-station training
OSUT one-station unit training

Pam pamphlet
PE perceived exertion
PNF proprioceptive neuromuscular facilitation
PRE partner-resisted exercise
PT physical training
pts points
PU push-up

RC Reserve Component
rep repetition
RHR resting heart rate
RICE rest, ice, compression, elevation
RM repetition maximum
ROTC Reserve Officers Training Corps

sec second(s)
SCUBA self-contained underwater breathing apparatus
SDT self development test
SOP standing operating procedure
SU sit-up

TB med technical bulletin, medical

TDA table of distribution and allowances
THR training heart rate
TM technical manual
TOE table of organization and equipment
TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TS timed set
TSP training support package

Glossary-2
U.S. United States
USAPFS United States Army Physical Fitness School
USAR United States Army Reserve

V 02max maximum oxygen consumption per minute

WBGTI wet bulb globe temperature index

WCF windchill factor

Section II: Terms

extension
An increase in the angle between two bones in which a straightening movement occurs; the opposite
of flexion. For example, extension of the elbow involves an increase in the angle formed by the upper
and lower arm as the arm straightens at the elbow.

flexion
A decrease in the angle between two bones in which a bending movement occurs; the opposite of extension.
For example, flexion of the elbow involves a decrease in the angle formed by the lower and upper arm as
the arm bends at the elbow.

Glossary-3
 REFERENCES

SOURCES USED

These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.

ARMY REGULATIONS (ARs)

15-6 Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers. May 1988.
30-1 The Army Food Service Program. January 1985.
350-15 Army Physical Fitness Program. November 1989.
385-55 Prevention of Motor Vehicle Accidents. March 1987.

OTHER ARMY PUBLICATIONS

DOD Directive 1308.1 Physical Fitness and Weight Control Program. April 1981.
FM 21-18 Foot Marches. June 1990.

DOCUMENTS NEEDED

These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.

ARMY REGULATIONS (ARs)

40-501 Standards of Medical Fitness. July 1987.

600-8-2 Suspension of Favorable Personnel Actions (Flags). October 1987.
600-9 The Army Weight Control Program. September 1986.
600-63 Army Health Promotion. November 1987.

OTHER ARMY PUBLICATIONS

FM 25-100 Training the Force. November 1988.

NGR 40-501 Medical Examination for Members of the Army National Guard. October 1981.
TRADOC Reg 350-6 Initial Entry Training (IET) Policies and Administration. August 1989.

READINGS RECOMMENDED

These readings contain relevant supplemental information.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLETS (DA Pares)

28-9 Unit Level Recreational Sports. June 1973.

350-15 Commanders Handbook on Physical Fitness. October 1982.
350-18 The Individuals Handbook on Physical Fitness. May 1983.
350-22 You and the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT). September 1987.
351-4 Army Formal Schools Catalog. August 1991.

References-O
FIELD MANUALS (FMs)

21-150 Combative. December 1971.

22-5 Drill and Ceremonies. December 1986.
31-70 Basic Cold Weather Manual. April 1968.

OTHER ARMY PUBLICATIONS AND MATERIALS

AR 215-1 Administration of Army Morale, Welfare, and Recreation. February 1984.

DA Form 705 Army Physical Fitness Test Scorecard. May 1987.
DA Form 3349 Physical Profile. May 1986.
Folio No. 1 Training Facilities, Corps of Engineers Drawing No. 28-13-95. Directorate of
Facilities Engineering.
SB 10-260 Master Menu. December 1989.
TB Med 507 Occupational and Environmental Health Prevention, Treatment, and Control of
Heat Injury. July 1980.
TSP Physical Fitness Training - Total Fitness. July 1987.

TRAINING VIDEO TAPES (TVTS)

8-103 Standards for Determining Body Fat. 1986.

21-76 Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT). 1986.
21-191 Administration of the APFT. 1988.
21-192 Partner-Resisted Exercises (PRE). 1987.
21-218 Flexibility: The Truth About Stretching. 1989.
21-203 Push-up/Sit-up Improvement. 1988.

References-1
 INDEX

This is a topical index organized alphabetically. Citations are to paragraph numbers.

ability group running

advanced individual training, 1-10
aerobic exercises; see exercises, aerobic
aerobic fitness; see fitness, cardiorespiratory
aquatic exercise, 8-19 through 8-22
Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT), 14-1 through 14-27
ability group running to prepare for, 1-10
administration of, 14-2 through 14-8
alternate events for, 14-20 through 14-27
cardiovascular screening program for, 14-1
command functions relating to, 1-2, 3
duties of test personnel for, 14-8, 9
evaluation of, 1-14, 15; 14-1
failures, 1-12
procedures for testing, 14-10, 11
profiles in regard to, 14-20; see also profile
push-up as an event in, 14-11 through 14-14
results of, 14-18, 19
scorecard for, 14-3 through 14-7
scores above maximum in, 14-19
sequence of, 14-11 through 14-18
site of, 14-9, 10
sit-up as an event in, 14-14 through 14-16
two-mile run as an event in, 14-17, 18

bicycle test (APFT event), 14-24 through 14-26

bicycle ergometer test, stationary (APFT event), 14-22 through 14-24; D-O
bicycling; see cycling
body composition, 1-3; 5-0, 1; see also overweight soldiers
broom-ball hockey, 9-11, 12

calisthenics, 7-7 through 7-17

cardiorespiratory fitness; see fitness, cardiorespiratory
circuits
designing of, 7-2, 3
types of, 7-1
circuit training, 7-1 through 7-6
sample circuits for, 7-3 through 7-6
variables in, 7-1, 2
competitive fitness activities, 9-1 through 9-18
cool-down, 1-7; 4-3; 8-22
cross-country skiing, 2-15
cycling, 2-14

index-O
dehydration, 6-5; 12-3
diet; see weight, diet and exercise
drills
conditioning, 7-17
grass, 7-17 through 7-22
guerilla, 7-23 through 7-26
log, 8-13 through 8-18
rifle, 8-11, 12

endurance
cardiorespiratory; see fitness, cardiorespiratory
muscular; see muscular endurance and strength

environmental considerations, 12-0 through 12-4

air pollution, 12-4
altitude, 12-4
cold environments, 12-2, 3
dehydration, 12-3
frostbite, 12-3
heat injuries and symptoms, 12-1
hot, humid environments, 12-1, 2
hydration guidelines, 12-2
hypothermia, 12-2
temperature regulation, 12-0, 1
windchill factor, 12-3

exercise principles, 1-4; 10-12, 13

exercises; see also drills

acquatic, 8-19 through 8-22
aerobic, 2-0, 2-6 through 2-16
aerobic (alternate forms), 2-13 through 2-13
calisthenic, 7-7 through 7-17
conditioning drills; see drills, conditioning
cool-down after, 1-7; 4-3
flexibility, 1 -3; 4-1 through 4-17
guerilla; see drills, guerilla
injuries related to, 13-1, 2
muscle strengthening, 3-3 through 3-9
muscular training chart, 3-36
partner-resisted, 3-13 through 3-20
rhythmic (with music), 2-15, 16
warm-up before, 1-7; 4-2
with equipment, 3-21 through 3-35
without special equipment, 3-12

Fartlek training; see running, Fartlek training

fat
body, 1-12, 13; 5-0, 1; see also overweight soldiers
saturated, 6-3

Index-1
fitness
cardiorespiratory (aerobic), 1 -3; 2-0 through 2-16
components of, 1-3, 4
conditioning phases for, 1-7 through 1 -9; 3-6, 7
muscular, 3-1
fitness programs; see unit program
fitness programs, types of
advanced individual training (AIT), 1-10
individual, 1-11
initial entry training (IET), 1-10; 11-0, 1
special, 1-11, 12
TOE and TDA units, 1-11
unit, 1-9, 10
FITT factors, 1-4 through l-7; 2-1 through 2-6; 4-2
flexibility, 1-3; 4-1 through 4-17
flexibility exercises; see exercises, flexibility
fluid intake, 6-5, 6; 12-1
frequency, intensity, time, type; see FITT factors

grass drills; see drills, grass

guerilla drills; see drills, guerilla

handball and racquet sports, 2-15

heart rate, components of
heart rate reserve (HRR), 1-6, 8; 2-3 through 2-6
maximum heart rate (MHR), 2-2
resting heart rate (RHR), 2-3, 4
training heart rate (THR), 1-6, 8; (calculation) 2-2 through 2-6

initial entry training (IET), 1-1, 10, 15; 11-0, 1

injuries, 2-6, 7; 7-7, 8; 13-1, 2
interval training; see running, interval training
intramural, 9- I through 9-5

log drills; see drills, log

master fitness trainer (MFT), 1-1, 2, 3, 9, 12, 13

maximum heart rate; see heart rate, maximum
muscle groups, 3-9 through 3-11
muscle contractions (types), 3-1, 2
muscular endurance and strength, 1-3; 3-1 through 3-36
age as a factor in, 1-13, 14
exercise programs for, 3-12 through 3-36
exercise selection for, 3-6
principles of, 3-2 through 3-5
key points regarding, 3-12
training for, 1-5 through 1-7, 9, 13; 3-1 through 3-36

nine-ball soccer, 9-5 through 9-8

nutrition
and fitness, 6-0 through 6-6
for optimal physical performance, 6-3 through 6-6
guidelines, 6-0 through 6-3
in the field, 6-6
Index-2
obstacle courses, types of
conditioning, 8-2 through 8-6
confidence, 8-6 through 8-10
safety precautions for using, 8-1, 2
olympics; see unit olympics
orienteering, 9-13 through 9-16
overweight soldiers, 1-12, 13; see also fat, body

partner-resisted exercise; see exercises, partner-resisted

perceived exertion, G-1
phases of conditioning; see fitness, conditioning phases
physical fitness log, C-O
positive profile form, B-1
principles of exercise; see exercise principles
profiles, 1-13; 14-20; B-1
push-up; see APFT, push-up
pushball, 9-7, 8
pushball (strategy), 9-8 through 9-11

resistance training; see strength training

rest, ice, compression, and elevation (RICE), 13-1
resting heart rate; see heart rate, resting
rifle drills; see drills, rifle
road marches, 2-11, 12; 11-1
rope skipping, 2-15
running
cross-country, 2-10
Fartlek training, 2-9
injuries; see injuries
interval training, 2-8, 9
last-man-up, 2-10
shoes; see shoes, running
technique, 2-6

safety, 1-15; 3-6; 7-7; 8-1, 2; 9-16; 11-0, 1

sexual differences, A-1, 2
shoes, running (how to select), E-1, 2
sit-up; see APFT, sit-up
soccer; see nine-ball soccer
speed play; see running, Fartlek training
strategy pushball; see pushball (strategy)
strength training; see muscular endurance and strength, training
stretching; see flexibility and exercises, flexibility
swim test (APFT event), 14-21, 22
swimming, 2-14; see also exercise, aquatic

training heart rate; see heart rate, training

two-mile run; see APFT, two-mile run

Index-3
unit olympics, 9-17, 18
unit program
activities and games for, 9-5 through 9-16
development of, 10-1 through 10-13
evaluation of, 1-14, 15
sample of, 10-5 through 10-12
types of, 1-10, 11

V O2 max, calculation of, F-1, 2

walk (APFT event), 14-26, 27

walking, 2-14, 15
warm-up, 1-7; 4-2; 8-19
weight (body); see also nutrition and fitness
Army standards for, 5-0, 1
diet and exercise for proper, 5-1
methods for evaluating, 5-0, 1
programs for overweight soldiers, 1-12, 13

Index-4
 FM 21-20
30 SEPTEMBER 1992

By Order of the Secretary of the Army

GORDON R. SULLIVAN
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

MILTON H. HAMILTON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
02361

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Arm y, USAR and ARNG: To be distributed In accordance with DA Form 12-11E,
requirements for FM 21-20, Physical Fitness Training (Qty rqr block no. 0165).

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1994 300-421/82850

GENERATIONS APART:
XERS AND BOOMERS
IN THE OFFICER CORPS

Leonard Wong

October 2000
 *****
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the
Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report
is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be
forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report
may be obtained from the Publications and Production Office by calling
commercial (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at
rummelr@awc.carlisle.army.mil

*****
Most 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)
monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic
dissemination. SSIs Homepage address is: http://carlisle-www.army.
mil/usassi/welcome.htm

*****
The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail
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ISBN 1-58487-038-9

ii
 FOREWORD

The junior officer attrition problem has grown in

importance and urgency to reach the levels of the Secretary
and Chief of Staff of the Army. They have instituted pay
raises, pay table reform, and improved retirement benefits
to stem the flow of captains and others from the Army. At
the same time, the Armys senior leadership has sensitized
battalion commanders throughout the force to the issue and
is trying to convince captains to continue in the Army. Yet
attitudinal surveys predict and exit numbers verify that the
exodus of junior officers has not abated.
In the following monograph, Leonard Wong mines the
generational differences literature for insights. Organi-
zations in the civilian sector have been forced to deal with
conflict between the Baby Boomer generation and
Generation X and the Army is now discovering that it is no
different.
The analysis in this monograph goes beyond anecdotes,
e-mails, and editorials to describe the situation the Army
finds itself in today. It is at times an uncomfortable and
difficult process to objectively examine our perspectives in
relation to others. The key point is that todays junior
officers think differently than junior officers in the past and
hence solutions to the attrition problem cannot come from
the traditional menu of conventional fixes.
Retaining our junior officers will require policy changes
and critical leadership actions. This monograph convinc-
ingly makes the case for both.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director
Strategic Studies Institute

iii
 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

LEONARD WONG joined the Strategic Studies Institute in

July 2000 after serving 20 years in the U.S. Army. His time
in the Army included teaching leadership at the U.S.
Military Academy, serving as an analyst in the Program
Analysis and Evaluation Directorate and later in the Office
of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and serving as the
Director of the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis.
He has authored several articles, chapters, and papers on
organizational issues in the Army such as downsizing,
leadership, and junior officer retention. He is a registered
Professional Engineer and holds a B.S. from the U.S.
Military Academy, and an M.S.B.A. and Ph.D. from Texas
Tech University.

iv
 SUMMARY

This monograph addresses the junior officer attrition

problem by identifying and discussing the disparity
between senior and junior officers in terms of generational
differences. Officers from the Baby Boom Generation think
and perceive things differently than officers from
Generation X. Using empirical evidence to support the
generational differences literature, the author points out
that Generation X officers are more confident in their
abilities, perceive loyalty differently, want more balance
between work and family, and are not intimidated by rank.
Additionally, while pay is important to Generation X
officers, it alone will not keep junior officers from leaving.
The solutions presented in the monograph range from
strategic policies changing the Army as an organization to
operational leadership actions affecting the face-to-face
interaction between senior and junior officers.

v
 GENERATIONS APART:
XERS AND BOOMERS
IN THE OFFICER CORPS

Introduction.

In July of 1998, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for

Personnel (ODCSPER) released a message addressing the
growing concern of junior officers departing the Army. The
message stated that,
ODCSPER analysts confirm that officer retention is down
slightly for all grades except lieutenant and major. However,
the downturn in retention is not significant, and rates remain
within bounds of pre-drawdown rates.1

Less than 2 years later, the Vice Chief of Staff of the

Army (VCSA) sent another message on the same topic. This
time, however, the message stated that,
. . .in the last 10 years, the voluntary attrition rate for captains
has risen from 6.7% to an all-time high of 10.6%. If we, as
senior leaders, dont take action now to turn this around, we
may not be able to meet our future requirements.2

Shortly after the VCSAs message was sent to commanders,

the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army
set up a Blue Ribbon panel tasked with developing specific
recommendations on how the Army could stop the exodus of
junior officers in the near, mid, and long-term future.3
In less than 2 years, the Army shifted from denial of a
junior officer retention problem to a situation where the
most senior Army leadership became involved in seeking
help to staunch the flow of captains out of the Army. How
could Army senior leaders miss the signals of an attrition
problem? How could the Armys senior leadership not see
junior officer resignation numbers increasing or hear the
growing discontent at the junior officer level?

1
 One answer is that the Armys downsizing masked the
increasing departure of junior officers. In the process of
drawing down a force of 780,000 to an Army of 480,000, so
many junior officers were enticed, encouraged, or induced to
leave that the resignation of junior officers became routine
and viewed as generally good for the organization.
Downsizing was painful, but the huge number of junior
officers that left the Army was viewed as an expected and
accepted consequence. The continued attrition that
occurred after the conclusion of the downsizing was thought
to be a temporary state while the organization recovered
from the drawdown.
In addition to desensitizing the force to junior officers
leaving, the downsizing had a far more subtle effect. Eight
years of downsizing affected the attitudes of the
survivorsthose officers left behind. Research in
organizational behavior had well documented the
detrimental effects on survivors as a consequence of
drawing down an organization. 4 The Army as an
organization was no exception. The psychological bond
between officer survivors and the Army was weakened and
redefined.5 As competition in the now trimmer Army
became keener, a stifling atmosphere of perfection known
as the zero defects mentality along with notions of
careerism emerged.6 This is the environment encountered
by todays junior officers soon after commissioning.
The attitudinal effects of the downsizing were
overshadowed, however, by reduced budgets and increased
operating tempo (OPTEMPO). With the Armys attention
focused on adjusting to a post-Cold War period, the
attitudinal changes in the junior officer population largely
escaped the notice of the senior Army leadership. Instead,
debate arose over the role of peacekeeping, humanitarian
assistance, a shrinking labor market from which to recruit,
a rush to digitization, and the need for a larger budget slice.
Thus, in addition to the numbing effects of forced attrition
due to downsizing, the changing roles and missions of the
Army after the fall of the Berlin Wall shifted the Army

2
leaderships attention away from monitoring its people to
reevaluating the Armys relevance in a post-Cold War
world.7

The Generational Divide.

Now that the junior officer attrition crisis has the

attention of the Army leadership, it seems plausible that the
problem may now be analyzed and remedied, assuming
adequate resources are available. One factor, however, that
contributed to the senior Army leadership overlooking the
attrition problem in the first place will continue to hamper
efforts to overcome it. Simply put, todays senior officers do
not understand todays junior officers or their perspectives.
Senior officers think they understand the world of
lieutenants and captains, but many junior officers and
others are convinced that they do not. Junior officers have
become persuaded in increasing numbers that the Armys
senior leadership is not connected to the reality of the
trenches.
This monograph identifies and discusses the disparity
between senior and junior officers in terms of generational
differences. The objective of this monograph is to inform
senior officers about captains and their perspectives during
a time when many junior officers believe that senior officers
just dont get it. The analysis is at times stereotypical and
over-generalizing, but it addresses a disturbing message
that is growing in intensity in the junior officer ranks of the
Army.
For example, in the spring of 1999 in the Sample Survey
of Military Personnel administered by the Army Research
Institute, sample comments concerning senior officers
included a major commenting that the problem is, Trust in
senior leadership. My personal opinion is that they are out
of touch with what is happening, where the rubber meets
the road. A colonel remarked,

3
 I talk to a lot of young officers. They have lost faith with the
senior leadership of the Army. They believe they [senior leaders]
are either out of touch with reality or liars. Were losing a
generation of good leaders.

A lieutenant added,
The largest problem affecting retention of junior officers is the
perception that the senior leadership (LTC+) is completely out
of touch with soldiers and their needs.8

A study on military culture conducted by the Center for

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) reiterated the
theme of mistrust and differing perceptions across ranks. In
that study, focus group participants believed, that senior
leaders were out of touch with conditions in the field and
fleet.9 The researchers found differing perceptions across
the junior and senior ranks, noting that issues ranged from,
. . . agreement by senior leaders to take on missions that have
stressed their forces beyond what some think are prudent limits
to assessments of readiness that did not match perceptions at
lower levels.10

The CSIS findings were echoed in a widely distributed

e-mail containing Command and General Staff College
focus group responses. In that study, one officer noted that,
Young officers are getting out because they feel out of touch with
leadership; the Army [that young officers] are experiencing is
not the same Army [that] general officers experienced as
lieutenants and captains.11

Junior officers wince when senior officers assume they

are familiar with the plight of todays junior officers. Yet,
well-meaning policies are created and admirable mentoring
sessions are conducted by senior officers who inadvertently
exacerbate the gap between the ranks by assuming todays
junior officers think the same as junior officers of yore. For
example, in the VCSAs message to field commanders
concerning the exodus of captains, the VCSA stated:

4
 I need your help in convincing these young warriors that there
is a bright light at the end of the tunnel. Listen to their
concerns, and let them know what we are doing to address
them. We know that many of their concerns are similar to those
we had as junior officers; so share with them what it was like
when you were a captainwhen you stood in their shoes and
faced similar hard career decisions.12 (emphasis added)

Rather than telling captains of the similarities of then

and now, it may be prudent to first examine the differences
between junior officers of then and now. Senior officers need
to understand who todays junior officers are and how they
may differ from junior officers in previous decades.
Of course, some will be quick to point out that there has
always been a rift between older, senior officers at higher
echelons and younger, junior officers on the front line. Two
key aspects make todays situation much different,
however. First, in the past, communication between ranks
was much less frequent due to the hierarchical nature of the
Army structure. A captain used to be merely a small cog of a
much larger wheel and contact with a senior officer was
rare. Today, a captain can be the pseudo-mayor of a town in
Bosnia or the only U.S. representative in a potential flash
point in Latin America. E-mail and the Internet keep these
junior officers well informed of issues and well connected
with peers and senior officers. As a result, junior officers
now interact much more with senior officers because the
unstable world situation demands it and advances in
technology allow it. This increased interaction serves to
highlight any generational differences between the ranks
and oftentimes results in debilitating conflict within the
Army.13
A less subtle difference of todays situation is the simple
fact that todays junior officers are leaving, and many are
blaming their departure on senior officer lack of
understanding. Commanders have always reassured
themselves with the adage, A happy soldier is a
complaining soldier, but now the complaining soldiers are
acting on their grievances. Simply stated, the Armys

5
current readiness and the future leadership of the Army are
in jeopardy. Ignoring or misinterpreting the increasingly
louder voices of disgruntled junior officers only serves to
kick the can down the road.

Boomers and Xers.

To understand the gap between senior and junior

officers, it is helpful to examine the research done on
generational differences. The following paragraphs briefly
summarize the two generations dominating the officer
corpsthe Baby Boomers and Generation Xers.14 Extensive
research in demographics has yielded a wealth of
knowledge concerning generational characteristics of
Boomers and Xers. The emphasis in this monograph is on
Generation X, however, since the junior officer population is
predominantly Generation X.
The Baby Boom Generation was born between 1943 and
1960 and Generation X was born between 1960 and 1980.
Different researchers have adjusted these dates 5 or 6 years
in either direction, but the important point is to realize that
there are two distinct generations in the officer ranks.
Generational differences emerge as cohorts experience
defining moments in history which shape their attitudes
and perspectives.
Baby Boomers grew up during a time of economic
prosperity against a backdrop of rebellion and indulgence.15
Their views were shaped by events such as Vietnam,
Woodstock, the Kennedy assassination, and Kent State. A
Boomer childhood consisted of a nuclear family where Dad
worked and Mom stayed at home. These parents doted on
the young Boomers and viewed them as the generation that
was going to change the world. At school, they learned to
work well with others since the sheer numbers of their
generation overwhelmed school systems and necessitated
teamwork and collaboration. They entered adulthood
optimistic and driven.

6
 In the workforce, Boomers worked relentlessly in
pursuit of goals, often at the expense of marriages, family,
and personal lives. Boomer women began to enter the
workforce as the influence of the feminist movement grew
and reinforced the independence characterized by Boomers.
Day care and nannies allowed both Boomer parents to work
tiring, yet supposedly fulfilling, 60-hour workweeks. Work
became more than just putting food on the table; it became
their raison dtre.
In contrast to all the attention heaped on the Baby
Boomers as they grew up, Generation X arrived on the scene
unnoticed. Sometimes called the Slackers, Baby Busters,
Twenty-somethings, or the MTV generation, Generation X
developed a cynical, pragmatic, survivor mentality as they
experienced a world much less idyllic than their Boomer
predecessors.16 Watergate, Three Mile Island, Operation
DESERT STORM, and Rodney King shaped their thinking
in their early years. With Boomer parents overworked and
focused on accomplishing personal goals, Generation X
children were often neglected and overlooked.17
Two factors heavily impacted the childhood years of
Xers. First, soaring Boomer divorce rates meant Xers did
not have the nurturing environment enjoyed by the
Boomers. Instead, visitation rights and joint custody
became the norm as over 40 percent of the Xers spent time in
a single-parent home by age 16.18 Second, as women entered
the workforce in increasing numbers, Xers became the
ultimate latchkey children. Being alone and fending on
their own, the young Xers learned to rely on themselves and
developed a confidence often misinterpreted as arrogance.
Yearning for the bonds normally found in a family, Xers
learned to seek out a circle of friends for relationships.
Xers developed a skeptical nature about authority as
people and institutions around them let them down
repeatedly.19 They watched one president resign in disgrace
and another defend himself by examining the definition of
is. Whereas the Boomers hopes soared eternal with the

7
first lunar landing, Xers hopes were shattered as they
watched the Challenger explode on their schoolroom TV
screens. They waited for the quality time with their
parents that seldom came and learned to trust only
themselves. To the Xer, authority was to be earned, not
declared by position or fiat.
Education became more and more important to
Generation X with record numbers of its members entering
college. In college, they were not given the approved
solutions, but instead were encouraged to think critically
and challenge whoever thought they had the right answer.
This pragmatism borne from memories of an austere
childhood led many Xers to choose business majors such as
economics instead of the traditional liberal arts degree.
As Xers entered the workforce, they remembered the
workaholic tendencies of their Boomer parents and
responded with an intense pursuit of balance in their lives.
Work became just a means to earn a living. Life included
work, but also family, spouse, friends, and personal time.
The psychological bond with the organization where they
worked weakened even more as Xers watched downsizing
reward hardworking Boomers with pink slips and early
retirements. The Work is Life motto of the Boomers was
replaced by Get a Life as Xers brought a sense of
informality and balance to the workplace.

Boomers and Xers in the Army.

In the Army, the distinctions between Baby Boomers

and Generation Xers are not as glaring because
self-selection into the Army serves to homogenize the
population. Nevertheless, generational differences still
emerge. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the two
generations in the officer corps. Note that lieutenants and
captains are almost exclusively Generation Xers, while
lieutenant colonel and above are almost all Baby Boomers.
While self-selection and the socialization process of the
Army soften many potential aspects of generational conflict,

8
the hierarchical nature of the Army puts Boomers clearly in
the senior ranks and Xers in the junior ranks. This is in
contrast to many civilian corporations where Xers are
increasingly entering the workforce in more senior positions
due to entrepreneurial and technological skills. With all the
Boomers in the key decision and policymaking positions in
the Army, it is easier for Xers to place the blame for Army
problems on generational differences rather than the classic
line versus staff tension.

Generation X Baby Boomer

16000

14000

12000

10000

8000

6000

4000

2000

0
2LT 1LT CPT MAJ LTC COL - GEN
Rank

Figure 1. Distribution of Generations in the Officer

Corps.20

As the first of the Baby Boomer generation of officers

entered the Army, they encountered the disillusionment of
the Vietnam War. Vietnam shaped the minds of the early
Boomers who used their zeal and enthusiasm for hard work
to later produce the AirLand Battle doctrine and the
National Training Center.21 Boomer officers squirmed
under the Carter administration and the frustration of the
Hollow Army, but came into their own under the Reagan
build-up. Boomer officers were the commanders who helped

9
transform the Army from failures in Vietnam and mistakes
in Grenada to victories in the streets of Panama and the
dunes of Operation DESERT STORM. It was the
hardworking Boomers who won the Cold War and saved our
way of life from the Evil Empire, but it was also the
overworking Boomers who brought zero defects, careerism,
and new accusations of micromanagement to the Army. As
Boomers moved into the senior ranks of the officer corps,
their driven nature flourished in the post-Cold war
environment. 24/7" became the norm and bigger and better
QTBs 22 became commonplace. Today, Baby Boomers
dominate nearly all the leadership positions in the Army
ranging from battalion commander to Chief of Staff. When
junior officers complain about the Armys senior leaders,
they are talking about the Boomers.
Generation Xers entered the Army as the reform of the
Army was nearing its completion. Xers were the platoon
leaders in Operation DESERT STORM and company
commanders in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. They can
remember the Cold War in a historical sense, but their time
in uniform has been dominated by peacekeeping,
humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. Events such
as the Armys downsizing, Somalia, Dont Ask, Dont Tell,
and Aberdeen shape the attitudes and views of Generation
X officers. Their skeptical attitudes toward authority,
already influenced by events prior to entering the Army,
were further affected by the court martial of the Sergeant
Major of the Army, the reprimand of Major General Hale,
and general-on-general sexual harassment.
Xers were deployed more often than their Boomer
counterparts,23 but their absence did not lessen their
interconnectedness with others. Instead, Xers grew up in a
deployed Army where phones, e-mail, and the Internet kept
them linked with their family, peers, and the outside
world.24 Consequently, Generation X officers tend to be
more current in issues and also more aware of the situation
outside the military than junior officers had in the past.
They know about the outside job market, housing trends,

10
technological advances, and the nuances of the New
Economy, often more than their Boomer bosses.

Captain Boomer and Captain Xer.

In order to gain a better understanding of todays

captains, it is useful to contrast Baby Boomers and
Generation Xers in the Army. Instead of comparing how
attitudes of older Boomers contrast with younger Xers,
however, the following analysis compares Baby Boomer
captains with Generation X captains. Specifically, the focus
is on captains with about 7 years time in service. For the
Boomers, data collected in 1988 concerning year group 1981
officers is used. Year group 1981 officers were born in the
late 1950s. They are the later Baby Boomers who remember
the Vietnam War growing up, but really entered the Army
during the height of the Cold War. For Generation Xers,
data gathered in 1998 concerning year group 1991 officers is
used. Year group 1991 officers were born in the late 1960s
and entered the Army at the early stages of the downsizing.
Longitudinal databases allow the contrast of two cohorts
at similar points of time in their careers. The comparison of
historical Boomer captain attitudes with those of current
Xer captains helps determine if senior officers really did
have the same experiences and thoughts as todays junior
officers.
Although much smaller in numbers, Generation X
captains are demographically almost identical to Baby
Boomers when they were captainsabout 89 percent male,
about 80 percent white, and about 92 percent married.25 As
we examine their attitudes, however, we see many trends
already identified in the Baby Boomer/Generation X
literature on differing attitudes.
Xer Captains are more confident in their abilities.
Because of the lack of attention showered on them as
children, Xers learned to rely mainly on themselves. The
hardiness developed by austere conditions manifested itself

11
in a belief held by Xers that they will succeed, regardless of
the circumstances. Xer captains believe that they will
flourish in the Army or wherever they are planted. Figure 2
shows the attitudes of captains in 1988 and in 1998.26 Notice
how Generation X captains are more confident in their
abilities and their capacity to succeed both in the Army and
in the civilian world.

Percentage of officers
agreeing
Boomer Xer
CPTs CPTs
(1988) (1998)
I am confident I will be promoted as high as 59.8 % 67.8 %
my ability and interest warrant if I stay in
the Army.

Percentage of officers
answering "Easy" or "Very
Easy"
Boomer Xer
CPTs CPTs

How difficult do you think it would be for you 52.4 % 75.1 %

to find a good civilian job right now,
considering both your own qualifications and
current labor market conditions?

How difficult would it be for you to leave the 45.2 % 51.1 %

Army in the next year or so given your
current personal or family situation?

Figure 2. Confidence of Generation X Captains

Compared to Boomer Captains.

Of course, fueling this belief is the sustained growth of

the New Economy. Xer captains have not experienced a
recession. In their minds, the current economic boom is
normal and expected to continue. In January 2000, the U.S.
economy entered into the longest official peacetime
expansion with 92 straight months of expanding Gross
Domestic Productand this while unemployment rates
remained at record lows.27 As the economy continues to
grow, the Xer captains perceived risk in leaving the Army
continues to shrink.

12
 What does this mean to senior officers? It means that
Xers are not in the Army for job security. They know they
can make it on the outside, and they see few obstacles if they
choose to leave. It means that policymakers should not
assume that the junior officers are a free good. They are a
valuable commodity and very hard to replace. For an Xer,
seriously exploring career options other than the Army is
not a momentous decision.
Generation X officers see loyalty differently. But even if
Xer officers can do well on the outside, what about their
selfless service? Where is the loyalty in our junior officers?
Keep in mind that Generation X officers grew up in a society
replete with downsizing and restructuring. As a Fortune
magazine pointed out:
Loyalty. Gratitude. Fortitude. Theyre dead, man. And whos
the culprit? Maybe corporate America. After all, it was big
companies that in the late 1980s and early 1990s ended the
traditional employment contract. That whole loyalty-
in-exchange-for-lifetime-employment-and-a-gold-watch
thing no longer made sense. So they got rid of it.28

Generation X junior officers are loyal, but their loyalty is

based on a bond of trust between the Army and the
officernot on the promise of lifelong employment. While
the impact of the civilian downsizing is significant on the
attitudes of the Generation X cohort in general, Generation
X Army officers are intimately familiar with the strain on
organizational commitment from downsizing. Figure 3
shows the magnitude of policies and programs designed to
coax or force officers to leave the Army as seen by
Generation X officers. With junior officers witnessing such
an array of policies designed to entice or force over 23,000 of
their peers and role models to leave, it is not surprising that
their loyalty to the military has been redefined with a
healthy dose of skepticism.
Xer Captains want more balance between life and work.
Ask a Baby Boomer captain to define who they are and they
will usually answer that they are an Army officer. Ask a

13
 Policy Years Total
Number of
Officers
Downsized
Selective Early Retirement (Involuntary) FY92--FY95 3,393
Early Retirement (Voluntary) FY93--FY97 3,387
Reduction in Force (Involuntary) FY92 244
Voluntary Separation Initiatives FY92--FY97 11,439
Captain/Lieutenant Retention Board FY92--FY94 1,681
(Involuntary)
Voluntary Early Release and Retirement FY92--FY95, 3,480
Program FY97
TOTAL OFFICERS 23,624
Source: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Army

Figure 3. Officer Drawdown Witnessed by Year Group

1991 from FY92 to FY97.

Generation X captain who they are, and they will also

answer that they are an Army officer, but in addition will
mention their family and occasionally their hobbies. Baby
Boomer captains admired and respected families, but
families were usually placed in the background and existed
mainly to support the role of the Army officer. Likewise,
hobbies and personal time were luxuries not afforded to a
Boomer Army officer who devoted every ounce of energy and
attention to the job.
To a Generation Xer, being an Army officer is a noble
profession. Nevertheless, to an Xer, it is not an
all-consuming source of self-identity. Of course, job
satisfaction is still important as evidenced by 26 percent of
Xer captains putting Opportunities for Job Satisfaction as
one of their top three factors in their career decision. But
contrast this with over 42 percent of Boomer captains who
placed Job Satisfaction in the top three considerations back
in 1988. Xers want more than just satisfaction at work for
their career in the Army.
Xer captains, like their civilian counterparts, are
yearning for balance in their lives. The job is still central,
but they want family time and personal time too. They have
watched their Boomer predecessors throw themselves into

14
the profession, and they are now resetting the boundaries of
what exactly it means to be in the Army. Figure 4 shows the
drastic attitudinal changes that have occurred in the officer
ranks in just 10 years. Notice how less than a quarter of Gen
X officers (compared with nearly half of Baby Boomer
officers) believe work/life balance is compatible with an
Army career. This is a significant attitudinal shift to take
place in only 10 years.

Percentage of officers
answering "Agree" or
"Strongly Agree"
Boomer Xer
CPTs CPTs
(1988) (1998)
The demands of an Army career would/does 48.7 % 65.3 %
make it difficult to have the kind of family life
I would like.

For me, a rewarding career can compensate 38.4 % 22.4 %

for limited personal /family time.

An Army career would allow/allows me to 47.4 % 21.3 %

maintain the kind of balance I want between
my work and personal life.

Figure 4. Work/Life Balance of Generation X Captains

versus Boomer Captains.

The shifting emphasis on work/life balance is a

troublesome trend for many Boomers since it implies a
lesser sense of duty. Yet today even many Boomers are
questioning the insatiable appetite that an Army career has
for family or personal time. It is no longer uncommon to hear
of Boomer colonels turning down coveted Brigade-level
command positions because of family reasons. Indeed, the
same Boomer sample that as captains had over 38 percent
agreeing that a rewarding career can compensate for
limited personal and family time had only 24.2 percent
agree when asked the identical question as lieutenant
colonels.
Pay is important to Xer captains, but more money wont
hold them in. Boomer policymakers often mischaracterize
Generation Xers as materialistic and consumed by higher

15
paychecks. Pay, indeed, is more important to captains today
than in the past. Nearly 37 percent of Xer captains listed
pay as one of the top three factors in the career decision,
while only 25.7 percent of Boomer captains placed pay in the
top three issues. But while compensation is important to
Xers and retention, it is not the primary reason why
captains are leaving. When asked about their current
compensation package of pay, allowances, and benefits, 57
percent of Boomer captains in 1988 and 56.3 percent of Xer
captains in 1998 said they were satisfied. The exodus of Xer
captains despite nearly identical levels of satisfied Boomer
and Xer captains indicates that the Xer captains are not
leaving in pursuit of better salaries. Pay is a critical issue
and must be adequate, but more money alone will not keep
the Xer captains from resigning.
Xer captains are not impressed by rank. Any senior
officer who has recently faced an auditorium full of junior
officers knows that Xer officers have a different attitude
towards authority. In those situations, someone will
inevitably ask a piercing, pointed question that, in years
past, would have evoked gasps from the audience. Its not
that Generation X officers are disrespectful; it is just that
they are not impressed by rank or hierarchical position.
They have been let down by too many authority figures
ranging from their overworked parents to their
Commander-in-Chief. As a result, they are extremely
skeptical towards authority. This attitude is reflected in the
questions in Figure 5.
Note that despite the possibility of a baseline level of
dissatisfaction towards superiors that may exist in all
organizations, Generation X captains are clearly more
critical of senior officers than captains in the past. This was
a major finding in the CSIS study that continues to be
echoed in every study of junior officers.

16
 Percentage of officers
expressing dissatisfaction
Boomer Xer
CPTs CPTs
(1988) (1998)
How satisfied are you with relationships with 5.7 % 17.8 %
superior/senior officers?

Percentage of officers
responding with "Poor" or
"Very Poor"
Boomer Xer
CPTs CPTs

Overall leadership effectiveness of 9.3 % 16.6 %

supervisor/rater

Figure 5. Attitudes Towards Senior Officers and

Superiors.
So Now What?

Before moving onto the implications of the generation

divide, it is important to note that just as senior officers
should not assume that Boomer captains and Xer captains
think alike, they should also not assume that they are
totally different either. Indeed, there are some enduring
attitudes spanning both generations in the officer corps that
point to the overarching culture found in the Army. Figure 6
illustrates with similar responses by both Boomer and Xer
captains that pride in the Army, camaraderie, and
professionalism are still alive and well in the Army. (Notice
how in the second and third survey questions Xer officers,
true to their generation, are drawn more toward peer
relationships than Boomers to fill the vacuum of familial
bonds.)
With an understanding of the nuances of Generation X
officers, senior leaders can address the junior officer
retention problem by altering the organization or effecting a
change in the attitudes and perspectives of Xer officers.
Changing the organization may include policies at the
strategic level to reflect the reality of Generation X attitudes

17
and also senior officer leadership and actions at the
operational level directly affecting Generation X officers.
Likewise, influencing the viewpoints of Xer captains may
require emphasis at both the strategic and operational
levels. The following section examines some possible policy
and leadership implications of the generational gap in the
officer corps.

Percentage of officers
answering "Agree" or
"Strongly Agree"
Boomer Xer
CPTs CPTs
(1988) (1998)
I am quite proud to tell people that I am in 92.2 % 90.8 %
the Army.
One of the things that I value most about the 72.5 % 76.4 %
Army is the sense of community or
camaraderie I feel.
I can count on Army people to help out when 72.7 % 75.9 %
needed.
Percentage of officers who
agreed
Boomer Xer
CPTs CPTs
When I think of myself as a professional, I 77.8 % 75.0 %
compare myself most often with Army leaders
whom I know and respect.

Figure 6. Enduring Attitudes Across Generations.

Instill work/family/personal time balance. This is easy

to say, yet hard to do given the Armys lack of control in
determining its own workload. Cutting back on deployment
tempo (DEPTEMPO) and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO)
may appear out of the realm of the possible, but the first step
is to establish a metric and then work towards reducing it to
acceptable levels. The goal is not to move to an 8-to-5 Army,
but rather to bring the life of a junior officer back into
balance. It is not just about getting more time off for Xers,
but also creating family and personal time activities that
work toward creating more commitment to the Army. Once

18
some breathing room has been established, then policies
and actions emphasizing balance can be put into place.
Examples include:

Make the Army community a fun place to work and

live. Revamp the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation
(MWR) program to include more activities amenable
to Xers. Remember that Xers gravitate to extreme
sports, so the frame shop may have to give way to the
mountain biking club. Army posts should rival every
nearby community in the quantity and quality of
activities and special events. If family and personal
time can be freed up, then make the Army an
attractive place to spend it.

Do not measure quality of life in square footage. To

Boomer officers, taking care of families was
constructing state-of-the-art day care facilities for the
kids and building big PXs29 for the spouses. To Xers,
taking care of families is giving officers time to
nurture relationships with children and spouses.

Commanders must avoid the temptation to fill every

minute of the training schedule. Cut back on
mandatory training, especially the classes viewed as
politically correct.30 There will certainly be peak
times when long hours are necessary for mission
accomplishment, but there should also be some valley
times when it is acceptable to give everyone time off.

Senior leaders must model work/family balance

themselves. Many junior officers are leaving because
they do not want the life of their superiors. It is not
good enough to make a policy sending everyone home
at 1700 if the commander is seen carrying several
hours worth of work home every night. Show junior
officers that senior officers dont have to sacrifice
family and personal time to be successful in the Army
(e.g., what message is sent when junior officers find

19
 out that the incoming commander will be a
geographical bachelor?).

Give officers a chance to reflect. Allow harried junior

officers to step off the fast moving train by
encouraging advanced civil schooling, training with
industry, or sabbaticals. Make the officer advance
course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School
(CAS3), and Command and General Staff College
(CGSC) times where officers can restore mental,
physical, and spiritual balance.
Appeal to the Xer desire for relationships. Generation X
officers crave close relationships to make up for the family
life they never had. As a result, a circle of close friends is a
valuable commodity to a Generation X officer. If the Army
can become the source of social relationships in addition to a
place of employment, it will be possible to improve
Generation X commitment to the Army. The goal would be
to emphasize the institutional aspects of the Army instead
of the occupational. 3 1 A focus on reinforcing the
institutional aspects encourages junior officers to find their
reference group internal to the Army. The Army becomes
not so much the work involved, but the people and shared
experiences it includes. If the Army can offer the
camaraderie and cohesion desired by Generation X officers
(and often lacking in the civilian world), then Xers will stay
regardless of the economic situation.
The objective here is to preserve aspects of one of the
Armys intangible, yet extremely powerful, retention
toolsthe Armys culture. Of course, some critics are
already questioning the gap between the military and
society32 and will point out that making the boundary
between society and officers less permeable only serves to
widen the gap. The intent of these policies and actions is not
to distance Army officers from society, but rather to provide
more opportunities for Generation X officers to find
satisfying bonds of friendship within the Army.

20
 Policies and actions to improve junior officer retention
that address the Generation X search for meaningful
relationships include:

Resurrect officer calls. When the Army got rid of

Happy Hour in order to de-glamorize alcohol, an
unintended side effect was the removal of an
organizational ritual that served to strengthen the
bonds between officers in a unit. Bring back
mandatory social gatherings such as prop blasts,
spur ceremonies, and dinings-in, but keep alcohol
consumption in check. Events do not have to be
restricted to the club, but can also include staff rides,
outdoor extreme sports, trips, or anything that allows
friendships to flourish. These events do not have to be
after work hours (when they would conflict with
family and personal time), but could be scheduled
during the workday. Rituals and traditions are often
viewed suspiciously by outsiders as frivolous, but they
serve the important purpose of strengthening the
bonds within a unit.

Proceed cautiously with privatization. While

economic rationale points us down the path to
privatization, it must be done carefully. Activities
such as officer clubs, housing, bowling alleys,
commissaries, and post exchanges provide services
that may be acquired more economically through
privatization, but recognize that these agencies also
serve to define the Armys culture. They provide a
platform for building relationships other than the
workplace. Economic efficiency is important, but
maintaining our culture of camaraderie is priceless.

Ma x imiz e opp or tuni ti es d ur i ng key c ar eer

milestones. The officer basic and advance courses,
CAS3, and CGSC all provide opportunities for officers
to establish lasting friendships with other officers.
Place exercises, activities, and events into the

21
 curriculum that foster close interaction and
teamwork. Use the time wisely since these are rare
moments in an officers career when large groups of
officers are gathered in an environment generally
void of the pressures of leading troops.

Really mentor junior officers. Senior officers need to

pull in junior officers and talk with (not to) them. This
is not performance counseling; this is not quarterly
counseling. This is a senior officer (not necessarily the
rater or senior rater) taking an interest in the life of a
junior officer. Spend 95 percent of the time listening
and 5 percent of the time giving advice. Of course,
junior officers will be guarded at first, but once they
see that the senior officer is not doing this out of
concern for the mission or even the unit, they will
begin searching out mentors.
Rely less on traditional hierarchical leadership. The
Army is the epitome of hierarchical leadership.
Unfortunately, Generation X officers, who are unimpressed
by position and leery of authority, reside at the lower rungs
of the Army structure. While it would be ludicrous to
suggest that we abandon all notions of hierarchical
leadership in the Army profession just to accommodate
Generation Xers, it may be feasible to alter the process
through which leadership is applied via the hierarchy. Note
however, that few policies can address this issue. Similarly,
speeches, posters, and articles will not change the way the
Army does business. Instead, direct leadership by senior
leaders is the main means to mitigate the Xer aversion to
hierarchical leadership. Xer officers are not nave. They
understand the need for some hierarchy. Yet they will
greatly appreciate genuine attempts to reduce the
dependence on rank or position whenever possible.
Some possible actions to reduce the undesirable aspects
of hierarchy for Generation X officers include:

22
 Make the Officer Professional Management System
(OPMS XXI) work. Generation X officers love
development and the option of switching to a career
field other than Operations may open the door to
sought-after training and development. More
importantly, the role of hierarchy is downplayed in
the technical career fields as the role of knowledge
becomes more salient. Of course, if the training for
career fields is dumbed down, Xer officers will see
through the faade quickly.

Stop micromanagement and the zero-defects

mentality. This is something that everyone knows,
but nobody does simply because senior leaders are too
concerned about the performance of their unit during
their watch.33 Senior leaders must learn to give Xers a
task and then avoid the temptation to tell them how to
do it or require them to check in constantly with a
status report. Unfortunately, it will take much more
than this paragraph to change this well-engrained
aspect of the Army. Interestingly, as promotion rates
rise due to dwindling numbers of promotable officers,
the intense inter-officer competition caused by the
downsizing may subside. This in turn may lead to
more freedom to make mistakes and a decrease in
levels of micromanagement. By then, however, it
might be too late.

Include Xers in the decisionmaking process. When

possible and appropriate, increase junior officer input
into key decisions. This is not to undermine the chain
of command, but rather to broaden the base of
knowledge and expertise supporting the decision.
Highlight technology. In the 1998 survey, less than 3
percent of Generation X officers believed that it would be
difficult to adapt personally to the high-tech demands of the
future Army. Not surprisingly, Xer officers are quite
comfortable with technology. Interestingly, however, close

23
to 40 percent of Generation X officers responded that they
did not believe that their particular job in the future Army
would be high-tech. In order to retain junior officers, the
Army must be technologically relevant. This does not imply
that somehow technology will replace boots on the ground; it
does suggest that the Army should not lag behind society in
the everyday use of technology.
Boomer officers can remember the days when the Army
was at the forefront of high-tech equipment, e.g., global
positioning systems, laser rangefinders, and night vision
devices. The rapidity of development in the commercial
world has left the Army behind.34 Today, it is not uncommon
for Xer officers to have more up-to-date technology at home
than they do at work.
Some possible actions to leverage the use of technology
include:

Keep Army technology current. Upgrade computers

in units every 2 years. Install the latest software
versions as they come out. Being able to brag that they
are fluent in using the latest hardware and software
will pay big dividends in retaining Xers.

Issue PDAs (personal data assistants). PDAs (e.g,

Palm Pilot, Visor, Pocket PC) are not only effective in
improving productivity, but also provide tangible
evidence that the Army is forward thinking in
technology. Offer them to officers who want them and
watch how quickly free application programs written
by Xer officers appear on websites such as
CompanyCommand.com. Within a year, key field and
training manuals will be available for download as
well as programs helping junior officers with
maintenance, supply, and administrative tasks. It is a
small investment (about $150 for each PDA) for a very
valuable benefit. Note how this differs from issuing
every officer a laptop computer. Laptops are clunky

24
 and geared more for business travelers on airplanes
than Army captains in TOCs.35

Continue to exploit the Internet. The Army is making

great strides in providing junior officers choices via
the Web (e.g., the career field designation process),
and it is time for other parts of the Army to catch up.
Junior officers should be able to schedule
appointments online instead of waiting endlessly on
the phone. Interactive training courses need to be
widely available on the Netand these courses
should not be just documents posted on a server, but
also video and audio clips. Everything from receiving
an RFO36 to submitting a household goods claim
should be made available via the Internet. One
caution, though. Junior officers are already decrying
the substitution of e-mail for face-to-face interaction.
Care must be taken to automate administration, not
leadership.

Conclusion.

The trends in junior officer attrition continue to point to

a worsening situation. Early indications from year group
1995 retention statistics show no let up in the exodus. Two
additional factors complicate the situation. First, attrition
for Baby Boomer officers is on the rise, too. As retention
rates for lieutenant colonels and colonels drop and continue
to decline, the officer corps inventory is starting to look more
like a trapezoid than the traditional pyramid. Second, the
newly-minted second lieutenants that will enter the Army
this year are not Generation X. Instead, they are
Generation Ythe Nintendo Generation, Generation 2001,
or Generation Next. Nexters bring a totally different
perspective than Xers or Boomers. While it is too early to tell
how they will approach the workplace, our experience with
Generation X tells us that we had better be ready.
Understanding generational differences will become even

25
more critical with three unique generations in the officer
corps.
Generation X officers are different. They are not
slackers, but are extremely competent and willing to work
hard. They are, however, voicing their opinions and leaving
the Army. This monograph will fall short of its objectives if
battalion commanders nod their heads in agreement with
the previous paragraphs, yet convince themselves that the
situation can only be remedied through policies at the
Department of the Army level. Likewise, if policymakers
defer to direct leadership as the sole solution to the junior
officer attrition problem, the intent of this monograph will
not be fulfilled either. It will take both policy and leadership
working in concert to keep our captains.
One common reaction to the junior officer exodus is to
call for calm and assume that this crisis, like all previous
ones, will also eventually pass. Somehow we convince
ourselves that, because the Army is a big enough
organization with a history of weathering all sorts of crises,
it can absorb this one too. Realistically, the Army will
survive through this crisisthe Army always goes rolling
along. But like a family who loses a child at an early age,
there will always be a sense of loss over the potential that is
never realized. Our captains are leaving and that says
something about who they are and what the Army has
become. It is time we took notice and did something about it.

ENDNOTES

1. Message from Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,

Headquarters, Department of the Army, July 28, 1998. The message
was in response to concerns over the increasing attrition rates of junior
officers. Notice that the message focuses on the static attrition rates in
1998 rather than the dynamic trend of junior officer attrition rates
overall.

2. Message from the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, Headquarters,

Department of the Army, February 15, 2000.

26
 3. Blue Ribbon Panels To Study Leadership And Training, Army
Public Affairs Press Release #00024, April 17, 2000.

4. For example, see David Noer, Healing the Wounds: Overcoming

the Trauma of Layoffs and Revitalizing Downsized Organizations, San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1993.

5. For an analysis of the effects of the Army downsizing on those left

behind, see Leonard Wong and Jeffrey McNally, Downsizing the Army:
Some Policy Implications Affecting the Survivors, Armed Forces and
Society, Vol. 20, Winter 1994, pp. 199-216.

6. A reduction in command positions and the departure of many

officers with low promotion potential left the relatively high-quality
survivors competing for advancement. See General Dennis Reimer,
Leadership for the 21st Century: Empowerment, Environment and the
Golden Rule, Military Review, Vol. 76, January-February 1996, pp. 5-9.

7. For example, the Armys main research engine for leadership, the
Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, was
downsized of nearly all of its leadership research capability in 1996.

8. Spring 1999 Sample Survey of Military Personnel Written

Comments, Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences, November 1999. The term senior leader is not well defined.
In this monograph, it refers to those officers in the older generation, or
generally in the rank of lieutenant colonel and higher.

9. American Military Culture in the Twenty-first Century, Center for

Strategic and International Studies, 2000.

10. Ibid.

11. CGSC Student Perceptions on Army Retention & Leadership,

E-mail, April 2000.

12. VCSA message, February 2000.

13. There have been efforts to explore the impact of generational

differences in the Army such as the research done by Peter J. Legree,
Generation X: Motivation, Morals, and Values, Army Research Institute
Special Report, June 1997. Additionally, Generation X expert Bruce
Tulgan spoke at the Spring 1998 TRADOC Commanders/Division
Commanders Conference (TCDC) about Generation X characteristics.

14. For a good description of all generations, see Ron Zemke, Claire
Raines, and Bob Filipczak, Generations at Work: Managing the Clash of

27
Veterans, Boomers, Xers, and Nexters in Your Workplace, New York:
American Management Association, 2000; Neil Howe and William
Strauss, 13th Gen, New York: Vintage Press, 1993, or Bruce Tulgan, The
Managers Pocket Guide to Generation X, Minneapolis: Lakewood
Publications, 1997.

15. For an interesting look at Baby Boomers, see The Boomer

Institute on the Internet at http://www.boomerpower.net/.

16. See discussion on the independence of Generation Xers by Jay A.

Conger, Winning Em Over: A New Model for Managing in the Age of
Persuasion, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998.

17. See Legree, p. 3, or Geoffrey T. Holtz, Welcome to the Jungle,

New York: St. Martin Press, 1995.

18. N. Zill and J. Robinson, The Generation X, American

Demographics, April 1995, pp. 24-33.

19. See Zemke, Raines, and Filipczak for a good account of the
Generation X skeptical nature towards authority.

20. Data includes Army Competitive Category officers only. Source:

Officer Master File, September 1999.

21. For a thorough discussion of how many of the successes

demonstrated in Operation DESERT STORM were shaped by
experiences in Vietnam, see Edward C. Meyer and R. Manning Ancell
with Jane Mahaffey, Who Will Lead?: Senior Leadership in the United
States Army, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995; or James Kitfield, Prodigal
Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized
the American Style of War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.

22. The Quarterly Training Brief (QTB) is a planning session that

has increasingly become a major production with exacting detail and
complicated PowerPoint slides.

23. While Boomer deployments were longer (e.g., a 1-year Vietnam

tour), todays deployments are more unpredictable and often occur
nearly back-to-back.

24. See Morten. G. Ender, E-Mail to Somalia: New Communication

Media Between Home and War Fronts, in J. E. Behar, ed., Mapping
Cyberspace: Social Research on the Electronic Frontier, Oakdale, NY:
Dowling College Press, 1997, pp. 27-52.

28
 25. Baby Boom and Generation X officer data are taken from the
1988 Officer Master File using Year Group 1981 and the 1998 Officer
Master File using Year Group 1991. The Generation X cohort did have
more U.S. Military Academy graduates (22 percent versus 17 percent)
and slightly more Asians (3 percent versus 1 percent) and Hispanics (3
percent versus 2 percent) than the Baby Boomers when they were
captains.

26. Attitudes of Baby Boomer captains are taken from year group
1981 responses to the 1988 Longitudinal Research on Officer Careers
(LROC) survey administered by the Army Research Institute (ARI).
Attitudes of Generation X captains are taken from year group 1991
responses to the 1998 Survey of Officer Careers (SOC) survey also
administered by ARI. Sample size of the LROC survey is 513 out of a
population of 3,478 year group 1981, Army Competitive Category
captains. Sample size of the SOC survey is 176 out of a population of
1,864 year group 1991, Army Competitive Category captains. Because
both the LROC and SOC surveys oversampled U.S. Military Academy
graduates, the samples used in this analysis were adjusted to reflect the
populations proportion of Military Academy graduates. Thus the
samples used in this analysis mirror the demographics of the
population.

27. See Christopher Chambers, The New Economy Shifts Soldiers

Expectations, Army, April 2000, Vol. 50, No. 4, p. 9.

28. Nina Munk, The New Organization Man, Fortune 137, No. 5,
March 16, 1998, pp. 62-74.

29. Post Exchanges.

30. Junior officers may perceive that training, while worthwhile, is

politically correct if it is not directly related to warfighting tasks.

31. See Charles C. Moskos, Institutional and Occupational Trends

in Armed Forces, in Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood, eds., The
Military: More Than Just a Job?, New York: Pergamon-Brasseys, 1988,
pp. 15-26.

32. For example, see Thomas Ricks, Making the Corps, New York:
Scribner, 1997.

33. Micromanagement or a zero-defects mentality is usually

considered to be the result of a self-interested commander. It may,
however, also stem from a well-intentioned senior leader.

29
 34. Compare Moores law that states that silicon chips double in
complexity every 2 years, with Army acquisition cycles that are typically
much longer.

35. Tactical Operation Centers.

36. Request for Orders.

30
 U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research
Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author
Dr. Leonard Wong

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition
Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist
Mr. James E. Kistler
STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES

Leonard Wong
Stephen Gerras
William Kidd
Robert Pricone
Richard Swengros

September 2003
 *****

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official
policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

ii
 FOREWORD

On December 21, 2001, the Chief of Staff of the Army tasked the U.S. Army War College to
identify the strategic leader skill sets for officers required in the post-September 11th environment.
The following report is the result of that tasking. Dr. Leonard Wong, assisted by four U.S. Army War
College students, reviewed the strategic leadership literature, interviewed corporate leader developers,
analyzed the leader development system, and gathered the views of key leader developers in the
Army. They distill the essence of strategic leadership into six metacompetencies that not only describe
strategic leadership, but also provide aiming points for an integrated leader development system.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director
Strategic Studies Institute

iii
 SUMMARY

The strategic leadership literature in both the academic and military contexts is replete with long
lists of the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed by strategic leaders of the future. Unfortunately, long
comprehensive lists are problematic. At the individual level, it is difficult to assess ones leadership
ability when the lists suggest that a strategic leader must Be, Know, and Do just about everything.
At the institutional level, the long lists make it difficult to focus an institutions attention and resources
on leader development when the desired endstate is so broad. Hence, the task of identifying the
competencies of future strategic leaders becomes one of reducing the lists to a few metacompetencies
that will prove useful in: a) directing leader development efforts in the process of producing leaders
with strategic leader capability, and b) facilitating self-assessment by officers of their strategic leader
capability. Looking across the existing literature on strategic leadership, the current lists of Army
strategic leader competencies, and the future environment of the Objective Force, six metacompetencies
can be derived: identity, mental agility, cross-cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, world-class warrior
warrior,
and professional astuteness. These metacompetencies describe the strategic leadership necessary for the
future Army.

v
 STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES
On December 21, 2001, the Chief of Staff of the
Army (CSA) tasked the U.S. Army War College
(USAWC) to identify the strategic leader skill sets
for officers required in the post-September 11th
environment. In his charter guidance, the CSA
specifically stated:
The first of the critical areas to be examined
is the identification of strategic leader skill
sets for officers in the post-September 11th
environment, and those necessary to meet the
leadership requirements of the Objective Force.
In conducting the study, the student study
team must start with the Army Training and
Leader Development (ATLD) Panel (Officer)
recommendations as a baseline, and build on the
great work already done in this arena. In addition
to strategic skill sets, the required knowledge and
attributes of the future Objective Force leader
should also be discussed.
A research group of four students and a
faculty advisor completed the following report
after extensive research and analysis. Research
visits conducted by the team included the Center
for Army Leadership, the Objective Force Task
Force Office, the Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences, U.S. Army Cadet
Command, the U.S. Military Academy, Training
and Doctrine Command headquarters and
schools, and the leader development offices in the
Offices of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
(DCSPER) and Operations and Plans (DCSOPS).
Additionally, the group consulted with leader
development experts in organizations such as
the Center for Creative Leadership, Bristol-Myers
Squibb, and Strategic Leadership Solutions.
Assumptions.
The CSA charter began by stating the need to
identify the skill sets required of future strategic
leaders. Before identifying these skill sets,
however, it is useful to define what a strategic
leader of the future actually means. Ironically,
strategic is often used at both ends of the
hierarchical spectrum. It is not uncommon to hear
1
of the strategic Captain or strategic Corporal
guarding the Brcko Bridge. This use of strategic
broadens the definition to such a degree that all
soldiers should be strategic. On the other hand,
strategic is often used in the narrow sense with
the view that the Armys strategic leadership
resides solely in the general officer ranks. An
even more narrow interpretation views strategic
leaders only at the 3-star level and above.
This report assumes that future strategic leader
capability will be required at the Brigade-level
commander (i.e., the Stryker Brigade Combat
Team level) or the O-6 level staff officer who will
have increased strategic responsibilities. This
distinction is important for several reasons. First,
stating that strategic leader capability, but not
necessarily strategic leadership, is required at the
O-6 level recognizes that senior officers will need
to think strategically, even if they are not in troop
leading positions. For this study, strategic
refers to a way of thinkingnot just a level of war
beyond tactical and operational. Strategic leader
capability is required in those officers who have
increased responsibility for an organization, who
are concerned with internal as well as external
spheres of influence, and who are surrounded
by ambiguity and complexity.1 Second, shifting
strategic leader capability down to the colonel
level greatly expands the target population of
any leader development efforts. Strategic leader
development must become more deliberate if
the number of officers requiring strategic leader
capabilities increases from 300 general officers to
several thousand colonels.
The use of the phrase strategic leader
capability has significant implications. It
recognizes that although not all colonels or
general officers are in strategic leader positions,
they still can (and should) possess a level of
strategic leader capability. Strategic leader
capability also implies a potential that is not
instantly acquired, but needs to be developed and
matured over time.
This report also assumes that the compre-
hensive Army Training and Leader Development
(ATLD) Panel (Officer) report adequately covered
the development of direct and organizational
levels of leadership. Thus, there is no reason
to examine the development of leadership
competencies other than strategic leadership
competencies. This report also assumes that the
leadership competencies required at the direct
and organizational levels will be resident in
emerging strategic leaders.
Finally, this report assumes that a post-
September 11th environment is the same as the
Objective Force environment. Both environments
involve breaking the linear method of warfare
and allowing the Nation to directly apply
operational maneuver from strategic distances
through the use of joint and coalition forces. Both
perspectives require strategic leaders capable of
handling a more complex, uncertain, and global
security environment.2
Strategic Leadership.
The search for strategic leader competencies3
is a natural progression of the research in the field
of leadership. In the late 1980s, some social science
researchers began to question whether leadership
actually made a difference in organizations
while others suggested that perhaps the study
of leadership had reached its culminating point.
Rather than disappearing, however, the study of
leadership took on new energy with an emphasis
on leadership of organizations, rather than the
traditional leadership approaches that focused on
face-to-face interaction at lower levels. Studies
of transformational leadership, organizational
culture, visionary leadership, organizational
change, and charismatic leaders reinvigorated the
field of leadership. Thus, the notion of strategic
leadership was introduced.
While lists of leadership competencies were
very popular in the 1980s, the most recent
literature distills strategic leadership to a few
key skills and competencies or a process. For
example, Stephen Covey states that strategic
leaders have three basic functions: pathfinding,
aligning, and empowering.4 Pathfinding deals
with tying the organizations value system and
2
vision with the mission and environment through
a strategic plan. Aligning consists of ensuring the
organizational structure, systems, and operational
processes all contribute to achieving the mission
and vision. Empowering is igniting the latent
talent, ingenuity, and creativity in the people to
accomplish the mission.
Other leadership theorists bring up aspects
of strategic leadership not included in Coveys
typology. In his research on future strategic
leadership, James F. Bolt focuses less on the
environment and more on the leader.5 He argues
that there are three dimensions of a leader:
business, leadership, and personal effectiveness.
The business dimension has been traditionally
the focus in executive development. This di-
mension includes the creation of new kinds of
organizations, leading change, and how the
organization works. The leadership dimension
has typically been overlooked because many
people do not believe it can be taught. According
to Bolt, this dimension is developed by the study
of a broad range of classical and contemporary
leadership theories and skills. The personal
effectiveness dimension, according to Bolt, has been
neglected because of the widespread view that
work and personal matters must be separated.
The personal dimension concentrates on helping
to clarify and develop an individuals purpose,
vision, values, and talents. The emphasis on
self-reflection is found in the self-leadership
literature that is becoming popular and is actually
as old as Thales (Know thyself) or Shakespeare
(To thine own self be true.).
A related aspect emerging in the strategic
leadership literature is self-efficacy.6 Self-efficacy
refers to individuals judgments about their
perceived capabilities for performing specific
tasks. Self-efficacy is the result of life experiences
that teach one that one can, in fact, take actions
that will effectively have an impact on ones
environment. This concept parallels the findings
of the Army Training and Leader Development
(ATLD) Panel. In the ATLD report, one of the
two leadership competencies for the 21st century
is self-awareness. Self-awareness is the ability
to assess abilities, determine strengths in the
environment, and learn how to sustain strengths
and correct weaknesses. The ATLD report also
argues that a key leader competency is adaptability.
According to the panel, adaptability is the ability
to recognize changes to the environment, to
determine what is new, what must be learned
to be effective, and includes the learning process
that follows that determination.7
Karl Weick states that in a world of
uncertainty and doubt, leaders must focus on
certain properties. Two of those properties are
improvisation and lightness.8 Improvisation
involves the flexible treatment of preplanned
material. It is not about making something
out of nothing. Instead, it is about making
something out of previous experience, practice,
and knowledge. Improvisation is something that
is almost intuitive to good leaders at the tactical
level, but seldom is addressed at the strategic
level.
Weicks novel concept of lightness refers to
the ability to drop heavy tools that are no longer
useful. Weicks analogy is the foreman who yells,
drop your tools, to wildland firefighters who
are trying to outrun an exploding fire. Firefighters
who refuse to drop heavy tools such as chainsaws
are prone to be overtaken by the fire and perish
(as has happened at least 23 times since 1990).
To strategic leaders, the now-unwieldy tools are
those that presume the world is stable, knowable,
and predictable. Future strategic leaders must be
able to drop outmoded perspectives, methods, or
assumptions in a world of uncertainty.
In their review of strategic leadership, Kim
Boal and Robert Hooijberg distill the essence of
strategic leadership to three factorseffective
strategic leaders must create and maintain
absorptive and adaptive capacity in addition
to obtaining managerial wisdom.9 Absorptive
capacity involves the ability to learn by
recognizing new information, assimilating it,
and applying it. Adaptive capacity involves the
ability to change due to variations in conditions.
Managerial wisdom consists of discernment and
intuition. Boal and Hooijbergs assertion that
absorptive and adaptive capacities are required
at the strategic level of leadership is very similar
3
to the Armys emphasis on self-awareness and
adaptability. Although the Army competencies
are intended to apply to all levels of leadership,
not just strategic leaders, it is interesting to see
the parallel development of parsimonious leader
capabilities in both the military and academic
literature.
Strategic Leadership in the Military.
In 1991, the U.S. Army War College hosted
a conference on the fledgling field of strategic
leadership. At that conference, strategic leadership
aspects were based on Jaquess Stratified Systems
Theory (SST).10 SST essentially argues that there
are critical tasks that must be performed by
leaders in effective organizations. At each higher
level in an organization, these tasks become
increasingly complex and qualitatively different.
Consequently, leaders at the strategic levels must
have higher levels of cognitive complexitythe
ability to deal with abstract, longer timeframe
concepts. The influence of SST on the Army
War College (and the broader Army) is evident
with the emphasis on cognitive complexity that
permeates much of the strategic leadership
instruction.
In its Strategic Leadership Primer,11 the Army
War College provides a list of strategic leader
competencies using the Be, Know, Do typology.
The list is extremely comprehensive and appears
to capture every possible aspect of leadership.
BE (Dispositionvalues, attributes):
The Values Championthe standard
bearer beyond reproach
Master of the Strategic Artends, ways,
means
Quintessential Student of History
Comfortable with Complexity
High Personal Staminaphysical, mental,
stress management
Skilled Diplomat
Possesses Intellectual Sophistication
alternative frames of reference, pattern
recognition, and able to see 2d, 3rd, and
4th-order effects.
KNOW (Dispositionskills):
Conceptual
o Envisioning-anticipating the future,
proactive thinkingpractices critical,
creative, reflective thinking
o Frame of Reference Development
including systems understanding,
scanning, pattern recognition
o Problem Managementcompeting
issues, no right answers, ability to
recognize and ignore irrelevant issues
o Critical Self-Examination
o Critical, Reflective Thought
o Effective within Environment of
Complexity
o Skillful Formulation of Ends, Ways,
Means.
Interpersonal
o Communicationto a much
broader audience; negotiations,
consensus-building across a variety
of stakeholders; systems knowledge;
sophisticated persuasion skills
o Inspire Others to Act
o Organizational Representationto
internal and external audiences/
stakeholders
o Skillful Coordination of Ends, Ways,
Means
o Master of Command and Peer
Leadership.
Technical
o Systems Understandingpolitical,
economic, cultural, logistical, force
management, and joint/combined
interrelationships, etc.
o Recognize and Understand
Interdependenciessystems,
decisions, organizations, etc.
o Information-age Technological
Awarenessnext generation
awareness, sophisticated time/space
selection
o Skillful Application of Ends, Ways,
Means.
4
DO (Actioninfluencing, operating, and
improving):
Provide for the Futurevisioning (long-
term focus, time span, perspective)
Initiator of Policy and Directive
Shape the CultureValues-based
organization, leverage diversity,
understanding and accepting differences,
multiple perspectives
Teach and Mentor the Strategic Art
Manage Joint/Combined and Interagency
Relationships
Manage National-Level Relationships
Represent the Organization
Leverage Technology
Lead and Manage Changecreating and
building learning organizations
Build Teams and Consensus at Strategic
Level (cant dictate action at this level)
co-opting, coalition building, negotiating,
etc.
Practice the Strategic Artallocate
resources, develop and execute strategic
plans derived from the interagency
process.
Similarly, in FM 22-100, Army Leadership, the
Armys doctrinal leadership manual, the skills
and actions required of strategic leaders are a
cumulative list of 41 competencies addressing
the direct, organizational, and strategic levels.12
Twenty-one competencies are provided for the
strategic level alone:
FM 22-100, Army Leadership:
Strategic Level Skills and Actions
o Communicating
o Using dialogue
o Negotiating
o Achieving consensus
o Building staffs
o Envisioning
o Developing frames of reference
o Strategic art
o Motivating
o Leveraging technology
o Executing
o Communicating a vision
 o Developing
o Decisionmaking
o Leading change
o Strategic planning
o Learning
o Strategic assessing
o Translating political goals into military
objectives
o Building
o Dealing with uncertainty and
ambiguity.
In one sense, the Army War College and FM
22-100 lists of strategic leader competencies are
too comprehensive. At the individual level, it is
difficult to assess ones leadership ability when
the lists suggest that a strategic leader must be,
know, and do just about everything. At the
institutional level, the lack of parsimony makes
it difficult to focus an institutions attention and
resources on leader development when such a
broad array of competencies is advocated. Hence,
the task of identifying the competencies of future
strategic leaders becomes one of reducing the lists
to a few metacompetencies13 that will prove useful
in: a) directing leader development efforts in the
process of producing leaders with strategic leader
capability, and b) facilitating self-assessment by
officers of their strategic leader capability.
Looking across the existing literature on
strategic leadership, the current lists of Army
strategic leader competencies, and the future
environment of the Objective Force, six meta-
competencies can be derived: identity, mental
agility, cross-cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity,
world-class warrior
warrior, and professional astuteness.
Before addressing each metacompetency, it
should be noted that concentrating on just
six does provide focus, but there are some
associated disadvantages. First, some skills
and abilities are not explicitly described by a
metacompetency label. For example, strategic
leaders need to be politically savvyknowing
when to compromise, understanding that many
strategic decisions are not black and white, and
knowing what is best in the long run for the
Nation and the Army. This ability is captured
in the professional astuteness metacompetency
5
description, but is not obvious in the words
professional astuteness. Understanding the
meaning and intent behind each metacompetency
is much more important than creating a catchy
mnemonic containing the first letter of each of the
six labels. Similarly, the metacompetency labels
may be misinterpreted if separated from their
descriptions. For example, cross-cultural savvy
includes the ability to work across organizational
boundaries, but the metacompetency can be
narrowly misinterpreted to refer to working only
across national boundaries. In other words, the
six metacompetency labels were not developed as
a stand-alone list. The concepts behind the labels,
not the labels themselves, are the focal points for
leader development and assessment.
The following section describes the six meta-
competencies. After a brief discussion of each,
the development of each in future officers
is examined using the three pillars of leader
developmentinstitutional, operational, and
self-development. This report is not intended
to be an exhaustive explanation of strategic
leadershipthe civilian literature does that
adequately. It is also not intended as a blueprint
to overhaul the Armys leader development
system. Instead, this report contrasts the future
environment with the current status of strategic
leader development and suggests some aiming
points for leader development efforts.
Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies.
Identity. This metacompetency is derived from
the work of Douglas Hall who heavily influenced
the conclusions of the ATLD Panel. According
to Hall, identity is the ability to gather self-
feedback, to form accurate self-perceptions, and
to change ones self-concept as appropriate.14
The ATLD report uses the term self-awareness and
describes it as the ability to understand how to
assess abilities, know strengths and weaknesses
in the operational environment, and learn how to
correct those weaknesses.15 The metacompetency
of identity moves beyond simply knowing ones
strengths and weaknesses as connoted by self-
awareness. It includes the understanding of
ones self-concept as an officer in the Army.
Identity also includes an understanding of ones
values and how they match the values of the
Army. Identity implies maturation beyond self-
awareness as officers come to understand who
they are, not just how well they do things.
Identity, as opposed to self-awareness, also
brings in aspects of development over a career.
In the corporate world, as an executive advances
in levels of responsibility, he or she must learn
to change the basis of his or her self-identity
away from individual contributions as the basis
for self-esteem and toward defining personal
value and esteem through the accomplishments
of subordinates.16 In an officers development
of strategic leadership capability, the metacom-
petency of identity acknowledges that the role
of a strategic leader goes beyond personal
contributions and shifts to serving as a catalyst
for success by subordinates.
The development of the identity meta-
competency in officers can begin as early as
precommissioning. In the early stages of an
officers career, identity focuses more on the
recognition of ones strengths and weaknesses,
but it also includes the establishment of a
foundation of continual self-assessment and the
desire to adjust ones self-concept when needed.
In the institutional realm of leader development,
identity can be increased through self-assessment
tools, simulations, peer evaluations, and coaching.
In the operational arena of leader development,
identity can be improved through After Action
Reviews, 360-degree feedback, Officer Evaluation
Reports, rewarding personal growth, and the
counsel of a mentor. Finally, identity can be
fostered through officer self-development with
reading lists and the use of a lifelong plan.
Mental Agility. In addition to self-awareness,
the ATLD report recommends that the Army
focus on developing the enduring competency of
adaptability. It is defined as the ability to recognize
changes in the environment; to determine what is
new, what must be learned to be effective, and
includes the learning process that follows that
determination, all performed to standard and
with feedback.17 Mental agility builds on the
ability to scan and adjust learning based on the
environment, and brings aspects of cognitive
6
complexity, improvisation, and lightness found
in the strategic leadership literature.
Strategic leaders operate in an environment
of ambiguity and uncertainty. Typical strategic
situations lack structure, are open to varying
interpretations, and potentially pertinent
information is often far-flung, elusive, cryptic,
or even contradictory.18 Mentally agile strategic
leaders possess the requisite cognitive skills
to navigate in this milieu and are adaptable
enough to alter their actions and those of their
organizations to function in this complex
environment.
From a cognitive perspective, strategic
leaders must learn how to scan the environment,
understand their world from a systems
perspective, and eventually envision different
futures and directions for their organization.
Scanning involves a constant search for
information that affects current assumptions,
along with the future of the organization. Officers
with mental agility search for more information
and spend more time interpreting it.19 They also
analyze large amounts of sometimes conflicting
information and try to understand why things
happen and identify possible courses of action
to affect events. Mentally agile leaders know
which factors really matter in the big picture;
they identify root causes quickly, display a keen
sense of priority, relevance and significance, and
integrate information from a variety of sources
while detecting trends, associations, and cause-
effect relationships. Just as important, mentally
agile leaders translate complex situations into
simple, meaningful explanations that others can
grasp.
Mentally agile leaders efficiently gather and
process relevant information in order to process
it from a systems perspective and then envision
feasible futures within increasingly longer time
horizons.20 From a systems perspective, they
challenge assumptions, facilitate constructive
dissent, and analyze second- and third-order
consequences of their decisions.21 Mentally
agile leaders are comfortable making important
decisions with only part of the information
available. More importantly, they know when
to act and when to experiment to validate beliefs
or assumptions. Once mentally agile strategic
leaders have scanned the environment, processed
information from a systems perspective, and
envisioned the future effect of that information on
the organization, they then adapt and implement
learning mechanisms to alter the processes,
structure, and behaviors of their organization to
accommodate their envisioned future.
Because the level of the organization rather
than the officers rank determines the nature of
problems that will be encountered and the skills
required, efforts to develop mental agility must
begin early in an officers career and not be delayed
until an officer is about to be placed in charge of
an organization at the strategic level.22 From a
school perspective, officers can be introduced to
quantitative decisionmaking, critical thinking,
and systems thinking during precommissioning
and the officers basic course. Throughout the
officers time at branch schools, simulations
allow the officer to adapt and anticipate changing
parameters and assumptions.23 Mental agility can
best be improved with a program of instruction
that encourages students to develop multiple
points of view, consider alternative explanations
and argue the merits of competing solutions to
complex problems, synthesize as well as analyze,
challenge existing frames of reference, and
engage in collaborative tasks. In the operational
environment, the Army culture determines
the amount of discretion given to commanders
to encourage innovation and improvisation.
Ambiguous scenarios at the combat training
centers and job variety in the assignment process
also foster mental agility through the operational
leader development pillar. Self-development of
mental agility can be done throughout a career
by activities that stretch the horizons of the
officer. Reading future studies, publishing, or
even reading business journals can also increase
mental agility. Of course, demanding periods
of an officers career (e.g., S-3 or XO time) afford
very little time for reading or self-development.
Nevertheless, it is possible to improve mental
agility through self-development when the
opportunity arises.
Cross-cultural savvy. With the increasing
frequency of coalition warfare and an emphasis
7
on theater security cooperation, the necessity
for cross-cultural savvy is obvious. The Armys
future leaders clearly need to be well-versed
in interacting with cultures outside the U.S.
borders. Cross-cultural savvy, however, refers
to more than just the ability to work with non-
U.S. militaries. The metacompetency cross-
cultural savvy includes the ability to understand
cultures beyond ones organizational, economic,
religious, societal, geographical, and political
boundaries. A strategic leader with cross-
cultural skills is comfortable interacting with
and leading joint, international, interagency, or
interorganizational entities. Future strategic
leaders must be able to work with a diverse
group of people and organizations ranging from
24-year-old congressional staffers, to Northern
Alliance warlords, to representatives from non-
governmental organizations.
While cross-cultural skills have been
desirable in the past, they will be even more
critical for future strategic leaders due to several
factors. First, globalization has vastly increased
interaction with other nations. Second, the
global war on terrorism is illustrating that
the Army must coordinate closely with other
services, agencies, and organizations in the new
national security environment. Third, the Army
traditionally has been accused of being somewhat
inept in its dealings with Congress and the media.
As societal exposure to the military decreases,
it becomes increasingly important for Army
officers to tell the Army story to those outside the
Army culture. Finally, although the United States
remains the worlds only superpower, unilateral
military action is becoming less common.
Coalitions will continue to be vital to the security
strategy.
Cross-cultural savvy implies that an officer
can see perspectives outside his or her own
boundaries. It does not imply, however, that
the officer abandons the Army or U.S. culture in
pursuit of a relativistic worldview. Instead, the
future strategic leader is grounded in National
and Army values, but is also able to anticipate and
understand the values, assumptions, and norms
of other groups, organizations, and nations.
Cross-cultural skills can be developed in future
strategic leaders as early as precommissioning
with courses in foreign languages, international
relations, or regional studies. Time spent abroad
or interning with various organizations can also
help broaden the horizons of officers. In the
institutional school setting, joint and interagency
issues can be taught along with focused electives
on specific regions. Increasing cross-cultural
savvy in the institutional arena should move the
officer from the introduction early in the career
of a general understanding and appreciation of
other cultures to gradually focusing later in the
career on particular cultures, organizations, or
regions.
The operational pillar also plays a key role
in developing leaders with cross-cultural skill,
especially during the 4-to-15 year-mark of
military service. During this period, developing
officers should have multiple tours outside the
Armys mainstream units. Tours overseas, in
higher headquarters staff (Joint Staff, Major
Commands), in graduate school or in fellowships
or internships with Congress, leading industry
partners, and foreign militaries will contribute
significantly to developing officers with cross-
cultural savvy. Operational deployments also
offer a good opportunity to understand and work
with different cultures and different organizations
outside the military.
While self-development can certainly play
a role in improving the cross-cultural savvy
metacompetency, it is not the predominant tool
because self-development cannot substitute
for experience in working with non-Army
organizations and cultures. Nevertheless, officers
can gain insights through regional and language
studies. Additionally, they can pursue diverse
readings on nonmilitary organizations. As with
all self-development strategies, care must be taken
not to assume self-development will make up for
the lack of deliberate institutional or operational
development. Too often, leader development is
relegated to self-development despite the fact
that self-development is often the first type of
development to be overcome by events.
Interpersonal maturity. Many of the interper-
sonal skills required of strategic leaders are
basically the same attributes used at the
8
organizational level applied at a higher level.
For example, much like a junior leader, strategic
leaders are expected to display compassion when
dealing with subordinates on sensitive issues.
However, several interpersonal skills, although
based on direct and organizational leadership
characteristics, are qualitatively different at the
strategic level. Strategic leaders must possess an
interpersonal maturity that goes beyond face-to-
face leadership. Strategic leaders devote far more
of their time dealing with outside organizations
and leaders of other services, agencies, and
nations. The power relationship between the
strategic leader and individuals from these
entities is markedly different from the power
relationship typically experienced at the direct
and organizational level.
Several interpersonal skills become very
important at this level. Most important among
these is empowerment. Strategic leaders need to
share power with their subordinates, peers, and
constituents. They must have the willingness
and ability to involve others and elicit their
participation based on the subordinates know-
ledge and skills, because tasks will be too
complex and information too widely distributed
for leaders to solve problems on their own.24 An
interpersonally mature strategic leader needs
to be persuasive and rely less on fiat, asking
others to join in rather than telling them.25
Empowerment implies that the leader is a good
listener; leadership at the strategic level is as much
collaboration as it is authoritative leadership.
Interpersonal maturity implies that strategic
leaders do not feel compelled to do all the talking
and resist imposing a solution on others unless
the situation demands it.26
Because of the unique power relationships,
the skills of consensus building and negotiation
rise to the top of a strategic leaders interpersonal
maturity. Consensus building is a complicated
process based on effective reasoning and logic
which may take place over an extended period.27
Peers, outside agencies, foreign governments,
and other services will not necessarily respond
to orders. In essence, the process of consensus-
building is insurance that effective reasoning
has taken place, and that contentious issues have
been resolved.28 As part of this process, or even
separate, strategic leaders will find that they
need to understand the art of negotiation. Again,
because many relationships at the strategic level
are lateral and without clear subordination,
leaders will find themselves in difficult situations
where success rests in their ability to negotiate an
agreeable solution.
Interpersonal maturity also includes the
ability of officers to analyze, challenge, and
change an organizations culture to align it with
the ever changing outside environment. Strategic
leaders must therefore have skills in analyzing
cultural assumptions, identifying functional
and dysfunctional assumptions, and evolving
processes that enlarge the culture by building on
its strengths and functional elements.29 Strategic
leaders then need to manage change proactively
through the processes associated with embedding
their vision within the organization and shaping
organizational culture to support the vision. Noel
Tichy posits, As long as a culture fits the external
environment, it succeeds, but when the external
realities change, the culture has to change as well
. . . at certain critical stages, radical cultural shifts
are needed, and without leadership, they just
dont happen.30
Lastly, strategic leaders must have the
interpersonal maturity to take responsibility for
the development of the Armys future strategic
leaders. Therefore, strategic leaders need to teach,
coach, mentor, and create an environment where
other leaders may do the same. Interpersonal
maturity includes the ability to ensure leader
development does not get neglected in the pursuit
of everyday mission accomplishment.
As with direct and organizational interper-
sonal leadership skills, interpersonal maturity
is best developed in the operational and self-
development arenas. The institutional setting
can provide a background in leadership theory
or specific topics such as negotiation, creating a
vision, or managing a culture, but interpersonal
leadership must be modeled and coached, not
taught in a classroom. Role models, mentors,
and coaches become critical to fostering
strategic leaders with interpersonal maturity.
Self-development of interpersonal maturity
9
can include constant self-assessment as well
as leadership studies. It should be noted that,
unlike previously discussed metacompetencies,
development of interpersonal maturity can be
introduced later in an officers career. Early
stages of an officers career should focus on direct
and organizational leadership skills.
World-class Warrior. This is the simplest
and most understandable of the six strategic
leadership metacompetencies. As a world-class
warrior, strategic leaders move beyond tactical
and operational competence in the employment
of the Objective Force. They understand the
entire spectrum of operations at the strategic level
to include theater strategy; campaign strategy;
joint, interagency, and multinational operations;
and the use of all the elements of national power
and technology in the execution of national
security strategy.
The ability to be a world-class warrior rests
upon the foundation of technical and tactical
competence formed early in an officers career.
The seeds of this metacompetency are planted
in the study of military history and military
art in precommissioning. As the officer moves
into the field grade ranks, strategic insights in
the full spectrum of operations may come from
operational assignments in key staffs, during
deployments, in simulations, or in the interagency.
Additionally, mentoring and coaching can
help develop strategic leaders into world-class
warriors. From the institutional perspective,
the officer increases this metacompetency by
establishing a foundation at the basic and career
courses and adding a broader perspective with
intermediate level education and the School of
Advanced Military Studies. The strategic aspects
of the full spectrum of operations, however, are
mostly introduced at the senior service college
level. Self-development can consist of reading
professional journals, military history, or taking
advantage of online courses and simulations as
they become available.
Professional astuteness. In their comprehensive
study of the Army profession, Don Snider and
Gayle Watkins arrive at one main conclusion
concerning the current officer corps:
 The Armys bureaucratic nature outweighs and
compromises its professional nature. This is
true in practice, but, of greater importance, it is
regarded as true in the minds of the officer corps.
Officers do not share a common understanding
of the Army profession, and many of them accept
the pervasiveness of bureaucratic norms and
behaviors as natural and appropriate.31
Strategic leaders who are professionally
astute understand that they are no longer
merely members of a profession, but leaders in
the profession as the Army serves the Nation.
They see the need to develop the future leaders
of the profession, work with stakeholders, and
communicate this responsibility to future leaders
of the profession. In his recent book, Good to Great,
Jim Collins talks about Level 5 leadersleaders
who can transform a company. He writes, Level
5 leaders channel their ego needs away from
themselves and into the larger goal of building a
great company. Its not that Level 5 leaders have
no ego or self-interest. Indeed, they are incredibly
ambitiousbut their ambition is first and
foremost for the institution, not themselves.32 In
contrast, Level 4 leaders are often effective and
charismatic, yet the company falls apart after
they leave since Level 4 leaders put their personal
success and egos ahead of institutional success.
The Objective Force will need strategic
leaders who are Level 5 leadersthose who
take responsibility for the Army as a profession.
Leaders with professional astuteness get the
mission accomplished, but they also have the
insight to do what is best for the profession
and Nation. This may include having political
savvy, knowing when to compromise, or
understanding the many constituencies that the
Army serves. Additionally, strategic leaders
with professional astuteness seek to ensure the
officer corps maintains its expertise in national
defense as well as adhering to a professional
ethic. Professional astuteness is a strategic
leadership metacompetency that ensures that
the Army deliberately takes the steps to remain
a profession, not merely a job, organization,
bureaucracy, or occupation.
Don Snider offers a two-stage approach
to developing professional astuteness in
10
future strategic officers. In the first phase, or
precommissioning and 4 to 5 years of mandatory
active service, the precommissioning education
and other developmental processes need to create
in the future officer at least three identifiable
outcomes which may then be matured during
the initial period of mandatory service. Those
outcomes are:
An understanding of Army officership
(i.e., the role of the officer) sufficiently
broad as to allow each individual to
find intrinsic satisfaction in ones own
self-concept as an officer (initially seen
as within an individual Branch or
specialty).
An individual acceptance of the Army
professions ethic; in other words,
aligning ones personal concept of
duty with the professional ethic such
that the future walk of the officer
will match the moral talk of the
profession.
An individual understanding of,
and mutual relationship with, the
Army profession and its unique role
within American society that will
motivate the officer toward sustained
development and service as a member
of that profession.33
The second stage of development for
professional astuteness is the time after an officers
initial obligation until selection for battalion
command. During that period, development
occurs in a culture that encourages:
The freedom occasionally to fail with-
out fatal career consequences.
Careers in which individual
officers find professional satisfaction
(developing and applying their
expertise) out-weighing the personally
incurred costs of the Armys bureau-
cratic nature.
The pervasiveness of absolute
candor as the cultural norm with
all Army leaders at all levels at all
times in interpersonal relations and in
official reports and communications.
 More senior Army officers (as
seen from each rank) leading by
the example of their own moral
character, by following and policing
the professions ethic across all of
its domains, particularly in issues
requiring the individual moral courage
to deny oneself, to see what is best for
the profession and its effectiveness
from the larger perspective.34
Conclusions.
In both the civilian and military literature, a
plethora of material discussing strategic leadership
and strategic leader competencies exists. Part of
the difficulty encountered by anyone desiring to
adjust leader development or education efforts is
the broad array of competencies presented in the
literature. This report combines what is known
about strategic leadership competencies and
integrates it with the characteristics of the officer
corps and the Objective Force environment.
The result is a list of six metacompetencies for
strategic leadership.
In addition to discussing each metacom-
petency, some leader development methods
were presented for each. Several key points
concerning development of strategic leadership
competencies should be noted. First, all three of
the pillars of leader developmentinstitutional,
operational, and self-developmentare critical
to increasing strategic leader competencies. Too
often the development of strategic leaders is left
to the institutional arenaspecifically the senior
service colleges. This report emphasizes that these
schools build on strategic leader foundations
established as early as in precommissioning
and should continue with Capstone and the
Army Strategic Leader Course. Also, this report
posits that the operational pillar includes the
assignment process and the Army culture,
not just training that occurs in units. Strategic
leadership competencies are not just taught in
the schoolhouse or learned through events on the
training calendarthey are also taught through
developmental assignments and through the
11
everyday experiences of officers as they work in
the Army culture.
Recommendations.
Although this report focused mainly on
determining strategic leadership competencies,
several policy implications and recommenda-
tions emerge from this analysis.
Responsibility for the integrated leader development
process needs to be assigned. Currently, leader
development efforts are spread across the Army
staff. The staff element that takes responsibility
for the integrated leader development process
should take a holistic approach that includes
development through training, education, and
experiences. The personnel process (i.e., strategic
human resource management) should not be
neglected as a key part of developing strategic
leaders.
Begin growing strategic leader capability at the
precommissioning level. Several of the strategic
leadership competencies begin with seeds sown
during precommissioning education. Current
accession educational standards are not uniform.
Some demands must be placed on officer
accession sources to align their precommissioning
standards with the future needs of the Army
(e.g., every officer must have 2 years of foreign
language training).
Self-development must become more than a reading
list of history books. Currently the CSA reading list
is restricted to Army heritage and history. While
these books are worthy of reading, a great many
other ways to develop strategic leader capability,
other than reading history books, exist. Other
topics must be explored (e.g., books from the
corporate world), other forums examined
(e.g., the Internet), and other activities must be
encouraged (e.g., involvement with groups and
organizations outside the Army).
ENDNOTES
1. Donald C. Hambrick, Guest Editors Introduction:
Putting Top Managers Back in the Strategy Picture,
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 10, 1999, pp. 5-16.
 2. For a complete description of the Objective Force
environment, see The U.S. Army White Paper, Concepts for
the Objective Force, Washington, DC: U.S. Army, 2002.
3. A competency is an underlying characteristic of an
individual that leads to effective or superior performance.
It subsumes knowledge, skills, attributes, and abilities
(KSAs). Therefore, this report focuses on competencies,
not KSAs.
4. Stephen R. Covey, Three Roles of the Leader in
the New Paradigm, in Frances Hesselbein, Marshall
Goldsmith, and Richard Beckhard, eds., The Leader of the
Future: New Visions, Strategies, and Practices for the Next Era,
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996, pp. 149159.
5. James F. Bolt, New Skills for New Leadership
Roles, in Frances Hesselbein, Marshall Goldsmith, and
Richard Beckhard, eds., The Leader of the Future: New Visions,
Strategies, and Practices for the Next Era, San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1996, pp. 161-173.
6. See Marshall Sashkin, Strategic Leader
Competencies, in Robert Phillips and James Hunt, eds.,
Strategic Leadership: A Multi-Organizational-Level Perspective,
Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1992, pp. 139-160; Robert
Hooijberg, Richard C. Bullis, and James G. Hunt in James
Hunt, George Dodge, and Leonard Wong, eds., Out-of-the-
box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-First-Century Army
and Other Top-Performing Organizations, Stamford: JAI Press,
1999.
7. Lieutenant General William M. Steele and Lieutenant
Colonel Robert P. Walters, Jr., 21st Century Leadership
Competencies: Three Yards in a Cloud of Dust or the
Forward Pass? Army Magazine, August 2001, p. 31.
8. Karl Weick, Leadership as the Legitimation of
Doubt, in Warren Bennis, Gretchen Spreitzer, and
Thomas Cummings, eds., The Future of Leadership: Todays
Top Leadership Thinkers Speak to Tomorrows Leaders, San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2001, pp. 91-102.
9. Kimberly B. Boal and Robert R. Hooijberg, Strategic
Leadership Research: Moving On, Leadership Quarterly,
Vol. 11, pp. 516-517.
10. The conference proceedings are described in Robert
Phillips and James Hunt, eds., Strategic Leadership: A Multi-
Organizational-Level Perspective, Westport, CT: Quorum
Books, 1992. See Elliot Jaques, Requisite Organization.
Arlington, VA: Cason Hall, 1989, for SST.
11. Roderick R. Magee II, ed., Strategic Leadership Primer
Primer,
Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998.
12. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field
12
Manual 22-100, Army Leadership, Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1999.
13. The argument against long lists of competencies can
be found in Jon P. Briscoe and Douglas T. Hall, Grooming
and Picking Leaders Using Competency Frameworks: Do
They Work? An Alternative Approach and New Guidelines
for Practice, Organizational Dynamics, Vol. 28, No. 2,
Autumn 1999, pp. 37-52.
14. Briscoe and Hall, pp. 48-49.
15. Headquarters, Department of the Army, The Army
Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to
the Army, http://www.army.mil/atld, 2001, p. OS-3.
16. Briscoe and Hall, p. 49.
17. Steele and Walters, p. 31.
18. Sydney Finkelstein and Donald C. Hambrick,
Strategic Leadership, New York: West Publishing Company,
1996, p. 39.
19. Boal and Hooijberg, p. 531.
20. Emil Kluever, William Lynch, Michael Matthies,
Thomas Owens, and John Spears, Striking a Balance in
Leader Development: A Case for Conceptual Competence,
National Security Program Discussion Paper Series 92-02, p. 5.
21. Gregory Dess and Joseph Picken, Changing Roles:
Leadership in the 21st Century, Organizational Dynamics,
Winter 2000, p. 30.
22. Kluever, p. 7.
23. The Armor Center and School is a good example
of working towards developing mental agility in the
institutional setting.
24. Edgar H. Schein, Leadership and Organizational
Culture, in Frances Hesselbein, Marshall Goldsmith, and
Richard Beckhard, eds., The Leader of the Future: New Visions,
Strategies, and Practices for the Next Era, San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1996, p. 68.
25. Lawrence A. Bossidy and Marcia J. Avedon,
Getting an Executive View: An Interview with a Chief
Executive Officer, in The 21st Century Executive, Rob Silzer,
ed., San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002, p. 337.
26. Anthony J. Rucci, What the Best Business Leaders
Do Best, in The 21st Century Executive, Rob Silzer, ed., San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002, p. 35.
27. Magee, p. 42.
 28. Ibid.

29. Schein, p. 68.

30. Noel M. Tichy, The Leadership Engine, New York:

Harper Business, 1997, p. 26.

31. Gayle L. Watkins and Don M. Snider, Project

Conclusions, in Don M. Snider, Gayle L. Watkins, and
Lloyd J. Matthews, eds., The Future of the Army Profession,
New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002, p. 537.

32. Jim Collins, Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make

the Leap . . . and Others Dont, New York: Harper Business,
2001, p.21.

33. Don M. Snider, The [Missing] Ethical Development

of the Strategic Leaders of the Army Profession for the
21st Century, conference paper, XIII Annual Strategy
Conference, Carlisle, PA, April 10, 2002, p. 2.

34. Ibid., p. 3.

13
 DEVELOPING ADAPTIVE LEADERS:
THE CRUCIBLE EXPERIENCE OF OPERATION IRAQI
FREEDOM

Leonard Wong

July 2004

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ii
 FOREWORD

The euphoria over the exceptionally successful combat operations

of the Iraqi War has subsided as Operation IRAQI FREEDOM shifted
to the long, hard tasks of nation-building and counterinsurgency. By
all accounts, the process of assisting Iraq in becoming a secure, stable
democracy has become much more complicated than originally
believed. Yet within the complex environment of postwar Iraq, Dr.
Leonard Wong argues that junior ofcers are being developed into
creative, innovative, and independent leaders. He attributes this
unique leader development opportunity to the ambiguous, complex,
and unpredictable environment of postwar Iraq.
The implication of so many of the Armys junior ofcers being
developed into adaptive leaders is signicant. For several years,
the leadership literature in both the military and civilian arenas
has been replete with calls for adaptable and innovative leaders.
The U.S. Army is transforming as its lowest ofcer ranks are lled
with leaders who have learned to deal with ambiguity, change, and
complexity. It is now the Armys responsibility to leverage this
newly developed cohort and continue to develop the condence and
creativity of tomorrows senior leaders.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director
Strategic Studies Institute

iii
 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

LEONARD WONG served in the Army for over 20 years, including

teaching leadership at West Point, serving as an analyst in the Ofce
of the Chief of Staff of the Army, and in the Ofce of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel, and serving as the Director of the Ofce
of Economic and Manpower Analysis. His current research includes
leadership, professionalism and innovation in the military. He is
a Professional Engineer and holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military
Academy, and an M.S. and Ph.D. in Business Administration from
Texas Tech University.

iv
 SUMMARY

This monograph examines the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

environment and concludes that the complexity, unpredictability,
and ambiguity of postwar Iraq is producing a cohort of innovative,
condent, and adaptable junior ofcers. Lieutenants and captains
are learning to make decisions in chaotic conditions and to be
mentally agile in executing counterinsurgency and nation-building
operations simultaneously. As a result, the Army will soon have a
cohort of company grade ofcers who are accustomed to operating
independently, taking the initiative, and adapting to changes. The
author warns that the Army must now acknowledge and encourage
this newly developed adaptability in our junior ofcers or risk stiing
the innovation critically needed in the Armys future leaders.

v
 DEVELOPING ADAPTIVE LEADERS:
THE CRUCIBLE EXPERIENCE OF OPERATION IRAQI
FREEDOM

Can you nd the opportunity within the chaos? Because you cant
organize the chaos of the battleeld.1

General Peter J. Schoomaker

Chief of Staff of the Army

Leadership has and always will be associated with the U.S. Army.
Cadets continue to memorize that the commander is responsible
for everything the unit does or fails to do2 and names such as Lee,
Patton, MacArthur, and Marshall still evoke images of larger than
life leaders in service to the Nation. The preeminence of leadership is
reinforced in Army guiding documents with statements such as We
are about leadership; it is our stock in trade, and it is what makes us
different,3 and Leadership is the lifeblood of The Army.4
A few years ago, a new emphasis began to emerge concerning
the leadership and leaders required in the future Army. It began
in 2001 with the Army Training and Leader Development Panel
(Ofcer) report, concluding after a sweeping study of the ofcer
corps that future leaders needed to be self-aware and adaptable.5
Similarly, the 2001 Objective Force White Paper looked into the future
and contended that tomorrows security environment will require
leaders changing from plan-centric to intent-centric operations;
changing from physical rehearsals to virtual ones; and changing
from static command posts to situational awareness on the move.
They will be adaptive and self-awareable to master transitions in
the diversity of 21st century military operations.6 More recently, the
current senior Army leaderships vision of the future Army calls for
agile and adaptive leaders able to conduct simultaneous, distributed,
and continuous operations.7 While the U.S. Army historically has
valued the ingenuity and creativity of its leaders, the ambiguous
and decentralized combat environment of the 21st century has made
adaptive leaders an especially valuable resource.
The criticality of adaptability has also emerged as a theme in
the civilian leadership literature. Warren Bennis, a prominent

1
leadership researcher, argued that effective leaders tend to have
experienced at least one intense, transformational experience
what he calls a crucible experience. A crucible experience is both
an opportunity and a test. It is a dening moment that unleashes
abilities, forces crucial choices, and sharpens focus. It teaches a
person who he or she is. 8 According to Bennis, the critical quality
of a leader that determines how that leader will fare in a crucible
experience is adaptive capacity. Adaptive capacity allows leaders to
respond quickly and intelligently to constant change. It is the ability
to identify and seize opportunities. It allows leaders to act and then
evaluate results instead of attempting to collect and analyze all the
data before acting.9 Bennis describes the role of adaptive capacity in
a crucible experience,

People with ample adaptive capacity may struggle in the crucibles they
encounter, but they dont become stuck in or dened by them. They
learn important lessons, including new skills that allow them to move on
to new levels of achievement and new levels of learning. This ongoing
process of challenge, adaptation, and learning prepares the individual
for the next crucible, where the process is repeated. Whenever signicant
new problems are encountered and dealt with adaptively, new levels of
competence are achieved, better preparing the individual for the next
challenge10

Despite the Armys tendency to lean towards the gravitational

pull of its bureaucratic nature, many of todays junior ofcersindeed
a large majorityare being given opportunities to be innovative,
adaptive, and mentally agile. The foundation of this unique leader
development transformation rests on the serendipitous crucible
experience of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)more specically,
postwar Iraq. Although there are many criticisms of postwar Iraq as
being avoidable,11 undesirable,12 and unwinnable,13 it nevertheless
is producing a cohort of junior leaders who are acquiring adaptive
capacity critical to the future Army.
The following monograph describes how the environment
of OIF is allowingand compellingjunior ofcers to develop
adaptive capacity. In the crucible of OIF, captains and lieutenants
are becoming more creative, innovative, and condent as they learn
to deal with the complexities, unpredictability, and uncertainties

2
of counterinsurgency and nation-building in postwar Iraq. This
study examines the leadership development of junior ofcers in OIF
through their words and perspectives. The study relies heavily on
observations collected from junior Army leaders deployed to Iraq in
March of 2004specically over 50 structured interviews conducted
with junior combat arms ofcers in the 1st Armored Division, 1st
Cavalry Division, 2nd Infantry Division, and the 82nd Airborne
Division in locations throughout Iraq. The interview sessions were
conducted in the eld environment, followed an interview protocol,
were taped, and subsequently were transcribed.14
The study reveals that our junior ofcers are developing
adaptabilitya competency that the Army has recognized as vital to
future warfare, yet difcult to develop in a nondeployed Army. By
being confronted with complexity, unpredictability, and ambiguity,
junior ofcers are learning to adapt, to innovate, and to operate with
minimal guidance.

DEALING WITH COMPLEXITY

Two things seemed pretty apparent to me. One was, that in order to be a
[Mississippi River] pilot, a man has got to learn more than any one man
ought to be allowed to know; and the other was, that he must learn it all
over again in a different way every 24 hours.15

Mark Twain
Life on the Mississippi

Complex Roles.

Complexity for a junior leader in the garrison Army environment

may consist of dealing with complicated personnel issues, logistics
or maintenance, or preparing and participating in a culminating eld
exercise such as a CTC rotation. (CTC and many other acronyms
used in this manuscript are explained in the Appendix.) In OIF,
complexity for junior leaders comes from a much wider variety of
sources. One signicant source of complexity is the number and
nature of roles that junior ofcers must ll in counterinsurgency
and nation-building operations. When examining the roles required
of our junior ofcers in OIF, the question is not which role, but how

3
many? One ofcer commented, You are not just trying to learn one
job, you are trying to learn several dozen jobs. Everything from being
a politician to being a war commander. That is just an incredible
amount of information for someone to carry around in their head.
Because of the large-scale nation-building effort taking place in
OIF, junior ofcers are being thrust into additional roles that would
ordinarily be the realm of specialists or be resident in a higher
echelon unit. Junior ofcers are nding themselves much more
involved in activities other than leading their platoon or company
in combat operations. A captain noted, Junior ofcers are handling
the embassy, PAO, and IOmissions that were mainly designated
functional areas for others . . . People are wearing a lot of different
hats that they thought they would never wear. Another ofcer
stated,

The complexity comes from some of the things that we did not have
to deal with [in the past], like POO, FOO, claims ofcer, dealing with
the IGOs, having CA teams attached, PSYOPS attached, dealing with
interpreters, all of the new thingsthe new variablesthat make it
different, but different in a good way.

Unlike recent previous deployments where debates centered on

whether combat arms soldiers could shift from being aggressive
warriors to functioning as calming peacekeepers, OIF requires
junior leaders to be warriors, peacekeepers, and nation-builders
simultaneously. A captain reected on the concurrent roles that he
performed as a junior ofcer in postwar Iraq,

It is complex because of the difference from full spectrum warbecause

at one moment I am planning three missions to do raids over here, and
the next moment I am planning projects for my three areas here, and the
next thing with the three NAC membersthey have certain things they
need help with. I am doing three different things on top of the regular
company commander stuff.

Another company commander described his changing roles,

You go out and you talk to the people at the school or the clinic.
You ask them, What do you guys need? How can we improve your
neighborhoodyour living conditions? You get all that information and

4
 the next thing you have is, Hey tonight you have a raid. You push all
that information to the side . . . I got to go and do this raid tonight and
then I got two more days of patrols and QRFso a week later you get
back to this civil affairs thing.

In addition to the complexity caused by the multiple roles of

junior ofcers in OIF, the previous comments also illustrate what
several ofcers called the faucet or the necessity of adjusting
to situations that could change from cold to hot and back to cold
instantaneously. A lieutenant described it by saying,

You have to be exible to what comes down. You could be doing a

presence patrol . . . saying Hi to a kid and your vehicle is there a few
hundred yards away getting mortared. Now you are talking to this little
kid, and you hear on the radio that the rest of your platoon is over there
getting mortared, and they want you to maneuver to try to catch the guy
who just mortared. So you have to switch from one thing to another.

Another ofcer gave an example, You got to deal with a little girl
who wants a chem light and the very next minute might have to
shoot somebody for trying to place an IED . . . It is such a switch.
Many leaders spoke of the intricacies of leading troops in the
sharply different worlds of ghting insurgents and maintaining good
relationships with the local people. One platoon leader described the
situation,

It is very difcult to keep 18-year-old guys, to take them and one second
we are dodging bullets and trying to hide on the street corner and react
because you got somebody in a window or a roof, and the next second
you are knocking on the door, asking to search the house and you have to
be polite. I think that is a very large leadership challenge herekeeping
guys focused on that; making sure that they can calm back down after
brief periods of excitement.

Because U.S. forces are largely consolidated on forward operating

bases, junior ofcers commented on the surreal nature of shifting
from the extreme danger in the streets to the relative comfort of the
FOB. One lieutenant put it this way,

Leaving out the gates of the re base, you can get in a re ght one
minute, or you can be on the scene of a VBIEDjust horrid scenes, body

5
 pieces everywhere. Ten minutes later, you travel back inside the FOB and
you can be inside your room with a TV on, go take a shower, sit in your
PT, sit on the couch. You know what I meanit is odd.

In addition to the mental agility needed to take on additional

duties or to shift roles constantly, many junior leaders in OIF
described the need to adapt by functioning outside their combat
specialty. Field artillerymen, engineers, and tankers spoke of
operating as infantrymen as they conducted raids or cordon and
searches. One engineer noted, I dont think that I am much of
an engineer at all. I think I am an infantry guy with a lot more
equipment. A eld artillery ofcer stated, I denitely didnt think
that I would be clearing buildings as an artillery ofcer, or working
with the CIA or Special Forces or anything like that. Never, never
ever. On the other hand, infantrymen spoke of functioning as
engineers or civil affairs ofcers as they assumed responsibility for
the infrastructure of a sector. An infantry lieutenant commented on
his added responsibilities,

I am a combat infantryman. You want me to re and maneuver; I can

re and maneuveranywhere, in any terrain, anywhere you want to do
it. Here, I have had to learn how sewage works. In my AO, I can brief
you where all my pumps are, all my manholes, and where my sewage
is broke.

Similar comments were heard from mechanized junior leaders

learning to operate as light infantry. An armor ofcer spoke of his
transition to light infantry tactics, My mental tool guide is just
not lled with how to employ dismounted soldiers. I know how to
employ vehicles. I know how to maneuver vehicles. I am a mounted
maneuver warfare guy. [But] I am trying to pick it up; I am adapting
the best that I can. Another tanker spoke of the hard adjustment
from mechanized warfare,

It is way out of my lane, dealing with dismounted. Every time I screw up

or do something that is bad, someone is like, No. Stop that. Bad idea.
Hey, roger, okay, just tell me when I am messing up because I am Death
before dismount. It is a totally new way of thinking.

6
 With so many leaders operating out of their usual specialties,
junior ofcers were asked if their OIF experience made them more
procient in their particular branch. Armor ofcers were asked if
they were becoming better tankers, artillerymen were asked if they
were becoming better artillerymen. Except for infantrymen, most
ofcers responded that they were not gaining prociency in their
branch. Interestingly, most ofcers also added that, while they were
not becoming better ofcers in their branch specialty, they were
becoming better ofcers in general. As one armor ofcer stated,

Am I a better tanker? Probably not. My tank is not here. I have not been
in a tank for 6 months . . . My specialization in armor is probably getting
worse, but my general knowledge as an army ofcer is exponentially
increasing every day because I am exposed to so much now . . . I feel I
am much more well-roundednot specialized as muchbut much more
well-rounded.

Another ofcer bluntly stated, Better artilleryman? For coming

here? Hell no. Absolutely not. I am a better leader.
Junior leaders in postwar Iraq are learning to be adaptable and
agile. They are taking on roles they never envisioned; they are
learning to shift mental models rapidly. They are developing the
leadership ability that the Army has been seeking for many years,
yet has struggled to capture. While many deployed ofcers do not
see the transformation they are undergoing in the crucible of OIF,
some do. One eld artillery lieutenant reected,

It wasnt exactly what I thought it would be because I pictured myself

ghtinglaying steel down, destroying stuff. But this is ne; this is what
it is about. It is about being exible. It is about being able to conduct any
mission as a soldier rst and a leader rstnot worried about being an
artilleryman rst.

Cultural Complexity.

While junior ofcers stationed in Korea or Germany often learn

to deal with a different culture, many OIF leaders expressed surprise
at how different the Iraqi culture that confronted them could be.
One lieutenant stated, We are absolutely the newcomers to this

7
environment . . . It is so foreign to us. You couldnt pick a place in the
world that would be more foreign to most Americans than Iraq.16
Another ofcer added, The complexity of their culturejust dealing
with their culturehas been overwhelming. That is where I run into
the biggest problems right now. One lieutenant spoke of learning
about the Iraqi culture in school, but not truly understanding it,

The biggest thing that makes it complex here for me personally is the
religious aspect of it and the Muslim world. I grew up learning about
Shia and Sunnis in social studies class in junior high school, but I had no
idea what these people were all about. To be here and learn about how
they interact with each other and then in turn how they interact with the
rest of the worldit was nothing I was prepared for.

Because junior ofcers are heavily involved in nation-building

activities, they are interacting much more with the local populace
than in other deployments such as Bosnia, Kosovo, or the MFO. As
a result, the nuances of culture become more noticeable. Ofcers
reported having to learn how not to offend Iraqis with mannerisms
inadvertently. Others noted that there were Iraqi idiosyncrasies that
had to be learned. One ofcer commented, People here like to get
really close to you when they talk. That bothers the hell out of me.
It is a good thing to learn that they are not trying to sneak up on
you or grab you or anything. They just want to talk; they are being
friendly.
Of course, junior ofcers in past deployments and even tourists
on vacations have had to deal with the complexities of foreign
cultures. OIF is unique, however, in that a large number of junior
ofcers are dealing with cultural intricacies that have potential
strategic implications. As one captain recounted,

I was never given classes on how to sit down with a sheik that 2 days
before I had seen his face on CNN, and now all of a sudden I am talking
to this guy face-to-face. He is providing food for myself and soldiers out
in the trucks that are providing security for us while we are having our
meeting in this guys house . . . He is giving me the traditional dishdasha
and the entire outt of a sheik because he claims that I am a new sheik
in town so I must be dressed as one. I dont know if he is trying to gain
favor with me because he wants something . . . or is it something good or
something bad. It is just something you are going to have to learn on the
job and how to deal with.

8
 Another lieutenant gave an example of how a seemingly simple
misunderstanding of cultural hand gestures could have led to
strategic consequences. Well, I did this [ ] to the Minister of [a
governmental branch] to say, Wait, and he ipped out because
you are suppose to cup your hand like this [ ] and say Hold on.
You do this [ ] to dogs, I think . . . I didnt really understand.
The result of the immersion of such a large cohort of junior
ofcers into a foreign culture is an emerging condence that they can
operate effectively in unfamiliar conditions. Day-to-day interaction
with Iraqis produces competence in understanding a Middle Eastern
culture, but more importantly, company grade leaders are realizing
that their horizons are being broadened. One ofcer reected upon
the leadership development value of the OIF cultural environment,

The things that I have experienced here, beyond the soldier environment,
just going around and really experiencing the Middle East, you know,
another part of the world and just being in a new environment, interacting
with the interpreters, I think that is where the real experience comes in.

Complex Warfare.

While war is never simple, many junior ofcers believed that

counterinsurgency operations were proving to be more complicated
than the high-intensity battles they had trained for in the past. Many
ofcers yearned for the simplicity of coordinating with units on their
right and left, and destroying everything in the sector ahead. One
lieutenant spoke of the experiences of high-intensity training at a
CTC and then arriving in Iraq,

[At NTC] we went through traditional force-on-force ghtingtank

battles. That is easy. You are here. The bad is north. Drive north and kill.
Secure this piece of terrain; clear this piece of terrain . . . You get here [in
Iraq], and it is just different.

Another lieutenant observed,

The waves of BMPs and T72s and stuff that you train forthat would
have been great! My guys wanted to blow something up so badly. As
soon as we got [live] ammunition, we were like, I hope I get to pump it
into a Volkswagen. That is the easy stuff.

9
 Counterinsurgency warfare presents junior ofcers with
missions and tasks that appear to be less complex than high-
intensity warfare, e.g., cordon and search, trafc control points, or
escort duty. Indeed, many ofcers noted that their actual missions
were amazingly simple. But many junior leaders also noted that the
counterinsurgency environment demanded more mental energy.
For example, one lieutenant commented on the asymmetrical moral
nature of insurgency,

It is frustrating at times because you are expected to play by certain

regulations and certain rules when your opposition is not held to the
same standard. There are all these Geneva Convention rules: you cant
go undercover in certain situations; you got to be in very plain view.
You have all these ROE rules that we are restricted to, yet we are ghting
against an enemy who is not constrained by the same things.

Another lieutenant described how ghting an insurgency adds a

level of complexity to leadership,

Most of the people here are actually our friends. It is very, very difcult
to determine who in a crowd is friendly and who is not, and what to do.
We go over ROE and then you have to constantly before every mission
sit down with the guys and read through and make up off the wall
situations because they actually happen.

Another ofcer reected upon CTC training and stated,

I thinkas far as mentallythis [OIF] is tougher. There [at a CTC], it is

physically tougher, but here it is mentally more difcult. There you knew
that if you see a guy on the hill with a weapon, you kill him because he
is the bad guy at JRTC, and they wear the uniforms and all that. Here,
you see a guy with a weapon and he is not in a uniform. You have to call
and be like, Hey do you see that guy? Is he wearing an Iraqi police
uniform? No, he is not. Does he have that weapon slung across his
back? Yeah, he does. Okay, well, lets go and dismount and talk to
him and see if he should be having that weapon. You cant just shoot the
guy like you do at NTC. You got to think about it.

The environment in OIF is forcing our junior leaders to confront

the hard realities of a complex situation, a relatively restrictive
ROE, the presence of innocents on the battleeld, and the need to

10
still accomplish the mission. The OIF experience is developing in
our junior ofcers the ability to recognize the strategic implications
of their actions in a complex moral environment. As one astute
lieutenant noted, The fact is that we dont lower our standards and
we abide by an ROE; that we are not out there just to kill innocent
civilians; and that the mission is important, but the means to that
end is sometimes more important. Such words speak volumes
about how adept our junior ofcers are becoming in dealing with
the moral complexities in the OIF crucible.

Complexity through Change.

Adaptive leaders learn to live with unpredictability. They spend

less time fretting about the inability to establish a routine or control
the future and focus more on exploiting opportunities. In OIF, junior
leaders reported operating in an environment of planning ahead
and attempting to establish a battle rhythm against a backdrop of
imminent change. Junior ofcers quickly learned that the battle
rhythm they emplace lasts only until the next interruption. As one
lieutenant paradoxically described the environment, Right now, it
is fairly predictable, but that can always change.
Army ofcers have always been accustomed to sudden change,
but the OIF environment is a sharp contrast to recent deployments.
Many factors appear to be accelerating the impact of unpredictability.
First, the insurgents are an adaptive enemy. As one ofcer noted,
Its a constant struggle of one-upmanship. We adapt, they adapt.
Its a constant competition to gain the upper hand.17
Second, because the OIF environment is rich in intelligence,
missions emerge on very short notice based on new information.
One platoon leader noted,

I cant tell you what I am doing tomorrow. I can tell you what I am
supposed to be doing tomorrow. Things change so frequently and you
just expect that. You know that every day you live a day at a time. Things
you plan change based on intel reports, based on different changes in the
mission.

Third, the attitudes of the Iraqi people towards U.S. forces are by
no means homogenous or stable. Junior leaders cannot assume the

11
reception their troops receive during missions will be constant. A
lieutenant observed,

We dont know whether we are going to get rocks thrown at us, or

mortars, or a handshake, or a cup of tea. It really doesnt depend on what
neighborhood we are going to. It doesnt matter what we are going to do.
The level of hostility is something that we cannot predict.

Finally, the overall strategic environment in postwar Iraq is

still unstable which creates havoc for those at the tactical level.
An assassination, a prison abuse scandal, or a localized uprising
can change conditions for leaders on the ground. One ofcer
elaborated,

Things are going to go wrong and some crazy things are going to happen.
Like the UN is going to blow up or Sadr is going to ambush a patrol
in Sadr City, and they are going to call our tanks in to be prepared to
basically assault the city . . . My guys realize that it is a very unpredictable
environment that we live in.

As a result of the possibility of change at any moment, junior

ofcers have learned to plan and establish routine, but anticipate
change at any moment. One lieutenant stated,

You never know what to expect. Tasks seem to come in spurts. It is quiet
for a whileyou think that maybe we have gotten a hold of the sector . . .
then we will have three IEDs in a day within the battalion AO.

One ofcer gave this advice for leading in the OIF environment,
The rst priority is to accept the fact that it is going to be completely
unpredictable. You just have to make the best of it. A lieutenant
added,

I guess you get used to the unpredictable nature of things . . . I guess

you build little lessons learned off of each one. So next time when a new
experience comes up, you draw from that last one. Okay, how could I
quickly adapt to this and make this happen? I guess the only danger is
it really could make you complacent. You want to be comfortable with
unpredictability. But, you dont want to become complacent. I guess
thats the balance.

12
 Junior ofcers in the OIF environment are working towards
establishing predictability for their troops. They are planning and
scheduling, but they are also learning to adapt to the situation when
it changes or emerges differently from what they expected.

TASK AND PURPOSE

There is a type of staff ofcer who seems to think that it is more important
to draft immaculate orders than to get out a reasonably well-worded
order in time for action to be taken before the situation changes or the
opportunity passes.

General B. H. Liddell Hart

Thoughts on War

A key factor in developing adaptive capacity in junior ofcers is

the ability to actually lead and make decisions rather than merely
to execute the orders of higher commands. Two years ago, a study
chartered by the Chief of Staff of the Army entitled Stiing Innovation
reported that the centralized and overly structured Army system
had created an oppressive culture that encouraged in our junior
ofcers reactive instead of proactive thought, compliance instead of
creativity, and adherence instead of audacity.18 Although creativity
and innovation tend to be highly esteemed by the Army in its
rhetoric, the report found that the reality is that junior ofcers are
seldom given opportunities to be innovative in planning training;
to make decisions; or to fail, learn, and try again.19 In essence, the
Army had replaced leadership with what leadership researchers call
leadership substitutes. 20 The leadership substitutes model suggests
that a variety of situational variables can substitute for or neutralize
the effects of a leaders behavior. These situational variables can
paralyze, destroy, or counteract the ability of leadership to make
a difference and make leadership not only impossible but also
unnecessary.21 For example, lack of authority may neutralize a
leaders effectiveness, while detailed planning may substitute for
leadership and make the leader redundant.
In OIF, many of the situational variables that normally substitute
for leadership in the nondeployed Army are removed. For example,
many ofcers reported that their missions were not covered by

13
Army doctrine or established TTP. Ofcers spoke of improvising
and experimenting in operations such as the employment of heavy
units in a MOUT environment, patrolling in a nonhostile MOUT
terrain, and conducting Phase IV (nation-building) operations in a
situation void of many of the agencies and organizations normally
expected in reconstruction. As a result, junior ofcers are having
to rely on the their own judgment and ingenuity in getting the
mission accomplished. One lieutenant perceptively noted, Every
environment that we as a military go in, we are going to learn
something. For those of us who are learning it now, well be the ones
to write the doctrine later to help out the next set.
For many of the ofcers interviewed, there was a surprising
lack of detailed guidance from higher headquarters. Geographical
dispersion, changing tactical and strategic situations, and volatile
environments prevented higher echelon commanders from
developing plans with specic guidance for junior ofcers carrying
out missions. Junior ofcers became the experts on the situation,
not higher headquarters. One ofcer commented on why he did
not receive more explicit directions, The big thing that you have
to understand is that this is bottom-up fed. I am the guy on the
ground. I know everything about my AO. As a result, junior
ofcers reported moving away from the traditional detailed military
decision making process and relying on FRAGOs, task and purpose,
and commanders intent for guidance instead.
One platoon leader recounted how general his guidance was
upon arriving in his sector, When we rst got here, the colonel told
us to go out and nd bad guys and kill them. That was our orders.
That was our task and purpose. We were, like, Roger, all right! A
company commander related the broad guidance he received,

I had a very simple commanders intent. It was two lines. It said prevent
anti-coalition militants and former regime militants from getting weapons
or explosives into this facility. Second linealways use active force
protection measures to deter an attack, i.e., be a hard target. In a situation
like this, you can make your commanders intent as complicated as you
want. You can address every issue, or you can just give them a broad
stroke of a philosophy you want them to work under.

14
 A signicant implication of OIF is the growing condence
possessed by junior ofcers that they can lead without being
propped up by either close supervision or detailed guidance. They
are learning to be comfortable, as one ofcer noted, with only,
Here is your task, here is your purpose, we dont have as much
information that may be necessary to complete the whole mission,
but the information is out there for you to get. Another ofcer
described the command climate as, Here, a lot of times it is, Here
it is, gure it out, go, you have one hour. An aviation lieutenant
commented on his condence in operating in an intent-centric rather
than plan-centric environment,

Honestly, if I was ying around out there . . . you give me a call sign on
a ground unit, a grid to go to, and a task and purposee.g., there is a
cordon and search, this grid, this is the call sign of the ground unit, this
is their frequencyin the time that it takes me to get there, I can have a
pretty good warm fuzzy about how to handle the operation.

TOMORROWS LEADERS

The preceding paragraphs have attempted to make the case

that todays junior ofcers are learning to lead in the crucible of the
extremely complex and dynamic OIF environment. Lieutenants and
captains have conducted missions for which they never trained,
executed operations that have outpaced Army doctrine, shifted
constantly from adrenaline-pumping counterinsurgency to patience-
demanding nation-building, and received very little detailed
guidance or supervision in the process. The result of this experience
is a cohort of junior ofcers that is learning to be adaptable, creative,
innovative, and condent in their abilities to handle just about any
task thrown at them.
One lieutenant reected upon the leader development aspects of
OIF, I have learned that I can adapt to circumstances and situations
that surround me much better than I expected . . . Three hours after
I got on the ground in Baghdad, I went on my rst raid with these
guys. Just my ability to learn and absorb information has impressed
me. Another ofcer offered insights on what he learned in theater,

15
 You learn not to over-analyze . . . A place like this really drives home,
I would say, that the most important thing that a leader can do at the
lowest level is make a decisionright or wrong . . . Making the decision
in a timely manner, on the spot, at the lowest level, has implications that
are huge all the way to the top.

Being able to adapt, make decisions, and lead in the complex,

ambiguous, and uncertain conditions of OIF produces a condence
in junior leaders. The boldness developed in OIF is the seed for
the audacity required in the future Army. It is something that can
be best developed by allowing junior ofcers to lead in a crucible
experience. One lieutenant noted,

I feel that myself, and all the other ofcers that I serve with, are doing
things that they never expected they would have to do and nding out
that theyre doing them very, very well. I think that it comes to a shock to
some guys, many of us, how well things are going for us individually.

For the ofcers deployed to Iraq, the OIF environment has become
the way the Army operates. For many of the more junior ofcers,
OIF is their only reference point in the leadership development
process of the Army. As a second lieutenant pointed out, I dont
really know what infantry platoon leaders normally do. I went to
two training centers and I came here. I have no idea what they do in
garrison. Another lieutenant said, I have never been on a CMTC
or a JRTC. You could say this is my rst eld problem coming out
here and coming to Baghdad. I am just kind of learning as I go. For
other ofcers with experience in the nondeployed Army, the OIF
experience stands in contrast to much of what they learned in other
leader development experiences. For example, one ofcer compared
leader development in the OIF environment with a CTC rotation,

I know the Army hates this word, but [the OIF environment] keeps me
exible . . . The Army hates the word because if you have ever been to
a training rotation, you always have an AAR, and the thing that they
always tell you . . . is Dont ever say under one of your Sustains
exible. Dont even bother. They hate to hear it. The Army hates to hear
the word exible.

Such observations raise a key question: What happens when these

junior ofcerswho have experienced the exhilaration of leading

16
troops in a complex environment with little close supervision
return to the nondeployed Army? Will the Army leverage this
newly developed adaptability? Or will bureaucratic forces gradually
whittle away and wear down these young warriors with SOPs,
TTPs, MREs, and strict adherence to the MDMP? While there have
already been some adjustments at the CTCs to instill ambiguity
and uncertainty instead of following closely scripted scenarios,
changes are also needed throughout the schoolhouses, and more
importantly, in the daily operational training of units. The leader
development gains of OIF will be lost if instructors at the Captains
Career Course, battalion and brigade commanders in tactical units,
and division chiefs on headquarters staffs fail to recognize that
these junior ofcers are quite capable of operating within the broad
boundaries of commanders intent, instead of being told what to do
and how to do it.
Three factors are important to consider when exploring the
implications of a large cohort of adaptive, independent leaders
returning to the garrison Army. First, while the current situation
has many similarities with deployments of the past such as Bosnia
and Kosovo, Vietnam, or post-World War II Germany or Japan, the
leader development experience is unique due to differences in scope
and scale. The Vietnam experience included counterinsurgency
operations, but the nation-building in that conict was mostly at the
local level (e.g., civil action teams) and did not attempt to rebuild the
national government. Operations in Bosnia and Kosovo included
some nation-building, but leaders were not confronted with an
active insurgency. Likewise, while post-World War II reconstruction
efforts were at the national level, junior ofcers did not have to
contend with ghting an insurgency at the same time. Probably a
more signicant difference in the leader development experience
from past deployments is the increased quality of the all-volunteer
forceespecially when comparing Iraq with the Vietnam conict.
With higher quality troops, especially the noncommissioned ofcer
corps, junior ofcers can devote more of their mental energy to
issues other than discipline and individual training. Additionally,
current force stabilization policies allow units to push their band
of excellence upwards due to cohesion and reduced turbulence.

17
In other words, the current situation of so many adaptive junior
ofcers returning to the nondeployed Army presents an extremely
rare opportunity to the Army.
Second, this monograph focused on the development of
adaptability in company grade ofcers. While many eld grade
ofcers are also in postwar Iraq, mostly lieutenants and captains are
in the line units interacting with the local populace, conducting the
raids, and working with soldiers. The development of agile, adaptive
leaders in OIF is, by and large, a junior ofcer phenomenon. Thus,
any impact of adaptability and exibility on the Army will come
mainly through the inuence of a large cohort of junior ofcers with
OIF combat experience.
Finally, the inuence of the Armys senior leadership on the
leadership development of the Army is also a salient factor to
consider. Former Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric Shinseki
set the stage for change. He chartered the Army Training and
Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) in anticipation of developing
adaptive leaders for the Objective Force. Under his direction, the
Army explored ways to eliminate 50 percent of nonmission related
training in order to allow company commanders to be innovative
in developing their own training. Additionally, he directed that all
company commanders be given a week of white space on their
training calendars to encourage junior ofcer creativity. While
the institutional Army may not have responded with signicant
policy changes to promote adaptability during his tenure, General
Shinsekis vision of adaptive leaders established the foundation for
change.
Current Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker continued the
momentum of change and is pushing the Army towards reform
with radical restructuring, discontinuation of programs once
thought sacred, and the dismantling of processes no longer viewed
as exible enough for a transforming Army. As far as developing
leaders, General Schoomaker has shown that he is comfortable
with exposing leaders to complex, ambiguous environments.
Statements such as, What makes a great team is what happens after
the ball is snapped, Youre not learning unless youre operating
in the zone of discomfort, and You cant organize the chaos of

18
the battleeld22 reect a perspective consistent with notions of
exibility, adaptability, and innovation.
With a cohort of junior ofcers experiencing and expecting to be
treated as adaptive, innovative, and independent leaders putting
pressure on the Army from the bottom, and a Chief of Staff of the
Army familiar with the virtues of special operating forces (not to
mention a transformation-oriented Secretary of Defense) pushing
adaptability from the top, the Army nds itself sandwiched between
forces of change. The Army can continue the momentum by
leveraging and encouraging adaptability and innovation, or it can
allow traditional Army inertia to gradually grind down the out-of-
the-box perspectives of its returning junior ofcers.
An Army at war is stressed and stretched. Wars also have the
ability, however, to mature an Army. Todays Army is receiving a
large number of junior ofcers who have learned to be comfortable
with complexity, change, and ambiguity. While these junior ofcers
do not appear much different than fresh-faced cadets, they carry
with them a savvy and wisdom that can only be gained in a crucible
experience. Such a perspective is evident in the following quotation
from a very eloquent second lieutenant. Note the maturity in his
words as he reects upon the OIF environment and his development
as a leader.

Our equation is lled with variables that constantly changethe weather,

people, different dynamics that we have no control over. If we tried to
control them, we would be breaking the rules. It is important that we
understand our constraints, understand our limitations, understand the
variables that are out there, and then learn how to deal with it. There are
certain things that you are not going to be able to controlthe emotions
your soldiers run into, the problems your soldiers have at home, the
complex situation between the Shiites and Sunnis, the cultural barrier,
the stand off between Western culture, Christian culture, and Muslim
culture. There are certain things that we wont understand because it
is a totally different environment . . . To prepare an ofcer for this, to
prepare anyone for this, you need to just constantly test him, put him
in very challenging situations, and allow them to sort of think and act
under pressure and stress. That is essentially what you do here. You
are given a task and expected to perform . . . You see the true colors of
people because you see a lot of these guys get bent out of shape. You get
tired, you get frustrated, you get mad, you start screaming. You are, like,

19
 This is all [messed] up. You understand their frustration. You got to
pull yourself back. You got to remain calm. You got to come with, Okay
these are the changes, and this is how we are going to change our plan.
You got to be able to think on your feet. You got to be exible. I cant
stress that enough. That has been our success here.

Of course, not all the junior ofcers encountered during

interviews for this monograph were as comfortable as this lieutenant
in leading in a complex environment. Some of the junior ofcers in
OIF are frustrated with the constant change, while others report
unease in dealing with ambiguity. Over all, however, most of the
junior ofcers showed an astute understanding of leadership in the
future environment.
Todays junior ofcers are not afraid to lead in ambiguous
conditions. They can execute a mission with minimal guidance. They
are an incredibly valuable resource to a transforming Army that has
desired and sought adaptive capacity in its leaders. The crucible of
OIF has delivered to the Army a cohort of adaptive leaders. The
challenge for the Army is to encourage and leverage this priceless
potential.

ENDNOTES

1. Quoted in Thom Shanker, New Chief Sets Out to Redesign a Stretched-

Thin Army, The New York Times, January 28, 2004, p. A19.

2. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 22-100, Army

Leadership, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Ofce, 1990, p. 7.

3. Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Vision Statement,

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Ofce, 1999, p. 7.

4. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 1, The Army,

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Ofce, 2001.

5. Headquarters, Department of the Army, The Army Training and Leader

Development Panel Ofcer Study Report to the Army, http://www.army.mil/atld, 2001
(emphasis added). See also Lieutenant General William M. Steele and Lieutenant
Colonel Robert P. Walters, Jr., 21st Century Leadership Competencies, Army
Magazine, August 2001, p. 29.

6. Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army White Paper, Concepts

20
for the Objective Force. http://www.army.mil/features/WhitePaper/ObjectiveForceWhiteP
aper.pdf, 2001, p. 5 (emphasis added).

7. Headquarters, Department of the Army, The Way Ahead, Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Ofce. 2004, p. 8 (emphasis added).

8. Warren G. Bennis and Robert J. Thomas, Geeks & Geezers: How Era, Values,
and Dening Moments Shape Leaders, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press,
2002, p. 16.

9. Warren G. Bennis, On Becoming a Leader, New York: Basic Books, 2003, pp.
xxiixxiii.

10. Bennis and Thomas, p. 93.

11. James Fallows, Blind Into Baghdad, The Atlantic Monthly, Jan/Feb 2004,
Vol. 293, p. 74.

12. Bob Herbert, No End In Sight, The New York Times, April 2, 2004, p.
A19.

13. General William E. Odom in John Harwood, Former General Sees

Staying the Course in Iraq as Untenable, The Wall Street Journal, April 28, 2004,
p. 4.

14. In addition to assisting in ofcer interviews, Colonel John R. Martin

handled logistics, scheduling, and transportation. He is a rst class soldier who
made this monograph a reality.

15. Mark Twain, Life on the Mississippi, Cambridge, MA: University Press,
1883, p. 105.

16. Unless otherwise noted, quotations are from transcribed interviews with
OIF company grade ofcers.

17. Major John Nagl, quoted in Nicholas Blanford, Insurgent And Soldier:
Two Views On Iraq Fight, Christian Science Monitor, February 25, 2004, p. 1.

18. Leonard Wong, Stiing Innovation: Developing Tomorrows Leaders Today,

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002, p. v.

19. Ibid, p. 3.

20. Steven Kerr and John M. Jermier, Substitutes for Leadership: Their
Meaning and Measurement, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, Vol.

21
22, 1978, pp. 375403.

21. Ibid, p. 395.

22. Shanker, p. A19.

22
 APPENDIX

ACRONYMS

AAR After Action Review

AO Area of Operations
BMP Soviet military personnel carrier
CA Civil Affairs
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CMTC Combat Maneuver Training Center
CSA Chief of Staff of the Army
CTC Combat Training Center
FOB Forward Operating Base
FOO Field Ordering Ofcer
FRAGO Fragmentary Order
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IGO Intergovernmental Organization
IO Information Operations
JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center
MDMP Military Decision Making Process
MFO Multinational Force and Observers
MOUT Military Operations in Urban Terrain
MRE Mission Rehearsal Exercise
NAC Neighborhood Advisory Council
NTC National Training Center
OIF Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
PAO Public Affairs Ofcer
POO Purchase Ordering Ofcer
PSYOPS Psychological Operations
PT Physical Training
QRF Quick Reaction Force
ROE Rules of Engagement
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
VBIED Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Device

23
 MAKING RIFLEMEN FROM MUD:
RESTORING THE ARMYS CULTURE OF IRREGULAR WARFARE

James D. Campbell

October 2007

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ISBN 1-58487-318-3

ii
 PREFACE

The U.S. Army War College provides an excellent environment for selected military
officers and government civilians to reflect and use their career experience to explore
a wide range of strategic issues. To assure that the research developed by Army War
College students is available to Army and Department of Defense leaders, the Strategic
Studies Institute publishes selected papers in its Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy
Series.

ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II
Director of Research
Strategic Studies Institute

iii
 ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JAMES D. CAMPBELL is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army. He is a 2007 graduate of

the U.S. Army War College.

iv
 ABSTRACT

Prior to World War II, the Army had a deeply ingrained facility with and acceptance of
what we now term unconventional warfareraising, training, advising, and cooperating
with tribal militias, local paramilitaries, and other nonstate armed groups. This culture of
irregular warfare was attributable to nearly 300 years of American military tradition from
the colonial period until 1941, including extensive experience in cooperating with Native
American tribes and individual scouts during the expansion of the western frontier.
These traditions of unconventional war reached maturity in the years of fighting on the
western plains after the Civil War, and were given ultimate expression in the creation
of the Philippine Scouts at the beginning of the 20th century. Since World War II, the
wider military has lost this expertise in and comfortable familiarity with unconventional
operations, with the Special Operations community taking on the sole proprietorship
of this role. Given the variety of political environments in which todays conventional
soldiers may find themselves and the current nature of conflicts ongoing and likely to
occur in the world, the Army culture as a whole can and must readapt itself to the new
old realities of irregular war.

v
 MAKING RIFLEMEN FROM MUD:
RESTORING THE ARMYS CULTURE OF IRREGULAR WARFARE

INTRODUCTION1

The leaders of regular units engaged in guerrilla operations must be extremely adaptable. They
must study the methods of guerrilla war. They must understand that initiative, discipline, and
the employment of stratagems are all of the utmost importance. As the guerrilla status of regular
units is but temporary, their leaders must lend all possible support to the organization of guerrilla
units from among the people.

Mao Tse Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare2

In the summer of 1899, Lieutenant Matthew Batson was commanding L Troop, 4th
U.S. Cavalry, during operations in the Philippines. Already recognized as an energetic
and courageous officer during the war in Cuba, Batson gained further note after being
awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for actions in combat with his troop in
July.3 At the request of his superiors, in late summer Batson submitted a formal proposal
for raising a scout company for the First Divisions Provisional Cavalry Brigade. The
plan called for this company to be recruited from the Macabebes, an ethnic tribal group
in Southern Luzon that had long opposed domination by the majority Tagalogs. The
Tagalogs formed the backbone and provided most of the leadership for the Army of
the Philippine Republic, fighting against U.S. rule in the archipelago. The Macabebes
military usefulness had been previously recognized by the Spanish as they faced revolt
and unrest prior to the war with the United States; large numbers of Macabebes had
been recruited and served with the Spanish forces until their defeat and cession of the
Philippines to the United States in 1898.4
The scout company proposed by Lieutenant Batson would consist of 100 soldiers,
and would be trained and led by officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) from
among the units of the Cavalry brigade and the First Division. On September 1, 1899,
Batson received a memorandum from the division headquarters approving his plan, and
he began immediately to raise his scouts, leading them in combat and working to gain
approval to raise still more scout companies.5
From this small beginning, Batsons Macabebe Scouts and other similar units raised
elsewhere in the Philippines would eventually evolve into the Philippine Scouts, forming
several infantry, cavalry, and artillery regiments composed of Philippine soldiers and
fully incorporated into the U.S. Regular Army.6 The Philippine Scouts are unique in
the American military experience, as they are the only large-scale native or colonial
units to ever serve as a conventional part of the U.S. armed forces. What is not unique
about the Scouts, however, is that the motives, rationale, and manner for which they were
originally raised was an accepted, matter-of-fact technique employed by Army leaders
for virtually the entire previous history of American armed conflict. This traditional
practice of raising, training, and working closely with indigenous groups to assist in
the prosecution of what we now term low-intensity military operations began in the

1
colonial period, reached a level of doctrinal maturity during the fighting on the Western
plains and in the Southwest after the Civil War, and achieved its ultimate expression in
the incorporation of the Philippine Scouts into the Regular Army in 1920.7
What happened to this traditional practice, which was at one time so implicitly accepted
by the Army at large? The practice was once so ingrained in our military culture that the
creation of the Philippine Scoutsand their largely civilian counterpart, the Philippine
Constabularyincited hardly more debate in Army circles than the adoption of the Lyster
Bag for cool, purefied water in 1910.8 Raising local troops and working closely with the
local and tribal leadership to suppress insurgency and lawlessness in loosely governed
or newly conquered areas were not carried out by special troops or elite units, but rather
were the norm throughout the Army. Any officer could be expected to either raise local
scouts or work with existing tribal organizations to accomplish his units goals. Yet since
World War II, a connection to indigenous or tribal soldiers has increasingly become the
sole province of the Special Forces (SF), and until quite recently the conventional Army
had almost totally shunned the idea of such affiliation or cooperation; the exigencies of
war in Afghanistan and Iraq have only just begun to break down the barriers. Aside from
the relatively brief periods of large-scale high-intensity operations during the periods
1917-18, 1941-45, 1950-54, and the Gulf War of 1991, these developments have occurred in
spite of the fact that the Army since 1900 has been operating and will continue to operate
more and more in areas and situations where the ability to raise, train, and cooperate
with local, tribal, and other nonstate armed groups is, if not a prerequisite, certainly a
central factor for military and political success.
The literature on the new nature of warfare since the end of the Cold War is vast and
growing. Authors have stressed that large-scale, symmetrical combat operations are a
thing of the past, while asymmetrical warfare is the new paradigm militaries will face
in the 21st century. This new paradigm of combat or stability operations applies to what
author Thomas Barnett calls the nonintegrating gap9 areas of ungoverned or poorly
governed space. These are places where poverty, crime, and the challenges posed by
modernization of traditional societies result in endemic conflict. Here, new strategies and
techniques are required for a western military like ours to be successful. As described
by Richard Shultz and Andrea Dew in their recent book on terrorists, insurgencies, and
nonstate militias,

war since 1990 has, with the exception of Desert Storm and the first phase of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, been different from the modern Western understanding of armed combat. But the
policymakers and military commanders of modern statesincluding the United Stateshave
often failed to grasp this new battlefield. Indeed, for the policymakers the perception is the
reversethat conventional warfare prevails and thus the United States is more than adequately
prepared to dominate the future face of war.10

This thoughtful statement, and others like it, should be familiar to any reader of recent
literature dealing with security studies, military science, or international politics.
The ideas encapsulated there are clearly backed up by the realities in these troubled
places, but in their stress on the new nature of conflict since the end of the Cold War,
they tend to obscure much of what is not new. Viewed in the context of the almost
400 years of American military history and tradition, asymmetrical conflict, insurgency,

2
stability operations, and constabulary operations in ungoverned or poorly governed
space are not new at allin fact, they are the norm, while the high-intensity conflicts of
the mid-20th century are the truly atypical episodes that diverge from the most common
experiences of American warfare.
In the ongoing effort both to succeed in our current fights in Iraq, Afghanistan, the
Philippines, East Africa, and elsewhere, and to continue the evolution of our doctrine and
tactics to address upcoming threats, the Army must certainly look to the future. The Army
must also, however, look to the past to recapture some of those organizational strengths
that have led to success in our long history of low-level conflict. One of these strengths
was the institutionalized practice of working with and through local irregular military
forces. This practice and the comfort and ease with which the Army at large followed
it in the period prior to the Cold War need to be reclaimed Army-wide. The culture of
irregular warfareadvising, liaison, training, leading, and operating closely with local
tribal levies, militias, and other nonstate forcesmust be embraced enthusiastically by
every part of the Army, as opposed to retaining current sole proprietorship in the Special
Operations Command. Such a reform is imperative now more than ever, given the limited
number of SF units and the demands currently being placed upon them. Conventional
units must be able to conduct irregular operations wherever they are deployed.
This paper will examine both the Armys historical practice of working with indigenous
forces and auxiliaries, and the institutional training programs formerly in place designed
to prepare officers and soldiers for roles as advisors, working with irregular as well as
regular forces. Using these examples while discussing current operations and the debates
surrounding incorporation of local irregular troops into those operations, I shall propose
measures that, if implemented by the Army, will restore the culture of capitalizing on
indigenous forces in low-intensity conflicts.
This paper is not, let it be emphasized, a call for establishment of an American foreign
legion or units of native or colonial troops. It is, rather, an argument for the restoration
of one of our Armys historic strengths. It is a truism that the best means of fighting an
insurgency is to persuade the local population to do it themselves. Additionally, the
human intelligence potentially derived from close contact and cooperation with irregulars
can be invaluable for the successful prosecution of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism,
and other low-level operations. Proven in the wars during the establishment of Western
empires and solidified in successful post-colonial counterinsurgencies, these dictums can
continue to be ignored only at considerable risk of disaster. In seeking that which is new
in the post-Cold War operating environment, we would do well to seek as well those
parallels to our own heritage, and apply those strengths which have underlain much of
our previous military success.

SCOUTS

The European and the Indian

Beginning with the earliest days of European colonial settlements in North America,
white soldiers and militiamen worked in close cooperation with natives, learning, teaching,
leading, and often employing Indians in the roles of guides, scouts, and interpreters. In

3
virtually every instance of warfare in the colonial period, whether in conflict with other
whites or with the indigenous people themselves, colonists allied with, or employed as
auxiliaries, members of native tribes. In the pattern of warfare as it evolved in colonial
North America, the Europeans learned much from the Indians, adopting clothing, weapons,
and tactics. The reverse was also true. In addition to such obvious transfers as firearms,
some even argue that warfare to the point of annihilationthe practice of attempting to
wipe out an enemy completelywas an innovation adopted by the Eastern tribes only
after sustained contact with and emulation of colonists. The virtual annihilation in 1637
of the once powerful Pequot tribe was accomplished not solely by white colonists in New
England, but also through close cooperation by virtually all the neighboring tribes as
well.11
Some of the best known examples of this early collaboration between whites and
Indians in war came during the Seven Years War or, as it is termed in North America,
the French and Indian War. During this war, previous cooperation between the Huron
and the French encouraged and solidified the alliance between the Iroquois Confederacy
and the British. Not a single major expedition or combat operation, British or French,
occurred during this war without contingents of Indians fighting on either side. The
tribes provided scouts and guides, interpreters, security for settlements and fortified
garrisons, as well as larger forces for combat. Acting either alongside European allies, as
part of secondary operations in concert with larger movements, or alone as surrogates, the
Iroquois and Huron people were a significant part of this major conflict that determined
dominance on the continent.12
There are two interesting sidelights to this close, almost symbiotic early cooperation
between native Americans and Europeans in colonial warfare. The first is the evolution
of what many feel is a uniquely American style of war, with an almost mythic emphasis
on the individual rifleman and a reluctance to adopt the close-order tactics of 18th and
19th century European militaries.13 This frontiersman approach to fighting, along with
the emergence of special Ranger units modeled on Indian formations, was in the eyes
of many American military leaders, up to and including General Pershing during World
War I, the special ingredient that made the United States Army not only different from its
European counterparts, but better.14
The second salient aspect of military relationships with Indian tribes is the parallel
between the English experience with the Iroquois in North America, and with the native
people in their other imperial possessions, like Scotland and India. At the same time that
some English officers were working with the Iroquois to fight the French and Huron, others
were beginning the process of raising and incorporating the first large-scale numbers of
native troops, the Scottish Highland regiments. The rhetoric employed by political
leaders in Britain when discussing the Highland regiments and the martial qualities of
the men who filled them, is very similar to the language used by the British leadership
in describing their Indian allies, both North American and South Asian.15 Additionally,
the political uses envisaged by men in the British government for their Highland troops
were in some cases very similar to those employed in dealings with the native peoples of
America.
Part of the justification for raising marching regiments from among the Highlanders
in Scotland was to denude the Highlands of its large population of military age males,

4
culturally accustomed to and enamored of combat. Political leaders in London and
Edinburgh sought to harness those martial energies by directing them towards Britains
external enemies. A corollary to this idea was that these men, once enlisted in the army,
would serve as hostages, assuring the good behavior of their often rebellious relatives
still in Scotland.16 Similarly, by encouraging Indian tribes to fight against one another,
whites exploited divisions between native societies and prevented their unifying against
the common threat of European domination. Indians would also thereby dissipate their
military strength in internecine quarrels, and not in resisting British expansion. Indian
leaders who agreed to cooperate with the British were in a sense offering themselves as
hostages, for, by choosing sides, they sacrificed their ability to act independently and
often even required protection later from the rebellions among their own people.17 Such
themes as exploitation of native divisions, cynical though they are, have been enacted
with some success by Americans throughout the period since. The U.S. Army did so on
the frontier, as well as in the early 20th-century campaigns in the Philippines, Central
America, and elsewhere, up to and including the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.
The myths perpetuated by the British concerning the warlike qualities of native troops,
and the resulting advantages to be gained in working with them to accomplish imperial
goals, have also colored the discourse surrounding these issues in the United States, at
least since the late 19th century. Certainly the recent advocacy by several writers for
either enlisting in the U.S. military large numbers of foreign troops, or creating formal
units of foreign scouts within the U.S. Armyto take advantage of the scouting and
close-in fighting abilities of these native warriorsis connected, at least in part, to echoes
of British imperial attitudes concerning the use of native troops.18

Expanding the Western Frontier

After the United States gained independence, colonial habits and techniques of
warfare did not disappear, but were, if anything, more regularized. The national debate
surrounding the establishment of a Regular Army, as opposed to reliance on a purely
militia force, was directly connected to the perceived success of American militia in the
wars both against the French and their native allies, as well as against the British.19 The
customary practices of working with Indians in the process of expanding the western
frontier did not change either.
In the campaigns against the tribes of the Old Northwest and in the Southern states,
commanders like Anthony Wayne and later Andrew Jackson and Winfield Scott,
employed local tribes and individual scouts in much the same way as had British and
American leaders in the colonial period. During the War of 1812, again both the British
and American sides had Indian allies. Both armies used Indian scouts, encouraging allied
tribes to pursue their own ends by attacking rival frontier settlements and enemy troop
concentrations. While fighting the Creeks in 1813-14, Andrew Jackson relied heavily on
Cherokee allies, with large numbers of Cherokees playing a decisive role in the ultimate
U.S. victory and slaughter of the Creeks at the battle of Horseshoe Bend.20 While fighting
the most intense of the Seminole Wars during the 1830s and 40s, the Army used native
scouts to assist in tracking Seminole bands, and to provide commanders knowledge about
the customs and habits of the Seminoles so that they would be better able to predict their

5
whereabouts and possible courses of action.21
In all of these instances, the facility with which American officers, both regular
and militia, worked with the tribes is a trait we accept without comment. In fact,
these practices at the time were so much a part of the normal, almost doctrinal way of
carrying on operations as to be totally unremarkable. It would have been a rare officer
indeed who was so blind as to try to prosecute a frontier campaign during this period
without actively seeking cooperation or alliance with local Indian leaders, tribes, or even
individual scouts. Virtually every account of military operations from the Revolution to
the Civil Warincluding the Lewis and Clark Expedition, the Creek and Seminole Wars,
and the Black Hawk Warincludes references to native scouts and allies. As the frontier
moved across the Mississippi westward, military leaders found it even more necessary
than previously to make alliances with local Indian leaders, enlisting native people in the
Armys attempts to subdue the plains tribes, and provide security and the rule of law in
the loosely governed and often fractious settler communities.

United States Scouts

During the Civil War, both Federal and rebel forces enlisted Indians in their regular
formations and, especially in the campaigns west of the Mississippi, used local Indians
as scouts and in capacities similar to what the Army had always done in frontier areas.
Additionally, when the Regular U.S. forces left garrisons in the West, local leaders had
to increase their reliance on militia forces in order to manage these vast areas. Unrest
and violence in the far West increased enormously during the Civil War, so much so that
the U.S. Government actually had to divert troops from campaigns in the East to assist
in quelling uprisings caused, in part, by inexperienced militia and by political and civic
leaders instigating conflict. A notable example of this kind of violence was the massacre
of a southern Cheyenne village at Sand Creek, Colorado; local volunteers took advantage
of the absence of Regulars to destroy this local band of Indians, murdering men, women,
and children. In fact, when the Army returned to the West after the war and signed
several treaties to end the immediate conflicts, the units garrisoning the posts were in
many cases far more sympathetic to the Indians than to the whites.22
When the Army returned to its traditional role of policing the largely ungoverned
areas of the Western frontier, it began to establish new posts and regarrison older ones
in an ongoing effort to avert conflict between white settlers and the tribes. As a part of
this increase in Army presence and activity on the frontier, many commanders sought to
improve their capabilities in conducting what really amounted to what we would now
term low-intensity fighting, or even counterinsurgency. One way they did this was to
enlarge upon and formalize the previous tactics for employing native Indian scouts.
When the Army began to recognize the difficulty it would have in subduing the
plains tribes and the Apache, they looked for Indian allies to assist them. In keeping with
long-standing practice, many of these allies came from tribes which had been previously
displaced or defeated by either the U.S. Government or other plains tribes, and who saw
alliance with the Army as a mean of recovering a lost position or obtaining revenge.
By using Indians to fight Indians, the Army again had a powerful tool to divide native
opposition and demoralize the hostile tribeswith one general opining that one Indian
Scout unit was more valuable than six cavalry companies.23
6
 In an attempt to formalize the customary but still haphazard practices of military
cooperation with the Indians, the Army asked Congress for official approval of a scheme to
enlist Indians into specifically designated scout units, and provide them pay, allowances,
and formal discharges like any other soldiers. Consequently, on July 28, 1866, Congress
authorized the formal enlistment of scouts into the Army as part of what became the U.S.
Scouts:

The President is authorized to enlist and employ in the Territories and Indian country a force of
Indians not to exceed one thousand to act as scouts, who shall receive the pay and allowances of
cavalry soldiers, and be discharged whenever the necessity for further employment is abated, at
the discretion of the department commander.24

These scouts were finally absorbed into the Regular Army in 1895 as a formal unit
that had its own distinctive insignia like the other branches of the Army, a device of
crossed arrows, coupled with the letters U.S.S. (United States Scouts), instead of the
normal U.S.25 In accordance with the legislation, members of the Scouts enlisted for
various periods based on local requirements, ranging from the normal cavalry enlistment
of 5 years to periods as short as 3 to 6 months. Scouts could reenlist, and many were
promoted to the rank of sergeant after long and faithful service. Scouts were enlisted and
then assigned to serve in specific areas or Military Districts, and were allocated to units
based on operational need.26
As stated previously, since the colonial period, tribes would often form alliances with
whites either to protect themselves or to gain an advantage against an enemy. The Scouts
who enlisted after 1866 largely followed this same pattern and came from tribal groups
who traditionally opposed the tribes at war with the government. Large numbers of
Navajos enlisted to serve against the Apaches, and Crows served against the Sioux and
Cheyenne. Working against his traditional enemies, the scout who warned Lieutenant
Colonel George Custer of the large hostile encampment of Sioux and Cheyenne at the
Little Bighorn in July 1876 was a Ree, sometimes identified as being from the Crow
nation. In the ensuing battle this scout, Bloody Knife, was beheaded by the Sioux for his
troubles.27
One of the more notable examples of tribes who fit this pattern of working with the
Army against traditional enemies was the Seminoles. The Seminole or Seminole-Negro
Indian Scouts are one of the more prominent formal Indian Scout units raised by the Army
during the late 19th century, and the background of this unit forms an interesting part of
the often tragic story of mixed relations between the Army and Indians. After the forced
removal in the 1830s and 1840s of the Seminoles from Florida to the Indian Territories
(what is now Oklahoma), many Seminoles moved into Mexico to avoid attacks and conflict
with the tribes already in the Oklahoma territory. A significant number of those who
moved into Mexico were Black Seminoles, people descended either from slaves owned
by the Seminoles, or escaped slaves who had been adopted as members of the tribe. A
large part of their motivation for moving to Mexico was to escape being enslaved by
whites immigrating into Texas and the Southwest. Some of the Black Seminoles served
in the Mexican Army in campaigns against the Comanche and Apache.28
In 1870 the Army began negotiations with the Black Seminoles to return to the
United States and serve as scouts, principally in campaigns against the Comanche and

7
the Apache. Recognizing their skills and experience in fighting these tribes, the Army
offered to relocate the entire community to Fort Clark, Texas, where they could live
unmolested. Eventually, between 100 and 150 Black Seminoles enlisted in the Scouts,
comprising a formal unit by 1872. In 1873 they participated in their first combat action.
By the time they were finally disbanded in 1914, the Seminole-Negro Indian Scouts had
achieved a distinguished record of success, with four members of the unit being awarded
the Congressional Medal of Honor.29
During the campaigns against the Apache, the Army was able to enlist scouts from
several tribes traditionally opposed to the Apache, and many Apaches enlisted as well.
These Apache Scouts also achieved distinction, and became such an institution in the
Army in the Southwest that they continued to serve as a distinct unit into the 1940s.
Apache Scouts performed reconnaissance and security duties during the Mexican Punitive
Expedition in 1916, and patrolled the southern border throughout the first half of the 20th
century. The last Apache Scout retired from the Army in 1947.30 Several officers who
recruited and served with the Apache Scouts in the late 19th century under Generals
George Crook and Nelson Miles went on to hold important senior leadership positions
during the war with Spain, and it was one of these, Major General Henry Lawton, who
as the commander of the 1st Division in the Philippines authorized Lieutenant Matthew
Batson to raise the Macabebe Scouts in 1899.31
The record of the Army in prosecuting its frontier campaigns against the Indians is
clearly checkered, with many examples of failure and cruelty, along with success and
humanity. In this mixed record, one aspect of the Armys frontier operations from the
1780s to the late 19th century stands out: an almost unbroken record of dramatic success
in working with local indigenous people to prosecute low-intensity or counterinsurgency
campaigns. These campaigns, prosecuted over a century, were ultimately successful for
the Army, resulting in a widely shared organizational expertise and comfort in conducting
what we now term irregular warfare.
This expertise and facility in working with and through indigenous or tribal military
forces were so ingrained that there was an institutional expectation that officers would, as
a matter of course, immediately establish contacts, alliances, and contracts for auxiliaries
with local and tribal leaders as soon as their units arrived in an area of operations. These
kinds of arrangements were not pursued by a corps of elite or specially trained soldiers
they were made by regular, conventional officers who were merely following customary
practice as established through military culture and experience beginning in the 1600s.
Following the establishment of U.S. colonial dominion in the Philippines, this tradition
and expertise carried over into the 20th century, achieving its ultimate expression in the
formation of the Regular Philippine Scouts and the Philippine Constabulary.

BULLETS AND BOLOS: SCOUTS AND CONSTABULARY IN THE

PHILIPPINES32

Irregulars

When Lieutenant Batson began to recruit and lead his Macabebe Scouts, he was
following a pattern familiar to most contemporary Army officers. Batson was not

8
the only officer involved with raising local units or cooperating with Filipino leaders
and communities. As soon as combat operations began in the Philippines against the
Republican Army led by Emilio Aguinaldo, American commanders all over the islands
began to seek local people who would assist in the U.S. effort. In many ways, enlisting
Filipinos to fight Filipinos carried on the tradition of using Indians to fight other Indians.
As stated in a contemporary textbook used at West Point, one of the best methods to
oppose guerrillas was to use forces of a similar character, and this adage was generally
accepted as valid.33 Filipino assistance to the Army came in many forms aside from
providing combat or scout units: thousands of Filipinos worked for U.S. forces as guides,
interpreters, laborers, drivers, clerks, and intelligence agents. Some of these Filipino
irregulars were paid with Quartermaster funds, some from special accounts created by
the Philippine command, and others from U.S. officers personal funds.34
While Batson raised his scout companies, other officers were doing the same in other
parts of the archipelago. In July 1899, the Philippine command established the Manila
Native Police, which eventually reached a strength of 625, and made 7,442 arrests in its
first year of existence.35 On the Island of Negros, military governor Colonel James F.
Smith of the 1st California Volunteers raised an entire constabulary, armed with rifles, for
patrolling and protecting the island against guerrillas and criminals.36 At the same time
that Batson was raising his scouts, another unit, Lowes Scouts, was operating with the
First Division as a mixed Filipino and American organization. Lowes Scouts were often
paired with Batsons unit, enjoying great success in numerous combat operations.37
After the success of Batsons initial efforts with the Macabebes, he was given
permission to expand his unit. In a memo dated October 16, 1899, Batsons Brigade
Commander Brigadier General S. B. M. Young justified his approval of this expansion:
I have no doubt that a regiment of Macabebes would be more effective than a regiment
of volunteers, and would be only about one half as expensive. . . . I have full faith in the
loyalty and efficiency of the Macabebes as soldiers. There is as a rule no sickness among
them, and they can live on the country.38
Batson was promoted to Major in December 1899 and continued to recruit. By the
spring of 1900, Batsons unit had grown to a full squadron of five companies. On May
24, 1900, the Philippine Command published a formal order establishing the unit as the
Squadron of Philippine Cavalry, formed under the auspices of Colonel Wilbur Wilder,
43rd U.S. Volunteer Infantry, with Major Batson as Squadron Commander.39 After an
operation on Luzon in April 1900, Brigadier General Frederick G. Grant wrote of the
Philippine Cavalry, In the Macabebe Scouts, the United States has a loyal servant who
can be depended on to pick out of a crowd of natives, however large, all the insurgents
masquerading as amigos and the culprits from other provinces.40 Readers can imagine
how extraordinarily valuable such units would be to U.S. forces operating in Iraq and
Afghanistan today.
The praise given the Macabebe Scouts by Generals Young and Grant was familiar to
that given scouts and units formed from the Indians of the American West, but so were
the doubts that many officers in the Philippines harbored about the performance of local
scouts. From the beginnings of American military cooperation with Indians, officers had
been concerned about the use by Indians of tactics that did not sit well with European
sensibilities. Traditional Native American customs of warfare which involved the torture

9
or mistreatment of captives, mutilation, scalping of the dead, and later adaptations
like killing of women and children, all militated against their use as auxiliaries. These
arguments continued throughout the entire period of frontier warfare in the United
States, with many officers prejudices against native people leading them to scorn the
use of Indian scouts in spite of their proven record of operational success. On the other
hand, most successful officers, such as Generals George Crook and Nelson Miles, knew
the value of Indian scouts and used them extensively in all of their campaigns.41
The debate surrounding enlistment of Philippine locals followed much the same
pattern. While always officially defending his men,42 Batson himself wrote to his wife
about his concerns that the Macabebes could be brutal in their treatment of local Tagalogs
in the barrios and countryside they occupied.43 Lieutenant Colonel E. H. Plummer actually
asked that the Macabebes be removed from his area of operations after a series of rapes
and robberies.44 In many areas, Army units were stretched very thin and were forced to
rely on local Filipino units to assist them on operations, often in spite of serious concerns
about their behavior:

. . . the police of San Miguel de Mayumo, for example, were adept at hunting down guerrillas, but
their methods were so brutal that the post commander was warned, If native police or any other
natives are used as scouts, guides, or in any way as part of your force or command, you will be
held responsible for their conduct and behavior under G.O. [General Order] 100 of 1863, and the
laws of war generally.45

Although the War Department in Washington urged General Otis, Commander of

U.S. Forces in the Philippines, to raise more local units, he disapproved many requests
like Batsons due to concerns about brutality and the loyalty of local auxiliaries.46 Still,
many officers carefully sidestepped regulations about arming locals, and continued to
raise police and constabulary units, as well as scouts.

Regulars

When Batsons Scouts were formally constituted as the Philippine Cavalry Squadron,
it was as part of a larger process begun by General Arthur MacArthur when he took
command from General Otis in May 1900. One of MacArthurs first acts as commander
was to issue G.O. 87, directing the arming of municipal police and the creation of
mounted constabulary bodies, which henceforth would be the conservators of the
peace and safety of districts, instead of [confining] their operations to areas limited by the
boundaries of towns and barrios.47 This order began the process which ultimately led
to the creation of large bodies of Philippine troops officered by Americans, as well as the
creation of the Philippine Constabulary, which, as a paramilitary police force, would be
instrumental in quelling rebellion throughout the islands well into the 20th century.48
After MacArthurs order, commanders around the islands began in earnest to raise
local scout and constabulary units to assist in suppressing the rebellion as well as the
lawlessness plaguing many places in the Philippines that had never been effectively
governed or policed by the Spanish. In Northern Luzon in January 1901, Colonel Charles
Hood, after having raised several detachments of scouts, persuaded the Headquarters in
Manila to recognize them officially (Government Order [GO] 4) as the Cagayan Native

10
Scouts. The four companies of this battalion were commanded by lieutenants from the
16th U.S. Infantry, with each company having two NCOs detailed from the 16th Infantry
as well.49 Additionally, under the direction of Luzons 4th District Commander Brigadier
General Frederick Funston, Colonel Lyman W. Kennan raised 100 Ilocano Scouts, and
later increased the size of the unit to 240 in January 1901.50
By early 1901, so many local commanders were raising Filipino units to fight the
insurgency that the government authorities in Manila sought a means of regularizing the
practice, emplacing policies and rules for how these units were to be recruited, organized,
equipped, and administered. In February 1901, some inkling of what was to come was
revealed in a letter to Major Batson. This letter from the Office of the Chief Commissary,
Philippine Islands, sought the benefit of Batsons experience with local soldiers by
soliciting his recommendations on types of rations projected for issue to large numbers
of native troops contemplated in the near future.51 Then, reflecting a recent authorization
by Congress, GO 310 issued in October 1901 arranged for the enlistment of up to 6,000
Filipinos into roughly 50 companies of what was to be termed the Philippine Scouts.
These companies of 100 men would all have American officers, selected in many cases
from NCO volunteers from Regular Army regiments in the Philippines.52
Beginning in 1904. these companies were organized into battalions that were then
incorporated into the Regular Army during the period of military reorganization (1919-
24) following World War I. By 1924, officers in the Philippine Scouts had the same status
as that of their counterparts in other Regular units, save that their rank was followed by
the initials PS (Philippine Scouts), and they could not command American troops while
assigned to the Scouts. Soldiers in the Scouts were treated the same as other Regulars,
except that they were paid less than American soldiersexcused by the War Department
on the grounds that Filipino soldiers did not need the same amount of money that
American soldiers did, and that furthermore if they were paid too highly, it would cause
disruption in the local society and economy.53
The process by which these local and tribal levies, militias, and scout units became U.S.
Regulars is fascinating for many reasons, suggesting much about contemporary American
ideas concerning race, military necessity, and larger concerns about imperialism, to name
just a few.54 It is also worth noting that the American experience in creating the Scouts is
just a small part of the larger process of late 19th-century Western militaries raising native
troops worldwide in areas where they were establishing colonial dominion. Askaris in
German East Africa; Moroccan Goumiers and Senegalese Tirailleurs in French Africa; and
Britains Kings African Rifles and the Queens Own Corps of Guides all fit into the same
category as the Philippine Scoutssoldiers locally raised from tribal or other groups in
order to assist in policing new colonial possessions.55 Virtually all of these types of units
later formed the basis of new national armies and police during the post-World War II
period of decolonization.
For the purposes of this paper, however, it is instructive to note that the story of
the creation of the Philippine Scouts tells us much about the deeply ingrained culture
of irregular warfare in the U.S. Army at the time. Officers, in spite of some official
discouragement, openly clamored for the authority to raise such units, which they saw as
an absolute practical necessity for conducting a successful counterinsurgency campaign.
These officers raised units with, and often without, formal authorization, and also co-

11
opted and armed local police, tribal groups, and even some religious groups all in the
name of prudent military improvisation.56 Officers were also willing to make what many
saw as moral compromises in view of cultural differences. Recognizing that Filipino
tribesmen might not share the same ideas about the Law of War that were held by their
American leadership, officers sought to make cultural changes incrementally rather than
shun the use of local troops altogether.57
Army leaders ranging from Generals Crook to Pershing, from the commander of the
Constabulary, Brigadier General Henry Allen, to General Leonard Wood, all recognized
that the successful leader of native troops had to exhibit all the traits of a paternal
strongman, sufficiently aloof from his charges to gain their allegiance while demonstrating
a genuine concern for their welfare and a respect for their cultural idiosyncrasies.58 Once
again, this recognition and acceptance that cultural change could and should be made in
the context of ongoing engagement and cooperation with local forces stems directly from
the Armys long experience with indigenous forces on the American frontier.
The practical experience gained in centuries of irregular warfare on the American
frontier was confirmed in the jungles of the Philippines. The incorporation of myriad
scout units into the regular forces was almost an official afterthought, an attempt to put
controls in place to standardize procedures and administrative arrangements, to confirm
a situation by regulation that in practice already existed. The act of making the Philippine
Scouts part of the Regular Army thus mirrored the progression of formalizing the Indian
Scouts, culminating in the creation of the United States Scouts in 1895.

Specialization

From the turn of the century extending into the 1920s when the Scouts became regulars,
numerous American officers who had served with them and the Constabulary went on
to distinguished careers elsewhere in the militaryGenerals John Pershing and Leonard
Wood are particularly salient examples.59 Twenty-five former Philippine Constabulary
officers went on to become generals in the Regular Army.60 A fascinating example of
this kind of American officer from the turn of the 20th century is Colonel John R. White.
White is perhaps not entirely typical in his career progression, but his career represents
what many at the time would have considered an enviable mix of experiences. In that he
is not unlike many of his contemporaries such as General Frederick Funston, who sought
out combat duty wherever it was and whoever it was with, White certainly provides a
stellar model for the conventional American soldier with a broad range of regular and
irregular service.
Colonel White began his military career as a volunteer in the Greek Foreign Legion
as a teenager, fighting the Ottomans in the Balkan Wars. After leaving Greece, White
prospected for gold in the Klondike, and then in 1898 enlisted in the Army for infantry
service in the Philippines. In 1901, at the age of 21, like many other serving and former
NCOs, he was offered a commission in the newly formed Philippine Constabulary. During
his time in the Constabulary, he was extremely active, participating in counterinsurgency
operations all over the islands, and raising the first Moro Constabulary company in Sulu
province. He eventually retired from the Constabulary, only to be recalled to active
service for World War I in 1918.61

12
 Whites career exemplifies the ease with which contemporary officers moved from
conventional to irregular assignments and back. The unremarkable nature of this kind
of transition was repeated in the assignment histories of numerous officers of the time. It
was, paradoxically, the regularization of the Scouts and Constabulary, and the success
of some officers in leading them, that began the process of creating a distinction in the
Army between those men who worked with native troops, and those who did not. It
was only when service with such organizations began to be seen somehow as a separate
track, different from the normal progression of a conventional career, that it came to be
viewed as a specialization and thus not career-enhancing. When in 1924 the Marines
were charged with building the Nicaraguan National Guard into a modern, effective
military, they worked with the State Department to contract with a retired Army officer
to lead the effort. Major Calvin B. Carter was hired because of his experience in training
and leading units of the Philippine Constabulary, with the Marines and State Department
feeling that this experience gave him some unique skills not possessed by the average
officer. Carter put his skills gained in the Philippines to work, but met with mixed
results.62
Major Carters employment in Nicaragua is just one example of the process by
which officers began to be perceived as specialized in irregular warfare, or in training
native troops in the years between the World Wars. In fact, by the start of World
War II, the Armys widely shared experience and comfort in working with indigenous,
local forces, had begun to disappearslowly becoming the province of officers who had
been assigned to the Scouts, had experience with irregulars, or served with other foreign
forces. In the interwar years, irregular warfare came to be seen in official Army circles
as inconsequential given the existing threat posed by potential large-scale, conventional
armies like those of Germany and the Soviet Union. As a result of this perception, small
wars doctrine was given short shrift in military education at this time, with a focus on
irregular war or constabulary duties coming to be seen in professional circles as extrinsic
to an officers development.63 Prior to and during World War II, with the dramatic
expansion of the Army and the consequent watering down of the officer corps with
men who had no experience whatever in irregular warfare or local troops, this essentially
accidental tendency toward specialization became even more pronounced.64
With specialization came a marked reluctance on the part of many ambitious career
officers to put themselves in positions where they might need to work with irregulars.
Clearly part of this reluctance stemmed from the recognition of potential moral problems
inherent in irregular operations.65 A stark example of this reluctance is provided by Edwin
Ramsey in his memoir of fighting with the anti-Japanese guerrillas in the Philippines.
Ramsey relates how, after the capitulation of U.S. forces on Bataan, he and some other
Philippine Scout officers escaped capture by the Japanese and linked up with a nascent
guerrilla organization. Ramsey relates how numerous regular American officers who
had escaped from the Japanese refused to take part in the guerrilla war. They felt that
such fighting was at least in part illegal, and they wanted no part of living as fugitives
and working with Filipino irregulars. Ramsey explains that he made his own decision
to live and fight with the partisans in part because of the bonds of respect and loyalty he
developed with Filipinos while serving in the pre-war Scouts.66

13
 Though some small numbers of former Scout officers or men with irregular experience
did achieve high rank in the post-World War II conventional Army,67 by the early 1950s
the separation between the conventional Army and the Special Operations community
was virtually complete. Men who had worked in the Office of Strategic Services with
units like Detachment 101 in Burma, raising and leading Kachin tribesmen against the
Japanese,68 and others who either as intelligence officers or combatants were infiltrated
into occupied areas to work with partisans, were increasingly seen as a corps of special
soldiers with uncommon knowledge. This view would have been rare indeed in
the Army only a few years previously. The career of one of these men who worked
in unconventional operations during World War II, Colonel Jay Vanderpool, in some
ways belied the nascent paradigm of specialization, but in other ways exemplifies the
contemporary attitudes about irregular war that led to specialization.
During the war in the Pacific theater, Vanderpool was a young artillery officer serving
in the 25th Infantry Division G2 section. As the plans for reconquest of the Philippines
began to take shape, General MacArthurs headquarters solicited subordinate units
for officer volunteers willing to be infiltrated into the archipelago to establish contact
with partisans, and coordinate their efforts in support of the invasion.69 A request of
this nature, seeking motivated volunteers from among all units instead of specifically
assigning specialized soldiers to this mission, is indicative of the prewar attitudes clearly
still held by senior officers in the Pacific, who continued to subscribe to the position that
irregular work remained part and parcel of a career officers duty portfolio.
Vanderpool, one of those who volunteered, spent months in southern Luzon working
with various guerrilla groups, including native tribes, Filipinos, Chinese Communists,
and the native communist movement, the Hukbalahaps or Huks. Vanderpool spent
much of his time trying to prevent these disparate elements from fighting each other
over territory, local power, and resources, and was successful only through the judicious
distribution of dollars and the threat of force once the invasion came. Ultimately, he
managed to keep them in the fight against the Japanese. After the war, Vanderpool
returned to a career in conventional Military Intelligence assignments, which continued
until the Korean War.70
During that war, as a result of Vanderpools previous experience in the Philippines,
he was specifically selected to run partisan operations in Korea, managing logistics and
operational issues for North Korean and Chinese deserters as they conducted raids and
sabotage behind enemy lines.71 In spite of his extensive experience in unconventional
operations, Vanderpool did not move into the area of Special Operations after Korea
but returned to the conventional Army, taking up such work as doctrine and force
development for the new branch, Army Aviation, and retiring as the Deputy G4, Third
Army at Fort MacPherson, Georgia.72
Even though Vanderpool was able to return to a conventional career, his assignment
during the Korean War points out the differences between the pre-World War II Armys
culture of nonspecialization, and the beginnings of an institutional desire to have only
those officers with special experience or other qualifications work with locals or irregulars.
It is highly probable that had the Armys culture of comfort with irregular warfare never
been lost, any young officer, regardless of experience, with the right qualities of leadership
and courage would have been chosen to perform Vanderpools job in Korea. Vanderpool

14
would not have been perceived as having any kind of unique or special qualification.
By the time war broke out in Korea in 1950, this transformation from a culture of
generalized experience, comfort, and facility in irregular warfare to one of specialization
was largely complete. The only remaining area where officers who were now officially
termed conventional could work with non-U.S. forces was as advisors, part of the
burgeoning Cold War system of military assistance to allied and developing countries
to keep them out of the Soviet orbit. A review of the programs set up to train officers as
advisors during the 1950s and early 1960s will be useful, showing how what remained in
the wider Armys culture of experience with irregular or non-U.S. troops was transmitted
to a new generation in time for the major counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam. This
review can also help to point out some possibilities for a restoration of the Armys
widespread capabilities in irregular war.

TRAINING FOR ADVISORS

The Military Assistance Institute

During the height of the Cold War, the United States maintained Military Assistance
Advisory Groups (MAAG) in a host of countries around the world, some with close
traditional allies such as Britain and France, and many in newer, developing countries.
These MAAGs, consisting of officers from all the services, performed a host of functions,
many of which have now been assumed by military attaches and foreign area officers.
Some of these functions were liaison, intelligence gathering, supervision of equipment
sold or given to countries, and, of course, training and advising a host countrys military.73
To accomplish these missions in an era of heightened tension and high-stakes geopolitical
competition, the United States relied heavily on this relatively small group of soldier-
diplomats, men whose training and experience were critical to ensuring that American
interests were served in sensitive locations.
For most of the 1950s, there was no special training given to members of advisory
groups, perhaps on the assumption that many senior officers had extensive combat
experience in World War II and did not need much more than a briefing on the location
where they were to be assigned. For example, officers serving as advisors in South
Korea during the war there were given only a short manual outlining their duties. This
manual included a section admonishing them on the importance of their positions and
the necessity to maintain professionalism, while observing carefully all that their Korean
counterparts did or failed to do. This manual contained almost nothing about cultural
issues unique to Korea, nor did it cover anything political. It also had nothing in it to
assist a newly assigned officer with the Korean language.74
Clearly this lack of special training for advisors cried out for rectification. Positions
as critical as these to our national security and strategic objectives required officers with
detailed knowledge of the countries to which they were assigned. They also required
men who could navigate these sometimes complex cultures while ensuring that the
military objectives of international relations were met in the most effective way possible.
By the end of the decade, MAAG chiefs petitioned the Department of Defense (DoD) to
create a program of training for newly assigned advisors, and with that petition the State

15
Department emphasized that skills in international relations were as important for these
officers as specifically military competence. Accordingly, in 1957 DoD turned to retired
Brigadier General Henry Newton to establish a DoD school that would train officers in
the skills required for success as members of MAAGs.75
Newton had had a career in the Army training hierarchy, and one of his final assignments
on active duty was as the director of the program to train U.S. personnel for constabulary
duty in occupied Germany.76 The school he created and presided over from 1958 to 1964
was called the Military Assistance Institute, located in Arlington, Virginia. According
to the official historical report on the school, published in 1969 after it was closed, the
Institutes curriculum included, but was not limited to, subjects such as U.S. foreign
policy programs and practices, the relationship of the U.S. Government to the countries
where MAAGs were assigned, how the MAAG system operated, the responsibilities of
the different agencies involved in the system, and orientation on specific countries.77
Officers who attended the Institute were assigned to a wide range of locations, from
Afghanistan and Iran to Guinea, Norway, Bolivia, and Uruguay, including, of course,
places like Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos71 countries in all.78 The Institute provided a
detailed course for these officers which lasted for varying times based on the country to
which men were to be assigned. Some of the specific topics of courses taught were the
Role of the MAAG Officer in Counterinsurgency, Meeting the Appeal of Communism,
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)/MAAG Field Cooperation, The
Interpreter and the MAAG Officer, Techniques of Advising, and Advisor Case Studies.
Additionally, each student participated in a detailed country study, which again varied
in length and scope based on the location of assignment.79
This Institute operated from 1958 until 1968, when its functions were subsumed in the
several courses operated at the then U.S. Institute of Military Assistance, later changed
and renamed the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (JFKSWCS).80
In later years, many of the functions of the MAAGs were taken over by Foreign Area
Officers and much of what was formerly taught at the Institute was adapted for their
purposes. Newton continued to work for the DoD education establishment until the 1970s,
conducting detailed reviews of officer branch schools and the Armys precommissioning
training programs as part of the Haines Board on Army officer education.81
While the officers who were assigned to MAAGs and attended the Military Assistance
Institute were not supposed to be advisors to tactical units in foreign countries, many acted
as such, especially later in the 1960s as the war in Vietnam escalated. The importance of
the Institute for the purposes of this paper, is that it provides an example of the extensive
training and education that were deemed necessary for conventional officers to have
before being assigned to work with foreign militaries. Clearly, with the complexities of
the international system after World War II, such extensive training was needed. There is
also no question that, given the evolution (or devolution) of the international system since
1991 and the increase in expeditionary involvement of the Army, a similar education is now
desirable for the widest possible circle of officers, well beyond the ones now designated
as Foreign Area Officers. Other examples exist of the emphasis the Army has previously
placed on educating conventional officers slated to work either with foreign militaries
or with irregulars. Two of these are the successor organization to the Military Assistance
Institute, to be discussed in the next section, and the training in counterinsurgency at the
Infantry School and other institutions during the Vietnam War.
16
The U.S. Institute of Military Assistance and Counterinsurgency Training

The U.S. Institute of Military Assistance was the name given to the group of schools
operated by the Army at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where the Armys Psychological
Operations (PSYOPS), Civil Affairs (CA), and SF soldiers were trained. As stated
previously, this organization took over many of the responsibilities of the Military
Assistance Institute when it was closed in 1968, and it was also responsible for training
NCOs and officers destined to be tactical advisors to units of the Army of the Republic
of South Vietnam (ARVN).82 This role eventually became one of the more time- and
resource-intensive of its missions. A review of the curriculum of the courses for advisors
destined for South Vietnam is again useful in pointing out how the Army viewed the
advisor mission and the emphasis placed on preparing conventional officers for that
mission. Extensive efforts were made in the 1960s to inculcate in soldiers some of the
unfamiliar tenets of unconventional warfare that were commonplace among soldiers of
the pre-World War II Army. These efforts led, in part, to a much broader Army-wide
understanding of irregular operations which, unfortunately, has generally not survived
beyond the generation of soldiers who fought in Vietnam.
In July 1971 Brigadier General Newton conducted a review and assessment of the
Institute of Military Assistance as part of a wider review of Army branch schools and officer
education directed by the Commanding General, U.S. Continental Army Command.83
This process was put in motion, in part, to assess the changes the Army would need to
make when the draft ended and the transition to an all-volunteer force began. In the report
of his visit to Fort Bragg, Newton provided details on the courses taught at the Institute,
both those strictly for Special Operations soldiers and those for advisors. The courses
for advisors were conducted under the aegis of the Military Advisors School, which was,
like the Special Warfare School, a separate school making up part of the Institute. The
Military Advisors School was responsible not only for training MAAG officers, but also
for conventional training of tactical unit advisors. At the Advisors School, there were
six different courses. Training options ranged from the 22-week Military Assistance
Command and Staff Course (preparation for officers assigned to MAAG positions in
international security and military assistance) to the 6-week Military Assistance Training
Advisor Officer and NCO Courses (designed to train officers and NCOs for duty as
advisors in ARVN units).84
Two of the courses offered at the Advisors School were specifically designed
for soldiers who would work within the Civil Operations and Rural Development
Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam, where they were closely involved with the
South Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF), those irregular paramilitary
organizations providing local security for villages and regions within South Vietnam.85
By 1969, U.S. Commander in Vietnam General Creighton Abrams had begun to put
vastly more resources and emphasis into programs like CORDS and into the RF/PF so as
to refocus the military campaign on local counterinsurgency.86 It is not hard to imagine,
then, that the men who were being sent to Vietnam to serve as advisors for these local
forces would understand the importance of their mission. In the 6-week course, these
men received training in the Vietnamese language and culture, as well as instruction
in counterinsurgency doctrine, Vietnam-specific tactics, and civic action. These advisor

17
courses were perhaps the most intensive of the counterinsurgency-related training the
Army provided, but were certainly not the only training designed to prepare officers and
soldiers for the atmosphere they would encounter in Vietnam.87
Starting in the early 1960s, the Army began to devote an enormous amount of
intellectual effort to understanding insurgencies and the means to combat them. In
addition to establishing libraries and encouraging articles and discussion, the Army
leadership in 1961 ordered that counterinsurgency be covered in all levels of officer
professional education. The Special Warfare School had the lead in providing draft
subject courses that branch schools could use in developing their instruction. After some
spotty initial efforts by the military to develop and implement satisfactory programs,
the President directed in National Security Action Memorandum 131 (1962) that all
agencies involved in counterinsurgency, including the Department of State, DoD, the
U.S. Information Agency (USIA), USAID, and the CIA, establish counterinsurgency
education programs.88 These programs were to include specific subject areas at all levels
of rank and education, including the history and nature of insurgency, insurgent tactics,
and counterinsurgency techniques and planning. Mid- and senior-grade officers were to
receive specific instruction on the country to which they were slated for posting. By the
end of the decade, the average officer branch course included up to 28 hours of pure
counterinsurgency instruction, as well as many additional hours in related subjects.89
ROTC and West Point cadets also received instruction in counterinsurgency and
compress unconventional warfare, including history courses focused on past wars in
the Philippines, Greece, Malaya, and French Indochina. The officer precommissioning
programs also included patrolling and raiding exercises in summer camps.90 The Infantry
School especially went to great lengths to develop training that prepared officers for the
unconventional warfare environment, teaching tactics proven successful not only in
Vietnam but in the Philippines and during the campaigns on the Western frontier as well.
According to the school, its career course for captains emphasized that in the tactical
realm, The majority of the day-to-day activity . . . will be small-unit action to locate
guerrilla forces, secure the population, installations and lines of communication, train
and assist the indigenous paramilitary forces, and conduct military civic action (emphasis by
author)91
Not only did the branch schools, again especially the Infantry School, and
precommissioning courses emphasize the military and political aspects of
counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, but the Command and General Staff
College and Senior Service Colleges did so as well, requiring officers to prepare plans for
military-political operations, as well as take courses and write papers on historical and
modern counterinsurgency operations.92 All of these levels of counterinsurgency and
unconventional warfare leader training in the Army were paralleled by specific training
efforts for soldiers and NCOs, including wide dissemination of such topics as quick-fire
weapons training, patrolling, and interaction with irregulars.93
The scope of the training designed to prepare the Army for operations in Vietnam
was broad but intensive, while the concepts promulgated by that training were quite
comprehensive. These training efforts, coupled with accumulating combat experience
in Vietnam, resulted in a generation of soldiers who had a level of understanding and
comfort with counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare that had not existed in

18
the Army since before 1941, and perhaps even before 1918. These men had worked
closely with ARVN counterparts, local paramilitary irregulars in the RF/PF and Civilian
Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), as well as with Vietnamese soldiers attached directly
to their squads and platoonsthe Kit Carson Scouts. Unfortunately, one of the many
results of the war in Vietnam has been a lasting reluctance, even resistance, to the idea of
our Army again becoming involved in counterinsurgency or low-level warfare, with an
almost exclusive doctrinal emphasis until the last 2 or 3 years on large-scale conventional
warfighting. This institutional distaste for low-level conflict has persisted in spite of the
fact that since 1975 we have been engaged in numerous low-level contingency operations
(actually, more or less continuous since 1989).
The resistance in some quarters of the Army to conventional, or even SF, units
conducting unconventional operationsliaison, cooperation, training, equipping,
target reconnaissance, and advising militias, guerrillas, or other nonstate armed groups
in combatis still widespread and significant.94 The separation of the SF troops from
the mainstream Army personnel system in 1989 was a contributor to this continued
resistance; when SF officers moved back and forth from conventional assignments to
SF assignments, their knowledge, experience, and, more importantly, their mindset
regarding unconventional warfare had a chance of being disseminated within the wider
Army. There is no question about the necessity and success of the decision to make
SF a distinct branch, but with that decision the Army did lose a valuable process for
intellectual and cultural cross-fertilization.
This cross-fertilization was dramatically apparent during the war in Vietnam, through
the extensive training efforts undertaken and practical experience gained in the face of
such a massive, lengthy counterinsurgency challenge. The results of all these efforts
and experiences point out to us today that a restoration of the wider Armys culture of
understanding and acceptance of unconventional warfare is clearly possible. The equally
clear fact that such a restoration is necessary is borne out by our Armys experiences in
Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere since 1991.

CONCLUSION

During the winter and spring of 2006, the Combined Joint Special Operations Task
Force in Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) underwent a laborious process to demobilize its
Afghan surrogate force, called the Afghan Security Forces (ASF). This process involved
the largest formal demobilization of U.S. surrogate or irregular forces since 1945.95 The
ASF were composed of a variety of tribal or local militias, anti-Taliban volunteers, and
Afghan mercenaries. Many of them had been working with the Special Forces since
2001, as they were originally members of the Northern Alliance, the coalition of Afghans
which overthrew the Taliban with U.S. help. The ASF provided local security to Special
Forces firebases and camps throughout Afghanistan, and prior to 2006 were also used
extensively to assist SF units in convoy security and small-scale combat operations.96
The ASF also provided a vitally important adjunct to U.S. counterinsurgency operations,
one which experienced American soldiers have valued and seen as central to success in
many campaigns. From the Pequot War in 1637 to the Seminole Wars in the early 19th
century to the Apache campaigns after the Civil War to 20th-century small wars from

19
the Philippines to Vietnam, this adjunct is one of the main reasons American soldiers
have always sought out cooperation with local irregular forces. This critical factor is
human intelligence, which supplies a knowledge of local geography, culture, language,
and personality that no outsider can ever hope to gain without such cooperation with
immediately neighboring forces. Such human intelligence was the very asset provided
by the Seminole, Apache, Macabebe Scouts, and others. The ASF were an invaluable
source of local intelligence, one that even the Afghan National Army or police could not
provide, since they were nationally recruited forces without the local or sometimes even
provincial connections possessed by the ASF.97
Given their importance, military value, and proven record of success, why were the
ASF demobilized? There is a complex set of answers to this question, many dealing
directly with concerns held by the Afghan government and coalition command about
nongovernment militias, sovereignty, and legitimacy. Those officers who were involved
in planning and carrying out the demobilization understood that there was also another
important reason, one which was perhaps not so clearly articulated. It was an enduring
discomfort with the existence and military use of irregular forces by the coalition.98
Questions of loyalty, brutality, cost, and effectiveness all played a role in this distaste,
much as they have throughout our history of cooperation with and employment of
irregulars. Many of the concerns felt within the Army and elsewhere about cooperation
with these irregulars had not changed since the operations at Tora Bora and Shalikot in
2002.99 In spite of these questions, the fact remains that these irregular soldiers contributed
enormously to the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan. Setting aside the fact that in many
instances they were the ones who had fought against and overthrown the Taliban, their
subsequent contributions have often been the crucial factors in determining the success
of an operation.
For many of the reasons previously discussed, this enduring distaste for military
cooperation with and employment of irregulars is not likely to go away. Neither,
however, are the crucial reasons for our Army to continue to work with and through just
such irregulars. Now more than ever, given that we will continue to operate in areas
of poorly or completely ungoverned spaceplaces where those holding sway are tribal
or sectarian militias, or forces employed by local warlords or strongmen, or even the
regular or paramilitary forces of host nationswe need to restore and embrace as part
of a wider Army culture this facility and willingness to engage in unconventional and
irregular operations.
So how can we restore this formerly prevalent advantage enjoyed by our Army, indeed
by our military at large? There are several ways in which this can be done. The first
is through experiencein the last several years an increasing number of conventional
officers and soldiers have gained first-hand experience working with irregulars and
advising foreign regulars and paramilitaries in our campaigns around the world.
The exigencies of the ongoing war have provided a powerful incentive for the wider
organization to adopt unconventional policies and procedures which until recently were
seen as being the exclusive preserve of the SF. A clear example of this type of spontaneous
local cooperation with tribal forces is in the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiments work
with the tribes in Fallujah in 2004-05. By encouraging and enabling tribal elders to take
responsibility for the security of their own local areas, the Marines were able to make

20
great inroads against the insurgency in that city.100 As an organization, we must continue
to encourage local commanders to take these kinds of initiatives, and disseminate the
lessons they learn throughout all of our units. This type of cooperation should become
the rule in our military, not the exception.
The second means for restoring our traditional facility in unconventional warfare
is education. Much as in the 1960s, when the pressures of war in Indochina brought
the military and other government agencies to undertake scores of counterinsurgency
educational initiatives, our contemporary Army needs to do the same. Instruction in
unconventional warfarethe nature of nonstate armed groups, the social and cultural
structures of local tribes, the realities of conflict in failed states or ungoverned space,
methods of integrating local forces into military and civil affairs operations, asymmetric
warfare, the list goes onmust take place at every level of NCO and officer professional
development, from NCO academies to precommissioning programs to senior service
colleges. The models provided by the Cold War Military Assistance Institute, Advisor
Training at Fort Bragg, and counterinsurgency training in the branch schools during the
war in Vietnam can be useful in creating an educational framework that makes all of our
leaders comfortable with and competent to conduct irregular operations, regardless of
venue.
By providing such education and training, the Army can go a long way toward
restoring its institutional comfort and facility in dealing with foreign militaries and local
armed groups. In the current operating environment, there is an increasing probability
that young company and field grade officers will find themselves in remote locations
conducting combat or stability operations with little close supervision and no counterparts
from civilian government agencies. Given this probability, it is now more necessary than
ever that we educate all of our officers in the functional skills and wisdom encapsulated
in the curricula of the Military Assistance Institute and its partner organizations in the
1960s. By having the largest possible number of officers educated in these areas, the Army
can also ensure that military operations at the lowest levels are far better synchronized
with the nations operational and strategic goals.
The third means of restoring our institutional strength in unconventional warfare is
organizational. Each Brigade Combat Team (BCT) should have as part of its structure
a staff section specifically designated to deal with unconventional operations. This
section, the S3-X, would be responsible for formulating unconventional warfare plans,
policies, and doctrine. Additionally, each S3-X should have funds available specifically
earmarked to underwrite the myriad tasks that are necessarily a part of any complete
unconventional campaign portfolio: logistics, intelligence, interpreter support, as well
as compensation for scouts, guides, and irregular soldiers. If each BCT commander had
at his disposal a trained staff to manage contacts with local armed groups, to direct and
advise subordinate units on irregular warfare, to manage pay, and to facilitate training, he
would have an incredibly powerful tool at his disposal. This staff would ensure not only
that his units took advantage of the possibilities presented by irregular operations, but
that these operations were conducted within the framework of larger plans and within
the laws and regulations that apply to such operations.
Officers assigned to a BCT S3-X staff would not need to be SF officers, nor would
they need to be exclusively combat arms officers. They would, however, need to have a

21
level of training and experience in unconventional operations perhaps above that of the
average officer. To provide such training, the Army should rely on the experts at the
JFKSWCS, who could develop a course on the model of the longer advisor courses run
at Fort Bragg during the Vietnam War. Officers trained at this course, along with the
practical experience in counterinsurgency most officers now have, would assuredly be
able to perform the desired function of the staff.
The final means to encourage and preserve widespread cultural acceptance of
unconventional operations is an enlightened and cooperative personnel system. Officers
should not be tracked into an irregular career path, or be given a functional area like
those for Psychological Operations or Foreign Area Officers. Rather, the largest possible
number of officers should be exposed to irregular operations, either as part of their formal
military education, or through assignment and experience. Given the ongoing and long-
term nature of our commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, it would certainly
be possible to rotate an enormous number of officers through assignments as trainers,
advisors, or staff members on Provincial Reconstruction Teams in those countries. Other
opportunities for irregular assignments exist outside of Iraq and Afghanistan. Soldiers
can be embedded for 6 to 12 months with regular or paramilitary units from countries
within regions of U.S. concern. For example, a potential model for this type of deployment
is the yearly rotation of infantry companies from the Guam Army National Guard to
Ethiopia, starting in 2004.101
Much the same as the policies in the early 1990s that dictated active duty assignments
for providing training and advisory support to Reserve Component units (AC/RC), or
assignments to Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) battalions, policies should be put
in place ensuring that a maximum number of officers are rotated through critical training
and advisory positions overseas. Clearly, the recent attempts to fill these positions solely
through soliciting volunteers have not worked. Personnel policies that reward volunteers
for serving in these positions are necessary, and a system of mandatory assignments
must be put in place. Along with this kind of assignment policy, the Army needs to
make language training more widely available, with some level of language training
mandatory at all professional military educational levels. Current policies that effectively
limit language training to Foreign Area Officers, SF soldiers, and military intelligence
personnel can serve only to restrict our capability to operate effectively in areas where
close cooperation with local forces, both regular and irregular, is required.
When Lieutenant Batson raised the Macabebe Scouts in 1899, he could not have known
that his efforts would be some of the last of their kind in the conventional Army. He most
likely would have been surprised at the suggestion that his initiatives were in any way
special or out of the ordinary. His Division Commander, Brigade Commander, and many
officers in between had raised scouts and worked with indigenous forces throughout
their careers in low-level operations. It could seem only natural for Batson to do the
same. In fact, it would have been almost unnatural for Batson and his contemporaries not
to raise local units and employ tribal groups in order to assure success in their mission in
the Philippines. They employed locals on a large scale, and they did succeed. In order
for our Army of today to succeed, we must regain the organizational culture that allowed
Batson and his contemporaries to conduct unconventional operations so unexceptionally.
We have already begun to take small steps towards this end, but a truly serious and

22
dedicated effort to complete the process must be launched. Only then can we expect the
same positive effects that the Scouts had in our earlier wars against insurrection.

ENDNOTES

1. The title of this paper is from a line in Rudyard Kiplings 1897 poem, Pharaoh and the Sergeant,
concerning the British NCOs attached to the Egyptian Army who created the force that conducted the
reconquest of the Sudan, culminated at the Battle of Omdurman in 1898. The applicable stanza from the
poem reads as follows:

Said England unto Pharaoh, Youve had miracles before,

When Aaron struck your rivers into blood;
But if you watch the Sergeant, he can show you something more.
Hes a charm from making riflemen from mud.

See Rudyard Kipling, The Five Nations, London: Methuen & Co., 1903.

2. Mao Tse Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, Chapter 5, 1937, accessed February 3, 2007, available from www.
bellum.nu/literature/mao001.html.

3. Letter from Lieutenant Matthew Batson to his wife, dated September 24, 1899, Matthew Batson
Papers, 1898-1900, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, OCLC 46910883.

4. Ibid. See also The Philippine Scouts, Daly City, CA: Philippine Scouts Heritage Society, 1996, p. 5.

5. Extract copy of memorandum dated September 1, 1899, Matthew Batson Papers, 1898-1900.

6. The Philippine Scouts, pp. 17-22.

7. Ibid., p. 17.

8. See Infantry Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1., July 1910, for the article introducing the Lyster Baga canvas
bag used to dispense purified water. The indices of this journal and the Journal of the Military Services
Institution of the United States show relatively few articles concerned with either the Philippine Scouts or the
Constabularythe vast majority of articles cover technological innovations, discussions of conventional
operations, and lessons from European Armies.

9. See Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagons New Map, New York: G. P. Putnams Sons, 2004.

10. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., and Andrea J. Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, New York: Columbia
University Press, 2006, p. 11.

11. Allen R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense, New York: The Free Press, 1994, p.
15.

12. Ibid., pp. 22-46.

13. Ibid., pp. 1-13.

14. Gregory Urwin, The United States Infantry: An Illustrated History 1775-1918, New York: Sterling
Publishing Co. Ltd., 1991, pp. 164-170.

23
 15. See Diana M. Henderson, Highland Soldier: A Social Study of the Highland Regiments 1820-1920,
Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1989, p. 12, for a particularly colorful example of the rhetoric
employed to describe 18th century Highland soldiers. The number of examples of language describing
Indians as noble savages, or conversely as brutes is legion. See James L. Axtell, The European and the
Indian, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, for some essays concerning the complex relationships
between white and native peoples in colonial North America.

16. See E. M. Lloyd, The Raising of the Highland Regiments in 1757, English Historical Review, Vol.
XVII, 1902, pp. 466-469; and John Prebble, Mutiny: Highland Regiments in Revolt 1743-1804, London: Penguin
Books, 1975, p. 33.

17. Millet and Maslowski, pp. 11-13.

18. See Charles K. Dalgleish, A New Lodge Act for the U.S. ArmyA Strategic Tool for the Global
War on Terrorism, unpublished paper, Washington, DC: National Defense University, National War
College, 2005; Carlton Meyer, Afghan Scouts, accessed December 19, 2006, available from www.g2mil.
com/Afghan%20Scouts.htm; see also Max Boot and Michael OHanlon, A Military Path to Citizenship,
Washington Post, October 19, 2006, accessed November 1, 2006, available from www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/18/AR2006101801500.html; see also Max Boot, The Struggle to Transform the
Military, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2005.

19. Millett and Maslowski, pp. 45-46, 88-95.

20. Ibid., p. 116.

21. Urwin, pp. 56-61.

22. Millett and Maslowski, pp. 251-253.

23. Ibid., pp. 254-255.

24. Thomas W. Dunlay, Wolves for the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United
States Army, 1860-90, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982, pp 44-46; Act of July 28, 1866, 39th
Congress Session I, Chapter 299, p. 333, accessed March 9, 2007, available from memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=014/llsl014.db&recNum=364.

25. This insignia of crossed arrows was ultimately adopted by the Special Forces when they became
a distinct branch of the Army in accordance with G.O. Number 35 in April 1987. See Images of Indian
Scouts, accessed March 8, 2007, available from www.army.mil/cmh-pg/topic/natam/idnscts.htm.

26. Dunlay, pp. 44-46.

27. Evan S. Connell, Son of the Morning Star: Custer and the Little Bighorn, New York: Harper & Row,
1984, pp. 12, 14-18.

28. Seminole-Negro Indian Scouts, accessed March 7, 2007, available from www.buffalosoldier.net/
SeminoleNegroindianScouts.htm; and Seminole Indian Scouts, accessed March 7, 2007, available from www.
texancultures.utsa.edu/seminole/seminolescouts.htm.

29. Ibid.

30. See Dunlay, pp. 28-30 and Chapter 10, for references to Apache Scouts. See also Apache Scouts,
accessed March 7, 2007, available from www.grenzer.com/11scout.htm. See also Images of Indian Scouts,
accessed March 8, 2007, available from www.army.mil/cmh-pg/topic/natam/idnscts.htm.

24
 31. Major General Lawton served as a captain in the 4th Cavalry during Miles successful campaign to
capture Geronimo, and developed a recognized expertise in negotiation and military cooperation with local
tribes. Lawton, through his connection to the 4th Cavalry, identified Lieutenant Batson as an intelligent,
highly competent officer, and had him seconded to his staff during the war in Cuba. It is highly probable
that Lawton was behind some of the initial concepts to raise local tribal scouts in his divisions area in
the Philippines. See memoir of service, Matthew Batson Papers, 1898-1900. See also Franklin Matthews,
Henry W. Lawton, the Soldier and the Man, Harpers Weekly, January 6, 1900, accessed April 1, 2007,
available from www.culbertsonmansion.com/Lawton/Info/Harpers1900-01-06.htm.

32. See John R. White, Bullets and Bolos, New York: The Century Company, 1928, a memoir of service in
the Philippine Constabulary.

33. Andrew James Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941,
Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1998, p. 116.

34. Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War 1899-1902, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000, p.
128.

35. Ibid., p. 128.

36. Ibid., pp. 76-79.

37. Ibid., pp. 128, 143-144.

38. Memorandum dated October 16, 1899, from Brigadier S. B. M. Young, HQ Provisional Cavalry
Brigade, 1st Division, Matthew Batson Papers, 1898-1900.

39. Ibid., order dated May 24, 1900.

40. Linn, p. 260.

41. See Millett and Maslowski, pp. 12-13, 42-44, and 252-257.

42. Linn, p. 260.

43. Letter packet, Matthew Batson Papers, 1898-1900.

44. Linn, p. 260.

45. Ibid., pp. 203-204.

46. Ibid., p. 204; Birtle, p. 116.

47. Ibid.

48. See White for a comprehensive account of the organization, training, and operational employment
of the Constabulary. See also Birtle, pp. 154-158.

49. The Philippine Scouts, p. 6; Linn, p. 260.

50. Linn, p. 260. Brigadier General Frederick Funston was highly experienced and comfortable with
irregularsprior to the U.S. war with Spain he had served as a volunteer with Cuban guerrillas against the
Spanish. He gained further notice when he engineered the capture of Emilio Aguinaldo using Macabebe
Scouts; pretending to be guerrillas bringing in captured Americans, the Scouts brought Funston and several

25
other officers into Aguinaldos camp, and then the ad hoc unit killed some of Aguinaldos body guard and
captured him (Linn, pp. 274-275).

51. Letter from Office of Chief Commissary, Philippine Islands, dated February 21, 1901, Matthew
Batson Papers, 1898-1900.

52. The Philippine Scouts, p. 5.

53. Ibid., pp. 5-13.

54. For contemporary views on politics, government, and security policies in the Philippines, see Francis
Burton Harrison, The Cornerstone of Philippine Independence; a Narrative of Seven Years, New York: The Century
Company, 1922. Harrison served as Governor-General of the Philippines from 1913 to 1921. See also Dean
C. Worcester, The Philippines Past and Present, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1930. Worcester served
as Secretary of the Interior of the Philippines and as a member of the Philippine Commission from 1900 to
1913.

55. For descriptions of the events surrounding and the process of raising these and other colonial
units, see Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa: White Mans Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876-
1912, New York: Avon Books, 1991; Charles Allen, Soldier Sahibs: the Daring Adventurers who Tamed Indias
Northwest Frontier, New York: Carroll and Graf, 2000.

56. One of the more interesting armed groups working with the Army during the counterinsurgency
campaign in Northern Luzon in 1901 was the religious sect Guardia de Honor, led by Crispulo Patajo.
On the other side was the armed Kapunan Society group led by Father Gregorio Agilpay300 men from
this group were killed in mass assaults against American positions on the nights of April 13-14, 1901. Linn,
pp. 260-261.

57. Ibid., p. 260; and White, especially Chapter XIX.

58. Birtle, p. 155.

59. Pershing served three tours in the Philippines between 1899 and 1913. He was ultimately assigned
as the Military Governor of Sulu Province, and worked closely with the Scouts and Constabulary to
suppress endemic lawlessness and insurrection among the Moro people. Leonard Wood likewise served
as Governor in Sulu before becoming Chief of Staff of the Army. See White, Chapter XXVII; Urwin, p. 160;
and Birtle, pp. 159-168.

60. Birtle, p. 154.

61. White, pp. vii-xii.

62. Richard Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1977, pp. 42-44.

63. Birtle, pp. 271-272.

64. Ibid., pp. 275-282.

65. In his memoir, Ramsey relates a particularly memorable instance of cultural differences leading to
moral conflict in irregular operations. During a meeting with one of his counterpart American guerrilla
leaders in northern Luzon, Ramsey began discussing the nature of their job. The other American, Captain
Charles Putnam, argued that what they were doing was different from any other kind of military leadership
and illustrated his point by describing some of his tribal soldiers:

26
 You see those hills there? Thats the territory of the Igorots and Ilongots. You know about them?
. . . Well what youve heard is true. Theyre headhunters, and some of em are cannibals. They
love Japanese raids, Ramsey; they invite them. You know why? Cause thats the only time they
have full bellies. Thats not military, and it sure as hells no job. Thats guerrilla warfare, and as
far as theyre concerned, Im no captain, Im the king.

See Edwin Price Ramsey and Stephen J. Rivele, Lieutenant Ramseys War, New York: Brasseys, 1990, pp.
162-163.

66. Ibid.

67. General Harold K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff during the Vietnam War, began his career as an
officer in the 57th Infantry, Philippine Scouts. He participated in the Bataan Death March with the rest
of the regiment, and spent the remainder of World War II in Japanese captivity. See General Harold K.
Johnson, accessed March 9, 2007, available from www.governor.state.nd.us/awards/rr-gallery/johnson.html.

68. See U.S. Office of Strategic Services, Special Unit, Detachment 101, Office of Strategic Services Detachment
101, Nazira, India, 1942-1945, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, Stacks number
D767.6.U56.

69. The Jay D. Vanderpool Papers, 1953-1983, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History
Institute, OCLC 47911297, oral history transcript Box 1.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Walter F. Choinski, The Military Assistance Institute: An Historical Summary of Its Organization,
Program, and Accomplishments 1958-1968, Special Report October 1969, American Institutes for Research,
in The Henry C. Newton Papers, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, pp. 1-2, OCLC
46832145.

74. U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) Advisors Handbook, March 1,
1951, Daniel G. Doyle Papers 1921-1962, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, OCLC
47003107.

75. Choinski, p. 3.

76. Henry C. Newton Papers.

77. Choinski, p. 5.

78. Ibid., p. 7.

79. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

80. Report on visit to U.S. Army Institute of Military Assistance, dated August 24, 1971, Tab G, p. 1,
Henry C. Newton Papers.

81. Ibid.

27
 82. Ibid., Cover Memorandum and Tab G, p. 1-2.

83. Ibid., Cover Memorandum.

84. Ibid.; Birtle, p. 257-258.

85. Report on visit to U.S. Army Institute of Military Assistance, Tab G, p. 2.

86. See Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of Americas Last Years in
Vietnam, Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 1999, for a detailed account of General Creighton Abrams counterinsurgency
strategies from 1968 to 1972.

87. Birtle, pp. 257-258.

88. Ibid., pp. 260-261.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid., p. 261.

91. Ibid., p. 263.

92. Ibid., pp. 265-266.

93. Ibid., pp. 264-265.

94. Author interviews with Vice Chief of Staff, and G3-X, U.S. Army Special Operations Command
(USASOC), February 14, 2007.

95. None of the U.S. surrogate forces in Vietnam, the Nungs and Montagnards for example, were
formally demobilized at the close of U.S. involvement there. By the summer of 2006, roughly 3,000 ASF
soldiers had been formally demobilized in Afghanistan.

96. From December 2005 to May 2006, the author was the CJSOTF-A project officer responsible for
planning and carrying out the bulk of this demobilization.

97. The Afghan National Army and Police are centrally trained and controlled, and their units are
deliberately kept ethnically and regionally mixed.

98. In the Armys new counterinsurgency manual, Field Manual 3-24, the words Irregular Warfare
are mentioned only twice, in the Introduction. Unconventional Warfare is not mentioned at alla glaring
omission, pointing out this reluctance and the lack of doctrinal emphasis on this deeply important aspect
of current operations. The fact that the only joint, DoD-level publication that explicitly deals with irregular
operations was published only in draft form in December 2006 is another indication that the military as an
institution is still far from any kind of comfort with this type of mission (Department of Defense, Irregular
Warfare Joint Operating Concept [JOC], Pre-Decision Draft Version 0.5, December 2006).

99. See Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda, New York: Penguin
Group, 2005. Naylor discusses some of the problems of effectiveness and loyalty evident in the performance
of Afghan auxiliaries during the early period of fighting in Afghanistan. See also Charles Briscoe, Richard
L. Kiper, James A. Schroder, and Kalev I. Sepp, Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan, Carlisle Barracks,
PA: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 2005, for an exhaustive account of Army Special Operations
Forces in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2002.

28
 100. Major Philip M. Zeman, USMC, Operation Iraqi Freedom Mission Breadth, unpublished paper.
Also, interview with Major Zeman, March 2, 2007. Major Zeman was the Executive officer, 3-4 Marines
during the period 2004-05.

101. Senior Airman Christine R. Martinez, Guam Guard Takes Long Mission in Africa, accessed
March 4, 2007, available from www.usarpac.army.mil/news/guamguardhoa.asp.

29
 CONFRONTING THE UNCONVENTIONAL:
INNOVATION AND TRANSFORMATION
IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

David Tucker

October 2006

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ISBN 1-58487-254-3

ii
 FOREWORD

The Department of Defense (DoD) is committed to transforming

its conventional warfare capabilities. At the same time, DoD must
increase its emphasis on irregular warfare. This ambitious agenda
raises some questions. Are there limits to military transformation?
Or, if it seems obvious that there must be limits to transformation,
what are they exactly, why do they arise, and how can we identify
them so that we may better accomplish the transformation that
the U.S. military is capable of? If limits to military change and
transformation exist, what are the broader implications for national
policy and strategy?
Professor David Tucker offers some answers to these questions
in this Letort Paper by analyzing the efforts of the French, British,
and Americans to deal with irregular threats after World War II.
He concludes that there are limits to transformation and offers an
analysis of the effects of these limits on policy and strategy for the
war on terrorism.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director
Strategic Studies Institute

iii
 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DAVID TUCKER is Associate Professor in the Department of Defense

Analysis and Co-Director of the Center on Terrorism and Irregular
Warfare at the Naval Postgraduate School. Prior to the Postgraduate
School, he worked in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and overseas
in Africa and Europe. Professor Tuckers publications include
U.S. Special Operations Forces, with Christopher Lamb (Columbia
University Press, forthcoming, 2006); Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire:
The United States and International Terrorism (Praeger, 1997); The
War on Terrorism and the Western Way of Warfare, in Bradley C. S.
Watson, ed., The West at War (Lexington Books, forthcoming, 2006);
and The Unconventional Threat to Homeland Security, Homeland
Security, Paul Stockton, ed. (Oxford University Press, forthcoming,
2007).

iv
 SUMMARY

As the Quadrennial Defense Review Report for 2006 makes clear,

the Department of Defense (DoD) is committed to transforming
itself. In the years to come, it will continue to transform its regular or
conventional warfare capabilities, that is, its capabilities to operate
against the military forces of other states. But the Report also makes
clear that DoD must give greater emphasis to the war on terror and
irregular warfare activities, including long-duration unconventional
warfare, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and military support
for stabilization and reconstruction efforts.
This ambitious agenda raises some questions. Are there limits
to military transformation? Are there some changes that militaries
cannot or should not make? Or, if it seems too obvious that there
must be limits to transformation, what are they exactly, why do they
arise, and how can we identify them so that we may better accomplish
the transformation that the U.S. military is capable of? For example,
can militaries transform themselves to deal with irregular threats?
Should they? Will efforts to transform at the same time both regular
and irregular warfare capabilities conflict? Will one transformation
frustrate the other? If limits to military change and transformation
exist, what are the broader implications for national policy and
strategy? If transformation of both regular and irregular capabilities
is not possible, which should we choose? And, again, to what extent
is that choice in our power?
The following case studies of three militaries (the French, British,
and American) that confronted irregular or unconventional threats
in the midst of significant conventional threats offer some answers to
these questions. In each case, the issue or important point is not that
militaries are static or find it hard to change, as is often said. In all
three cases, the militaries did, in fact, change or transform themselves.
The important issue is which changes were possible, which proved
superficial and faded, which endured and why. Answering these
questions is important not just for defense planning and strategy.
Answering them will affect national strategy as well, since DoD is
part of a broader national effort to deal with the regular and irregular


threats we face. If we understand DoDs limitations, then we should
be in a better position to devise an effective national approach.
As the case studies show, the three militaries responded to
irregular threats, but did so differently and with different degrees of
success. How do we explain these different responses? In the cases
examined, external threats engaged the institutional interests and
professional concerns of military officers and led to innovations.
At the same time, military professionalism also led the militaries to
see those threats through the conventions of the military profession.
Political institutions and historical circumstances shape these
conventions and help explain variations in the responses of the three
militaries studied. But these variations take place within, and affect
a larger convention common to all three that focuses on directly
engaging and killing the enemy as the principal task of a military.
Since this approach is not effective in irregular or unconventional
warfare, to the degree that the militaries were limited to innovating
within it, they failed. They were able to innovate but not to transform
themselves to deal with irregular conflict.
Since the limitations that the militaries faced derived in part from
historical circumstances, the conclusion of this monograph considers
whether likely changes in these circumstances will improve the
ability of the U.S. military to deal with irregular threats. The analysis
considers the interconnected effects of four such circumstances or
threats: increased irregular warfare; terrorist acquisition of chemical,
biological, or radiological weapons; significant success for the Jihadist
insurgency we now face; and the long-term rise of a great power rival.
The analysis concludes that the best way to deal with both long- and
short-term irregular threats is to establish two new organizations,
a new kind of interagency organization devoted to unconventional
warfare and an unconventional warfare organization within DoD.
Establishing these new organizations would acknowledge that
irregular warfare has become a potent force but would not imply
necessarily that the age of the nation-state and its distinctive style of
warfare is over. It would imply only that nonstate forces are a serious
threat; this is far less difficult to grasp since September 11, 2001, that
nonstate forces pose a serious threat that deserves a transformative
response different from, but as serious as the response DoD is
making to the apparent revolution in military affairs in conventional
warfare.
vi
 CONFRONTING THE UNCONVENTIONAL:
INNOVATION AND TRANSFORMATION
IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

INTRODUCTION

As the Quadrennial Defense Review Report for 2006 makes clear,

the Department of Defense (DoD) is committed to transforming
itself. In the years to come, it will continue to transform its regular or
conventional warfare capabilities, that is, its capabilities to operate
against the military forces of other states. But the Report also makes
clear that DoD must give greater emphasis to the war on terror and
irregular warfare activities, including long-duration unconventional
warfare, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and military support
for stabilization and reconstruction efforts.1
This ambitious agenda raises some questions. Are there limits
to military transformation? Are there some changes that militaries
cannot or should not make? Or, if it seems too obvious that there must
be limits to transformation, what are they exactly, why do they arise,
and how can we identify them so that we may better accomplish the
transformation the U.S. military can or should execute? For example,
can militaries transform themselves to deal with irregular threats?
Should they? Will efforts to transform at the same time both regular
and irregular warfare capabilities conflict? Will one transformation
frustrate the other? If limits to military change and transformation
exist, what are the broader implications for national policy and
strategy? If transformation of both regular and irregular capabilities
is not possible, which should we choose? And, again, to what extent
is that choice in our power?
The following case studies of three militaries (French, British,
and American) that confronted irregular or unconventional threats
in the midst of significant conventional threats offer some answers
to these questions. In each case, the issue is not that militaries are
static or find it hard to change, as is often said. In all three cases, the
militaries did, in fact, change or transform themselves. The important
issues are which changes were possible, which proved superficial


and transient, which endured and why. Answering these questions
is important not just for defense planning and strategy. Answers will
affect even national strategy, since DoD is part of a broader national
effort to deal with the regular and irregular threats we face. If we
understand DoDs limitations, then we should be in a better position
to devise an effective national approach.
To orient the reader as we set out, we may summarize what
follows. The case studies examine how the French, British, and
Americans dealt with irregular or unconventional conflict prima-
rily in the 2 decades following World War II. These military
establishments had varied success in thinking anew and in acting
anew to meet the threat posed by irregular forces. In two of these
cases (the French confrontation with revolutionary warfare and
the American effort to combat insurgency), the challenge posed by
irregular forces was understood to be, as the QDR Report says of
our current conflict, markedly different from wars of the past.2
In both cases, some French and American defense officials, civilian
and military, called for and encouraged innovations to meet the
revolutionary threat their countries faced. In neither case were the
innovations successful or enduring. The British, on the other hand,
who understood post-World War II insurgencies to be different from
conventional warfare but not unprecedented, did manage to innovate
to counter this threat. The following sections present information
about why these militaries did and did not innovate successfully in the
face of unconventional threats, and why some innovations endured
while others disappeared like fads. In these pages, we will encounter
many of the same factors (e.g., external threats, bureaucratic interests,
interservice rivalry) and actors (e.g., crusading civilians, military
professionals and mavericks, immovable traditionalists) commonly
found in discussions of military innovation. After assessing such
factors and characters, the author draws some conclusions about the
limits of military transformation and their implications for current
U.S. efforts.
Military innovation has received a lot of attention over the past
15 years, but little of this work has examined innovation to meet
unconventional threats.3 This monograph attempts in some measure
to redress this imbalance by looking at the development of psycholog-


ical warfare and counterinsurgency (or revolutionary warfare, as the
French called it). Psychological warfare, psychological operations,
political warfare, and covert operations, on one hand (all these terms
were used immediately after World War II to refer to a similar set
of activities), and counterinsurgency, on the other, are of course
separate activities. This paper treats them together for two reasons.
First, for historical reasons discussed below, the French, who first
encountered what they felt was a new kind of warfare in Indochina,
combined within their response to it the two forms that the British
and Americans viewed as separate and distinct forms: psychological
warfare and counterinsurgency. For this reason, a comparison
between the French, British, and Americans should include both
psychological operations and counterinsurgency.
Second, psychological warfare and counterinsurgency have
an intimate connection. Insurgents work within and through a
population to attack the government because they are not strong
enough to attack the government and its military forces directly.
In response, the government must work within and through the
population to get at the insurgents, specifically, to get the intelligence
it needs to kill or capture them and to cut off the resources and recruits
they need to carry on the fight. Because they work through civilian
populations, insurgency and counterinsurgency are more political
than military struggles. True, force is not absent. Both sides use it to
intimidate and build support. But it plays a less decisive role than in
conventional military conflicts.
In keeping with their predominantly political character,
insurgency and counterinsurgency require political organization,
legitimacy, and persuasion more than does a conventional military
struggle. For this reason, psychological operations or political warfare
are more important in this kind of conflict than in conventional war.
This was true in individual insurgencies but also, according to the
leaders of France, Britain, and the United States, in the Cold War
as a whole, which was why they all attributed to psychological or
political warfare after World War II an importance that it had not
previously enjoyed in their defense plans and strategies.
Two terminological issues remain. To this point, we have spoken
of both sets of oppositional pairsregular or irregular, and conven-
tional or unconventionalin categorizing threats and forces. At the


risk of confusion with the modern term unconventional warfare,
we shall use the terms conventional and unconventional threats
and forces. These terms highlight the hold that established ways
of thinking (conventions) have on our minds, reminding us of the
part such ways of thinking may play in limiting transformation. As
far as military and security affairs are concerned, conventions are
established in two ways. First, nations and their militaries compete,
with the nations and militaries that win setting a standard that
others try to meet. The Prussians, for example, followed the example
of Napoleon after he had defeated them; in the post-Civil War years,
the U.S. Army looked to the Prussian Army as the standard-setter
in view of its victories over the Danish, Austrians, and French. This
view of how conventions are established rests on the assumption that
militaries, like the individuals who compose them and the nation-
states they serve, are rational actors who marshal available resources
to achieve specified goals, such as national survival and prosperity.
This account is true as far as it goes, but not exhaustive since
sometimes the weaker do not emulate the stronger, and at other
times emulation, though attempted, remains merely formal.4 The
explanation for these varied results, at least in part, is that culture
or ideas influence the actions of individuals, organizations, and
nations. Thus culture becomes still another explanation of how
conventions are established; established ways of thinking produce
conventional actions. In the United States and Great Britain, for
example, the interplay between conceptions of political liberty and
distinctive forms of government has led to a certain understanding,
not identical in each country, of the proper distribution of authority
between civilian and military officials. As the discussion below will
make clear, this understanding affected how the American and
British militaries responded to the threat from insurgency. With
regard to organizations, culture means the set of basic assumptions,
values, norms, beliefs, and formal knowledge that shape collective
understandings.5
Competition and culture together, then, establish conventions,
which are powerful facts of individual, institutional, and national
life. In the case that concerns us, what we might call the warfare
convention defines warfare as violence by the uniformed agents of


states who in principle do not target noncombatants. Unconventional
conflict, by way of contrast, takes place in the midst of civilians
and includes violence by actors, who may or may not be agents
of a state, against noncombatants. Insurgency is a species of such
unconventional conflict.
The second terminological issue arises in explaining why the U.S.
military has had difficulty dealing with unconventional conflict.6 Part
of the explanation, we argue, is the professionalism of the American
military, which makes it attentive to external threats but also inclined
to understand them in a particular way. By professionalism, we mean
self-regulation by practitioners who understand themselves and are
understood by others to possess specific knowledge and skills that
set them apart from others. Professionals regulate their activity in
part by sharing certain ideas and principles of behavior, the mutual
recognition and encouragement of which are what, to a large extent,
defines a profession.

THE FRENCH

Revolutionary Warfare.

Almost immediately following the end of Word War II, the French
began fighting the Vietminh for control of Indochina. The war lasted
from 1946 to 1954. The French had technological superiority (armor
and aircraft) and gained some initial success against Vietminh
forces. However, as the French continued to seek out and engage
their enemy, the Vietminh dispersed their forces, denying the French
the decisive battles they sought. When it was to their advantage, the
Vietminh engaged the French, operating in battalions, regiments, and
divisions as expedient. Their commander, General Vo Nguyen Giap,
explicitly followed a strategy of prolonging the war, in expectation
that the French would not be able to sustain their effort. To ensure
their own endurance, the Vietminh undertook intense organizing of
the Vietnamese people. During the course of the war, French Union
forces (French and colonial forces) suffered 92,000 dead, 114,000
casualties, and 28,000 captured. Many of the dead, injured, and
captured were from Frances colonies, but the steady grind of the


war without apparent progress wore down public opinion in France.
Support for the war by the French populace dropped from 52 percent
in 1947 to only 7 percent in early 1954. When the fortress of Dien
Bien Phu fell in May 1954 to a well-planned conventional assault,
with several thousand more French casualties and many more taken
prisoner, the French were forced to give up their Indochina colony.7
The defeat at Dien Bien Phu had a significantly adverse effect
on French confidence. Coupled with the Suez disaster of 1956, it
marked the contraction of French power and exposed the fractious
ineptitude of the government of the Fourth Republic. Insufficiently
funded and supported by its political masters, the French Army felt
betrayed, setting in motion events that would help bring about the
end of the Fourth Republic in 1958 and an attempted putsch against
Charles De Gaulle in 1961, following his decision to grant Algerian
independence.
The defeat also sent the French Army, or at least some of its
officers, in search of an explanation. How could a small, backward
colony have defeated its metropolitan master? The answer to this
question began to emerge in meetings and training sessions even
before the war in Indochina had ended. It appeared in the pages
of professional military journals shortly after Dien Bien Phu, as the
French began another war, this time for control of Algeria, an integral
part of France.8 The explanation for their defeat was that the French
had encountered a new kind of warfarerevolutionary warfare.
Unlike classical warfare, in which one military force sought to defeat
another in order to gain control of territory, revolutionary warfare
sought to control a territory by controlling its population. That was
the point of Vietminh efforts to organize the Vietnamese people.
The decisive fighting of the war took place not on the battlefield
where the French had the advantage, but in the hearts and minds of
the French and Vietnamese populations, where the Vietminh built
an advantage through inducements and coercion. The Vietminh
avoided pitched battles, hoping to exhaust not just the French Army,
but the French people, while organizing the Vietnamese population
so it could withstand a long struggle.
The organizing effort had two components. One was political
warfare. The Vietminh infiltrated all sections and levels of society
through a system of committees. These committees paralleled


the official political organizations at every level (hamlet, village,
province, etc.) and included a series of social committees (of the
young, the old, women, etc.). The result was a system that, as
explained by Charles Lacheroy, one of the most famous of the
French students of revolutionary warfare, allowed the Vietminh to
take physical possession of people. But this componentpolitical
warfarewas not sufficient. The second required component of
revolutionary warfare was psychological warfare. The Vietminh
aimed to take control of peoples hopes and fears, loves and hates
to take control of peoples souls. To do this, they used a variety of
measures ranging from propaganda to brain-washing, supported
by physical punishment. The French referred to these measures as
psychological warfare. Political warfare and psychological warfare
together made revolutionary warfare. Revolutionary warfare had
allowed the Vietminh to beat a force that by conventional measures
was far superior. Thus revolutionary warfare was itself a revolution
in warfare.9
Having diagnosed the problem, French officers knew the remedy.
The French military had to transform itself by adopting the techniques
that had defeated them. In adopting these techniques, The Army,
explained a French officer, was thinking only of turning against an
enemy the arms that he used. What could be more normal in war?
Otherwise, he argued, the Army would simply fail to adapt itself to
the kinds of struggles it would face in what he called the era of the
masses.10
The French decision to imitate the Vietminh provides a good
example of the process by which conventions are established. In
this case, of course, the convention at issue was one that challenged
conventional warfare as it had developed over several 100s of years
of European history; but the process was the same as that which
made the German Army the standard of excellence in the late 19th
century European world: imitating the stronger. The convention-
establishing impulse pushing the French to take psychological
warfare seriously in the early 1950s had been foreshadowed by the
success the Americans and British had had with it during World
War II. This success was all the more striking to the French because,
prior to World War II, neither the British nor the French had any
real psychological warfare nor even military information capability.


French efforts during the war had trailed behind the larger and more
sophisticated efforts of the British and Americans, but following
World War II, the French were eager to develop an information
and propaganda capability.11 Hence the French produced films to
reeducate the German population in the French zone of control and,
in 194647, established French army offices to provide information
to the public on the Armys activities and to look after its morale.
These were modeled on similar offices in the U.S. Army.
An important event in the developing French interest in the
psychological aspect of warfare was the struggle over French
involvement in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The French Communist Party, a powerful player in French politics,
opposed French entry into the North Atlantic Treaty. The French
government came to believe it necessary not merely to react to
communist propaganda hostile to the treaty, but to sell the treaty
proactively to the French people and to deflect the subversive effects
of the propaganda on the people and the Army. To accomplish this,
the French government used what it called psychological action.
Psychological action consisted of measures taken to influence
friends; psychological warfare was measures taken to influence or
intimidate enemies. In February 1950, for example, the Minister of
Defense ordered the chiefs of the three military services to counter
actions by the Communist Party that were contrary to the national
defense. A few months later, the French government published a
decree that gave to the Ministry of Defense the responsibility for
assisting the government with psychological action as it pertained to
issues of national defense. This was the first time that a psychological
function had been assigned to the Ministry. In 1952 the government
set up an interministerial committee that was supposed to develop a
doctrine for psychological action. Since this task appeared to mean,
at least to some involved, establishing the principles upon which
public support for national defense would rest, it was set aside as too
political. The committee worked on other issues instead. A further
step in the institutionalization of psychological action was taken
in November 1952 when the Minister of Defense set up a separate
office of psychological action and information. For the first time,
the military now had personnel designated as psychological action
officers.12


The Rise to Preeminence of Revolutionary Warfare.

The military took much of the initiative in conceptualizing and

institutionalizing psychological action, psychological warfare,
and the broader concept of revolutionary warfare. It established
a psychological warfare course at the cole de Guerre in 1954 to
train French officers to work on psychological operations at Allied
headquarters. This was followed by the establishment in 1955 of
psychological action sections at Army headquarters to replace an
office of morale and information. A month later, the military estab-
lished psychological action offices at various levels of command
in the 10th military region (Algeria). In 1956, the military set up
a psychological warfare training center in Paris, and introduced
psychological warfare doctrine into its educational system to prepare
its officers for the new mode of warfare and its use in Algeria. In the
same year, it also organized four loudspeaker and leaflet companies,
dispatching three of them to Algeria, and arranged for officers
who had survived the Vietminh prison camps to travel throughout
Algeria, teaching the principles of psychological warfare.13
As this activity on the part of the military continued, a new
government came into office in January 1956. The Defense Minister
was Maurice Bourgs-Maunoury. Sympathetic to the doctrines of
revolutionary warfare and psychological operations, he endorsed
and made official the initiatives the French military already had
taken. On January 23, 1956, Bourgs-Maunoury set up a psychological
action and warfare committee within the Army Chief of Staffs office.
The same day, Charles Lacheroy was attached to the headquarters
staff as the officer in charge of psychological operations. A month
later, when the committee met for the first time with General Ely, the
new Chief of Staff, as its chairman, Lacheroy assumed responsibility
for the committee. In April, Bourgs-Maunoury created an
information and psychological action office, with Lacheroy as its
head, attached directly to the office of the Minister of Defense. In
May 1956, Lacheroys committee considered and approved the idea
of creating military staff organizations in Algeria to be responsible
for psychological warfare, the soon-to-be-famous 5eme bureaux.
These offices were, in principle, equivalent in authority to the other


Bureaus of the French Army, such as those for operations (3eme
Bureau) or logistics (4eme Bureau). Establishing a 5eme bureau in
Algeria gave psychological warfare a stronger institutional basis. For
example, once the office was set up, it took charge of the Center for
Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare in Algeria,
previously under the control of the 3eme bureau, which had been on
the verge of closing the Center.14
The official sanctioning of revolutionary and psychological
warfare is clear in remarks that Bourgs-Maunoury published in
the Revue militaire dinformation in July 1956. The Minister began by
acknowledging that France was undertaking a policy of reform in
Algeria, but that these reforms should not be seen as concessions to
the terrorists. They were not a sign of weakness but of the strength
of Frances longstanding commitment to Algeria, a commitment that
made failure there unthinkable, according to the Minister. Before
turning to the role of the Army in the conflict, he acknowledged
the sacrifices that the great national effort required of France and
her citizens. He described Frances Army in Algeria as an Army
of pacification. The Army thus had a new role, according to the
Minister, a role marked by the evolution of the military art over the
preceding 20 years. This new role was necessary because the rebels
in Algeria were practicing psychological and revolutionary warfare.
Frances Army was adapting itself to these new modes of warfare,
the minister contended, new modes he was sure would appear in
other conflicts. The result was that France no longer had an Army
only of soldiers, but one of builders, doctors, and pioneers as well, an
Army of propaganda and an Army in contact with the population.15
Bourgs-Maunourys article in the Revue militaire shows the
degree to which he had accepted both the diagnosis and the remedy
that theorists of revolutionary warfare offered: the struggle in Algeria
was over the loyalty of the Algerian people; the key to victory was
not defeating an enemy force or seizing territory, but winning that
loyalty. Further evidence of both the importance of revolutionary
and psychological warfare and its penetration of the French defense
establishment emerged in 1957. In July 1957, Chief of Staff Ely
approved and Bourgs-Maunoury, now Prime Minister, signed a
directive on psychological action. The directive aimed to define the

10
general principles of the psychological arm, specify responsibilities
with regard to psychological warfare, and review the tools that this
new kind of warfare provided commanders. In November 1957,
the Commander of the Army Corps in Algeria presented the new
doctrine to Frances allies at a meeting at Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). By the end of 1957, psychological
warfare staff offices were in place in the headquarters of the French
Army, in all the military regions, and in French forces in Germany.16
The existence of 5eme bureaux gave psychological warfare a status
comparable to that of the traditional organizations and activities of
French military life.
The publication of the Directive on the Psychological Arm
and its presentation to SHAPE represent for the French military the
fullest acceptance achieved by the doctrine of revolutionary warfare
and its accompanying understanding of psychological warfare. In
different ways, both the Directive and the presentation show clear
debts to the writings of the revolutionary warfare theorists; one of
the most prominent of these, Jacques Hogard, was an author of the
Directive. The Directive discussed the geopolitical situation only in
general terms. It acknowledged that atomic weapons had changed
both warfare, by making it almost unthinkable, and politics, by
increasing the burden of fear that the average citizen had to support.
It asserted that France was on the side of those struggling for
freedom in the world. It used the notion of revolutionary warfare
(which it, like the revolutionary warfare theorists, characterized as
permanent, universal, and total) as the framework for discussing
psychological action and psychological warfare. It distinguished
these two, as we have noted, according to their targets, the former
used against friends, the latter against enemies. Both were needed to
counter revolutionary warfare. To prevail, the government and the
military had to win hearts and souls in France and overseas.
The Directive then discussed at length the tactics, techniques,
and procedures of psychological action and psychological warfare,
carefully distinguishing the two and what was permitted in each.
The presentation to SHAPE gave a more detailed analysis of the
geopolitical situation, dwelling on the struggle between communism
and freedom in the world, the advance of communism toward world

11
domination, and the betrayal of France by some of its allies (the United
States and Great Britain), who recently had sent arms to Tunisia,
arms that the French were certain would end up in Algeria. The
advance of communism, the presentation argued, was occurring by
an indirect route made necessary, in part, by the presence of nuclear
weapons on both sides, which made traditional large-scale warfare
too risky. The presentation avoided detailed discussion of tactics and
techniques. Like the Directive and the revolutionary war theorists,
however, it saw revolutionary warfare as the key threat to freedom
in the world and argued that the objective of this kind of warfare
was not control of territory, as was the case in classic warfare, but
control of populations. It thus saw psychological warfare as central
to the defense of freedom and the West.17
What accounts for the rapid rise to prominence in France of
revolutionary and psychological warfare? Most discussions of
innovation assume that institutions generally resist change. The
military often is thought to be particularly resistant to change, yet in
this case much of the impetus for change came from within the ranks
of the French Army. Moreover, the proponents of revolutionary
warfare were telling their colleagues in the French military that it
had to change root and branch. Bourgs-Maunourys description of
the French Army in Algeria as one of builders, doctors, and pioneers
makes clear the extent of the transformation required. Rather than
destroying enemy forces, the French military would be building
schools and improving public health.
Analysts and historians have suggested a number of explanations
for the rapid acceptance of revolutionary and psychological warfare.
For example, one argues that these theories received wide support
because they allowed France to explain why it should keep its empire
and its mission civilatrice after World War II, when the dominant
opinion among its allies was that such colonial posturing should
be abandoned. He also argues that revolutionary warfare allowed
the French to regard themselves as important despite their recent
defeats and lack of nuclear weapons. Unlike the nuclear-armed
British and Americans, the French had faced and now understood
the new warfare. Finally, he argues that revolutionary warfare
theory gave to the French Army a privileged position in the French

12
defense establishment vis--vis the Air Force and the Navy, and to its
exponents a privileged position in the Army.18 The emphasis in this
analysis is not on the intrinsic merits or demerits of the new doctrine,
but on the way it served to protect vested interests, either Frances
or the French Armys. According to this view, the new doctrine
called for innovation and transformation, but in doing so, protected
established interests and therefore was accepted widely within the
Army, contrary to our expectations about military establishments
and innovations.
Of these interest-based arguments for the adoption of
revolutionary warfare doctrine, the most plausible is the notion that
the new doctrine transformed what really was just colonial warfare,
something Frances allies would not support, into a new mode of
warfare critical to the survival of the West, which Frances allies
presumably would be eager to support. Yet, even this argument
seems suspect, since the partisans of revolutionary warfare continued
to adhere to the doctrine, even after the Allies refused to accept
what the commander of the Algerian Army Corps, General Allard,
presented to them at SHAPE. What purpose did the new doctrine
serve once it had failed to win Allied support? One possible self-
interested purpose was to give the Army a special position in the
French military establishment, to compensate it for the presumed
Naval and Air Force monopoly over nuclear weapons. The advent of
nuclear weapons did contribute to the development and acceptance
of revolutionary warfare theory. Its partisans argued, as General
Allard did, that the new weapons meant that traditional wars could
no longer be fought, and aggression would now take the indirect route
of revolutionary warfare. We today may as well take this argument at
face value. It has come to be generally accepted; historical experience
over the past 50 years or so supports it. It was not simply a ruse to
maintain relevance for the Army or some Army personnel as nuclear
weapons developed.
It is true that interest in revolutionary warfare doctrine developed
at the same time as, though more quickly than, the interest in nuclear
weapons. This might suggest that the development of revolutionary
warfare theory was the Armys response to this internal or interservice
threat to its resources and prestige. The French, however, were

13
rearming at the same time as they developed nuclear weapons, so
the interest in nuclear weapons did not necessarily disadvantage the
Army in the fight for resources. In addition, many of those who were
prominent supporters of revolutionary warfare were from technical
fields in the military or from the Air Force. If preferment was what
they wanted, then support for nuclear weapons or other modern
technologies would have provided it. Yet, they chose to support
revolutionary warfare.
Moreover, if compensation for lack of a nuclear role explains
support for revolutionary warfare among certain officers, how do
we explain support for this doctrine among civilians? Clearly, the
position of political figures was not threatened by the development
of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, if the French Army had wanted
to assure its significance alongside the Navy and Air Force, it could
have emphasized its importance in the defense of Europe and of
metropolitan France. These were traditional roles, unlike the efforts
revolutionary warfare seemed to call for, which tended to turn the
Army into a kind of peace corps, as Bourgs-Maunourys description
of the Army in Algeria makes clear. The traditional role in Europe was,
in fact, one that many in the Army chose and supported throughout
the days of revolutionary warfare. For example, a prominent Army
general resigned in 1956 over the decision by Bourgs-Maunoury to
break up mechanized units in Germany in order to send them to
Algeria. Finally, if it is true that junior officers supported revolutionary
warfare doctrine because they thought it would enhance their
position in the Army, how do we explain the young officers who did
not support it? Presumably, they hoped for advantage in promotion
just as did those who supported revolutionary warfare, so this motive
alone does not account for support of the new doctrine.19
Generally speaking, there appear to be no simply self-interested
motives sufficient to explain the rise and spread of revolutionary
warfare doctrine among the French military. While it is no doubt
true that some officers were attracted to revolutionary warfare
doctrine because it appeared to preserve the human element in
warfare in a push-button age, the new doctrine did not appeal
only to nontechnicians who wished to prevent a loss of status to the
technicians of a modern Army. The most important although not

14
sole prompter of support for the new doctrine appears to have been
the experience of engaging in revolutionary warfare, particularly
in Indochina. The war in Indochina had a profound effect on those
who fought in it. Among other things, it caused younger officers to
question the accepted ways of doing things in the French military,
particularly the unsuitability of its methods for the war in Indochina.
It created in the younger generation a tendency to question the
Armys habits and traditions, including, ultimately, its traditional
subservience to civil authority. But before that extreme had been
reached, it created a disposition to accept new doctrine and a desire
among many of the best officers for innovation in and renovation of
the military. Concerned with the defense of France and its interests,
soldiers turned to revolutionary and psychological warfare doctrine
in response to a serious threat. In other words, they responded
as professionals, as individuals with a sense of themselves as an
independent self-regulating group dedicated to something beside
their self-interest. That something was the defense of France. An
event so unexpected as the French defeat in Indochina by an inferior
force cried out for an explanation, particularly as the same problem
seemed to be developing in Algeria. Revolutionary warfare theory
supplied that explanation.20
We gain another perspective on the acceptance of revolutionary
warfare theory by considering why it might have appealed to those
who had not participated in the Indochina War (only about 40
percent of French officers did). Antoine Argoud, for example, one
of the leading exponents of the new doctrine, did not fight there. In
these cases, the success the new doctrine achieved appears due to its
plausibility as a diagnosis of what had gone wrong in Indochina and,
in the early stages, what was going wrong in Algeria. Acceptance
was facilitated, in part, because it was possible to see the emphasis on
working with the population, so prominent in revolutionary warfare
doctrine, as similar to the methods of French colonial warfare in the
19th and early 20th centuries pioneered by Lyautey and Gallieni.
According to these two colonial soldiers, attacks on rebels or bandits
were supposed to be followed by constructive work in the colony
that would tie the local population to France. Such a combined
approach resembled revolutionary warfare doctrine. Although the

15
Armys instinct in Algeria may have been to attack and destroy the
rebels, some civilian and military leaders came to see the need for a
more constructive approach. This environment favored the growing
acceptance of revolutionary warfare theory.21 As we have noted,
Defense Minister Bourgs-Maunoury represented Frances reform
efforts in Algeria as a mere continuation of Frances historic mission
there (the reforms vont dans le sens de lhistoire). This patina of
tradition may have helped Frances military professionals accept
revolutionary warfare as essential to the defense of France.
Two other factors appear to have worked in favor of the adoption
of the new doctrine. First, the United States pressured the French
to do something about communist influence in France, particularly
as to the communist opposition to NATO. French politicians were
themselves concerned with the communists and sought a way to
counter them. This opened the way for doctrines of psychological
action. Indeed, influencing French opinion and attitudes was
part of the program of revolutionary warfare proponents. If the
Vietminh won because they organized or politicized Vietnamese
society, then, as some revolutionary warfare theorists contended,
the French government or the military had to organize or politicize
French society. Such thinking was part of the background that made
acceptable to some military officers the direct involvement of the
military in French politics, leading to the attempted putsch against
de Gaulle. As noted earlier, in 1952 the interministerial committee
had thought producing a doctrine on psychological operations was
too political and abandoned the effort. But only 9 years later, the
military tried to overthrow the government.
Second, the new understanding of the importance of unconven-
tional warfare developed because some politicians, preeminently
Bourgs-Maunoury, saw revolutionary and psychological warfare
theories as cures for the problem of Algeria. Unlike the traditional
methods of repression that the Army first employed, the new
doctrines offered at least hope that some way could be found to deal
with the problem of Algeria in an acceptable way. One analyst has
argued that the politicians did not have confidence in Frances general
officers because they did not think the old guard military understood
the new doctrine. Another analyst says of the military elite that

16
it proved itself, once again, too lethargic and unimaginative to
understand changing modes of warfare, perhaps because it had too
much invested in established ways.22 Senior civilian decisionmakers
looked to younger officers, therefore, who were proponents of
revolutionary warfare doctrine. These civilians supported the
doctrine and its proponents with money and favored positions in
Frances military and defense institutions. As the movement grew
from below, nurtured by politicians, some general officers became
converts to the cause, with their support helping to further embed
revolutionary warfare in the French defense establishment.23

The Fall of Revolutionary Warfare.

Recalling the rise of revolutionary and psychological warfare

theories makes clear that although these theories gained wide
support, neither won universal acceptance in the French officer
corps or among civilians. As noted, the majority of French officers
had not served in Indochina. Many of them, therefore, did not have
the personal interest in or commitment to the new doctrine that the
Indochina veterans had. This explains perhaps why the doctrine
experienced a fall as rapid as its rise, once its political implications
became apparent. Revolutionary warfare in Algeria led to the use
of torture and other techniques (e.g., brainwashing) that created
political problems for the Army in France. The association of so many
of the leading theorists with the political involvement of the Army in
1958 and 1961 also discredited theory within the military. When de
Gaulle, who had never been a supporter of revolutionary warfare,
came to power, he extracted France from Algeria and won the Armys
support for a more conventional military role.24 Revolutionary and
psychological warfare theories lost their place in French military
life.
The political problems outside the Army generated by the new
doctrine were not the only reason it failed to maintain its position
in French military life. The new doctrine generated problems within
the military as well. To the new doctrines partisans, its broad scope
meant that psychological action and warfare became not adjuncts
to national defense but its leading element. The Directive on the

17
Psychological Arm issued in 1957 all but made this argument
explicitly. It stated that the final end of military operations was
of a psychological order and that man, in his heart and spirit, is
the essential objective of war and of psychological action. If it is
mans heart and spirit that are the essential objectives of war, and
if these are the domain of psychological action and warfare, then
it would follow that the psychological arm is the heart and soul
of warfare. The Directive even argued that nuclear warfare was a
psychological arm because it could produce disarray in the souls of
men. Comments in a similar vein, that war in the common sense
of the term [is] . . . an episode of psychological warfare, were
heard in training and education sessions at French military schools.
These theoretical implications were matched by practical ambitions.
Lacheroy came to his new responsibilities with a plan to undertake
a great national reorganization. In Algeria, the 5eme Bureaux
acquired responsibilities that were far removed from their original
mission.25
The presumptions of the new doctrine and its growing influence
bred resentment, opposition, and efforts to curtail it. In March
1957, for example, the Chief of Staffs office informed Lacheroys
committee that it could not disseminate lessons learned unless they
were approved by the Chiefs office. In Algeria, too, the 10th Military
District resisted efforts by the psychological warriors in Paris to issue
instructions in response to events. Psychological action was seen
as a fad and was criticized for some of its ineffective experimental
techniques. A military officer writing in 1960 remarked that certain
officers believed they could win battles with loudspeakers and
schools. By the beginning of 1960 in Algeria, one analyst reports,
senior officers as well as units in the field . . . were showing
considerable hostility toward the staffs of the 5es Bureaux.26
Some of this resistance was no doubt the typical way in which
bureaucracies tend to resist change. That ministers were constantly
encouraging the chiefs of the military staff to take seriously and
promote the tenets of psychological warfare shows that such resist-
ance continued to exist. As late as 1958, communiqus suggest that
the tenets of the new doctrine had not penetrated everywhere
or deeply in the Army. As its military supporters tried to put the

18
new doctrine into practice, one analyst noted that they found
themselves free of control by politicians from above but blocked
by the military bureaucracy below. The effectiveness of the new
doctrine, he remarked, would have been enhanced had the situation
been reversed. In addition to these typical problems, adoption of the
new doctrine was impeded by a lack of resources, which rendered
premature the rush to put the doctrine into practice. The result was
that psychological warfare was declared the true warfare without
sufficient resources to make good the claim. For example, the Office
of Information and Psychological Action that Bourgs-Maunoury
established in April 1956 was at the center of power, attached directly
to the office of the Minister of Defense. But for lack of personnel, it
had to act through civilian or military offices over which it had no
control. Worse, haste produced insufficiently trained practitioners,
whose ineptitude discredited the newly proclaimed queen of
battle.27
While the support of politicians was a major cause of the
institutionalization of revolutionary warfare doctrine, the political
disarray of the Fourth Republic was also one of the reasons this
innovation failed. The new doctrine needed a firmer guiding hand
and more support than the Fourth Republics politicians were able to
muster. It often was the political figures in the defense establishment
who were best positioned among the civilian and military supporters
of revolutionary warfare to promote the new doctrine, but they
changed frequently. The Fourth Republic had 21 changes of Prime
Minister in 12 years. The organization of the defense establishment
suffered from a similar lack of stability. From 1945 to 1962, according
to one count, there were at least 25 reforms of French defense
structures, averaging one every 8 months. By another count, there
were 15 reorganizations between 1946 and 1958.28
Within the military, the problem the new doctrine had to
overcome was, in a sense, less complicated but more difficult.
Revolutionary and psychological warfare were not just innovations.
They represented, according to their proponents, a revolution in
warfare to which France and the West had to adapt, or they would
perish. This amounted, of course, to the claim that the French military
had to change in fundamental ways. The Army in Algeria, Bourgs-

19
Maunoury announced, was a new kind of Army, because the military
art had evolved. But it was not a new Army, and many in the Army
remained not very evolved. In 1954, a decorated officer assigned
to a public information position, an important job in the eyes of
revolutionary warfare theorists, showed his medals to another officer,
saying, With these, I had a right to hope for something better.29
The paras, elite light infantry, who took pride in their ability to
track down and kill the enemy, often clashed with the Specialized
Administrative Sections, French military personnel who worked
with the Algerians and performed what the U.S. military would call
civil affairs functions. These are just a few of the indications that
many in the Army resisted the new doctrine because it required them
to leave behind the conventional understanding of themselves, not
only with regard to the role of the Army in politics, but with regard
to the roles and missions of the Army in national defense.30
Just as support for the doctrine of revolutionary warfare was
not simply self-interested but the result of professional concern
for the safety of France, so should we conclude that attachment
to conventional warfare among French officers was not merely an
irrational longing for traditions. An officer in the French military
might agree that the kind of warfare that defeated France in
Indochina and appeared to be defeating it in Algeria was a threat to
France, without agreeing that it was the only or most serious threat.
As we have seen in the case of the general officer who resigned
when armored units in Germany were broken up for the sake of the
war in Algeria, opposition to revolutionary warfare could reflect a
different evaluation of the external threats that France faced. Officers
also could disagree over evolutions of the internal threats to France:
the threat was not great enough to justify the innovation of military
psychological action targeted at Frenchmen. One might well conclude
that the conventional understanding of warfare and of civil-military
relations was most appropriate for Frances situation. In any case,
no matter how reasoned, the attachment to conventional ways of
thought and action was the most important cause for the failure
of revolutionary and psychological warfare. These innovations
required the transformation of the French Army. However useful
the innovation, the transformation they implied was not acceptable

20
to enough French officers or civilian officials to allow the innovation
to endure.

THE BRITISH

The British experience with political or psychological warfare

and insurgency offers a sharp contrast to the French experience with
revolutionary warfare. We will consider first the development in
Britain of political warfare, and then turn to the better known topic
of British counterinsurgency doctrine.

Political Warfare.

In 1950, as the French were just beginning to consider the

importance of psychological warfare, Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart
reflected on the long British experience with that mode of war in a
lecture at the Royal United Service Institution (RUSI). Lockhart, who
had worked as a spy for the British in Moscow during the Russian
revolution, had been the Director General of the Political Warfare
Executive, the agency of the British government that handled
propaganda abroad, during World War II. In his talk, Lockhart
stressed that political warfare, or psychological warfare as the
Americans call it, was a regretful necessity: I regard the modern
form of political warfare as a necessary evil in war-time and as one
of the greatest menaces to our civilization and standards of conduct
in peace-time. Yet, Great Britain could not set aside this menacing
technique in the cold war, a period of neither peace nor war,
because political warfare was being used against Britain every day
with great violence and cynical disregard for the truth. Indeed,
Lockhart contended, political warfare was the principal weapon of
the cold war. Britain, like other democracies, was at a disadvantage
in waging political warfare against a totalitarian enemy because its
freedom could be exploited by that enemy, whereas the enemys
repression and secrecy largely were impenetrable. Still, Lockhart
insisted that Britain should not try to remedy these disadvantages by
imitating the methods of the totalitarians. In other words, political
warfare, as practiced by Britain, should occur within the constraints
on government that a free society required. This was not the only

21
constraint under which it should operate, according to Lockhart.
Political warfare, he told his audience, was not an independent force
or power but a mere handmaid of official policy and strategy.31
Two years after his own lecture, Lockhart was on hand at the RUSI
to introduce another political warfare expert, Richard Crossman.
Among other things, Crossman, then a Member of Parliament, had
been the Assistant Chief of the Psychological Warfare Department,
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), in
194445. In his lecture and another given at the same location in 1953,
Crossman presented political warfare in much the same terms as had
Lockhart. He insisted that it could not produce results on its own. To
be effective, political warfare had to be coordinated with diplomatic
and military activity and subordinated to some overarching strategy.
Citing examples from World War II where political warfare had failed
when used on its own, he remarked that this was one of the principal
lessons he had learned in the war. With regard to political warfare
in the Cold War, Crossman argued that the totalitarian states were
defined by the fact that they were always at war. This meant that,
compared to the democracies, the totalitarian states had a greater
unity of purpose.
For Crossman, this, in turn, meant that it was easier for the
totalitarian states to mount effective political warfare campaigns.
As he said to a questioner, In peace-time, you will not be able to
make a democrat accept the totalitarian concept that one overriding
objective must be followed by everybody. Far from seeing this
difference between democracies and totalitarians as a liability or
believing that it required the democracies to copy the methods of
the totalitarians, Crossman saw the diversity of viewpoints in a
democracy as an advantage. Crossman told his audience that by
reporting a bitter controversy in a democracy one could give an
example to the enemy which is highly subversive. He concluded
his lecture by arguing for a limited use of psychological warfare,
one appropriate for a democracy in peacetime, and cautioned his
audience that, unless Britain was willing to become totalitarian, an
absurd idea, it could not duplicate what Russia could do in this new
mode of warfare. It is enough, he said, to tell the truth, to build up
credibility, [and] to understand our purpose.32

22
 The views of these two political warfare experts contrast
sharply with the understanding of psychological warfare that was
emerging in France. First, unlike French theorists, both Lockhart
and Crossman argued that the British should not imitate their
enemies, even though both Crossman and Lockhart admitted that
these totalitarian enemies had distinct advantages in political or
psychological warfare. Furthermore, although both men agreed that,
during war, measures may be necessary that would be unacceptable
during peacetime and that the Cold War was something between
peace and war, neither argued for an unconstrained use of political
warfare. Even Crossman, who acknowledged, as the French did,
that the totalitarians were permanently at war, refused to conclude,
unlike many French theorists, that Britain or the democracies had to
respond in kind. To both of these men, imitating the enemy would
have surrendered what success at political warfare was meant to
preserve, the British way of life that included a commitment to civil
liberties and limited government. To both Lockhart and Crossman,
political warfare remained a regretful necessity.
In trying to fashion a political warfare weapon compatible with the
British view of free government, Lockhart and Crossman represented
mainstream British thinking. During the 1930s, as the British secretly
planned for the propaganda component of a future world war, they
refused to imitate what the Germans were doing, even though they
acknowledged that the Germans excelled at propaganda. After
World War II, when the British faced a string of internal conflicts
in their colonies, they remained generally committed to British free
speech traditions. During the Malaya Emergency, the Colonial Office
refused to suppress press freedoms in Malaya because such a move
would contradict the longstanding tradition of leaving opinion free
from government regulation.33 We know of no British student of
political warfare who ever suggested, as did French theorists, that
winning the struggle against the totalitarians required adopting
their methods.
The second way in which the British political warfare experts
differed from their French counterparts was in their assessment of
the importance of this technique. French doctrine on psychological
warfare, we recall, implied that it was, in fact, the heart and soul

23
of modern warfare. Lockhart called political warfare the principal
weapon of the cold war but did not claim that it was the essence of
warfare. His insistence that political warfare had to be subordinate
to policy and strategy suggests that he saw political warfare as just
another weapon, one particularly suited to the situation of not
peace, not war that existed between the Western democracies and
the Warsaw Pact. Crossman, too, remarked that political warfare had
to be subordinate to some overarching strategy if it were to succeed.
Rather than being the heart and soul of warfare, as the French
doctrine on psychological warfare claimed, Lockhart and Crossman
saw it as only another tool to carry on the fight.
Perhaps the principal cause of the differing British and French
views of psychological warfare was the difference in their level of
experience with it. The British were long familiar with psychological
warfare and had faced an array of issues associated with it. The
British had used political warfare effectively in World War I, or so
they and their enemies thought. Although the British government
dismantled its political warfare capability when the war ended, it
almost immediately began to rebuild it. The first efforts were the
introduction of internationally oriented press attachs at some
British Embassies, initiatives to lure tourists to Great Britain, and
initiating BBC foreign language broadcasts in the late 1930s. As
official documents make clear, the point of these efforts, especially
in response to the increasing power of totalitarianism, was to serve
national interests by promoting British prestige and influence in the
world.34 The deliberate effort to use information to promote national
interests in the emerging struggle with the totalitarian powers
defined these efforts as political warfare.
In addition to these various overt efforts, by 1938 the British had
been trying secretly for several years to prepare to use propaganda
in a possible war with Germany. The initial impetus came from
the Air Ministry in 1935. As the military planned for a possible
conflict with Italy over Abyssinia that year, the questions of both
censorship and propaganda arose. This led a press attach in the
Ministry to consider the issue in the context of a conflict larger
than a clash in Africa. He wrote a memorandum arguing that the
organization of propaganda in World War I had been deficient and
should be improved if another such war broke out. This led to the

24
establishment of an interministerial committee to consider the issue
and eventually to plan for the possibility of war. The French had no
comparable experience. Between the World Wars, they did nothing
to develop a political warfare capability. A British civil servant sent
to coordinate a propaganda plan with the French in 1939 reported
that such coordination was impossible because the French had no
plan.35
Although the British did some planning, they also did a good
deal of bickering. Infighting among the different ministries and
organizations involved in information and propaganda efforts
continued even through the first year or so of World War II.36
This bickering and infighting arose from the petty jealousies, turf
fights, and resource conflicts typical of bureaucratic squabbling, but
these fights also involved substantive issues, many of which the U.S
Government continues to wrestle with. Everyone seemed to agree
that effective political warfare required the coordination of all sources
of information. But did that mean that the BBC, for example, should
be run by the same organization that disseminated disinformation
to enemy countries? Would this not hopelessly compromise the
reputation for truthfulness that made the BBC so effective? If one
distinguished between information and propaganda, the latter of
which required hiding its source, should propaganda be handled by
a separate ministry or combined with the organizations that carried
out sabotage activities overseas, and which therefore had expertise
in hiding the British hand? Since all these efforts were part of the
more general effort to support British foreign policy, should not the
foreign office have a key role or perhaps the directing role? But was
the Foreign Office competent to direct such efforts? And what role
should the military have? Did it not have its own interest in and
need to exercise a propaganda function, as various officers argued
in the 1930s?37 As British officials debated these questions, they were
developing their understanding of political warfare, and how it fit
into Britains political and institutional life. In the 1930s, the rise of
the totalitarian powers prompted these discussions; they did not
occur after a surprising and devastating defeat, such as the French
suffered in Indochina, a defeat that might have encouraged a search
for radical solutions.

25
 When one compares the theorizing approach to psychological
and revolutionary warfare of the French to the more practical,
empirical approach of the British, one might be inclined to see this
as a confirmation of national stereotypes. There is some truth to this
view. Although some authors speculated about developments they
thought were changing the nature of warfare,38 the British generally
remained close to their experience. They tended not to claim that
the changes they noticed were revolutionary or that responding to
them required a fundamental break with British practice. These were
also the views expressed by Lockhart and Crossman. Institutionally,
as well, the British tended to operate in a recurring cycle. Seeing
political warfare as a regretful necessity, the British would not
devote resources to it until an external threat made that necessary.
As soon as that threat disappeared, the government dismantled its
political warfare capability, as it did after World Wars I and II. As
a new threat appeared (Germany in the 1930s, the Soviet Union in
the late 1940s and early 1950s), the government re-created that
capability, incorporating a few changes based on past experience.39
By the time of the Cold War, the British had learned to keep the
overt and covert parts of their information efforts separate but to
try to coordinate them through interministerial committees. They
had also, as represented by the lectures of Lockhart and Crossman,
come to understand the dangers to democratic government inherent
in psychological operations. One might characterize the British
approach as adaptive rather than innovative, but the cumulative
result was an institutional and doctrinal arrangement that allowed
the British to use political warfare for the purposes and within the
limits of democratic government.

Counterinsurgency.

When we look at the development of what the British came to call

counterinsurgencywhat the French called revolutionary warfare
we see a process and result similar to those occurring with political
warfare.40 The British had been contending with border and internal
security problems in their empire for generations by the time World
War II began. Indeed, the British continued to deal with them during
the war. What the British had learned through these efforts was

26
compiled in such books as Colonel C. E. Callwells Small Wars: Their
Principles and Practice and Charles Gwynns Imperial Policing. These
books and a host of articles in military journals described operations
against bandits or rebels who were operating as more or less self-
contained armed bands. Thus, in general, these books and articles
emphasized military operations and not any larger political context.
In imperial policing, political warfare was not very important. The
tone is captured in Callwells remark that:

the most satisfactory way of bringing such foes to reason is by the rifle
and the sword, for they understand this mode of warfare and respect it.
Sometimes, however, the circumstances do not admit of it, and then their
villages must be demolished and their crops and granaries destroyed;
still it is unfortunate when this is the case.41

Not every author had quite Callwells starkly candid tone, but in
addressing their imperial policing duties, the British tended to put
the emphasis on effective military campaigning.
The British took this approach despite their experience in Ireland
in 191921. There they had encountered something more than just
self-contained armed bands. What they had fought in Ireland was
an armed political movement, in which the armed force relied on the
Irish people for support and intelligence and, in turn, helped form,
sometimes coercively, the peoples political views and motivation.
In essence, this was the phenomenon that the French would come to
call revolutionary warfare. Against the Irish, the British finally did
develop a political warfare or propaganda campaign. In the interwar
period, the colonial conflicts the British engaged in were more like
small wars or antibandit campaigns than political or revolutionary
warfare.
Some officers noted that changes were occurringthe rise
of the masses, and therefore the development of mass politics,
communication, and propaganda with their effects on world
opinionthat would require a different response from the British. For
example, when discussing the use of propaganda in guerrilla war in
1927, one officer argued that modern methods of communication
and what he described as the increased civilization of the Great
Powers meant that the Great Powers could not respond to colonial
insurrections with the ferocity they had used in the past. If they did so,

27
guerrillas would use the new communication technology to exploit
the more humane sentiment in the cities and the larger world to the
disadvantage of those powers. So potent was this new combination
of communication technology and sentiment, the officer argued, that
it might even topple the metropolitan government. This gave the
guerrillas a new and significant advantage over the Great Powers.
The guerrillas gained another advantage by the invention of
powerful weapons (automatic weapons and high explosives) that
could be concealed easily on a person or in a city and therefore were
well-suited to implement the first principle of guerrilla warrapid
concentration and dispersion.42 Despite these new developments, by
and large, it was not until after World War II that the British, like the
French, consistently faced armed political warfare in their overseas
territories.
As Timothy Llewellyn Jones has shown in painstaking detail,43
the British responded to this postwar conflict by drawing on their
accumulated experience, modifying their practice in response to
what they learned in each of their postwar counterinsurgency
campaigns. What gradually emerged was the recognition that the
postwar conflicts in the colonies were different from the rebellions or
banditry of the past. The difference was that, inspired by nationalism
and organized politically, the native populations of the colonies
had changed from largely inert observers of British operations
against rebels and bandits into decisive participants in the struggle.
Recognition of this change did not come to the British at once. Nor
did it seize the military or the government as a whole at any time
until rather late in the process, if then. It dawned in a piecemeal
and halting fashion. As the British worked themselves through
a succession of campaigns, they came to see that force alone was
no longer sufficient to deal with colonial conflict. They had to pay
attention to the allegiance of the people. Psychological and political
dimensions of the struggle were decisive.
The history of British colonial warfare and counterinsurgency is
the story of how the British adapted to these changes. The learning
process was halted temporarily by World War II, but picked up its
pace after the war ended. Some officers, like Field Marshall Bernard
Montgomery, who for a few of the immediate postwar years was
Chief of the Imperial General staff, remained attached to traditional

28
methods. When an officer who became an early convert to the
new counterinsurgency methods explained the approach to him,
Montgomery replied testily, I cannot follow such reasoning.44 Yet
others, more and more as time passed, could. Hence, almost without
knowing it, the British developed a successful approach to respond to
insurgency. This included the key provisions of integrating civilian
and military efforts; paying attention to information, public opinion,
and propaganda or psychological operations; and limiting the use of
force.
In the case of both political warfare and counterinsurgency, no
British theorist emerged declaring a revolution in warfare that would
have challenged long-held views of the proper role of the British
military or its relation to civil authority, as happened in France.
On the contrary, both Crossman and Lockhart warned against
such thinking. In the case of both counterinsurgency and political
warfare, the British responded to changing external threats and
enduring domestic constraints and then adapted their organizations
and doctrine. The British Army was able to do this, in large measure,
because it became a professional organization at the height of the
British Empire when imperial duties required adaptation, and
the geopolitical situation forced the Army to respond to a variety
of circumstances and conflicts rather than focus on conventional
warfare in Europe. Adaptability became part of the British militarys
understanding of itself as a professional organization.
This professional ethos developed with and through the
intervention of civilians in military affairs and the involvement of the
military in politics. Again, this explains, at least in part, the ability of
the British to deal with forms of conflict like insurgency that have a
decisive political component.45 As a practical matter, the adaptability
of the British Army was in keeping with a somewhat self-deprecating,
improvisational British national style, jauntily epitomized by
Crossman in his remarks on political warfare. Describing how
British efforts in this new method of warfare had changed in keeping
with the phases of any normal British campaign, he said that the
British nearly always start by being defeated and nearly always
end by occupying the enemys country. Although almost willfully
denying that they were doing anything new, and most certainly not
revolutionary, the British were, in fact, over time devising enduring

29
innovative responses to new kinds of warfare. A comparison of the
French and British experiences suggests that innovation to meet
unconventional threats is more likely to occur and take hold in a
military that is less connected to proclamations of revolutionary
change that threaten the militarys self-understanding.

THE AMERICANS

Psychological Operations and Insurgency.

The American experience with psychological operations was

more like the British experience than that of the French. The United
States used psychological warfare techniques during World War I
but demobilized this capability when the war ended; resurrected
it during World War II but demobilized it again; and then quickly
had to reconstitute it as the Cold War developed. The American
experience also was like that of the British in that the need for
psychological warfare was not seen as a response to a revolution in
warfare. Initially, its proponents represented psychological warfare
as a potentially useful adjunct to conventional arms. After World War
II, as the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union developed,
some came to see psychological or political warfare as a decisively
important component of our national security strategy. More so than
the British, however, from the moment psychological operations first
appeared, the American military as an institution remained largely
opposed or indifferent to them, and later to counterinsurgency,
even though civilian officials and some in the military argued that
insurgency was a new kind of warfare that required a transformation
of the way the military fought.
To get a sense of typical U.S. military attitudes toward psycho-
logical and unconventional warfare, and how deep-seated they are,
we begin with some of the pre-Cold War military experience with
these techniques, and then focus on the early Cold War years.

Psychological Warfare in the World Wars.

American experience with psychological warfare or, more

broadly, with the use of information to serve national interests,

30
dates from World War I. President Woodrow Wilson established the
Committee on Public Information 1 week after the declaration of war
on Germany. Headed by a civilian, a former journalist, the committee
included the Secretaries of State and War and the Navy Department.
The purpose of the committee, never fully realized, was to coordinate
the work of all federal agencies in the effort to build support for the
war and American war aims at home and abroad, and to undermine
support for the war within Germany itself. The military component
of Americas information or propaganda effort grew from the work
of the Committee. Heber Blankenhorn, a journalist and pacifist who
worked on the Committee, came to believe that combat or tactical
propaganda could play an important role in the war effort. In
particular, he believed that President Wilsons words promising self-
determination, democracy, and justice might be used to undermine
the morale of enemy soldiers, inducing them to surrender. He tried
to get the Committee to produce such combat propaganda, but the
Director of the Committee told Blankenhorn that such efforts were
the responsibility of the military.
Consequently, Blankenhorn approached a friend in the Army
for help and eventually came into contact with the Chief of the
Foreign Intelligence Branch in the Military Intelligence Service,
Major Charles Mason. As Mason and Blankenhorn talked during
January 1918, conversations that ultimately included the Chief of
Military Intelligence, Blankenhorn succeeded in persuading the
officers that the military should set up a propaganda section. When
the intelligence service was reorganized as the Military Intelligence
Branch in February 1918, it included the Psychological Subsection.
Blankenhorn, directly commissioned as a captain, was placed in
charge.46
Blankenhorn and members of his unit arrived in France in
July 1918, having been told by the Secretary of War, who strongly
supported psychological warfare, that they were to work only for
the Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, General
John Black Jack Pershing, and not for the Committee on Public
Information. From July to the Armistice in November, Blankenhorn
and his staff, working as part of the Expeditionary Force intelligence
or G-2 staff, prepared millions of leaflets that were dropped by

31
airplane or balloon on German lines. The official history of the
Expeditionary Force claimed that 75 percent of enlisted prisoners of
war had believed Allied leaflets, particularly the American variety,
and offered anecdotal evidence that the leafleting did produce
surrenders, as Blankenhorn had thought it would.47
Immediately following the Armistice, the Army disbanded its
psychological and propaganda offices. Some of the practitioners
from these offices were transferred to the Political Section of the
Military Intelligence Bureau, but even this section was cut from
the staff in 1925. The demise of psychological warfare occurred
amidst a general demobilization, of course, but the rapidity with
which the psychological warfare apparatus disappeared suggests a
lack of appreciation for its contribution to the war effort. This lack
of appreciation was evident even during the war. Blankenhorn,
for example, had trouble getting airplanes to drop his leaflets and
gas for the balloons to carry them. Propaganda and psychological
warfare remained a matter of minor importance to the Army and
the Expeditionary Force. The Army Air Service generally thought of
leaflet-dropping as a low priority. For example, then Colonel Billy
Mitchell, ordinarily regarded as a visionary, told Blankenhorn that
propaganda had no place in combat operations. Ironically, given
Mitchells own subsequent encounters with the Armys judicial
system, he even threatened to court-martial Blankenhorn if he
continued to try to get pilots to carry the leaflets. Mitchell was not
alone in his attitude toward psychological operations. One student
of Blankenhorns efforts argues that the Armys first psychological
warrior succeeded despite the general indifference toward
unconventional warfare displayed by combat soldiers and their
hesitancy, if not outright refusal, to consider its use in support of
operations.48
The neglect of psychological warfare continued throughout the
interwar years. By the time the United States entered World War II,
only one active duty officer, Charles Mason, Blankenhorns original
collaborator and now a lieutenant colonel, had any experience in
psychological warfare. His initial efforts in 1940 and 1941 to do
some planning for psychological warfare met, in his own judgment,
with indifference in the War Department. Blankenhorn himself,

32
recalled to active duty at Masons request, found that the Army
was reinventing the psychological warfare wheel and that he had
to fight the same battles all over again, this time with an Army that
was, in his opinion, even less willing to accept the potential utility of
psychological activities than it had been during World War I.49
More serious efforts to develop a psychological warfare capability
began in 1941 thanks to the efforts of Assistant Secretary of War
John McCloy. Impressed by what he thought the Germans had
accomplished with propaganda in the opening years of World War
IIanother example of how conventions are establishedhe pressed
the Army to create an office that could plan for psychological warfare.
This office, established in June 1941 with great secrecy (Mason was
not informed of its existence), and its variously named successors,
provided analysis of enemy propaganda and liaison with civilian
offices involved in the information or propaganda effort. The Army
also established its first tactical radio teams about this time (although
they did not deploy until later in the war), and produced a training
manual for combat propaganda and other publications, including a
lessons-learned report that was intended for the combat theaters.50
German activities in Europe and Latin America increased
interest in propaganda and public morale among officials and others
outside the War and Navy Departments. Long concerned over both
the intelligence he was receiving and the state of public morale,
President Roosevelt appointed William Donovan as the Coordinator
of Information in July 1941. In 1942, Donovans office was divided,
in effect, into two components, the Office of War Information,
responsible for both domestic and foreign information efforts
(except for those in Latin America, which a separate committee
handled), and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), under the Joint
Staff, responsible for sabotage, subversion, guerrilla warfare, and,
eventually, covert propaganda aimed at foreign audiences.51 The
Army transferred its responsibility for psychological warfare to OSS
in late 1942 and shut down its psychological warfare office. This move
had the effect of decentralizing control of psychological warfare since
OSS had no authority over theater commanders, who were now in
effect operating without control from Washington. A year passed
before the military opened a central office. It did so because C. D.

33
Jackson, a civilian from the Office of War Information, who was then
working as a deputy to the military commander of the Psychological
Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary
Force, presented papers to Assistant Secretary McCloy arguing for
the central office. These papers and a series of military assessments
of psychological warfare, which acknowledged its utility, led to
the reestablishment of an Army psychological warfare office in
late 1943. This office remained in existence throughout the war, its
principal function being the coordination of military psychological
warfare activities and liaison with the civilian agencies involved
in psychological warfare efforts. Operations remained under the
control of theater commanders, with varying degrees of success.52
The greatest problem psychological warfare faced during the war
was the mixed reception it received from the conventional military.
Some commanders valued it and wanted it used in their area of
operations (e.g., Dwight Eisenhower); most did not. Admiral Chester
Nimitz banned it. Negative views of psychological warfare reflected
attitudes deeply bred into the military. Like the highly decorated
French officer noted earlier, who was insulted to find himself
assigned to a psychological operations job, one veteran colonel on
Eisenhowers staff who prided himself on being a tough cavalryman,
was horrified, he reported, when Eisenhower asked him to take over
command of the theaters psychological operations. Another officer
assigned to a psychological warfare unit reported that commanders
saw the unit as a nuisance, while enlisted personnel considered it
a joke. A high-ranking officer reportedly remarked that the Army
exists for the purpose of killing our enemies, not for persuading or
arguing them out of the war. Even the commander of Eisenhowers
psychological warfare effort wanted to command combat troops.
After getting the chance during a leaflet run to fire the guns on a
B-17, he remarked that doing so made him feel like a soldier
again. Sometimes when psychological warfare demonstrated its
effectiveness, it mitigated such ingrained attitudes somewhat, but
the attitudes were a persistent characteristic of the American military
outlook.53
Despite the prejudice against psychological warfare, it
undoubtedly contributed to the Allied victory in World War II and
consequently earned some support within both military and civilian

34
agencies of the government. One of the first analysts of Americas
psychological warfare efforts, who had access to the relevant officials
and documentary evidence, concluded that there was significant
support for psychological warfare across the government, if not in
the military itself, by the end of the war. This support, however,
tended to manifest itself in resourcing public relations or information
offices. For example, in the summer of 1945, both the State and War
Departments informed Congress that funding for the Office of War
Information should continue (State was particularly concerned
to keep the Voice of America going). Generals Eisenhower and
Marshall told Congress that the U.S. occupation forces in Germany
and Japan would have to provide motion pictures, radio, news,
and magazines to the Germans and Japanese. The War Department
maintained a public information office. Support for propaganda or
tactical psychological operations tended to be more circumscribed,
although some who supported these activities were influential. At the
conclusion of the war, Eisenhower offered a positive assessment of
psychological warfare, remarking that without doubt, psychological
warfare had proved its right to a place of dignity in our military
arsenal.54

Psychological Operations in the Cold War.

The support enjoyed by psychological operations and information

campaigns was not enough to prevent their disappearance shortly
after the war. President Harry Truman authorized closing the Office
of War Information as soon as the war ended in August 1945. He
shut down the Office of Strategic Services in September of that year,
parceling out its functions to the State Department, which got research,
and the War Department, which got the covert capability. When the
war ended, Congress forbade government information campaigns
in the United States and cut the funding for information activities
and cultural affairs overseas by 50 percent between 1946 and 1948.55
These actions reflected a general dislike of propaganda, the inability
of the proponents of psychological operations to demonstrate in a
compelling way its contribution to victory, and the focus among
those involved in defense matters on reorganizing and streamlining
the military once the war ended. Finally, even if the government

35
and the military had been more favorably disposed to psychological
operations, many of those who had fought the psychological war
would not have stayed around. They were journalists, artists, and
advertising men who had done their duty and wanted to return as
soon as they could to their peacetime pursuits.56 The result was that,
within a year or two of the wars end, hardly anything was left of
the American wartime information management and psychological
warfare capability.
What did survive demobilization were agency press offices
and other activities such as Armed Forces Radio and the Voice
of America that provided information to the American public or
American servicemen and selected foreign audiences. It was these
activities that so impressed the French. The military also kept alive
in a much diminished form its combat propaganda capability. It
used this capability overseas to deal with civilian populations in
Germany, Austria, Korea, and Japan, printing and distributing
newspapers and magazines and running radio stations and movie
houses. In the United States, the Army formed an experimental
Tactical Information Detachment, performed some studies of
psychological warfare, and did some planning for its use in a future
war. This planning began in 1946 after an Assistant Secretary of the
Navy suggested it was necessary. An interdepartmental committee
the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), which
became the State, Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating Committee
(SANACC) after the establishment of the Air Forceconducted the
planning. As it did so, Americas psychological warfare capability
continued to decline. In 1947, a memorandum to the Under Secretary
of State from the SANACC reported that the Department of State
and the Military Establishment have no funds appropriated for
psychological warfare purposes and that no psychological warfare
specialist reserves exist within the Military Establishment or the
Department of State.57
As Americas psychological warfare capability withered, events
overseas were suggesting that such a capability might be necessary
even in peacetime. By 1947, communists had taken over Poland,
Hungary, and Rumania and were attempting to take over Greece,
while continuing to apply pressure on the government of Turkey. In

36
response, President Truman announced in March 1947, in what came
to be called the Truman Doctrine, that the United States would supply
military aid to countries under attack from communist rebellions.
Other problems had emerged in Europe. The economic and political
situation in France and Italy, both with large communist parties,
looked bleak. Fears mounted that the communists might win elections
in 1948 (communists already were in the cabinets of both countries;
in France, the Minister of Defense was a communist). In response
to this threat, Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced a
program of economic aid for Europe in October 1947, a program that
came to be known as the Marshall Plan. As the U.S. Government
developed and announced these responses, it and its Western allies
met with the Soviets in a series of conferences in Moscow to discuss
peace treaties with Germany and Austria.
By the end of 1947, these conferences had produced nothing but
a deterioration in relations between the Soviets and the Western
powers. In September, the Soviets established the Communist
Information Bureau (COMINFORM), which included communist
parties in both eastern and western Europe, launching it with a
speech by the Leningrad party boss in which he said, The cardinal
purpose of the imperialist camp is to strengthen imperialism, to hatch
a new imperialist war, to combat socialism and democracy, and to
support reactionary and anti-democratic pro-fascist regimes and
movements everywhere.58 Events outside of Europe, for example,
in the Philippines, where a communist insurgency was underway,
also caused concern in the U.S. Government.
This rising external threat prompted a response. Some weeks
after the COMINFORM meeting, the Army representative to the
SANACC sent a memorandum to committee members approving
the committees plans for psychological operations during wartime.
The representative argued in addition, however, that the events
of the recent past suggested the need to consider as a matter of
urgency [the] desirability or necessity [of] deliberate coordinated
psychological warfare in peacetime. The Director of Central
Intelligence seconded this proposition a few days later in his own
memorandum to the SANACC. A few days after that, the Secretary
of the National Security Council forwarded to Secretary of Defense

37
James Forrestal a very persuasive and accurate appraisal of the
need for psychological warfare operations to counter Soviet-inspired
Communist propaganda, particularly in France and Italy. This
memorandum was from Secretary of Commerce Averell Harriman,
who from 1943 to 1946 had been Ambassador to the Soviet Union and
then to Great Britain. While transmitting Harrimans memorandum,
the NSC Secretary took the opportunity to suggest some basic
organizational principles to improve the U.S. Governments
psychological warfare capability: strengthen the State Departments
overt information activities; give the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) responsibility for covert activities, since it already has contacts
and communications with appropriate organizations and agents in
foreign countries; and appoint an interdepartmental board, chaired
by the Department of State representative, with the military and CIA
as members, to set policies for overt and covert information activities
and to coordinate everything that the government does.59
This sequence of memos in late 1947 set in motion the process
that restored psychological warfare or, more accurately, elevated it to
importance as a component of Americas peacetime foreign policy. A
consensus had formed that the present world situation requires that
the U.S. immediately . . . develop and utilize strong and concerted
measures designed to produce psychological situations and effects
favorable to the attainment of U.S. National objectives and that
these measures be both white and black, i.e., overt and covert.60
In an interview in 1971, Harriman highlighted the perspective within
which this consensus formed. In addition to his official positions,
Harriman had a wide network of influential friends with whom he
discussed foreign and domestic politics. According to Harriman,

It was very clear [in the immediate post-war period] that the whole
of Europe would be weakened, and that communismwithout [U.S.
help]would take over. Im sure that was one of the reasons why Joseph
Stalin broke his agreements, because the situation looked too good in
Western Europe for a Communist takeover. I think Stalin was convinced
he could move into Western Europe. He was undoubtedly told by leaders
in the Communist Parties in Italy and France that their organizations
were very strong; that with some help they would be able to take over
Italy and France.61

38
The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were two responses to
the Soviet threat to Western Europe and by extension to the United
States. Overt and covert psychological operations in peacetime, a
significant departure from past practice, was another.
The perception of the external threat was critical in establishing
the consensus in favor of psychological warfare in peacetime, but
the external threat was not the only concern at the time among
decisionmakers, nor was it decisive. Marshall, for example, was not
part of the consensus in favor of psychological warfare. The Director
of Central Intelligence told his staff on November 18, 1947, that
Marshall does not like the term PW and does not seem to favor
the idea of psychological warfare at this time.62 In his oral history
interview, Harriman said that Marshall was one of the last senior
leaders of the government to recognize the threat posed by the Soviet
Union. Following the failed Moscow conference in 1947, however,
Marshall came to recognize the threat. Yet, he opposed psychological
warfare. His opposition, or at least the State Departments, appears
to have derived from sentiments similar to those then present in
the military establishment. Psychological operations, especially
covert psychological operations, should they come to light, were
incompatible with diplomacy and therefore potentially damaging to
the Departments efforts.
The NSC staff made psychological operations more palatable
to the State Department by dividing the governments information
activities in two parts, calling the overt component that accompanied
U.S. foreign policy foreign information activities and referring to
the covert component as psychological operations. Consequently,
National Security Council Document 4 (NSC 4), Report by the
National Security Council on Coordination of Foreign Information
Measures (December 17, 1947), put the Secretary of State in charge
of providing policy for and coordinating Americas overseas
information efforts.
NSC 4-A gave the CIA authority to carry out covert psychological
operations abroad. The CIA ultimately defined these operations as
all measures of information and persuasion short of physical in
which the originating role of the U.S. Government will always be
kept concealed. NSC 4-A granted this authority to the CIA subject
to the approval of a panel designated by the National Security

39
Council, which would include representatives from State, the Joint
Staff, and the military services. This approval process was to make
sure that the CIA carried out covert psychological operations in a
manner consistent with U.S. foreign policy, overt foreign information
activities, and diplomatic and military operations and intentions
abroad. 63
The United States used its new peacetime psychological warfare
capability in the months leading up to the Italian elections in April
1948. Those who knew of these operations judged them a success,
with the Christian Democrats victorious, receiving 48 percent of the
vote. This result contrasted sharply with events in Czechoslovakia,
where the communists had complete control of the government
by March 1948. George Kennan, the Director of the Department of
States Policy Planning Staff, was particularly impressed with what
psychological operations had accomplished. He became a powerful
voice inside the government for continuing and increasing what
he termed political warfare. Whereas in December 1947, he had
argued that State would wish to consider most carefully the need
for each psychological or covert operation before giving its consent,
in the Spring of 1948, 1 month after the Italian election, he wrote a
memorandum arguing in favor of establishing an organized political
warfare capability so that in the future the U.S. Government would
not have to scramble into impromptu covert operations. In January
1949, he argued that the CIA was not doing enough and told Frank
Wisner, who was running covert operations, that every day makes
more evident the importance of the role which will have to be played
by covert operations if our national interests are to be adequately
protected.
As he was arguing for the necessity of covert operations, Kennan
was concerned about how they were organized. He argued, echoing
the arguments that the British had engaged in a decade before,
that State should have the lead in both overt and covert operations
because they were political activities and State was in charge of all
political activities overseas. Like others in the State Department,
however, he believed that covert activities, if known, would
undermine or compromise States diplomatic efforts. He argued,
therefore, that State should have authority over the operations but
take no responsibility for them. The CIA argued that it should have

40
authority over all covert activities, although it acknowledged that it
should take policy guidance from State and the military. The agencies
involved continued to argue over these organizational issues into
the early 1950s.64

The Military and Psychological Warfare.

As the psychological warfare apparatus took shape in the U.S.

Government, the military was at best a reluctant and hesitant
participant. As the SANACCs planning effort for wartime
psychological operations took place, the question of the Armys role
in psychological warfare was broached with the appointment of
retired World War II General Kenneth C. Royall as the Secretary of
the Army in 1947. Royall was skeptical of psychological operations,
as were a number of high-ranking officers and DoD civilians. Like
other service Secretaries, Royall argued that the military should
not be involved with psychological warfare, especially during
peacetime, because it would involve the military in political matters
outside its purview and competence. Royal and the other Secretaries
also argued that the questionable morality of psychological warfare
would adversely affect the image of the military if its participation in
this activity became known.65
Two of Royalls deputies disagreed with him, however, and
worked with like-minded officers, including Lieutenant General A. C.
Wedemeyer, the Director of the Office of Plans and Operations, where
the responsibility for psychological warfare then resided, to give the
Army a psychological warfare capability. Wedemeyers interest in
this capability derived from his view that the conventional American
approach to warfare was flawed. In his memoirs, published in 1958,
Wedemeyer argued against slaughtering the enemy, which he called
the standard American and British approach, as the only way to
fight a war. Failing to use political, economic, and psychological
means in coordination with military operations had prolonged
World War II, he contended, and increased Allied casualties. One of
Royalls deputies who worked with Wedemeyer was another World
War II Army general, William H. Draper, whose responsibilities had
included the occupied areas, where Army psychological operations

41
were continuing. The other official was Gordon Gray, who had only
limited experience in the Army during the war. In an effort to change
Royalls mind and preserve the Armys psychological warfare
capability, Draper commissioned a study by a civilian consultant
that described what the Army was already doing in psychological
warfare. Apparently it helped persuade Royall that the Army should
have some capability in this area, for he agreed in 1949, toward the
end of his tenure, that the Army should establish a psychological
warfare branch. Royall stipulated, however, that a civilian within
the War Department should have ultimate responsibility for this
activity. Wedemeyer was not happy with this arrangement, fearing
that it would compromise the military chain of command, but he
accepted it and psychological warfare found a precarious place in
the Army.66
The situation was not much better in the other services. In 1949,
only the Air Force had an office devoted to psychological warfare,
which was supposed to develop plans and policies and consider
logistical requirements. The Navy was in no better shape than the
Army. Both services apparently felt that psychological warfare,
as a peacetime concern, was not sufficiently important to require
continuous detailed staff consideration. The Joint Staff did establish
a component to meet the support requirements that it felt would
follow from the establishment of a covert capability in the CIA, but it
otherwise dealt with psychological warfare issues by creating ad hoc
groups, which meant that knowledge of the issues was ephemeral.
Members of the Joint Strategic Plans Group (JSPG) expressed concern
about this state of affairs, feeling that the Joint Staffs interests had
not been represented adequately in the interagency discussions that
led to a peacetime psychological warfare capability.
Part of the problem, according to the JSPG, was a fundamental
difference in orientation between State and Defense. Defense believed
in long-range planning, which State did not do because it felt that
political contingencies were so variable and intangible that long-
range political plans were impracticable, if not impossible. This
difference led to frustration and misunderstanding that no amount
of staff structure would have overcome. But many of the Joint Staffs
responsibilities could have been handled more effectively with more

42
staff. Proposals to augment staff to meet the full range of requirements
associated with psychological warfare ran into objections from the
services, however. In the words of the historian of the Psychological
Strategy Board, A year of wrangling passed before the Joint Chiefs
approved an organizational design.67
The difficult birth of a peacetime military psychological warfare
capability is most apparent, however, in the Army, where the greatest
responsibility lay. When Secretary of Army Royall consented to
the Army having a psychological warfare capability in 1949, this
did not lead immediately to tangible results. Royalls successor as
Secretary of the Army was Gordon Gray, one of the subordinates
who had worked to change Royalls views about psychological
warfare. Now in a position to support this capability, Gray exerted
pressure on the Army staff, as did Grays successor, Frank Pace. Yet,
in the summer of 1950, 15 months after Royall had first authorized a
psychological warfare branch, the Army was still trying to identify
the personnel spaces to fill it. The Army had no schooling underway
in psychological warfare and only a handful of people qualified to
conduct it. Paces insistence that the Army staff get moving, along
with the outbreak of the Korean War, finally led the Army to create
in January 1951 the office that Royall had authorized originally. It
was no longer a branch but a special staff office, the Office of the
Chief of Psychological Warfare.68
The creation of the psychological warfare office did not
resolve the Armys difficult relationship with this unconventional
capability. In his meetings with the Chief of Staff, Secretary Pace
continued to insist on the importance of psychological operations,
calling them the cheapest form of warfare. He inquired directly
of General Matthew Ridgway in Korea about his ability to conduct
such operations. Meanwhile, General Robert McClure, in charge
of psychological warfare, warned his staff at their first meeting
of the prejudice existing in the Army against their activity. It was
not seen as the work of a true soldier. Because of this prejudice,
career-conscious officers were reluctant to become involved with
psychological warfare. During the war in Korea, McClure repeatedly
complained, as Blankenhorn had during Word War I, that the Air
Force was not making sufficient aircraft available for leaflet drops

43
and had to deal with Army officers who did not see the value of
psychological warfare. His efforts to assist the Far Eastern Command
in establishing its psychological warfare office were blocked by the
Army Staffs operations office. Some of these difficulties were the
result of personality clashes and the aggressiveness with which the
new Psychological Warfare office pursued its responsibilities, but
perhaps the major factor . . . was the belief of many staff officers
that the relatively new fields of psychological and unconventional
warfare were incidental activities that demanded an unjustified share
of attention and resources in terms of their real value to the Army.
Yet, despite all of these obstacles, by the early 1950s, the Army and the
military in general had established the peacetime offices devoted to
psychological operations that remain to this day permanent features
of military organization and operations. In establishing these offices,
the military paralleled innovations in civilian agencies that, taken
together, gave the U.S. Government an unprecedented ability to
wage psychological warfare in peacetime.69
Psychological operations received a place in the military
establishment principally because of the efforts of civilians
(Blankenhorn, McCLoy, Pace, Gray, Jackson) and of soldiers
like Eisenhower and Wedemeyer, who had the reputations of
being political generals. The role of these operations was one, not
surprisingly, that fit well with conventional military operations.
The military wanted nothing to do with covert operations or with
psychological operations understood as independent strategic
activities, such as those employed in Europe after World War II. It
was not so much the rising Soviet geopolitical threat that caused the
Army to accept psychological operations as their possible utility in
the Korean War in support of conventional operations.
The U.S. military was less enthusiastic than other elements of
the U.S. Government about psychological operations because these
operations did not fit its understanding of what military operations
should be. Soldiers achieve victory by engaging the enemy, not
by talking him to death, as we have seen one U.S. officer put it.
Psychological operations were much more acceptable, therefore,
when they supported engaging the enemy. Even then, not all military
officers and civilian officials would accept them. These attitudes were

44
sensible as long as the enemy adhered to conventions about what
militaries should do. When they ceased such adherence, however,
these conventions became a vulnerability. This is what happened
when the United States confronted an insurgency in Vietnam.

Counterinsurgency in Vietnam.

To understand the American approach to counterinsurgency, we

may consider two events centered on a hotel in Vietnam in 1964. Early
that year, an Army study team gathered at the Brinks Hotel in Saigon,
where U.S. officers were billeted, to devise a table of organization and
equipment for a Vietnamese infantry company. U.S. forces were not
deployed yet in South Vietnam, but the standard U.S. Army company
was the model that the U.S. advisory and assistance effort was using
to build South Vietnams Army. These Army companies, however,
were originally structured to fight in Germany. Recognizing that
the South Vietnamese were not faring well against the Vietcong, the
Army analyzed the problem. It carried out extensive research in the
field, asking operations research and systems analysis questions,
and concluded that the war at that point was one of small fleeting
engagements. As a result, the infantry company the study team
devised was self-contained and more able than a standard U.S. Army
company to operate independently of a battalion structure. As such,
it was better suited than the U.S. Armys typical company to the
small-unit war of scattered engagements then taking place in South
Vietnam. According to one of the officers involved in the study, most
of its recommendations eventually were adopted.70
Some months after the study team finished its work, two Vietcong
detonated a car bomb in the parking area underneath the hotel
where the team had worked. The explosion killed 2 Americans and
injured 58. The Vietcong had conducted surveillance of the hotel,
noting that South Vietnamese officers met Americans there. Buying
South Vietnamese uniforms on the black market, the two Vietcong
impersonated a South Vietnamese officer and his chauffeur looking
for an American colleague. When told by staff that the American was
no longer at the hotel, the officer insisted he was. He announced
that he would drive himself home in his own car, leaving his
chauffeur behind to wait for the American. Having been informed

45
by a Vietcong agent in the South Vietnamese government that the
American had left the country, the South Vietnamese officer knew
the American would not arrive and spoil his plan. The chauffeur
was directed to wait in his car in the parking area under the hotel.
The chauffeur parked the car and then informed a guard that he was
going to get something to eat but would be right back. He watched
the car explode from a nearby cafe.71
The meeting and the bombing at the Brinks Hotel suggest an
important fact about the war in Vietnam that deserves attention
from those interested in military innovation: contrary to the
impression sometimes given, the U.S. Army did learn and innovate
in Vietnam. It reorganized itself, deployed new technology, took on
new tasks, and devised new tactics. The Army deployed a new air-
mobile division to Vietnam and developed and refined air-mobile
tactics with helicopters, an innovation that combined new tactics
by a new organization using new technology, the epitome of the
type of transformation that the U.S. military today hopes to create
throughout its forces; it deployed night vision sensors; it developed
and deployed communications technology that gave commanders
unprecedented connectivity to echelons of command above and below
and beside them. The result of these innovations was that tactical
operations in South Vietnam often bore little resemblance to those
of the past.72 The Army also undertook activities in South Vietnam
that bore little resemblance to conventional military operations. It
ultimately assigned advisors to each of South Vietnams 236 districts
and participated in a series of efforts to pacify the countryside, a
learning process that culminated in the establishment of the Office of
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development (CORDS) in 1967.
The Army also rewrote its doctrine. The 1962 version of Field Manual
100-5, Operations, the Armys foundational doctrinal publication,
contained a chapter on Military Operations Against Irregular
Forces, absent from earlier editions of the manual. The chapter
provides a sound counterinsurgency doctrine. The Army, then, did
innovate during the War in Vietnam.73
The explosion at the Brinks Hotel, however, is only a small
bit of evidence indicating that these innovations were essentially
irrelevant. They were irrelevant because, like the plan to change the
South Vietnamese Army devised at the Brinks hotel, they were based

46
on a conception of warfare that emphasized engaging and defeating
enemy forces. But at this point in the long conflict, the enemy was
not fighting that kind of war. The enemy was infiltrating government
organizations and civil institutions and carrying out dramatic sneak
attacks, like the bombing of the Brinks Hotel, that were insignificant
for the conventional military balance but important for the political
struggle that was the primary focus of the enemy.
It is important to note that during the long and complex fight in
Vietnam, engaging enemy forces was sometimes, perhaps more often
than not, the most important thing to do. For example, following
the political crisis touched off by the demonstrations of the Buddhist
priests, the Diem assassination, and the increasing effectiveness
of Vietcong and North Vietnamese military activity (196465),
engaging the enemy was not merely a military cultural preference.
It was a necessary response to the enemys activity and the political
situation it created. There was no other way to stop the collapse of
South Vietnam. The Armys operations stabilized the situation and
might have led to victory if the political situation in Vietnam or in
the United States had been more supportive.74 Earlier in the war
(196164), however, the Army had a freer hand in determining how
it should respond to events in Vietnam than it did later. During the
first years of American involvement in Vietnam, the situation was
bad but not desperate. Nor was the enemy operating in large units.
Yet, the Army at that stage pursued or, rather, trained and equipped
the South Vietnamese Army to pursue, the same strategyseek and
engage the enemythat it followed later in the war.
The Armys commitment to its customary way of doing things
is evident in the history of the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups
(CIDG). As part of efforts underway to increase the security of the
South Vietnamese population, an Army officer working for the
CIA came up with the idea of having U.S. forces train and advise
Montagnards, tribal people living in the highlands of Vietnam. The
purpose of the program was to get the Montagnards to stop the
Vietcong from gaining control of their villages and tribal areas. In
the fall of 1961, the Special Forces began training and supporting
what came to be called CIDG. Run by the CIA, the program focused
on village defense, although it included a strike force that the

47
program planners intended to use to protect the programs training
center and to provide additional protection to any villages that the
Vietcong might attack in force. In their support of CIDG, the Special
Forces aimed at the insurgencys social-political center of gravity by
winning the loyalty of the villagers. For example, they conducted
medical assistance in the villages and included in the program
other civil affairs activities, work with the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), and psychological operations.
In a process characteristic of much good innovative practice, the
Special Forces experimented. Its official historian notes that, in the
field, counterinsurgency was practiced and adjusted empirically
with many tactics attempted on a lets-try-it-and-see-what-
happens basis. If something worked, then it became an acceptable
counterinsurgency tactic; if not, it was dropped.75 Working in the
CIA program, supported by the Agencys money and its flexible
and militarily unorthodox supply system, the Special Forces had
control of their resources (people, time, money) and the latitude and
flexibility to develop their counterinsurgency practices. While not
without problems, the program succeeded. After reviewing CIDG
activities in Vietnam in early 1963, the Special Assistant to the Chief of
Staff for Special Warfare Activities reported that the CIDG program
holds the key to the attainment of the ultimate goal of a free, stable,
and secure Vietnam. In no other way does it appear possible to win
support of the tribal groups, strangle Vietcong remote area redoubts,
and provide a reasonable basis for border patrol.76
The Army soon brought the autonomy of the Special Forces in
the CIDG program to an end, however. As the program succeeded
with more villagers joining and the area under control of the South
Vietnamese government increasingthe CIA requested more
Special Forces. As the involvement of the Special Forces grew, it
became more appropriate, at least in the eyes of the John F. Kennedy
administration after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, for the military to run
it. This is what apparently persuaded Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara to have his department take charge of the program, a
decision he reached following an inspection trip to Vietnam in
May 1962.77 This decision accorded with the views of the Armys
leadership. They disliked having U.S. forces involved in operations

48
that did not fit their strategy of seeking the enemy and engaging
him. They also disliked that the CIDG program allowed military
forces to operate outside the control of the regular military command
structure. McNamaras decision to bring the program under military
control took care of these problems. With the end of the CIAs logistic
responsibility for the program, all control passed to the U.S. Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). From that time on, the U.S.
Army assumed complete responsibility for Special Forces activities
in Vietnam.78
Once control of the CIDG program passed to the Army,
operational control of Special Forces detachments was transferred
to conventional military officers, who had little experience in
counterinsurgency. Both the program and the missions of the
Special Forces in Vietnam were reoriented to support the Armys
conventional operations and strategy, leaving population protection
to the South Vietnamese Army. Village defense became less
important, for example, as the CIDG training camps were turned
into bases for offensive strikes against Vietcong. With the Armys
assumption of the South Vietnamese border surveillance and control
mission in 1963, the responsibilities of the Special Forces shifted
further away from pacification and population security operations
to missions viewed by the military hierarchy as more aligned with
conventional Army doctrine. In such operations, CIDG forces were
used as regular troops in activities for which they had not been
intended, and in many cases, for which they had not been trained or
equipped.79 To address this problem, the Army began organizing
the CIDG as a more conventional force. It established a standardized
table of organization and equipment (TO&E) for a CIDG light
guerrilla company in an attempt to standardize indigenous forces
for better pursuit of the Vietcong. This was part of the plan devised
at the Brinks Hotel and symbolically blown up there a few months
later, epitomizing the irrelevance of Army innovation in Vietnam.80
The Army put an end to the CIDG for the same reason that later
in the war it opposed the Marines Combined Action Platoons (CAP),
small numbers of Marines who, rather than chase down and engage
the enemy, stayed in villages and helped villagers protect them-
selves.81 Neither the CIDG nor the CAP fit the Armys conception

49
of warfare. We can gauge how strongly it held to its conception
of warfighting if we recall the efforts made by the Kennedy
administration to change the Army. The new administration
believed, correctly, that the Army was not prepared to conduct
counterinsurgency.82 The administration set out to correct this problem
by exerting pressure on the Army from the highest level. President
Kennedy took a special interest in and pushed the development of
counterinsurgency capabilities immediately after he took office, as
part of his administrations new strategy of developing an array of
responses to the Soviet threat. In a special address to Congress in May
1961, Kennedy discussed the problem of insurgency, as he did when
he addressed the West Point graduating class in 1962. On this latter
occasion, he spoke of the need for a whole new kind of strategy, a
wholly different kind of force, to meet the threat of insurgency.83
Even before Kennedys address to the West Point class, the
administration was calling on DoD to improve its ability to counter
insurgency. For example, National Security Action Memorandum
(NSAM) 2 (February 3, 1961), disseminated shortly after Kennedy took
office, called on the DoD to put more emphasis on counterguerrilla
forces; NSAM 56 (June 28, 1961) called on the Department to
assess future requirements for unconventional warfare; NSAM 110
(October 25, 1961) urged the Department to use the results of the
study requested in NSAM 56 to budget resources for unconventional
conflict, even though the study was not complete, lest another year
pass without improvement in U.S. preparations for unconventional
warfare; NSAM 119 (December 18, 1961) called on the Pentagon
to make use of civic action, i.e., the use of military forces on
projects useful to the populace at all levels, in the struggle against
insurgency.84
The Kennedy administration also took steps to reorganize
the executive branch in an effort to coordinate and integrate its
counterinsurgent activities better and to make sure that the DoD
was part of them. Its principal move in this direction was to set up
in January 1962 the Special Group (Counterinsurgency), a collection
of Cabinet-level officials from relevant agencies, including the DoD.
This reorganization was part of the effort to encourage the DoD
to take counterinsurgency seriously. NSAM-124, which set up the

50
Special Group, stated that the Group was designed to ensure that
subversive insurgency (wars of liberation) was recognized
throughout the government as a major form of politico-military
conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare. In particular,
it stated that the function of the Group was to insure that such
recognition is reflected in the organization, training, equipment, and
doctrine of the U.S. Armed forces.85 In addition to the Special Group,
the Kennedy administration set up other interagency coordinating
groups at lower levels in the government, on which the DoD also
had seats.
More direct pressure was brought to bear on the military. Kennedy
met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss counterinsurgency,
and had a similar meeting with Army commanders, during which
he suggested that promotions would depend on experience in
counterinsurgency. Kennedy backed up this hint by arranging
for Colonel William Yarborough, who was the commander of the
Special Forces headquarters and had worked with the Philippine
Scouts prior to World War II, to be promoted to brigadier general
and then to major general. Kennedy also sent Secretary McNamara
a memorandum informing him that he (Kennedy) was not satisfied
with what the Department and the Army were doing with regard to
guerrilla warfare, and that he wanted military personnel at all ranks
educated in the requirements of counterinsurgency. High-ranking
members of the Administration, including the Deputy National
Security Advisor, carried the administrations message directly
to military personnel by making speeches to military audiences.
Kennedy himself paid a visit to the headquarters of the Special Forces
at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.86
The new administration not only exhorted the Army to develop
the new mission of counterinsurgency and dangled the carrot of
promotion as an incentive, it laid out in detail a comprehensive policy
and strategy for responding to insurgency. NSAM-182 (August
24, 1962), titled United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy,
represented insurgency as the result of communists hijacking the
unrest created by modernization, that is, the profound socioeconomic
changes sweeping the developing world. To prevent the communists
from succeeding, the policy called for a counterinsurgency program

51
combining diplomatic, legal, social, economic, psychological, and
military measures. It listed activities that each agency of the U.S.
Government ought to undertake to support the policy. The first task
listed for the DoD was to develop U.S. military forces trained for
employment in unconventional warfare and counterguerrilla and
other military counterinsurgency operations. There followed 15
other tasks for the Department, including developing equipment,
doctrine, and research and development capabilities to support its
counterinsurgency forces. The policy also instructed the Department
to work with civilian agencies engaged in counterinsurgency and,
in a reference to the Special Forces, to develop language-trained
and area-oriented U.S. forces for possible employment in training, or
providing operational advice or operational support to indigenous
security forces.87
All of this effort by the civilians did cause the Army to make
some changes. As we noted above, it rewrote its basic doctrine to
include counterinsurgency, making the doctrine accord with the
new Overseas Internal Defense Policy. In 1961, it established a
new organization, the Fifth Special Forces Group, whose mission
was counterinsurgency in Vietnam. The Army upgraded the Special
Forces headquarters at Fort Bragg to the status of Special Warfare
Center. It created the Office of the Special Assistant to the Chief of
Staff for Special Warfare Activities in February 1962. The Army staff
developed some innovative counterinsurgency ideas and a program
to increase (again) the numbers of the Special Forces. Also in 1962,
the Army opened a counterinsurgency school in Okinawa, Japan, and
throughout this period expanded the courses on counterinsurgency
taught at Fort Bragg for non-Special Forces Army personnel.88
While these changes were not insignificant, they amounted to rela-
tively little, given the priority and urgency the Kennedy administra-
tion had articulated. Most Army doctrine remained unchanged; other
changes in the Army were superficial. Senior officers disparaged the
administrations emphasis on counterinsurgency.89
Thus, despite significant civilian pressure for the Army to take
counterinsurgency seriously and despite promising potential, the
two alternatives to its search-and-destroy missionsthe CIDG
early in the war, and CAP later onthe Army persisted in its
preferred strategy. It refused to countenance an alternative that, by

52
protecting civilian populations, might have at least complemented
its conventional efforts. Army Chief of Staff General William
Westmoreland explained his opposition to CAP by arguing that he
did not have the troops to put a squad in every village in imitation
of the Marines. Yet, by one estimate, at the high point of the U.S.
commitment, Westmoreland had enough troops to implement a CAP
program and still have some divisions in reserve to handle larger-
scale attacks. Even if we dispute the wisdom of such a diversion of
Army assetsU.S. strategy called for South Vietnamese Regional
and Popular Forces to provide local security (leaving U.S. units
free to counter depredations by enemy mainforce unitsa more
compelling argument against Westmorelands claim that he did
not have enough troops is that such a program did not have to be
implemented everywhere all at once. It could have been done bit
by bit, even as the Army kept searching for and destroying larger
enemy units. The Marines ran their CAPs, by one estimate, with only
2.8 percent of the Marines in Vietnam. Thus Army resistance to the
idea of imitating the Marine program was not only practical, it was
cultural as well. Perhaps it would be better to say that because it
had cultural overtones, it seemed practical. In any case, derogatory
comments made by senior Army officers about the Marines CAP
program, reminiscent of comments made about the Special Forces
in the CIDG program, indicate that not only the effectiveness of the
program, but its operational style was the issue for the Army.90
In extenuation of General Westmoreland and the Army, two
things may be noted. First, alternatives to the strategy of attrition
that Westmoreland followed were not self-evidently war winners.91
Second, contrary to some claims, neither the Marines nor the CIA
were particularly innovative in Vietnam. The CIA simply ran another
paramilitary operation (CIDG), an action very much part of its usual
repertoire. The population protection aspects of the program do not
appear to have been the CIAs contribution but an Army officers,
as previously noted. The Marines did devote more time to the
unconventional business of population security than the Army did
and developed an innovative program (CAP) in Vietnam, but this
resulted from the efforts and leadership of individuals, often junior
officers but including Generals Lewis W. Walt and Victor Krulak. If

53
Walt and the others involved in these efforts had not been in place
when they were, there is no guarantee that the Marines would have
innovated in Vietnam. The Corps as an institution did not accept
counterinsurgency as a mission, despite its long experience with
improvisational operations in its role as a constabulary force prior
to World War II. During the counterinsurgency era, the Corps, like
the Army, remained devoted to its principal mission, in the case of
the Corps, amphibious operations. The Marine general most closely
identified with counterinsurgency, Krulak, was denied promotion
to Commandant, the Corps highest position, in part because of his
association with this unconventional approach to conflict. Because
counterinsurgency was their core mission, we might argue that
not even the Special Forces innovated in Vietnam, at least not in
doctrine, however much their attention to the local populations and
their trial-and-error approach led to innovation or adaptation in
counterinsurgency practice.92
The stout resistance throughout the military to civilian calls for
more attention to counterinsurgency contrasts with the final accept-
ance and continued survival of psychological operations following
World War II. The obvious reason why one innovation failed and
the other succeeded, at least to some extent, is that psychological
operations support conventional operations, whatever else they may
do. In fact, such operations have found a home in the military to the
extent that they support conventional operations. Counterinsurgency,
with its emphasis on protecting populations rather than destroying
the enemy, represented too much of a departure from conventional
warfare. The Kennedy administration believed that insurgency was a
new kind of warfare, a major form of politico-military conflict equal
in importance to conventional warfare. In a sense, the military as an
institution could not be won over to such a concept.
Judgments about innovation in Vietnam and elsewhere need
to be tempered of course by the recognition of their contingent
nature. Innovation is a complex event, transformation even more so.
Outcomes are far from certain. Vietnam illustrates this point. Apart
possibly from the Special Forces, if we are to find innovation in the
military in the counterinsurgency era, we need to look at individuals
like Krulak. Indeed, if the Marine Corps reputation for innovation in
Vietnam properly rests on a few individuals, then one might argue

54
that the Armys reputation for lack of innovation rests on the same
basis. As Lewis Sorley has noted, if President Lyndon Johnson had
chosen one of the other candidates for the job that Westmoreland
eventually got, the Armys operations in Vietnam might have taken
a different direction.93 The three other candidates all developed into
critics of search-and-destroy. One of the three, Creighton Abrams,
succeeded Westmoreland, and tried to make population security a
more important part of the Armys efforts in Vietnam. If Johnson
had chosen one of these three instead of Westmoreland, history
might record that instead of innovating only organizationally,
technologically, and doctrinally, the Army in Vietnam might have
innovated strategically as well, possibly producing a better result.

CONCLUSION

Defeat in Indochina and an ongoing threat in Algeria prompted

the French to innovate in unconventional warfare. Military officers
pushed the innovation; imitation of the Indochinese enemy and
victorious allies guided it; civilians assisted it. Ultimately it failed.
An external threat prompted American civilians to push the
U.S. military to innovate with psychological operations and in
counterinsurgency. The military resisted in both cases. Ultimately,
it accepted psychological operations to the extent that they were in
accord with the conventions of the military profession (e.g., nothing
covert) and supported conventional operations. The military
rejected counterinsurgency. A defeat in Indochina prompted
the U.S. military to focus all the more strongly on conventional
warfare.94 External threats prompted the British, including civilians
and military in almost equal measure, to adapt continually to a
variety of unconventional threats, developing capabilities in both
political warfare and counterinsurgency. This process of adaptation
continues to the present. British peacekeeping following the end
of the Cold War was arguably a further development of the British
approach to counterinsurgency. The British also approached certain
unconventional tasks in the Iraq War of 2003 differently from and
arguably better than the Americans.95 How do we explain these
different responses to unconventional warfare?

55
Limitations to Innovation and Transformation.

Material interests and interservice or intraservice rivalries

do not explain much, if anything. As we noted in discussing the
French case, narrow or self-serving bureaucratic, service, branch,
or individual interests do not explain the support of French officers
for revolutionary warfare. In the case of the United States, material
self-interest also does not appear to be a good explanation for why
the military treats unconventional warfare as unenthusiastically
as it does. The U.S. military and its industrial suppliers and their
supporters in Congress had and have a good deal invested in the
continuation of conventional warfare. The military has consistently
failed to sell unconventional warfare, even to administrations that
were eager buyers. By itself, therefore, material self-interest does not
explain the U.S. militarys support for the kind of warfare it prefers.
If material self-interest were an explanation for military behavior,
the military would have adapted to the demands of unconventional
warfare more readily.
In all the cases we examined, external threats were an important,
if not the most important, motivation for innovation. Such threats
engage the institutional interests and professional concerns of
military officers and those involved with national security. In the
case of unconventional threats, however, military professionalism
explains why certain militaries do not adapt readily. While the
professionalism of the military makes the military attend to external
threats, it also leads the military to see those threats through the lens
of professional conventions. These conventions ultimately channel
thinking and resources into conventional paths, toward M-1 tanks
rather than Army Special Forces, toward carrier air wings rather
than Navy SEALS, and toward F-16s rather than Combat Talons.
Whatever the threat, conventional technology, organization, and
doctrine tend to become the answer.96 Even more so, the fundamental
orientation of the military, which is to engage the enemy directly,
does not change. Four years into the war on terrorism, reports
surfaced that the Pentagon was rethinking its focus on conventional
warfare. A high-ranking civilian official involved in this process
explained what this meant: When weve talked about precision
warfare in the past, its been in terms of hitting a tank or an SUV from

56
15,000 feet in the air with a precision munition. In the future, the talk
about precision gets down to the level of using individuals to go
after individuals.97 Transformation is about putting projectiles into
targets ever more quickly and precisely, whether the target is a tank
or a forehead. Find, fix, finish is the mantra for both conventional
and unconventional warfare. In this view, the focus of the Special
Operations Command on its direct action mission, the direct
application of force to the killing or capturing of terrorists, despite
all the lessons and analysis indicating its limitations, is evidence of
the power of the conventional warfare paradigm. This convention
remains the prevailing view in the DoD. The QDR Report defines the
indirect approach as working by, with, or through other forces. It sees
the difference between conventional and unconventional warfare,
therefore, as one of means. The only example of this approach offered
in the QDR is T. E. Lawrences leadership of irregular forces (Bedouin
tribesmen) against the Turks at Aqaba. In other words, according
to the QDR Report, the indirect approach is getting others to take a
direct approach. In both conventional and unconventional warfare,
closing with and engaging an enemy force remains the objective.98
The one consistency in our historical and contemporary
experience with unconventional warfare is that innovations in this
area will not succeed if they challenge the fundamental sense of
identify and the self-understanding of a military. The U.S. military
innovated continuously in Vietnam to get better at engaging and
killing the enemy, but could not do so to get better at or even to
undertake protecting civilians. The French doctrine of revolutionary
warfare called for a fundamental change in the nature of the French
Army, one that made dealing with and protecting civilians a high,
if not the highest, priority. This effort at innovation failed. The
British Army, on the other hand, developed an adaptive style that
allowed it to accommodate a role in unconventional conflict. Its
experience in the 19th century as it professionalized was principally
in colonial warfare against irregular forces. Both the British and the
French had traditions of imperial policing, but only the British were
able to convert their tradition into a useful method of dealing with
insurgents. One important difference between the French and British
experience was the view, held by many in France, that insurgency or

57
revolutionary warfare was a new kind of warfare that would supplant
conventional warfare as the most applicable response to future
threats to the French nation. This implied of course that the French
Army had to change in a fundamental way and that civil-military
relations had to change as well. These requirements amounted to too
great a transformation in the French Armys understanding of itself
for it to succeed. The British Army did not have to face the challenge
of radical change. It therefore managed to adapt or at least to adapt
better than its American and French colleagues. When it comes to
innovating or transforming, at least for unconventional warfare,
it is the self-understanding of a military that is critical and not, as
various analyses of conventional military innovation argue, whether
civilians intervene, or military mavericks take the lead, or the rivalry
is within or between the Services.
Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the unconventional threat has
assumed a generally accepted importance it did not previously have.
The past experience we have examined suggests, unfortunately, that
the U.S. military will not innovate successfully to meet this threat.
Current experience appears to confirm this. The report of the 9/11
Commission concluded that, confronted with the threat of al-Qaida,
the national security establishment could provide Presidents Bill
Clinton and George Bush only a narrow and unimaginative menu
of options.99 Two years into the war against terrorism, Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, appearing quite doubtful on the matter,
asked his senior advisers whether the Department had changed
enough or could change enough to fight this unconventional threat.
Four years into the war, Rumsfeld reportedly was dissatisfied with the
U.S. Special Operations Commands response to the war.100 Clearly,
change has occurred in response to 9/11, but as the foregoing brief
review suggests, it has come slowly or not at all in many cases.101
Moreover, one might wonder how far-reaching or enduring any
change will prove. The QDR and other DoD documents state that
irregular warfare and stability operations enjoy as high a priority as
combat operations,102 but the Kennedy administration, to no enduring
effect as we have seen, once declared counterinsurgency to be the
equivalent of combat operations. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11,
Secretary Rumsfelds rhetoric was eerily reminiscent of the words
spoken about so-called wars of national liberation by Kennedy at

58
West Point in 1962. At military schools today, counterinsurgency is
a hot topic, much as it was for a few years in the early 1960s.103

Implications for Policy and Strategy.

Past and present experience suggests that the U.S. military will
continue to innovate within its understanding of what warfare is,
and that these innovations will doubtless aggregate into some sort
of transformation of conventional warfare capability, but these
innovations and the transformation they drive will be largely
irrelevant to unconventional conflict. In simple terms, the U.S. mili-
tary will get better and better at putting projectiles into targets,
whether bullets into foreheads or missiles into tanks, but this skill
will not be decisive in unconventional conflict. If this limitation
in the capability of the military to transform itself is permanent, it
would mean that DoD, to answer Secretary Rumsfelds question to
his advisors, will not be able to change enough to prevail in the fight
against jihadism. This suggests, in turn, that DoD should not have
as prominent a role in this fight as it has had so far. If we accept
this conclusion, we face a series of difficult questions. Which agency
or department could replace DoD? If none could, would some sort
of interagency organization work, or should DoD retain the lead
but establish a new DoD organization devoted to unconventional
warfare? If a new interagency organization develops, should DoD
still establish a new organization devoted to unconventional warfare
so that it will be able to make relevant contributions to the interagency
effort?
Before considering such questions, we should examine the
assumption that gives rise to them, i.e., that the current conventions
about warfare that govern DoDs conduct will not change. If this
assumption is wrong, then DoD might alter itself so that it could
better deal with unconventional threats, making a new interagency or
DoD unconventional warfare organization unnecessary. Throughout
the long history of humans warring on each other, the accepted
notion of what warfare is has seen considerable change.104 Might it
not continue to do so? To answer this question in turn, we begin by
briefly considering how the current warfighting convention came to
be.

59
 What we know today as conventional warfare is the result of
centuries of technological, socio-economic, and political change. The
self-understanding of the U.S. military as a professional organization
matured in the latter stages of these developments, mediated by
a specific institutional (presidential) and geostrategic (isolated,
internally focused) setting and also affected by the long-term interplay
of various civilian, military, political, and bureaucratic interests. In
the latter part of the 19th century, the U.S. military, particularly the
Army, became a professional force when it faced no serious external
enemies. Consequently, politicians left the Army alone. It became
the Armys understanding that it should be left alone to perfect the
military art as it understood that art. The hold of this formative period
on the U.S. Army remains powerful. Some present-day cavalry
units wear spurs; the Armys Blue dress uniform resembles a 19th-
century cavalry officers. When President George W. Bush spoke
at the Citadel shortly after the U.S. military had swept the Taliban
from power, the remark that received the biggest ovation from the
cadets was his description of U.S. military forces as having led the
first cavalry charge of the 21st century.105
As the United States came to need a larger Army in the 20th
century, the countrys presidential system and its doctrine of the
separation of powers helped protect the Army and the other services
from civilian intervention. Whether or not Congress was in the
hands of a party different from the Presidents, representatives and
senators had motives to oppose the Presidents military initiatives.
For example, the level of military spending in a congressional district
or state matters to a representative or senator regardless of who is in
the White House. The military serves two masters, with each having
different, often competing interests. This weakens the control of either
master, helping insulate the military from outside influence. It allows
the services to define themselves as devoted to defending the nation
from what threatens it, as those threats are understood through the
military art and the conventions of the military profession, not in
response to the changing demands of politicians.
To the question of whether current U.S. military conventions
about warfighting might change, the first answer we reach is that
they are unlikely to do so in the short term or as a result of civilian

60
intervention. The U.S. militarys formative experiences have made it
resistant to such pressure. Moreover, the direct levers on the military
that a President or Secretary of Defense holds and which are often
cited as levers to prompt innovationbudgeting, promotions, force
structure, etc.are subject to review by Congress and comment by
journalists and interest groups. This means that intervention by the
President or the Secretary of Defense carries political risks. Donald
Rumsfelds fights with the services and Congress over the direction
of the military threatened his job before 9/11.106 Given the militarys
institutional commitment to what it does and has always done, it
also is unlikely that replacing generals will do much good. It might
allow us to win a campaign that we would otherwise lose, but it
will not change the way the institution thinks.107 That thinking, and
the now habitual or conventional way of responding to the world,
have been and remain relatively impervious to the manipulation of
interests.
To this argument about the futility of civilian intervention, one
might respond that civilians simply have not tried hard enough.
Yet, even if one were willing to pay the political costs of massive
civilian intervention in the personnel and budgetary work of the
military in order to promote transformation against unconventional
threats, two objections to doing so would arise. First, civilian
intervention might decrease our security from external threats. This
would occur if such intervention made the military too attentive to
domestic political pressure and not attentive enough to changing
threats in the security environment, particularly when those threats
run counter to the prejudices of domestic politics. Second, civilian
intervention might increase our vulnerability to internal threats.
Political intervention strong enough to change the military could
well undermine the militarys political independence, which might
both transform Americas civil-military relations in a deleterious
way and undermine the professionalism of Americas military. This
consequence need not reach the degree of civil-military turmoil that
the French suffered as a consequence of defeat in Indochina and
Algeria to be a development that the United States should try to
avoid.

61
In the Short Term.

The character of the U.S. military and the institutional setting in

which it operates suggest that, in the short term, it will be difficult to
change the self-understanding of the military so that it is better able
to deal with unconventional conflict. Faced with this conclusion,
we return to the set of questions we previously asked concerning
what substitute for DoDs lead role in the struggle against jihadism
might exist. Three answers or some combination of them seem
possible. DoD can retain the lead in the struggle against jihadism,
and we can continue to muddle through; or we can transfer as much
responsibility as possible for the struggle from DoD to another
agency or agencies; or we can create a new organization within DoD
from those components which have experience with unconventional
warfare. Each of these responses has virtues; none is completely
satisfactory.
Muddling through may not make things worse, at least in the
short term, but it would not improve them either. Innovation to
meet the unconventional threat would continue as it always has
at the point of contact with the enemy, but, given the inertia of the
warfare convention, such innovations would have limited effect
and staying power.108 Even if the military devotes more resources
to unconventional or irregular warfare, it is likely to continue to
treat unconventional warfare as a lesser-included case, despite
current rhetoric to the contrary. Inconveniently, the history we
have examined suggests that unconventional warfare is different
fundamentally from conventional warfare. It is a different case, and
not a lesser-included case, vis--vis conventional warfare. As we
have noted, British officers began reporting this development in the
1920s, as changing political ideas and new technologies combined to
limit the power of Europeans to impose their will in their colonies.109
Thus, the development of unconventional warfare is a kind of
revolution in military affairs. Muddling through as a response to
such a revolution will probably be an inadequate response over the
longer term.110
As an alternative to merely muddling through, we might transfer
responsibility for the unconventional response from DoD. This
would help insulate the struggle from the conventional approach

62
that is inappropriate for it. It would move the emphasis of our
response back toward police and intelligence work, which is most
appropriate, restricting DoD to that limited aspect of the fight against
jihadism marked by an interface with nation-states and their forces.
One might object that DoD must remain in charge precisely because
dealing with the nation-states that support terrorism is critical to our
success against jihadism. This view, itself a reflection of conventional
prejudices, seems largely unfounded. Although helpful, nation-state
support is not critical for terrorists. Jihadism has not abated, certainly
not operationally, since it was deprived of control of Afghanistan. In
any event, stronger and less arguable objections to this alternative
exist. We have no police force capable of taking charge of a global
struggle and no likely candidate for such a role. The Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) is consumed with transforming itself to deal
with the internal threat from terrorism, and should not be burdened
with an additional and very difficult duty. The CIAs operational
capability is global and its role critical, but its clandestine character is
incompatible with the public and political character that leadership
in the struggle against jihadism requires. More important, no matter
which agency was in charge (for example, the State Department), it
would tend to let its own perspective dominate what should be an
integrated interagency effort. An interagency organization would be
best, then, but it would need to be one unlike any that has so far
existed and certainly altogether different from the still-born Low-
Intensity Conflict Board within the NSC mandated by the same
legislation that established the Special Operations Command.111
Shifting leadership from DoD to a new interagency organization
would leave DoDs capability unreformed and unable to contribute
as required. The history and analysis we have presented suggest that
improving DoDs capability will require establishing an organization
within DoD devoted to unconventional warfare.112 The argument
for this new organization is the same as the one used to support
the establishment of the Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
Just as it was unlikely that special operations forces could flourish
within conventional military organizations, so is it unlikely that
an unconventional warfare capability can flourish in a department
that has become dominated by the direct approach to carrying

63
out its responsibilities. Yet, setting up an effective unconventional
warfare organization within DoD would be difficult, certainly
more difficult than setting up SOCOM. SOFs direct action mission
fits more easily into the warfare convention than does the indirect
approach of unconventional warfare. Playing on this similarity
between direct action and conventional warfare was one of the ways
that early proponents of an improved special operations capability
used to sell the Army on this idea.113 Proponents of an improved
unconventional warfare capability will not have that advantage.
Given DoDs warfighting culture, if such an organization comes into
being, it is likely always to lead a precarious existence.114 Committed
civilian leaders, including legislators, and military officers would
have a hard time preventing such an organization from being either
overwhelmed or worn down by the inertia of the conventional. Yet,
such a separate organization remains probably the best hope for an
effective unconventional warfare capability in DoD.

In the Long Term.

Our analysis to this point leads to the conclusion that the best bet
to improve the U.S. Governments capacity to wage unconventional
warfare in the short term is a new, untried interagency organization
and a separate unconventional warfare organization in DoD that will
have difficulty thriving. Might a longer-term perspective change the
analysis and the recommendations that flow from it? At first glance,
the prospects for DoD changing to meet the unconventional threat over
the long term look good. The institutional setting that helps insulate
the services from political pressure to transform (our presidential
system) is not likely to change (the United States is not likely to adopt
a parliamentary system), but the geo-strategic setting that affects the
professional understanding of the military already has. Since World
War II, the United States has emerged from its insular, isolationist
shell, employing its power and military forces overseas repeatedly.
For most of this postwar period, the United States faced a significant
conventional threat in the Soviet Union. This allowed the military
to discount the unconventional threat. More fairly, given limited
budgets, time, and human capacity, the existence of the conventional

64
threat, which was by far the most important, required the military
to treat the unconventional threat as a lesser-included case of the
greater threat. Over the coming decades, if we continue to encounter
unconventional threats without facing a powerful conventional threat,
then the U.S. military, as a professional force attentive to external
threats, should adapt institutionally to these unconventional threats.
After all, some change in the militarys outlook was occurring in the
1990s after the Soviet Union collapsed and the U.S. military faced a
series of unconventional threats and operational challenges.115 The
attacks on 9/11 prevented further change, one might argue, only
because the Bush administration responded to them by fighting the
war on terrorism in large measure as either a struggle between states
or a matter of killing or capturing enemies. This approach returned
conventional warfare to prominence and stopped the militarys
adaptation to unconventional warfare. The Bush administration even
has given the one organization in the military supposedly devoted
to unconventional warfare, the Special Operations Command, the
conventional task of target acquisition and destruction. If over the
longer term, this conventional approach to the unconventional
problem of jihadism fails, then future administrations and the U.S.
militaryguided by its professional devotion to the defense of the
United Statesare likely to change to meet the unconventional
threat.
This change to meet the unconventional threat over the long term
will be unlikely to occur, however, if a conventional threat arises
comparable to the one posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold
War. In that case, the militarys professional concern is likely to
focus on that conventional threat, since it will reinforce established
patterns of thought and action. A critical point, then, in assessing
long-term prospects for DoD adapting to unconventional warfare is
the development of our strategic situation with China. China appears
to be the one country that, in the the future, could pose a conventional
threat sufficient to eclipse the unconventional threat. If it does, then
the U.S. military, once again, is likely to treat unconventional warfare
as a lesser-included case of conventional warfare.
If it is true that the future status of unconventional warfare
depends on what happens with China, then it will be difficult to
predict. But as Dr. Stephen Biddle has argued incisively,116 what

65
happens with China is not entirely beyond our influence. An
emphasis by the United States in its conflict with jihadism on the
unilateral use of conventional military force, especially focused on
other nations or their forces, even in the name of democratization,
is likely to encourage great power competition and, hence, the rise
of China as a conventional threat to the United States. A unilateral
conventional approach by the United States is likely to increase such
competition in the future because it will appear threatening to other
nations and spur their efforts to counter American power. Fighting
jihadism in a multilateral manner, on the other hand, emphasizing
cooperative efforts in human intelligence and policing, is likely to
retard the rise of great power competition and, hence, the rise of
China as a conventional threat to the United States. In brief, our
inability to understand and use an unconventional approach to
jihadism today is likely to promote the rise of China as a great power
competitor tomorrow and to that extent to discourage adaptation to
unconventional threats in the future.
We might not need to worry about our failure to adapt to
unconventional threats, and hence the more rapid rise of a great
power rival, if we maintain a comparative advantage in conventional
warfare. This advantage would allow us to contend with the rival on
terms that would be best for us. This assumes, however, that the
unconventional threat, while remaining fundamentally different
from the conventional threat, will not pose as great a danger to us as
the conventional threat. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Terrorist
acquisition of an enormously lethal chemical, biological, radiological,
or nuclear (CBRN) weapon is already an unconventional threat that
rivals any conventional threat. Another unconventional threat that
might rise to the level of the conventional threats we are accustomed
to would be the political success of the jihadist insurgency within
Islam. If jihadists came to control one or more strategically important
(oil, nuclear weapons) Islamic country, that might shift the balance
of power in the world against the United States as decisively as the
rise to preeminence of China. At the moment, this threat is less real
than the threat of terrorist acquisition of CBRN weapons, but may
become more real over time if we continue to respond in a largely
conventional fashion to the jihadist insurgency.

66
 A long-term perspective toward our ability to adapt to
unconventional threats suggests a competition for our attention,
so to speak, between conventional and unconventional threats.117
Which threat wins the competition for our attention is not entirely
in our control, as we have seen, but we can affect the competition.
To repeat, we may be able to retard the emergence of a great power
competitor in the future if we improve now the effectiveness of our
unconventional response to jihadism and make it the centerpiece
of our efforts. In doing so, we would remove an incentive for great
power competition, as noted above. Improving our unconventional
warfare capability now also makes sense as the best way to deal with
unconventional threats that are likely to increase. Taking measures
to deal with unconventional threats now, therefore, will improve
our security in the short term and, by possibly reducing great power
competition in the long term, make us more secure in the future.

RECOMMENDATION

Our analysis of the long-term prospects for adaptation to

unconventional threats has concluded that short-term adaptation
is the best way to deal with the long-term issues. Our analysis of
the short-term prospect for adaptation has concluded that the most
promising steps are to establish two new organizationsa new kind
of interagency organization devoted to unconventional warfare, and
an unconventional warfare organization within DoD. If we give these
innovative organizations a central role in our response to jihadism,
we will not only increase our security now, but in the long term as
well by forestalling the rise of a great power competitor. If the very
idea of great powers and great power competition is fading and
along with it the importance or even the existence of conventional
warfare,118 then these innovative organizations for unconventional
warfare will be the beginning of a truly revolutionary transformation
of our warfighting capability.
Adaptation to unconventional threats in the short term will be
difficult because those threats are not yet deemed serious enough to
overwhelm the conventional orientation of the U.S. military and U.S.
Government. In these circumstances, using shorter-term incentives
(control of budgets, promotions, etc.) to reinforce the longer-term

67
incentives provided by the changing strategic setting might encourage
the process of adjustment to unconventional warfare. The history we
have examined suggests that, in any event, the adjustment is likely
to be slow, intermittent, and stumbling, with rapid change proving
superficial and substantial change emerging bit by bit, if at all. It also
suggests that for the U.S. military, the adjustment is most likely to
come, if it comes, from the inside, by relying on the professionalism
of the military. Unlike encouragement with incentives, direct
civilian intervention is unlikely to work, especially if it insists that
a transformation of the militarya fundamental change in how the
military thinks about war and itselfis necessary.119
Implicit in the analysis we have offered is the assumption that
the military cannot focus at the same time on both conventional and
unconventional warfare, that one or the other inevitably will suffer.
Good infantrymen can do many things well, but in relying only on
them and good infantry thinking, the best we are likely to manage
in unconventional warfare is muddling along. The requirements for
each kind of warfare are distinct and rarely complementary. The issue
here is not so much budgetary (our unconventional warfare capability
should be low-tech, for example)120 as it is cultural. The two kinds of
warfare require two different ways of thinking and evaluating. There
is no reason to believe that any organization or the people within it
will be equally good at both. We are entering a period when, because
of socio-economic and technological developments, the claim of the
Kennedy administrationthat unconventional warfare is a major
form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to conventional
warfareis indeed coming true. It is therefore appropriate to
develop new organizations to deal with this kind of conflict, much
as we developed new organizations to deal with the Cold War.
Establishing these new organizations would in effect acknowledge
that the changes proposed by the Kennedy administration were the
first halting efforts to deal with a true revolution in military affairs.
But again, to grant the possibility that unconventional warfare has
become a potent force does not require us to go to the extreme of
arguing that the age of the nation-state and its distinctive style of
warfare is over. It requires only that we recognize, which has been
less of a problem since 9/11, that nonstate forces pose a serious threat
that deserves a response different from but certainly as serious as the

68
response the DoD is making to the apparent revolution in military
affairs in conventional warfare.

ENDNOTES

1. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, pp. 34, www.defenselink.

mil/qdr/, accessed February 10, 2006.
2. Ibid., p. 9.
3. For example, Terry C. Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies:
Disguising Innovations, New York: Frank Cass, 2004, summarizes much of the
literature on innovation but focuses on conventional warfare.
4. Leslie C. Eliason and Emily O. Goldman, Theoretical and Comparative
Perspectives on Innovations and Diffusion, in The Diffusion of Military Technology
and Ideas, Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason, eds., Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2003, p. 8; Martha Finemore, Norms, Culture, and World
Politics: Insights from Sociologys Institutionalism, International Organization,
Vol. 50, Spring 1996, pp. 328330.
5. Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War, French and British Military Doctrine between the
Wars, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 28.
6. For references to support this claim and a discussion of it within the
perspective of conventional strategic thinking, see Colin S. Gray, Irregular Enemies
and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? Carlisle Barracks,
PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, March, 2006, www.
strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=650, accessed May 10,
2006.
7. Bernard Fall, Street without Joy, New York: Shocken Books, 1972, especially
pp. 34, 40, 105, provides an account of the fighting and Giaps strategy. Figures
in this paragraph are taken from Maurice Larkin, France Since the Popular Front,
Government and People, 1936-1996, Oxford: Clarendon Press, second edition, 1997,
p. 240; and Jean-Pierre Rioux, The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958, translated by Godfrey
Rogers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 217.
8. Franois Gr, La Guerre Psychologique, Paris: Economica, 1997, provides the
best account of the development of psychological warfare in France. On p. 129,
he lists some of the early presentations and writings on revolutionary warfare.
General Lionel-Martin Chassin published some of the first reflections on Indochina
and revolutionary warfare in 1954.
9. Colonel Charles Lacheroy, La Guerre Revolutionnaire, La Defense Nationale,
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958, pp. 312321, who was one of the
leading theorists of revolutionary warfare, refers to the Vietminhs efforts to
control body and soul. Lacheroys first writings on revolutionary and psychological
warfare circulated as mimeographs among French officers beginning in 1954. See

69
John Stewart Ambler, The French Army in Politics, 1954-1962, Columbus: The Ohio
State University Press, 1966, p. 398.
10. Colonel Laure, quoted in Jean Planchais, Petite histoire de laction
psychologique, Signes du Temps, Vol. 1, January, 1959, p. 11.
11. Georges Meyer, La guerre psychologique dans la 2eme guerre mondiale,
Hommes et mondes, Vol. 10, No. 112, 1955, pp. 560572, provides details on the
state of French psychological warfare capabilities before and during World War II.
Meyer was a former director of the press and information service in the ministry of
war. See also Philippe Ratte and Jean Thyrard, Armee et communication, une histoire
du SIPRA, Paris: ADDIM, 1989, pp. 1035.
12. Ratte and Thyrard, Armee et communication, pp. 67, 6971, 76, 80; Gr, La
Guerre Psychologique, pp. 9299; Maurice Mgret, LAction Psychologique, Paris:
Libraire Artheme Fayard, 1959, pp. 110111.
13. Ambler, The French Army in Politics, p. 218; Gr, La Guerre Psychologique, pp.
182, 193194; George Armstrong Kelly, Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in
Crisis, 19471962, Boston: MIT Press, 1965, pp. 184185.
14. Gr, La Guerre Psychologique, pp. 181182; Ratte and Thyrard, Armee et
communication, pp. 103, 111; Lieutenant Colonel Frdric Guelton, Martin S.
Alexander, trans., The French Army Center for Training and Preparation in
Counter-Guerrilla Warfare, CIPCG, at Arzew, in Martin S. Alexander and J. F. V.
Keiger, France and the Algerian War, 19541962: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy,
London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002, p. 41.
15. Maurice Bourgs-Maunoury, Le Problm Algerien, Revue militaire
dinformation, Vol. 274, July, 1956, pp. 67.
16. Instruction provisoire sur lemploi de larme psychologique, le 29 Juillet
1957, p. 4., at www.infoguerre.com/fichiers/tta117.pdf, accessed February 4, 2003;
Ambler, The French Army in Politics, pp. 219, 315; Kelly, Lost Soldiers, pp. 184185.
17. Instruction provisoire, pp. 3, 5, 7 29, 47; General Jacques Allard, Verits
sur laffaire algerienne, Revue de Dfense Nationale, Vol. 26, January, 1958, pp.10,
1921, 39.
18. D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency
Policy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 159161.
19. Ambler, The French Army in Politics, pp. 296298, 315; Bougeard, Ren Pleven,
p. 260.
20. Ambler, The French Army in Politics, pp. 296298. Peter Paret, French
Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria, the Analysis of a Political and Military
Doctrine, New York: Praeger, 1964, pp. 5455, also argues that it was the French
military experience in Indochina and Algeria that led officers to accept the doctrine
of revolutionary warfare. Rene Delisle, La Crise Interne du Corps des Officiers,
La Nef, Vol. 7, July/September, 1961, pp. 3950, considers and rejects the argument
that revolutionary warfare was popular with the nontechnicians in the Army and
served merely as a defense of their interests. Raoul Girardet, La socit militaire de

70
1815 a nos jours, Paris: Perrin, 1998, pp. 278279, describes the effect of the war in
Indochina on the French Army. For the contrast between the human element of
war and push-button war, see Lacheroy, La Guerre Revolutionnaire, p. 10. For
the connections between Indochina and Algeria, see Capitaine Jean-Marc Marill,
Lheritage Indochinois: adaptation de larme francaise en Algrie, 19541956,
Revue Historique des Armes, Vol. 187, June, 1992, pp. 2632.
21. Ambler, The French Army in Politics, p. 176. Cf. Girardet, La socit militaire
de 1815 a nos jours, p. 285.
22. Ambler, The French Army in Politics, pp. 344, 342.
23. Irwin Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-195,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 212215; Gr, La Guerre
Psychologique, pp. 9495, 127128, 181182; Ambler, The French Army in Politics,
p. 160162, 309, 326; Bernard Chantebout, Le partage des responsibilities de la
defense entre politiques et militaries de 1945 a 1962, in Olivier Forcade, Eric
Duhamel, and Philippe Vial, Militaires en Republique 1870-1962, Les Officiers, Le
Pouvoir et la Vie Publique en France, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999, p. 86;
Delisle, La Crise Interne du Corps des Officiers, p. 4445.
24. Raoul Girardet, La socit militaire de 1815 a nos jours, pp. 274275; Ambler,
The French Army in Politics, pp. 221, 254; Larkin, France Since the Popular Front, p.
277.
25. Ratte and Thyrard, Armee et communication, pp. 103, 113; Instruction
provisoire, pp. 30, 39, 41; Gr, La Guerre Psychologique, pp. 157158; Paret, French
Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria, p. 77.
26. Ratte and Thyrard, Armee et communication, pp. 106, 111; Paret, French
Revolutionary Warfare, p. 77; Gr, La Guerre Psychologique, pp. 224; Chef de
Bataillon Etcheverry, Rflexions sur la guerre subversive dAlgrie, Revue des
Forces Terrestres, July, 1959, p. 43.
27. Ratte and Thyrard, Armee et communication, pp. 110112, 113114, 118, 129.
28. Bernard Chantebout, Le partage des responsibilities de la defense entre
politiques et militaries de 1945 a 1962, in Militaires en Rpublique, 18701962, Les
officiers, le pouvoir et la vie publique en France, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne,
1999, p. 83; Christian Bougeard, Ren Pleven, Un Francais Libre en Politique, Rennes:
Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1995, p. 259.
29. Ratte and Thyrard, Armee et communication, p. 120.
30. Ambler, The French Army in Politics, pp. 162163; Jean Planchais, Une Histoire
Politique de L Arme: de Gaulle a de Gaulle, Paris: ditions du Seuil, 1967, p. 338;
Mgret, L Action Psychologique, p. 111; Girardet, La socit militaire de 1815 a nos
jours, p. 299.
31. Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, Political Warfare, Journal of the Royal United
Services Institute, Vol. 95, 1950, pp. 193, 195, 198, 202, 203.

71
 32. Richard Crossman, Psychological Warfare, Journal of the Royal United
Services Institute, Vol. 97, 1952, pp. 320321; and Crossman, Psychological
Warfare, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Vol. 98, 1953, pp. 353360.
33. Philip M. Taylor, If War Should Come: Preparing the Fifth Arm for
Total War, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 16, January 1981, pp. 3435; L.
Carruthers, Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media and Colonial
Counter-Insurgency 19441960, London: Leicester University Press, 1995, pp. 105,
italics in original, 11, 75, 89.
34. Taylor, If War Should Come: Preparing the Fifth Arm for Total War,
p. 31; Captain A. I. Pemberton, Propaganda: Its Theory and Practice, Journal
of the United Service Institution of India, No. 255, April, 1929, p. 148; John B. Black,
Organising the Propaganda Instrument: The British Experience, The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1975, pp. 18; Charles Cruikshank, The Fourth Arm, Psychological Warfare
19381945, London: David-Poynter, 1977, p. 9.
35. Charles Cruikshank, The Fourth Arm, Psychological Warfare 19381945,
London: David Poynter, 1977, p. 28.
36. Arthur Willert, Publicity and Political Propaganda in International Affairs,
International Affairs, Vol. 17, November-December, 1938, pp. 809, 817; Taylor, If
War Should Come, p. 33.
37. Lieutenant Colonel H. L. F. Dimmock, Propaganda, Journal of the United
Service Institute of India, Vol. 68, April, 1938, pp. 223, 226; Pemberton, Propaganda,
p. 144, 145; Thomas Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency 19191960, London:
Macmillan, 1990, pp. 30, 31, 36, 11, 68.
38. For example, Major C. B. Denning, Modern Problems of Guerrilla Warfare,
Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, Vol. 13, 1927, pp. 347354; Willert, Publicity
and Political Propaganda in International Affairs, pp. 809810; 811. See also
Taylor, If War Should Come, p. 30.
39. Cruikshank, The Fourth Arm, pp. 2526; Mariel Grant, Towards a Central
Office of Information: Continuity and Change in British Government Information
Policy, 193951, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 34, January 1999, p. 60; W.
Scott Lucas and C. J. Morris, A Very British Crusade: The Information Research
Department and the Beginning of the Cold War, in British Intelligence, Strategy
and the Cold War, 19451951, Richard J. Aldrich, ed., London: Routledge, 1992, pp.
95, 106; Richard Aldrich, Unquiet in Death: The Post-War Survival of the `Special
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Press, 2002, pp. 122141.
40. This account of British counterinsurgency draws on Mockaitis, British
Counterinsurgency, and Timothy Llewellyn Jones, The Development of British
Counterinsurgency Policies and Doctrine, 194552, Ph.D. Dissertation, London
University, 1991; John Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to

72
Northern Ireland, London: Palgrave, 2002, takes a more critical view of British
counterinsurgency efforts.
41. Colonel C. E. Callwell, Small Wars, Their Principles and Practice, 1906; third
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Doctrine, 194552.
44. Quoted in Llewellyn, The Development of British Counterinsurgency
Policies and Doctrine, p. 138.
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Peripheral Wars, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994; Hew Strachan, The Politics
of the British Army, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997; Hew Strachan, The British
Way of Warfare, in The Oxford History of the British Army, General Editor, David
Chandler and Associate Editor, Ian Beckett, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996, pp. 398415.
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The Chanting of Crusaders: Captain Heber Blankenhorn and AEF Combat
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pp. 457482; and Stanley Sandler, Cease Resistance: Its Good for You!: A History of
U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations, Fort Bragg: United States Army Special
Operations Command, Directorate of History and Museums, 1999, pp. 1837.
47. Sandler, Cease Resistance, p. 3334, 3637. Consider also in this regard the
arguments of Laurie, The Chanting of Crusaders, pp. 477479.
48. Laurie, The Chanting of Crusaders, pp. 475, 479, 481; Sandler, Cease
Resistance, p. 21.
49. Sandler, Cease Resistance, pp. 3839, 43; Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Army
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June 27, 1948, FRUS Document 291; Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, pp. 4345,
48.
66. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, pp. 5760, 64; General Albert C.
Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958, pp.
91, 95.
67. Lilly, Short History of the Psychological Strategy Board, p. 6264, 7576,
7879.

75
 68. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, pp. 61, 63, 9194; Lilly, Short History
of the Psychological Strategy Board, p. 86.
69. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, pp. 97, 94, cf. p. 147, 100101, 118, 102
103, 107.
70. John A. Nagl, British and American Army Counterinsurgency Learning
during the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War, Ph.D. Dissertation, Oxford:
University of Oxford, 1997, pp. 185186.
71. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam, A History, New York: The Viking Press, 1983, pp.
408-409.
72. Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 194676,
1979; Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, and Washington, DC: The
Center for Military History, 2001, p. 30.
73. The argument for noninnovation in Vietnam focuses principally on doctrine,
where this argument is most true. See, for example, Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The
Army and Vietnam, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989. Krepinevich,
p. 39, however, misrepresents the quality of the discussion of counterinsurgency
doctrine in FM 100-5, 1962. For innovation in Vietnam, see Lieutenant General
John Hay, Jr., Vietnam Studies, Tactical and Materiel Innovations, Washington, DC,
1974. Peter M. Dawkins, The United States Army and the Other War in Vietnam,
A Study of the Complexity of Implementing Organizational Change, Ph.D.
Dissertation, Princeton: Princeton University, February 1979, provides a detailed
discussion of the Armys involvement in the advisory program.
74. Jeffrey Record, Vietnam in Retrospect: Could We have Won? Parameters,
Winter, 199697, pp. 5165, summarizes the views of those who believe that the
Armys strategy could have worked.
75. Francis J. Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces, 19611971, Washington, DC:
Department of the Army, 1973, p. 10.
76. Shelby L. Stanton, Green Berets at War, U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast
Asia, 19561975, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1985, pp. 3839; Letter, DA Office
of the Chief of Staff, Subj: Special Warfare Field Visit to Vietnam and Okinawa,
1330 Jan 63, dated January 30, 1963, p. 3, quoted in Outline History of the 5th
SF Group, Airborne, Participation in the CIDG Program, 19611970, p. 11, www.
ehistory.com/vietnam/pdf/sfcidg.pdf, accessed October 1, 2002. See also Thomas K.
Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional
Warfare, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998, p. 85; Krepinevich, The Army and
Vietnam, pp. 70-71; Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces, pp. 4, 1944. On the problems in
the CIDG program, see, for example, General William B. Rosson (USA, ret.), Four
Periods of American Involvement in Vietnam: Development and Implementation
of Policy, Strategy, and Programs, Described and Analyzed on the Basis of Service
Experience at Progressively Senior levels, Ph.D. Dissertation, Oxford University,
1979, p. 124.
77. Rosson, Four Periods of American Involvement in Vietnam, pp. 149
151.

76
 78. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, pp. 7274.
79. Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces, p. 49.
80. Ibid., U.S. Army Special Forces, pp. 34; 46-48; Krepinevich, The Army and
Vietnam, pp. 7375. I have not uncovered any documentary evidence that the work
done at the Brinks Hotel was the basis for the CIDG table of organization and
equipment, but the timing is right and the CIDG table is similar to what the Army
study team developed. Compare Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces, p. 48; and Nagl,
British and American Army Counterinsurgency Learning, pp. 185186.
81. On the Marines and counterinsurgency, their operations in Vietnam and
the CAPs, see Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, pp. 172177; Allan R. Millett,
Semper Fidelis, The History of the United States Marine Corps, New York: The Free
Press, 1980; revised and expanded ed., 1991, pp. 548549, 570572, 589590; Keith
F. Kopets, The Combined Action Program: Vietnam, Military Review, Vol. 82,
July-August, 2002, pp. 7881; T. P. Schwartz, The Combined Action Program: A
Different Perspective, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 83, February, 1999, pp. 6372;
and General Lewis W. Walt, U.S. Marine Corps, Strange War, Strange Strategy, A
Generals Report on Vietnam, New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970, pp. 8184.
82. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, p. 25.
83. John F. Kennedy, Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the
U.S. Military Academy, June 6, 1962, p. 226.
84. The NSAMs are available at www.cs.umb.edu/jfklibrary/nsam.htm, accessed
September 19, 2002.
85. www.cs.umb.edu/jfklibrary/images/nsam124a.jpg, accessed September 19,
2002.
86. Lloyd Norman and John B. Spore, Big Push in Guerrilla Warfare,
Army, Vol. 12, March, 1962, p. 33; Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action,
p. 68; Krepinevich, The Army in Vietnam, pp. 3033; Douglas S. Blaufarb, The
Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present, New York:
Free Press, 1977, p. 65; Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation, The Politics of Foreign
Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy, New York: Doubleday & Company,
1967, pp. 415, 424; Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces, pp. 56.
87. For NSAM 183, see www.cs.umb.edu/jfklibrary/images/nsam182a.jpg, accessed
September 20, 2002; United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy, September
1962, declassified copy in possession of author, pp. 2829.
88. Rosson, Four Periods of American Involvement in Vietnam, pp. 98, 109
110, 113115; Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 76.
89. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, pp. 30, 3637, 4344.
90. Ibid., pp. 174177; Kopets, The Combined Action Program.
91. For comments on the effectiveness of attrition and criticisms of alternatives
to it, see Scott Sigmund Gartner, Strategic Assessment in War, New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1997, pp. 133137; Doughty, The Evolution of U.S. Army

77
Tactical Doctrine, p. 39; James J. Wirtz, Intelligence to Please? The Order of
Battle Controversy during the Vietnam War, Political Science Quarterly, Vol.
106, Summer, 1991, 239263, especially p. 245; Robert S. McNamara, James G.
Blight, and Robert K. Brigham, with Thomas J. Biersteker and Colonel Herbert
Y. Schandler (U.S. Army, Ret.), Argument without End, In Search of Answers to the
Vietnam Tragedy, New York: Public Affairs, 1999, pp. 313371, especially pp. 348
362, 409419; Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, pp. 167, 178, 190, 255256; Walt,
Strange War, Strange Strategy, p. 105; Schwartz, The Combined Action Program: A
Different Perspective, pp. 6372. Millett is less enthusiastic about the CAP effort
than Krepinevich. He also claims, contrary to Krepinevich, that Marines in CAPs
suffered higher casualties than Marines in other units. Compare Krepinevich, The
Army and Vietnam, p. 174; and Millett, Semper Fidelis, pp. 590. See also, Millett,
Semper Fidelis, p. 602.
92. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change, argues that the Marines and
the CIA innovated in Vietnam; Rosson, Four Periods of American Involvement in
Vietnam, p. 124; Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces, p. 10; Stanton, Green Berets at War,
pp. 3843; Millett, Semper Fidelis, pp. 570572, 548549, 582583, 602; Krepinevich,
The Army and Vietnam, pp. 172174, 232; Lewis Sorley, A Better War, The Unexamined
Victories and Final Tragedy of Americas Last Years in Vietnam, New York: Harcourt
Brace & Company, 1999, p. 1.
93. Sorley, A Better War, p. 1.
94. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, p. 4042.
95. Thomas R. Mockaitis, Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict: The Sword or the
Olive Branch? Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999; John Keegan, The Iraq War,
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004, pp. 175, 182, 193, 209.
96. Thomas R. Searle, Making Airpower Effective against Guerrillas, Air &
Space Power Journal, Vol. 18, Fall 2004, pp. 13-23.
97. Bradley Graham, Pentagon Prepares to Rethink Focus on Conventional
Warfare; New Emphasis on Insurgencies and Terrorism Is Planned, Washington
Post,January 26, 2005,p.A2.
98. Gordon Lubold, Rumsfeld Leads Talks on Reshaping DoD, Army Times,
January 23, 2006, p. 12, vi, 11.
99. The 9/11 Commission Report, The Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, New York: W. W. Norton and Company,
2004, p. 350.
100. Rumsfelds war-on-terror memo, October 16, 2003, www.usatoday.com/
news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm accessed October 8, 2004; Bradley
Graham, Shortfalls of Special Operations Command Are Cited, Washington
Post,November 17, 2005, p.A2.
101. For example, DoD does not acknowledge that it faces a global insurgency.
R. R. Keene, In a Historic Move, the Corps to Stand Up a Special Ops Command,
Leatherneck,Vol. 88, December, 2005, pp. 46-47; Dana Milbank, Rumsfelds War on

78
Insurgents, Washington Post, November 30, 2005, p. A4. Brigadier General Robert
L. Caslen, the Joint Staffs Deputy Director for the Global War on Terrorism,
recently remarked that we do not go as far as to say it is a global insurgency
because it lacks a centralized command and control. Quoted in Sharon Behn,
Terrorist Growth Overtakes U.S. Efforts, Pentagon Deputy Warns of Decades-
long War, Washington Times, March 2, 2006, p. 13.
102. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability,
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction, SSTR, Operations, November 28, 2005;
News Briefing with Principal Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Ryan Henry
and Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, Joint Staff Vice Adm.
Evan Chanik, February 3, 2006, www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2006/tr20060203-
12424.html, accessed February 13, 2006. Henry: . . . before wed always said major
combat operations, everything else was a lesser included subset. But now were
saying that we have two co-equal type of activities that we do operationally.
103. Thomas E. Ricks, Lessons Learned in Iraq Show Up in Army Classes,
Washington Post, January 21, 2006, p. A1; Lloyd Norman and John B. Spore, Big
Push in Guerrilla Warfare, Army, March 1962, p. 33; DoD News Briefing,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, September 20, 2001, www.defenselink.
mil/news/Sep2001/t09202001_t920ruma.html, accessed January 30, 2006; John F.
Kennedy, Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the U.S. Military
Academy, June 6, 1962, The Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1962,
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 226.
104. John A. Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture, Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 2003.
105. The argument in this paragraph and the next borrows from Avant, Political
Institutions and Military Change; and Jerry M. Cooper, The Armys Search for a
Mission, 18651890, in Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military
History from Colonial Times to the Present, Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts,
eds., Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986. On the connection between attachment
to the cavalry and problems of innovation and transformation, see Edward L.
Katzenbach, The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century: A Study in Policy
Response, in American Defense Policy, John E. Endicott and Roy W. Stafford, Jr.,
eds., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977.
106. Al Kamen, Donny, We Hardly Knew Ye, Washington Post, September
7, 2001, p. A27; and Richard Lowry, Bombing at the Pentagon, National Review,
Vol. 53,Issue 17, September 3, 2001,p.36.
107. Secretary Rumsfeld is now conducting an experiment to test this point,
having recalled General Peter J. Schoomaker from retirement to serve as Chief
of Staff of the Army in an apparent effort to speed up the transformation of the
Army.
108. As Matthew G. Karres and Michael Richardson report,
a review of cases that span a century of US irregular warfare operations
provides evidence that, at times, the military hierarchy did allow

79
 subordinates to innovate and did listen to their recommendations, with
positive outcomes as a result. This evidence also illustrates, however,
that the military has failed to institutionalize these lessons and is prone to
have to relearn them from conflict to conflict, and at times this relearning
process has resulted in the failure of an operation.

Matthew G. Karres and Michael Richardson, Innovation from Below: the Role of
Subordinate Feedback in Irregular Warfare Operations, Thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School, June 2001.
109. Major C. B. Denning, Modern Problems of Guerrilla Warfare, Army
Quarterly and Defence Journal, Vol. 13, 1927.
110. For unconventional warfare as a revolution in military affairs, see David
Tucker, The War on Terrorism and the Western Way of Warfare, in The West at
War, Bradley C. S. Watson, ed., Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, forthcoming, 2006.
Ivan Arregun-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,
International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1, Summer 2001, pp. 93128, documents and
explains the increasing success in the 20th-century of the weak against the strong.
111. For an argument for and a description of an effective interagency
organization, see David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, Restructuring Special
Operations Forces for Emerging Threats, Strategic Forum, Institute for National
Strategic Studies, National Defense University, January 2006.
112. Ibid.
113. Interview with General E. C. Meyer by Dr. J. W. Partin, Arlington, VA,
July 14, 1988, p. 2, copy in authors possession.
114. Precarious is how Susan Marquis describes the existence of Special
Operations Forces prior to the establishment of the Special Operations Command.
See Susan Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations
Forces, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997.
115. General Henry Shelton, Peace Operations: The Forces Required, National
Security Studies Quarterly, Vol. 6, Summer 2000, shows the lesser-included case
assumption weakening, at least verbally.
116. Stephen Biddle, American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment, Carlisle
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2005,
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=603, accessed May 3,
2006.
117. This discussion of long-term trends assumes that the distinction between
conventional and unconventional warfare will remain in the future. This may
not be a safe assumption, since, as noted in the introduction, this distinction
unconventional warfare deliberately targets civilians, conventional warfare does
nothas eroded in the 20th century. If the distinction disappears or as it disappears,
we should expect the U.S. military to adapt, since in this case conventional and

80
unconventional threats to the United States will no longer compete for the attention
of the military. There simply will be one threat. In this case, attacks on American
noncombatants would occur not as an asymmetric strategy pursued by an enemy
who despaired of competing with our conventional forces. (For example, see Qiao
Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts
Publishing House, February 1999, translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, www.terrorism.com/documents/ TRC-Analysis/unrestricted.pdf, accessed May
10, 2006.) Such attacks would be the only strategy. This would be a true revolution,
not just in military but in human affairs, since it would imply that the modern state,
whose fundamental purpose is to protect its citizens, had become obsolete. It would
mean that organizations or movements like al-Qaida, which lack sovereignty and
territory, yet have power and affect world politics, would no longer aspire, as al-
Qaida still does, to both sovereignty and territory. This political transformation
may not be possible. If it is, whether it would return us to something like the world
of the Middle Ages or propel us into some new world, it is not likely to happen
within anything that could be considered a planning framework, unlike the rise of
China or the acquisition by terrorists of CBRN. We therefore may acknowledge it
as a possibility but ignore it as a factor in our planning.
118. Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, New York: Basic Books,
1991; Through a Glass Darkly: Some Reflections on the Future of War, Naval War
College Review, Vol. 53, Autumn 2000, pp. 2544.
119. On this point, consider officer attitudes as reported in Thomas G. Mahnken
and James R. FitzSimonds, The Limits of Transformation: Officer Attitudes toward the
Revolution in Military Affairs, Newport Paper, No. 17, Newport, Rhode Island:
Naval War College Press, 2003.
120. For a defense of this claim, see Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence
of Strategy, pp. 3538.

81
 WHY THEY FIGHT:
COMBAT MOTIVATION IN THE IRAQ WAR

Leonard Wong
Thomas A. Kolditz
Raymond A. Millen
Terrence M. Potter

July 2003
 *****

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army,
the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for
public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This study was greatly supported by members of the 800th Military Police
Brigade -- specifically BG Paul Hill, COL Al Ecke, and LTC James OHare. Staff
Judge Advocates COL Ralph Sabbatino and COL Karl Goetzke also provided
critical guidance. Finally, COL Jim Embrey planned and coordinated the visits to
units for this study.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded

to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes
Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244, or directly to Leonard.Wong@carlisle.army.mil
Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications Office by calling
(717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or by e-mail at Rita.Rummel@carlisle.army.mil

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI
Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSIs Homepage address is: http://
www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to

update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent
and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the
Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our
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ISBN 1-58487-133-4

ii
 FOREWORD

With the recent lightning swift combat successes of Operation

IRAQI FREEDOM, there may be a tendency to view with awe the
lethality of U.S. technology and training. Indeed, the U.S. military
is unmatched in the raw combat power it is capable of unleashing in
a conflict. This monograph, however, argues that the true strength
of Americas military might lies not in its hardware or high-tech
equipment, but in its soldiers.
Dr. Leonard Wong and his colleagues traveled to Iraq to see
what motivated soldiers to continue in battle, to face extreme
danger, and to risk their lives in accomplishing the mission. As
a means of comparison, they began by interviewing Iraqi Regular
Army prisoners of war to examine their combat motivation and unit
dynamics. The researchers then interviewed U.S. combat troops
fresh from the fields of battle to examine their views.
What they found was that todays U.S. soldiers, much like
soldiers of the past, fight for each other. Unit cohesion is alive and
well in todays Army. Yet, Dr. Wong and his fellow researchers
also found that soldiers cited ideological reasons such as liberation,
freedom, and democracy as important factors in combat motivation.
Todays soldiers trust each other, they trust their leaders, they trust
the Army, and they also understand the moral dimensions of war.
This year marks the 30th anniversary of the all-volunteer Army.
This monograph is a celebration of the success of that radical idea
and the transformation of the U.S. Army from a demoralized draft
army, to a struggling all-volunteer force, to a truly professional Army.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of the
American soldier to the national defense community as policymakers
continue to chart the course of the Armys transformation.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director
Strategic Studies Institute

iii
 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

DR. LEONARD WONG is an Associate Research Professor of

Military Strategy (Human and Organizational Dimensions) in the
Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. His army
career included assignments teaching leadership at West Point,
serving as an analyst in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army
and in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and
serving as the Director of the Office of Economic and Manpower
Analysis. His current research includes leadership, professionalism,
and innovation in the military. Dr. Wong is a Professional Engineer
and holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, and an M.S.B.A.
and Ph.D. from Texas Tech University.

COLONEL THOMAS A. KOLDITZ is Professor and Head of the

Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the U.S.
Military Academy. Colonel Kolditzs most recent troop assignment
was from 1997 to 1999 as commander of 2nd Battalion, 17th Field
Artillery in the Second Infantry Division, Republic of Korea. His
research activities and teaching assignments span applied social
psychology, personality, and leader development. Colonel Kolditz
holds a B.A. from Vanderbilt University, as well as M.A. and Ph.D.
degrees in Social Psychology from the University of Missouri, a
Master of Military Arts and Science from the School of Advanced
Military Studies, and a Masters in Strategic Studies from the U.S.
Army War College.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RAYMOND A. MILLEN is assigned as

the Director of European Security Studies at the Strategic Studies
Institute. He is a Foreign Area Officer for Western Europe. Lieutenant
Colonel Millen graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1982,
was commissioned as an infantry officer, and has held a variety of
command and staff assignments in Germany and Continental United
States. He has also served as the U.S. Army Infantry School Liaison
Officer to the German Infantry School at Hammelburg, Germany;
Battalion Executive Officer, 3-502d Infantry, Fort Campbell,
Kentucky; and Chief of Intelligence Section and Balkans Team

v
Chief, Survey Section, SHAPE, Belgium. Lieutenant Colonel Millen
has published articles in a number of scholarly and professional
journals to include Infantry Magazine and the Swiss Military Journal.
His book, Command Legacy, was published by Brasseys in April
2002. Lieutenant Colonel Millen is a graduate of the U.S. Armys
Command and General Staff College, and holds an M.A. degree in
National Security Studies from Georgetown University.

COLONEL TERRENCE M. POTTER is an Associate and Academy

Professor at the U.S. Military Academy, Department of Foreign
Languages. Colonel Potter has served in the Army for over 29 years,
and has taught languages and linguistics for the past 7 years. His
research interests include applied sociolinguistics, onomastics,
language and culture, and the teaching and learning of Arabic.
Colonel Potter holds a B.A. from The Citadel, an M.A. from
Middlebury College, and a Ph.D. from Georgetown University.

vi
 SUMMARY

Since World War II, studies have argued and conventional

wisdom has claimed that soldiers fight for each other. Cohesion,
or the bonds between soldiers, traditionally has been posited as the
primary motivation for soldiers in combat. Recent studies, however,
have questioned the effects of cohesion on unit performance. This
monograph reviews the combat motivation literature and then
analyzes findings from interviews conducted during the recent Iraq
War.
By examining the perspectives of Iraqi Regular Army prisoners
of war, U.S. troops, and embedded media, the monograph argues
that unit cohesion is indeed a primary combat motivation. The
report also notes that, contrary to previous studies of U.S. soldiers,
notions of freedom, democracy, and liberty were also voiced by
soldiers as key factors in combat motivation.
The monograph concludes that soldiers continue to fight for each
other, but todays soldiers are also sophisticated enough to grasp
the moral concepts of war. The report suggests that this is a result
of the transformation of the Army from a fledgling all-volunteer
experiment to a truly professional force.

vii
 WHY THEY FIGHT:
COMBAT MOTIVATION IN THE IRAQ WAR

Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to
attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure
of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack
resolutely.1
Ardant du Picq, 1870

Introduction.

This monograph seeks to answer the question: Why do soldiers

fight? It begins with a historical overview of the combat motivation
literature and examines studies from World War II, Korea, and
Vietnam. It then shifts to the recent Iraq War and analyzes the
results of interviews with Iraqi Regular Army prisoners of war,
U.S. combat troops, and embedded media. The varied perspectives
combine to show the critical importance of unit cohesion in combat
motivation but also highlight how todays soldiers are different from
U.S. soldiers of the past.

Why Do Soldiers Fight?

The motivations of Americas conscripted soldiers was a growing

concern during the early stages of World War II, as the Army ranks
swelled with freshly drafted soldiers. As Kansas newspaper editor
William Allen White noted, soldiers of a draft army havent the
slightest enthusiasm for this war or this cause. They arent grouchy,
they are not mutinous, they just dont give a tinkers dam.2 After
noting the ineffectiveness of prepared lectures read to bored troops,
Chief of Staff of the Army General George C. Marshall brought in
movie producer Frank Capra and told him to make a movie that
would explain to our boys in the Army why we are fighting, and
the principles for which we are fighting.3 Critics claimed that there
were more important things to do, but Marshall insisted on men
motivated and knowledgeable about the democratic cause. The
seven-part Why We Fight film series resulted and was widely used
during World War II.4 The riveting film series emphasized that the

1
war was not just a war against Axis villainy, but for liberty, equality,
and security.5
After World War II, a series of studies emerged that examined
the motivation of soldiers during combat--to determine why a
tired, cold, muddy rifleman goes forward with the bitter dryness
of fear in his mouth into the mortar bursts and machine-gun fire of a
determined enemy.6 Was it for ideological reasons as suggested by
the Why We Fight series?
In his widely acclaimed work, The American Soldier, Samuel
Stouffer documented the attitudes of World War II combat
infantrymen. When soldiers were asked what kept them going
during the war, the most common response was getting the war over
so that they could go home. The second most common response
and the primary combat motivation, however, referred to the strong
group ties that developed during combat.7 When asked about
sources of support during combat, responses concerning loyalty to
ones buddies and the notion that you couldnt let the other men
down were second only to the number of combat soldiers who
said they were helped by prayer.8 Despite the Why We Fight films,
Stouffers study argued that ideology, patriotism, or fighting for the
cause were not major factors in combat motivation for World War
II soldiers. Cohesion, or the emotional bonds between soldiers,
appeared to be the primary factor in combat motivation.
Historian S. L. A. Marshall reinforced the importance of the bonds
between soldiers in his examination of World War II infantrymen in
Men Against Fire. He noted, I hold it to be one of the simplest truths
of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going
with his weapons is the near presence or the presumed presence of
a comrade. . . . He is sustained by his fellows primarily and by his
weapons secondarily.9 As for fighting for a cause, Marshall wrote,
Men do not fight for a cause but because they do not want to let
their comrades down.10
In another landmark study on combat motivation, Shils and
Janowitz interviewed Wehrmacht prisoners in an attempt to
determine why some continued to fight so determinedly despite
the overwhelmingly obvious evidence that Germany would lose the
war. Testing the belief that good soldiers were those who clearly

2
understood the political and moral implications of what was at
stake, they concluded that the behavior and attitudes of infantrymen
who fought to the end derived, instead, from the interpersonal
relationships within the primary group (although they did note an
allegiance to Hitler as a secondary motivation.) From their research,
they concluded that:

When the individuals immediate group, and its supporting formations,

met his basic organic needs, offered him affection and esteem from
both officers and comrades, supplied him with a sense of power and
adequately regulated his relations with authority, the element of
self-concern in battle, which would lead to disruption of the effective
functioning of his primary group, was minimized.11

The emphasis on unit cohesion as the primary source of combat

motivation continued into the Korean War. Sociologist Roger Little
observed a rifle company in combat for several months and found
that the bonded relationships between men in combat--what he
called buddy relations--were critical to basic survival.12 To Little,
buddy relations could refer to a specific soldier or the entire unit.
During the Vietnam War, noted military sociologist Charles
Moskos interviewed soldiers and concluded that combat primary
group ties serve an important role in unit effectiveness. Interestingly,
Moskos argued that the close bonds with other soldiers may be
a result of self-interested concern for personal safety rather than
an altruistic concern for fellow soldiers.13 Regardless, Moskos
reinforced the critical role of cohesion in combat performance.
Despite the wide acceptance of the importance of interpersonal
relationships between soldiers in combat,14 things began to change
in the later stages of the Vietnam War. In their controversial book,
Crisis in Command, Gabriel and Savage claimed that the individual
replacement system in Vietnam and the lack of professionalism in
the officer corps led to the dissolution of primary group cohesion
in the Army. While their conclusions about the causes of the
decline of cohesion can be questioned, they did bring attention to
a potentially deleterious effect of cohesion--fragging. They pointed
out that cohesion between soldiers without the proper norms can
work against organizational goals as in the case of nearly 800 cases

3
of fragging in Vietnam.15
More recently, cohesion in the military has been addressed by
several critical studies that go beyond highlighting the potentially
detrimental effects of cohesion and instead challenge the correlation
of unit cohesion with performance. Interestingly, the subject of
many of these studies is not cohesion, but the current Department
of Defense (DoD) policy on homosexual conduct. The current policy
assumes that, The presence in the armed forces of persons who
demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts
would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale,
good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of
military capability [emphasis added].16 Arguing that unit cohesion
is not critical to military capability supports efforts to change the
DoD policy. To this end, researchers such as Elizabeth Kier examined
the cohesion literature and concluded that fifty years of research in
several disciplines has failed to uncover persuasive evidence . . . that
there is a causal relationship leading from primary group cohesion
to military effectiveness.17
In a 1993 RAND report, Robert MacCoun argued that actually
two types of cohesion exist. According to MacCoun, social cohesion
refers to the quality of the bonds of friendship and emotional
closeness among unit members--the type of cohesion referred to by
the post-World War II studies. Task cohesion, on the other hand,
refers to the commitment among unit members to accomplish a task
that requires the collective efforts of the unit. MacCoun argued that
task cohesion is correlated with unit performance, not social cohesion.
Social cohesion, according to MacCoun, has little relationship to
performance, and can even interfere with unit performance (e.g.,
rate busting, groupthink, or fragging).18 MacCouns arguments
are echoed by Segal and Kestnbaum who stated that, There is no
clear causal link that can be demonstrated using rigorous methods
between social cohesion and high levels of military performance.19
Despite an emerging debate about cohesion occurring in the
academic realm, it is tempting to believe that it has little relevance in
the Army policy arena. Three factors suggest otherwise. First, the
homosexual conduct policy assumes that unit cohesion is essential
to military capability. Determining the role of cohesion in combat

4
motivation helps inform that policy debate.
Second, the Army is pushing ahead with the Unit Manning
Initiative that rests on the premise that full-spectrum forces must
be highly cohesive teams whose shared experiences and intensive
training enable them to perform better in combat.20 As the 172nd
Infantry Brigade transforms to a Stryker Brigade Combat Team and
implements a unit manning personnel system, its soldiers will arrive
and train together through a standard 36-month tour. If cohesion is
truly unimportant to unit performance as recent critics suggest, then
the Army is putting an abundance of resources into a radical change
that may produce a modicum of results.
Finally, discussions at the DoD level have been exploring the
difference between task and social cohesion and which has the
biggest impact on the military. One view maintains that the Services
already do a good job of getting people who dont like one another
to work well together, so social cohesion may be unnecessary. Given
that the academic debate concerning cohesion has moved into the
policy arena, an exploration of cohesion--specifically social cohesion
--and the broader topic of combat motivation, is warranted.

Methodology.

This monograph analyzes motivation and cohesion in combat.

The backdrop for analysis was Operation IRAQI FREEDOM with
major combat operations occurring roughly from March 20, 2003,
to May 1, 2003. To examine the concepts of combat motivation
and cohesion, views were solicited from three distinct samples that
experienced combat during IRAQI FREEDOM.
The first sample consisted of Iraqi Regular Army soldiers. The
combat motivation of Iraqi soldiers was analyzed through interviews
with enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) held at Camp Bucca at Umm
Qasr, Iraq.21 Nearly all of the EPWs questioned were lower enlisted
Iraqi soldiers; two officers, a lieutenant colonel and a lieutenant,
were also interviewed. Only two soldiers, both sergeants, claimed
membership in a Republican Guard or Special Republican Guard
unit. In this sample, then, views probably represent rank-and-file
soldiers, rather than elite units or senior leaders. The researchers

5
conducted, recorded, translated, and transcribed over 30 interviews,
using a structured interview format. 22
To gain the U.S. perspective, researchers met with troops assigned
to the maneuver units of the three U.S. divisions conducting the
majority of combat operations--the 3rd Infantry Division, the 101st
Airborne Division (Air Assault), and the 1st Marine Division.23
Researchers conducted interviews at unit locations in the vicinity of
Baghdad and Al Hillah prior to the official cessation of major combat
operations. They conducted, recorded, and transcribed over 40
interviews.24 The same structured interview format was used with
both Iraqi EPWs and U.S. troops--thus providing a good comparison
and contrast of issues across both armies.
Embedded media represent the third sample used to analyze
cohesion and motivation in combat. They furnished a unique
perspective on cohesion and combat motivation for two reasons.
First, they were able to comment on small unit dynamics without
being a part of the small unit. Second, prior to the war, much
discussion concerned the embedded media needing to avoid
developing emotional relationships with unit soldiers in order to
remain objective journalists. The personal reflections of the medias
experience help to explore the role of cohesion in combat. Over a
dozen members of the media embedded in U.S. Army ground units
were interviewed in person or telephonically, or responded to an
email questionnaire.

Motivated by Fear.

During World War II, Stouffer asked combat veterans the

question, Generally, in your combat experience, what was most
important to you in making you want to keep going and do as well
as you could? The same question concerning combat motivation
was asked of the Iraqi EPWs. Iraqi EPWs were expected to respond
that they were motivated to fight for each other (as earlier research
had shown with the Wehrmacht or North Vietnams Viet Cong) or
were simply defending their homeland.25
Instead, the near universal response was that the Iraqi Regular
Army soldiers were motivated by coercion. Even with the powerful

6
coalition forces to their front, they were fearful of the dreaded Baath
Party to their rear. Their behavior was driven by fear of retribution
and punishment by Baath Party or Fedayeen Saddam if they were
found avoiding combat. Iraqi soldiers related stories of being jailed
or beaten by Baath Party representatives if they were suspected of
leaving their units. Several showed scars from previous desertion
attempts. One soldier related how he still felt guilty that his mother
was jailed in response to his AWOL26 status several years before.
When Iraqi soldiers described the desertion of their comrades,
they noted the universal practice of deserting with small arms,
rather than burying their weapons in the sand as U.S. psychological
leaflets had urged. Deserters remained armed to protect themselves
against the Fedayeen Saddam death squads they expected to find in
Iraqi rear areas. The decision to desert with arms is one not taken
lightly because it increased the likelihood of being killed by U.S.
or British forces, particularly reconnaissance units common to the
most forward elements. Armed desertion, then, represented clear
evidence of the fear experienced by those who wished neither to
fight nor surrender.
Surprisingly, fear of retribution was usually not attached to
officers serving in Iraqi units. Most of the enlisted soldiers described
their officers as distant, but normally not as a threat. Iraqi officer
training was described by a captured graduate of the Baghdad
Military Academy as on the Sandhurst model, suggesting a British
influence and a subsequent separation between the ranks of officers
and enlisted. Officers were often politically appointed and not
regarded as tactically competent by their men. Such circumstances
led to little mutual respect between officers and the enlisted soldiers,
but the strained relationship was far from intimidating. Several
prisoners reported that if their officers had tried to force them to fight,
they would have simply killed them and surrendered anyway. No
prisoner ever described an attempt by officers to compel resistance
against coalition forces.
Surrender decisions, in the sample interviewed, were usually
made at very low levels, often among small groups of soldiers, and
were not attributed to the capitulation of a higher headquarters.
Artillery shelling or air attack sometimes catalyzed surrender--

7
though none of the soldiers interviewed had to withstand lengthy
bombardment. Officers permitted surrender, sometimes by their
own desertion, sometimes by benign neglect. One officer stated,
when questioned about why he had not forced his men to fight, As
a man before Allah, that would have been the wrong thing to do.
Although he understood that his mission was to defend along the
edge of an oil field, he had no map, no plan, and no communication
with his higher headquarters. The ability of the Iraqi small unit
leadership to invoke loyalty and influence up and down the
command chain was almost completely lacking and unquestionably
contributed to the disintegration of Iraqi Regular Army units in the
face of advancing coalition forces.
As far as cohesion serving as a factor in combat motivation,
questioning revealed that if Iraqi Regular Army soldiers had
emotional ties to other soldiers, they were almost always with
soldiers from their tribe or region. Squads and platoons had little
or no cohesion. Iraqs approximately 150 major tribes are comprised
of more than 2,000 smaller clans with a wide range of religions
and ethnic groups. Soldiers spoke of units fragmented by tribal
or regional differences. In addition, units were at such reduced
strength that manning issues may have exacerbated the effects of
fragmentation. No Iraqi soldier reported a unit strength greater
than 40 percent. One of the two officers in the sample, a platoon
leader, found his unit composed of only nine men of more than 48
authorized.
Many soldiers reported the practice of constantly asking (and
bribing) their officers for permission to go home to their families for
ten days out of every month. As Shils and Janowitz in the World
War II study of German prisoners found, surrender decisions
are greatly facilitated when primary groups are disrupted. The
surrendering Iraqi soldiers showed little or no concern about letting
their comrades down since their allegiances to their fellow soldiers in
the unit were already strained or never fully cultivated. One BMP27
driver related how, despite the fact that one of his friends was both
his vehicle commander and his immediate supervisor, his surrender
decision was easily made at home where he was physically and
emotionally separated from his unit.

8
 Interviews uncovered no evidence of higher order concepts
such as commitment to national service or the Arabic obligation
to withstand (Sumoud) among the Iraqi soldiers interviewed. The
soldiers never invoked Iraqi nationalism or the need to repel
Americans as an invading army in response to questions about
why they were in the Army, or what would cause them to try their
hardest in battle.28
The Iraqi Regular Army appeared to be a poorly trained, poorly
led, disparate group of conscripts who were more concerned with
self-preservation and family ties than defending their country. It
provided a good case study of what happens to a unit when social
cohesion and leadership are absent.

Motivated for Others.

When U.S. troops were interviewed shortly after their experience

in combat (for most, it was 3 weeks of continuous enemy contact),
one of the first questions the researchers posed addressed their
reasons for entering the military in the first place. The responses
were what most recruiters already know--to get money for college,
to gain experience before looking for a job, to follow in the footsteps
of a family member who had been in the military, or just to find
some adventure before settling down. Although one or two
mentioned that they were motivated to enlist because of September
11, 2001, most did not cite patriotism or ideology as their enlistment
rationale.
As the interview progressed, soldiers were asked the same
question posed to World War II combat soldiers by Stouffer and
also to the Iraqi EPWs in this monograph--Generally, in your
combat experience, what was most important to you in making you
want to keep going and do as well as you could? For World War
II soldiers, besides ending the task to go home, the most common
response was solidarity with ones comrades. For Iraqi Regular
Army soldiers, it was coercion. For U.S. soldiers in the Iraq War,
similar responses were given about going home, but importantly the
most frequent response given for combat motivation was fighting
for my buddies. Soldiers answered with comments such as, In

9
combat, just the fact that if I give up, I am not helping my buddies.
That is number one. or Me and my loader were talking about it,
and in combat the only thing that we really worry about is you and
your crew. The soldiers were talking about social cohesion--the
emotional bonds between soldiers.
Social cohesion appears to serve two roles in combat motivation.
First, because of the close ties to other soldiers, it places a burden of
responsibility on each soldier to achieve group success and protect
the unit from harm. Soldiers feel that although their individual
contribution to the group may be small, it is still a critical part of
unit success and therefore important. As one soldier put it, I am
the lowest ranking private on the Bradley [fighting vehicle] so I am
trying to kind of prove something in a way that I could do things. I
did not want to let anyone down.
This desire to contribute to the unit mission comes not from a
commitment to the mission, but a social compact with the members
of the primary group. One Bradley Commander (BC) spoke of the
infantrymen in the back of his vehicle and the responsibility he felt
for them:

You have two guys in the back who are not seeing what is going on, and
they are putting all their trust into the gunner and the BC. Whatever
objects or obstacles, or tanks or vehicles are in front of you, you are
taking them out, because they dont know what is going on. They are
just like in a dark room. They cant do nothing. Having that trust. . . . I
guess that is one thing that kept me going.

One soldier simply stated, I know that as far as myself, sir, I

take my squad mates lives more important than my own. Another
soldier related the intense burden he felt for his fellow soldiers,
That person means more to you than anybody. You will die if he
dies. That is why I think that we protect each other in any situation.
I know that if he dies and it was my fault, it would be worse than
death to me.
The second role of cohesion is to provide the confidence and
assurance that someone soldiers could trust was watching their
back. This is not simply trusting in the competence, training,
or commitment to the mission of another soldier, but trusting in

10
someone they regarded as closer than a friend who was motivated
to look out for their welfare. In the words of one infantryman, You
have got to trust them more than your mother, your father, or
girlfriend, or your wife, or anybody. It becomes almost like your
guardian angel.
The presence of comrades imparts a reassuring belief that all will
be well. As one soldier stated, It is just like a big family. Nothing
can come to you without going through them first. It is kind of
comforting. One soldier noted, If he holds my back, then I will
hold his, and nothing is going to go wrong. Another added, If
you are going to war, you want to be able to trust the person who
is beside you. If you are his friend, you know he is not going to let
you down. . . . He is going to do his best to make sure that you dont
die.
Once soldiers are convinced that their own personal safety will
be assured by others, they feel empowered to do their job without
worry. One soldier attempted to describe how the close relationship
he had with another soldier provided the psychological cushion to
drive his vehicle without concern:

I knew Taylor would personally look out for me. . . . It was stupid little
things like, Dude, you look like you need a hug. He would come over
and give me a big old bear hug. He knew that I looked out for him
and vice versa. . . . Knowing that there is somebody watching when I
didnt have the opportunity to watch myself when I am driving--Taylor
watched everywhere. When I am driving down the road, I have to
watch in front of me knowing where I am driving and knowing that I
am not going to drive over anything. I dont know what is behind me.
I dont know what is to my side. I trusted Taylor was going to keep an
eye on everything. He always did. Obviously, he did. We are still here.
Thank God.

It should be noted that soldiers understood that totally entrusting

their personal safety to others could be viewed as irrational. One
young soldier commented on his parents reaction--My whole
family thinks that I am a nut. They think, How can you put your
life in someones hands like that? . . . You are still going to be shot.
Despite the occasional skepticism of outsiders, soldiers greatly
valued being free of the distracting concerns of personal safety.

11
 Of course, anyone who has been around soldiers for any period of
time recognizes that there is always a level of bickering and quarreling
occurring between soldiers--especially in austere conditions. Social
cohesion in combat, however, manages to overcome petty disputes.
A soldier put it this way:

I think that when we are here and we are living and seeing each other
every single day going on 6 months, there is a lot of [stuff] that you just
get irritated with and dont want to be around one another. But in the
same sense, I think that everybody learned that no matter how [ticked]
off we were at one another and how bad we were fighting, when the
artillery started raining down and [stuff] started hitting the fan--it was
like the [stuff] never happened. Everybody just did what we had to
do. It was just looking out for one another. We werent fighting for
anybody else but ourselves. We werent fighting for some higher-up
who is somebody; we were just fighting for each other.

The bonds of trust between soldiers take weeks and months to

develop. Soldiers related how shared experiences prior to combat
helped develop those bonds. One soldier related how the weeks
of training prior to deployment helped build relationships between
soldiers:

Going out and constantly training together, NTC rotations. . . . We are

together every day for the majority of the day, 5 days a week. You are
going to start knowing what ticks people off, what makes them happy,
what you need to do to work with them. Eventually a bond is going to
form.

Once deployed, soldiers spent more time together training. As

one soldier noted, We have worked a lot together. We did a lot of
field training together, so it is like we are brothers. Suffered through
it all together.
But cohesion is not just developed in training. In the long, often
mundane, periods of time spent neither in training or actual combat,
the bonds between soldiers are often nurtured. One infantryman
spoke of cultivating relationships while pulling security:

I knew we were going to end up spending some time together, but I

never knew that we would be sleeping nose to nose, waking each other
up to stand guard over the hole. . . You are waking somebody up to help

12
 keep you awake and they will get up and talk to you for however long
it takes.

Interestingly, much of the cohesion in units is developed simply

because there is nothing else to do except talk. As one soldier
observed, In a fighting hole with somebody for so many hours,
you get to know them real good because there is nothing else to talk
about. You become real good friends. Another pointed out:

You are sitting in the dirt, scanning back and forth, [and] the only person
you got to talk to for me is him, which is on my left right here, about 18
inches away, sitting shoulder to shoulder. After about a month or so
in the dirt like that together, you start talking about family. You start
talking about everything . . . family, friends, what is going on, and your
life in general pretty much, what is not right at home. Everything.

While some soldiers referred to the relationships between soldiers

as friendships, most tried to convey the depth of the relationships
by using the analogy of the family. One soldier insightfully noted:

You are away from your family and everybody--I dont care who you are,
even if you are in the States and you are not in the military--you are going
to look for something to attach yourself to. In the military, especially
when you come out to the field, you have no family. Everyone here
becomes your family. With my wife, for the first couple years of being
with her, I had to learn to live with her--her routine in the morning and
how my routine fits in with that, who uses the bathroom first and what
have you. It is the same thing with a bunch of Joes walking around. You
learn everybodys personality--who is grumpy in the morning, who is
grumpy at night, and who is grumpy when they miss chow and let them
up in front of you. It is pretty much the same deal.

Another soldier echoed the family analogy by stating:

We eat, drink, [go to the bathroom]--everything--together. I think that

it should be like that . . . I really consider these guys my own family,
because we fight together, we have fun together. . . . We are to the point
where we even call the squad leader Dad.

Despite the academic debate concerning social cohesion and its

effects on performance, social cohesion remains a key component of
combat motivation in U.S. soldiers. Social cohesion is what motivates

13
soldiers not only to perform their job, but also to accept responsibility
for the interests of other soldiers. At the same time, social cohesion
relieves each soldier of the constant concern for personal safety as
other members of the unit take on that responsibility.

Reporting the War.

To provide another perspective on cohesion in combat units, the

researchers solicited views from members of the embedded media,
who presented a unique point of view for two reasons. First, they
could describe small unit dynamics in combat from an observer
viewpoint. Because they were essentially outsiders, they did not
have to be committed to the units mission or contribute to the unit
effort. Second, and more importantly, embedded media could relate
their own experiences with relationships in their embedded units.
It was expected that most of the embedded media would avoid
becoming too emotionally connected with soldiers to maintain
their objective, neutral journalist role. Staying aloof would avoid
predictions that the media embeds would end up in bed with their
military protectors.29 As CBS anchor Dan Rather warned early in
the war, Theres a pretty fine line between being embedded and
being entombed.30
Embedded media were asked if their intentions were to establish
close bonds with the soldiers and then to describe the eventual
outcome as far as establishing emotional bonds. Surprisingly, the
overwhelming majority of the media interviewed did not attempt
to prevent any bonds from forming. One journalist commented, I
knew they would form, I just didnt know how strong they would
be.31 For the media, cohesion provided the assurance that their
personal safety would not be imperiled. One media person noted,
We were going to war. It was potentially dangerous. I needed to
get to know people to figure out who to trust if things got ugly.
Another stated, My intention all along was to form as close a bond
as possible, since my main objective was to come home safe, second
to telling the story.
Nearly all of the embedded media stated that close emotional
bonds did form, although the bonds were not instantaneous. Similar
to the experience of soldiers, time spent together provided an

14
opportunity for relationships to develop. As one embed stated, Its
impossible to spend that much time living and working with people
round-the-clock and not develop both a rapport and an affection.
In the words of another journalist:

I felt at first the soldiers were very suspicious and leery of me. But as
the days went by and I faced the threats they faced and I went through
the hardships without complaint, and I helped wherever I could, and I
tried to do good deeds for them whenever possible, they came around
and actually ended up feeling quite a bit of affection for me. I certainly
did for them.

Another reporter related how he became close to his

minder:

At the battery level, I rode with this young lieutenant who was in
charge of media relations through the initial race across Iraq in the
opening few days of the war. We faced snipers and an enemy artillery
attack together and I think that helped form a bond. When we finally
made camp out in the desert and stayed there for a week or so, he and I
often chatted for hours on end (there not being much else to do most of
the time).

To many of the embeds, the relationships that formed were

surprising and profound. One reporter stated, I dont really have
many close male friends back here at home. So I didnt expect
much in the way of close emotional relationships. I was pleasantly
surprised that I made some very close friendships with some of these
guys. Another journalist reflected upon the experience and stated:

I am still in contact with the wives, who pass on messages from their
husbands. We also learned after we returned home that the two cots
[I and my photographer] used . . . were still in place and no one else
was allowed to sleep there, either out of respect for us or because they
think we might be back. Either way, I thought it was a nice tribute and
demonstrates in some small degree the respect they have for us and the
friendships we developed while telling the story of Charlie Co.s war.

Interestingly, once a level of personal trust was established via

the emotional bonds with the soldiers, the embedded media felt as
if they could accomplish their job better. With their personal safety

15
assured through the trust gained by closer personal relationships,
the media could fully concentrate on reporting the war. One
embedded journalist contrasted his experience in the Gulf War with
the Iraq War. In the Gulf War, he felt like an outsider and a spy.
In the Iraq War, he was able to deliver a better product--reporting
the war uninterrupted by a lack of trust. He commented, War is
a barrier by itself, so you dont need another barrier with a lack of
trust. Another reporter noted, I became so familiar with them that
I became part of the team. I was serving my nation as well, in a
different way, just like the soldiers.
As far as becoming too close to the unit and losing objectivity, the
embedded media saw that the trust that comes with cohesion works
both ways. They could trust the soldiers, but the soldiers could also
trust the media to report fairly. After a serious incident occurred in
one unit, a reporter commented how the relationship he had formed
with the brigade commander allowed him to report on the incident:

What was really helpful was that by then, he and I had already got to
know each other. I liked him and trusted him. When he said he was
concerned about releasing certain information, he would give me a
reason, and the reason made sense. That is not generally the case even in
civilian life when dealing with officials in a crisis.

Another reporter, after experiencing the combat intensity of

purposefully driving into ambush after ambush on a Thunder
Run into Baghdad, described how the bonds he had formed helped
him overcome his reluctance to go again:

The company first sergeant, in whose APC I rode, asked me if I wanted

to stay behind that day because he knew it was going to be bad. But I felt
that if I opted out of that, it would be abandoning those guys. I felt I had
to be there to tell their story of the day they went into Baghdad to stay.
So, despite a great deal of concern, I went with them.

The perspectives of the embedded media are important

because they were a group that could choose their approach to
establishing relationships. While the bonds the embeds described
were often qualitatively different from the intense, almost familial

16
relationships described by soldiers, the presence of soldiers with
whom relationships had been established gave the embedded media
a reassurance of their personal safety and an empowerment to do
their job.

Motivated by the Cause.

The conventional wisdom established by post-World War II

studies done on the American soldier is that soldiers fight for each
other. This generalization was and continues to be reinforced in
American society through media ranging from Mauldins Willie and
Joe cartoons to movies such as Blackhawk Down or Band of Brothers.
Indeed, the findings of this study add yet another example of how
cohesion serves as an important component of combat motivation
for U.S. soldiers.
Cohesion is not, of course, the only source of combat motivation.
The notion of fighting for ones comrades has usually been contrasted
with the possibility that soldiers may be motivated in combat by
idealistic principles--fighting for the cause. Past researchers almost
always concluded that ideological notions are not prime sources
of combat motivation for American soldiers. For example, Civil
War researcher Bell Wiley studied both the Confederate and Union
armies. Concerning the Confederate soldiers, he wrote that it is
doubtful whether many of them either understood or cared about
the Constitutional issues at stake.32 Concerning the Union soldiers,
he wrote, One searches most letters and diaries in vain for soldiers
comment on why they were in the war or for what they were fighting.
. . . American soldiers of the 1860s appear to have been about as little
concerned with ideological issues as were those of the 1940s.33
The soldiers in the 1940s were the subjects of Stouffers The
American Soldier studies. In that work, he noted that, Officers and
enlisted men alike attached little importance to idealistic motives--
patriotism and concern about war aims.34 He added that except for
expressions of flagrant disloyalty, the strongest taboo in World War
II combat soldiers was any talk of a flag-waving variety.35
Surprisingly, in the present study, many soldiers did respond that
they were motivated by idealistic notions. Liberating the people and

17
bringing freedom to Iraq were common themes in describing their
combat motivation. In the words of one soldier, Liberating those
people. Liberating Iraq. Seeing them free. They were repressed for,
I dont know how many years, 30 something years. Just knowing
that they are free now. Knowing that is awesome to me. Another
soldier noted:

There were good times when we see the people. . . . How we liberated
them. That lifted up our morale. Seeing the little children. Smiling
faces. Seeing a woman and man who were just smiling and cheering
Good! Good! Good! Freedom Good! . . . That lifted us up and kept us
going. We knew we were doing a positive thing.

One embedded media person wrote, By far the most powerful

motivation for many soldiers here is the belief that they will improve
life for the Iraqi people.36 Another embed commented that soldiers
did fight out of a sense of camaraderie and a duty concept, but an
icing of patriotism guides their decision to go down this path.
Three points are important here. First, this combat motivation
centered on bringing freedom and democracy to Iraq. It was not
nationalism or even a national security issue, but a more fundamental
outcome addressing the people of Iraq. Although much of the official
rationale for the war was much more complex, e.g., Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM is the multinational coalition effort to liberate the
Iraqi people, eliminate Iraqs weapons of mass destruction and end
the regime of Saddam Hussein,37 soldiers focused only on the more
fundamental liberation aspects of the war aims.
Second is the timing of this response. Many soldiers described
how this motivation was revealed to them as combat progressed.
The images of Iraqi citizens, especially the children, helped the
realization of liberation as a motivation to emerge as the war
developed. As one soldier related:

After everything settled down we actually got to see some of the

people we liberated and we got to talk to them. I think that was the
most rewarding part of it. Getting to do presence patrol and seeing all
the little kids coming out and waving, everybody honking their horns,
everybody being happy because we came over here and we kicked some
ass.

18
 Another infantryman noted:

We were down for a while because we were in cities--all we did was get
shot at and we didnt see no civilians until like now . . . I didnt see it at
first, and then I saw the people coming back who are happy, it was like,
Thank You! That really was the turning point. Now I know what I am
doing.

It appears that todays soldiers are motivated in actual combat

by fighting for their buddies, but once the war outcomes become
apparent, the motivation shifts to more ideological themes.
Additionally, these soldiers were interviewed just a few days after
major combat operations, but before units transitioned to the peace
enforcement role. Possibly, as soldiers experience a protracted
deployment supporting the Coalition Provisional Authority, this
motivation may shift again.
Third, while it is no longer taboo to talk about idealistic notions
--especially after September 11th, soldiers still find it difficult to
express this moral dimension of their combat motivation. It was not
uncommon for soldiers to tell of the difficulty of describing morally
charged values. Comments such as, You just have to be there and
see it for yourself or You cant really explain it were frequent. As
one tongue-tied infantryman put it:

It may be a cornball answer, but believe me, Im not into all that, but just
actually seeing some of them waving and shooting thumbs up. They are
like, We love you America! . . . I am not like a very emotional person,
but the kids come up to you, they give you a hug. One lady came up to
one of our soldiers and tried to give him the baby so that the baby could
give him a kiss. It was like, Whoa!! It was a heartfelt moment there for
me.

Despite the results of previous studies and the subsequent

conventional wisdom that American soldiers are not motivated by
ideological sentiments, many soldiers in this study reported being
motivated by notions of freedom, liberation, and democracy. Why
would todays U.S. soldiers be more apt to speak of being motivated
by idealistic aims? Two possible reasons emerge.

19
 First, U.S. soldiers throughout history may have had ideological
motives, but did not realize it. In his study of American enlisted
men, Moskos argued that while cohesion is often the primary
combat motivation, supplementary factors (other than training
and equipment) must exist to explain why cohesion alone does
not determine battle performance. He posited that cohesion will
maintain the soldier in his combat role only when he has an
underlying commitment to the worth of the larger social system for
which he is fighting.38 He called this commitment a latent ideology
that supports the role of cohesion as a combat motivation. According
to Moskos, soldiers may not acknowledge or even know about this
latent ideology, but it nevertheless exists. Thus, while todays
soldiers still feel awkward speaking of idealistic motivations, they
may be relatively less inhibited about articulating idealistic notions
compared to soldiers of the past.
Civil War historian James McPherson proposed another possibility
concerning why soldiers sometimes fight for ideology. McPherson
argued that ideology did serve as a combat motivation during the
Civil War. He proposed that three situational characteristics were
present during the Civil War that helped ideology emerge as a
combat motivation for both sides of that war. First, he noted that
the Confederate and Union armies were the most literate armies in
history to that time. Over 80 percent of the Confederate soldiers and
over 90 percent of the Union soldiers were literate. Second, most of the
soldiers were volunteers as opposed to draftees or conscripts. They
were not forced to take up arms. Finally, McPherson noted that Civil
War soldiers came from the worlds most politicized and democratic
society.39 Soldiers voted, read newspapers, and participated in
discussions concerning national issues. The interaction of these three
factors provided the conditions where soldiers were able, inclined,
and encouraged to debate ideological notions. Soldiers who are
educated, comfortable discussing ideological topics, and volunteers
are more apt to fight for the cause. As a result, McPherson argued
that Confederate soldiers fought for liberty and independence
from what they regarded as a tyrannical government while Union
soldiers fought to preserve the nation created by the founders from
dismemberment and destruction.40

20
 Interestingly, the same three conditions exist today. Soldiers are
well-educated. The average education of a new soldier in 2002 was
12.1 years of education. That implies that the average new soldier
is more than a high school graduate; he or she has some college
experience. Soldiers are also older and more mature than we think.
In 2002, the average new soldier was 21.1 years old.
Soldiers are also amazingly in touch with the pressing issues
of the day. Via the Internet, Fox News, and CNN, they know the
world situation, who the key players are, and the essence of the
policy debates. When The New York Times quoted an infantryman
of the 3rd Infantry Division as saying, You call Donald Rumsfeld
and tell him our sorry asses are ready to go home,41 it was not only
surprising to hear such a direct message being conveyed up the
chain of command, but it was also eye-opening that a Private First
Class (PFC) would even know who the Secretary of Defense was.
One embedded journalist commented on the underestimated
sophistication of todays soldiers and said, Soldiers I encountered
were trained, ethical, thoughtful, and intelligent. It was not unusual
to talk to a Private or PFC and be absolutely astounded at how
well he could talk about why they were there [fighting in Iraq].
Additionally, soldiers are attuned to ideology, values, and abstract
principles. Since the day they took their enlistment oaths, they have
been bombarded with idealistic notions. New soldiers are socialized
to be comfortable talking about value-laden ideas ranging from the
seven Army values to the Soldiers Creed.42
Finally, todays soldiers are volunteers. They were not coerced
into service, and they did not approach the military as the employer
of last resort. They come from a generation that trusts the military
institution. In 1975, a Harris Poll reported that only 20 percent of
people ages 18 to 29 said they had a great deal of confidence in
those who ran the military.43 Compare that with a recent poll by
the Harvard Institute of Politics that found that 70 percent of college
undergraduates trust the military to do the right thing either all or
most of the time.44 Soldiers understand that they are professionals
in a values-based institution. They trust each other, their leaders, the
Army, and they understand the moral aspects of war.
The U.S. Army has matured from a conscript army, through a

21
fledgling all-volunteer army, to what is now a truly professional
army. Professional soldiers still fight for each other, but professional
soldiers also accept the responsibility that the Army has entrusted
to them. Evidence of this transition is found even in the families
of todays soldiers. When reporters interviewed wives about their
husbands delayed redeployment from Iraq, one sergeants wife
commented, As military spouses, we know our husbands have
responsibilities. They are professionals doing their jobs. Another
spouse added, I wonder how [complaining] must sound to someone
whos lost someone. 45 Still another spouse noted, I could have
married anyone else who would have been at work 9 to 5. The job
(my husband) does is an amazingly honorable one.46

Conclusion.

Shortly after the latest Iraq War, Colonel Abdul-Zahra of the

former Iraqi Army commented that, The U.S. Army is certainly the
best in the world. But its not because of the fighting men, but because
of their equipment.47 Colonel Abdul-Zahra missed the point. The
Iraq War showed that while the U.S. Army certainly has the best
equipment and training, a human dimension is often overlooked.
As military historian Victor Davis Hanson observed shortly after the
end of major combat operations in Iraq:

The lethality of the military is not just organizational or a dividend of

high-technology. Moral and group cohesion explain more still. The
general critique of the 1990s was that we had raised a generation with
peroxide hair and tongue rings, general illiterates who lounged at malls,
occasionally muttering like and you know in Sean Penn or Valley Girl
cadences. But somehow the military has married the familiarity and
dynamism of crass popular culture to 19th-century notions of heroism,
self-sacrifice, patriotism, and audacity.48

The soldiers interviewed for this study presented an impression

that was often crude, vulgar, and cynical, yet that impression was
leavened with a surprisingly natural acceptance of the institutions
values. The U.S. Army is the best in the world because, in addition to
possessing the best equipment, its soldiers also have an unmatched
level of trust. They trust each other because of the close interpersonal

22
bonds between soldiers. They trust their leaders because their leaders
have competently trained their units. And they trust the Army
because, since the end of the draft, the Army has had to attract its
members rather than conscripting them. Unable any longer to obtain
labor by force, the all-volunteer Army was compelled to transform
itself into an institution that people would respect and trust. Bonds
forged by trust replaced bonds forged by fear of punishment.49
Because our soldiers trust the Army as an institution, they now look
to the Army to provide the moral direction for war. As this study
has shown, soldiers still fight for each other. In a professional army,
however, soldiers are also sophisticated enough to grasp the moral
reasons for fighting.

Implications.

Two implications result from this study. First, cohesion, or the

strong emotional bonds between soldiers, continues to be a critical
factor in combat motivation. One of the main purposes of the Unit
Manning System is to increase unit cohesion. While critics may
attack the implications of the Unit Manning System because of the
effects on leader development, total force turbulence, or increased
personnel management complexities, denouncing cohesion as either
irrelevant or detrimental is nonsensical. Likewise, attempting to
dissect cohesion into social or task cohesion and then comparing
correlations with performance is best left to the antiseptic
experiments of academia. For those interested in overturning the
DoD homosexual conduct policy, it may be prudent to choose a
strategy other than questioning the linkage between cohesion and
combat performance.
The Iraq War confirms what every combat soldier already
knows--cohesion places a shared responsibility for the success of
the unit on each individual while giving each soldier the confidence
that someone else is watching over them. Spending large amounts
of time together, usually in austere conditions, develops this trusting
relationship. The Iraqi and American armies provide an interesting
contrast in cohesion. In the former, the absence of cohesion made
the surrender decision easy. In the latter, the presence of cohesion

23
was a primary source of combat motivation.
The second implication concerns the transformation of the force
to a professional army. The move from a struggling all-volunteer
army to a truly professional force has not been easy. Early problems
in the hollow Army included declining enlistment propensity,
low quality recruits, high attrition, and plummeting morale.50 Seven
years into the experiment, Richard Nixon, who introduced the all-
volunteer Army, wrote, The volunteer army has failed to provide
enough personnel of the caliber we need for our highly sophisticated
armaments.51 The Army rebounded in the 1980s with Be All You
Can Be and a recruiting overhaul, but the 1990s dismantled much
of what had been accomplished through a demoralizing downsizing.
The survivors picked up the pieces, however, and overcame another
recruiting crisis in the late 1990s. Today, the Army of One is the
culmination of 30 years of movement toward a professional Army.
It is a high-tech, highly trained, and highly professional force.
The bonds of trust among soldiers, their leaders, and the Army as
an institution, however, are not invulnerable. Horror film director
John Carpenter was once asked what he thought scared people the
most. His answer: Uncertainty.52 Uncertainty can unravel the
trust that provides the underpinnings for the professional Army
through two means.
First, uncertainty can be introduced by subjecting the Army to a
major downsizing. The research is clear that downsizing severely
damages the psychological contract between an organization and its
downsizing survivors.53 Those left behind grapple with uncertainty
in the form of wondering about the magnitude and duration of
the downsizing, the management of the downsizing, determining
who will pick up the remaining workload after the reductions, and
wondering if their turn is next. In the rush for lessons learned after
the Iraq War, there has been enough talk of trading force for speed
that the specter of an Army downsizing in the future is real.
Second, uncertainty can be imposed on the Army through open-
ended deployments. Soldiers will salute and deploy to distant parts
of the world when ordered, but when their redeployment date
is uncertain, trust with the institution is strained. Much like the
society they represent, todays soldiers view wars in terms of weeks,

24
not months, e.g., a CBS poll early in the war showed 62 percent of
Americans believing that the war would be quick and successful.54
While todays wars may be prosecuted quickly, the ensuing
peace operations continue indefinitely. As a result, the Army is
increasingly stretched over 120 countries, and the ability to redeploy
soldiers home after an operation has diminished significantly. After
observing the current situation, Michael OHanlon noted, It would
be the supreme irony, and a national tragedy, if after winning two
wars in 2 years, the U.S. Army were broken and defeated while
trying to keep the peace.55
This study set out to examine why soldiers fight. The findings
showed that U.S. soldiers continue to fight because of the bonds
of trust between soldiers. They also fight, however, because of the
bonds of trust established with the Army as an institution. Our
soldiers are professionals and are the culmination of 30 years of an
all-volunteer force. While that may be cause for commemoration, it
is also cause for consideration as policymakers chart the course for
the future.

ENDNOTES

1. Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern, Harrisburg, PA: Military
Service Publishing, 1947, p. 110.

2. Why We Fight, http://history.acusd.edu/gen/filmnotes/whywefight.html.

3. Frank Capra, The Name Above the Title: An Autobiography, New York: De
Capo Press, 1997, p. 327. (Original emphasis.)

4. Thomas Doherty, Projections of War: Hollywood, American Culture, and World

War II, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 70.

5. Ibid., p. 73. (Original emphasis.)

6. Samuel A. Stouffer, et al., The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath,
Volume II, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949, p. 107.

7. Ibid., p. 110.

8. Ibid., p. 136.

25
 9. S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire, New York: William Morrow and
Company, 1947, pp. 42-43.

10. Ibid., p. 161.

11. Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, Cohesion and Disintegration in the
Wehrmacht in World War II, Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 12, Summer 1948, p.
281.

12. Roger W. Little, Buddy Relations and Combat Performance, in Morris

Janowitz, ed., The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organization, New York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 1964, p. 221.

13. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in
Todays Military, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970, p. 146.

14. Other works supporting the role of cohesion in combat include Nora
Kinzer Stewart, Mates and Muchachos: Unit Cohesion in the Falklands/Malvinas
War, New York: Brasseys, 1991; William D. Henderson, Why the Vietcong Fought:
A Study of Motivation and Control in a Modern Army in Combat, Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1979; and Reuven Gal, A Portrait of an Israeli Soldier, Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1986.

15. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis in Command: Mismanagement

in the Army, New York: Hill and Wang, 1978, p. 43. The fragging data is from
1969-72.

16. U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 37, Section 654, (a) (15).

17. Elizabeth Kier, Homosexuals in the U.S. Military: Open Integration and
Combat Effectiveness, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2, Fall 1998, p. 18.

18. Robert J. MacCoun, What is Known About Unit Cohesion and Military
Performance, in RAND, Sexual Orientation and U.S. Military Personnel Policy:
Options and Assessment, Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research Institute,
MR-323-OSD, 1993, p. 298.

19. David R. Segal and Meyer Kestnbaum, Professional Closure in the

Military Labor Market: A Critique of Pure Cohesion, in Don M. Snider and Gayle
L. Watkins, eds., The Future of the Army Profession, New York: McGraw-Hill Primus,
2002, p. 453. See also Stephen B. Knouse, Keeping On Task: An Exploration of
Task Cohesion in Diverse Military Teams, Patrick Air Force Base, FL: Defense Equal
Opportunity Management Institute, 1998.

20. Unit Manning Task Force, https://www.unitmanning.army.mil/Overview_

26
items/mission_statement.htm.

21. The Iraqi soldiers required special consideration due to their status as
captured combatants. Both the Geneva Convention and specific guidance from
Department of Defense (Department of Defense Directive 3216.2, Protection of
Human Subjects and Adherence to Ethical Standards in DoD-Supported Research,
Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 25, 2002) protect enemy
prisoners from exposure to the idly curious and from use as human subjects
in behavioral research. Questions were therefore restricted to issues involving
individual and unit military effectiveness and followed the advice and consent of
staff judge advocates in Iraq, Kuwait, and CONUS. Although camp rules dictated
that prisoners remain under military guard at all times, the interview setting was
made as comfortable as possible. A U.S. military intelligence officer oversaw the
collection of information from EPWs.

22. Colonel Terrence Potter is an Arabic professor at the U.S. Military Academy
and conducted all the interviews.

23. While 16 U.S. Marines were interviewed, the majority of the U.S. sample
consisted of U.S. Army soldiers. No noticeable differences in demographics or
attitudes were noted between the Marine and Army infantrymen interviewed.

24. Subsequent quotations from soldiers are taken directly from the transcribed
interviews.

25. Perhaps the Iraqis would have been expected to fight because that is what
soldiers do when their country is attacked. Sumoud (as in the al-Sumoud missile)
means withstanding or steadfastness in Arabic, and soldiers might have been
expected to respond that they fought just to resist the invaders.

26. Absent Without Leave.

27. Soviet armored personnel carrier.

28. Such questions are sensitive in a prison setting and responses may have
been influenced by social desirability concerns. It should be noted that during
the interviews, significant numbers of prisoners were being released from the
camp--as many as 350 per day during the final 2 days of interviews. Under such
circumstances, prisoners may be less likely to express defiant or nationalistic
attitudes to military interviewers. On the other hand, knowing that freedom was
imminent may have allowed them to speak more freely.

29. Howard Kurtz, After Invading Kuwait, Reporters Need Boot Camp, The
Washington Post, March 10, 2003, p. C1.

27
 30. Justin Ewers, Is the New News Good News?, U.S. News & World Report,
Vol. 134, No. 11, April 7, 2003, p. 48.

31. All embedded media interviewed for this monograph were assigned to U.S.
Army ground units. One could expect different responses from Air Force or Navy
embedded media as well as from journalists embedded to higher headquarters.
Unless otherwise noted, quotations from embedded media are taken from phone,
email, or personal interviews.

32. Bell Irwin Wiley, The Life of Johnny Reb: The Common Soldier of the Confederacy,
Indianapolis: Wiley, 1943, p. 309.

33. Bell Irwin Wiley, The Life of Billy Yank: The Common Soldier of the Union,
Indianapolis: Wiley, 1952, pp. 39-40.

34. Stouffer, p. 111.

35. Ibid., p. 150.

36. Ann Scott Tyson, Oceans Away, US Troops Crave Approval at Home,
The Christian Science Monitor, April 8, 2003, p. 1.

37. Photo caption insert on all Operation IRAQI FREEDOM imagery, Joint
Combat Camera Center, a division of the American Forces Information Service
(AFIS), a field activity of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

38. Moskos, p. 147.

39. James M. McPherson, What They Fought For: 1861-1865, Baton Rouge,
LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1994, p. 4. See also Earl J. Hess, The Union
Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat, Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 1997, pp. 97-102, for a discussion of the role of The Cause in the combat
motivation of Union soldiers.

40. McPherson, p. 7.

41. Steven Lee Myers, Anxious and Weary of War, G.I.s Face a New Iraq
Mission, The New York Times, June 15, 2003, p. 1.

42. The seven Army values are Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless-service, Honor,
Integrity, and Personal Courage. These values are on posters, wallet cards, and
even tags to accompany each soldiers identification tags (dog tags). The Soldiers
Creed is issued to soldiers with their Soldiers Manual on the first day of basic
training. It contains statements such as, I am doing my share to keep alive the
principles of freedom for which my country stands.

28
 43. Harris Poll, Harris Confidence Index, January 22, 2003.

44. Institute of Politics, Harvard University, A National Survey of College

Undergraduates, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2002, p. 2.

45. Jack Kelley, Gary Strauss, and Martin Kasindorf, Troops, Families Await
Wars Real End, USA Today, June 12, 2003, p. 1.

46. Gregg Zoroya, Spouses, Kids Endure Own Agonies of War, USA Today,
July 11, 2003, p. 9.

47. Charles J. Hanley, Iraqis Find Price of Battle Too High, Associated Press,
June 1, 2003.

48. Victor Davis Hanson, Anatomy of the Three-Week War, National Review
Online, April 17, 2003, http://www.nationalreview.com/hanson/hanson041703.asp.

49. Richard A. Posner, An Army of the Willing, New Republic, May 19, 2003,
p. 27.

50. See Mark J. Eitelberg, The All-Volunteer Force After Twenty Years, in
J. Eric Fredland, et al., eds., Professional on the Front Line: Two Decades of the All-
Volunteer Force, Washington: Brasseys, 1996, pp. 66-98.

51. Richard M. Nixon, The Real War, New York: Warner Books, 1980, p. 201.

52. Mark Seal, What Scares the Scary People? American Way, October 15,
1993, p. 71.

53. For an analysis of the effects of the Army downsizing on those left behind,
see Leonard Wong and Jeffrey McNally, Downsizing the Army: Some Policy
Implications Affecting the Survivors, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 20, Winter
1994, pp. 199-216.

54. CBS News Poll, Americans See Longer War, March 25, 2003.

55. Michael OHanlon, Breaking The Army, The Washington Post, July 3,
2003, p. 23.

29
 U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research
Dr. Steven Metz

Authors
Dr. Leonard Wong
Colonel Thomas A. Kolditz
Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A. Millen
Colonel Terrence M. Potter

Director of Publications
Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition
Ms. Gretchen S. Smith
 CONFERENCE REPORT

A NATION AT WAR

Seventeenth Annual Strategy Conference

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
April 11-13, 2006

Edited by
Colonel (Retired) John R. Martin

January 2007

Visit our website for other free publication downloads

http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/

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This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined

in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the
public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States
Code, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted.
 *****

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution
is unlimited.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

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on the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies
of this report also may be ordered from our homepage. SSIs
homepage address is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail

newsletter to update the national security community on the
research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and
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also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research
analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please
subscribe on our homepage at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.
mil/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-273-X

ii
 CONTENTS

FOREWORD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

PANEL I. THE HOMELAND SECURITY CONTEXT:

NATIONAL ACCESS VS. NATIONAL SECURITY
General.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Border Security: A Foreign Perspective
by Ms. Susan Sim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

PANEL II. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT:

COALITION BUILDING AND MAINTENANCE
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Coalition Building
by Lieutenant General (Retired)
Christian Delanghe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

PANEL III. THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT:

THE RESERVE COMPONENTS AT WAR
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Building a Defense Force for the 21st Century
by Dr. William J. Perry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

PANEL IV. THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT:

GLOBALIZATION VS. NATIONAL SECURITY
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Globalization and U.S. National Security:
An Overview of Some Basic Issues
by Dr. Edward M. Graham. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

iii
 The Economic Rise of China:
Commercial Threat or Blessing?
by Dr. Leif Rosenberger. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
The Dollar as a Commodity of Strategic
National Interest
by Mr. John D. Lange. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

PANEL V. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW

AND NATIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT:
COMPETING LEGAL ISSUES
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Justifying the American Way of War
by Professor Michael F. Noone. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
The Nation at War
by Rear Admiral (Retired) Jane G. Dalton . . . . . . 149
Competing Legal Issues: A European Viewpoint
by Professor Charles Garraway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

iv
 FOREWORD

The U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Strategy

Conference each year addresses a major security issue of
relevance to the United States and its allies. Recognizing
that the ultimate symbol of the nations commitment
is boots on the ground, the USAWC focuses the
Strategy Conference on the subjects implications for
ground power. The conference brings together top
national security strategists, senior military leaders,
media, university faculty, and the policymaking
community to consider, discuss, and debate topics
concerning Americas national security strategy. The
2006 conference was designed to help frame vital
questions that offer insights on the conference theme:
A Nation at War.
The phrase A Nation at War evokes images of
mobilization of the nations resources: military surely,
but also the government, industry, and the population.
Thus far in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT),
though, the mobilization has not been on the scale
seen in past global wars. As the Nation approached
the 5-year mark of the start of the GWOT, the USAWC
focused the attention of its Seventeenth Annual
Strategy Conference on whether or not the evidence
supports the continuing assumption that the Nation
is really at war. Some would insist that the answer is
obviously yes. The conference studied this question in
depth with panels on the homeland security aspects,
the international context, the legal foundation for the
war, and the associated economic and domestic policy
issues. The conclusion was that the answer to the
question is not as clear as first thought. Much of the
evidence suggests that the Nationor at least some
parts of itis not at war.


 The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to provide
this summary, analysis, and associated papers from
the 2006 conference.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director
Strategic Studies Institute

vi
 INTRODUCTION

Is America at war? To the soldier under attack

today from a roadside bomb or a group of insurgents
in Iraq, the answer seems clear: a resounding yes. The
same unequivocal response would have emanated
from Afghanistan in 2002, although that theater has
suffered from inattention in the intervening years. In
Afghanistan, the answer to the war question is a bit
harder: soldiers in Kabul recognize that they are at
something other than peace, but may not be sure
that they are at war . . . and with whom. As one draws
farther and farther from the theaters of war, confusion
increases about whether or not the Nation is really at
war. Even in some parts of the Defense Department,
bureaucracyin the most pejorative sense of the
wordreigns, providing examples that suggest even
the agency charged with prosecuting the war is unable
to instill in all its people the urgency that should attach
when a nation is involved in an existential fight. Military
personnel serving in Iraq and Afghanistan sometimes
can see the faults of their own Department, but are
more likely to focus their attention on other parts of
the government. In 2005 (and undoubtedly continuing
in 2006), senior leaders in Iraq increasingly were
asking, Wheres the rest of the U.S. Government?
The State Department, with its significant investment
of personnel and other resources in Iraq, is protected
somewhat from the implied criticism, but many parts
of the diplomatic corps also are missing the expected
sense of urgency. Perhaps worst of all is the answer
that would come from the broad American public.
Their vocal response might be affirmative, but except
for those families with loved ones in the military, there


might be scant tangible evidence that the Nation is at
war.
Part of the confusion stems from the nature of
the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The war is
certainly existential, but judging the performance of
the nation by the standard of the fight for the nations
life in World War II is wrong. Even in World War II,
some parts of the United Statesgovernment and
publicmight have been only marginally affected,
but the overwhelming majority of the country felt
in daily life the sacrifices required for the war effort.
Mobilization was immense; American industry was
mobilized on par with the nations citizenry. Although
some actionslike saving tin foil to be used in building
battleshipswere more symbolic than significant,
virtually every American was acutely aware of his or
her role in the war. When making comparisons against
the World War II standard, analysts of todays GWOT
can not be faulted for suggesting that the Nation really
is not at war.
A better standard to use for comparison would
perhaps be the Cold War. The Department of Defense
(DoD), in its Quadrennial Defense Review and other
documents, has recognized that the United States is
engaged in . . . what will be a long war.1 During the
Cold War, the nuclear threat sometimes seemed like the
Sword of Damocles hanging over the head of the U.S.
populace, but faith in deterrenceeven that provided
by mutually assured destructionallowed Americans
to continue with their everyday lives. Industry was
able to focus on products other than military materiel,
contributing to the strength of the economy that was
key in the eventual defeat of the Soviet Union. The
analogy with the Cold War is not perfect: the economy
may be of less importance in the GWOT than finding


the intellectual capital to win the diplomatic and
informational battles that lie ahead. Nonetheless, the
Cold War paradigm is probably more appropriate for
a comparison with todays GWOT.
For the U.S. Army War Colleges Seventeenth An-
nual Strategy Conference, the Strategic Studies Institute
proposed analysis of several of the many dimensions
of the GWOT. Recognizing that no conference could
hope to be comprehensive in such an analysis, the
conference organizers decided to concentrate on five
distinct aspects of the current war, hoping to touch in
some way on each of the elements of national power.
1. Defending the nations borders (addressingat
least in partthe informational element of national
power). When in a wareither of the Cold War or
World War II varietydefense of the borders is an
imperative. One side of a current political debate
suggests that open borders are the more desirable
alternative. While not specifically addressing the
national security risks, the pundits on this side of the
equation point out that tightening borders and limiting
foreign entrance into the country are accompanied by
real costs: economic costs, intellectual costs, and costs
in international goodwill. Finding the balance between
open and tightly-constricted borders presents a major
national security challenge.
2. Building and maintaining international support
(addressing an issue for the diplomatic element of
national power). Even a unilateral preemptive
attack requires the support of other nations, whether
organized in a loosely-bound coalition or bonded
together as allies in a legally-binding treaty. In Iraq
and other recent operations, some part of that support
simply has served a legitimizing function. Absent an
international mandatefrom the United Nations (UN)


or other internationally-recognized bodythe addition
of coalition partners confers a degree of legitimacy on
a particular operation. Those partners, though, join
because of their own national interests, not necessarily
because of some shared rationale for the conflict at
hand. Those same interests drive alliances, too, but
alliance partners usually can be expected to contribute
significantnot tokenforces to a fight. Both alliances
and legitimizing coalitions provide a valuable service
in the GWOT and any war; again the question is one of
balance.
3. The domestic context and the Reserve
Components (addressing domestic support through
an analysis of one part of the military element of
national power). Available evidence suggests that
the Armys personnel and equipment are stressed by
the on-going requirements of the long war and the
continuing obligations for engagement around the
world. One key piece of evidence is the paradigm shift
in how the Army Reserve and National Guard are
mobilized, deployed, and employed. While supporting
processes remain mired in a Cold War mentality, the
Reserve Components have gone from being a strategic
reservethe Cold War modelto an operational
reserve. A new force generation model is attempting
to put some predictability into deployment cycles,
but the reserves in the GWOT are deploying more
regularly, with some predictable adverse impacts on
recruiting, retaining, and equipping the force. Another
adverse impact became obvious in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, when many of the National Guard
first responders in the affected States were unavailable
because of deployment. As with nearly all of the adverse
impacts of limited force size, adaptable leaders found
work around solutions that dedicated soldiers could


execute to accomplish the mission. However, these
solutions frequently fell short of the desired end-state
and were clearly executed on the backs of war-weary
soldiers, both active and reserve.
4. Economic dimensions (addressing the economic
element of national power). Economic globalization
may be a good phenomenon for those nations blessed
with the ability to move rapidly as markets shift.
However, globalization also creates a regime of loser
nations, those with no ability to adapt quickly and with
no safety net when a broad swath of their citizenry find
themselves unemployed, possibly producing recruiting
opportunities for Americas enemies around the
world. Another economic phenomenon that affects the
means to execute the nations strategy is the amount of
Americas external debt. A robust economy is needed
to prosecute the war; some of the current monetary and
taxation policies put the economy at significant risk in
the mid-term.
5. The rule of law (also addressing the information
element of national power). One of Americas
enduring values is the legal foundation of society.
Even whenperhaps especially whenAmericas
enemies ignore the basic provisions of international
law, America should set an example for the rest of the
world by adhering to the highest legal standards. In the
GWOT, that example has been tarnished by perceived
inadequate justification (casus belli) for the war in Iraq
and by inappropriate conduct during the war. Notable
among the latter is the treatment of prisoners at Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq, but the practice of rendition of
prisoners to third countries and the use of aggressive
interrogation techniques some believe this to be a
euphemism for tortureare not helping the United
States win the war of ideas in the Muslim world.


Legal scholars are challenged to lay out the legal basis
for the war and then to state the rules under which
the war should be prosecuted. Neither the war model
nor the law enforcement model covers precisely
all the situations being encountered in the GWOT.
Soldiers fighting the war deserve clear guidance on
the application of jus in bello; American citizens asked
to support the war need to know that their soldiers
are acting appropriately in a war that was justified
adequately.
This book is a compilation of the papers that resulted
from panels convened to discuss the five particular
aspects of the war described above. Where papers were
not provided, the editors comments seek to provide
the gist of each panelists presentation. A brief analysis
of each panels contributionanalysis sometimes
engendered by questions asked by the Strategy
Conference audienceis also part of this conference
report and may provide some added meaning to the
panelists presentations and help in understanding the
complex issues addressed.

ENDNOTES - INTRODUCTION

1. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, p. v,

inter alia.


 PANEL I

THE HOMELAND SECURITY CONTEXT:

NATIONAL ACCESS VERSUS NATIONAL SECURITY

General.

Immigrationespecially changing the status of

millions of illegal immigrantsis a hot button
topic as the President and Congress attempt to craft
a reasonable policy, while listening to a cacophony
of voices recommending one solution or another. To
their great credit, the panelists on National Access
vs. National Security steered clear of the controversy.
They focused instead on the national security interests
that help to locate the balance between a theoretical
hermetically sealed border and one that is so open
that unwanted personnel are able to cross at will to do
Americans harm or to perpetrate their own criminal
enterprises. Without saying so explicitly, the panel made
the point that the largely-Hispanic illegal immigrant
issue is a by-product of a border management system
that lacked appropriate enforcement and resources
to work effectively. Nonetheless, the real national
security interest is not immigrants who provide cheap
labor (although they do have an economic and social
impact); the threat is from thosenot immigrants at
allwho come to the United States to do harm to the
American people.
In his opening remarks, panel moderator Ted
Gong pointed out the paradigm shift that followed
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11).
Prior to those attacks, the granting of visas was
perceived as increasingly liberal. Perhaps a result


of the governments decreased ability to process a
growing number of visa requests, the average visit
length had progressively increased, causing concern
about overstays. Further, with some countries, the
visa requirement was eliminated altogether in favor
of the Visa Waiver Program, developed for those
countries which were considered least likely to have
citizens overstaying their visa-authorized time in the
U.S. Whether strategic calculation or simple workload
analysis produced the liberal policy was moot; the open
borders were considered good for American commerce
and society, which benefited from the free exchange of
goods and ideas. The policy also supported government
efforts to open other countries to American travelers
and business.
September 11, of course, forced lawmakers and
the public to think differently about visa policies and
immigration management. The indefinite visaeven
for Americas strongest allieswas eliminated entirely,
and visas granted after 9/11 were often for significantly
shorter stays. In an age when an airplane could be used
as a guided missile, the restrictions seemed appropriate,
but produced immediate impacts on personal access to
the United States for businessmen and tourists. In the
longer term, adverse impacts were felt on other forms
of commerce, too. Diplomatic efforts to open targeted
countries by offering reciprocal entry to America also
were affected negatively. The latter seemed especially
counterproductive to efforts to spread American values
abroad. Almost 5 years after 9/11, some technological
applications and procedural changes have mitigated
the effects of restricted cross-border flow, but no final
balance has been found between tight borders and the
need for adequate screening of international traffic
terminating in the United States.


Ms. Elaine Dezenski.

At an International Organization for Migration

(IOM) conference earlier this year, Panelist Elaine
Dezenski said,

On any map, national borders look like big, imposing

monuments to national sovereignty, but the number
of places where reality meets image is very small.
Instead, boundaries between countries often amount to
imaginary lines across mountain ranges or deserts, or
simply a counter at an airport. People may cross borders
either temporarily or to migrate for reasons ranging
from tourism, business, to seek economic or social
opportunity,or to engage in acts of terrorism. Our
challenge today is to develop approaches that make that
line on a map as transparent and welcoming as possible
for those in the first group while making it as imposing
as possible to the second.1

Border security is too often translated as sealed

borders, but the demands of legitimate commerce
require that borders be as transparent as possible. Ms.
Dezenski provided insights into the layered security
that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sees
as key for integrated border management, describing
three key parts: interoperability, biometrics, and
international cooperation. Although she described the
first two as separate components, she did not really
distinguish between them as she spoke about the U.S.
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
(US-VISIT) program. The biometrics was explained in
some detail; the interoperability had to be assumed,
though she was clear that the concept of US-VISIT is
based on the idea that integrated border manage-
ment systems are the foundation of ensuring that
those visiting the United States are appropriately


identified and assessed for risk. At established ports
of entry, those seeking entry to the United States are
required to submit two fingerprints and to have a
digital photo taken. Ms. Dezenski claimed that it takes
only 15 seconds for the data to be gathered and for
it to be processed through a database that identifies
those to whom the United States would deny access.
The processing time seems incredible, especially
when the process must include a search through
various databases (perhaps what she meant when she
mentioned interoperability2). This technology generally
was available earlier, but it took the horror of 9/11 to
provide the political will to develop and install such a
system at the borders. The goal of the program seems to
be to slow down legitimate visitorstourists, students,
legal immigrantsonly imperceptibly, while filtering
the terrorists, criminals, and illegal immigrants. The
system seems to be working in both regards: 15 seconds
is not a too-high price to pay for border security, and the
identities of undesirable entrants are being unraveled
before they gain entry to the United States.
Two problems remain. First, US-VISIT screens
only people who use the normal and legitimate
ports of entry. Those who take advantage of porous
American borders to bypass the system are still able
to enter the United States. Second, in an age in which
terrorists contemplate the use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), the system to keep them out of the
United States needs to be perfect, not just a help in
screening the millions of visitors to America each year.
In the end, US-VISIT cannot reach this lofty goal, but is
probably the best possible program until alternatives
or improvements are developed.
International cooperation is a requirement for
layered security that essentially extends Americas

10
borders further from U.S. shores. The second program
Ms. Dezenski discussedthe Western Hemisphere
Travel Initiativewas an outgrowth of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, which
required the Department of State and DHS to close the
so-called Western Hemisphere loophole that allowed
travelersincluding U.S. citizensto cross borders in
the Americas, the Caribbean, and Bermuda without
a passport or other identification proving name and
citizenship. The initiative will be phased in over the
course of the next 2 years and is the cause of much
consternation, especially in Canada. Some options are
being considered for new credentialing options that
would provide frequent travelers an option other than
a passport.
Ms. Dezenski concluded her remarks with an
overview of the Security and Prosperity Partnership
(SPP) with Canada and Mexico. According to the
leaders of the three North American nations, the
programs aim is to . . . ensure North America is the
most economically dynamic region in the world and a
secure home for our citizens.3 The partnership covers
a variety of issues, from avian influenza pandemics
and emergency management to energy security, but
calls for smart, secure borders in North America.
The partnership looks closely at development of
common American/Canadian/Mexican strategies
for the free and secure flow of commerce across the
borders of the continent. Just as a naturalor man-
madedisaster in one country can affect the other
continental neighbors, a unilateral border enforcement
regime can have impacts beyond the enacting nations
shores. The SPP goal is to ensure common external
border processes and procedures that allow the
governments to have less concern about commerce

11
crossing the borders shared by the three countries. To
paraphrase Ms. Dezenski, Were not there yet. . . and
it will be a while. As with the simpler process of
personnel flow, the goal for such partnerships must be
perfection so long as one terrorist cell can produce such
dramatically disproportionate casualties, either with
WMD or with improvised weapons as seen on 9/11.
That goal is impossible, of course, but SPP provides
a policy framework to focus on those areas of shared
importance.
A common framework is only as effective as its
ability to get it right every time, by stopping the flow
of terrorists, their money or their weapons. Arguably,
the best policy would push the borders even further
from North American shores. Ms. Dezenski provided
some detail about initiatives with Canada and Mexico,
two countries with which the United States has
frequent immigration or travel issues, but with which
the United States also is traditionally very friendly.
Left unaddressed by Ms. Dezenski was the greater
challenge with nationsespecially those with interests
inimical to those of the United Statesfurther from
U.S. borders. Obtaining their cooperation in extending
Americas borders will be problematic. At the same
time, broader challenges exist with key trading partners
in Europe and elsewhere. Obtaining their cooperation
in American border policies will be essential to creating
a lasting and effective border management system.

Mr. Mark Krikorian.

Mark Krikorian and Demetrios Papademetriou

were perhaps the most likely panelists to raise the
controversial illegal immigrant issuefrom both sides
of the aisle: Mr. Krikorian from the low immigration,

12
tight border perspective and Mr. Papademetriou
from the high immigration, loose border side. They
both stayed away from inflammatory statements, but
the structure of their comments made their separate
positions clear. Mr. Krikorians comments were based
on the thesis that mass immigration is fundamentally
incompatible with homeland security in the modern
security environment.4 According to Mr. Krikorian,
borders should not be viewed simply as obstacles to
overcome for the free flow of goods; they should be
seen as the home front, which has become more than
just an expression for the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT). In World War II, references were made
numerous times to the home front, but the likelihood
of attack on the North American continent was remote.
That same paradigm does not hold today: The attacks
of 9/11 made it clear that attacks are possible and likely
if the borders are not better protected. Even though the
contours of the fight against radical Islam were visible
before 9/11, the loose border immigration policy
allowed fully one-third of the al-Qaida operatives
from 1993 to 9/11 to have visas. Another third were in
the country illegally; the other third were naturalized
citizens or temporary residents. To Mr. Krikorian, the
loose borders did not protect American citizens
adequately.
Mr. Krikorian then went on to postulate how loose
borders might affect the United States in future wars.
Having learned from asymmetric successes in Iraq and
elsewhere, future foes may choose to challenge Ameri-
can intervention in their affairs by attacks on the main-
land. Imagine a war with Colombia, perhaps precipita-
ted by U.S. intervention to protect the Colombian gov-
ernment from insurgents of the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed

13
Forces of Colombia or FARC). Irregular attacks could
be facilitated by the half-million Colombians already
in the United States. Similar friendly populations are
resident in the United States for potential challengers
like China, Russia, and even north Korea. Attacking the
United States at home will figure into the calculation of
all future enemies, and immigrants from the enemies
particular part of the world may very well act to help
their formeror currentcountrymen. What Mr.
Krikorian fails to explain is the absence of such attacks
during the current GWOT. Hundreds of thousands
of Iraqis and Afghansnot to mention even-larger
Muslim communitieslive in the United States, but
there have been virtually no attacks since 9/11. That
may simply speak well of assimilation into American
society, but it is evidence that Mr. Krikorian should not
ignore as he attempts to raise the borders around the
United States. He did make one valuable comparison,
stating that al-Qaida is to terrorism as the Mafia was to
crime. The Mafia was able to operate among the large
Italian immigrant community only until assimilation
drained the sea in which the criminal fish were
swimming. Neglecting the value of assimilation, he
implied that denying immigrationand concurrently
reducing the number of illegal immigrants already in
the countrywill achieve the same result.
The initial response to insecurity at the borders
was to profile Arabs and Muslims. This selective law
enforcement is doomed to failureand not just because
of protests about racial profiling. Such profiling may
be the prudent step to take, but targeting the citizens
of one region or country is a gamble; none of the 9/11
attackers came from a country that was on the American
terrorist list prior to 9/11. Expanding the blacklist
to all Arab countrieseven if possiblewould also

14
not stop the flow of terrorists. Radicalsboth Muslim
and otherwiselive in Russia, China, the Philippines,
India, Pakistan, etc. Extending a visa waiver program
even to some long-term allies is fraught with risk.
Although he was short on specific proposals,
Mr. Krikorian emphasized the need for a huge
investment in border controls. He denies that the
impact of tightened controls would be inimical to the
U.S. economy,5 but nonetheless calls for significant
investment of money into programs like US-VISIT. The
greater investmentand eventually the harder one to
achieveis in the political will to enforce unpopular
immigration policies. The policies being enforced
need to be the right ones, e.g., allowing entry for those
genuinely being persecuted in their own countries,
allowing entry to those who have the right technical or
advanced skills needed for technological or industrial
development, and allowing bona fide family members
to join the American citizen member of their family.
This retains Americas traditional image as a haven for
immigrants, while also balancing the national security
and societal development interests of the United States.
Access to America is not a right or entitlement, as many
on both the right and left of the political spectrum seem
to believe; it is a privilege that should be granted based
on American interests.

Ms. Susan Sim.

An international perspective on immigration and

borders was gained from panelist Susan Sim. Ms.
Sim started by pointing out Singapores contributions
of police trainers, LSTs (Landing Ship, Tank), and
transport planes to the coalition in Iraq and identified
Singapore as an unwavering partner in the GWOT.

15
She explicitly stated that the risk of terrorism is a risk
that Singapore recognizes that it shares with the Uni-
ted States. Not all countries, of course, recognize that
or at least will not explicitly say so, perhaps because
they are content to have the United States and its
closest partners in the terrorists cross-hairs. Singapore
clearly understands the need to defend ones borders
from those wishing to do its citizens harm, and is
situated in a part of the world where demographics
suggest that the risk may be very near. Singapore and
abutting Malaysia have sizable Muslim populations of
their own, but also are located just a few dozen miles
across the Singapore Strait from Indonesia, with the
largest Muslim population in the world. Some profiling
is prudent in light of the Bali bombings in 2002 and
2005, but it also is important to remember that not all
Muslims are extremists and terrorists, of course.
Ms. Sim also recognized the difficulties in erecting
barriers at a nations borders. One of those is cost,
which was addressed only obliquely. While Singapore
is supporting U.S. initiatives for biometric passports,
there is clearly a direct cost involved, one that poorer
nations will not be able to cover on their own. Ms.
Sims real concerns were with the costs that are more
difficult to measure: the impact of increased border
security on Singapores trade, which is crucial to its
prosperity. The United States also is affected by trade
restrictions, but not to the same extent as Singapore, a
nation directly dependent on international trading for
its prosperity. When traders find themselves slowed
more than imperceptibly at ports, they will seek other
outlets for their products. When buyers find themselves
unable to inspect products in Singapore because of visa
restrictions, they will quickly learn to go elsewhere,
to places where security is not as cumbersome. Just

16
like the United States, Singapore must find a way
perhaps technologicallyto balance border security
with commerce.
An even greater concern for Ms. Sim was the effect
on personal travelespecially for the purpose of
educationto the United States. She mentioned the
value of the education that she personally received
in the United States, but also pointed at Indonesian
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (who is
knownthankfullyas SBY) as a major example of
the value of an American education. While an officer
in the Indonesian Army, SBY received training in
the United States at Fort Benning, Georgia, and Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, both under the auspices of the
International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program. While in the United States, he also received
a masters degree and . . . picked up the ideas of
Samuel Huntington. His career is considered a great
model of integrity in public service and resulted in his
being the first directly-elected president of Indonesia.
Additionally, several of the reformers who wrote the
election laws in 1999 were educated in political science
in the United States; Ms. Sim was a journalist covering
those proceedings and heard them several times break
out into debates about the U.S. Constitution. There are
other benefits to the United States in foreign education:
Costs for American students are held down because
of what Ms. Sim described as a $13 billion industry
of foreign education. American students also are
exposed to other cultures as they share classrooms and
dormitory spaces and interact socially with foreign
students on their campuses.
The transforming experience of an education
in America cannot be understated, although there
certainly are examples of peoplesuch as several of

17
the 9/11 terroristswho were exposed to American
culture and were revulsed by what they perceived as
the libertine nature of U.S. society. Ms. Simas with
Ms. Dezenskialso left uncovered any discussion
of how to get other nations to see that terrorism is a
risk for them and how to get countries antithetical
to the United States to work to tighten their borders.
Singapores contributions in this regard are significant
and appreciated, but getting friends and allies to
help is the easy part of extending borders virtually.
Although perhaps only implicitly, Ms. Sim concluded
that technological and other improvements to border
security can only go so far; what is really needed to
complement them is an ideological counterforce that
enlists Muslim moderate elites in stopping Muslim
extremists and their message of hatred and violence.

Dr. Demetrious Papademetriou.

Dr. Demetrious Papademetriou has been an immi-

gration scholar for many years; as an immigrant him-
self, he brought yet another unique perspective to the
panel. In his brief comments, Dr. Papademetriou empha-
sized that hermetically-sealed borders are impossible
and that, even if they were possible, the adverse impact
culturally, economically, and technologicallyon the
United States would be more than its citizens would
care to bear. Technology in some distant future may be
able to sort people perfectly through some automated
process, but no such system will be available at least for
the foreseeable future. He supports biometric initiatives,
but does not believe they will achieve the level of
security protection desired by many Americans.
Although realistic, the statements about imperfect
sealing of the borders may have been a bit of a red

18
herring. Dr. Papademetriou has long been an advocate
of broad immigration policies.6 To some, that advocacy
will seem not to have been sufficiently tempered by
the experience of 9/11. However, he presented a
compelling argument that immigration is critical to
address the needs of the losers of globalization.
Some nations are unable to keep up with the rapid
pace of technology and commerce and find themselves
with citizens whose livelihood is no longer sustainable.
Richer nations like the United States, according to
Dr. Papademetriou, have the financial capacity
and perhaps the moral obligationto help those
disadvantaged by globalization and the United States
has enormous capacity to absorb them. In later
questioning, he nonetheless averred that there should
be some need in the United States for the immigrants
to be allowed legally into the country.
Tamar Jacoby, another immigration scholar, says,

If it really were a choice . . . between cheaper produce and

American security, no one would even pose the question
. . . But that isnt the choice. We can have security and
remain connected to the world, too. Most of the war
against terror ought to take place beyond our borders,
using military means and intelligence to stop evildoers
before they arrive at our shores. Then, when it comes to
immigration, the key is recognizing the reality of how
many are coming, creating legal channels for those we
can vet easily and focusing resourcesmoney, agents,
technology, and the reston the much smaller number
who might conceivably do us harm.7

While Ms. Jacobys desire to see the war on terrorism

far away from American shores is idealistic, her point is
solid: America has the ability to have secure borders that
do not unnecessarily hinder commercial or intellectual
intercourse. Technology will play an important role in

19
providing that security, but will never bring the perfect
solution that seems necessary in an age of non-state
terrorist actors with potential access to WMD. While
these procedural and technological initiatives should
be pursued, they must be complemented by efforts to
win the war of ideas, to address radical and violent
terroristsMuslim or otherwisein a holistic way
that encompasses more than simply placing obstacles
in the way of their access to America.

ENDNOTES - PANEL I

1. Elaine Dezenski, at the January 24, 2006, IOM Conference on

Reinforcing the Area of Freedom, Security, Justice, and Prosperity
in Europe and its Neighboring Countries. Available at www.
belgium.iom.int/pan-europeandialogue/documents/elaine%20dezenski.
pdf, accessed on August 24, 2006. Distributed by the International
Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, usinfo.state.gov.
2. In an e-mail after the conference, Ms. Dezenski explained,
Regarding interoperability, Im referring to the ability
to link border management functions throughout DHS
and more broadly throughout the government so that
all information on a particular person is consolidated
into a common operation picture, and that all relevant
[government] databases are accessed as part of the check
on that person. This notion of interoperability could also
extend as far as connectivity with foreign governments
where systems can be developed to conduct real time
checks of documents such as passports and visas.
E-mail correspondence between Elaine Dezenski and Colonel
(Ret) John R. Martin, May 24, 2006.
3. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, The Security
and Prosperity Partnership of North America: Progress, March
31, 2006, www.spp.gov/pdf/security_and_prosperity_partnership_of_
north_america_statement.pdf, accessed August 24, 2006.
4. In other writing, Mr. Krikorian makes the case that
uncontrolled immigration is bad for society more broadly than
only in the security arena. For example, he debunks the argument

20
that the masses of illegal immigrants are doing jobs that Americans
will not do. Americans wont do them because they do not
pay enough. Without the cheap labor readily available from
illegal immigrants, market forces would act to raise wages (and
benefits) for the jobs that absolutely need to be done manually.
The artificiality of the cheap labor also inhibits innovation, both
technological and otherwise. Mark Krikorian, Jobs Americans
Wont Do: Voodoo Economics from the White House, NRO
(nationalreviewonline), January 7, 2004, www.nationalreview.com/
comment/krikorian200401070923.asp, accessed on August 24, 2006.
An unintended consequence may occur if borders are tightened
and market effects force change: The affected industries may
simply move off-shore. Off-shore out-sourcing, of course, is not
possible with some industries, e.g., lettuce growers will not be able
to move their agricultural industry off-shore. See Tamar Jacoby,
Dealing With Illegal Immigrants Should Be a Top Priority of the
War on Terror. Round III, NRO, NRO Debates, Pros v. Cons,
February 14, 2003, www.nationalreview.com/debates/debates021403.
asp, accessed August 24, 2006.
5. Mr. Krikorian writes that labor provides for only ten percent
of the cost of lettuce, so even a doubling in the labor costs would
not wreak economic havoc on farmers. He also claims that
unskilled labor accounts for perhaps four percent of the gross
domestic product (GDP); surely the dire impacts predicted by the
loose border advocates are not going to be precipitated by such
a small part of the GDP. Krikorian, Jobs Americans Wont Do.
6. See Think Again: Migration, Foreign Policy 109, Winter
1997-98, also at www.ceip.org/people/papthink.htm, accessed August
24, 2006.
7. Jacoby.

21
 PANEL I

BORDER SECURITY: A FOREIGN PERSPECTIVE

Ms. Susan Sim

The National Security Imperative.

In the war against terrorism, the first imperative

for any government is to stop would-be terrorists
from entering the countrys shores. A nations borders
constitute at least part of its first line of defense, and it is
good strategy to push the borders as far out as possible
so that terrorists and their materiel are stopped at their
point of departure before they get on a plane to a New
York airport or send a dirty bomb on a container ship
to Long Beach. With stringent visa requirements, each
U.S. consulate abroad can be turned into a virtual
border checkpoint to identify aliens who might pose
a security threat to the United States and to deny
them entry. Various U.S. border security measures
Container Security Initiative (CSI), Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI), Radiation Detection Initiative
(RDI), Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
(C-TPAT)to check and clear containers bound for
the United States start in Singapore, thousands of
miles from any American customs check points. And
in pushing its borders out, the United States has shifted
some of the burdenand shared the costsof U.S.
homeland security with other countries like Singapore,
which have to invest in building up home-front security
capabilities to take into account American requirements
as well as their own.

23
 The government of Singapore agrees that these
border initiatives are necessary security measures.
Singapore was among the first to sign up for CSI,
PSI, RDI and C-TPAT. As a participant in the U.S.
Visa-Waiver Program, Singapore will begin issuing
biometric passports to Singaporeans in August 2006,
before the October 26 deadline.1 Singapore strongly
supported Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and
IRAQI FREEDOM, and sent police trainers, LSTs
(Landing Ship, Tanks), and transport planes to assist
in the reconstruction of Iraq. One LST is still in the Gulf
region. Last year, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong
signed with President Bush a Strategic Framework
Agreement for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in
Defence and Security that further expands the scope of
U.S.-Singapore cooperation. In the Global War on Terror
(GWOT), Singapore must be an unwavering partner.
As Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff put
it when he met Ambassadors from the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries at the
Singapore Residence last year, We are all equally at
risk because the terrorist networks are equally hostile
to your governments as to the United States. The
common goal is to take down terrorist cells, deny them
sanctuary, and to stymie their recruitment.
The main debates over immigration policies in this
security environment center on two difficulties:
One, how to balance freedom of quick access of
people, goods, and services with the security
demands for greater scrutiny of these flows and
the integrity of the supply chain; and,
Two, how to formulate a differentiated-enough
risk profile to detect security threats accurately
without unnecessarily victimizing those who
are of no risk.

24
 Security risk profiling is an operational tool that
governments have no choice but to use. Based on
research, intelligence gathering and sharing with
the security agencies, including those from the
United States, risk profiling is necessary from a risk
management standpoint as it allows Singapore to
utilize finite operational resources better and to
strike a good balance between facilitating trade and
travel while ensuring a robust security threshold at
border checkpoints. In the CSI program, for example,
cooperation procedures between Singapore and the
United States allow for the exchange of information,
identification, screening, and sealing of targeted U.S.-
bound containers.
Singapore has also invested heavily in technology
which can help conduct inspections of goods and
people quickly, efficiently, and with good detection
rates. In fact, Singapore believes that one strategic
effort on which countries can work together more
urgently is the development and deployment of
biometric passports. Such a project is an investment
which would restrict the space for terrorist movement
by tightening passport controls and border security.
It will not only make mobility extremely difficult
for terrorists; it will also boost the chances of timely
detection of suspects after an incident. But it is an
expensive proposition. If the United States did not lead
on this issue in international fora like the International
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), no one would
have much incentive to invest in the technology. But
leadership means providing assistance or resources to
encourage countries to develop the system, especially
less-developed ones where borders are often most lax
and passport controls weak.

25
The Costs of Prevention.

The rub is that successful prevention does not give

governments a demonstrable success story that will
convince their citizens that the extra effort is worth
the risks to economic competitiveness. Singapore is
primarily a trading nation. Without trade, Singapore
would die. Singapore is now the worlds busiest
container port by volume and has to be very careful
that CSI, RDI, and C-TPAT combined do not lead to
unacceptable delays and extra costs for shippers,
because they will then go to other ports that are not as
rigorous in inspecting their goods. For example, since
the launch of C-TPAT in April 2005, Singapore has
registered 10,434 applicants, 5,777 certified members,
and 1,500 validated companies who exceed minimum
security criteria. But those applicants are all still
waiting to see what the hullabaloo is about since there
are no green lane benefits for them. Since eligibility
for the program is restricted to U.S. companies,
the downstream/spin-off benefits for Singaporean
exporters are still unclear.
Many AmericansSenators, Congressmen, univer-
sity heads, and captains of industryhave been
extremely concerned about the impact the post-9/11
U.S. immigration regime is having across a wide range
of activities.
According to a study released June 2, 2004, by
the Santangelo Group, an international business
and economic development consulting firm
based in Washington, DC, visa backlogs have
cost U.S. businesses more than $30 billion in
revenue loss and indirect expenses. In particular,
small- to medium-sized exporters experience
disproportionately severe losses because of the
way the government handles visas for foreign

26
 business travellers. Two concrete examples
were highlighted in The Los Angeles Times last
year:
1. In Hawaii Loses Out Big, the paper reported
that the organizers of a conference for Asian
insurance executives moved the event from
Hawaii to Hong Kong out of concern that
they would not be able to get visas for the
thousands of Chinese participants they
were expecting. That is a lot of hotel rooms
cancelled.
2. The Times also reported that Boeing has lost
millions of dollars because foreign customers,
particularly those from the Middle East and
other Muslim countries, could not get visas
for their pilots to pick up their new jets or
undergo training in the United States. Is it
any wonder that major U.S. companies now
feel they need to set up training centers
overseas if they are to sell their products
abroad?
Speaking at a conference in Washington, DC,
on the role of foreign visitors last year, Senators
Norm Coleman and Jeff Bingaman noted that
2005 was the first school year since September
11, 2001, that the total number of international
students in the United States actually decreased.
International applications to U.S. graduate
schools fell 28 percent from the fall of 2003 to the
fall of 2004, and 54 percent of all English-as-a-
Second-Language programs reported declines.
Where are these students going? According
to the Senators, they are going to the United
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia because they
have fewer hurdles for international students.

27
Senator Coleman found this decline troubling. In his
words:

In a world that too often hates Americans because they

dont know us, international education represents an
opportunity to break down barriers. It is in our local and
national interest for the best and the brightest foreign
students to study in America because these are the people
who will lead their nations one day. The experience they
gain within our democratic system and our values gives
them a better understanding of what America is and who
Americans are. Ive also heard from American colleges
and universities. The presence of international students
give American students an irreplaceable opportunity to
learn about other cultures and other points of view.

And heres the kicker: International education is a

$13 billion-a-year industry, and foreign students who
pay full tuition help keep costs down for American
students.
Many industry chiefs have expressed concern
that the United States is not producing enough
engineers and science graduates. The percentage of
U.S. undergraduates taking engineering is the second
lowest of all developed countries; China graduates
three times as many engineering students as the United
States. A recent U.S. News and World Report article on
The Fight for the Future: What America must do to
keep up with roaring economies like those of China,
India and South Korea noted that 56 percent of
engineering doctorates awarded in the United States
go to foreign-born students. U.S. research institutes
traditionally have attracted some of the best scientific
scholars in the world. Their continued commitment to
the institutes will, to an extent, be influenced by their
experience in getting their visas renewed. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that many Indians and Chinese

28
are now choosing to stay at home as their economies
grow and afford them greater opportunities. And if
these research and development talents want to work
abroad, Singaporeand others perhaps less friendly
to the United Stateswill grab them.
These statistics and anecdotes speak to questions
that only Americans can answer: questions of Americas
economic competitiveness, Americas role as the
intellectual hub of the world, andsince perception
is reality for most people who live outside the United
Statesthe impact of such horror stories about visa
backlogs on U.S. foreign policy goals. America cannot
afford isolationism to deal with terrorism.

Transformational Power of Access.

As President George Bush has said, the war on

terror is a generational and global struggle of ideasa
struggle that pits the power of hate against the power
of hope. A key task that the administration has set for
itself is how to speak more effectively with Muslim
countries: to show them that there is no war on Islam
or a clash of civilizations, perceptions that will create a
perpetual cycle of hate. But America cannot hector on
one hand, and slap with the other, and hope to decrease
anti-Americanism. Visa regimes with the announced
intention of profiling male Muslims aged 16 to 45
from Muslim countries can only be seen as tarring all
Muslims indiscriminately.
A critical component of a comprehensive strategy
to counter al-Qaida and its ilk is the development of
an ideological counterforce to challenge the rhetoric
of the extremist preachers who recruit in madrassahs
and on the Internet. As non-Muslims, Americans are
not up to the task. America and its allies in the GWOT

29
need to support the mobilization of the moderate elite
in Muslim communities and not allow them to be
intimidated by the extremist fringe. But it is difficult for
American diplomats to encourage moderate Muslims
to speak out against extremist violence when American
policies say in effect: Muslims are all the same and we
do not trust them to do right.
Karen Hughes, the Undersecretary of State for Pub-
lic Diplomacy and Public Affairs, outlined four strate-
gic pillars in her public diplomacy efforts to ensure the
United States prevails in this battle of ideas. She calls
them the Four Es: engagement, exchanges, education,
and empowerment. In her words, People who have
the opportunity to come here learn for themselves that
Americans are generous, hard-working people who
value faith and family. That is generally agreed . . .
but foreigners first have to get to America before they
can learn about Americans.
To end on a positive note: an education in the
United States is a transforming experience, and
people so empowered are key to changing their own
societies. One of the most successful examples of the
benefitsto Americaof an American education is
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
While in the United States for military training (under
the International Military Education and Training
program), he earned a masters degree from Webster
University and picked up the ideas of Samuel
Huntington on democracy. SBY, as he is popularly
known, won Indonesias first direct presidential
election in 2004 and is making sure that his countrys
reform efforts are irreversible. Another less well-
known but crucial success story: the reformers who
wrote Indonesias new election laws in 1999. Three of
them studied political science in graduate programs

30
at Northern Illinois University in the early 1990s
and used their training to strengthen Indonesias
experiment with democracy. It was surreal to watch
them at work in Jakarta. As they wrote the new laws,
they occasionally would break into debates about the
U.S. Constitution and its applicability to Indonesia.
Anything that America can do to ensure the continued
ready availability of these transformational experiences
will redound to the benefit of the United States and to
friendlyand less than friendlynations around the
world.

ENDNOTES - SIM

1. Explanatory notes on Singapores participation in U.S.

border security initiatives:
Container Security Initiative (CSI). Singapore was the first
in Asia to implement the CSI program on March 17, 2003.
This is a container trade supply chain initiative. Singapore
believes in CSIs value for global maritime security, and
has signed a Declaration of Principles with U.S. Customs
Administrations. This Declaration provides a framework
to implement joint CSI procedures such as the exchange of
information, identification, screening and sealing of U.S.-
bound containers whose profiles are considered high-
risk for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other
implements of terrorism. U.S. customs inspectors, located
side-by-side with Singapore Customs officials, study the
manifests and help decide which containers to screen
using scanners the Singapore government purchased.
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Again Singapore
was the firstand may still be the onlycountry in
Southeast Asia to participate in PSI. This initiative builds
on efforts by the international community to prevent the
proliferation of WMD. Singapores policy support and
resource investment in this initiative involve surveillance
and/or interdiction of suspect vessels and the deployment
of mobile radiographic scanners to scan and detect the
presence of WMD in shipping containers.

31
 Radiation Detection Initiative (RDI). This is a U.S.
Department of Energy initiative that Singapore agreed to
implement in March 2005. Radiation detection equipment
will be deployed at Singapores ports to deter and detect
the trafficking of nuclear material that may be used to
make illicit nuclear weapons or dirty bombs. For the
pilot project at Singapores Pasir Panjang Container
Terminal, the U.S. Energy Department will be responsible
for acquiring, installing and maintaining the equipment
while Singapore will be responsible for operating it.
U.S. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
(C-TPAT) Program. C-TPAT is much applauded as
a volunteer government-trade community/industry
scheme that will be an important component for securing
the global supply chains and facilitating legitimate cargo
and conveyances. Under this scheme, goods imported
by eligible U.S. importers will be provided a gradation
of facilitated clearance through Customs access if they
qualify for certification and validation.
Level Groupings Level of Checks

Tier 1 Certified members Front-of-Line inspections

Tier 2 Validated members,
meeting minimum security criteria Reductions in checks
Tier 3 Validated members,
exceeding minimum security criteria Green Lane Privilege

Biometric passports. Singapore is one of the 26 countries

under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). This program
commits Singapore to develop and issue tamper-resistant
machine-readable passports (MRP) with biometric
identifiers by October 26, 2006. The United States also
requires that any travel documents issued with biometrics
identifiers must comply with the standards laid down and
endorsed by the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO). Singapore has supported this initiative as an
excellent security measure and has begun a pilot project
to issue biometric passports to frequent travellers; by
August 2006, every Singaporean will be able to apply for
a biometric passport that complies with the standards set
by ICAO.

32
 PANEL II

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT:

COALITION BUILDING AND MAINTENANCE

General.

An international perspective on A Nation at

War was gained by a look at coalition building
and maintenance, one of the challenges inherent in
executing a global strategy. A global strategy is certain-
ly appropriate for the American global superpower,
but adequate forces to execute that strategy must be
available to avoid a significant disconnect between
ends, ways, and means. By itself, the U.S. military
is too stretched by the ongoing war in Iraqamong
other challengesto carry out the many aspects
of the current strategy. That is certainly cause for
alarm, but the Quadrennial Defense Review makes the
case in various places that international partners will
complement American forces to close the gap between
strategic requirements and available military power.1
For this plan to work, those partners must come with
very real capabilities, not just be accepted as a partner
for political reasons.
Fighting a war alongside soldiers of other nations is
nothing new to American forces, of course. Some of the
earliest nations fights may seem to have been mainly
solo events, but even then other nations participated
in a variety of ways. More recentlyat least in an
historical sensesuccess in the two World Wars of the
past century was only possible because of the combined
efforts of many nations. From the U.S. perspective,
American leadership in World War II was key, but

33
even more observers would draw that conclusion from
studies of the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Other
nations contributed significant forces for both, but
both conflicts are remembered much moreat least by
Americansas American wars. That phenomenon may
have been a result of the bipolar geopolitical situation
of the Cold War, but the trend continued in the first
Gulf War with another important distinction reflected
in the rhetoric. In Operation DESERT STORM, the
other nations were described as friends or coalition
partners, not allies as in the previous wars.2 A few of
those coalition partners contributed major forces in
the Gulf (although the United States still provided the
preponderance); most seemed to be accepted as part
of the coalition less for any real combat capability they
could provide than to show the rest of the world that
the conflict was supported broadly internationally.
With no real international mandate for the current war
in Iraq, this legitimizing function of a coalition is
even more important.3
The political difficulties of building and maintaining
a coalition in this strategic situation are significant. If
the goal is to show international support, virtually any
applicant to the coalition will be accepted with open
armseven if the United States and the applicant
country have fundamentally different purposes for
participating in the conflict. Some may join an operation
hoping for a quid pro quo from the United States in
other areas. They may still ask the United States to fund
their participation, but seek more important trade or
aid agreements as a precondition or as a result. Other
national intereststrade, ethnicity, and ideology, for
examplein a particular region also can drive nations
to join a coalition; when those interests conflict with
U.S. interests, the results predictably are suboptimal.

34
 One characterization of U.S.-led coalitions is that
the United States does the killing; the other members
of the coalition do the healing. That characterization
has some credibility as many nations find it more
politically palatable to contribute forces to a post-
hostilities situation or for some role other than combat:
peacekeeping, reconstruction, or training indigenous
forces. Building a coalition in post-hostilities situations
generally is easier than for combat, but the challenges
remain significant and similar. American funding
whether supporting another nations operating forces
or provided in a different venuecan help to gather
coalition members, but those forces are more likely
to serve a legitimizing function than to add real
capability.
The operational challenges of fighting or otherwise
operating with a coalition force are no less daunting.
Languageeven with English-speaking countries or
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), where English is the official languagestill
presents many barriers to efficiency and effectiveness.
These barriers become even higher with weapons,
communications systems, and other interoperability
considerations. Most of these technical issues are
surmountable. Probably the most demanding barrier
is much harder to overcome. National chains-of-
command continue to operateintentionally and
unintentionallyto stymie efforts by coalition leaders
to effect coordinated action. Even when forces in the
field want to execute coalition plans, obtaining national
permission can take an inordinate amount of time. The
result is frequently an uncoordinated operationif the
operation proceeds at all.

35
Lieutenant General (French Army, Retired)
Christian Delanghe.

Lieutenant General Delanghe noted that most

interventions since the end of the Cold War have
been done with a coalition and cited his experience in
suggesting three bases for successful coalition opera-
tions. While not claiming his list was exhaustive,
Lieutenant General Delanghe said that one of the
most important factors in coalition success is a good
consultation process between the nations involved.
Perhaps even more important is a common under-
standing of the strategic objectives for the intervention.
Finally, once strategic objectives are agreed upon and
solid consultation is established, the coalition needs a
good concept of operation, i.e., a coordinated strategy
that integrates all elementsnot just the military
armof national power.
Consultationfor the involved nationsmay be of
less importance when a lead nation has coerced, bribed,
or bullied4 other nations to join a coalition to give an
operation international legitimacy. In such a case, the
lead nation may be able to act essentially unilaterally,
although some adjustment of the coercion, bribing,
or bullying may be necessary to ensure acquiescence.
When the coalition is comprised of nations joined
together because of shared interests,5 consultation is a
much more important part of coalition maintenance,
but also can be a major hindrance to effective action in
operations. Without honest consultation for a shared-
interest coalition, the coalition will be unable to mount
effective operations easily and may very well fall apart.
Lieutenant General Delanghe also pointed out that even
when interests converge and a nations military leaders
want to act in accordance with coalition directives, the

36
coordination of differing national processes can be
unacceptably slow in approving action. When either
the military or political leaders wish to act contrary to
the lead nations desires, bureaucratic roadblocks can
be used to stymie coalition action.6 The consultation
process must be crafted very carefully if the coalition is
not to be denied effectiveness while awaiting coalition
approval on various levels: military, alliance, and
political.
Finding common strategic objectives is key, but
doing so since the end of the Cold War is an increasing
challenge. During the Cold War, western nations
shared a general strategic objective of containing the
Soviet threat. In that war, the threat was a known
one and common to all; in addition, the threat could
be quantified mechanically. The number of tanks
and fighter jets in East Germany could be counted, as
could the number of Soviet ships at sea and nuclear
missiles pointed at the west. The common assessment
of the threat made coalition building easier, although
the nations at the nexus of the west and the Soviet
world were always torn. Lieutenant General Delanghe
likened todays threat to a chemical process, where all
the ingredients of crisis are extant permanently and
occasionally explode. He elaborated further that the
process may even be alchemical, in that certain actors
are looking to change the nature of the ingredients.
According to Lieutenant General Delanghe, the five-
to six-million Muslim citizens of France were able
to act as alchemists in keeping France from acting
in a positive waya way that reflected its enduring
national interestsin Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
Yet another example cited by this panelist was the
British/French/Israeli action in the Suez Canal in 1956.
The three partners entered the conflict with differing

37
motives: the French to solve problems with the Algerian
war, the British to gain the Canal, the Israelis to address
a military threat. The strategic environment of the Cold
War was forgotten completely, but the real decisions
about the conflict would be taken in Washington and
Moscow, not Paris, London, Jerusalem, and Cairo. As
a result of these differing objectives and disregard for
the strategic calculus, the coalition encountered severe
difficulties and ultimately failed to achieve the disparate
national goals. The coalition actions also changed the
balance of power in the Middle East, giving the Soviets
increased leverage in the region and adversely affecting
the coalition members broader strategic interests.
Even when strategic objectives are commonly held
and effective and timely consultation processes are
established, goals may not be accomplished because of
coalition disagreement over strategy and operations.
The chosen strategy and concept of operations must
also take into account all the elements of national
power; the military is too often the only element used, at
least in quantity. The strategy and resulting operations
must cover all expected phases of the conflict and see
what combinations of the elements are most effective.
Economic, diplomatic, and informational elements
may be more effective than military in pre-hostilities
engagement. Conversely, ignoring the other elements
in favor of military power during the hostilities phase
can lead to open-ended commitments, as in Bosnia
and perhaps Iraqfor the United States; the same was
true in Africa for France. Lieutenant General Delanghe
ended by emphasizing that a coalition of coalitions
may be appropriate when all elements of national
power are involved. As stated previously, some
nations may be unwilling to provide combat forces
for active hostilities, but will be willing to contribute

38
reconstruction or peacekeeping forces. One coalition
may be necessary for the hostilities phase of an
intervention; another may address only the rebuilding
of the legal structure after the war; yet another may
work to ensure development of a fair electoral process.
The coalition leader or leaders must work each of
these sub-coalitions carefully, or the military will
be handed too many tasksincluding ones for which
they are not the best candidates.

Colonel Pete Mansoor.

How a coalition is built affects how it works and

whether or not it stays together. Having commanded
a U.S. brigade under the tactical control of a Polish bri-
gade when Moqtada al-Sadr called for an uprising by his
Mahdi Army in Najaf in April 2004, Colonel Mansoor
was able to provide first-hand observations on what it
takes to make a coalition effective in combat. His unit
was sent to Karbala because the rules of engagement
for Multi-national Division-Center South (MND-CS)
did not allow for offensive operations by any of the
units. All could defend themselves, as the Poles capably
did when attacked by the Mahdi Army, but were not
authorized to counterattack to regain ground once lost.
Other units had even stricter requirements: The Thais,
for example, were not even allowed to leave their
operating base once serious hostilities commenced.
No nation is immune from national political guidance;
even the United States had to restrict itself to operations
outside of certain exclusion zones around the Muslim
shrines in Najaf.
With these constraints, why was this ad hoc organi-
zation successful? According to Colonel Mansoor,
several factors were important:

39
 1. Senior U.S. Embeds. At various positions in the
Polish Brigade and at MND-CS, the United States sent
a senior leader to advise their coalition counterpart.
This leader was senior enoughwith the requisite
skills and experiencethat his advice had credibility
with the coalition partners. He also was able to provide
diverse types of external resources (e.g., aviation,
supplies, and medical evacuation) that enhanced the
ability of the coalition units to succeed in their missions.
Finally, because of his presence, he was able to work
on developing consensus in the coalition. He served to
explain the U.S. direction to the coalition leaders, but
also to explain to his U.S. chain of command how the
coalition leaders felt about a particular order.
2. Standardized Procedures. The Polish Brigade
included battalions from Poland, Bulgaria, and
Thailand and a Lithuanian platoon. Although
Thailand was not a member of NATO, the other major
contributors were and enforced the use of NATO
standard operating procedures. This included the use
of English as the lingua franca in coalition operations.
Although translated English still presents difficulties
on both sides of the equation, there was at least a basis
for common understanding. Familiar procedures for
reporting logistics requests and other routine functions
made operations simpler at all levels.
3. Previous Relationships. The Chief of Staff of
the Polish Brigade was a 2002 graduate of the U.S.
Army War College under the International Military
Education and Training (IMET) program; Colonel
Mansoor graduated from the War College in 2003.
Since they shared this particular experience, they were
able to begin their cooperation with a shared idea of
strategic issues. Habitual relationships between the
United States and the other NATO countries, including

40
their time in the NATO Partnership for Peace, were
complemented by a similar relationship between the
United States and Thailand, built on a basis of 25 years
of joint training exercise COBRA GOLD. Although the
relationships may not have been personal, just because
the other coalition members had previously worked or
trained with American forces, they were able to operate
together more easily in hostilities in Iraq.
4. Sensitivity to Coalition Needs. Different
members of the coalition need a range of support from
the coalition leaders. Logistics support comes quickly
to mind as one of the ways that the larger coalition
frequently the lead nationcan assist the individual
members. Intelligence support is also key, although
normally subject to restrictions on dissemination
outside of national channels. Less frequently
considered is the news media. National contingents
often are accompanied by national news media and
coalition leaders must be attuned to how they can
support the various governments by highlighting
the contributions of the national forces. The news
media support builds popular support that helps to
keep friendly governments in power and part of the
particular coalition.

Even the strongest of coalitions is stretched under

crisis. When the Madrid train bombings occurred in
March 2004, the Spanish government was voted out
of power under the resulting pressure and withdrew
its forces from the coalition in Iraq shortly afterward.
Conversely, the United Kingdom, when subjected
to its own terrorist attacks with the London subway
bombings in July 2005, stood as a staunch ally. The
attention paid to both nations by the U.S. Government
prior to and after the attacks was significant, but other

41
political factors come into play when the citizens of a
coalition member are under direct attack. In such cases,
only the closest convergence of national interests
which would probably need to be sustained by broad
popular supportwill sustain the coalition.

Mr. Sebestyn L. V. Gorka.

In comments he described as deliberately pro-

vocative, Sebestyn Gorka diverged from the
panels focus on coalition building and maintenance,
preferring instead to discuss the broader issue of a
European perspective of the United States at war. He
first provided his answer to the question: Is the U.S. at
war? He explored the issue from the perspectives of
the law, politics, and the common man. Answering the
question in the negative, he then attempted to describe
where the United States was, if not in a war.
From the legal perspective, Mr. Gorka applied
traditional standards, using a definition that describes
war as a prolonged conflict between nation-states.
Applying this narrow definition strictly, Mr. Gorka
asserted that the United States is not at war. Some
of the conflict may have been against nation-states
in Iraq and Afghanistanbut the fights there were
short ones that toppled the governments quickly. The
current fight against the insurgency in Iraq meets the
prolonged requirement; certainly there is no shortage
of evidence that the fight there will be an enduring
part of what the Quadrennial Defense Review report calls
a long war.7 However, there is no identified nation-
state in opposition. The panelist also may have been
implying that major combat is another requirement
of his definition. If that were added to the rubric, the
Iraq counterinsurgencywith its short and scattered

42
responses to car-bombings and other quick attacks
would be further disqualified as a war.
The problem, of course, is with the definition. It
still works to identify some types of war, but needs
to be broadened to encompass the war in which the
United States and its partners are engaged. To a soldier
on the ground, a period of intense combatno matter
how shortcan seem to be a war. That broadest of
definitions can be discarded, though, in favor of one
that says war is the prolonged application of violence
against each other by competing entities. The nation-
state part of Mr. Gorkas definition falls short in an era
in which non-state actors are capable of attacks like
those of September 11, 2001 (9/11). The prolonged
part of Mr. Gorkas definition still fits; there must be
some way to distinguish a war from a punitive border
raid or cruise missile attack. The rhetoric on the U.S.
side clearly states that the war is a long one. And the
multiyear attacks by al-Qaida8 further suggest that
this particular competing entity also takes a long view
of the war.
Mr. Gorka next addressed the question from what
he described as the realpolitik perspective. Realpolitik
describes foreign policy based on raw national interests,
not moral or ideological considerations. This may
not have been the best descriptor for the observation
he made, but that in no way attacks its accuracy. As
evidence that the United States is not at war, he points
to the lack of mobilization by the people. The line of
reasoning would not be that mobilization is sufficient
to define war, but that it is surely necessary for a nation
to be at war. Mr. Gorka points to the mobilization of
World War II to make his point, then refers to the draft
of the Vietnam War to say that those were wars, not
like the war of today. Unfortunately, World War II

43
is a particularly bad analogy. That was clearly a war,
with the nations resources mobilized to a significant
extent, but it was a different type of war against a
different type of enemy. As written in the introduction
to this report, the Cold War would present a better
exemplar for comparison. As in this war, there was
no full mobilization, even in the military forces. But to
suggest that the United States was not engaged fully in
an existential war against the Soviet Union is ludicrous.
The definition of war should not be stretched beyond
recognition, but must adapt to the evolving nature of
war. At least from this perspective, Mr. Gorka may not
have proven his assertion that the nation is not at war.
His next perspective was that of the layman,
described by Mr. Gorka as someone who doesnt know
Clausewitz from any other tactical or strategic writer.
This person, if he or she thinks about the concept of a
nation at war at all, would be guided by the fact that a
war has a beginning and an ending. Even the layman
would recognize, though, that terrorism always has
been around and will endure no matter howand
perhaps precisely becausethe powers of the world
array themselves against it. Because of this, the
layman would say that the United States is not at war.
According to Mr. Gorka, the layman also must have a
well-defined sense of the enemy if the nation is truly at
war. As evidence to the contrary, he points to comments
made by a U.S. dockworker about the recent imbroglio
over the Dubai Ports deal, where a friendly Middle
Eastern country was trying to secure the rights to run
port security operations along the eastern seaboard of
the United States.9 The dockworker said that he did not
understand how the United States could put its port
operations in the hands of a Middle Eastern country
when it is those guys who are responsible for 9/11.

44
While a finely-tuned categorization of the enemy is
helpful in a war, the dockworkers statements do not
necessarily answer the question of whether or not the
nation is at war. From the laymans perspective, the
war may very well include a larger enemy, but the fact
of war is still true for him or her.
Mr. Gorka may not have been convincing in his
presentation of evidence that the nation is not at war,
but his provocative comments nonetheless left a sense
that the answer to the question is not clear. His next
attempt was at defining where the nation was, if not
at war. Reiterating his conclusion that the nation is
not at war, Mr. Gorka made a comparison with the
Cold War, saying that the threat of Osama bin Laden
easily can be called Marxist-Leninism informed by
religion. As with the Soviet Union, there is an idea
of global control, this time in a Muslim caliphate.10
As in the Cold War, there also is a sense of a zero-sum
game, where nations are either for us or against us.11
Despite those and other similarities, the terrorists and
insurgents fighting the United States today are different
from the Soviet Union in at least one regard: they do
not possess the capability to destroy the United States.
They are certainly capable of damaging attack, but not
of total destruction. They actively seek such capability
and would use it if allowed, which makes the question
of the Nation at war so important. If the Nation does
not perceive itself to be at war, the chances of bin Laden
and his ilk obtaining and using devastating attack
capabilities grows.
Mr. Gorka seemed to be saying that the United
States needs to wake up: if Americans do not believe
they are at war, they are putting the rest of the world in
danger. The rest of the world has its own responsibility,
of course, but is unable to gather the political will
to face the clear threat, so American leadership

45
and unilateral action, when necessaryis critical.
He understands that the answer must not be only
military. The greater contribution must come from a
generational information campaign that transforms
the image of America in the Middle East to what it was
in Europe while America and its allies were facing the
Soviet Union. The United States was viewed then as a
shining beacon of freedom, liberty, and democracy.
That is not true in todays Middle East. The average
resident of that volatile region may not want a bin
Laden caliphate, but he or she still responds positively
to what bin Laden says about the Palestinian issue and
about the encroachment of western globalization
on the values of the Muslim world. None of the steps
required in prosecuting the war are easy or quick, but
they must be taken as soon as possible.
In conclusion, Mr. Gorka pointed out that
comparisons with the Cold War can lead people to
think of the 1950s. He prefers instead to talk about 1905,
when Lenin and Trotsky were busy organizing the
Bolshevik revolution, but nobody took them seriously.
The United States must come to the realization that it
is in an existential wardifferent from other conflicts,
but still existential and still a warand learn to fight it
with all the assets at its disposal. Solving the problem
of Islamic extremism may be impossible, but a solid
application of all the instruments of national power can
at least manage it so that answering a question about
the Nation being at war becomes easier.

Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Flores-Hernandez

(El Salvador Army).

Returning to coalition-building and maintenance,

Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Flores-Hernandez sup-
ported Colonel Mansoors comments about the value

46
of a shared language in coalition operations. As part of
the Spanish Brigade in Iraq in 2003, Lieutenant Colonel
Flores-Hernandez enjoyed the ease of communicating
in a common language for combat operations, as well
as for logistics and other support. The value of the
common language became even more apparent when
the Spanish withdrew their forces in 2004 after the
Madrid train bombings. Relying afterwards on U.S.
and Polish units for command, control, and support
was much more difficult because of the language and
procedural barriers for a non-NATO country.
Lieutenant Colonel Flores-Hernandez most
important contribution to the panel discussion was
probably his commentary on why El Salvador joined
and stayed with the coalition. Although Lieutenant
Colonel Flores-Hernandez undoubtedly does not
speak officially for either his government or the
population of El Salvador, he spoke movingly about
the gratitude felt by the Salvadoran people for
American support during their 12 years of civil war
and in the ensuing reconstruction of El Salvador. This
translated into ready acceptance of the U.S. invitation
to join the coalition in Iraq. That gratitude, according
to the panelist, was buttressed by the Salvadorans
commitment to supporting the spread of democracy,
a stated U.S. objective in Iraq and the Middle East.
When Salvadoran soldiers died and were wounded in
fighting in Najaf in 2004, the support for El Salvadors
role in the coalition remained strong because of this
sense of gratitude and these shared objectives.
Other evidence suggests that the support of the
population is much lower12 than Lieutenant Colonel
Flores-Hernandez says, but the fact remains that El
Salvador continues to be part of the coalition in Iraq,
despite having been bloodied in combat. Yet to be seen
is whether or not the country will stayas attested by

47
Lieutenant Colonel Flores-Hernandezthe years the
Salvadorans know will be required to win against an
insurgency. And while his comments seem to ring true,
there remains the troubling fact that El Salvadorthe
smallest country in Latin Americais the only Latin
American nation13 represented in the coalition in Iraq.
Countless others of those nations were helped by the
United States, even if only in the bipolar era of the Cold
War, when support was more to counter Communist
expansion than any alignment of national interests.
Although gratitude and shared interests may be critical
in coalition-building and maintenance, there must be
other factors that also come into play.14
In any event, Lieutenant Colonel Flores-Hernandez
was correct in his overall assessment of coalitions:
coalition-building must begin years before the coalition
takes the field. Engagementdiplomatic, economic,
and militarysets the stage for construction of a
coalition. Shared doctrine, language, and procedures
may make coalition operations easier and should
also be built early, but engagement is key to these,
too. Whether developing consensus or the means for
coercion, the time invested in maintaining ties with a
government and its people pays dividends when that
countrys resourceswhether primarily for legitimacy
or for actual capabilityare needed in a fight.

ENDNOTES - PANEL II

1. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense

Review Report, Washington, DC, February 6, 2006. See, for example,
p. vii and p. 2 (where the military is to move from performing
tasks itself to focus on building partner capabilities), p. viii (where
NATO is to be enlarged and transformed and its role in Iraq and
Afghanistan extended) and p. 6 (where the document says, . . . the
vision set out in this Report will only be possible by maintaining
and adapting the United States enduring alliances.).

48
 2. Some dictionaries suggest that coalition and alliance are
synonymous. For the purposes of this report, a coalition is a
short-term and informal agreement for two or more nations to
utilize certain elements of their military or other national power
in concert to oppose the interests of another nation or coalition.
The purposes for that cooperation may be divergent. An alliance
also opposes the interests of another nation or coalition, but is
more formal and usually exists for a longer period of time. The
purposes for opposing those interests are usually similar.
3. On the website of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (on a graphic
stating it was last updated on April 27, 2006, at 8:27 a.m.), 28 flags
one of them being the U.S.are shown comprising the coalition.
For details, see Operation Iraqi Freedom, Official Website of the
Multi-National Force-Iraq, Inside the Force, Coalition Partners,
www.mnf-iraq.com/coalitionpartners.htm, accessed July 5, 2006.
Despite the United States being represented by just one of the
28 flags, America contributes approximately 133,000 troops to
the coalition in Iraq and Kuwait, The Army as of June 15, The
Army Times, June 26, 2006, p. 7. The largest contribution from the
other countries is the United Kingdom, with approximately 8,000
troops. Close behind are the Republic of Korea (3,200 troops) and
Italy (2,900 troops). Several other countries (Poland, Australia,
Georgia, Romania, Japan, and Denmark) each account for about
a battalion (530 to 900 soldiers). Approximately 1,140 troops
are contributed by the remaining 17 or 18 countries. For details,
see The International Coalition in Iraq, RadioFreeEurope
RadioLiberty, June 20, 2006, www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/06/
262E1945-27F0-4916-8E4A-25489CAD03E9.html, accessed July 5,
2006.
4. Sarah Anderson, Phyllis Bennis, and John Cavanaugh,
Coalition of the Willing or Coalition of the Coerced: How the Bush
Administration Influences Allies in its War on Iraq, Washington, DC:
Institute for Policy Studies, February 26, 2003, p. 1. Available at
www.ips-dc.org/COERCED.pdf, accessed July 5, 2006.
5. Most coalitions will not be in only one of these two categories,
and the consultation process will be encumbered even more. The
lead nation will have to tailor the consultation process according
to the category of the country involved.
6. As a final point about consultation, Lieutenant General
Delanghe also said that military leaders often are not given any
real guidance from their political masters. As an example, he

49
cited the early days of the intervention in Bosnia, when he felt the
only guidance the French forces received was a vague statement
from the French President to do something to keep the Balkans
conflagration from reaching western Europe and to make sure the
something was done in the European way.
7. Curiously, though, the tense used in the QDR is future:
The United States is a nation engaged in what will be [emphasis
added] a long war. Rumsfeld, p. v. Many would contend, of
course, that the passage of nearly five years since the 9/11 attacks
suggests that this already is a long war.
8. Although the then-anonymous author of Through our Enemies
Eyes acknowledged that Osama bin Laden (and hence al-Qaida)
may not have masterminded, ordered, or had foreknowledge of
all the following attacks, he does stress that they fit squarely with
bin Ladens themes. The attacks include ones in the Philippines in
1991-94 by the Abu Sayyaf Group, in Bosnia from about 1992 until
the Dayton Accord ended the war there, in the United States in
1993 by Ramzi Yousef on the World Trade Center, in Saudi Arabia
in 1996 on Khobar Towers, in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 on U.S.
embassies there, in Yemen in 2000 by suicide bombers on the USS
Cole. For more detail on less well known attacks, see Anonymous,
Through Our Enemies Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the
Future of America, Washington, DC: Brasseys, Inc., 2002, pp. 137-
143, 198-204.
9. See CNN.com, Bush, Congress clash over ports sale,
February 22, 2006, at www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/02/21/port.
security/, accessed July 5, 2006.
10. Caliphate may not be exactly the right term here. A recent
National Defense University paper says that the term describes an
era of just rule, particularly that of the first four caliphs in 632-661
A.D. What bin Laden and his ilk propose is called a caliphate,
but is more accurately described as a global totalitarian state.
See Douglas E. Streusand and Lieutenant Colonel (P) Harry
D. Tunnell IV, Choosing Words Carefully: Language to Help
Fight Islamic Terrorism, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic
Communications, National Defense University, May 23, 2006, p.
4. Available at www.ndu.edu/csc/docs/Choosing%20Words%20Caref
ullyLanguage%20to%20Help%20Fight%20Islamic%20Terrorism%
2024%20May%2006.pdf, accessed July 5, 2006.
11. You are either with us or you are against us in the fight
against terror. President George W. Bush, The White House,

50
Washington, DC, November 6, 2001, press briefing with Frances
President Jacques Chirac; available from www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/11/20011106-4.html, accessed July 5, 2006.
12. A poll this year by the University of Central America
shows that 72 percent of Salvadorans oppose their governments
decision to send troops to Iraq. Joe Rubin, El Salvador: Payback,
PBS Frontline World, October 12, 2004, available at www.pbs.org/
frontlineworld/elections/elsalvador/, accessed July 6, 2006.
13. El Salvador was originally part of a Central American
battalion with soldiers from Honduras, Nicaragua and the
Dominican Republic, but is the only remaining member, with
forces still roughly equivalent to its original commitment of
just under 400 soldiers. Jim Garamone, American Forces Press
Service, El Salvador to Continue Iraq Deployment, American
Forces Information Service News Articles, DefenseLINK News,
July 22, 2004, available at www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/
n07222004_2004072207.html, accessed on July 6, 2006. See also
Denis D. Gray, Salvadoran Soldiers Praised for Iraq Role, The
Washington Times, May 4, 2004, available at www.washingtontimes.
com/world/20040503-115511-7092r.htm, accessed on July 6, 2006.
14. One of those factors may be the continued easy flow of
remittances from the United States. During the 2004 presidential
election in El Salvador, U.S. lawmakers and others suggested
that election of a Frente Farabundo Mart para la Liberacin Nacional
(Farabundo Mart National Liberation Front or FMLN) government
might cause restrictions on the flow of remittances (cash sent to
families in El Salvador by Salvadorans working in the United
States). Chris Ney and Kelly Creedon, Preemptive Intervention
in El Salvador, Peacework Magazine, American Friends Service
Committee, Cambridge, MA: May 2004, available at www.afsc.
org/pwork/0405/040515.htm, accessed on July 6, 2006. As with U.S.
support, though, the value of remittances must apply to several
other Latin American countries.

51
 PANEL II

COALITION BUILDING

Lieutenant General (Retired) Christian Delanghe

Introduction.

Since the end of the Cold War, most conflict situa-

tions in the world have been addressed by coalitions
rather than by a single nation. The process of building
a coalition normally begins with the identification of a
deteriorating or crisis situation by one or more nations
with an interest in the area involved. The motives that
drive the nation (or nations) to build or join a coalition
are numerous: to share costs, to increase the effect
of chosen actions (such as sanctions), to add needed
capability to the coalition forces, or to add international
legitimacy to a potential intervention. Recent coalition
operations have involved short periods of major
combat, but have generally been less concerned with
high-intensity warfare than with conflict prevention,
humanitarian assistance, and post-conflict stabilization
and reconstruction actions. That same trend is
expected to continue for the foreseeable future. These
complex operations pose specific challenges and
carry specific requirements for coalitions. The issue
at hand is no longer simply winning a war, but rather
crisis management, conflict resolution, and long-term
stabilization. The aim is not victory and the end of
the particular national security problem, but success
at managing the issue. The measure of success is not
the total defeat of an enemy; it is the normalization of
a country or a region.

53
 Once a coalition is formed, its success in operations
depends on at least three important aspects: a
consultation process that is responsive to operational
needs, a shared understanding of the strategic
environment (including strategic and operational
objectives), and a concept of operations that integrates
all elements of national power.

The Consultation Process.

In most cases, the nations intending to respond

to a deteriorating situation or to a crisis will engage
in high-level political consultations prior to making
any decisions. These consultations will be held by
a group of representatives from each nation and
each representative will have direct contact with the
appropriate national bodies. If not already decided,
a lead nation normally emerges at an early stage of
political discussions. The lead nation will seek to build a
coalition that will address its specific national interests,
but should seek and consider partners national
assessments, positions, and desired outcomes.
At the political level, the consultation process allows
a potential coalition to determine whether intervention
is required, as well as the foundation (whether
rationalization or justification) for any intervention.
The process is also important in deciding objectives and
the ways in which those objectives are to be pursued.
A shared and agreed understanding of the situation,
desired end state, exit strategy, and predictable risks
and costs is necessary to ensure robust cohesiveness
within any coalition.
The consultation process must be iterative and
flexible enough to respond to changing operational and
strategic circumstances, but still must be conducted
through existing national processes. Political leaders

54
do not always give clearor anyguidance to forces
in the field, but sufficient contact must be maintained
with political authorities to allow them to communicate
guidance, if desired.

Common Understanding of the Strategic

Environment.

During initial stages of coalition building, potential

coalition members must exchange their national views
on the situation and their understanding of the strategic
environment. A shared assessment of the situation
must be obtained through the comparison of different
national assessments, after also taking into account any
relevant inputs from international organizations (IOs)
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). This
enables potential coalition members to understand
different national perspectives and, in particular, to
assess the thresholds of acceptability of the situation at
hand. The objective is to identify overlapping interests
and develop a desired end state that is not only the
lowest common denominator between the nations, but a
common objective for all. Based on their national vision
of the area under consideration, on their understanding
of what the situation there is and could become, and
on the means they are willing to commit, potential
coalition members have to agree on what they want
to achieve. Understanding the strategic environment
is a fundamental element of a successful intervention.
Strong situational analysis and understanding of the
strategic environment within the country and region
as well as the global international contextare crucial
elements of any intervention.
The 1956 French-British-Israeli Suez Expedition
is an excellent example of faulty analysis of the

55
geopolitical context. The actors completely failed to
take into account the broader geopolitical context of the
Cold War and failed to realize that the key decisions in
the situation were going to be made in Washington and
Moscow, not in the capitals of Europe. The coalition
partners did not perceive that their colonialist attitudes
would gain no support from the United States and
did not take into account the possible risk of nuclear
escalation (in rhetoric, at least) their intervention could
entail.
A coalition isby definitionvulnerable to
tensions, and it is essential to ensure that the coalition
has common strategic objectives. The Suez Expedition
is again an excellent illustration of this point. Although
France, Great Britain, and Israel shared the common
goal of removing Egyptian President Gamal Abdel
Nasser from power, their underlying motivations
diverged significantly. France aimed at isolating the
Algerian rebellion by eliminating its main source of
external support. Great Britain wanted to maintain
its control over the Suez Canal. The Israelis sought to
conduct a preventive action before an Arab coalition
led by Nasser could become strong enough to try to
conquer Palestine.
Because of these different underlying aims, the
members of the coalition disagreed during the military
planning phase. The French wished to arrive in Cairo
quickly and therefore make Alexandria the coalitions
point of entry; the British insisted on entering the
country at Port Said, the mouth of the canal; meanwhile,
the Israelis wanted to deal a significant defeat to the
Egyptian military before proceeding. These differences
of opinion considerably delayed planninglong
enough for Nasser to act effectively on the diplomatic
front, consolidating support from the Soviet Union and

56
ensuring that the coalition would be unable to reach its
political objectives.

Coordinating and Integrating All Elements

of National Power.

Successful coalition intervention requires the

integration of all instruments of national and
multinational power during all phases of the
operation: preliminary actions, military intervention,
stabilization, and reconstruction. Given the complex
environments in which most operations take place,
the success of a coalition no longer depends on the
application of military power alone. It has become
essential to make use of all instruments of national
power when intervening abroad: during coercion or
engagement exercises, for counterterrorist operations,
or during the stabilization and reconstruction period.
To minimize the duration of the military involvement
and to facilitate transitions from one phase to another in
a campaign, militaries should develop mechanisms to
interact effectively with long-term players in the other
agencies of national power. This requires interagency
coordinationconducted multinationallyfrom the
advance planning phase through the execution phase.
The concept of operations must encompass the
whole spectrum of political, diplomatic, military,
informational, and economic actions. The activities
and capabilities of the multinational interagency
community (including all relevant governmental
ministries, as well as IOs and NGOs) must be closely
coordinated with the work of military planners
to permit the incorporation of their perspectives,
capabilities, and support requirements. This acts to
improve the overall coherence and effectiveness of

57
the operation. The general concept of operations must
include a position on conflict-termination issues. Crisis
resolution will not occur simply because the situation
is no longer deteriorating or when military operations
are completed.
In reality, a complex international intervention
may require the construction of several coalitions: a
military coalition, of course, but also different types
of ad hoc coalitions organized to conduct activities
such as political development, humanitarian relief,
instituting the rule of law, building electoral capability
and capacity, human rights protection, weapons
inspection, and various reconstruction and economic
development activities. Each coalition would have
its own organization, leadership, and group of
participants. The coordination between these coalitions
or subcoalitions has to be assured at the political level
by a contact group set up by major contributing
nations. This coalition of coalitions must be in place
very early during the consultation and planning
process.
The intervention in Kosovo is a good example of
the importance of combining various instruments of
power. All political, diplomatic, military, information,
and economic instruments were used during
this intervention, both during the short military
phase and in the much longer stabilization and
reconstruction phase. The Balkans Contact Group, a
political coordinating body, facilitated consultation
and coordination among the governments involved.
Planning for various nonmilitary aspects of the
stabilization and reconstruction phase began early and
took into account the roles of the European Union, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), various
United Nations (UN) bodies, and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

58
 A coordinated strategy, issued at the political and
strategic level, is necessary to assure coherence and
convergence of the mission, the mandate, the means,
and the situation on the ground, and initiates the
coordinated planning of all national instruments of
power. This convergence ensures that the coalition
will have appropriate troop levels, equipment, rules of
engagement, etc.
The early years of the UN mission in Bosnia are
perhaps the most tragic example of incompatibility
between the situation on the ground and the mandate
and rules of engagement. It demonstrates that an
intervention in a so-called peacekeeping operation
can, in fact, be a way for Western political leaders to do
nothing while presenting a face-saving appearance of
action. This type of situation is particularly hard on the
military and ought to be avoided. As learned the hard
way, deploying to a crisis or conflict zone where the
situational reality is disconnected from the mandate
and the means, with no coherent plan or vision of
strategic objectives or desired end state, can only be
disastrous.

59
 PANEL III

THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT:

THE RESERVE COMPONENTS AT WAR

General.

At first glance, the choice of the Reserve Compo-

nents1 of the military as a venue for looking at the do-
mestic context of a nation at war seems unusual. The
choice may even have confused the panels moderator,
Dr. James Carafano: He identified selection of the
Reserve Components as absolutely the right choice
to talk about the military component [technically, not
the focus of the panel] of a nation at war. Although
absolutely the right choice is a judgment call, various
aspects of the military context of the Nation at war
certainly could be addressed through analysis of the
Reserve Components role in the war and would be a
valuable addition to the debate on the main topic of
a nation at war. Domestic context, though, implies a
broad analysis of the impact of the war on the American
population. A domestic content panel should not look
exclusively at the military, but at the home front to
analyze popular support of the war or what sacrifices
the people were making because of the wars conduct.
The panel would look at issues like those that George
Packer mentioned in The Assassins Gate:

The home front of the Iraq War was not like World War
II, and it was not like Vietnam. It didnt unite Americans
across party lines against an existential threat (September
11 did that, but not Iraq). There were no war bonds,
no collection drives, no universal call-up, no national
mobilization, no dollar-a-year men. We were not all in

61
 it together. Nor did it tear the country apart. As soon as
the war began, the American antiwar movement quietly
folded up its tent and went home. . . . Iraq provided a
blank screen on which Americans were free to project
anything they wanted, and because so few Americans
had anything directly at stake there, many of them never
saw more than the image of their own feelings. The
exceptions, of course, were the soldiers and their families,
who carried almost the entire weight of the war.2

These issues deserve separate in-depth analysis and

public discussion, but a look at the Reserve Components
is not necessarily the antithesis of a study of popular
support. Believers in what is known as the Abrams
Doctrine3 would contend that analysis of the Reserve
Components inevitably leads to a measurement of
popular support for any conflict. The impact on the
reservesmore than the impact on the more-insular
active forcesreflects broadly the impact on the
citizenry. The choice of the Reserve Components as the
focus of the domestic context panel seems somewhat
more prescient in that light.
Images of the Nation at war usually include
mobilization of the nations reserve forces. That image
almost certainly is produced by the Nations experience
in World War II, although more recent conflicts in Korea
and Vietnam adjusted that paradigm significantly. Just
as they have for all the deployments of the U.S. Army
since the end of the Cold War, the Army Reserve and
the Army National Guardalthough certainly not
fully mobilizedare just as certainly carrying a large
load in the Global War on Terrorism, especially in Iraq.
The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves
recently reported to Congress that, Following the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, unprecedented
numbers of reservists and national guardsmen have

62
been involuntarily recalled to active duty and have
served for longer periods than at any other time since
the Korean War.4 That involvement does not come
without costs. The capability to respond to disasters
like Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana or forest fires in
Montana is diluted by the National Guard deployment
to Iraq and Afghanistan. Although current statistics5
suggest that the situation has reversed itself, recruiting
and retention have been continuing challenges for both
the National Guard and the Army Reserve (as well as
for the active forces).6 The very nature of reserve service
has changed; the force now is considered an operational
reserve, not the traditional strategic reserve.7
Describing the Reserve Components as the
center of gravity of the military in the 21st century,
Dr. Carafano framed the subject by saying that the
success of the U.S. military in the next few decades
will depend strongly on the health of the Reserve
Components. Three factors will determine that health.
First, the military will either get more money . . . or
it wont. Barring the politically unpopular step of
limiting entitlements, the current trend of spending 4
percent of the gross domestic product is about the best
the military can expect. If defense spending decreases,
the Army will depend on the cheaper Reserve
Componentscheaper in peacetime, not necessarily
in war or other operationsbut the reduced dollars
available will limit readiness and capability of the total
force, especially since much of that money will have to
be spent on manpower costs. Second, the military will
change . . . or it wont. According to Dr. Carafano, the
military will need to change to make military careers
remain consistent or congruent with the civilian
sector. Some 21st century phenomenamore women
in the workplace, telecommuting, changing careers,

63
people working longerwill need to be reflected in
the military structure if the military and its Reserve
Components are to succeed. If the personnel structure
of the total force does not accommodate and reflect this
change in the civilian sector, the Reserve Components
dependent on citizen-soldierswill lose their vitality.
Finally, the military will include a larger active force
or it wont. The Reserve Components are acting
as an operational reserve because of the continuing
need for more active troops. If that trend continues,
the Nation may decide simply to increase the size of
the active component, with corresponding reductions
in the Reserve Components.8 If, however, the Nation
sees the need for active troops waxing and waning in
some type of sine wave, maintaining healthy Reserve
Components will be an essential part of any national
security strategy. That construct of the future has not
yet been decided.

Brigadier General David Burford

(Army National Guard [ARNG]).

Acknowledging the shift from a strategic to an

operational reserve, Brigadier General Dave Burford
described some of the differences in the reserve force
since the start of the Global War on Terrorism. When the
terrorists attacked on September 11, 2001, the Reserve
Componentsalong with the rest of the Armywere
based on a symmetrical threat that was expected to start
a war overseas with enough notice for time-phased
mobilization and deployment, if and when needed.
That force also was organized in a linear fashion, in
contrast to the modular form being established today
to provide capabilities that can be used against an
unpredictable enemy. With its modular organization,

64
the current force is better prepared for an asymmetric
threat that may attack anywhere, including in the
continental United States, giving no real opportunity
for a lengthy mobilization and deployment timeline.
For the National Guard, the mission of support to the
various states presents an additional overlay to their
federal mission.
Although some of Brigadier General Burfords
presentation simply described the National Guard and
some of the programs underway to improve the force,9
he did make three important points. The first related
directly to the conflict between the state and federal
missions of the Guard. No better example exists than
the response to Hurricane Katrina to show the challenge
of accomplishing state missions while that states
National Guard forces are deployed elsewhere on a
federal mission. Up to 40 percent of the National Guard
forcesand their equipmentfrom Louisiana and
Mississippi were on active duty in Iraq when Katrina
hit their homes.10 Wartime equipment shortages
compounded by fielding decisions that traditionally put
less-capable equipment into the Guard formations
limited the National Guard response even more.
Despite those challenges, there were . . . over 50,000
National Guardsmen engaged in the recovery... from
the disaster within 96 hours after Hurricane Katrina
cleared New Orleans. Although the affected governors
might have felt better with their own forces at hand,
the response shows just how much residual capacity
still exists within the National Guard. Tapping into
that residual may require some extraordinary efforts,11
but the Global War on Terrorism apparently has not
pushed the National Guard to a breaking point if it can
still respond to a natural disaster in such numbers and
so quickly.

65
 Brigadier General Burford briefly mentioned
the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model.
ARFORGEN is part of an effort to put some
predictability into the lives of Reserve Component
soldiers by development of a cycle that would deploy
them no more than once every five or six years.
Manning, equipping, and training levels within the
force also would be adjusted to bring units to maximum
readiness on the same cycle. Brigadier General Burford
focused on the fact that the cycle is only a goal; soldiers
still can be mobilized and deployed more frequently
if strategic or operational requirements demand it.
Left unstated were questions about how the lower
readiness of units in the early years of the ARFORGEN
cycle might impact on the readiness of those forces to
accomplish either state or other federal missions. The
National Guard, although pleased with the increased
predictability, also might find itself unhappy with
a reduced number of training and equipping dollars
provided to the Reserve Component units in those
same early years.
Brigadier General Burfords final point hit upon
homeland security. In his comments, he simply stated
that homeland security should not be assigned as
a mission for the National Guard, but that making
it a role might make more sense. Semantics aside,
homeland security is such an all-encompassing
activity that it requires the involvement of the whole
federal government and multiple agencies of local and
state government. Consequence management alone
can quickly overwhelm response capacity locally or
regionally within the United States; adding just the
responsibility for critical infrastructure protection
makes the problems even more difficult to manage.
Assigning the National Guard the mission of homeland

66
security would force it to reorganize and equip for the
mission, and would deprive the Nation of its use in
other strategic and operational crises. The National
Guard always will have a role in homeland security,
but should not be optimized for that role. Optimizing
the Guard for that mission would deprive the Nation
of some more-flexible forces that would be better
capable of responding to other crises at the strategic
and operational level.

Brigadier General Michael Squier (ARNG, Retired).

Brigadier General Mike Squier brought a historical

perspective to his discussion of the Reserve Compo-
nents. As a senior leader of the Army National Guard at
the National Guard Bureau for many years, he worked
through the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 1997
fistfight between the active Army and its Reserve
Components. He also was around for the culminating
point of QDR 2001, when more reason was applied
and the components worked as a team after identifying
the need for more Army than was available at the
time.
As one of the architects of the current Army
National Guard force, Brigadier General Squier spoke
with some pride about the capabilities of the force,
but saved his greatest compliments for the can do
attitude that he believes permeates the entire force. He
then spoke realistically about the problems created by
that can do attitude. According to him, the National
Guard got caught up in the zeal to get into the game
after the attacks of 9/11 and National Guard soldiers
and units suffered as a result. The recruiting and
retention challenges experienced in the past couple of
years followed from decisions made about utilizing the

67
Reserve Components more than most Reservists and
Guardsmen desired. Cross-leveling of soldiers from
one unit to another also affected retention decisions,
but the greater effect was organizational. Units with
new personnel added just before deployment suffer
from loss of unit cohesion. Cross-leveling occurs with
equipment, too, to ensure that deploying units have
the best and the right amounts of their authorized gear.
That is the right decision for the deploying units, but
a severe adverse impact can be felt on the units that
remain behind, stripped of manpower and equipment
needed for training or operations. Thus far, the plans to
reconstitute reserve forces look good on paper, but the
huge associated bill undoubtedly will force changes,
limiting the Reserve Components ability to perform
either state or other federal missions.
To address these issues, Brigadier General
Squier suggested looking closely at how the Reserve
Components are planned to be employed, and
specifically reexamining the roles and missions of the
reserves. Although some disagreement continues to
exist, in QDR 2001 the reserves roles were defined as
expanding Army capabilities in time of need, enhancing
Army capabilities (often possible because Guardsmen
and Reservists bring civilian professional and trade
skills and associations with them into uniform), and
providing a sustainment capability for long-term
operations. Those roles seem to remain valid for the
near- and mid-term future, but that paradigm could be
changed if the Nation decides to pursue a larger active
duty force, for example. Brigadier General Squier
did not provide any insight into just what other roles
and missions might be appropriate for the Reserve
Components, but he did caution against wholesale
discarding of the reserve forces. Although they are

68
expensive in operations because of predeployment
training and equipping requirements, the Guard and
Reserves are still cost-effective forces over the long
term. He also cautioned against changing the laws
affecting mobilization without understanding the intent
of those laws. Guardsmen and Reservists understand
their responsibility to answer the Nations call in time
of crisis, but if changes to mobilization processes
result in more frequent mobilizations, there will be
an accompanying impact on recruiting and retention.
Brigadier General Squier also suggested asking why
there was such a need to cross-level equipment and
personnel for deploying units. The reason is because
reserve units have not been resourced for success. The
bill is significant, but the force can be more readily
employed if appropriately manned, equipped, and
trained.
Brigadier General Squier buttressed Brigadier
General Burfords comments about ARFORGEN and
homeland security. He described ARFORGEN as
useful in identifying requirements, but warned against
using it to restrict the flow of money to the Reserve
Components. Without adequate funding, the Guard
and Reserve will not be ready when needed. He also
agreed with Brigadier General Burford that homeland
security is not a National Guard mission, stating
emphatically that . . . the Guard is not . . . the federal
response force for homeland security. This seems
somewhat contradictory to his image of the Guard as
the force that never says no, but is understandable in
the context of missions added without accompanying
resources. Probably recognizing that the Nations
civilian infrastructure is the better place to assign the
homeland security mission, he challenged the panel
and the audience to define the role that the military

69
should play in homeland security. The mission of
homeland security can be assigned to the National
Guard, but there will be associated costs. Some of those
costs are in equipping and training, but a greater cost
may be the impact of not having a deployable reserve
forceeither operational or strategicwhen needed
to augment active capabilities.

Major General Robert Ostenberg

(U.S. Army Reserve [USAR]).

Major General Robert Ostenberg, like other panel-

ists, discussed homeland security in the context of mili-
tary support to civilian authorities. The case used for
discussion was Hurricane Katrina. In his remarks, he
compared the natural disaster of Katrina to the effects
of a terrorist attack. The 1,300 deaths there and the $96
billion in damage (including the loss of approximately
300,000 homes) are comparable in many respects
to the results that could be expected after a terrorist
attack with a weapon of mass destruction in one of
the Nations major cities. The 9/11 attacks killed more
people, but the physical impact12 could be considered
much smaller than the damage to New Orleans alone.
The metaphor is a good one; after a terrorist attack or
after a natural disaster, the militaryparticularly the
National Guardcan be expected to be involved in the
response. After a terrorist attack, the response is called
consequence management, but the effect is much the
same. The metaphor breaks down, though, if broader
arguments are made about homeland security based
only on consequence management/disaster relief.
Homeland security covers preventive measures, too,
such as critical infrastructure protection, not just
consequence management.

70
 As did the previous two panelists, Major General
Ostenberg pointed out that the homeland security
and disaster relief missions will take more capacity
and capability than are resident in the military,
active or reserve. Specifically for disaster response
(andby implicationconsequence management), he
said that the first responders need to come from the
Nations cities. When the cities response capabilities
become overwhelmed, their leaders should call on
state resources first; the governors should then call on
federal resources if the magnitude of the event requires
it. What he didnt mention was the fact that not all
disasters (or terrorist attacks) allow for such a neat and
linear process. Just as Hurricane Katrina immediately
overwhelmed city and state resources, a terrorist attack
can do the same thing, particularly if a weapon of mass
destruction is somehow unleashed in an American
city. In such cases, the federal force must be leaning
forward, not waiting for some beleaguered local or
state politician to call for help. Despite the complaints
of slow response to Hurricane Katrina, the federal force
anticipated some or much of the need. Guardsmen from
the region, experienced in responding to hurricanes,
were naturally mobilized, but Guard forces from
across the Nationincluding far away Wyoming,
Ohio, Vermont, and many otherswere also among
the responding forces. Some eventslike a Category 5
hurricane or a terrorist attack of similar magnitude
are so unprecedented as to deny any real opportunity
for adequate prior planning and preparation. In such
cases, some ad hoc-racy must be expected. The
natural patriotic response of all Americansnot just
the military or those in the governmentto volunteer
in such cases will help, but the response and recovery
nonetheless will be slow, at least in the eyes of those
who most need the help.

71
 On the subject of cross-leveling, Major General
Ostenberg noted a shift from the early days of the
Global War on Terror, when units were told to
come as you are. As the war has progressed, there
is no longer any need to send units that are not fully
manned, equipped, and trained, but he cautioned
against gold plating units by sending them with
more people and equipment than needed. Sending too
many people now makes it harder to sustain required
manpower levels for the long war. He recognized
the stress on the Army Reserve, but emphasized that
significant potential remains, at least in quantity of
people. The challenge is not just numbers of people;
it also is making sure that the right skills are part of
the package. Reclassification and retraining actions are
underway to address some of these issues in various
military occupational specialties, but they have not yet
been enough to avoid units being deployed with up to
70 percent of their strength being fillers, people not
originally assigned to the unit.

Major General Donna L. Dacier (USAR).

Major General Donna Dacier started her comments

by mentioning some of the ways the Army Reserve has
adapted to meet the needs of the regional combatant
commanders. Three of those ways are several years
old: the move to reduce the number of nontactical
organizations and the soldiers in them, the formation
of multiple-component units (multi-compo units
consisting of units with some combination of elements
of the ARNG, the USAR and the active force), and the
USAR effort to change its force structure to reduce
the number of high-demand, low-density units. Each
of these initiatives may have been accelerated in

72
execution since the onset of the Global War on Terror,
but nonetheless have been around in concept for quite
some time. All could probably trace their origin back
to reductions in the total force either taken or planned
prior to 9/11.
The first was used in all components to increase the
number of tactical units by eliminating unnecessary
organizations involved in generating and projecting the
force, replacing them in some cases with contractors or
government civilian employees. The second could be
touted as a more economical use of assets, but also was
necessitated by the continuing need to make do with
less caused by post-Cold War and post-Operation
DESERT STORM reductions in the size of the force.
There may be no way to eliminate all high-demand,
low-density units, but they have been around for years,
again a result of a focus on tactical units, specifically
the combat units. To keep the fighting edge on the
force, superfluous units like civil affairs, military
police, and psychological operations units were cut or
put into the reserves without due regard for how often
they would be utilized in the post-Cold War world.
While it is easy enough to identify these problems in
the USAR,13 the same problems abound in the ARNG
and the active force. The shame is just that it took the
Global War on Terror to fix or to accelerate fixing these
old problems.
The one true innovation Major General Dacier
covered was the use of the USAR Division (Institutional
Training) for training of Iraqi security forces. The DIV
(IT) was designed to augment active training programs
in peacetime, then to provide backfills in the event of
large-scale deployment of the active force. Instead,
as the program to build the Iraqi police and military
accelerated in late 2004, a DIV (IT) was mobilized to

73
deploy to Iraq to assist in that effort by providing
individual staff for the multinational training command
and training teams to the Iraqi army and police forces.
This was an excellent example of the particular flexibility
of the USAR, whichunlike the ARNGeasily can
mobilize and deploy individual soldiers, not just units.
If criticism were to be leveled at this action, it would
mention timeliness.14 The same action could have
been taken with the training of Afghan security forces
in 2002, which would have freed Special Operations
Forces from the training mission.
Like the others, Major General Dacier covered the
stressors afflicting the military, explaining that some
stress in the early days of the current war seemed
to be self-induced by leaders and planners who did
not possess the insight needed to put together force
structure needed for the long war. She did emphasize
that breaking point stress on the military is a problem
that transcends the Reserve Components and even the
total Army; it is an issue that reaches deep into each part
of the Department of Defense and must be resolved at
that or higher levels.

Major General William Nesbitt (ARNG).

After saying he would avoid redundancy with the

other panelists comments, Major General William
Nesbitt was only partially successful in that effort,
as is probably to be expected due to the nature of
the subject. Like the other panelists, he covered the
stressors on personnel and equipment. For the former,
he asserted that the deployment stress on Reserve
Component personnel is greater than for the active
force. All of the components generally put boots on
the ground for twelve months in theater, but for the

74
Reserve Components, that is in addition to the lengthy
mobilization and predeployment training process that
can add another 6 months to the time that a Guard or
Reserve soldier is away from his or her family. That
may be somewhat misleading, though, asby Major
General Nesbitts own admissionactive soldiers tend
to be deployed more frequently. In congruence with
the other panelists, he called for a better mobilization
process to limit the total time away from home, but
also suggested that the use of the Reserve Components
in the operational reserve role means that they need to
be better trained and equipped before mobilization.
Although he said his opinion only reflects a personal
perspective, Major General Nesbitt argued that the
National Guard . . . is not in danger of breaking. He
also opined, though, that the Guard cannot sustain
mobilization of approximately 100,000 Guardsmen as
in 2005, but can sustain . . . in the neighborhood of
20,000 to 40,000 over the long haul . . . . In the context
of an authorized end strength of 350,000, the former
number seems to make sense, but the latter may not.
Even under the ARFORGEN cycle of one mobilization
and deployment every six years, the number of soldiers
available each yearassuming the spaces in the
structure are all filled with faces of soldierswould
be over 58,000.15
In talking about equipping the National Guard,
Major General Nesbitt withdrew his comment about
not being in danger of breaking. His comments about
the equipping levels of the National Guard are hard
to dispute. The equipment may not be substandard, as
he charged, but fielding priorities do allot the better
equipment more broadly across the active force.16 For the
same reasons, equipment shortages are more prevalent
across the reserve force; the ravages of wartime losses

75
have aggravated this situation, made even worse for
some units by equipment cross-leveling that leaves
some nondeploying units unready. Major General
Nesbitt pointed out that the Reserve Components
are no longer functioning as a strategic reserve, but
are still budgeted that way. That is in part due to
inadequate allocation of the gross domestic product to
defense. That is compounded by the fact that the Army
gets less than 25 percent of the Defense budget, but is
. . . carrying most of the load . . . in the Global War
on Terror. From the National Guard perspective, that
is made even worse by the active forcewith only
27 percent of the total Army strengthspending
approximately 79 percent of the (pre-supplemental)
budget. At least one of his statistics may be misleading:
47 percent of the force is active and can be expected to
consume more of the budget than the 53 percent of the
force that is in reserve and not doing the same level of
training and operations. Nonetheless, his depiction of
the Guard and Reserves as . . . kind of at the bottom
of [the budgeting] food chain . . . is fair. That will only
get worseat least for the early years of the cycle
with implementation of ARFORGEN.
As at least a partial solution, Major General Nesbitt
recommended that Congress consider a dedicated
appropriation for the ARNG, much like is done for
the Special Operations Forces. According to him, this
would be more likely to ensure that the Guard receives
adequate resources and would force the active force
to stop using the Guard like a teller machine when
a budgetary shortfall is encountered. The active
leadership can be expected to oppose this because
of the limitations on total force readiness it would
produce. Friction between the Guard and the federal
force also could be expected to ensue, even if some of

76
the funding came from the Department of Homeland
Security.
Major General Nesbitt added some specific
comments about the ARFORGEN model, describing it
as good for predictability for individual soldiers, but
not good for the sustained readiness of the force. On
the high point of the cycle, the model would provide
forces that are ready: trained, equipped, and manned
appropriately. The problem is the other years of the
cycle, when ARFORGEN will create various levels of
unreadiness to accomplish the Guards normal state
missions and unexpected missions in both the state
and federal arena.
Contradicting his fellow panelists, Major General
Nesbitt stated that the Guard was not only capable of
providing rapid response forces in support of homeland
security, but they have been doing so for some time.
Whether stated as a Guard role or mission, the Guard
because of its state mission and its proximity to affected
communitieswill be involved intimately at least in
consequence management for any large-scale terrorist
attack. As with the other panelists, he ignored the
non-consequence management aspects of homeland
security, but did argue for more accessibility of other
Reserve Component units (presumably USAR) to the
governor when a catastrophic event occurs. That has
been addressed at least partially by the development
of joint force headquarters in the states.

ENDNOTES - PANEL III

1. The Army has various components associated with it. The

first three are the active force, the Army National Guard, and the
Army Reserve, known as Components 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
2. George Packer, The Assassins Gate, New York: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, 2005, pp. 381, 382.

77
 3. The so-called Abrams Doctrine allegedly originated with
Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams as he reorganized
the Army after Vietnam. The legend says that General Abrams,
wary of political leadership ever again committing the Nations
military to a conflict without popular support, structured the
force with large numbers of combat support and combat service
support units in the reserves. This meant that any commitment
of the military to a war would necessitate mobilization of the
reserves, thus ensuring broad involvement of the population, if
not in supporting the war, at least in the decision to go to war.
While recognizing that the Abrams Doctrine actually may not
have been developed except in response to budgetary constraints,
Dr. Carafano refers to it in The Army Reserves and the Abrams
Doctrine: Unfulfilled Promise, Uncertain Future, Heritage
Lectures, No. 869, The Heritage Foundation, April 18, 2005,
available at www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/loader.
cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=77058, accessed
July 11, 2006. For more on development of the Abrams Doctrine,
see Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.
An alternative view (that suggests the available evidence does
not support Sorleys conclusion) can be found in Conrad Crane,
Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Armys Response to Defeat in Southeast
Asia, Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute, September,
2002.
4. Arnold L. Punaro, et al., Commission on the National Guard
and Reserves: 90-Day Report, June 5, 2006, p. 21-22, available at
www.cngr.gov/pdf/CNGR percent20Ninety-day percent20Report.pdf,
accessed July 12, 2006.
5. Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, the Chief of the Army
Reserve, wrote in early 2005 that the Reserves were rapidly
degenerating into a broken force. Lionel Beehner, Recruitment
Woes for U.S. Guard and Reserve, backgrounder from the Council
on Foreign Relations, October 26, 2005, available at www.cfr.org/
publication/9101/recruitment_woes_for_us_guard_and_reserve.html,
accessed July 13, 2006. However, data on reserve forces recruiting
for October 1, 2005, to June 30, 2006, show the Army National Guard
at 103 percent of its goal and the Army Reserve at 101 percent of
its goal. Retention numbers are well within acceptable limits
and indications are that trend will continue . . . Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), U.S. Department
of Defense, DOD Announces Recruiting and Retention Numbers
for June, news release, July 10, 2006, available at www.defenselink.
mil/releases/2006/nr20060710-13413.html, accessed July 13, 2006.

78
 6. Perhaps the better measure of the challenge is the change
in recruiting standards: The Army is accepting more recruits
with lower scores on qualification tests; the maximum age
for a recruit was increased to 40 (from 35) in January 2006 and
further increased in June 2006 to 42. Increased cash bonuses also
complement the call that patriotism has on potential recruits. An
increased recruiter force also undoubtedly has an impact. With
continuing low unemployment, such measures are necessary to
meet recruiting goals. Tom Vanden Brook, Military on pace to
meet recruiting goals for this year, USA Today, July 10, 2006,
available at www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-07-10-
military-recruiting_x.htm, accessed on July 13, 2006.
7. This may be a false dichotomy, because the Reserve
Components must be capable of fulfilling both roles: as the
strategic reserve and as the operational reserve. The Commission
on the Guard and Reserves defines the strategic reserve as . . . a
pool of replacement manpower and capability to be employed in
a large-scale conflict with a peer or near-peer military competitor
. . . Use of the reserves in an operational contextas in Operations
IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOMdefines the new
paradigm. The Commission then goes on to say, Policymakers
must strike an appropriate and sustainable balance between the
operational and strategic use of the reserve components that will
be necessary to achieve national security objectives in a long war.
Punaro, et al., p. 22-23.
8. The USAR leadership in the past has said that falling below
their current authorized end strength would make viability of
the force problematic. The constitutionally-protected National
Guard would probably survive, but might have to use as force
structure justification the federal homeland security mission,
complementing its traditional state role in disaster response.
9. Brigadier General Burford spoke specifically about the state
and federal missions of the National Guard, saying that was one
of the only real distinctions between them and the Army Reserve.
He also briefly mentioned two programs to improve manning of
the force. The first is a program to make every soldier a recruiter
and to give them bonuses for getting friends to join and to complete
training. The second was about the initiative to provide a trainees,
transients, holdees, and students (TTHS) account. Formation of
this account will not increase National Guard readiness, but will
improve the accuracy of reporting and is long overdue. The active
force has had a TTHS account for years.

79
 10. Bryan Bender, Demands of Wars Since 9/11 Strain National
Guards Efforts, The Boston Globe, September 2, 2005, available at
www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2005/09/02/demands_
of_wars_since_911_strain_national_guards_efforts/, accessed July 17,
2006.
11. Ibid.
12. The national psychological impact of the terrorist attacks
arguably is greater.
13. The Chief of the Army Reserve, Lieutenant General Jack
Stultz, confirmed in testimony to the Congressionally-mandated
Commission on the Guard and Reserves that some of the issues
faced by the mobilized Reservists and Guardsmen were not new,
although he said new problems have arisen because of the Armys
heavy reliance on them in Iraq and Afghanistan and because of the
failure to predict the long war. John W. Gonzalez, New Strategy
Urged to Retain Reservists, Houston Chronicle, July 20, 2006.
14. Any criticism of this innovation also would have to ask why
Reservistsinstead of better qualified active forceswere used
for this mission. The Reservists could have been used to backfill
training programs from which active forces had been drawn. That
discussion is beyond the scope of this report.
15. This assumes that the spaces of the force structure
are filled with faces of actual soldiers, which is never a good
assumption. However, even if the active forces TTHS account of
13 percent is applied and subtracted from the Guard end strength,
the ARFORGEN model would still produce over 50,000 soldiers
for deployment every six years.
16. New equipment is distributed to units based on deployment
plans. Since most active forces deploy earlier, they generally
have newer equipment on hand. Both for political reasons and
for warfighting readiness, some of the newer equipment also is
allotted to high-priority Guard and Reserve units.

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 KEYNOTE ADDRESS

BUILDING A DEFENSE FORCE

FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

Dr. William J. Perry

Without addressing specific theaters in the Global

War on Terrorism, former Secretary of Defense
William J. Perry provided some general guidance and
a framework for evaluating the extant strategy. His
general guidance stemmed from time he spent with
the various Services senior enlisted personnel while
he was the Secretary of Defense and was very simple:
Remember the soldiers.1 During his time as Secretary,
Dr. Perry met regularly with enlisted personnel. While
they may have raised a whole pantheon of issues,
several of them stuck with the Secretary on strategic
matters.
First, the soldiersand Dr. Perrysaid that
training must be protected. Too often, training suffers
as budget crises force tradeoffs in requirements. The
soldiers recognized that the U.S. military is the best
in the world because of that training and told him not
to cut it because of fiscal pressures. Other things
e.g., force structure, technology, paymust also be
protected, but one of the real keys to success with the
modern military system is training.2 As seen with the
war in Iraq, that training must be focused on the right
kind of battle, but a force without adequate training
tends to be a force in name only.
Secondand related to the firstsoldiers told the
Secretary to sustain education. Dr. Perrys comments
revolved around education benefitse.g., the

81
Montgomery G.I. Billbut also could have referred to
the individual education programs for soldiers while
they are on active or reserve duty. That education
teaches them how to think and provides the skills
especially critical for leadersthat enable them to
succeed in unfamiliar surroundings with only vague
guidance.
The soldiers next gave the Secretary guidance on
deployments. As part of an all-volunteer force, they
knew that it was their lot to deployoften into harms
waywhen the nations leaders required it. They
simply asked him to make sure that each deployment
was important enough to warrant the sacrifices asked
of the soldiersand they reminded him to ensure
that the soldiers being deployed were supported fully
by the Nation generally, but also particularly by the
Department of Defense.
Finally, the soldiers asked the Secretary to remember
their families and to ensure that theynot the soldiers
themselveshad the best possible quality of life. None
of these points seem particularly earth-shattering, but
the Secretary correctly emphasized them as what must
undergird any effective strategy.
After his general guidance, Dr. Perry launched into
a description of a fairly basic framework for building
a defense force. Steps included evaluation of both
the threat and the existing friendly force (which he
identified as the legacy force); development of a
strategy, to include basing, budget and alliance needs;
and subsequent development of plans of action to
implement the strategy. He next provided some case
studies for evaluation. He identified World War II as
perhaps the easiest because there were basically no
budget limits. The start point for the American forces
was not at all high, but the strategy developedto
overwhelm the enemy on the ground in Europe and

82
at sea and on the ground in the Pacificrequired full
mobilization of the nations resources, particularly the
human and economic ones.
The Cold War was much more challenging. The
Soviets, seeing the success of overwhelming U.S.
mobilization in World War II, decided to do the same
thing. American leadership, convinced that the U.S.
economy could not match the Soviet mobilization,
opted for deterrence and containment, counting on
treaties and a healthy nuclear force to keep the peace.
Secretary Perry skipped the Korean War and its sad
example of how dependence on that nuclear force so
weakened U.S. ground forces that the nations leaders
initially were unable to use them effectively in sustain-
ed combat. Similarly ignoring the war in Vietnam,
Dr. Perry focused next on the 1970s, when the United
States decided to use technological advantages to offset
the Soviet forces. From this stemmed various major
programs that produced capabilities such as stealth,
precision guided munitions, the Global Positioning
System, the Airborne Warning and Control System,
and the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar
System. Dr. Perry identified this offset strategy as
the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) or at least the
RMAs underpinnings.
As the Cold War ended, the threats changed and
included loose nukes, failed states, and major
regional conflicts, not global nuclear war. The RMA
continued to be applied, though, as a way to minimize
the costs of war. This may have been the first indicator
that the strategy was being drivenat least in part
by current programs and capabilities. It may also have
been an indicator that equating the RMA with the offset
strategy was the wrong thing to do. An offset strategy
looks at ways to counter an enemys strengths with

83
friendly forces strengths orbetter yetto attack an
enemys weaknesses with friendly strengths. While
the technological aspect should have been included,
the offset strategy also should have looked at other
ways to overcome enemy strengths. The post-9/11
enemy certainly was looking at the United States with
an eye toward attacking its weaknesses. Although
Dr. Perry did not say so explicitly, the force that the
United States possessed when attacked on 9/11 was
optimized somewhat for a major regional conflict, not
the type of war which was thrust upon it. The U.S.
and its military were dominant in the world, with
generally strong alliances and solid finances, but they
were vulnerable to terrorist attack and had failed to
see the shifting paradigm, despite numerous warnings
before 9/11. Fighting the war with a heavy force was
appropriate in several aspectsand that capability
needs to be maintainedbut the more likely scenario
is one in which the United States is confronted on an
asymmetric battlefield where the enemy uses lawfare3
and information operations to make points that the
United States thus far has been unable to counter
effectively. The offset strategy that Dr. Perry described
is still valid, but has to be seen as much more than
simply the technology-centric Revolution in Military
Affairs.

ENDNOTES - PERRY

1. All enlisted personnelsoldiers, sailors, airmen, and

Marinesare included in Dr. Perrys comment. The term soldier
is used in this report as emblematic of all of them.
2. For a compelling argument about the importance of training,
see Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in
Modern Battle, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.

84
 3. Lawfare suggests the situation where a foe, unable to
address an issue symmetrically, turns to the field of international
or domestic law to achieve its military goals. The term is used
extensively in the Panel V discussions and is specifically addressed
in endnote 6. of the Panel V summary (p. 141.)

85
 PANEL IV

THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT:

GLOBALIZATION VERSUS
NATIONAL SECURITY

General.

Accurately calculating the costs of the Global War

on Terrorism is a major challenge. Some estimates focus
strictly on military expenditures; others add the costs
of U.S. aid. Others look at commitments only from
the planned budget, but not at supplemental funding.
Another covers current obligations, but not future costs
of increasing intelligence capabilities, replacing worn
equipment, and providing pensions and payments
for those wounded and killed. Estimates range from
half-a-trillion dollars to over two trillion dollars for the
ultimate cost of the Global War on Terrorism, including
the Iraq War and the Afghan War. By any measure,
the Global War on Terrorismand not just the war in
Iraqhas been costly, placing huge demands on the
defense budget, the federal budget, and the national
economy.1 Any study of the Nation at war should
include a look at the cost of the war and the ability of
the Nation to pay that price. The economic health of
the Nationand the worldis critical to providing the
means to execute the strategy to achieve desired ends.
And from the perspective of the American people, the
shape of the economy is not good.2
Curiously enough, the economics panelists made
little direct mention of the Global War on Terrorism
except for a couple of comments thanking U.S.
servicemen for their sacrifices in this time of war.

87
Instead of costs and budgets and ends-ways-means
mismatches, the panel chose to look almost exclusively
at globalization, with a heavy dose of concerns about
China added to the mix. In his opening remarks, the
panel moderator stated that the purpose of the panel was
to try to build a bridge between the notions of national
security and globalization. Much of the ensuing panel
discussion might have been as relevant before 9/11 as
afterward, but the effects of globalizationand the
impact of China on the U.S. and global economyare
nonetheless important factors in the economic health
of the United States and, hence, its ability to wage war.
To some, the international interdependence resulting
from globalization removes some of the motivation
for one country to go to war with another; for others,
globalizations creation of international winners
and losers provides powerful incentive for war,
particularly one that would be fought asymmetrically.
Is the globalization of commerce antithetical to national
security? The answer is not clear, particularly in an era
in which one of globalizations disaffected losers
might be able to find and use a nuclear weapon. The
panel provided some insight into the interrelationship
between globalization and national security. That may
appear not to tell if the Nation is at war or not, but does
provide good information on how prepared America
is to fund this waror the next.

Dr. Edward M. Graham.

Kicking off his presentation, Dr. Edward Graham

listed two major concerns about international
exchanges between the United States and the rest of
the world. First was the significant trade deficit, which
he described as approximately $800 billion in 2005.

88
Many people look at the $1.8 trillion (approximately
15 percent of the gross domestic product) imported in
2005 and wring their hands about the trade imbalance.
They tend to forget that the United States is not only
a voracious importer, but also a . . . very, very
effective exporter of goods and services, with exports
of approximately $1.0 trillion for the same year. After
defining foreign direct investment (the equity of foreign
investors in operations under their direct control in the
United States), Dr. Graham pointed out that the amount
of foreign direct investment3 is of the same order of
magnitude as the cost of imports: approximately $1.7
trillion.4 Nonetheless, the United States is a creditor
in this area because of approximately $2.0 trillion
dollars invested similarly by U.S. investors in overseas
locations.
In somewhat of an aside, Dr. Graham mentioned
one purchase of services made by foreigners: education.
For example, about 55 percent of the students in U.S.
science and engineering graduate programs are foreign.
Linking this point to the previous panel on immigration,
Dr. Graham said that the foreign students would like
to see the post-9/11 student visa restrictions eased, at
least for countries like China which were not involved
in the 9/11 attacks.
Acknowledging that the statistics he was presenting
are less than interesting in their own right, Dr. Graham
said the point is that all this international exchange
whether students in the United States, trade deficit,
or foreign direct investmentprovide tangible and
intangible benefits to the United States. Although a
parent pays high out-of-state tuition costs for a son or
daughter, foreign students paying higher tuition fees
at U.S. universities and colleges make those academic
institutions more affordable for American students.

89
Exposure to American culture is an intangible benefit,
but very important as pro-American attitudes are
developed in many of the foreign students. The
size of the trade deficit is daunting, but the fact that
certain commodities are purchased overseas should
be of less concern than many Americans think.
Commodities produced more cheaply overseas result
in less expensive items for U.S. consumers. The lower
cost of production overseas allows American firms
to concentrate on developing goods and services in
which they have a distinct advantage. This concept, of
course, has limits. Manycertainly not allproducts
can be made overseas with negligible impact on U.S.
national security. Some products, though, are critical to
national security and overseas control of the means of
production could be contrary to U.S. national interests
in time of conflict or crisis. One way to ameliorate this
effect is by diversification. If certain national security-
specific items are made in a number of countries, the
risk that all of them would shut down production
during a crisis is more remote.
Alternatively, foreign direct investment offers
a way out of the conundrum. While some may still
look with distaste on foreign ownership of U.S.-based
factories, it is still better to be dependent on foreign-
owned production based in the United States than on
production in the same foreign countries. In the former
case, factories and other proprietary materials can be
nationalized under the Trading with the Enemy Act,5
as happened with the explosives industry in World
War I and with rubber in World War II. What Dr.
Graham did not mention was the huge international
political cost this would incur, making it an option of
last resortat best.
In closing, Dr. Graham asserted that the huge U.S.
external debt is unsustainable, but that it is caused in

90
part by a low U.S. savings rate. In one of the few panel
references to the Global War on Terrorism, Dr. Lange
said that the other major factor in the external debt is
the very large government fiscal deficit, the result of tax
cuts and significant government expenditure increases
since 9/11. Trade deficits and the amount of foreign
direct investment in the United States should not be
addressed on the same track with the government
deficit, which is, at least partially, a domestic issue.
Blaming the Chineseas seems to be the wont in
Congresssimply does not work. Although Americans
may feel better if foreign debt is owed to the United
Kingdom than to China, the fact is that the Chinese
simply are responding to American demands.

Mr. John D. Lange.

In many respects, the dollarsince being taken

off the gold exchange standard in 1970has been
little more than a commodity, traded on international
markets like any other commodity, from hog bellies
to semiconductors, and subject to trading and
manipulation by others for their own purposes. One of
the effects of globalization and free trade is the rapid
flow of various nations commoditiesespecially their
currency, enabled by electronic transmissionaround
the world. As a nations currency becomes resident
in other countries banks, that nation loses some level
of control over its own money, which is particularly
worrisome when the money is concentrated in one
nation, and that nation is not a traditional ally. Al-
though his subsequent comments made the event seem
less likely, Mr. John Lange talked initially of a very
real risk of a collapse of the U.S. dollar because of the
large amounts of American dollars now held overseas,

91
particularly in China. The enormous fiscal and current
accounts deficits were described as a double tsunami
waiting to envelop the American economy with the
potential for significant decreases in the value of the
dollar and major increases in interest rates. As the dollar
goes down, interest rates rise (which will be particularly
troublesome for homeowners or businessmen with
adjustable rate mortgages). The costs of other currencies
also rise, making import costs soar. U.S. treasury bonds
become less attractive to investors, domestic or foreign.
As the dollar continues downward, other changes can
be expected: invoicing in U.S. dollars probably will
stop, creating some international financial instability
before another nationperhaps less than friendly to
the United Statessteps into the breach with its own
currency. Consumer prices will begin to rise, and the
inflationary spiral will begin. These events occur in
any downward slide of the dollar; a collapse of the
dollar would accelerate the processes and worsen their
results.
Fortunately, there are some dampers that will act
against any slide of the dollar. Not to be outdone by
how easily Dr. Graham bandied about measurements
of trillions of dollars, Mr. Lange mentioned the foreign
exchange market of approximately $2 trillion daily.
The first damper is the inertia inherent in a market
of that size. Even the $400 billion that China holds in
U.S. dollars can be absorbed if China decides to begin
selling its holdings. Buyers would have to be other
holders of euros or yen, who would be facing the same
loss of confidence in the power of the dollar and would
be trying to divest themselves of their own stores of
U.S. currency. Buyers could be found, but the laws of
supply and demand would act to keep the price below
what Chinaif concerned about the value of its own
treasurywould be willing to accept.

92
 A second damper is more direct: coordinated
intervention. This is an attempt to match the increased
supply of dollars for sale with an artificially-induced
demand. Whenever the market is being disrupted by
a sell-off, the United States and its friends intervene.
At an agreed-upon hour, they begin buying massive
amounts of dollars, making speculatorsindividuals
or nationsmore wary about their chances for profits
in currency dealings. Mr. Lange described the process
and opined that it would work today, but he did not
address changes in the international system since he
used coordinated intervention to good effect in the
past. His collaborator in some of the past interventions
was the Bundesbank; today he would have to work
through the European Central Bank, which probably
would be more prone to inaction because of the
conglomeration of nations which would have to be
consulted first. And he did not cover the remaining
internationalparticularly European (French and
German)hostility over the war in Iraq. Nations that
would cooperate with the U.S. Treasury Department
during the Cold War may be much less likely to do so
in the current environment. Coordinated intervention
requires friends with similar interests. He did recognize
one of the challenges of coordinated intervention: It is
impossible to control a two-trillion-dollar market, even
with infusions of $400 million in 20 minutes.
If the selling of dollars is done for political
purposesto hurt the United States, not for profit
the selling nation may be willing to accept tremendous
losses to destabilize the U.S. currency. In that event, the
United States still has an option: ordering U.S. banks to
stop trading with the Bank of China (or whichever other
nation has initiated the action). As with coordinated
intervention, being effective in shutting down a nations

93
bank requires allies; it will be much less likely to work
if it is applied only by the United States. As with Dr.
Grahams threat of nationalization, this draconian
action should be attempted only as an absolutely last
resort, but having this arrow in the quiver makes a
destabilizing sell-off less likely.

Dr. Leif Rosenberger.

As might be expected from a representative of

Pacific Command, Dr. Leif Rosenberger focused on
China. He first presented what could be considered
a case study of how a loser in globalization might
turn out not to have been hurt as much as anticipated.
For that study, Dr. Rosenberger took the case of textile
manufacturers in China and Bangladesh. The latter
and some other poor countrieshad been protected
for years by an agreement that gave them guaranteed
U.S. and European Union (EU) markets. Without that
guarantee, the Chinese textile price was unbeatable.
When the agreement expired, Bangladeshis feared for
the loss of an industry that accounted for 80 percent
of their exports. In a separate actionfor unrelated
reasonsat about the same time, China eliminated a
millennia-old agriculture tax, making farming a more
profitable enterprise. Unintentionally, this reduced the
flow of workers from rural areas to the urban centers,
making it much harder for textile manufacturers to
find the cheap labor they needed to maintain their
prices. Although at least some of the Chinese textile
exports to the United States increased tenfold in the
short-term, the offsetting action of elimination of the
agriculture tax very quickly returned the competitive
edge to Bangladesh and the other poor countries. What
Dr. Rosenberger failed to mention, though, was how

94
often offsets like this occur. Offsets do occur, of course,
but the odds that two disparate actions will produce
offsetting actions in different countries probably are
low. More likely is a scenario in which one country
gains an edge over another, and the second countrys
industry simply withers on the vine. An offsetting
decision may be made, but the results would affect
a third country, not the one wounded by the first
action.
Dr. Rosenberger next made a long argument that
shared prosperity in Asia is good for all concerned. He
seemed to be saying that increased trade between China
and Japan and Australia, for example, makes conflict
between any two of them less probable. The same
would be true for trade between China and Taiwan: As
their mutual interests in prosperity coincide, the risk of
cross-straits war reduces. Unfortunately, that shared
prosperity also ties the hands of those desiring to act.
Some would argue that a war on the Korean peninsula
is much less likely because of the economic impact it
also would have on China and Japan. However, the
term rogue actor fits Kim Jong-Il better than most,
so American and Korean soldiers stationed in Korea
continue to be prepared for a no-notice war. If that war
(or war between Beijing and Taipei) started, America
could find its access to the region denied by those
countries too worried about the effect on their trade
with China. That near-term effect may not be the worst
result. Chinas growing influence in the region would
be part of a zero-sum game with the United States.
American influence would decrease proportionately,
and the growth of a peer competitor would be possible
much sooner than many pundits predict.

95
ENDNOTES - PANEL IV

1. For a look at the varying estimates (and their bases), see

Anthony Cordesman, The Uncertain Cost of the Iraq War
(working draft), Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, May 10, 2006, available at www.csis.org/
media/csis/pubs/060509_iraq_war_costs.pdf, accessed on July 27,
2006.
2. Almost two-thirds [of Americans] say the U.S. economy is
getting worse, not better, and well less than half are willing to rate
the economy as excellent or good. Frank Newport, Americans
Still Dour on U.S. Economy, Gallup News Service, July 17, 2006,
available at poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=23782, accessed
on July 26, 2006.
3. This includes both de novo investment (as when Toyota buys
land and builds a factory in the United States) and acquisition of
U.S. firms (as the abortive attempt in 2005 by the China National
Offshore Oil Corporation to buy UNOCALthe Union Oil
Company of California).
4. With approximately 18 percent of the U.S. manufacturing
base owned by foreign investors, Dr. Graham said that the
influence is pervasive. Some of these organizations (e.g., British-
and Dutch-owned Shell Oil and Belgian-owned Food Lion) have
been in the United States so long that they often are considered to
be American companies.
5. Available at www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/
statutes/twea.pdf, accessed July 27, 2006.

96
 PANEL IV

GLOBALIZATION AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY:

AN OVERVIEW OF SOME BASIC ISSUES

Dr. Edward M. Graham

Introduction.

Globalization has become a household term in

the United States only during the past 10 years or so,
and for many Americans, the term brings on fear of job
loss and/or U.S. economic decline. That it does so is
unfortunate for at least two reasons. First, globalization
is a process that has affected the economy of the
United States since at least the end of the 19th century
(yes, the 19th, not the 20th!) and, moreover, over this
whole course of time, the U.S. economy certainly has
not suffered on account of the process. Second, for the
overwhelming majority of Americans, globalization is
bringing net benefits, not harm, to them personally.1 The
benefits include goods and services that can be bought
at lower prices and greater product variety than would
be the case had there never been any globalization.
(Would most Americans, for example, really want to
go back to a time when Toyotas, Hondas, and Nissans
were not available in addition to Ford, General Motors,
and Chrysler vehicles, or to pay much higher prices
and possibly have to give up altogetherthe DVDs,
flat-panel TVs, compact cell phones, laptop computers,
and other high-end electronics products that now are
mostly imported into the United States?).
The benefits also include, for manyalbeit not all
Americans, better job prospects at higher wage rates

97
than would be available in the absence of globalization.2
This is especially true for highly educated persons or
those who otherwise are technically skilled. It is true,
however, that some Americans, especially at the low-
skill end of the labor spectrum, do suffer net losses
(either reduced wages or loss of job opportunity) as a
result of globalization, and account should be taken of
such persons.3 The total losses are, according to serious
measurement, significantly less than the gains from
globalization,4 but the losses do tend to be concentrated
upon persons who are at the lower end of the
economic scale in the United States. This concentration
is unfortunate; it almost surely exacerbates income
inequality in the United States. More could be done
to alleviate the suffering of those who are adversely
affected by globalization in this country. Moreover,
it curiously is true that Americans tend to weight the
costs of globalization more heavily than the benefits,
and this weighting in public attitudes, in turn, gives
more weight to the negative or anti-globalist side
of the debate over globalization than pure economic
considerations might suggest are appropriate.5
Globalization also does present some special issues
specifically relevant to national security. The essence
of globalization is greater interdependence among
national economies, including the U.S. economy, such
that some goods and services consumed in the United
States that once might have been produced in the
domestic economy by firms owned by U.S. nationals,
now are produced abroad and imported or perhaps
made in the United States but by foreign-owned firms.
The non-domestic location or ownership of production
enables cost reductions or greater product variety,
as already noted, and for certain goods and services
these factors actually can enhance national security,

98
e.g., by freeing resources needed to produce an item at
home and enabling these resources then to be used to
produce goods or services of greater value for security
purposes.
But, even so, most Americans would not be
comfortable if certain goods and services of high
strategic importance were to be produced overseas
or by foreign nationals operating in the United States.
This is especially so if, in time of conflict, control of this
production were to enable foreign powers hostile to the
United States to gain access to technologies or other
information that, if retained exclusively in the Nation
or under national control, would give the United States
some sort of strategic advantage over these foreign
powers. This is true particularly where the information
or technology remaining exclusively under domestic
control is otherwise vital to national security. Also, in
some cases, there might be an opposite concern, notably
that foreign control of certain activities enables a foreign
power to withhold information from Americans where
this information is of import to national security.
Moreover, even if control of the production of the
goods or services did not impart such technology or
other information, Americans might be uncomfortable
if a foreign location of production were to render the
goods or services vulnerable to short supply in the
event of conflict.
Thus, there can be a significant security-related
tradeoff between the benefits of globalization (e.g.,
lower costs or greater product variety) and the risks
of supply interruption or loss of strategically-sensitive
information, including technology, that can ensue from
globalization. It is important not to exaggerate the
risks, however. One thinks of the example of the U.S.
textile and clothing industry, which in the early 1990s
mounted an advertising campaign claiming that U.S.

99
policy allowing increased imports of clothing would
put at risk the domestic industry, such that in time of
war U.S. soldiers would have no battlefield clothing to
wear.
This claim, in fact, was bogus in the extreme for
three reasons. First, while much of U.S. demand for
clothing indeed was being met by imports, a substantial
U.S. apparel industry remained in place (and still
does). Indeed, one consequence of globalization has
been that, while certain U.S. sectors indeed shrink,
other sectors expand and, moreover, fewif anyof
the shrunken sectors disappear altogether. Second,
battlefield clothing is a highly specialized sub-sector
of the total apparel industry, and there was never
any danger whatsoever that this sub-sector would
disappear due to import competition. Third, even
had U.S. domestic production of (non-battlefield)
military clothing been shut down (it was not), most
such clothing needs could be provided by imports
from any of at least a dozen friendly nations. (Very
high tech battle gear, even in this last instance, would
continue to have been produced at home.) Thus, and in
a word, the textile industry was using threats to the
U.S. national defense as a front in a demand for plain,
old-fashioned protectionist policies against imports
(ones which, in fact, the industry already had secured,
so what was being sought at that time was still more
protectionism).
National defense has been advanced as a reason
for protectionism in other sectors, where defense-related
arguments for protection against imports again have been
bogus, or at least largely so. One thinks, for example, of
the steel industry, which consistently has claimed that
imports of steel pose a risk to the U.S. national defense,
even though the domestic industry has retained far
more capacity than is needed for defense production.

100
In this case, it also is true that many traditional uses
of steel for military goods are disappearing, thanks to
new technologies, e.g., whereas armor once was made
100 percent of steel, modern armor consists largely of
composite materials not containing steel. Indeed, it is
possible in the future to envisage armored vehicles for
which only a limited number of parts, and perhaps
even none at all, are made of steel. Moreover, to the
extent that imports of certain goods create security
risks, in many cases those risks can be mitigated by
means that are less costly than import protection. For
example, if the risk is disruption of supply in times
of conflict or national emergency, strategic stockpiles
of the relevant material can be created. If the risk is
that the principle supplier is located in a country that
might prove to be an unfriendly in time of conflict,
alternative suppliers in more friendly countries can be
developed. Also, it must be remembered that, even in
times of war, many goods and services can continue
to be imported more economically from overseas than
produced domestically (international trade in certain
strategic goods flourished during World War II, for
example), and this is especially true for those goods or
services that can be obtained from multiple and diverse
sources.
Let us explore some of these facts and issues just
introduced in more detail. We will begin by looking
at some measures of the extent and consequences of
globalization.

How Globalized is the U.S. Economy,

and What Does this Mean for National Security?

Table 1 below indicates U.S. imports and exports,

broken into goods and services, for each of the
years 2005 and 1985. The numbers mostly speak for

101
themselves, indicating the extent to which both imports
and exports, as a percent of gross domestic product
(GDP), have grown during the 20 years from 1985 to
2005. Imports thus were 9.7 percent of GDP in 1985 but
had grown to 16 percent in 2005. But U.S. exports have
also grown, from just under 7 percent of GDP in 1985
to more than 10 percent in 2005. Indeed, what surprises
some persons is that U.S. exports of goods have grown
as a percent of the national economy, although not by
as much as imports of goods. Such persons often tend
to think of globalization as a one-way street, whereby
domestic U.S. markets are captured increasingly by
imports while U.S. exports stagnate. This, in fact, has
not been so.

Indicator Amount Percent of U.S. Amount Percent of U.S.

($ billions) GDP ($ billions) GDP
1985 1985 2005 2005

Imports into 411.0 9.7 1995.8 16.0

the U.S.

Of which:
Goods 338.1 8.0 1674.3 13.4
Services 72.9 1.7 321.6 2.6

Exports from 289.1 6.9 1272.2 10.2

the U.S.

Of which:
Goods 215.9 5.1 892.6 7.1
Services 71.2 1.7 379.6 3.0

Memo: U.S. GDP 4220.3 100.0 12487.1 100.0

in current $
Note: Data do NOT include factor income.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; data available
on-line at www.bea.gov.

Table 1. Indicators of Globalization of the U.S.

Economy Exports and Imports of Goods and Services.

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Indeed, one category of U.S. exportsexports of
services actually has been the fastest growing item in
Table 1; these exports jumped from 1.7 percent of GDP
in 1985 to 3.0 percent in 2005. In spite of this, many
trade policy specialists believe that the potential for U.S.
exports of services is greater than the figures in Table 1
indicate, and this potential is one reason why the U.S.
Government has placed priority on negotiation of free
trade agreements with a number of countries wherein
service sector opening is emphasized. Moreover, the
U.S. Government has supported continuance of work
in the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), an agreement
that came into force in 1995, but which most trade
policy analysts believe is incomplete.6
It is true that U.S. exports consistently have been
less than U.S. imports during the past 25 years or
so, creating a trade deficit, and this is the result of
macroeconomic factors. In recent times, the two such
factors that have most affected the U.S. trade deficit are
the Federal fiscal deficit and the low U.S. savings rate,
especially at the household level. An analysis of how
these factors create the U.S. trade deficit and why in the
long run this deficit almost surely is unsustainable are
contained in Mann and Plueck (2005).7 A consequence
of the large U.S. trade deficit is a continuing need for
international inflows of capital to finance the deficit.8
Were, at some point in the future, foreigners to
become reluctant to invest in the United States in the
amounts required to finance the trade deficit, the likely
consequence would be a very sharp depreciation of the
dollar. Such a depreciation eventually would correct
the trade deficit (that is, bring the value of U.S. imports
more into line with the value of exports) because prices
of imported goods to Americans would increaseand

103
hence Americans would cut back their importsand,
also, foreign prices of U.S. exports would decline,
causing foreigners to buy more American-made goods
and services. However, a precipitous decline of the
U.S. dollar almost surely would require rises in U.S.
interest rates (risking a recession) and, moreover, a
dollar decline would reduce the wealth of Americans
relative to the rest of the world.
Moreover, some analysts fear that a rapid decline of
the U.S. dollar could trigger an international financial
crisis. Thus, analysts do worry that the several
international imbalances caused by the U.S. trade
deficit could have serious effects on U.S. and world
economies sometime in the future. Even so, the United
States seems unprepared to take any action to correct
the imbalances, or at least that appears to be the case
at the time of this writing, and this could prove in the
future to create a major problem.
Globalization is not just about international trade,
however; a big piece of globalization has to do with
the spread of foreign-controlled economic activity
via international operations of multinational firms.
The standard measure of this activity is foreign direct
investment (FDI), which technically is the equity
component of international investors (i.e., the parent
firms of multinational firms, where the parent is the
home nation or headquarters firm9). A problem is that
foreign direct investment is a financial concept, not
a national income concept; it really makes no sense,
then, to calculate a ratio of FDI to GDP, as we have
done for international trade (imports and exports)
above. Imports and exports are components of national
income or national consumption, but FDI is not.
A better measure is value added by foreign-
controlled firms to the national economy. GDP, in

104
fact, is simply the sum of value added by all economic
activity, and thus value added by foreign-controlled
firms as a percentage of GDP is a number that makes
sense. The problem is that value added by foreign-
controlled firms is not a data item that is commonly
collected; indeed, even for the United Statesand
we are a nation that collects a lot of data pertaining
to our economysuch data go back only a relatively
few years. (Multinational firms, by contrast, have been
around since the late 1800s.) Table 2 presents some
such data for the United States for 1997-2003, where
the 2003 data are the most recent available at the time
of this writing. The data indicate value added by
foreign firms in the economy both as a whole and in
the manufacturing sector.

Year 1997 1999 2001 2003

Total value added by foreign-controlled firms 313.7 397.3 417.1 486.3
($ billions)
Above as a percent of total U.S. GDP 3.8 4.3 4.1 4.4
Value added by foreign-controlled firms in 169.3 219.1 200.5 227.7
U.S. manufacturing ($ billions)
Above as a percent of total U.S. GDP 2.0 2.4 2.0 2.1
Above as a percent of U.S. mfg national 14.1 19.0 18.3 20.1
income
Memo: U.S. Mfg National Income as a percent 14.4 12.4 10.8 10.3
of U.S. GDP
Memo: U.S. GDP ($ billions) 8304.3 9268.4 10128.0 10971.2
Memo: U.S. Mfg National Income ($ billions) 10
1195.8 1150.3 1094.1 1133.4

Source: U.S. Commerce Department, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Data available on-line
at www.bea.com.

Table 2. Value-added by Foreign-controlled

Firms in the U.S. Economy.

A number of points can be made from the data of

Table 2. First, the line U.S. manufacturing national

105
income as a percent of U.S. GDP tells the story that
the manufacturing sector as a whole in 1997 accounted
for only 14.4 percent of the U.S. economy, but that
this percent had declined to 10.3 percent by 2003.
Some of this decline doubtlessly is cyclical, because
manufacturing sectors are more sensitive to business
cycles than other sectors, and 2001 and 2003 were years
of economic slowdown, but much of it does seem to
be a long-term trend. But, second, value added by
foreign-controlled firms in the U.S. manufacturing
sector actually climbed somewhat in those years, from
2.0 percent of GDP in 1997 to 2.1 percent in 2003. It
follows that value added by foreign-controlled firms
in the U.S. manufacturing sector increased their share
of U.S. manufacturing national income in those years,
from 14.1 percent in 1997 to 20.1 percent in 2003.
Is this latter worrisome? One way to look at this
issue is that foreign-controlled firms do account, then,
for about one-fifth of all domestic U.S. manufacturing
activity. They also account for a fast-growing share of
this activity. On the other hand, of course, four-fifths of
U.S. manufacturing activity is under domestic control.
Moreover, in light of the fact that manufacturing is a
declining sector in the United States, it seems reason-
able to claim that foreign-controlled activities in
this sector are contributing not to its decline (as has
been asserted), but rather to its preservation! Some
implications of this for the U.S. defense industrial base
are discussed in the final section of this essay.
Third, overall, foreign-controlled business activity
in the United States accounts for a rather small share of
the total U.S. GDP; this share was 3.8 percent in 1997,
but it did grow to 4.4 percent in 2003. In fact, the share
seems rather stable; in 1985, it was 3.5 percent.11

106
Trying to Put All of This in Perspective.

A number of further points can be made pertaining

to globalization and the U.S. economy and globalization
of the world economy, ones that hopefully provide
some perspective on these two important sets of issues.
First is simply this: that, at the end of the day, for all
of the talk about globalization, the vast majority
of economic activity in the United States remains
basically domestic in nature. Thus, for example, of
annual absorption (net expenditures on goods and
services by domestic residents, including on imports)
in the United States in 2005 of $12.889 trillion,12 only
13 percent consisted of goods and services produced
outside the country, while 87 percent consisted of goods
and services produced in the United States. If one were
to be asked then, How much of the U.S. economy is
globalized? a sensible answer would be about 13
percent. Moreover, as just noted, of all goods and
services produced in the United States, more than 95
percent is produced in business firms that are under
domestic control, and less than 5 percent in business
firms under foreign control. The point, of course, also
can be made that the U.S. economy is significantly more
integrated internationally, i.e., globalized, in 2005
than was the case only 20 years ago, and, also of course,
the economy is much more globalized than it was
40 or 50 years ago. Even so, the United States remains
a large economy that is, at the end of the day and by
almost any measure one can think of (and in this essay
we have examined a number of such measures), less
dependent upon foreign economies than some of the
rhetoric surrounding globalization might suggest.
At the same time, it must be remembered that the
trend towards globalization of the world economy

107
is a phenomenon that affects all major nations of the
world. There is some tendency for certain economic
nationalists in the United States to talk as though
globalization is something that affects the United
States singularly. This is, with a moments thought,
simply not possible. Rather, almost by definition,
increased integration of the worlds economies implies
mutual interdependence, not dependence that extends
in one direction only. Here is an interesting fact in this
latter direction. There has been concern expressed,
as noted earlier, about the high degree of control of
domestic business activity by foreign investors in the
United States. As we have noted, this degree of control
is less than alarmists might have one think. But it also
is true that firms that are both based in the United
States and under domestic control hold more activities
outside the United States than foreign firms hold in the
United States. For this comparison, the stock of foreign
direct investment is a relevant measure. Foreign direct
investment in the United States totaled $1,709 billion at
the end of 2004, the latest data available. This is a large
number of course, but direct investment abroad by
U.S.-based firms at the end of 2004 was $2,367 billion.
Thus, if the United States is becoming more
dependent on the economies of other countries
(and if the message here is we are becoming more
dependent, but lets not exaggerate), the economies
of other nations also are becoming more dependent
on foreigners (where, of course, from the point of
view of another country, the United States itself is a
foreigner, indeed, the biggest one). For example,
if one takes a close look at the economy of China,
where China is the nation most consistently identified
as a possible challenger to U.S. power in the coming
decades, this economy, in fact, is far more dependent
upon foreigners than is the U.S. economy.13

108
 An interesting fact is that nationalists in all nations,
and not just the United States, decry the increased
dependence upon other nations that currently is being
witnessed worldwide. For example, the rapid growth
of China, which, in turn, enables Chinese leaders to
dream of a future in which their nation is a global
power, is being driven in very large part by firms
in that nation that are under foreign control. Thus,
some Chinese nationalists wonder, and wonder quite
loudly, would it not be better for China if China could
somehow expel these firms and put a greater share
of its economyespecially in the high technology
sectorsunder purely domestic control.
The answer to this last question, in fact, is probably
no. In thinking about this, this author thinks about
his recent purchase of a laptop computer. The price,
after a rebate from the manufacturer (Hewlett-Packard)
was $800 plus change. The computer itself was made in
China, but from components imported from the United
States (CPU), South Korea and/or Taiwan (memory),
Singapore (hard drive and DVD), and other locations.
The benefits of globalization are embodied highly in
this machine (the last time I bought a laptop had been
7 years earlier; I had paid over $2,000 for a machine
that had considerably less capabilities, not to mention
a much smaller screen), but this type of product also
has enabled China to become a major producer and
exporter of advanced electronic products. Would this
have been possible without massive foreign investment
in China? Probably not! It is exactly because China has
become part of the global economy, via this investment,
that it has been able to modernize, grow, and turn itself
into a rising power. But that I paid less than half what
I did 7 years ago for a better product also might not
have been possible without this investment. Thus, my

109
new laptop represented a win/win for China and
the United States; I, as an American, benefited, but so
did China and a number of other countries as well.

Some Last Thoughts on Globalization

and National Security.

The points raised in the previous section

notwithstanding, there are activities that Americans
would, for national security reasons, want to remain
on U.S. soil and/or under domestic U.S. control. The
production of advanced weapons systems, for example,
surely is one of these. But how far down the line
does production on U.S. soil and under U.S. control
actually go? Do we care if major components of these
systems (e.g., memory chips, flat panel displays, etc.)
are sourced from abroad or from non-U.S. controlled
firms?
The answer to the latter is probably no, we dont
care if the component in question is produced in
a number of places or by a number of firms, so that
the United States is not dependent excessively upon
just one or a small number of production locations or
producers. But what is the threshold where either of
these numbers becomes too small? It can be difficult to
say. One issue in this matter is whether or not, in times
of national emergency, a domestic alternative source
of supply could be established and how quickly. If a
domestic alternative could be quickly established, we
might be willing to deal with a very small number of
suppliers; but if domestic entry were to be difficult, we
might still not worry if the number of foreign suppliers
were sufficiently diverse that the risk of a complete
cutoff of supply was to be negligible.
Implicit in the above is that the component not
embody a technology that uniquely is held in the United

110
States, and where that technology conveys a defense-
related advantage to the U.S. military. But in assessing
whether such a technology figures, it is important to
distinguish between one that is truly unique and one
that, at the end of the day, is not. Here is an example
of what this author would argue is the wrong case
to be made for preservation of a U.S. technological
capability: We dont want to be dependent upon
foreigners for this type of product. When this line of
argumentation is made, it is often the case that not only
does the relevant technology not reside uniquely in the
United States, it is often the case that the leading edge
of the technology has shifted to foreigners (e.g., in the
production of memory chips, Samsung, a South Korean
firm, at the moment seems to be the most advanced
producer of these). In such a case, what the wrong
case thinking can lead to is this: The U.S. military buys
from a domestic source where, in fact, a foreign source
not only can supply the same product at a lower price,
but can supply a better version of the product than can
the domestic source. This makes no sense whatsoever
unless, perhaps, there is some possibility of a critically-
short supply in the event of a national emergency.
The main point, then, is this: There, indeed, are
some activities that, for security purposes, should be
maintained domestically and under domestic control.
But there are many wrong reasons for designating a
particular activity as one of these. Indeed, there are
situations where to maintain domestic supply under
domestic control could be costly and not provide any
security benefit to the United States. What activities
should not be under foreign control, then, is a difficult
question. In fact, with respect to foreign takeovers of
U.S. firms, there is in place a review mechanism, under
the Exon-Florio provision of the Defense Production

111
Act, that is meant to make this sort of determination.
Has this provision worked well? In fact, the Exon-
Florio provision and the inter-agency committee that
implements the law have been subject during the
past year to considerable congressional scrutiny and
criticism, most of it misplaced (the review process, in
fact, has worked quite well)14. There are those members
of Congress who would pass legislation to modify the
review process and perhaps to force the process to take
seriously bogus arguments for maintaining domestic
control of activities that could, without damage to
U.S. national security, be maintained under foreign
control.
A final word: What if a technology exists that is
security-sensitive but is also dominated by a foreign
firm? What is the best course of action for the United
States to take then? This author would suggest that the
best option is to encourage that firm to produce those
products that embody that particular technology right
here in the United States. If foreign control of a security-
sensitive technology is simply a fact of life (and in some
instances it will be; the United States cannot be best at
everything, as much as we might like it to be!), it is
better to have the relevant production facilities on U.S.
soil than elsewhere. This is true because, in times of
war or other national emergency, the U.S. Government
can seize control over the facilities if necessary, under
either the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA) of 1977 or, more drastically, under the
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917. Indeed, the
latter act was used to seize German investments in
the United States during World War I. At that time,
German firms in the chemicals sector dominated the
technology of high explosives, and this dominance
early in World War I conveyed significant advantages

112
to the Germans. But the German industry had invested
abroad and especially heavily in the United States.
The net result was that we, too, had access to these
technologies when we needed them to use against the
Germans. This might not have been the case had the
German investments in the United States never been
made, perhaps as the result of misguided legislation
to restrict foreign ownership in strategically-sensitive
sectors had such legislation been passed in, say, 1905.
Of course, no such legislation was passed, and the U.S.
war effort in 1917-18 benefited accordingly. And may
the obvious lesson not be forgotten.

ENDNOTES - GRAHAM

1. Scott C. Bradford, Paul Grieco, and Gary C. Hufbauer, The

Payoff to America from Global Integration, in C. Fred Bergsten,
ed., The United States and the World Economy: Foreign Economic
Policy for the Next Decade. Washington, DC: The Institute for
International Economics, 2005. They calculate that the average net
benefit from globalization to the United States adds up, in effect,
to something between $7,100 and $12,900 in additional annual
income per U.S. household. Most of this derives from lower
prices paid for goods and services, but some of the benefit arrives
from incomes of persons that are increased by globalization, most
especially those who are employed in export-generating activities
that expand under globalization.
2. It is demonstrable, for example, that workers employed
in sectors that are export-intensive are paid higher wages than
workers in other sectors, controlling for such variables as skill level
of the worker. See Howard Lewis III, and J. David Richardson,
Why Global Commitment Really Matters! Washington, DC: The
Institute for International Economics, 2001.
3. See, for example, Lori G. Kletzer, Job Loss from Imports:
Measuring the Costs, Washington, DC: The Institute for International
Economics, 2001.
4. Bradford, Grieco, and Hufbauer.

113
 5. On this, see Kenneth F. Sheve, and Matthew J. Slaughter,
Globalization and the Perceptions of American Workers, Washington,
DC: The Institute for International Economics, 2001.
6. Pierre Sauv, Completing the GATS Framework:
Addressing Uruguay Round Leftovers, Aussenwirtschaft (Swiss
Economic Review), Vol. 57, No. 3, 2002, pp. 301-341; reprinted in
Pierre Sauv, Trade Rules Behind Borders, London: Cameron, May
2003.
7. Catherine M. Mann and Katharina Plueck, The U.S. Trade
Deficit: A Disaggregated Perspective, Institute for International
Economics Working Paper WP-05-11, 2005, available on-line at
www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp05-11.pdf.
8. To determine the total capital inflow of the United States,
one must add certain other quantities to the balance of trade
deficit, most notably net factor income paid to foreigners. When
all is added, the total capital inflow into the United States in 2005
was slightly more than $804 billion.
9. Thus, for example, one of the worlds largest multinational
firms is Toyota Motor Corporation. The parent firm in this
case is the Toyota Motor Company of Japan. This firm, in turn,
holds control of many international subsidiaries, e.g., Toyota
Motor Corporation of North America. The subsidiaries are legally
separate firms from the parent firm, but the parent maintains
control over them, most often by owning the majority of the stock
(equity) of these subsidiaries.
10. Without capital consumption allowance.
11. Edward M. Graham, and Paul R. Krugman, Foreign Direct
Investment in the United States, 3rd Edition, Washington, DC: The
Institute for International Economics, 1995, Table 1.2.
12. Calculated as follows: Absorption = GDP - (exports) +
(imports) or, in numbers, $12.889 trillion = $12.487 trillion - $1.272
trillion + $1.674 trillion.
13. See, for example, the economics chapters in C. Fred
Bergsten, Bates Gill, Nicholas R. Lardy, and Derek Mitchell,
China: The Balance Sheet, Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic
and International Studies and the Institute for International
Economics, 2006.
14. On this process, see Edward M. Graham, and David M.
Marchick, U.S. National Security and Foreign Direct Investment,
Washington, DC: The Institute for International Economics, 2006.

114
 PANEL IV

THE ECONOMIC RISE OF CHINA:

COMMERCIAL THREAT OR BLESSING?

Dr. Leif Rosenberger

Is China a commercial threat? Or is China a

commercial blessing due to what can be called shared
prosperity? To address these questions, analysis of the
following four case studies can be helpful:
The rise and fall of Chinas commercial threat to
Bangladesh;
A comparison and contrast of the China-
Australia economic relationship with the U.S.-
Australian economic relationship;
The U.S. trade deficit with China; and,
The China-Taiwan economic relationship.

Bangladesh.

A decent start is exploration of Chinas commercial

threat to Bangladesh from January 1, 2005the day
something called the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA)
expired. MFA was a system of textile quotas for poor
countries like Bangladesh. It gave textile producers
guaranteed export markets with the European Union
and the United States. After the MFA was eliminated,
countries like Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Indonesia
were afraid they could not compete head-to-head with
China. Why not?
For the 6 years between 1998 and 2004, China
had price deflation in textiles and other low-end

115
manufacturing. Simply put, the China price was
unbeatable. Those poorer countries benefiting from
the MFA worried they would not be able to compete
with China. A number of people told them, though,
Dont worry; be happy. It will take China a long
time to capture new market shares after January 1,
2005. Market events proved them wrong. In the first
quarter of 2005, Chinas cotton shirt sales to the U.S.
skyrocketed 1,250 percent from the same period in 2004.
Similarly, Chinas cotton trouser sales in the United
States increased 1,500 percent from the same period in
2004. Bangladesh, in particular, was on the ropes, on
the verge of losing an industry that accounted for 80
percent of its exports and had lifted 13 percent of the
countrys poor households out of poverty.
The 9/11 Commission Report says, When people
lose hope, the breeding grounds for violent extremism
are created. As hope became a scarce commodity
in Bangladesh following the MFA expiration and
its unpredicted impact, violent extremist groups
moved into the vacuum, blaming the United States
for globalization and its adverse effects. Although
incorrect, the perception of U.S.-caused social and
economic injustice was pervasive. Violent extremists
in Bangladesh were planning to exploit this ill-advised
but pervasive perception of social and economic
injustice. Again, some pundits said, Dont worry; be
happy. Weve beefed up the capacity of the Bangla-
deshi government to counter terrorism. All is well.
Of course, building capacity to counter terrorism was
necessary, but not sufficient. (If success at capacity-
building was a silver bullet, there would be no terrorism
in Israelbecause God knows the Israeli military has
no shortfall in capacity.)
At this point, the socio-economic demand for vio-
lence was rising. Frustrated people were at risk of buy-

116
ing the propaganda of violent extremists. Unfortu-
nately, in August 2005, the worst fears were played out
when Bangladesh suffered through 500 bombings in
one month. But at a time when things looked especially
bleak in Bangladesh, things were changing in China
that would reverberate in every nook and cranny in
the international business world and would reduce the
demand for violent extremism in Bangladesh. Social
unrest was rising in the Chinese countryside. In 2005,
there were 87,000 public disturbances, a 13 percent rise
over 2004. In an effort to placate at least some of its
apparently restive populace, Beijing in September 2005
announced that the agriculture tax would be eliminated
in 2006. This unprecedented stepthe agriculture tax
dates back over 2,000 yearswould benefit 730 million
Chinese farmers. Many Chinese farmers opted to stay
on the farm as the elimination of the tax improved their
lives in rural China, but that produced an unintended
consequence. It meant fewer migrant workers were
leaving the countryside and looking for work in the
cities.
Now imagine the person running a textile factory in
Shanghai. He now has a shortfall of workers knocking
on the doors looking for work. How will he attract
more textile workers? The supply-demand curve
suggests that higher wages would be required, and in
2005, there was a double-digit rise in Chinese wages.
And the rising wages did not just happen in the textile
industry; wages rose across the board in Chinese low-
end manufacturing. As a result, Chinese manufacturing
competitiveness declined in 2005, and China is no
longer the producer of lowest cost in low-end manufac-
turing. Who benefited from rising production costs in
China? Textile factories in Bangladesh, along with those
in India, Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. In

117
Bangladesh, textile factories are over-booked, the way
China used to be.
Now imagine the recruiter or propaganda specialist
for a violent extremist group in Bangladesh. He has
been bashing the United States and globalization. With
orders for textiles pouring into Bangladesh factories,
bashing globalization loses its punch. As the number
of textile jobs rise in Bangladesh, textile workers now
see globalization as a blessing, not a curse. Job creation
in Bangladeshi textile factories helps to reduce the
socio-economic demand for extremist violence.

The China-Australia and U.S.-Australia

Economic Relationships.

Juxtapose the effect of globalization in a poor

country like Bangladesh with a relatively rich country
like Australia. Is Chinas economic rise a commercial
threat or a blessing to Australia? The answer to this
questionat least commerciallyis a no brainer.
Australias economic ties with China are booming,
with Sino-Australian merchandise trade skyrocketing
248 percent between 2000 and 2005. In contrast, the
United States is losing its economic high ground with
Australia, with U.S.-Aussie trade being virtually flat,
only growing 13 percent in the same time frame.
Beyond commerce, though, the answer is more
difficult to discern. At a strategic level, Chinas shared
prosperity with Australia can be seen as positive: Their
shared prosperity gives both China and Australia a
stake in stability and makes war less likely. But Pacific
Command plans for worst-case scenarios. What if war
breaks out between China and Taiwan? In that case,
Chinas shared prosperity with countries in the region
increases the risk for the U.S. military, which may be

118
denied operational access to bases and places in Asia
including Australiabecause of their economic and
other links to China. In other words, Chinas military
strategy of access denial is enhanced by their shared
prosperity with Australia. Some evidence suggests
that this effect already is being seen: Back in August
2004, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer
publicly told Beijing that Australia was not bound to
help the United States defend Taiwan in the event of
a China-Taiwan military conflict. Today20 months
laterAustralias trade with China dwarfs its trade
with the United States. Australia has significant
incentive to bend over backwards not to antagonize
China and not to jeopardize this highly-prized
economic relationship.
But Australia is not alone. Even Japanwith
longstanding security ties with the United States
and with ongoing political strains with Chinanow
trades more with China than with the United States.
The United States undoubtedly can expect some
operational military support from Japan in a China-
Taiwan scenario. But the nature and extent of Japanese
support to the United States arguably would be less
than if Japan had nothing to lose and had virtually
no economic equities to weigh with China. Japans
booming exports to China are critical to sustaining
Japans long-awaited recovery, so Tokyo will think
twice before jumping on the U.S. bandwagon against
China in a China-Taiwan conflict. That would be
especially true if Taiwan were to trigger the war. Of
course, there would also be considerable pressure
from the U.S. business community to make sure any
China-Taiwan conflict does not trigger a larger U.S.-
China war. That communitywith billions of dollars
invested in Chinais not the only one in the United

119
States that would want to avoid expansion of the war:
U.S. consumers benefit from low-cost Chinese goods
they buy at Wal-Mart.

U.S. Trade Deficit with China.

In contrast to Australias positive economic

perceptions of China, the United States sees China
as much more of a commercial threat. U.S. Senators
Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Charles Schumer (D-NY)
argue that Chinas foreign exchange rate against the
U.S. dollar is 20 percent to 30 percent undervalued,
which underprices Chinese exports. The two Senators
view Chinas 2.1 percent revaluation in July 2005 as
a drop in the bucket. Their bill would raise tariffs by
27.5 percent on all Chinese-made goods coming into
the United States unless China strengthens its yuan
(or renminbi) currency by a comparable percentage
against the U.S. dollar. China also could be designated
a currency manipulator, triggering immediate U.S.-
China foreign exchange rate talks. This is just one of
the laundry list of economic problems that need to be
discussed at the highest levels of both governments.
That said, much of the U.S. bashing of China for
its $200 billion trade surplus is ill-advised. If the U.S.
trade deficit with all of Asia for the past decade is
examined, not much has changed. What has changed
is the breakdown of U.S. trade with Asia. The United
States used to have relatively high trade deficits
with many countries in Asia. Now many of these
trade deficits have fallen as the U.S. trade deficit has
risen with China. Why? It is all about supply chain
management in international business. For instance,
Japanese and South Korean companies have moved
their final assembly of products to China. It stands to

120
reason that the U.S. trade deficit with China would rise
now that final assembly is in China.
Interestingly enough, the United States asked
Beijing to open China to foreign direct investment
(FDI), and the Chinese did sofar more than Japan or
South Korea have done. Yet some people in the U.S.
Government are bashing China for what are really
international business decisions to relocate to the
cheaper production opportunities there. In addition,
those U.S. Government bashers of China who point to
the Chinese trade deficit as a threat to the United States
need to learn more about the nature of these so-called
Chinese exports. About 60 percent of these Chinese
exports are made by foreign-funded or wholly-
owned companies based in China. The percentage
is even greaterat 80 percent to 90 percentif the
analysis is narrowed to high-technology exports. A
Chinese political leader might very well ask, Is foreign
domination of Chinese exportsespecially in the high-
tech sectorsuch a good thing for China? Finally, if
the Chinese yuan is so undervalued, the same complaint
should be heard from the many Asian countries with
foreign exchange rates that they keep at least loosely
tied to the U.S. dollar to boost their export-led growth.
But only the United States is complaining. Why? For
starters, much of Asia is running a trade surplus with
China. Nevertheless, the odds are rising that the United
States will use trade sanctions against China.

The China-Taiwan Economic Relationship.

A few words about the China-Taiwan economic

relationship also are warranted. That relationship
should be viewed as a continuum with economic
nationalism at one extreme and shared prosperity at

121
the other extreme. Unfortunately, Taiwan is moving
in the wrong direction toward economic nationalism,
putting Taipei on a collision course with Beijing and
Taiwan businessmen.
Taipei now has strict regulations on Taiwanese
investment on the mainland. For instance, Taiwanese
companies can not invest over $100 million on the
mainland. If Taiwanese companies want to invest
more, Taipei demands that those companies make
financially unattractive investments in Taiwan. At first
glance, Taiwans new regulations seem to threaten
Chinas economic security if Taiwanese companies
abandon investment on the mainland. That is because
Taiwanese companies have been at the forefront of
Chinas economic growth. Over 60,000 Taiwanese
businesses now operate on the mainland. Officially,
Taiwans business investment on the mainland is $48
billion. However, Taiwans central bank puts this
figure at $70 billion and private estimates of Taiwans
investments suggest that the total may run over $100
billion.
Taiwanese companies simply may not submit
to the measures; they are considering taking drastic
actions. Many Taiwanese businesses are considering
cutting ties altogether with Taiwan and moving their
headquarters to China. If so, Taiwans heavy-handed
micro-management and economic nationalism would
backfire, resulting in a loss of tax revenue to Taiwans
treasury.
This certainly would forestall any increase in
Taiwans military budget. Such a scenario would
widen the military gap between China and Taiwan.
Just for starters, Chinas economy is four to five
times larger than Taiwans economy. Additionally,
Chinas economic growth has been about twice that of

122
Taiwans for the past decade, and the U.S. Department
of Defense says China is spending a larger percent of its
gross domestic product (GDP) on defense than Taiwan.
Pacific Command has been trying to get Taiwan to
increase its military spending from 2.3 percent of GDP
to 3 percent of GDP. If Taiwanese businesses move en
masse to the mainland and stop paying taxes to Taiwan,
the government will be challenged to continue its
defenseand otherspending. The U.S. government
needs to dissuade Taipei from this reckless zero-sum
game, to move away from economic nationalism and
toward shared prosperity with the mainland.

123
 PANEL IV

THE DOLLAR AS A COMMODITY

OF STRATEGIC NATIONAL INTEREST

Mr. John D. Lange

Providing adequate economic support for a nation

at war requires a strong currency, but the dollar is
buffeted by deficits, among other economic currents.
What are the risks of a collapse of the dollar? And what
can be done to prevent it?

Risks of a Collapse of the Dollar.

The United States has enormous fiscal and balance-

of-payments deficits which are unsustainable. They
are like a double tsunami that reduces the value of
the dollar while simultaneously reducing the incentive
for other nations to buy dollars. Barring unforeseen
circumstances, this double tsunami will weigh on
the value of the dollar sooner or later. China alone
is holding $400 billion in U.S. Treasury debt and
accumulating more. Should China and other foreign
holders of U.S. debt have enough, they eventually will
decide to stop buying American dollars and even may
start to sell dollars for other currencies. If China cannot
find ready buyers, the price of the dollar will decline.
What happens then? At least four things, each of them
major political problems for the White House:
1. The Japanese yen and the euro will rise in value.
So will the Chinese yuan (or renminbi), the Korean won,
etc. The cost of imported goods will soar.
2. The U.S. Treasury will find a suddenly shrinking
market to finance its fiscal deficit. The interest rate on

125
Treasury bonds will soar and so will other rates of
interest. Monthly mortgage payments on homes will
rise sharply for those homeowners with adjustable rate
mortgages.
3. Businesses will pass the increasing cost of their
operating capital to consumers in the form of higher
prices. In short, the United States will have significant
inflation.
4. Oil is priced at the well-head in dollars. So
are airline tickets and much of the world trade in
other goods and services. If the dollar collapses and
confidence in U.S. Treasury bonds evaporates, that
will not last. The global economic community may be
set adrift orperhaps worsethe currency of a nation
with values antithetical to those of the United States
will replace the dollar.

Preventiveor CompensatorySteps.

The foreign exchange market has some

transparency, so it is easy enough to discern that China
holds nearly half-a-trillion dollars in the market. While
that is clearly a large amount, the daily turnover
purchases and salesin the foreign exchange market
is approximately two trillion dollars each day! The
foreign exchange market is active almost 24 hours each
day and very deep. Although they would be unwilling
to pay the premium price China desires, buyers in
the market will meet any dollar sell-off by China. The
Chinese would be stupid to sell too much too soon and
trigger a major loss in the value of its savings in foreign
assets, but governments occasionally do what seem to
others to be stupid things. If China decides that a large
sell-offeven at great expense to themselvesis the
right thing to do, the United States still has a first line

126
of defense. It is called coordinated intervention, a term
especially familiar to macroeconomists and one which
should be familiar to all national security strategists.
The Treasury has conducted coordinated foreign
exchange market intervention before. In the 1990s, the
dollar was weak and weakening beyond fundamental
economic justification. The downward trend was
fueled by speculators using rumors and faux analysis
to foment sell-offs. Germany and Japan agreed with
the United States that it was time to do something.
Over a 2-year period, the United States found moments
when the market was quiet and when the short-term
debt positions of the speculators were vulnerable.
At the same moment in the day, the Bundesbank sold
massive amounts of deutschmarks (DM), the Bank of
Japan sold yen, and the U.S. Treasury sold DM and yen
from the Exchange Stabilization Fund. For example, in
20 minutes one morning, the U.S. Treasury sold $400
million in DM and yen. Germany and Japan took similar
steps at the same time. Even in a market measured in
trillions of dollars per day1, that got the attention of the
speculators.
So what if this game does not work the next time?
What if China sells massive amounts of dollars to
destabilize the United States for political reasons?
China must know that the United States has a trump
card. While it has never been necessary before, the U.S.
Treasuryacting in concert with the European Central
Bank and the Bank of Japancould and probably
would forbid banks to buy dollars or dollar assets from
the Bank of China. A draconian measure, this would
be tantamount to defaulting on U.S. Treasury debt,
with all that implies. That would be done only under
extreme financial duress, butlike many things in this
businessno options are off the table.

127
ENDNOTES - LANGE

1. In the intervention period cited (1993-96), the daily turnover

was $1.5 trillion per day. E-mail message from Mr. John D. Lange,
received August 23, 2006.

128
 PANEL V

THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL

SECURITY CONTEXT:
COMPETING LEGAL ISSUES

General.

In at least one narrow legal sense, America is not at

war: There has been no constitutionally-required Senate
declaration of war against any of the current foes of the
Nation. As with the various non-declared wars fought
since World War II, that distinction appears to be of
little significance. President George W. Bush might
have been able to follow the lead of former presidents
in circumventing the attempt by Congress to limit
presidential authority to lead the nation to war,1 but
explicit congressional authority has been granted for
broad action against terrorists2 and specifically against
Iraq.3
The long-term degradation of Congress role in
declaring war is a valid subject for in-depth discussion,
but is generally a U.S. domestic issue. When war has
not been declared, though, questions of international
lawand moralityarise very quickly4 and usually
revolve around two parts: jus ad bellum and jus in
bello. The former asks if the reasons for going to war
(casus belli) are legitimate; the latter asks if the war
is being fought in a proper way. A less well-known
part, jus post bellum, asks about the justice of the peace
settlement, to include the trying of war criminals. The
American view of all three parts of the theory has been
assailed internationally and domestically for the wars
in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Although some question

129
of proportionality still can be asked, responding to
the 9/11 terrorist attacks by deposing the Taliban in
Afghanistan should be allowed under just war theory
as a response to an unprovoked attack. The attack into
Iraq has less international legal justification, especially
since it now seems clear that intelligence about weapons
of mass destruction in the country and the nexus
between Iraq and al-Qaida or other terrorist groups
was grossly overstated. Although they may be rare
exceptions to the rule, recent revelations of possible
war crimes by American soldiers and Marines in Iraq
leads to questions about how justly the war is being
fought. The line between jus in bello and jus post bellum
may be crossed, but the treatment of enemy detainees5
in Afghanistan and Iraq is another cause for concern.
Similarly, the planned trials of the detainees may not
be following international precedent or U.S. law.
In his remarks introducing the panel, Colonel
Dave Gordon said that the United States long has
been a proponent of the rule of law and should
continue to provide an example of adherence to that
standard (Americans should be the good guys). The
challenge, of course, is doing so even in a war in which
the enemy regularly and egregiously violates the laws
of armed conflict. Failure to maintain the moral high
ground, though, has an adverse impact in the court of
public opinion, both domestically and internationally.
Describing the law as a front in the current war,
Colonel Gordon introduced the term lawfare and
described it as when legal matters are used by our
opponents as a way of attacking us and degrading
our position in public opinion. . . . As an example,
he cited the mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq. According to Colonel Gordon, this was
an aberration, and those responsible were investigated

130
and punished appropriately, but the enemy seized
upon it as evidence of bad faith by the United States
and U.S. unwillingness to play by its own rules.
He also cited the tendency of the enemy to publicize
legitimatethough unfortunatecollateral damage in
Afghanistan and other places as evidence of wanton
attacks on civilians by U.S. forces. Although the
definition has some merit, these examples are better
used as illustrations of information warfare. Other
definitions6 and examples of lawfare may provide
greater fidelity on the conundrum facing America
when the rule of lawwhich the United States
traditionally supportsis used to limit its ability to
fight foes that ignore the law except when it is to their
advantage. In lawfare, a foeunable to address an
issue symmetricallyturns to the field of international
or domestic law to achieve its military goals. A better
example might be the use of the International Court of
Justice to condemn the building of a defensive fence
by Israel.7 In this forum, the plaintiffs attempted in
court to eliminate a barrier that they could not remove
militarily. Another good example is the potential
use of cases in the International Criminal Court as
political tools to limit U.S. military action.8 Although
the term may not be defined precisely, lawfareused
by both U.S. foes and friends, as well as by the United
States itselfundoubtedly will continue to be a part
of the geostrategic environment. As the 2005 National
Defense Strategy says, Our strength as a nation state
will continue to be challenged by those who employ a
strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial
processes, and terrorism.9
The issue of lawfare is related to another
conundrum: whether to address terrorism as a law
enforcement issue or as a military/warfare issue. The

131
answer undoubtedly is some combination of the two
approaches, but this and the other issues raised by the
panelists suggest that the role of the law in the Global
War on Terrorism (GWOT) needs to evolve. As Colonel
Gordon articulated, that is normal when a conflict
enters uncharted territory.

Dr. Michael F. Noone.

Dr. Michael Noone addressed what he termed

GWOT anomalies: actions taken by U.S. operatives
(military and covert) that do not adhere to the rule of
law,10 and for which the administration has offered no
compelling justification. Dr. Noone asserted that the
U.S. military has lost the moral high groundboth
internationally and domesticallyby these extra-
legal activities, but believes that some of that ground
can be regained by providing public justification for
the changes in customary law that are required by the
changing circumstances of the GWOT. That justification
has to be more than the British offered for its Special
Air Service dirty war against the Irish Republican
Army (IRA). Their response was essentially, These
are big boys games, played by the big boys rules.
Dr. Noone spent the majority of his time explaining
why traditional analysis of the discrete legal problems
of the GWOT has not been satisfactory. Much of the
international legal community points to the United
Kingdoms (UK) troubles in northern Ireland and
asks why the United States would not treat its own
terrorist problems similarly. That is probably at best a
false dichotomy: The IRA was a domestic threat with
a hierarchical structure, whose members wanted to
avoid capture and who generally eschewed attacks
that would produce large numbers of casualties. They

132
also had no expressed interest in acquiring and using
weapons of mass destruction. The distinctions in al-
Qaidageographic dispersion, cellular structure,
disregard for their own safety, willingness to inflict
maximum numbers of casualties among civiliansare
remarkable. Some of these differences, though, simply
make law enforcement difficult or inconvenient,
neither of which offer adequate justification for
extraordinary extra-legal methods. The problem is
that law enforcement is ineffective in todays conflict
environment. The American and international legal
systems are built on the concept of justice that convicts
perpetrators of crimes, not on preventing crimes (except
in the sense that convicting one perpetrator might deter
another). There is little or no prophylactic effect if a
law enforcement philosophy is applied to the GWOT.
Justice requires due process, but the presentation
of evidence in a regular criminal court of law easily
could compromise intelligence sources and collection
methods. Unreasonable searches are prohibited unless
a subject is suspected of acting as the agent of a foreign
government. Finally, and perhaps most important, the
post-trial penalties that normally follow conviction in
criminal court are ineffective in achieving their normal
goals: deterrence of others similar behavior and
removal from society until rehabilitation occurs. Such
penalties do not convince suicide bombers to change
their minds.
The 1998 bombings of two of its embassies in
Africa led the United States to adopt a new standard,
sometimes called law enforcement plus, exemplified
by the extra-legal action of calling for the killing
of Osama bin Laden if he could not be arrested or
otherwise captured. In normal criminal law, the violator
of the law still is protected by the law, both domestic

133
and international. Human rights law, in particular,
might not have allowed the taking of bin Ladens life
except in self-defense. Like the Bush administration a
few years later, the Clinton administration offered no
specific public justification for the action with regard to
bin Laden, but the changed threat assessment after the
1998 bombings seemed to warrant the extraordinary
step taken.
Under the law of armed conflict, the law generally
does not protect the violator; in fact, it authorizes
at least some level of reciprocity when violations
occur. Because there is still some application of law
enforcement standards, the post-9/11 philosophy
might be characterized as belligerency minus.
There is still some effort to act in accordance with
law enforcement requirements, but the laws of armed
conflict are applied more frequently, as in the killings
in Yemen in 2002. The individuals killedincluding a
U.S. citizenwere identified as belligerent combatants
and their deaths were allowed under the law of armed
conflict. This, of course, has some penalty: If they are
combatants, they should be afforded protections as
prisoners of war when captured, and some of their
actions (except war crimes) as a combatant may be
immunized.
Dr. Noone was not arguing that the steps taken
by the United States were inappropriate; instead, he
seemed more than willing to accept that the changed
circumstances of the GWOT required changes in the
law. He insisted, though, that some public justification
of those extra-legal steps is required. The U.S. domestic
population seems to accept those extra-legal actions,
seeing the tradeoff with their own security. While the
domestic audience also could appreciate the debate, the
public justification is most needed with the internation-

134
al community, which sees America arrogantly refusing
to justify the extra-legal steps being taken simply
because it can act with impunity. Dr. Noone suggests
that the appropriate forum for the discussion is
Congress, which should live up to its constitutional
obligations to make laws for the U.S. Armed Forces
and to monitor their execution. In suggesting this, Dr.
Noone ignored the fact that the Congress generally has
been put on the sidelines by the consolidation of much
power in the office of the President, a trend that started
well before the 9/11 attacks, but that has accelerated
since. Nonetheless, Dr. Noone believes that it would
be easy to convene a panel of specialists in the law
of armed conflict to answer questions about what is
wrong with that law today and how to relook the law
in light of the current situation. He believes that the
panel would suggest no major changesprobably no
changes at all in treaties and only moderate changes
in customary lawbut that the hearings would go a
tremendous distance in achieving democratic domestic
support and much-needed international support.

Rear Admiral (Retired) Jane G. Dalton.

At the beginning of her presentationafter a brief

interlude to say that the Global War on Terrorism could
have been more appropriately namedRear Admiral
Jane Dalton said that the international community was
clearly supportive of the American decision to go to
war following the attacks of 9/11. Accordingly, she
questioned how the international community could
now conclude that the war against al-Qaida and
international terrorism is over simply because the al-
Qaida leadership has fled Afghanistan. Although
much of the leadership may have been routed there,

135
al-Qaida still actively seeks ways to attack the United
States, so the threat and the rationale for the GWOT
still exist. Unfortunately, the problem the international
community has with the GWOT is with Iraq, not
necessarily Afghanistan or al-Qaida. Although Rear
Admiral Dalton did not address the war in Iraq, the
current administrations position is that the war there
is part of the GWOT. International support of the war
against al-Qaida may still exist; it is the war in Iraq that
so much of the rest of the world finds ignominious.
After first stating that changing international treaties
would be next to impossiblebecause of both lawfare
and hyperbolic reactions to proposed changesRear
Admiral Dalton seemed in general agreement with Dr.
Noones ideas about the need to adapt the customary
aspects of international law. In her comments, she
identified the need for international support in this
effort. Since changes to customary law evolve through
state practice, there is no need to negotiate treaties
or find universal international consensus to change
customary law. Nonetheless, customary law changes
develop slowly and require general consensus through
the practice of those states most particularly affected
by the law in question. Changes cannot be applied
unilaterally, but not all nations have to agree for the
United States to have a firmer foundation for its extra-
legal actions.
In the remainder of her presentation, Rear Admiral
Dalton provided several maritime examples of where
customary law should be adapted. The first point
covered the boarding of ships. If a warships commander
believes a ship is engaged in piracy, he legally can board
the ship to search for evidence and to stop the activity.
Despite efforts to get terrorism internationally branded
in the same way as piracy, no similar right exists for
boarding ships suspected of supporting terrorism or

136
violating nonproliferation regulations. This may reflect
the difficulty in distinguishing one mans terrorist
from another mans freedom fighter. The United States
nonetheless should assert the rightunder the rules of
self defenseto board those ships. Protests by nations
like the Democratic Peoples Republic of Koreawhich
called such actions a brigandish naval blockade
perhaps cannot be ignored in diplomatic channels, but
should not gain much traction with other nations.
Another maritime example covers hospital ships,
which are protected as vessels of mercy. Current
treaties are interpreted to permit the crews of hospital
ships to carry small arms for defense of themselves
and their patients, but not to carry other armaments.
Unfortunately, the brutal enemy the United States
faces today has shown no proclivity to respect that
convention. The United States probably needs to assert
the right to provide better armaments to those ships,
while still maintaining their protected status.
The concept of a war on terror has resulted in
some apparent incongruities in U.S. practice. One
example is seen in the U.S. Navy action to replace active
duty sailors on U.S. warships with civilian mariners. If
the war on terrorism is not really a war and the U.S. is
not engaged in an international armed conflict, then it
does not matter whether civilians on warships operate
the propulsion plant, navigate the ship or serve on
boarding parties to take down a terrorist platform. But
if the U.S. is engaged in a war, then replacing active duty
sailors with civilian mariners may call into question
whether the civilians are taking a direct part in armed
conflict, thus risking their protected status as civilians
accompanying the force. Although the enemy in the
GWOT has shown no tendency to respect that right,
the United States probably should stop this blurring
of the line between combatants and noncombatants.

137
Enforcing the law of armed conflict is undoubtedly
easier when the enforcer is above reproach. Detainees
being held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, under the rules
of war may rightly claim that the state of war cannot
be applied unevenly: either a state of war exists and
civilians should not be engaged in direct participation
in armed conflict, or the Nation is not at war and the
status of the detainees might have to be reexamined.

Professor Charles Garraway.

The fear of lawfare might be compared to the fear

of individual or organizational lawsuits. Some people
or organizations so fear lawsuits that they become
immobilized. Others accept some prudent risk and
continue to pursue their goals. Professor Charles
Garraway suggested that the perception is that Europe
is already in the immobilized category, while the
United States is carefully maintaining its freedom of
action. As a Briton, he presented a view from across the
transatlantic divide, saying that there are some areas of
legitimate concern, but that at least some of the debate
is just hot air.
His first example was the furor over the International
Criminal Court (ICC), which of course pre-dates the
current war. Professor Garraway contended that the
effect on U.S. and UK operations has been nil. The two
nations have approached the matter quite differently,
though. The UK chose to support the ICC, but to make
sure that no British soldier ever stood before it. The
U.S. position effectively is the same: No American
soldier will ever appear before the ICC. The United
States, though, chose not to support the idea of the
court. That position at least was partially the result
of past experiences when ad hoc courts with similar
mandates found themselveswittingly or notused

138
for political purposes. For example, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia received
a request to prosecute the Supreme Allied Commander
in Europe, General Wesley Clark, for war crimes
in connection with the attack on Yugoslavia, citing
overwhelming evidence that the attack was unlawful
and that the conduct of the attack on civilian objects
. . . breached the Geneva Conventions.11 Indeed, even
the ICC already has been used for political purposes
or lawfarewhen Saddam Hussein recently petitioned
the court to investigate alleged violations of law
regarding his treatment by U.S. personnel.12 Professor
Garraway argued that the ICC has little interest in
picking a fight with a major power, which he described
as the courts heavyweight backers. Nonetheless, the
potential exists for the court to be used by the Nations
foes in an exercise of lawfare.
Professor Garraway also described the debate
about which law to apply: human rights law or the
law of armed conflict. Again, the transatlantic divide
is exemplified. While most accept that neither human
rights law nor the law of armed conflict normally can
be applied exclusively, many Europeans believe in
the primacy of the former. The U.S. administration
believes in the primacy of the law of armed conflict.
Professor Garraway came down in favor of the law
of armed conflict because it takes into account the
reality of conflict, but also argued that the law needs
to be updated to include specific circumstances of the
GWOT. If the U.S. administration persists in ignoring
this need, legal uncertainty will continue to pervade
military action from strategic to tactical levels.
Identifying it as his fundamental issue, Professor
Garrawayalone among the law panelistsrather
explicitly answered the question about whether or not

139
the nation is at war, saying, In the traditional sense,
this is not a war. In the legal sense, it doesnt fit with
the definitions of armed conflict to which the existing
international law treaties apply. Complementing
the reference to the Constitution earlier, he cited the
applicable articles of the Geneva Conventions and said
that it fits the definition of neither international conflict
nor non-international conflict. Nonetheless, it is not
difficult to see that the GWOT presents a new paradigm
for armed conflict. Given that, the rules for that new
model of warfare must be defined. Cherry picking
rules that provide a benefit and ignoring those that are
inconvenient leads to a legal morass. That legal morass
affects not only U.S. Armed Forces; it also adversely
affects Americas ability to form coalitions.
In closing, Professor Garraway quoted the eloquent
words of John Reid, the UK Secretary of State for
Defence:Our values of law, democracy, restraint, and
respect are at the core of our national beliefs and even
if, as some suggest, they create a short-term tactical
disadvantage, they represent a long-term strategic
advantage. A concerted effort by great legal minds
is necessary to establish the parameters of the war
in which the nation finds itself. While leadership is
required, the effort cannot be a unilateral one. Broad
although undoubtedly not universalacceptance of
those parameters is key.

ENDNOTES - PANEL V

1. The War Powers Act of 1973, Public Law 93-148, 93rd

Congress, Joint Resolution Concerning the War Powers of
Congress and the President, November 7, 1973, available at www.
cs.indiana.edu/statecraft/warpow.html, accessed on August 9, 2006.
2. [T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the

140
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future
acts of international terrorism against the United States by such
nations, organizations or persons. Public Law 107-40, 107th
Congress, Joint Resolution to authorize the use of United States
Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks
launched against the United States, approved September 18,
2001, available at news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/terrorism/sjres23.
es.html, accessed on August 9, 2006.
3. The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the
United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate
in order to (1) defend the national security of the United States
against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all
relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding
Iraq. Public Law 107-243, 107th Congress, Joint Resolution to
authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq,
considered and passed by House and Senate, October 10, 2002,
available at frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_
cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ243.107, accessed on August 9,
2006.
4. The circumstance of undeclared war makes it even more
important that legal and moral justification be clearly apparent to
the international community.
5. Even the use of this term suggests a break with international
law. Enemy prisoners of war are accorded certain rights;
detainees may not qualify for those same rights. Declaring that
persons captured on a battlefield are not prisoners leads soldiers
and Marines to question just how they are to treat them: according
to their normal training or following some unclear if provided
guidance.
6. Lawfare is defined in one source as the pursuit of strategic
aims, the traditional domain of warfare, through aggressive legal
maneuvers. Jeremy Rabkin, Lawfare: The International Court
of Justice Rules in Favor of Terrorism, WSJ.com Opinion Journal
from The Wall Street Journal Editorial Page, July 17, 2004, available
at www.opinionjournal.com/forms/printThis.html?id=110005366,
accessed on August 9, 2006. That definition ignores the reality that
the pursuit of strategic aims is not solely the domain of warfare.
Those aims are pursued in a variety of ways, using all the elements
of national power: diplomatic, informational, military and
economic. Another source defines lawfare as a strategy of using

141
or misusing law as a substitute for traditional military means to
achieve military objectives. Lawfare: the latest in asymmetries,
Council on Foreign Relations, March 18, 2003, available at www.
cfr.org/publication.html?id=5772, accessed on August 9, 2006.
7. Rabkin.
8. Council on Foreign Relations.
9. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, The National
Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Washington,
DC: March 2005.
10. These actions are those sanctioned by the U.S. Government.
Rendition of terrorism suspects would fall into this category, as
would actions like the killing of suspected al-Qaida operatives
in Yemen in 2002. Although some unusual interrogation methods
also might be covered, outright abuse of prisonerssuch as
occurred at abu Ghraib prison in Iraqwould not. Nor would
war crimes such as rape or murder perpetrated by individual
soldiers acting on their own volition.
11. Statement of the International Action Center, Stop War
Criminal Wesley Clark From Testifying in Secret, New York:
December 15, 2003, available at www.iacenter.org/archive2004/
clark_1203-1.htm, accessed on August 14, 2006.
12. Tom Henry, Hussein Lawyers ask International Criminal
Court to investigate violations, Jurist, Legal News and Research,
University of Pittsburgh School of Law, July 6, 2006, available at
jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/07/hussein-lawyers-ask-
international.php, accessed on August 14, 2006.

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 PANEL V

JUSTIFYING THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR

Professor Michael F. Noone

There are legal consequences for a nation at

war. These consequences are both domestic and
international since legal doctrine acknowledges that
belligerencya state of warpermits governmental
behavior which would be forbidden in peacetime.
The U.S. Government therefore must be prepared to
offer legal justification for actions in its Global War on
Terrorism which otherwise would violate legal norms.
It is doing so, slowly and reluctantly, in the domestic
realm as individual cases are adjudicated and appealed
in the U.S. court system, where the government claims
that a state of war justifies extraordinary measures.
It has not, in any coherent way, justified its apparent
deviations from the law of war. Three recent Executive
Branch documentsthe Presidents National Security
Strategy of the United States, the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review Report, and the unclassified version of
the Joint Chiefs National Military Strategic Plan for the
War on Terrorismwere issued at the highest levels
of the U.S. Government, but fail to acknowledge or
respond to claims that U.S. forces have violated the
rule of law in waging the war. The Executive Branchs
refusal to justify past actions is troubling. That it
intends to continue some controversial practices
kidnapping and targeted killing, for examplewithout
offering legal justification should cause grave concern.
Perhaps the governments silence can be attributed to
the fact that traditional legal doctrineshuman rights

143
and humanitarian lawintended to address the legal
issues raised by the Global War on Terrorism (or Long
War) have proven to be inadequate.
The pre-9/11 U.S. response to Islamic terrorism has
been described as Law Enforcement Plus. In 1997-
98, the National Security Council (NSC) directed that
bin Laden, who had been indicted, should be captured
and held for trial. If he could not be capturedbecause
he had sought refuge in Afghanistan, which refused to
extradite himthe NSC authorized his killing. Human
rights law forbids killing criminals simply because they
cannot be arrested and tried. No matter how heinous
their crimes, human rights law starts from the premise
that a persons right to life is absolute unless there is
immediate need to act in self defense. A human rights
regime would call for the Executive Branch to follow
a law enforcement model similar to that followed by
the British during the Irish Troubles. Unfortunately,
Islamic terrorism is quite different from the warfare
practiced by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The
former relies on the infliction of mass casualties
and seeksand would employweapons of mass
destruction. The IRA never sought mass casualties
as an end in itself. The IRA was essentially domestic,
focused in Northern Ireland; Islamic terrorism is
transnational. The IRA was tightly structured and, as
has been learned recently, could be and was penetrated
at the highest levels. Islamic terrorism is loosely
organized and difficult to penetrate. Finally, the IRA
had a negotiable agenda, and Islamic terrorism does
not. There are important differences between U.S. and
United Kingdom (UK) legal institutions as well. IRA
terrorists had no fundamental right to a jury trial; they
were tried before special courts whose judges were
concerned neither with jury intimidation nor with the

144
elaborate U.S. evidentiary rules designed to protect
jurors from information which could prejudice their
decision. Moreover, U.S. legal doctrine fails to make
the clear distinction between criminal and political
motivations, which is a fundamental characteristic
of the British system. Faced with an implacable alien
enemy committed to maximizing civilian casualties
with weapons of mass destruction and capable of
mounting complex attacks, the Executive Branch sought
and was granted authority to initiate armed conflict
no matter how contested that authority may befrom
Congress, the United Nations (UN), and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In doing so, the
paradigm changed: from criminal justice and human
rights law to war and the Law of Armed Conflict. That
paradigm can be described as Belligerency Minus.
The terms law of war, law of armed conflict
(LOAC), and humanitarian law essentially are
synonymous, although each is intended to emphasize
a different aspect of the phenomenon. LOAC has two
significant components: treaty law, characterized
by rules, arrived at by negotiation and compromise,
and exemplified in the Geneva Conventions; and
customary law, characterized by standards, arrived
at by state practice and exemplified in the Martens
Clause (named after the Russian delegate to the Hague
Conventions), which provided that in cases not
included in the Regulations . . . the inhabitants and the
belligerents remain under the protection and the rule
of the principles of the law of nations as they result
from the usages established among civilized peoples,
from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the
public conscience. Unlike Human Rights Law, LOAC
traditionally has relied on reciprocity: either that
assured by treaty obligation or assumed by common

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usage. LOAC treaty law resembles human rights
law in one respect: Both are characterized by rules
which are composed of a protasis (if), a statement
of circumstances which calls a rule into play, and an
apodosis (then), which describes the consequences
of the rules application. Thus, if a prisoner satisfies the
Geneva Conventions criteria for prisoner of war status,
then he or she is entitled to the treatys enumerated
protections. Typically, the customary LOAC is based
not on rules, but on standards. Standards call for
balancing and are sensitive to individual circumstance.
Thus, unnecessary suffering, killing, or destruction
must be avoided. The United States has argued that
treaty law does not apply in its war on terror because
terrorist groups are nonstate actors who have agreed
neither to the treaties nor adopted their standards.
Nor, the United States claims, does customary law
apply, because it also assumes reciprocity and a
general adherence to the usages established among
civilized peoples. Furthermore, neither the human
rights nor LOAC regimes offer acceptable punitive
mechanisms for terrorists violations of international
norms. Potential suicide bombers are not deterred by
routine criminal justice penalties (bound by human
rights strictures): incarceration or even death. The
LOAC merely can threaten international obloquy of an
organization or individual war crimes penalties similar
to those imposed in domestic legal systems.
Since neither legal regime offers adequate solutions,
it is not surprising that the Executive branch has
refused to offer a principled and coherent rationale
for its apparent deviations from international legal
norms and that the British Minister of Defense recently
called for reexamination and revision of the Geneva
Conventions. His proposalapparently focused on

146
changing treaty law languageis unrealistic. The
United States has, for more than 30 years, refused to
accept language in proposed Protocols I and II amend-
ing and clarifying the Geneva Conventions. However,
it would be relatively easy for LOAC experts to identify
gaps in treaty and customary law, created by changed
conditions, and to suggest principled solutions to the
legal problems posed by those conditions.
Was the November 2002 Predator missile ambush
in Yemen (a neutral country) of six suspected al-
Qaida operatives as legally justified as the 1943
ambush of Admiral Yamamoto? Can those two cases
be distinguished from the Soviet/Bulgarian London
assassination of dissident Georgi Markov? Or from the
European Court of Human Rights ruling that the UK
had violated the human rights of three IRA terrorists
when its forces killed them in Gibraltar? The United
States has lawyers capable of answering those questions
in a venue more suitable than the Department of
Justices Office of Legal Counsel or the Department of
Defense General Counsels Office. Congress, charged
with the constitutional obligation to make laws for the
administration of the armed forces and thus with the
duty to oversee the application of those laws, should
undertake hearings which address these questions.
Has the Executive Branch adequately established
that it remains engaged in hostilities with an entity or
movement which constitutes a state of war? If there is
no belligerent state, can there be enemy aliens subject
to internment or expulsion from sensitive areas? Do
Hague prohibitions of assassination, proscription,
and outlawry apply? Do Hague restraintswhich
assume reciprocity on weapons and tactics, e.g.,
perfidyapply when these restraints are not honored
by opponents as a matter of policy? If a state of war

147
exists, what obligations does the United States have to
captured persons who are not entitled to prisoner of
war status? How is the termination of hostilities to be
decided? These questions, addressed by Congress and
answered in a democratic fashion, would assure U.S.
forces and neutral observers of Americas continued
commitment to the rule of law. If America is to re-take
the moral high ground, public engagement in this kind
of principled discussion is essential.

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 PANEL V

THE NATION AT WAR

Rear Admiral (Retired) Jane G. Dalton

Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the topic of

the Nation at War has been, and remains, one of
considerable discussion and disagreement among
lawyers, policymakers and the general public. Whether
one agrees with the U.S. position that the nation is
truly at war in the jus ad bellum/jus in bello context
or not, the subject raises many legal issues that bear
discussing. This section focuses on just a few of those
topics, primarily those related to maritime law.
First, one criticism of the Global War on Terror is
that the United States is attempting to wage war on
an abstract conceptone that cannot be defined or
identified in any concrete sense. The truth is, however,
that the United States and its coalition partners are not
fighting an abstraction. Perhaps it would have been
more precise for the President to have announced
a global war on the transnational, networked
organization of al-Qaida and its affiliate organizations
that are committed to the ultimate destruction of the
United States and other free societies the world over
the GWOTNOAQAOCUDUSOFSWO. The acronym
certainly does not have the same cachet as the simpler
GWOT, but it reflects the fact that the country is fighting
an organized, identifiable enemy that has attacked the
United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Indonesia,
Jordan, and many other countries, and killed well over
4000 innocent men, women, and children.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks there was little,
if any, doubt in the international community that the

149
United States had been the victim of an armed attack
that entitled the United States and its coalition partners
to respond with armed force in self-defense. The United
Nations (UN) Security Council (in Resolution 1368),
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (by
invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty) and the
Organization of American States (OAS) (by invoking
Article 3(1) of the Rio Treaty) all made that perfectly
clear, and the outpouring of support for Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM was overwhelming. It thus
appears somewhat disingenuous that many of those
same supporters now announce that the war is over
simply because Afghanistan largely has been freed
from the tyranny of the Taliban and al-Qaida, while
the leaders of the organization simply have moved
their headquarters and are conducting armed attacks
from another undisclosed location or locations.
That approach reflects a very narrow view of jus ad
bellum and the inherent right of self-defense. The Final
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on
the United States (the 9/11 Commission Report) made clear
that misconstruing the scale of terrorism is dangerous
and has cost the United States and its allies dearly. The
Report opined that an unfortunate consequence of
the superb criminal investigative and prosecutorial
efforts in the aftermath of the first World Trade Center
bombing in 1993 was that it created an impression
that the law enforcement system was well-equipped
to cope with terrorism.1 Law enforcement is certainly
one of many instruments of national power available
to the President to combat terrorism, but it is not the
sole and exclusive instrument when dealing with an
enemy that is committed to the ultimate destruction of
the United States and other democratic societies world-
wide.

150
 The problem with the approach of many critics
is that they have not proposed an alternative other
than the 19th-20th century concept of war as a conflict
between two nation-states played out on defined
battlefields by massed armies wearing uniforms and
firing guns. United Kingdom (UK) Defense Secretary
John Reid, in a speech at the Royal United Service
Institute think-tank, reportedly called for sweeping
changes to international law, including the Geneva
Conventions, to counter the threat of global terrorism.
The legal constraints upon us have to be set against
an enemy that adheres to no constraints whatsoever.2
John Reid, of course, was criticized immediately by
Human Rights Watch, which implied that he sought
to change such rules as the basic principles of not
torturing people3the sort of hyperbolic reaction that
leads to doubt whether there could ever be a successful
renegotiation of law of armed conflict treaties in a
reasoned and thoughtful manner.
Accordingly, it seems the only available alternative
is to adapt the 19th and 20th century rules to the realities
of the 21st century war on global terrorism. Those rules
and concepts are flexible enough to be adapted to the
21st centurybut doing so will require some creative
thinking and a willingness to adapt. Several examples
of where that is happening in the maritime context will
be illustrative.
First is command of the commons. The U. S. Navy
always has been one of the premier advocates of
freedom of the seas and freedom of navigation.
At first blush, then, the concept of command of the
commonscommand of the seas (including under the
surface of the seas), air, space, and cyberspacecould
appear to be inconsistent with the Navys traditional
viewpoint. The U. S. Air Force has identified command

151
of the commons as the key military enabler of the
United States. That approach is not unrealistic when
one considers that both the National Strategy for
Maritime Security4 and the National Defense Strategy5
identify the global commonsparticularly the oceans
and cyberspaceas ambiguous.
Ambiguity means that the same global commons that
give life, food, resources, and means of communication
also provide conduits for threats to national security
and offer vast expanses conducive to anonymity
and surreptitious activity. The oceans, for example,
provide an immense maritime domain of enormous
importance to the security and prosperity of all nations
and all peoples, but they also provide a vast, ready and
largely unsecured medium for an array of threats by
nations, terrorists, and criminals.6 So it is particularly
important to be able to operate in, through, and from
the commonsand to command the commons in
the sense that the nation is able to identify and counter
threats emanating from the commons.
The U.S. Navy recently has been involved in
aggressive efforts to counter piracy at sea off the African
coast. There is a well-established legal regime under
customary international law, and reflected in Part VII
of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, that authorizes
warships to board and inspect any ship at sea, flying
any nations flag, if there are reasonable grounds to
believe the ship is engaged in piracy. In this situation,
the law is clear and fully adequate to address concerns
about threats emanating from the global commons.
There is another area, however, where the law is
not so clear. The authority to board vessels suspected
of supporting terrorism, or of shipping weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) components or precursors
by sea to terrorist organizations or rogue states, is not

152
addressed in the Law of the Sea Convention, or in any
other international legal instrument. More precisely,
that authority was not addressed prior to 9/11. The
2002 National Security Strategy announced the American
intention to convince the international community to
view terrorism in the same light as piracy and the slave
tradeand to interdict shipments of WMD-enabling
technologies and materials.7
Unfortunately, the administration was not entirely
successful in this regard. A series of UN Security
Council resolutions after 9/11 identified terrorism
as a threat to international peace and security and
reaffirmed the inherent right of individual and
collective self-defense, but never went so far as to
equate terrorism with universal crimes such as piracy
or the slave tradeand certainly never authorized the
use of all necessary means to combat terrorism or to
interdict the shipment of WMD on the high seas or in
international airspace. In what could be considered a
minor victory, UN Security Council Resolution 1390 of
January 28, 2002, decided that all states should prevent
the use of their flag vessels or aircraft to provide
arms and related materiel to al-Qaida and associated
terrorist groups. But for the most part the resolutions
simply stressed the need for improved coordination
and information exchange, and called upon states
to enforce and strengthen domestic legislation and
international cooperation.
So it was that after the unfortunate incident in
December 2002 with the un-flagged freighter So San
carrying Scud missiles and fuel to Yemen, the Bush
Administration announced the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI), in May 2003. The PSI is a global effort to
create a dynamic, creative and more proactive approach
to the problem of air and sea shipment of WMD, their

153
delivery systems and related materials. It relies on a
series of bilateral agreements with cooperating nations,
exercises to test and train expedited procedures
for obtaining consent to search another states flag
vessels, and strengthening domestic legislation and
international instruments. Some have criticized PSIs
legitimacycalling it a brigandish naval blockade
and vigilante attacks on the high seas.8 Nevertheless,
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 of April 28,
2004, welcomed multilateral arrangements which
contribute to nonproliferationa subtle reference to
the PSI. Over 70 nations are cooperating with the United
States on PSI, which has had publicly-announced
successes in preventing the shipment of material and
equipment to Libya and Iran.9
The United States has introduced a number of other
international initiatives to enhance national security
in the global commons, such as the Long-Range
Information and Tracking regime, which would enable
tracking vessels as far as 2,000 nautical miles from
the U.S. coastline. Furthermore, in October 2005, the
International Maritime Organization adopted signifi-
cant antiterrorism and nonproliferation amendments to
the 1988 UN Convention for the Suppression of Unlaw-
ful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.
These amendments include a comprehensive framework
for boarding suspect vessels at sea, establishment of
expedited boarding procedures, and bringing certain
terrorist-related and nonproliferation offenses (such as
the unlawful transport of WMD) within its ambit. 10
Make no mistake, however: Given the right
circumstances, the inherent right of national self-
defense, under customary law and as reflected in Article
51 of the UN Charter, would support the interdiction of
Osama bin Laden or other terrorists, or WMD, at sea or

154
in the air, based on reliable and actionable intelligence.
Such an action would be an example of adapting 19th
and 20th century rules to the realities of the 21st century
war on global terrorism. The President should use all
the diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, and other
tools at his disposal, but if military action is the most
appropriate action in a given situation, then military
action is a lawful tool for the President to employ.
The U.S. Navy is facing a number of other issues
where the correct answer may turn on whether the war
on terrorism is an actual war. For example, when
Admiral Vern Clark was Chief of Naval Operations,
he challenged the Navy to maximize the use of active
duty sailors in warfighting positions. The Military
Sealift Command proposed replacing sailors with
civilian mariners in a number of key positions onboard
warshipspositions such as navigation, engineering,
and deck operations. Currently, half the crew of USS
Mount Whitney is civilian. The ship serves as the flagship
for the U.S. Sixth Fleet, NATOs Joint Command Lisbon,
and NATOs Naval Striking and Support Forces. This
Navy practice would be a candidate for examination if
a review as called for by Secretary John Reid were ever
conducted.
The other services also are wrestling with the issue
of civilians in the battlespaceoperating unmanned
aerial vehicles, providing perimeter or distinguished
visitor security in combat zones, and maintaining
sophisticated weapons systems. The issue is whether
or not these civilians have lost their protected status as
civilians accompanying the force by taking a direct
part in armed conflict.
If the war on terrorism is not really a war and the
United States is not engaged in an international armed
conflict, then it does not matter whether civilians on

155
board warships operate the engineering plant, navigate
the ship, or serve as small-boat coxswains for boarding
parties engaged in a take-down of a terrorist platform.
It is certainly true that the United States is not at war
with a nation-state party to the Geneva Conventions,
and there is no expectation that the adversary would
provide Geneva protections to anyone. But it seems
somewhat incongruous for the United States to detain
several hundred enemy combatants at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, for engaging in warlike acts against the
United States, while denying that civilians involved
in seizing a terrorist ship are directly participating in
armed conflict.
The Navys solution to this dilemma was to intro-
duce legislation that would have placed the civilian
mariners in a reserve status, from which they would
have been recalled to active duty prior to the ship
engaging in international armed conflict. That legislation
was not passed, and the Navy is now assessing the
extent, if any, to which civilian mariners can be used
in traditional armed conflict onboard warships such
as those planned for the Maritime Prepositioned Force
(Future).
Another 20th century maritime-related legal
doctrine that needs review in light of the global war on
terrorism relates to military hospital ships, which are
granted extraordinary protections under the Second
Geneva Convention of 1949. Those protections depend,
however, on the ships being used solely to assist, treat,
and transport the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked.
To guarantee that hospital ships will not transmit
intelligence or engage in offensive military operations,
the Geneva Convention approach is to ensure they are
incapable of engaging in those activities. Thus, article
34 forbids the possession or use of a secret code
for communicationmeaning hospital ships cannot

156
use encrypted communications systems. Concerning
weapons, article 35 provides that the crews of hospital
ships may be armed for maintaining order and for
defense of themselves and their patientsa provision
understood to mean that the ships themselves cannot
carry armaments, but that their crews may carry small
arms for self-defense.
In the post-USS Cole, post-9/11 world, these
requirements simply are unacceptable. The San Remo
Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed
Conflicts at Sea, prepared by a group of military and
legal experts and published in 1995, attempted to be
forward-leaning by opining that hospital ships may
be armed with deflective means of defense, such as
chaff and flares, but not with means that could be used
in offensive fashion, such as anti-aircraft guns.11
Chaff and flares, however, would be decidedly
ineffective against a determined suicide attack like
that launched against USS Cole. While there is merit in
taking a cautious approach to deploying hospital ships
bristling with defensive armaments, the realities of
the war on terrorism require that hospital ships and their
crews be provided with crew-served weapons such as
machine guns and grenade launchers, and even with
the Phalanx close-in weapons system and other state-
of-the-art defensive anti-air and anti-surface weapons.
Surely it is possible to devise some method of ensuring
the integrity of hospital ships (such as by placing
international observers on board) other than denying
them armaments necessary for force protection against
pirates and terrorists.
Sea-basing is another maritime concept that will
challenge accepted notions of warfighting. It is part
of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullens
vision of a 1,000-ship Navy. Not merely a Navy/
Marine Corps program, sea-basing will support all

157
services, coalition partners and other interagency
organizations. One of 21 Joint Integrating Concepts,
sea-basing reflects a vision of how to aggregate, sustain,
and project combat power at sea. It is defined as the
rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection,
reconstitution, and reemployment of joint combat
power from the sea, without reliance on land bases
within the Joint Operations Area.
How does sea-basing work? Basically, large, floating
military bases are staged 12 nautical miles off the
coastline and project people, machinery, armaments,
and materiel ashore to conduct an assigned mission
whether the mission is counterterrorism or disaster
relief. In Admiral Mullens vision of the 1,000-ship
Navy, no single nation would have that many ships,
but the worlds navies and coast guards would work
together to fight wars, defeat pirates, deter illegal drug
traffickers and terrorists, and deliver humanitarian
assistancemoving rapidly from place to place as
required . . . all as part of the long war of winning
hearts and minds to defeat the conditions that sustain
terrorist ideology.12
Interestingly, in this area, 19th and 20th century
rules completely support the freedom of the seas to
conduct military operations in international waters
without the consent or prior knowledge of the coastal
state. Some recent expansive views of coastal state
rights in the 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone
(EEZ), however, would hold that such operations are
not permitted. China, for example, asserts sovereignty
over air and sea operations in the EEZ. As noted, in this
case the existing laws are consistent with U.S. projected
operations. However, the United States and its coalition
partners must be vigilant to ensure traditional high
seas rights and freedoms do not atrophy from lack of
use or misuse.

158
 Finally, a word about detainee operations. One
does not typically think of detainee operations as
a Navy or maritime issue. Given the U.S. Navys
long-term association with Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
however, Secretary of the Navy (now Deputy Secretary
of Defense) Gordon England was named as the
Designated Civilian Official for the Combatant Status
Review Tribunals (CSRTs) and the Administrative
Review Boards (ARBs) conducted for the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay. One of the most frequent criticisms
lodged against the United States in the Global War on
Terrorism is that the enemy combatants are being held
indefinitely, without trial or other due process. That
was a second criticism raised by Human Rights Watch
against Secretary Reids reported call for a renegotiation
of the Geneva Conventions.13 Yet through the CSRT
and ARB processes, almost 250 detainees have been
released from detention in Guantanamo Bay, either
because they were determined no longer to be enemy
combatants or no longer to pose a threat to the United
States.
Furthermore, the terrorists consider themselves
enemy combatants in a global war. One of the July
2005 London bombers stated, We are at war, and I am
a soldier in that war.14 A number of the Guantanamo
detainees also readily acknowledge they were, and
continue to be, combatants against the United States.15
The Department of Defense has detained and
screened around 83,000 individuals in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and elsewhere. The vast majority are freed shortly
after initial questioning. There remain about 14,500 in
custody, primarily in Iraq, consistent with the Fourth
Geneva Convention concerning security detainees.
Less than 700 individuals have been transferred to
Guantanamo Bay. The government already has released

159
about 245 Guantanamo detainees to 12 countries
and, unfortunately, the government has been wrong
about 10 percent of the time. About a dozen have been
captured after they returned to the battlefield to wage
war against the United States.16
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
made clear that since the 18th century, captivity during
time of war is neither revenge nor punishment, but
rather is solely protective custody, the only purpose of
which is to prevent the prisoners of war from further
participation in the war.17 What is the alternative to
detaining these individuals as enemy combatantsto
let them go? It hardly seems to be in the interest of
humanity at large to release individuals who intend to
return immediately to the fight and kill more innocent
men, women, and children. Certainly, this is an area
where a review of the Geneva Conventions would be in
order, though, as mentioned earlier, there is probably
little hope of success in that regard.

ENDNOTES - DALTON

1. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National

Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, New York: W.
W. Norton Company, Inc., July 22, 2004, p. 72.
2. Thomas Harding, Reid Calls for Geneva Convention To Be
Rewritten, London Daily Telegraph, April 4, 2006.
3. Ibid.
4. The National Strategy for Maritime Security, September 2005,
available at www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/4844-nsms.pdf.
5. The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America,
Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2005, available at www.
defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005.
6. The National Strategy for Maritime Security, p. 2.
7. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
Washington, DC: The White House, 2002, available at www.
whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf, pp. 6, 14.

160
 8. See, e.g., Samantha Maiden, Howard Begins Tour with
Warning to North Korea, The Advertiser (Australia), July 14, 2003,
p. 7 (quoting the official North Korean news agency); Nikki Todd,
Activists Hit Out at PSI Plans to Stop Weapons Trade, AAP
Newsfeed, July 9, 2003 (LEXIS, News Library, Wires File, quoting
Just Peace spokeswoman Annette Brownlie).
9. Condoleezza Rice, Secretary, U.S. Department of State,
Remarks on the Second Anniversary of the Proliferation Security
Initiative, May 31, 2005, transcript available at www.state.gov/
secretary/rm/2005/46951.htm.
10. Available at www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_
id=259&doc_id=686.
11. Louise Doswald-Beck, ed., San Remo Manual on International
Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, Cambridge, United
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1995, para. 170.3, p. 235.
12. For more information on Seabasing, see Major General
Gordon C. Nash, Seabasing: an international aspect, Janes
Defence Weekly, March 29, 2006, p. 22; and Scott C. Truver, Special
Delivery, ibid., p. 24.
13. The National Strategy for Maritime Security.
14. BBC NEWS, London Bomber Video Aired on TV,
September 2, 2005, available at news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4206708.stm.
15. Farah Stockman and Charlie Savage, Guantanamo
Transcripts Paint a Picture of Wars Combatants, Boston Globe,
March 20, 2006, p. 1.
16. Department of Defense, News Transcript, Washington,
DC, July 8, 2005, available at defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005. For
more information on detainee procedures and review boards,
see www.defenselink.mil/news/Combatant_Tribunals.html and www.
defenselink.mil/news/Jan2005/d20050131process.pdf.
17. Leslie Green, What IsWhy Is Therethe Law of War?
Naval War College International Law Studies, Vol. 71, Newport:
Naval War College Press, 1998, p. 167, quoting The Nuremberg
Judgment.

161
 PANEL V

COMPETING LEGAL ISSUES:

A EUROPEAN VIEWPOINT

Professor Charles Garraway

Introduction.

Robert Kagan, in his seminal article entitled Power

and Weakness, written in 2002,1 stated that on major
strategic and international questions today, Americans
are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus. He
referred to the transatlantic divide and sought to set
it in a historical context, referring to Europe moving
from the horrors of the first half of the 20th century
into a Kantian paradise while the United States is
left to sort out the dangerous Hobbesian world that
still flourishes outside Europe. The question he asks
is whether the point has now been reached where, in
military terms, the United States will do the fighting
and Europe the cleaning up. Put another way: Does
the real division of labour consist of the United States
making the dinner and the Europeans doing the
dishes?
It is becoming popular now to talk about the
transatlantic divide. Another example is Jeffrey
Kopstein, who discusses the subject in The
Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion.2
In that article, he compares the European preference
for order over freedom, contrasting this with the
United States rhetoric about the spread of democracy,
particularly the January 2005 speech of President Bush
arguing that promoting the freedom of other countries

163
was now an urgent requirement of our nations
security and the calling of our time.3
I myself have written previously on the trans-
atlantic divide.4 This arose from a presentation made
at the International Conference on Current Issues
in International Law and Military Operations, at the
U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, in
June 2003. Three years on, with increasing arguments
on the relevanceand indeed the applicabilityof
international law to current military operations, it
perhaps is necessary to revisit the issue and look
at the differing views of the United States and its
European allies. Differences there certainly are, but as
I stated in my earlier article, what is needed is greater
communication between the parties and a willingness
to talk with each other rather than at each other.5
Is it correct to argue that the European nations
are now so bound by constitutional and other legal
constraints that they cannot effectively contribute to
high intensity conflict? Is the increasing emphasis on
the law in its relation to military operations justified
or is it an attempt to bind the powerful Gulliver
with Lilliputian cords? In an address to the Air and
Space Conference and Technology Exposition 2005,6
Brigadier General (now Major General) Charles
Dunlap, U.S. Air Force, referred to this as lawfare
and an asymmetrical form of warfare. He defined
lawfare as the strategy of using or misusing law as a
substitute for traditional military means to achieve an
operational objective. While pointing out that this can
work both positively and negatively, he went on to say
that most adversaries are using Lawfare . . . as a form
of asymmetrical warfare by manipulating a value of
our societies, which is respect for law.
My purpose is to look at those areas of law where
there is dispute or disagreement between the United

164
States and Europe and to examine exactly where
those disagreements are in the hope that this may
generate a debate and contribute to the resolution of
these disagreements. I will not look at constitutional
constraints as these are, on both sides of the Atlantic,
effectively self-imposed. I will, however, look at
two issues that I consider serious. The first is the
application of human rights; the second is the differing
interpretations of the law of armed conflict. I will then
look at an issue that I consider fundamental and that
underpins the whole impasse: the differing views on the
campaign (or war) against terror. However, before I
move on to these subjects, I need to deal with one area
that has been raised frequently in debate, but isin
my viewa complete red herring: the International
Criminal Court.7

International Criminal Court.

In 1998, in Rome, a Diplomatic Conference adopted

the Statute for an International Criminal Court.8
Unfortunately, there remained major disagreements
on a number of key issues and as a result, it was not
possible to achieve a consensus text in negotiations.
A compromise text was put forward on a take it or
leave it basis, and it was this text that was adopted
by a large majority after a vote. Sadly, one of those
countries voting against it was the United States. The
United States had played a majorand very positive
role in the negotiations, and it must be acknowledged
that many of the key areas of the Statute benefited from
U.S. expertise in both subject matter and drafting. This
is particularly true in relation to the crimes that fall
within the jurisdiction of the Court.
After Rome, the United States initially seemed
to adopt a position of benevolent neutrality, though

165
maintaining its objections. The line seemed to be
dont mess with us, and we wont mess with you.
The delegation continued to play a major role in the
drafting of the subsidiary documents, including the
Rules of Procedure and Elements of Crimes, the latter
being primarily a joint Swiss-U.S. venture. Indeed, on
almost his last day in office, President Clinton signed
the Rome Statute, although indicating that the United
States still had some fundamental problems that needed
to be resolved before there could be any question of the
United States becoming a Party to the Court.
President Bush, on gaining office, took a different
line and launched a policy of strong opposition to
the Court. On both the domestic and international
stage, he took steps to ensure that the Court could
not in any circumstances take jurisdiction over any
American citizen and, in a letter to the United Nations
(UN) Secretary General, the administration sought to
unsign the Treaty.9
As a result of these actions, many in the U.S. military
community see the International Criminal Court as a
major threat to U.S. operationsand this concern has
spread to the United Kingdom to some extent. On July
14, 2005, six former Chiefs of the Defence Staff launched
a debate in the House of Lords expressing concern over
the impact that on-going investigations in Iraq into the
conduct of operations were having both on the morale
of the British Army and on the chain of command. The
International Criminal Court was blamed for much of
this.10
In fact, I would suggest that the International
Criminal Court has had no effect at all on operations in
Iraqor elsewhere. Furthermore, it is not responsible
for the level of inquiries carried out. The problem lies
elsewhere as I will outline later. It has always been

166
United Kingdom policy to investigate allegations of
misconduct by British forces (as it is in the United States)
and that has not changed. What may have changed is
the greater public awareness of these investigations,
caused partly by greater civilian involvement. But that
cannot be laid at the door of the International Criminal
Court.
It is official British Government policy that no
British service person will ever appear in front of the
International Criminal Court.11 However, in seeking
to achieve this policy objective, we have approached
the matter from a different angle. We have indeed
become a Party to the Court and intend to rely on the
principle of complementarity laid down in Article
17 of the Rome Statute. This key principle was one of
those that benefited from U.S. input at the negotiating
stage and is worth examining in full. The text of Article
17 of the Statute states:

Article 17Issues of Admissibility. (Emphases below added

by the author.)

1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and

article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is
inadmissible where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by
a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the
State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out
the investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which
has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided
not to prosecute the person concerned, unless
the decision resulted from the unwillingness or
inability of the State genuinely to prosecute;
(c) The person concerned already has been tried for
conduct which is the subject of the complaint, and
a trial by the Court is not permitted under article
20, paragraph 3;

167
 (d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify
further action by the Court.
2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular
case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the
principles of due process recognized by international
law, whether one or more of the following exist, as
applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or
the national decision was made for the purpose
of shielding the person concerned from criminal
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court referred to in article 5;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the
proceedings which in the circumstances is
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being
conducted independently or impartially, and they
were or are being conducted in a manner which, in
the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent
to bring the person concerned to justice.
3. In order to determine inability in a particular case,
the Court shall consider whether, due to a total or
substantial collapse or unavailability of its national
judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the
accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.

The test is a very high one and the default position,

as is made clear by Article 17(1) is inadmissibility.
Of course, the final decision rests with the Court, but
if the Court is to be truly international, no State can
have a veto. Attractive as it might have been to give the
five permanent members of the UN Security Council
such a vetoeffectively exempting their personnel
that was utterly unacceptable to the rest of the world.
If the United States thinks that it is the only major
power likely to come under scrutiny, the example of

168
Russian operations in Chechnya comes to mind. These
are already the subject of human rights investigations
under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human
Rights, as we shall see later.
The United Kingdom began by passing domestic
legislation ensuring that every offence in the
International Criminal Court Statute became (if it
was not already) an offence under our domestic law
in all our various jurisdictions.12 This enables us to
investigate and, where appropriate, try before our
domestic courts, both military and civilian, any cases
that might be within the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court. While this does not, and cannot,
give us an absolute guarantee of exemption, the bar
imposed on the Prosecutor by Article 17 is a very high
oneand one on which he must satisfy a three-Judge
Pre-Trial Chamber, and subsequently, a five-Judge
Appeals Chamber. Put another way, he must obtain
the agreement of a minimum of five judges in the two
Chambers. We have a British Judge in the Court who, in
the normal course of events, would educate his fellow
Judges on the UK judicial system. It must be considered
highly unlikely, to put it mildly, that the Court could be
persuaded that, in a particular case, the British judicial
system had so moved from its fundamental principles
that it was being used with one of the intents described
in Article 17 (2). If we reach the stage of Article 17 (3),
then I would suggest that the United Kingdom is in
real trouble!
The fear in the United States is primarily one of
politically-motivated prosecutions. However, this
works both ways. The Court is going to need to rely
on its heavyweight backers for support as it has no
real capabilities of its own on the ground. Politically,
it is not in the Courts interests to pick a fight with a
major power. If it were minded to do so, particularly

169
on political grounds, then it would be in the process
of self-destruction. With British personnel operating
within the Court structure, we would have ample
warning of any such fundamental shift in the Courts
philosophy and our own participation would have
been called into question long before matters got that
far.
Thus, on legal grounds and political grounds, we
have no fear of the Court but our objectives are exactly
the same as those of the United States: to ensure that
matters are dealt with in our own domestic courts.
We do so by applying our ordinary procedures and
standards, and thus the International Criminal Court
has had no effect whatsoever on ongoing operations.
Although we have adopted all the International
Criminal Court offences into UK domestic law, the
conduct which they reflect always would have been
prosecutable, though perhaps under different titles.
Investigations therefore always would have been
undertaken where such conduct came to light. Nothing
has changed.

Human Rights Law.

Where there has been a change is in the growing

influence of human rights law. Here, there is a marked
difference between the United States and Europe, a
divide that is likely to get more pronounced before it
gets better. There are two major areas of difference.
First, the U.S. position is that the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights only applies
to individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction.13 The wording is taken directly from
Article 2 (1) of the Covenant and the issue is the use
of the word and. The U.S. view is that this is a two-
part test, and thus the obligations imposed on the U.S.

170
by the Covenant do not extend beyond the territorial
boundaries of the United States. This position
was confirmed recently in the official reply by the
Administration to the Report of the Special Rapporteurs
on Guantanamo.14 The argument put forward is that this
is the literal reading of the words of the Covenant, and
the negotiating history supports such a limitation. The
detailed arguments are well-outlined in a commentary
on the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion
on the Wall, written by Michael Dennis, a legal adviser
to the State Department.15 The counter argument is
that times have moved on and that, whatever was the
position when the Covenant was drafted in 1966, or
even when it came into force in 1976, it generally is
accepted that the words should be read disjunctively.
This view is supported by General Comment 31 of the
Human Rights Committee.16
For the United Kingdom and other European
States, this argument is, to a considerable extent,
only of academic interest. The European Convention
on Human Rights refers to everyone within their
jurisdiction.17 The territorial reference has been
removed. But what does this phrase mean? In Europe,
the European Court of Human Rights exists to interpret
the Convention and can issue judgements which are
binding on the 41 Member States of the Council of
Europe who have ratified the Convention. This issue
of the meaning of jurisdiction has been raised in a
number of cases and, while the full extent of any extra-
territorial effect is perhaps still unclear, what is beyond
peradventure is that, while the Convention is primarily
territorial, it can, in exceptional circumstances, be
applied extra-territorially. The leading case to date
was that of Bankovi,18 in which the Court recognised
only exceptionally extra-territorial acts as constituting
an exercise of jurisdiction:

171
 . . . when the respondent State, through the effective
control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad
as a consequence of military occupation or through the
consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of
that territory, exercised all or some of the public powers
normally to be exercised by that Government.19

The Court has indeed gone further in some other

specific cases, accepting, for example, the application of
the Convention to the acts of Turkish agents in Kenya
during the capture of Ocalan.20
The wording of Bankovi is interesting and the test
laid down somewhat obtuse. The British courts have
been wrestling with this in domestic cases arising from
the occupation of Iraq. While the British courts have
been reluctant to concede that military occupation
necessarily brings into full force all the relevant
provisions of the Convention, its partial applicability
seems not to be in doubt. The question therefore is not
whether the Convention applies but to what extent.21
Where this is particularly important in relation
to military operations is that the Court has held in
numerous cases that subsumed in the nonderogable
right to life enshrined in Article 2 of the Convention
is the right to an effective investigation where life has
been taken by State officials. This has been applied
also to conflict situations, as in the Turkish operations
to counter the Kurdish insurgency in the east of the
country and, most recently, in a series of cases arising
from Russian operations in Chechnya, including
Khashiyev v. Russia, Akayeva v. Russia,22 Isayeva v.
Russia (No. 57947/00), Yusupova v. Russia, Bazayeva
v. Russia,23 and Isayeva v. Russia (No. 57950/00).24
It is, if anything, this concern over the application of
the human rights norms to military operations that
has caused the greater attention to investigations

172
being undertaken in respect of deaths arising from
such operations in Iraq. It brings into sharp focus
the second point, which is the application of human
rights law in situations of armed conflict and the
relationship between human rights law and the law of
armed conflict. Again, there is a difference between the
European and American positions, though here it may
more be a matter of emphasis rather than substance.
What seems to be agreed is that the law of armed
conflict is the lex specialis in time of armed conflict.
There is clear authority for this from the International
Court of Justice25 and it does not appear to be in dispute.
What is in dispute is what this means. The U.S. position
is linked to its earlier position on extraterritoriality:
In armed conflict, the law of armed conflict prevails
and overrides human rights law to the extent that the
latter is almost de minimis. To the Europeans, while it is
accepted that the law of armed conflict is the primary
law applicable in conflict situations, the coexistence of
human rights law is considered a given. This is again
based on the slightly different language between the
International Covenant and the European Convention.
While the International Covenant has no direct
reference to war or armed conflict, the European
Convention does. Thus Article 15, the derogation clause
of the Convention, makes a number of references. It
states:

Article 15Derogation in Time of Emergency. (Emphasis

added)

1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening

the life of the nation, any High Contracting Party
may take measures derogating from its obligations
under this Convention to the extent strictly required
by the exigencies of the situation, provided that
such measures are not inconsistent with its other
obligations under international law.

173
 2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of
deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from
Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under
this provision.
3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this
right of derogation shall keep the Secretary General of
the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures
which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall
also inform the Secretary General of the Council of
Europe when such measures have ceased to operate
and the provisions of the Convention are again being
fully executed.

What is important to note is that death caused by

lawful acts of war requires a derogation. Furthermore,
it is for the Court itself to decide whether the measures
taken in derogation are to the extent strictly required
by the exigencies of the situation. The Convention
clearly envisages that it will continue to apply in time
of war, though subject to such derogations as the Court
may approve. There is no reference in the Courts
jurisprudence directly to the law of armed conflict as lex
specialis, though it is to be anticipated that, where there
was a clear divide between the two bodies of law, the
Court would indeed apply the lex specialis argument.
However, it is notable that in the Chechnyen cases
mentioned above, there is no mention of the law of
armed conflict, and the cases were decided wholly on
human rights law arguments. There was no derogation
there, but there is clearly the risk of a collision between
the two legal systems if the Court is not careful. In
those particular cases, the result probably would have
been the same under either legal system. However,
in the Bankovi case, involving the attack on the TV
station in Belgrade during the Kosovo campaign, it
was argued that the deaths of the civilians in the attack
were a breach of the right to life in Article 2 of the

174
Convention. Could the respondent states have argued
that these were deaths resulting from lawful acts of
war without invoking a derogation? If not, would
those States be limited to arguing the issue purely on
human rights grounds?
The danger here lies in the fact that the law of
armed conflict is exactly that: the law of armed conflict.
It recognizes the reality of armed conflict and has
developed in a pragmatic way balancing the needs of
the military with humanitarian considerations. That
fine balance does not appear in human rights law,
which is designed fundamentally for times of peace.
The relationship between the two legal frameworks
is going to be the challenge of the next generation. To
maintain a position that, in armed conflict, human
rights law is replaced by the law of armed conflict
is simply not an option for the European states and
is likely to be seen as a step backwards by many
states racked by internal conflict. However, to permit
human rights law to dominate in an area where its
requirements have not been crafted to take into account
the realities of the situation may in turn lead to the
ridicule of the law. As human rights law in principle
governs the behaviour of states towards those within
their jurisdiction, it is an attractive weapon for nonstate
actors to use in propaganda campaigns. It is perhaps
the classic example of lawfare. However, if a conflict
arises between human rights law and the law of armed
conflict, giving primacy to human rights law will not
be in anybodys interestsleast of all the victims of
war who will again fall prey to new legal uncertainty.

The Law of Armed Conflict.

However, even if we accept the argument that the lex

specialis is applicable, that does not decide the problem,

175
as it remains to be decided exactly what makes up that
lex specialis: the law of armed conflict. While this is a
large subject on which books have been written, I wish
to limit my examination of this to one area where,
again, an apparent divide has developed between the
United States and Europe. That relates to Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 drafted
in 1977.26 This treaty, drafted in the aftermath of the
Vietnam War, always was controversial. It contained
elements within it that caused considerable concern to
Western nations, particularly the extension of the law
relating to international armed conflict to conflicts in
which:

. . . peoples are fighting against colonial domination

and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the
exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined
in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations.27

This and other provisions relating to the principle of

distinction led Douglas Feith to describe it as Law in
the Service of Terror.28 It was thus no surprise that
President Ronald Reagan in his Letter of Transmittal to
the Senate on January 29, 198729 declined to recommend
that the Senate grant advice and consent to Additional
Protocol I, describing the protocol as fundamentally
and irreconcilably flawed.30
However, that was not his sole comment. The
Protocol itself contains 102 articles, many of which
codify existing customary international law and many
others of which, while perhaps creating new law, were
inserted with the active encouragement of the United
States delegation.31 President Reagan thus also referred

176
to the Protocol as containing certain sound elements
and to the positive provisions of Protocol I that could
be of real humanitarian benefit if generally observed
by parties to international armed conflicts. He went
on to state:

We are therefore in the process of consulting with our

allies to develop appropriate methods for incorporating
these positive provisions into the rules that govern our
military operations, and as customary international law.
I will advise the Senate of the results of this initiative as
soon as it is possible to do so.32

This was a sensible approach, and one that

reflected actual practice. For several years, North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) lawyers had
been meeting on a regular basis discussing how best
to handle interoperability issues arising from the
ratification or otherwise by NATO States of Additional
Protocol I. In fact, there were few issues that caused
any serious concern and, while there may have been
minor differences of interpretation, the fundamental
principles that underlay much of Protocol I were
unchallenged. In 1986, speaking at a Washington
College of Law Conference, Michael Matheson, then
Deputy Legal Adviser at the Department of State, had
laid out what was considered to be the official U.S.
position on Additional Protocol I. That speech was
turned into an article33 and has been cited frequently all
over the world, including in U.S. military manuals.34 It
always has been the document to which other Coalition
militaries have turned when seeking to ascertain the
U.S. position. However, all has now changed and
current United States thinking threatens to throw out
the baby with the bath water.

177
 In 2005, the Operational Law Handbook issued by
the Judge Advocate Generals Corps as guidance to its
officers contained reference to the Matheson article.35
However, an Errata Sheet quickly was issued,
stating, in relation to the citation, Information was
taken from an Article written by Michael Matheson in
1986. It takes an overly broad view of the U.S. position
and, as a result, may cause some confusion as to U.S.
Policy.36
This creates confusion as it is now impossible to
find any official source which clearly lays down what
is the U.S. position. Arguments rage, even over such
basic issues as the definition of military objective in
Article 52 (2) and, in particular, as to the customary
law status of Article 75, which lays out fundamental
guaranteesa baseline for treatment of detainees. The
current U.S. State Department Legal Adviser, John
Bellinger, speaking at Chatham House in London, in
February 2006, is reported as saying:

We have said that thats customary international law in

the past, we are looking at whether thats appropriate,
and we havent said that it isnt, but we have not yet said
that it is, because this really is in that regarddealing
with people whose whole aim in life is to kill civilians
is sort of a different situation.37

This creates serious interoperability problems on

the ground. How is it possible for Allied Forces to hand
detainees over to American custody if it is unclear as
to whether they will even be granted the most basic
guarantees granted under the law of armed conflict?
This is but one example of where such uncertainty
exists and is beginning to prove a serious difficulty. In
turn, it raises perhaps the most fundamental issue of
all: the nature of conflict.

178
The Global War on Terror.

When President Bush announced We are at war,

he touched a chord with the American people. After
all, the United States had just suffered the first major
attack on its continental territory since the Civil War.
However, in Europe, terrorism was a problem that had
existed for many decades. Throughout that period, the
authorities resolutely had refused to treat terrorism
other than as a domestic law matter. In Northern
Ireland, through almost 30 years of insurgency, the
United Kingdom had insisted that the situation did
not reach the international law definition of armed
conflict. The point was made firmly when the United
Kingdom ratified the Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions. One of the statements of understanding
made on ratification read: It is the understanding of
the United Kingdom that the term armed conflict of
itself and in its context denotes a situation of a kind
which is not constituted by the commission of ordinary
crimes, including acts of terrorism, whether concerted
or in isolation.38
Spain, Germany, Italy, and other countries faced
similar problems and took a similar line. Terrorists were
criminals. However, this of itself caused difficulties.
As with organized crime, terrorists were adept at
using the criminal process to their advantage, and it
was found necessary to introduce special provisions
to counter this. In Northern Ireland, intimidation
of juries led to the introduction of Diplock courts,
where specialist judges heard criminal cases sitting
alone without juries. While this might seem to offend
the common law principle of trial by ones peers, it
caused no ruffled feathers in continental Europe, where
professional judges had long been the deciders of both

179
issues of fact and law. Other evidential provisions
were also introduced to ensure that the balance was
not tilted too far towards the accused.
It should be noted that the countries that introduced
these specialist provisions were all subject to the
European Convention on Human Rights and, while in
some cases, partial derogation was required, there was
little challenge. The balance between the rights of the
individual and the rights of society was maintained.
However, from the start, the Bush administration
made it clear that war was no political statement.
This was war in every sense of the word, and
terrorists would be hunted down and killed as enemy
combatants. Of course, if captured, they would be
subject where appropriate to trial, but even those trials
would take wartime form in the shape of Military
Commissions, and detention would not be subject to
the usual domestic law controls.
While this may have seemed a logical position,
it created legal difficulties. Under the law of armed
conflict, there are two types of armed conflict:
international and non-international armed conflict.
Each is defined in the Geneva Conventions. In the
case of international armed conflict, the definition is
. . . all cases of declared war or of any other armed
conflict which may arise between two or more of the
High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is
not recognized by one of them.39 Similarly, Common
Article 3 is applicable . . . in the case of armed conflict
not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.40
The war against Afghanistan seems to fit into
the first category, international armed conflict, and
so far as Europe is concerned, it did. However, the
administration saw it differently. The Presidential

180
Memorandum of February 7, 200241 makes it clear
that, in the view of the administration, there were
two conflicts (at least) going on in Afghanistan. First,
there was the conflict with the Taliban which, with
some reluctance, the President accepted as a Geneva
conflict. However, he determined that none of the
provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al-
Qaida in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the
world. So what is this conflict with al-Qaida?
Clearly al-Qaida is not a state, and so this is not
an international armed conflict within the terms of
Common Article 2. However, similarly, it is not a
conflict limited to the territory of a High Contracting
Party within the terms of Common Article 3, and so it
would appear that the President is right. This is not a
Geneva conflict. But then what is it? The President
elsewhere in the memorandum stated that the war
against terrorism ushers in a new paradigm. If it is
indeed a war within the legal meaning of the term, that
would appear to be correct. It is a war in which there
are no written rules, in which there is no reciprocity
and to which none of the normal conventions apply.
It is this, perhaps more than anything else, that
has concerned Europe. There is an understandable
reluctance to create a legal black holeand this is
precisely how the war on terror is seen. This perception
is not helped by the failure of the United States to
outline any coherent view as to what law does apply.
In the same way as with the law of armed conflict in
general, there seems to be a reluctance to commit to
any particular view. Perhaps understandably, there is
a feeling that, in a new paradigm, it is safer to keep
ones options open. However, this does nothing for
legal certainty.

181
Conclusion.

Can this divide be bridged? I believe that it can. In

many ways, 9/11 was a classic military operation. Just
as a military commander looks for the weak spot in
the enemy line, often a boundary between formations,
so al-Qaida struck at the dividing line between law
enforcement and armed conflict. Catastrophic
terrorism, as it is sometimes called, places severe
pressure on law enforcement mechanisms. However,
the nature of terrorist activity also threatens the
cohesiveness of the law of armed conflict as a legal
framework. It therefore poses a challenge for both
domestic and international lawyers.
At present, there is too great a divide between law
enforcementwhere force may only be used where
absolutely necessary, and human rights bind only the
state to the advantage of the individualand armed
conflictwhere the use of force is governed by the
nature of the target, and participants are treated as
equals, subject to similar rights and responsibilities.
Terrorism is a method of warfare, thoughin most
casesan illegitimate one. However, terrorism is also
a criminal act, which can be committed outside armed
conflict. Put another way, not every act of terrorism is
an act of war. What is required is a more coherent legal
approach to acts of terrorism to avoid the stark divide
between domestic and international legal regimes. At
present, the use of ordinary criminal processes to deal
with battlefield situations is putting an immense
strain on domestic criminal law as is apparent from
efforts to prosecute insurgents in Iraq and elsewhere.
On the other hand, the use of selective law of armed
conflict provisions to replace inconvenient domestic
provisions equally casts doubt on the more general

182
applicability of those provisions. The only victors will
be the terrorists themselves who will play the two
frameworks off against each otherwith the unwitting
help of the lawyers.
A coherent approach will not be easy to devise. It
will involve an acceptance that catastrophic terrorism
does indeed pose a major challenge and needs to be
confronted. This may mean, in the domestic field,
recognition that human rights no longer can be seen
solely in terms of the rights of the individual set against
the power of the State. The rights of the individual
now need to be viewed in the light of the rights of the
majority, particularly the right to security. This may
require a revision of some of the interpretations of
human rights conventions which have been acceptable
in the past.
Similarly, those involved in the application of the
law of armed conflict must test their own interpretations
against the new reality. In conflicts where the majority
of participants do not meet the traditional definition
of combatant, is it any longer realistic to insist that
they are civilians and are thus entitled to the same
protections as all other civiliansexcept that they can
be prosecuted for their conduct? As we have seen,
criminal prosecution based on evidence gathered on
the battlefield may not be a feasible option.
One thing is clearthis is not a matter that can be
subject to unilateral decision. There must be a universal
response to a universal problem. National solutions,
particularly those ostensibly based on international
law, simply will complicate an already serious situation.
The challenge that we all face is one of collaboration.
In this, it is indeed correct to say that if we do not hang
together, we will hang separately.

183
ENDNOTES - GARRAWAY

1. Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, Policy Review, No.

113, June/July 2002, accessed at www.policyreview.org/jun02/kagan.
html.
2. Jeffrey Kopstein, The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy
Promotion, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2006, p. 85.
3. See President Sworn-In to Second Term, accessed at White
House web site, www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural/.
4. Charles Garraway, Interoperability and the Atlantic
DivideA Bridge Over Troubled Waters, Israel Yearbook on
Human Rights, Vol. 34, 2004, p. 105.
5. Ibid, p. 125.
6. Brigadier General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Air Combat
Command Staff Judge Advocate, The Law of Armed Conflict,
Air & Space Conference and Technology Exposition 2005,
September 13, 2005, accessed at www.afa.org/Media/scripts/Dunlap_
conf2005.asp.
7. For a slightly different slant on the same issue, see Douglas
Edlin, The Anxiety of Sovereignty: Britain, The United States,
and the International Criminal Court, in Jeffrey McCausland
and Douglas Stuart, eds., U.S.UK Relations at the Start of the 21st
Century, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, January 2006, p. 55.
8. The full statute can be accessed on the ICC website at www.
icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_120704_EN.pdf.
9. See State Department Press Statement, May 6, 2002,
International Criminal Court: Letter to UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan, accessed at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm.
10. Hansard, House of Lords, Vol. 673, Part. 33, Col. 1220,
July 14, 2005, Armed Forces: Chain of Command, accessed at
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldhansrd/vo050714/
text/50714-04.htm#50714-04_head3.
11. See statement by Robin Cook, Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, during the Second Reading
Debate on the International Criminal Court Bill, 3 April 2001,
Hansard, House of Commons, Vol.366, Pt.65, Col.222, accessed
at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmhansrd/vo010403/
debtext/10403-17.htm.

184
 12. See International Criminal Court Act 2001 and International
Criminal Court (Scotland) Act 2001.
13. Article 2(1), International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, adopted by U.N.G.A Res. 2200A (XXI), December 16,
1966, accessed at www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm.
14. See the Reply of the Government of the United States of
America to the Report of the Five UNCHR (sic) Special Rapporteurs
on Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, March 10, 2006, pp. 25-
30, accessed at asil.org/pdfs/ilib0603212.pdf.
15. Michael J. Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties
Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military
Occupation, Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion on Construction of
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 99, No. 1, January 2005, p. 119.
16. General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States parties to the Covenant, May
26, 2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, accessed at
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CCPR.C.21.Rev.1.Add.13.
En?Opendocument.
17. See Article 1, Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, November 4, 1950, accessed
at conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/Word/005.doc.
18. Bankovi and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting
States, European Court of Human Rights, Vol. 123, International
Law Reports, No. 94, 2003.
19. Ibid, p. 113.
20. Ocalan v Turkey, 41, European Human Rights Reports, Vol.
985, 2005, p. 988.
21. See R (on the application of Al-Skeini and others) v.
Secretary of State for Defence, 2005, All ER (D) 337 (December).
22. The judgment of the European Court of Human
Rights in Khashiyev and Akayeva can be accessed at
cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&
action=html&highlight=Khashiyev%20%7C%20Russia%
20%7C%2057942/00&sessionid=7363474&skin=hudoc-en.
23. The judgment of the European Court of Human
Rights in Yusopova, Basayeva and the first Isayeva case, can
be accessed at cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=

185
hbkm&action=html&highlight=Isayeva%20%7C%
20Russia%20%7C%2057947/00&sessionid=7363554&skin=hudoc-
en.
24. The judgment of the European Court of Human
Rights in the second Isayeva case can be accessed at
cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=
hbkm&action=html&highlight=Isayeva%20%7C%
20Russia%20%7C%2057950/00&sessionid=7369028&skin=hudoc-en.
25. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons, International Court of Justice, Advisory
Opinion of July 8, 1996, 110 International Law Reports p. 163, and
Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, International
Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion of July 9, 2004, accessed at
www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm.
26. Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
reprinted in Documents on the Law of War, Adam Roberts and
Richard Guelff, eds., 3d. ed. 2000, p. 422.
27. Ibid, Article 1(4).
28. Douglas J. Feith, Law in the Service of TerrorThe Strange
Case of the Additional Protocol, The National Interest, Fall 1985,
p. 36.
29. Printed in Agora: The U.S. Decision not to Ratify Protocol
I to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims,
The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 910, p. 81.
30. Ibid., p. 911.
31. A clear example is Article 36 on weapons reviews, a practice
in which the United States has led since the early 1970s.
32. Agora, pp. 911-912.
33 . See The Sixth Annual American Red CrossWashington
College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law:
A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977
Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Session
One: The United States Position on the Relation of Customary
International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, Remarks of Michael J. Matheson, American
University Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 2, p. 415.

186
 34. See, for example, Annotated Supplement to the
Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, Ralph
Thomas and James Duncan, eds., International Law Studies, Vol. 73,
U.S. Naval War College, 1999 p. 404.
35. Operational Law Handbook, published by the Inter-
national and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate
Generals Legal Center and School, U.S. Army, 2005 version, p.
15.
36. Errata Sheet, 2005 Operational Law Handbook, September 27,
2004.
37. See Anthony Dworkin, Crimes of War Project, United
States is Looking at the Place of Fundamental Guarantees in the
War on Terror, accessed at www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-
guarantees.html.
38. See Roberts and Guelff, footnote 26, p. 510.
39. Common Article 2 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, see
Ibid., pp. 198, 222, 244, and 301.
40. Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, see
Ibid., pp.198, 223, 245, and 302.
41. White House Memo, Humane Treatment of al-Qaida
and Taliban Detainees, February 7, 2002; Karen Greenberg and
Joshua Dratel, Eds., The Torture PapersThe Road to Abu Ghraib,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 134.

187
 CONCLUSION

The then-anonymous author of Through Our

Enemies Eyes wrote in 2002 about the threat posed by
not recognizing with whom the United States was at
war. He used an engaging movie excerpt to make his
point:

In the wonderfully entertaining 1940 Warner Brothers

swashbuckler titled The Sea Hawk, Queen Elizabeth I,
played by the inestimable Flora Robson, angrily convokes
her courageous, dashing, and exceptionally handsome
band of privateersknown collectively in the movie as
the Sea Hawksfor having had the temerity to sink
in the English Channel a Spanish galleon carrying the
new ambassador of Spain to her court. With the recently
rescued, and presumably still soggy, Spanish ambassador
looking on, the queen addresses herself to Captain
Geoffrey Thorpeplayed by the equally inestimable
Errol Flynnwho is the leader of the Sea Hawks, the
queens favorite, and the sinker of said galleon. Do
you imagine, Captain Thorpe, that we are at war with
Spain? the queen thunders. Thorpe, with due respect
for his sovereign, responds firmly: Madam, Spain is at
war with the world. Flash ahead 60 years and a similar
question posed by any national leader in Christendom
might accurately earn the response: Madam (or Sir),
Osama bin Laden is at war with the Christian world.

If the exchanges above are reimagined to focus on Osama

bin Laden, they would have little entertainment value,
but their resulting unsubtle messagesthat bin Laden
has been at war with Christendom, and has longed
to see a world map that is simply a map of the House
Islamshould be taken with deadly seriousness. Bin
Laden has declared war on the United States, the leader
of invading, barbarous Crusaders, and intends there to
be a struggle to the death against the United States.1

189
 More well-known philosophers on warSun Tzu
and Clausewitz among themhave extolled the virtue
of knowing ones enemies and of knowing the type of
conflict in which a state is engaged. Even more basic
than that is the idea that a nation must know it is at war
before it can craft a strategy to succeed in it. Evidence
observed and presented by the panelists at the
Seventeenth Annual U.S. Army War College Strategy
Conference suggests that the Nation is at war, but that
various parts of the government and the public do not
appear to understand that. Some of that stems from
confusion about just what constitutes a war against
terrorists, and how the norms of law and custom must
adapt to reflect the peculiar nature of such a war.
Another part of the problem is that the comparison
is made against the outdated model of World War
II, not the more appropriate model of the Cold War.
Unlike the major combat of both World Wars, the
long war of the Global War on Terrorism does not
necessarily require the full mobilization of the country.
The countrys leaders must take the necessary steps to
ensure that all understand clearly that the Nation is at
war and should be able to justify that in the court
of international law. Those same leaders then must
mobilize selectively the parts of the Nation, both the
government and the public, that are needed to win the
war. Those parts will not be simply the military arm
of the government; all the tools of national power
diplomatic, informational, economic and military
must be utilized. Full mobilizationas in World War
IImay not be necessary, but the government agencies
involved must fully understand and vigorously execute
their responsibilities. If not, they place the Nation at
unnecessary strategic risk.

190
ENDNOTES - CONCLUSION

1. Anonymous, Through Our Enemies Eyes: Osama bin Laden,

Radical Islam, and the Future of America, Washington, DC: Brasseys,
Inc., 2002, pp. 227-228.

191
 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE EDITOR

JOHN R. MARTIN is Visiting Professor of National

Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute at the
U.S. Army War College. During a career of over 30 years
in the Army, Colonel (Retired) Martin served in a great
variety of positions, including tactically in Infantry and
Aviation, technically as an experimental test pilot, and
strategically and operationally in numerous overseas
deployments (including tours in Korea and operational
deployments to Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and
Iraq). Colonel (Retired) Martin also has extensive
experience at the Army Staff, where he served as
Systems Integrator for the RAH-66 Comanche and as
Chief of the U.S. Army Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations, Force Structure Division, and
the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,
Plans Division. In a previous assignment (from 2000
to 2004) to the Strategic Studies Institute, Colonel
(Retired) Martin was concurrently the Chairman of
the Art of War Department and the Deputy Director
of the Institute. His current research focuses on post-
hostilities operations and training of indigenous
security forces in counterinsurgency. Colonel (Retired)
Martin is a 1974 graduate of the United States Military
Academy and graduated with highest distinction from
the College of Naval Command and Staff in 1988. He is
also a 1996 graduate of the National War College.

193
 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES
BY PANEL AND EVENT

Panel IThe Homeland Security Context.

TED GONG is the senior executive-ranked Foreign

Service Officer assigned to work at the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) on immigration issues
as the Senior Advisor in the Office of the Citizenship
and Immigration Service (CIS) Ombudsman. He was
involved in planning for temporary guest worker
programs and the transformation of the CIS operation,
among other issues. Prior to this assignment, he
worked as the Senior Policy Advisor in the DHS Office
of International Affairs responsible for the Asia-Pacific
region and border security and migration issues,
as well as participating in the U.S.-Mexico bilateral
working group on the implementation of US-VISIT,
biometrics, and electronic visa processing. Within the
State Department, his foreign service assignments have
focused on consular, refugee, and visa issues. He has
had assignments as the director of consular programs
in Guangzhou, Sydney, Manila, and Taipei and has
been assigned to various positions in Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and Washington, DC, which included being
responsible for management oversight of consular/
visa posts in the Middle East, South Asia, and East
Asia/Pacific regions.

DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU is the President

of the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), a Washington-
based think tank dedicated exclusively to the study
of international migration. He is also the convener of
the Athens Migration Policy Initiative (AMPI), a task
force of mostly European senior immigration experts

194
that advises European Union member states on
immigration and asylum issues, and the Co-Founder
and International Chair Emeritus of Metropolis:
An International Forum for Research and Policy on
Migration and Cities. He has held a wide range of
senior positions that include Chair of the Migration
Committee of the Paris-based Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD);
Director for Immigration Policy and Research at the
U.S. Department of Labor and Chair of the Secretary of
Labors Immigration Policy Task Force; and Executive
Editor of the International Migration Review. Dr.
Papademetriou has published more than 200 books,
articles, monographs and research reports on
migration topics and advises senior government and
political party officials in more than 20 countries. His
most recent books include Secure Borders, Open Doors:
Visa Procedures in the Post-September 11 Era (co-author,
2005); NAFTAs Promise and Reality (co-author, 2003);
Americas Challenge: Domestic Security, Civil Liberties,
and National Unity after September 11 (co-author, 2003);
and Caught in the Middle: Border Communities in an Era
of Globalization (senior editor and co-author, 2001). Dr.
Papademetriou received his Ph.D. in Comparative
Public Policy and International Relations in 1976,
and has taught at the universities of Maryland, Duke,
American, and New School for Social Research.

MARK KRIKORIAN is Executive Director of the Center

for Immigration Studies, a nonprofit, nonpartisan
research organization in Washington, DC, which
examines and critiques the impact of immigration
on the United States. The Center is animated by a
pro-immigrant, low-immigration vision which seeks
fewer immigrants but a warmer welcome for those
admitted. Mr. Krikorian frequently testifies before

195
Congress and has published articles in The Washington
Post, the New York Times, and National Review; and has
appeared on 60 Minutes, Nightline, the NewsHour with
Jim Lehrer, CNN, National Public Radio, and on many
other television and radio programs. Before joining the
Center in February 1995, he held a variety of editorial
and writing positions. His publications includeThe
Open Door: How Militant Islamic Terrorists Entered and
Remained in the United States (1993-2001); and Falling
Behind on Security: Implementation of the Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002. Mr. Krikorian
holds a masters degree from the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy and a bachelors degree from
Georgetown University, and spent 2 years at Yerevan
State University in then-Soviet Armenia.

SUSAN SIM has been the Deputy Chief of Mission

at the Singapore Embassy in Washington, DC, since
August 2003. She was previously the Indonesia Bureau
Chief of The Straits Times, based in Jakarta, Indonesia,
from August 1996 to the end of 2001. She has also been
a Police Inspector and Head of Research and Policy
Analysis at the Ministry of Home Affairs in Singapore.
Ms. Sim graduated with a B.A. Honours degree in
Politics, Philosophy, and Economics from Oxford
University, United Kingdom, in 1986. An MA (Oxon)
was conferred in 1992.

ELAINE DEZENSKI recently completed nearly four

years of service with the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). Most recently, she served as the Acting
Assistant Secretary for Policy Development within the
newly-created DHS Office of Policy. She played a major
role in the creation and structuring of this new entity,
including expansion and integration of this office and
its functions within DHS. She advised DHS leadership

196
on border and transportation security, immigration
policy, preparedness, information-sharing, screening
coordination, and other key security areas; and routinely
testified before Congress on a range of security policy
issues. Prior to this position, Ms. Dezenski served as
Acting Assistant Secretary for Policy and Planning
within the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security.
As Acting Assistant Secretary, she was the principal
policy advisor to the Under Secretary for Border and
Transportation Security, including immigration and
customs inspections and investigations, cargo and trade
policy, transportation security, counter narcotics, and
federal law enforcement training. Ms. Dezenski also
represented the department before public and private
sector organizations and serves on official government
policy review boards and working groups. Before
joining DHS, Ms. Dezenski was Special Assistant to the
Administrator of the Federal Transit Administration
(FTA). She was selected as a Brookings Institution
LEGIS Fellow during her tenure at FTA and served in
the office of Congressman Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY).
Ms. Dezenski began her professional career with the
transportation division of Siemens Corporation. In the
June 2004 edition of Air Cargo World, Ms. Dezenski
was chosen as one of the air cargo industrys top 15
most influential leaders. She was awarded the 2005
Leadership Award from the Air Forwarders Association
in recognition of her contributions to cargo security. She
currently serves on the National Board of the Womens
Transportation Seminar, a nonprofit organization
dedicated to advancing women in transportation. Ms.
Dezenski holds a Masters Degree in public policy
from Georgetown University and a Bachelors degree
in international relations from Wheaton College in
Norton, Massachusetts.

197
Panel IIThe International Context.

JOHN AGOGLIA is the Director of the U.S. Army's

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
(PKSOI) at Carlisle, PA. He joined the Institute in the
summer of 2004 after having served 3 years at U.S.
Central Command. He arrived at CENTCOM from
an assignment in Japan 4 weeks before September 11,
2001. Colonel Agoglia was involved in developing the
U.S. Central Command plans for Afghanistan and the
Global War on Terrorism. He was part of the planning
group that initiated the campaign plan for Iraq. He
accompanied Ambassador Bremer into Baghdad in
May 2003 as his CENTCOM liaison officer and worked
the integration of the planning efforts between the CPA
and the military; the hand-off of the police training
from the CPA to CJTF-7; and the initial engagement
strategy for senior military commanders with the
newly-appointed interim Iraqi Government leaders.

CHRISTIAN DELANGHE is a Saint-Cyr graduate

from the 1963-65 class. After graduation from the
Artillery School in Chlons-sur-Marne, he served in a
number of positions in several Air Defense units. He
also served in the Chief of Defense Joint Staff in Paris
as analyst officer in the Military Intelligence Agency
(1982-85), and Chief of operation division(1991-
95), where he was promoted to Brigadier General in
1993. Lieutenant General (ret) Delanghes command
experienceincludes service with the 51st Air Defense
Regiment (Roland-Mistral) in Wittlich, Germany (1987-
90), as Chief of Staff of the III Corps in Lille (1995-96), as
2nd Armored Division Commander in Versailles (1996-
97), as Multinational Division South-East Commander
in Bosnia (1997-98), and as the Training and Doctrine

198
Commanding General in Paris (1998-2000). Since his
retirement in early 2001, he contributes to the U.S.
Center For Research and Education on Strategy and
Technology activities in Arlington, Virginia, and is
Vice President of the Marechal Leclerc Foundation
in Paris, France. Lieutenant General (ret) Delanghe is
a graduate of the Universities of Rennes and Reims,
the Junior Command and Staff Course in Paris, the
U.S. Air Defense Advanced Course in Fort Bliss, the
Senior Command and War College in Paris, the Center
for Higher Military Studies and the National Defense
Institute in Paris.

PETER MANSOOR commanded the 1st Brigade

Combat Team, 1st Armored Division in Iraq, where his
unit was responsible for the security and stability of
eastern Baghdad. He has extensive expertise in military
history, Iraq, U.S. Army, national security, and stability
and reconstruction operations. He commanded the 1st
Brigade, 1st Armored Division in Iraq and Germany, to
include 13 months in combat in support of Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM (July 2003-June 2004). He served as
G-3 (Operations, Plans, and Training Officer) of the
4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, Texas,
during a period which included multiple deployments
in support of homeland defense in the wake of terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001 (2001-02); commanded
the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, to include a deployment
to Kuwait in support of Operation DESERT SPRING,
and two counterdrug deployments along the U.S.-
Mexican border in support of Joint Task Force 6 (1999-
2001); and served on the Joint Staff as the Special
Assistant to the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy
(J-5). Colonel Mansoors publications include The GI
Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry

199
Divisions, 19411945 (University Press of Kansas, 2002).
Colonel Mansoor received a B.S. degree from the U.S.
Military Academy in 1982, an M.A. and doctorate in
military history from The Ohio State University, and a
Master of Strategic Studies degree from the U.S. Army
War College.

SEBESTYEN L. V. GORKA is the Director of the Institute

for Transitional Democracy and International Security.
Following the fall of communism in Hungary, he
moved to Budapest to take up a policy position in the
Defense Ministry of the first newly-elected democratic
government. Since then, he has been an International
Research Fellow at the NATO Defense College in
Rome, a Fellow at Harvard Universitys Kennedy
School of Government, and a policy analyst with the
RAND Corporation in Washington, DC. In addition to
running the institute, he is also a nonresident fellow of
the Terrorism Reseach Center in Virginia and member of
the U.S. Council for Emerging National Security Affairs.
In the past he has acted as an ambassadorial briefer for
the U.S. Department of State. He has published more
than 60 articles and monographs internationally on the
topics of terrorism, Central European military reform,
Russia and the Newly Independent States, biological
terrorism, and organized crime, in publications such
as the NATO Review, the Harvard International Review,
the World Policy Journal, the Washington Times, Nature
and Defense News. Mr. Gorka was awarded the State
Secretary and Deputy State Secretary awards for work
executed in the field of defense diplomacy, and is an
alumnus of the Salzburg Seminar and the U.S. Atlantic
Council. He received his education in the United
Kingdom.

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FRANCISCO JAVIER FLORES-HERNANDEZ is a
Lieutenant Colonel in the El Salvadoran Army and was
an International Fellow in the U.S. Army War College
Class of 2006. Previously he served as an operations
officer, Cuscatain Battalion, in Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM. He is a 2004 graduate of the U.S. Naval
Post Graduate School and of several other military
service schools. Lieutenant Colonel Flores-Hernandez
has been awarded the Gold Cross; the Gold Medal OIF;
and the United Nations Medal, Coalition Forces OIF.
He is the author of The Salvadoran and Honduran
Conflict, Magazine of the CODEM, 2000.

Panel IIIThe Domestic Context.

JAMES JAY CARAFANO is the Senior Fellow for

National Security and Homeland Security in the Kathryn
and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies, The Heritage Foundation. He has been an
assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy in West
Point, New York, and served as Director of Military
Studies at the Army's Center of Military History. He
also taught at Mount Saint Mary College and was a
fleet professor at the U.S. Naval War College. He is a
visiting professor at the National Defense University
and Georgetown University. Dr. Carafano is a member
of the National Research Council's Committee on
Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security,
the National Defense Transportation Association's
Security Practices Committee, and is a Senior Fellow at
the George Washington University Homeland Security
Policy Institute. He is the coauthor of Winning the Long
War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism
and Preserving Freedom (Heritage Books, 2005). As an

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expert on defense and security issues, he has testified
before the U.S. Congress and has provided commentary
for ABC, BBC, CBS, CNBC, CNN, C-SPAN, Fox
News, MSNBC, NBC, SkyNews, National Public
Radio, and The History Channel. He served 25 years
in the Army, rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel,
and served in Europe, Korea, and the United States.
Before retiring, he was executive editor of Joint Force
Quarterly. His editorials have appeared in USA Today,
The Washington Times, The Baltimore Sun, The New York
Post, and The Boston Globe. He was also the principal
author of the budget analysis in the 2003 Independent
Task Force Report, Emergency Responders: Drastically
Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared. His works
on military history include Waltzing Into the Cold War,
After D-Day, and Made in America: Technology and GI
Ingenuity on the Battlefields of Normandy, forthcoming
from Praeger (2006). A graduate of West Point, Dr.
Carafano also has a master's degree and a doctorate
from Georgetown University and a master's degree in
strategy from the U.S. Army War College.

WILLIAM T. NESBITT, Director, National Guard

Bureau-J3, is the Assistant Adjutant General-Army and
also serves as the Commander of the Georgia Army
National Guard. Brigadier General Nesbitts military
career began in February 1966 when he was drafted
into the U.S. Army. He completed basic training at Fort
Benning, Georgia, and Infantry Advanced Individual
Training at Fort Ord, California. He was commissioned
a second lieutenant of Infantry in January 1967 after
completion of Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning.
Following completion of the U.S. Army Special Forces
Officers Course at Ft Bragg, North Carolina, he was
assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in

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the Republic of Vietnam. General Nesbitt entered the
Georgia Army National Guard in June 1973. Prior to his
current assignment, he was assigned as Commander
of the 48th Brigade (Rear). As Acting Commander, he
was responsible for the readiness and training of the
portion of the brigade that did not deploy to Bosnia.
Previously, Brigadier General Nesbitt served as Chief of
Staff, Headquarters, Georgia Army National Guard.

MICHAEL SQUIER assumed duties as the Deputy

Director, Army National Guard, National Guard
Bureau, Washington, DC, in March 1998 and served
there until his retirement. Prior to this assignment,
he served in various positions at National Guard
Bureau, including Chief of Staff, Army National
Guard; Executive Officer to the Chief, National Guard
Bureau; Chief, Readiness Division; and Deputy Chief,
Public Affairs. He enlisted in the Idaho Army National
Guard in August 1963. Brigadier General Squier was
commissioned through the Infantry Officer Candidate
School in August 1965. As a young officer, he served
at the state level in a variety of command and staff
positions in the 116th Ordnance Company and the
Idaho State Military Academy, culminating in the
positions of Company Commander and Commandant
respectively. In September 1978, Brigadier General
Squier was assigned to National Guard Bureau where,
as a Major, he served in various positions of the
Mobilization Readiness Division, ultimately serving
4 years as Assistant Executive to the Chief, National
Guard Bureau. In 1987, he assumed command of the
145th Support Battalion, 116th Cavalry Brigade, Idaho
National Guard. His last State assignment before
returning to National Guard Bureau was his second
command assignment, battalion-level command at The
Equipment Maintenance Center in Europe.

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DAVE BURFORD began his current assignment as
Assistant to the Director of the Army National Guard
in November 2005. Previously, he served and was
mobilized in the Global War on Terror as the Deputy
Commanding General of the Armys Special Forces
Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where he was
second-in-command of the Armys 9,000-man inventory
of Green Beret soldiers, consisting of seven active duty
and two National Guard Special Forces Groups. During
this time, he was deployed several times to several
combat theaters. For the summer of 2003, General
Burford served as Acting Commanding General of
Special Forces Command (Airborne). His military
service began in 1973 when he was commissioned as a
Field Artillery officer after completing Reserve Officer
Training Corps training as a Distinguished Military
Graduate from Georgia Tech.

Keynote Speaker.

WILLIAM J. PERRY, a senior fellow at the Hoover

Institution, is the Michael and Barbara Berberian
Professor at Stanford University, with a joint
appointment in the School of Engineering and the
Institute for International Studies. He also is co-
director of the Preventive Defense Project, a research
collaboration of Stanford and Harvard Universities.
His previous academic experience includes professor
at Stanford from 1988 to 1993, when he was the co-
director of the Center for International Security and
Arms Control. He also served as a part-time lecturer
in the Department of Mathematics at Santa Clara
University from 1971 to 1977. Dr. Perry was the 19th
U.S. Secretary of Defense, serving from February
1994 to January 1997. His previous government

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experience was as Deputy Secretary of Defense
(199394) and Undersecretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering (197781). His business experience
includes serving as a laboratory director for General
Telephone and Electronics (195464); founding and
serving as the President of ESL (196477); Executive
Vice-President of Hambrecht & Quist (198185); and
founding and serving as the Chairman of Technology
Strategies and Alliances (198593). He serves on the
Board of Directors of Anteon International Corporation
and several emerging high-tech companies and is
Chairman of Global Technology Partners. Dr. Perry is a
member of the National Academy of Engineering and a
fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
From 1946 to 1947, Dr. Perry was an enlisted man in
the Army Corps of Engineers and served in the Army
of Occupation in Japan. He joined the Reserve Officer
Training Corps in 1948 and was a second lieutenant in
the Army Reserve from 1950 to 1955. Dr. Perry received
B.S. and M.S. degrees from Stanford University and a
Ph.D. from Pennsylvania State, all in mathematics.

Panel IVThe Economic Context.

MICHAEL J. FRATANTUONO is Associate Professor

of International Studies, Business and Management
at Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He
has worked as a project manager in the software
development industry. He also has been visiting
professor in the Department of National Security and
Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. Dr. Fratantuono
is interested in international economics, government-
business relations, and U.S. foreign economic policy.
He received the Dickinson Award for Distinguished

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Teaching for 2004-05. Dr. Fratantuono received a B.A.
from Brown University in 1974; an M.A. from the
University of Rhode Island in 1982; and a Ph.D. from
the University of Washington in 1988.

EDWARD M. GRAHAM, senior fellow at the Institute

for International Economics since 1990, has been an
Adjunct Professor at Columbia University in New York
since 1992. Previously he was Associate Professor in the
Fuqua School of Business at Duke University (1988-90),
Associate Professor at the University of North Carolina
(1983-88), Principal Administrator of the Planning and
Evaluation Unit at the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (1981-82), International
Economist in the Office of International Investment
Affairs at the U.S. Treasury (1979-80), and Assistant
Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(1974-78). He is the author, coauthor, or coeditorof
a number of studies, including Does Foreign Direct
Investment Promote Development? (2005);Reforming
Korea's Industrial Conglomerates (2003); Fighting the
Wrong Enemy: Antiglobal Activists and Multinational
Enterprises (2000); Global Competition Policy and
Competition Policies in the Global Economy, with J. David
Richardson (1997); Global Corporations and National
Governments (1996); and Foreign Direct Investment in the
United States, 3d ed., with Paul R. Krugman (1995).

LEIF ROSENBERGER has been the Economic Advisor

at the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) since 1998. Dr.
Rosenberger analyzes the strategy and performance of
43 economies in Asia and the Pacific.In January 2006,
Access Asia of the National Bureau of Asian Research
evaluated the top 141 experts on Asian economies and
selected Dr. Rosenberger as their top-ranking expert.He

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is the author of all but one chapter inVolume1and each
chapter in Volume2 of theAsia Pacific Economic Update
2005, which received the highest 5-star rating from
the Australian National University.Before coming to
PACOM, Dr. Rosenberger worked for 10 years at the
U.S. Army War College, where he held the General
Douglas MacArthur Academic Chair of Research. In
October 1993, Dr. Rosenberger was promoted from
Associate Professor of Economics to full Professor
of Economics at the U.S. Army War College. He also
worked at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S.
Army War College, Central Intelligence Agency, and
the Defense Intelligence Agency. Dr. Rosenberger
currently teaches International Finance and Trade
in the Executive MBA Program at the University
of Hawaii. He spent his sabbatical year of 1997 as a
Visiting Scholar on the Economic Faculty at Harvard
University, funded by a Secretary of the Army
Research and Study Fellowship. He was also a Visiting
Professor of International Relations at Providence
College andtaughtEconomics and Political Science at
Dickinson College. Dr. Rosenberger is a 1989 graduate
of the U.S. Army War College, and received a B.A. with
honors from Harvard University, a Masters Degree
from Boston University, and a Ph.D. from Claremont
Graduate School.

JOHN D. LANGE worked as an economist for the

International Monetary Fund and as Assistant Vice
President of CitiBank. He joined the U.S. Treasury in the
Nixon administration and served there until the end of
the Clinton administration. While in the Department
of the Treasury, Mr. Lange served as Director of
Foreign Exchange Operations, where he managed the
U.S. foreign reserves in support of the dollar. He also

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served with Treasury as the U.S. Chief Negotiator on
official trade finance. Currently, Mr. Lange is Managing
Director of Lange, Mullen, and Bonn, LLC, a firm which
provides strategic and tactical advice and counsel for
international project management, investment, and
foreign exchange strategies.

Panel V: International Law

and National Security Context.

DAVID S. GORDON is a Colonel in the Judge

Advocate Generals Corps, U.S. Army Reserve, and
was mobilized in 2002 for the Global War on Terrorism.
He spent a year in Kabul, Afghanistan, where he
was the senior legal advisor and Rule of Law Officer
for the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation. He was
responsible for synchronizing efforts to bring about
civilian judicial sector reforms and reforms of military
law. He has remained on active duty after returning
from Afghanistan. He is currently assigned to The
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S.
Army War College, with duty at the U.S. Army Civil
Affairs and Psychological Operations Command
(Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where his
primary duty is to develop training and doctrine for
U.S. Army Civil Affairs military lawyers who perform
rule of law missions overseas. Colonel Gordon served
on active duty with the U.S. Army Judge Advocate
Generals Corps from 1977 to 1986. His assignments
were primarily in Europe, including 2 years as an
attorney in the International Affairs Division of the
Office of the Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Europe.
From 1987 until he was mobilized in 2002, he was
the General Counsel for Caldwell Aircraft Trading

208
Company in Charlotte, North Carolina. He was
promoted to Senior Vice President in 1990. During that
period, Colonel Gordon also served in the Reserves
as the International Law Officer of the 360th Civil
Affairs Brigade, and deployed to Saudi Arabia in
Operation DESERT STORM in 1991. He has published
law journal articles on legal status and rights under
the NATO SOFA and legal practice in the European
Communities. He holds the Army Skill Identifier for an
International Law Specialist. Colonel Gordon received
AB and JD degrees from the University of Georgia, and
is licensed to practice law in North Carolina, Georgia,
and Maryland. He received an M.A. degree in Church
History from Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, and
is a graduate of the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General
Course and the U.S. Army War College. Colonel
Gordon has done graduate work in international
law at the Hague Academy of International Law and
Georgetown University Law Center.

MICHAEL F. NOONE, a member of the California and

District of Columbia bars, served 20 years as a judge
advocate in the U.S. Air Force, retiring as a Colonel before
he joined the law faculty of The Catholic University of
America in 1978. He remains active in national security
issues. He is a fellow of the Inter-University Seminar
on Armed Forces and Society, and serves as a member
of the International Advisory Board, Geneva Centre
for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the
board of the National Institute of Military Justice, the
executive board of the Judge Advocate's Association
Inn of Court, and the legal committee of the National
Inter-religious Service Board for Conscientious
Objection. He was a distinguished visiting professor
of law at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point,

209
New York, in 1991 and co-authored the text book used
by the West Point Law Department. His professional
interests include torts and products liability, remedies,
and comparative and international law. His research
and writing on peacekeeping and political violence
have taken him in recent years to Australia and New
Zealand, to South Africa, and to Northern Ireland and
Israel. Professor Noone holds a B.S. in Foreign Service
(1955) from Georgetown Universitys Edmund A.
Walsh School of Foreign Service, an LL.B. (1957) and
LL.M. (1962) from Georgetown University Law School,
and an S.J.D. (1965) from The National Law Center of
George Washington University. He is a Distinguished
Graduate of the U.S. Air Force Air Command and Staff
College.

JANE G. DALTONwas commissioned an Ensign

through Officers Candidate School in Newport, Rhode
Island, in December 1977 and graduated from Surface
Warfare Officers School, also in Newport, in July
1978. As a line officer, Professor Dalton was among
the first 10 women assigned to sea duty and to earn
designation as a Surface Warfare Officer after 10 U.S.C.
6015 was amended to permit women to serve aboard
noncombatant vessels. She served as Third Division
Officer (1978-80) and Assistant Operations Officer
(1980-81) onboard the U.S.S. Puget Sound (AD-38). She
then taught History at the U.S. Naval Academy, 1981-
82. In 1982, she was selected for the Law Education
Program. As a judge advocate, Professor Daltons initial
duty assignment was to Naval Legal Service Office,
Treasure Island, San Francisco, California, where she
served as a defense counsel (1985-1987) and the senior
trial counsel (1987-88). Professor Dalton was the Staff
Judge Advocate to the Commander, Naval Surface

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Group, Middle Pacific (1988-90) and the Commander,
Naval Base Pearl Harbor (1990-91). She was the Oceans
Law and Policy Planner in the Strategic Plans and Policy
Directorate (J-5), Joint Staff, Washington, DC (1992-94),
and became the first woman to serve as the Fleet Judge
Advocate to a numbered fleet, Commander, Third
Fleet, San Diego, California, (1994-96). Professor Dalton
served two additional tours on the Joint StaffDeputy
Legal Counsel (1996-98) and then Legal Counsel (2000-
03) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. She
served for 2 years as the Commanding Officer, Naval
Legal Service Office, North Central, headquartered
in Washington, DC (1998-2000). In June 2003, then-
Captain Dalton assumed duties as the Commanding
Officer, Naval Civil Law Support Activity, and in July
2003, she was appointed the Assistant Judge Advocate
General (Civil Law). In August 2005, Professor Dalton
reported to the Naval War College as the Charles H.
Stockton Professor of International Law. Professor
Dalton officially retired from the U.S. Navy on October
1, 2005, with the rank of Rear Admiral (lower half).
Professor Dalton graduated from the University
of Kansas with a B.A. in Political Science in 1972
and an M.A. in Latin American Studies in 1974. She
earned a Juris Doctor degree magna cum laude from
Georgetown University Law Center and was admitted
to the Maryland Bar in 1985. She also received a Master
of Laws degree with a focus in international law from
the University of Virginia in 1992.

CHARLES GARRAWAY retired in 2003 after 30 years

in the United Kingdom (UK) Army Legal Services,
initially as a criminal prosecutor but latterly as an
adviser in the law of armed conflict and operational
law. In that capacity, he represented the Ministry of

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Defence at numerous international conferences and
was part of the UK delegations to the First Review
Conference for the 1981 Conventional Weapons
Convention, the negotiations on the establishment of
an International Criminal Court, and the Diplomatic
Conference that led to the 1999 Second Protocol to the
1954 Hague Convention on Cultural Property. He was
the senior Army lawyer deployed to the Gulf during
the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict. Since retiring, he spent 3
months in Baghdad working for the Foreign Office
on transitional justice issues and 6 months as a Senior
Research Fellow at the British Institute of International
and Comparative Law before taking up the Stockton
Chair in International Law at the U.S. Naval War
College in August 2004 for the year 2004-05. He is a
Visiting Professor at King's College, London. Professor
Garraway is a member of the teaching faculty at the
International Institute of International Law, San Remo,
Italy, and has lectured extensively on the law of armed
conflict to both civilian and military audiences. His
publications include contributions to The International
Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure
& Evidence (Roy Lee, ed., Oceana Publications, 1999);
as well as articles on superior orders (Superior
Orders and the International Criminal Court: Justice
Delivered or Justice Denied, 1999, IRRC No.836
p.785), internal conflict (The Code of Conduct for
Military Operations during Non-International Armed
Conflict, IIHL, November 2001); and interoperability
(Interoperability and the Atlantic DivideA Bridge
over Troubled Waters, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights
[2004], p. 105).

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