CNDI Japan Re Arm Disadvantage

CNDI 2010
Japan Re-arm Disadvantage Starter Pack
Index
Index..............................................................................................................................................................................................1 1NC Japan Re-arm Disadvantage 1/3............................................................................................................................................2 ________________________.......................................................................................................................................................5 *****UNIQUENESS*****..........................................................................................................................................................5 Uniqueness No Re-arm 1/2........................................................................................................................................................6 Brink Japan Re-arm Likely........................................................................................................................................................8 ________________.......................................................................................................................................................................9 *****LINKS*****.......................................................................................................................................................................9 Link Military Presence 1/3.......................................................................................................................................................10 ___________________...............................................................................................................................................................13 *****IMPACTS*****................................................................................................................................................................13 Impact Asia Arms Race 1/3......................................................................................................................................................14 Impact Indo-Pak Arms Race 1/2..............................................................................................................................................17 Impact Sino-Japan War............................................................................................................................................................19 Impact North Korea..................................................................................................................................................................20 Impact Nanotechnology............................................................................................................................................................21 Impact Japan Economy 1/3......................................................................................................................................................23 Impact US Economy 1/2..........................................................................................................................................................27 Impact Timeframe = Immediate...............................................................................................................................................30 A2: No Re-arm Perception Link...............................................................................................................................................31 A2: No Re-arm Technical Barriers...........................................................................................................................................32 A2: No Re-arm DPJ..................................................................................................................................................................33 A2: No Re-arm Public 1/2........................................................................................................................................................34 ______________.........................................................................................................................................................................36 *****AFF*****..........................................................................................................................................................................36 2AC Non-unique Re-arm Now.................................................................................................................................................37 2AC No Link Troops Not Key.................................................................................................................................................38 2AC No Impact No Re-arm (Technical Barriers) 1/2..............................................................................................................39 2AC No Impact No Re-arm (DPJ) 1/2.....................................................................................................................................41 2AC No Impact No Re-arm (Public) 1/4..................................................................................................................................43 2AC Strong Alliance Bad Sino-Japan War..............................................................................................................................47 2AC Strong Alliance Bad US-Sino War..................................................................................................................................48
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1NC Japan Re-arm Disadvantage 1/3

US security credibility with allies is high troop presence is key Russell 10 (James, Co-Dir. Center for Contemporary Conflict at Naval Postgraduate School, Former Advisor to
the Sec. Def. on Persian Gulf strategy, PhD Candidate in War Studies Kings College U. London, Extended Deterrence, Security Guarantees and Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Strategic and Policy Conundrums in the Gulf, 1-5, http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art_id=3297)
Her formulation reflects a firm historic grounding in the time-honored Cold War concepts of extended deterrence and security assurances, both of which have served as vitally important tools of American
Extended deterrence is the threat to use force , including nuclear weapons, against an adversary that threatens an ally. As noted by political scientist Paul Huth: The objective of extended deterrence is to protect other countries and territories from attack, as opposed to preventing a direct attack on ones own national territory.[16] Security assurances are the means through
statecraft since the dawn of the nuclear age.[15] which the actor drawing upon extended deterrence conveys the commitment to an allys security. Each of these concepts is critically contingent on the credibility of the actor extending the deterrent umbrella
To be effective, the actor receiving these assurances and the antagonist threatening action must be convinced that the security provider is prepared to follow through on its conveyed commitments .[18] The linked concepts of extended deterrence and security guarantees are nothing new to American security strategy.[19] During the Cold War, the United States commitment to defend Europe became operationalized through a series of extended deterrent commitments that included the basing of nuclear weapons in Europe that could have been used in the event of a Soviet attack. In Europe, the United States and its NATO allies eventually constructed a seamless web of conventional and nuclear capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat a Soviet invasion.[20] More recently, United States clearly still believes that the concept has great relevance in Northeast Asia . In response to North Korean nuclear and missile tests during the last several years, senior U.S. officials quickly and
and the security guarantees, which may or may not involve the specific commitment of nuclear weapons.[17] routinely fan out to South Korea and Japan to assure them of Americas commitment to their security.[21] A main target of these efforts is to forestall the possibility that either South Korea or Japan will
. Japan in particular has a robust nuclear infrastructure and is now widely considered to be a latent nuclear power that could develop a weapon reasonably quickly . As is the case in Northeast Asia, the United States today routinely acts as if extended deterrence and security assurances together constitute active, ongoing and useful tools in managing its regional security relationships in the Gulf. Secretary Clintons recent remarks only represent the latest evidence that this is the case. In May 2006, for example, the Bush Administration embarked on a
reconsider decisions not to develop nuclear weapons much ballyhooed Gulf Security Dialogue that sought to re-invigorate U.S. security relationships with the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The initiative was presented as part of a consultative process to focus attention on building regional self defense capabilities; consulting on regional security issues like the Iran nuclear program and fallout of Irans struggle against Sunni extremists; the U.S. invasion of Iraq; counter-proliferation; counter-terrorism and internal security; and critical infrastructure protection.[22] The dialogue came as the Bush Administration proposed billions of dollars in new arms sales to Israel and its Gulf partners that included precision guided munitions such as the Joint Defense Attack Munition and the Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile. The Gulf Security dialogue is but the latest chapter of an active and ongoing practice of reassurance that dates to the early 1990s, and, in the case of Saudi Arabia, to 1945 and the assurances made by President Roosevelt to the Saudi leader, King Abdul Aziz al-Saud. The United States has worked assiduously to operationalize conventionally-oriented extended deterrence commitments and security guarantees in the Gulf. As noted by Kathleen
deterrence is not a hands-off strategy. It cannot be created from a distance through a submarine capability in the Persian Gulf or a troop deployment in another country such as Iraq. It is a real, tangible, physical commitment, to be palpably felt both by allies and adversaries.[23] The United States has indeed worked hard at this in the Gulf largely through its ever-efficient military bureaucracies. In the aftermath of
McKiness: Operation Desert Storm, the United States actively sought and concluded a series of bilateral security agreements with each of the Gulf States that became operationlized under something called defense cooperation agreements, or DCAs. These commitments between the United States and the regional signatories contained a number of critical elements: (1) that the United States and the host nation should jointly respond to external threats when each party deemed necessary; (2) permitted access to host nation military facilities by U.S. military personnel; (3) permitted the pre-positioning of U.S. military
Extended
. The United States today has agreements with all the Gulf States except Saudi Arabia, which is subject to similar bilateral security commitments conveyed in a variety of different forums. Under these agreements, the United States and the host nation annually convene meetings to review regional threats and developments in their security partnerships . One of the principal purposes of these meetings is for both sides to reassure the other side of their continued commitment to the security relationship . In short, this process operationalizes the
equipment in the host nation as agreed by the parties; (4) and status of forces provisions which addressed the legal status of deployed U.S. military personnel conveyance of security guarantees in ways that reflect the principles in the DCAs. Using this Cold War-era template, the United States built an integrated system of regional security in the 1990s that saw it: (1) preposition three brigades worth of military equipment in the Gulf in Qatar, Kuwait and afloat with the Maritime Pre-positioning ships program; (2) build host nation military capabilities through exercises, training and arms sales; and, (3) build out a physical basing infrastructure that continues its expansion today. Each of the Central Commands major service components today have forward headquarters in the region today spread between Arifjan in Kuwait, Al Udied Air Base in Qatar and the 5th Fleet Naval Headquarters in Manama. After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United States further added to this infrastructure with bases in Iraq and a space at Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates used by the Air Force for ISR missions. As is the case in Northeast Asia, there is a substantial basing infrastructure with significant numbers of forward deployed U.S. military personnel. The major difference in Northeast Asia is that a hostile actor (North Korea) has already achieved a nuclear capability while in the Gulf, Iran may aspire to achieve North Koreas nuclear status. In Northeast Asia, the nuclear component of U.S. extended deterrence and security guarantees is palpable, whereas in the Gulf it is more implicit, or existential. Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence
The build out of the U.S. military infrastructure points around the region provide the hosting states with tangible evidence of the credibility of the American military commitment to their security . The military footprint today in the Gulf is no trip-wire force, but is engaged in tangible military operations , such as the
multi-national maritime security operations conducted in the Gulf and the Arabian Sea by the combined task force command operating out of the 5th Fleet Headquarters in Manama. Since the British withdrawal from the Gulf in the early 1970s, the United States has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to deploy its conventional forces to the region in response to regional instability. Starting with Operation Earnest Will in 1988, the United States slowly but inexorably inserted itself into the role played by the British for over a century as protecting the Gulf States from external threats. Following Operation Desert Storm, the United States kept sufficient forces in theater to enforce the United Nations cease fire resolutions on a recalcitrant Saddam. Last, but not least, it flowed significant forces and
Given this history it is difficult to see how any state could doubt the credibility of the United States commitments to use its
absorbed the monetary costs of toppling Saddam and providing a protective conventional force that can be readily called upon by the Iraq regime if needed
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conventional forces as an instrument of regional defense. This history suggests an overwhelming emphasis on the role of conventional force in operationalizing American security guarantees and extended deterrent commitments. In the Gulfunlike Northeast Asiathe role of nuclear weapons has never been explicitly spelled out and has very much remained in the background. However, while reference to nuclear weapons might remain unstated, the reality is that they are explicitly committed to defend American forces whenever the commander-in-chief might deem it necessary. The entire (and substantial) American military regional footprint operates under a quite explicit nuclear umbrellaheadlines or no headlines . If a nuclear umbrella is indeed draped over Americas forward deployed Gulf presence, its hard not
to see how that umbrella is similarly draped over the states that are hosting those forces. The only problem with Secretary Clintons recent statements is that she seems unaware of this fact, i.e., the United States already maintains a nuclear umbrella backed by nuclear weapons in the region
Current US military presence prevents Japanese re-arm withdraw causes spiraling Asian arms race Pittsburg Post-Gazette, 7 (February 21, Flash points in Northeast Asia: North Korea, Japan and China all pose
challenges for U.S. foreign policy http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/07052/763587-374.stm)
The United States sought to retain its influence and reassure Japan's neighbors after World War II by stationing forces there. The presence of those troops also made it logical for Japan not to rearm . An
argument can be made that Japan's having been spared the cost of defending itself was a key element in its postwar economic resurgence. But Japan, now the world's second-largest economy, no longer needs that boon. The United States, pushed
hard by the Iraq war and other calls on its military resources, now wishes to scale down its presence in Japan. This coincides with a Japanese desire to see the U.S. military presence in Japan reduced , which is
manifested regularly in public demonstrations. But what does that mean? It means also that Japan is seeing increasingly to its own defense. The United States is encouraging this trend by asking Japan to contribute to international military efforts, including the Iraq war and U.N. peacekeeping. There is strong pacifist sentiment in Japan; there also is a strong military tradition. From before 1905, when Japan defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, until 1945, the military basically ran Japan. If the United States has forgotten this in its drive to save money and troops and to scratch up help for Iraq, it is absolutely certain that Japan's neighbors have not. So, point one. It is potentially disruptive to the region for Japan to rearm . Assuming that for other reasons Japanese rearmament makes sense, the reasons for that not to occur also still exist. It is in that context that the current deal with North Korea needs to be seen. If it is accepted that North Korea has nuclear weapons, there is every reason to believe that Japan will want them, too. Japan is fully capable of developing them quickly , if it wishes. So that could mean three powers in Northeast Asia with nuclear weapons: China, Japan and North Korea. And then probably South Korea, a fourth. That's one flash point in the region well beyond American military or political capacity to control.
The second is Taiwan. What saves U.S. policy and pride there is Chinese patience. Beijing certainly will not give up the idea of eventual Taiwan reintegration into greater China, along the route that Hong Kong and
Macau followed. And it is in little or no hurry. But even if America could get past the idea that China owns a big piece of the United States, with 10 percent of U.S. federal debt in its hands and with a huge trade deficit in China's favor, the fact is that militarily the United States would be unable to respond effectively to a Chinese grab of Taiwan . That is to assume that the American people and the U.S. Congress would see it as in the U.S. interest to fight a war with China over Taiwan.
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1NC Japan Re-arm Disadvantage 3/3

Asian arms races escalate to nuclear conflict Cimbala 8 (Stephen J.-, March, Comparative Strategy, Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future
Asia, Vol. 27 #2, Informaworld)
The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened
by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.12 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the
Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne
delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one anothers vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially
. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance . In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strikevulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now pass e, on account of the emergence of the Revolution in
strategic effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and NorthKorea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on Military Affairs and its encouragement of information-based warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of
The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.
unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16
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________________________ *****UNIQUENESS*****
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Uniqueness No Re-arm 1/2

Japanese government currently committed to peace and relations Koshoji Correspondent UPI Asia 9-8 (Hiroyuki-, UPI Asia, Will Hatoyama weaken ties with United States?,
http://www.upiasia.com/Politics/2009/09/08/will_hatoyama_weaken_ties_with_united_states/9299/) Yukio Hatoyama, leader of the Democratic Party of Japan and the countrys incoming prime minister, is softening his stance to dispel concerns that he advocates an anti-U.S. foreign policy . Such concerns had heightened after a controversial article by Hatoyama appeared in translation on U.S. news sites. American policymakers and experts are concerned that the DPJs major policies rethinking the alignment of U.S. forces in Japan, the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement, and Japans participation in naval refueling missions in the Indian Ocean could undermine the Japan-U.S. alliance. In the article posted on the online version of the New York Times on Aug. 26, titled "A New Path for Japan," Hatoyama questioned U.S.-led market fundamentalism and the dollar as the key global currency, and stressed the need to restrain U.S. political and economic excesses. To protect Japans political and economic self-sufficiency and maintain a balanced relationship between the United States and China, Hatoyama explained the importance of monetary union and building a permanent security framework in East Asia. In reaction to the article, major U.S. dailies questioned Hatoyamas qualifications as Japans next leader. The article "stirred a hornet's nest in Washington by casting Japan's embattled economy as the victim of American-inspired free-market fundamentalism," the New York Times said on Sept. 1. On the same day, the Washington Post also said, "The threat of a nuclear North Korea makes Japan's neighborhood too dangerous, we think, for the government in Tokyo to seek a rupture with Washington or for the Obama administration to let one develop." Japan's conservative Sankei Shimbun quoted a former U.S. government official as saying that if Rahm Emanuel, the White House chief of staff, read the article, he would persuade U.S. President Barack Obama not to deal with the anti-U.S. Hatoyama government. Sheila A. Smith, senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, questioned if the DPJ would try to find another financial framework apart from the International Monetary Fund, the leftist Asahi newspaper reported. In response to such unexpected reaction from the United States, Hatoyama explained that his article was not intended to display anti-U.S. sentiment . Still, it surely contained expressions that could be seen as de-Americanization. "At a time when the G-20 is trying to address financial crisis on a global scale, the article has given the impression that Japan is not cooperative," said Masashi Nishihara, director of the Research Institute for Peace and Security in Tokyo. "Hatoyama's opinion regarding the Japan-U.S. alliance was not fully explained in the article. If it was posted to foreign media in English, it should have been revised with due consideration of the United States," Nishihara pointed out. Meanwhile, Jun Iio, vice president of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, was more sympathetic to Hatoyama. "I think Hatoyama does not have anti-American sentiment, he said. To counter the policy of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, he wrote such an article. But he should be careful not to shake the Japan-U.S. alliance, as criticism from the United States indicates that it contained anti-American sentiment." For Japan, which has consistently relied
on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the Japan-U.S. alliance is the axis of its security policy. Until now all new prime ministers, without exception, have appealed for a strengthening of the alliance soon after taking office. This is the first time concerns have emerged that Japan's next prime minister might be anti-American. Hatoyama is already beginning to shift his stance to divert the criticism . He emphasized the positive side of
globalization in his keynote address at the opening of the World Economic Forum Japan Meeting 2009, held in Tokyo on Sept. 4. "Globalization and the deepening of mutual independency internationally have both positive and negative aspects, Hatoyama told the gathering. What is important is to limit the negative aspects as much as possible, while accentuating the positive." In his first telephone conversation with Obama last Thursday, Hatoyama said he wanted to build a constructive and future-oriented Japan-U.S. alliance. Clearly his intention was to amend the impression given by the article and dispel any distrust of his policies . "As Hatoyama has been one of the opposition lawmakers until now, he has voiced all kinds of criticism," said Naoyuki Agawa, former minister for public affairs at the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., and now a professor at Keio University in Tokyo. "The U.S. medias comments may give an indication of general opinion in the United States, but the Japanese government doesn't conduct its diplomacy based upon that."
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Uniqueness No Re-arm 2/2

No re-arm now US security shield Hung, China Post, 4-13-9
(Joe, Japan may now have to rearm http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/the-china-post/joe-hung/2009/04/13/204014/Japan-may.htm) itself
Japan has a mutual defense treaty with the United States. Uncle Sam provides a nuclear defense umbrella for Japan under the treaty signed at the beginning of the Cold War era for protection against attacks from the Soviet Union. Thanks to the mutual defense arrangements, Japan has been able to refrain from rearmament, which is frowned upon by the United States and the People's Republic of China, along with those Asian countries that were invaded or occupied by the Japanese Imperial Army before and during the Second World War.
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Brink Japan Re-arm Likely

Obama weakness on NK and talk of disarm has put Japan on the brink of prolif Ben Yakov 9 (Menachem, June 24, http://menachembenyakov.newsvine.com/_news/2009/06/24/2964035-obamaand-the-bomb) Have President Obamas policies made a nuclear more likely and , as an unintended consequence of race.
war less likely or more likely? Unfortunately I think the answer is his speech in Cairo, he has set off a global nuclear arms
We are at a crucial moment in history. One that will determine whether or not nuclear conflict becomes a reality.
Obama has taken a hands off approach to Iran. He has been even handed regarding the revolution in Iran. He has stated his willingness to work with whomever winds up in charge. Obama never offered support to the Brits who championed the moral rights of the protesters immediately. He never came to Gordon Browns defense. His current statements, mild as they are, took some prodding. Obama has not taken a strong stand as far as North Korea is concerned either. His failure to communicate a severe American response has caused a panic in Japan. The Diet, Japans parliament, is holding talks about acquiring nuclear weapons to defend themselves as the American umbrella becomes unreliable. Obamas statement in his Cairo address, " No single nation should pick and choose which nations hold nuclear weapons.", has opened the Nuclear Pandoras Box. Why? Because all the other countries in the world, despite their
public bad mouthing of America, relied on America to be the Big Policeman. And that has been enough to confine the spread of nuclear weapons to responsible countries. According to the President, the United States will not act alone. Yet it is the fear of American consequences that kept the genie in the bottle.
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________________ *****LINKS*****
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Link Military Presence 1/3

Withdrawl forces Japan to build its conventional & nuclear arsenals. Causes arms races and war Khalilzad, Policy Analyst at the Rand Corporation, 98 (Zalmay, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century)
The third vital interest is to ensure the survival of American allies critical for a number of reasons. The first and most obvious reason is that the United States has treaty obligations to two important Asian states, Japan and South Korea. While meeting these obligations is necessary to maintain the credibility of the United States in the international arena, it is consequential for directly substantive reasons as well. In both instances, the assurance of U.S. protection has resulted
in implicit bargains that are indispensable to the American conception of stable international order. Thanks to American security guarantees, South Korea and Japan have both enjoyed the luxury of eschewing nuclear weapons as guarantors of security. Should American protective pledges be seen as weakening, the temptation on the part of both states to resurrect the nuclear option will increase to the consequent detriment of Americas global antiproliferation policy. Equally significant, however, is that Japan, and possibly South Korea as well, would of necessity have to embark on a significant conventional build-up , especially of maritime and air forces. The resulting force posture would in practice be indistinguishable from a longrange power-projection capability possessing offensive orientation . Even if such forces are developed primarily for defensive purposes, they will certainly give rise to new security dilemmas regionwide that in turn would lead to intensive arms-racing, growing suspicions, and possibly war.
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Military presence in Japan key to preventing re-arm Lee, Asia Times, 10 (Peter, June 3, The Cheonan sinking and Korea rising The Global Realm,
http://theglobalrealm.com/2010/06/02/the-cheonan-sinking-and-korea-rising/) That role is traditionally played by Japan, which is locked in a zero-sum economic
battle with China and highly suspicious of Chinese military motives. The US forward military presence in Japan pre-empts Japanese rearmament, reduces the incentives for a regional arms race, and is welcomed by many regional actors including, perhaps, China itself. US military presence prevents re-arm Ebrey, History Professor at UWash, 9 (Patricia, Modern East Asia from 1600: A Cultural, Social, and
Political History p 528)
The U.S. military presence in East Asia has had a strong stabilizing effect. It has prevented Japans rearmament and has stemmed both the growing Taiwanese desire for independence and China's ability to take Taiwan by
force. It has blocked a North Korean invasion of the South and a southern invasion of the North. If the United States finds a way to reach a negotiated solution of problems with North Korea, ii might be able to maintain a beneficial presence in East Asia. Otherwise, the United States could spark an even more disastrous Korean war, or East Asia might decide to solve its own problems without U.S. interference. South Korea. Taiwan, and Japan are at a crossroads. In terms of security,
they face east, allied militarily with the United States and Australia. In terms of prosperity, they now face west as they strengthen economic cooperation with China. Reducing military presence causes re-arm and proliferation Scales and Wortzel 99 (Robert, Major Gen. and former Deputy Chief of Staff for Base Operations and former
Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine at Headquarters Training and Doctrine Command US Army and PhD in History Duke, and Larry, Col. US Army, Dir. Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College, and PhD in Pol. Sci. U. Hawaii, THE FUTURE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN ASIA: LANDPOWER AND THE GEOSTRATEGY OF AMERICAN COMMITMENT, 4-6, https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB75.pdf)
The presence of American military forces in the region was one of the reasons that U.S. nuclear deterrence was extended to our allies in Korea and Japan. As in Europe, the stationing of U.S. conventional forces provided a deterrent option that is reinforced by the nuclear dimension. American nuclear deterrence, therefore, is also welcome in Northeast Asia for its contribution to security and stability in the region. Chinas military strategists may complain that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is a threat to China; but they acknowledge in private discussion that without extended deterrence, as provided for in the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Republic of Korea defense treaties, Korea might develop nuclear weapons and Japan could follow sui t.23 Chinas leaders even realize that without the defensive conventional arms provided to Taiwan by the United States under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Taiwan might develop nuclear weapons. Japanese military strategists express their own concerns about South Korea.24 Threatened by the probability that North Korea has developed a nuclear capability, without the protection of U.S. extended deterrence, the South would probably respond in kind by developing its own weapons . Certainly South Korea has the requisite technological level to develop nuclear weapons. In the event of the reunification of the Korean peninsula, because the North already has a nuclear capability, Japan would face a nuclear-armed peninsula. Tokyo might then
reexamine its own commitment to defense relying on conventional weapons with the support of the Japanese populace. Strategic thinkers in China and Japan acknowledge that the continuation of extended deterrence might inhibit Japan from going nuclear in such a case.25 Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, two Americans, make this same argument: . . . Japans leaders would be less likely to develop a nuclear arsenal as a hedge against Korean pressure.26 Strong U.S. diplomacy combined with continued extended deterrence, argue some of Korea and Japans strategic thinkers, might convince
the regime in charge of a reunified Korea to dismantle whatever devices the North has built instead of improving them.
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Credibility. Troops are the best guarantee that nuclear threats mean something. Nye 9 (Joseph, Prof. IR Harvard U., Korea Times, Will US-Japan Alliance Survive, 7-14, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/07/137_48423.html) Japan officially endorses the objective of a non-nuclear world, but it relies on America's extended nuclear deterrent, and wants to avoid being subject to nuclear blackmail from North Korea (or China). The Japanese fear
that the credibility of American extended deterrence will be weakened if the U.S. decreases its nuclear forces to parity with China. It is a mistake, however, to believe that extended deterrence depends on parity in numbers of nuclear weapons. Rather, it depends on a combination of capability and credibility. During the Cold
War, the U.S. was able to defend Berlin because our promise to do so was made credible by the NATO alliance and the presence of American troops , whose lives would be on the line in the event of a Soviet attack. Indeed, the best guarantee of American extended deterrence over Japan remains the presence of nearly 50,000 American troops (which Japan helps to maintain with generous host-nation support). Credibility is also
enhanced by joint projects such as the development of regional ballistic missile defense.
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___________________ *****IMPACTS*****
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Impact Asia Arms Race 1/3

That causes Asian arms races that risk total explosion Richardson Presidential Management Fellow DOD 6 (Corey-, Sept. 9, South Korea must choose sides,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/HI09Dg02.html) Japan must then consider its options in countering an openly nuclear, reunified Korea without USFK.
Already building momentum to change its constitution to clarify its military , it's not inconceivable that Japan would ultimately consider going nuclear to deter Korea. As in South Korea, there is no technological barrier preventing Japan from building nuclear weapons. While the details of the race and escalation of tensions can vary in any number of ways and are not inevitable, that an arms race would occur is probable. Only the perception of threat and vulnerability need be present for this to occur. East Asia could become a nuclear powder keg ready to explode over something as childish as the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute between Korea and Japan, a Diaoyu/Senkakus dispute between China and Japan, or the Koguryo dispute between Korea and China.
The arms race need not occur
One could argue that the US would be able to step in and moderate things before such an escalation could occur. Considering the recent US record on influencing either North or South Korea, it is perhaps unwise to count on it being able to do so at some crucial point in the future. Extinction Kennedy & Irie 00 (Prof. Paul-, Prof. Akira-, Daily Yomiuri, Jan. 10, 21st Century--Dialogues on the Future/
Globalization's sway in evolution of states put in focus, Lexis) Kennedy: Over the past two or three decades, many Asian nations European countries have done otherwise. During this time, there have Europeans who even want nuclear power stations today. We have good reason to feel worried that Asia could
have increased their defense budgets, while been many flash points in Asia, such North Korea, Taiwan and Kashmir. Some Asian countries have developed nuclear weapons, as contrasted with few become a tinderbox should there be any conflict in disputed territories like the Spratly Islands and an autistic North Korean regime that does not bother to understand the outside world. Taiwan is often rash to provoke Beijing, while the Kashmir conflict could grow into an India-Pakistan war. There is great concern about how we should ensure that bitter rivalries in the Asian part of the globe will not bring down a system that is emerging in the world now. We do not want a repeat of 1914. I am concerned that an armed conflict might arise in South or East Asia in 2008, for example, and bring down the credit, financial flow and capital in the region.
Irie: I share Prof. Kennedy's sense of pessimism about some serious problems facing the world today. There are many more sovereign nations today, and the majority of them are newly independent states. Therefore, they are even more nationalistic. Nationalism has often served as the only symbol of national unity for some African, Asian and Middle Eastern countries that have been grated in their regions without national traditions comparable to those of European countries. This has made matters even worse. Nationalism is all that can keep a country together. It is essential to ensure that local conflicts
will be kept from blowing up the entire world.
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Re-Arm causes arms races and war Greb, PhD at Lawrence Livermore, 95 (G. A., Reasons for an American Military Presence in Asia, Document 43-95) If Japan were to abandon its post war promise and decide to undertake a large arms build-up, the affect on stability in the region would be enormous. Fears of a renationalized Japan would spur an arms race throughout the Pacific Rim which would turn the region into a multipolar version of Cold War Europe. The Spratley Islands, sea lane conflicts, and competing resource claims could much more easily turn into open war if the region were to become this sort of armed camp. The ethnic differences and historical animosities would exacerbate this effect and make war much more likely. Asian arms races escalate to nuclear conflict Cimbala 8 (Stephen J.-, March, Comparative Strategy, Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future
Asia, Vol. 27 #2, Informaworld)
The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened
by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.12 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the
Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne
delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one anothers vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially strategic effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and NorthKorea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on
. The
short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance . In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strikevulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now pass e, on account of the emergence of the Revolution in
Military Affairs and its encouragement of information-based warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of
The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.
unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16
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Japan re-arm causes Asian arms race and proliferation Halloran Military Correspondent NYT 9 (Richard-, May 24, Real Clear Politics, The Dangers of a Nuclear
Japan, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/ 2009/05/24/nuclear_japan_96638.html)
That anxiety has reinvigorated a debate about whether Japan should acquire a nuclear deterrent of its own and reduce its reliance on the US. Japan has the technology, finances, industrial capacity, and skilled personnel to build a nuclear force, although it would be costly and take many years. The consequences of that decision would be earthshaking. It would likely cause opponents to riot in the streets and could bring down a government. South Korea, having sought at least once to acquire nuclear weapons, would almost certainly do so. Any hope of dissuading North Korea from building a nuclear force would disappear. China would redouble its nuclear programs. And for the only nation ever to experience atomic bombing to acquire nuclear arms would surely shatter the already fragile international nuclear non-proliferation regime . The main reason Japan has not acquired nuclear arms so far has been a lack of political will . After the atomic bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the Japanese experienced a deep-seated nuclear allergy. That and the threat from the Soviet Union during the Cold War kept Japan huddled under the US nuclear umbrella. Today, Japanese fear North Korea, which is developing nuclear weapons and has test fired missiles over Japan. Longer run, Japan casts wary eyes on China's expanding nuclear arsenal and is again fearful of a revived nuclear threat from Russia.
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Impact Indo-Pak Arms Race 1/2

Japanese rearm would be rapid and cause India/Pakistan arms races Kunii 03 (Irene M.-, Jan. 20, Business Week, Why Japan Just Might Build Nukes, Number 3816, P. 22, Lexis) But if Japan decides to build its own nukes, get ready for an Asian arms race. China would likely want to boost its arsenal, which would prompt India to develop more nuclear weapons, which would spur Pakistan to do the same -- and on and on into an ever more perilous future. Unintentional nuclear exchange Rajaraman, Theoretical Physics Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru, 2 (November, Nuclear Weapons in
South Asia Risks and Their Reduction Pugwash Workshop on South Asian Security, www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/Rajaraman.pdf) The point is not that our own early warning systems in India will also be prone to false alarms. In fact we will probably not have the luxury of even such a fallible early warning system. This is not just because of the costs involved but also because of geography. The missile travel time between Pakistan and India is only about 5 minutes far too short a time to provide any meaningful warning. (Bombs delivered by planes will take longer, but that is offset by the difficulty in spotting the bombers carrying nuclear weapons from the dozens of other similar planes in action during wartime.) One
would therefore have to settle for indirect indicators that give a little more time to react things like signs of unusual activity at missile launch sites . airfields and nuclear ammunition depots of the enemy, intelligence reports of their military plans and political intentions and so on. These can yield at best secondary evidence of an impending attack, much less concrete and more amenable to misinterpretation. A very plausible scenario is one where, at a time of wartime crisis, such indirect evidence suddenly peaks to a crescendo and points towards an imminent nuclear attack . Such evidence may be very strongly indicative, but it is unlikely to be one hundred percent certain. One can imagine the extraordinary dilemma that the country's political leadership would then face. They may find themselves under immense pressure from the more hawkish elements among them and the military to launch a preventive attack within a matter of hours if not minutes. Notwithstanding any declarations of No First Use. and no matter how responsible the leadership is or how conscious they are of the gravity of a wrong decision it is still hard to imagine them just sitting on their hands and waiting for the bombs from the other side to land before retaliating. Herein lies the serious risk of circumstances forcing a hasty panic-driven nuclear attack in response to a perceived threat that may eventually turn out to
have been false.
The pressure to launch a preventive attack would be all the more intense if missiles and bombers loaded with nuclear weapons were already fully deployed and ready to take off in minutes . When such firepower is kept primed day after day, ready to be used any moment, it is itching to be fired. The mere
availability of such capability generates a momentum of its own to the decision making process. There is very little doubt that the decision to drop the bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki was in part influenced by the fact that the bombs, only recently fabricated after a massive military and scientific effort, were sitting there, waiting to be tested over a "real target". Finally, the fact that the antagonist also carries a similar nuclear arsenal with very similar risks, increases the danger many-fold. What may be viewed as a purely deterrent weapon by one side cannot, if kept in a state of readyto-fire alert, be distinguished by the other side from a capability mounted to make a surprise first attack. Each side, in evaluating the threat from the other, will not only have to consider the likelihood of a deliberate attack, but
also factor in the possibility of inadvertent, unauthorised or hasty crisis driven attacks. Such increased perceptions of threat can bounce back and forth between the strategic calculations of the two countries ,
getting magnified in the process.
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Impact Indo-Pak Arms Race 2/2

And, Indo-Pak war causes extinction Fox, Independent Journalist 8 (Maggie, April 8, India-Pakistan Nuclear War Would Cause Ozone Hole
http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/47829/story.htm) WASHINGTON - Nuclear war between India and Pakistan would
cause more than slaughter and destruction -- it would knock a big hole in the ozone layer, affecting crops, animals and people worldwide, US researchers said on Monday. Fires from burning cities would send 5 million metric tonnes of soot or more into the lowest part of Earth's atmosphere known as the troposphere, and heat from the sun would carry these blackened particles into the stratosphere, the team at the University of Colorado reported . "The sunlight
really heats it up and sends it up to the top of the stratosphere," said Michael Mills of the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics, who chose India and Pakistan as one of several possible examples. Up there, the soot would absorb
radiation from the sun and heat surrounding gases, causing chemical reactions that break down ozone. "We find column ozone losses in excess of 20 percent globally , 25 percent to 45 percent at midlatitudes, and 50 percent to 70 percent at northern high latitudes persisting for five years, with substantial losses continuing for five additional years," Mills' team wrote in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. This would let in enough
ultraviolet radiation to cause cancer, damage eyes and skin, damage crops and other plants and injure animals. Mills and colleagues based their computer model on other research on how much fire would be produced by a regional nuclear conflict. "Certainly there is a growing number of large nuclear-armed states that have a growing number of weapons. This could be
typical of what you might see," Mills said in a telephone interview. SMOKE IS KEY Eight nations are known to have nuclear weapons, and Pakistan and India are believed to have at least 50 weapons apiece, each with the power of the weapon the United States used to destroy Hiroshima in 1945. Mills said the study
added a new factor to the worries about what might damage the world's ozone layer, as well as to research about the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange. "The smoke is the key and it is coming from these firestorms that build up
actually several hours after the explosions," he said. "We are talking about modern megacities that have a lot of material in them that would burn. We saw these kinds of megafires in World War Two in Dresden and Tokyo. The difference is we are talking about a large number of cities that would be bombed within a few
days." Nothing natural could create this much black smoke in the same way, Mill noted. Volcanic ash, dust and smoke is of a different nature, for example, and forest fires are not big or hot enough. The University of Colorado's Brian Toon, who also worked on the study, said the damage to the ozone layer would be worse than what has been predicted by "nuclear winter" and "ultraviolet spring" scenarios. "The big surprise is that this study demonstrates that a small-
scale, regional nuclear conflict is capable of triggering ozone losses even larger than losses that were predicted following a full-scale nuclear war," Toon said in a statement.
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Impact Sino-Japan War

Japan re-arm causes Sino-Japanese war Xinbo, IR Professor at the Center for American Studies, 6 (Wu, Winter, The End of the Silver Lining: A
Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance Washington Quarterly, Vol 29 No 1, p 119-130) Since the end of the Cold War, Japan has come a long way to becoming a major military player. It maintains one of the most modernized armies in the world and continues to expand its military capability. Since 1992, it has enacted 21 major pieces of security-related legislationnine in 2004 alone legitimizing and legalizing sending military forces abroad. Japan is drifting away from pacifism, driven partly by its evolving domestic politics and partly by the United States. As one U.S. expert on Japan noted, Since the end of the Cold War in 1991 and particularly under the administration of George W. Bush,
the United States has been doing everything in its power to encourage and even accelerate Japanese rearmament. Such a development promotes hostility between China and Japan, the two superpowers of East Asia.15 This has given rise to strong Chinese concern over U.S. strategic intentions toward China, as well as the mission of the U.S.-Japanese alliance in todays security environment. Nuclear war Brzezinski 04 (Former Sect. Of State) 2004 [Zbigniew, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership,
Perseus, New York)
How the power dynamics in the Far East are shaped by the interrelationship among America, Japan, and China will also affect global stability. The United States should seek to translate the emerging equilibrium among itself, Japan, and China into a more structured security relationship. Geopolitically, Asia roughly resembles Europe prior to World War I. America has stabilized Europe but it still faces a potential structural crisis in
Asia, where several major powers still contend, though checked by Americas peripheral strategic presence. That presence is anchored by the American-Japanese connection, hut the rise of a regionally dominant China and the unpredictability of North Korea signal the need for a more active U.S. policy to promote, at a minimum, a triangular security relationship. As argued earlier, such a triangular equilibrium, to be enduring, will require a more internationally engaged Japan that will have gradually assumed a wider range of military responsibilities. Creating this equilibrium might entail, in turn, fostering a trans Eurasian multilateral security structure for coping with the novel dimensions of global security. Failure to engage China
and Japan in at least a de facto security structure could eventually trigger a dangerous tectonic shift, perhaps involving the unilateral remilitarization of Japan, which already has the potential to very quickly become a nuclear power, in addition to the already grave challenge posed by North Koreas quest for a nuclear arsenal of its own, The need for a collective regional response to North Korea reinforces the more general point
that only a co-optive American hegemony can cope effectively with the increasingly pervasive spread of weaponry of mass destruction, whether among states or extremist organizations. [P. 226-227]
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Impact North Korea

Japanes re-arm causes North Korean instability Tamamoto Sr. Fellow World Policy Institute Fall 09 (Masaru-, World Policy Journal, The Emperors New
Clothes Can Japan Live Without the Bomb?, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/wopj.2009.26.3.63?cookieSet=1) Vol. 26 #3,
If Tokyo were to embark on a nuclear program, the historical antagonism between Japan and North Korea would only contribute to provoking Pyongyang in a manner the international community is trying so hard to avoid. Any escalation of the threat carries the danger of breaking down deterrence . So, even
among Tokyos hawks, a nuclear Japan, propelled by fear of abandonment and North Korean belligerence, makes little security sense.
North Korean nuclearization causes global prolif and nuclear instability. Huntley, director-Simons Center, 05 (Wade, director of the Simons Centre for Disarmament and NonProliferation Research, North Korea & the NPT, May 5, 2005, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/1190)
North Koreas reinvigorated nuclear program provides Pyongyang with the capability to fuel proliferation fires worldwide by exporting fissile materials, nuclear weapons development technologies and expertise, or even completed operational weapons. This potential , highlighted by recent questions as to whether uranium discovered in Libya might have originated in North Korea,5 constitutes probably the greatest direct threat that a nuclear North Korea poses to the NPT and to global nuclear stability.
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Impact Nanotechnology
Japan will deploy offensive nanotechnology risking extinction Huang 3 (Joseph-, The Coming War with Japan!, www.hope-of-israel.org/japwar.htm) Japan is already more militarized than most Americans and Australians think. Its wealth could quickly become a means to build one of the world's most technologically advanced arms industries in a short time. Over the next decade, Japan will evolve a new generation of military technology easily convertible from defense to
offense.
A 'Star Wars' type system is another possibility. Having brought Japan into the initial stages of Star Wars research, the United States may abandon the programs as too costly, especially with the end of the cold war, a new administration under the Democrats, and a growing deficit to worry about. Japan, with its combination of high technologies and financial resources, will be quite willing to develop and perfect such a system.
Japan is known for its ability to adapt technology for its own use, especially in miniaturising high-tech products, ranging from camera, television, video camera, motor vehicle and electronics. Japan is reportedly ahead in the field of nanotechnology. When this new technology is combined with artificial intelligence, the effect could be more dreadful than nuclear weapons!!
New Weapon Technology In an eye-opening book, titled Engines of Creation by K. Eric Drexler, the author explains the coming revolution in machine building, a new-found technology that will enable us to construct machines a thousand times smaller than a microchip, or the same size as an enzyme. This field of technology is called 'nanotechnology' (nano means the billionth part), and could be used to revolutionize research into all areas of our lives from within the heart of the living cell to the depths of space itself.
The machines or molecular assemblers will be able to analyze and construct virtually anything that can be conceived, atomic layer by atomic layer. Machines might be programmed, for example, to enter individual cells and repair damage or destroy diseases, even prevent the very process of aging. Similarly, small machines could be sent into outer space to construct spaceships or complex scientific equipment out of basic ingredients that need be nothing more than earth and air. Once they control the machine tools and combine with a system of artificial intelligence to automate engineering, final products could flow forth almost like magic! Deadlier than Nuclear Weapons
Writing on nanotechnology, Drexler warns,
Replicators can be more potent than nuclear weapons: to devastate Earth with bombs would require masses of exotic hardware and rare isotopes, but to destroy all life with replicators would require only a single speck made of ordinary elements . Replicators give nuclear war some company as a potential cause of extinction, giving a broader context to extinction as a moral concern" (Engines of Creation, pp.174). Escalation to nuclear war is likely Gubrud Center for Superconductivity Research 97 (Mark Avrum-, Fifth Foresight Conference on
Molecular Nanotechnology, Nanotechnology and International http://www.foresight.org/Conferences/MNT05/Papers/Gubrud/index.html) The greatest danger coincides with the emergence of these powerful technologies: A quickening Security,
succession of "revolutions" may spark a new arms race involving a number of potential competitors . Older systems,
including nuclear weapons, would become vulnerable to novel forms of attack or neutralization. Rapidly evolving, untested, secret, and even "virtual" arsenals would undermine confidence in the ability to retaliate or resist aggression. Warning and decision times would shrink. Covert infiltration of intelligence and sabotage devices would blur the distinction between confrontation and war. Overt deployment of ultramodern weapons, perhaps on a massive scale, would alarm technological laggards . Actual and perceived power balances would shift dramatically and abruptly. Accompanied by economic upheaval, general uncertainty and disputes over the future of major resources and of humanity itself, such a runaway crisis would likely erupt into large-scale rearmament and warfare well before another technological plateau was reached. International regimes combining arms control, verification and transparency, collective security and limited military capabilities, can be proposed in order to maintain stability. However, these would require unprecedented levels of cooperation and restraint, and would be prone to collapse if nations persist in challenging each other with threats of force.
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Japan Re-arm Disadvantage Starter Pack If we believe that assemblers are feasible, perhaps the most important implication is this: Ultimately, we will need an integrated international security system. For the present, failure to consider alternatives to unilateral "peace through strength" puts us on a course toward the next world war.
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Impact Japan Economy 1/3

Japanese re-arm crushes Japanese economy Morgan 99 (Robert-, RFI Analysis: Clinton's China Policy: Unintended Consequences,
http://www.pelagius.com/AppleRecon/monsoon.html) It's no longer a joking matter or a discussion relegated to the likes of Japanese Nationalists over whether Japan should rearm in order to defend itself from aggression. It's being whispered and discussed as a possible necessity in light of the Clinton Administration's caving in to China over defending them from Chinese or North Korean missiles. Suddenly, there is talk about having to increase defense spending and re-arming for "self-defense ," which is allowed under Japan's Constitution. How long would it take for the Japanese to build nuclear weapons? Missiles? Not long. Missile defenses? Not too long. Extremely expensive yes. Long? No. That will have consequences. The Japanese will need hard currency to make the appropriate purchases, etc. It's
no longer a matter of national pride but survival. Therefore, they will need those Dollars in their massive Dollar reserves as well as those Dollars currently locked into Treasuries. If they have to, they will use those reserves in order to finance their national defense. And to hell with the U.S. and the impacts that it would have on the American economy and markets. Defense contractors might have salad days, but the ripple effects throughout the rest of the U.S. economy and markets would be disastrous. If the Japanese have to re-arm to protect themselves, and therefore repatriate even more capital to finance it then the Bond would tank and rates would rise . It takes a lot of money to build and deploy a national
defense that has been minimal all these years. And while those Dollars would be used to buy and manufacture tangible goods, the impacts it would have on the Japanese economy might not be as stimulative as some might think . Yes, the "unthinkable" has become the thinkable in Japan now. And as the Bond tanks so will the U.S. markets . Flight to quality and safety would be the norm. But even then it wouldn't prove to be safe as rates would continue to rise. And those higher interest rates would also stall the U.S. economy with the aforementioned exceptions. Think Japan in the '90s.
Don't take this lightly, or as our engaging in gloom and doom scenarios. Think of the massive build up the United States had to undergo during World War II. Think of the expenditures the U.S. had to undergo during World War I and the resultant inflation. Think of all the treasure that was expended during the Cold War and the costs
that it inflicted. Not to mention the inflation that it caused. Yes, the economy and markets flourished for the most part during the Cold War but it came at a high cost. Don't expect history to repeat itself if Japan has to re-arm. And we wouldn't blame them if they did.
This potential "arms race" and "New Cold War" could cause a huge disruption in the global economy and both Japan's and the United States' economies are inextricably linked . Some would dispute that assertion, but we disagree. If Japan has to re-arm it would have very negative consequences in the U.S. and the entire globe.
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Japanese economic collapse causes Asian instability and collapses trade and democracy Auslin, American Enterprise Institute, 9 (Michael, February 17, Japans Downturn is Bad for the World
Wall Street Journal)
If Japan's economy collapses, supply chains across the globe will be affected and numerous economies will face severe disruptions, most notably China's . China is currently Japan's largest import provider, and the Japanese slowdown is creating tremendous pressure on Chinese factories. Just last week, the Chinese government announced that 20 million rural migrants had lost their jobs. Closer to home, Japan may also start running out of surplus cash, which it has used to purchase U.S. securities for years. For the first time in a generation, Tokyo is running trade deficits -- five months in a row so far. The political and social fallout from a Japanese depression also would be devastating. In the face of economic instability, other Asian nations may feel forced to turn to more centralized -- even authoritarian -- control to try to limit the damage. Free-trade agreements may be rolled back and political freedom curtailed . Social stability in emerging, middle-class societies will be severely tested, and newly democratized states may find it impossible to maintain power. Progress toward a more open, integrated Asia is at risk, with the potential for increased political tension in the world's most heavily armed region.
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Asian economic stagnation causes global conflict escalation Auslin, American Enterprise Institute, 9 (Michael, February 6, Averting Disaster Daily Standard,
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.29339/pub_detail.asp) As they deal with a collapsing world economy, policymakers in Washington and around the globe must not forget that
when a depression strikes, war can follow. Nowhere is this truer than in Asia, the most heavily armed region on earth and riven with ancient hatreds and territorial rivalries. Collapsing trade flows can lead to political tension, nationalist outbursts, growing distrust, and ultimately, military miscalculation. The result would be disaster on top of an already dire situation . Asia's political infrastructure may not be strong enough to resist the slide towards confrontation and conflict. No one should think that Asia is on the verge of conflict. But it is also important to remember what has helped keep the peace in this region for so long. Phenomenal growth rates in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, China and elsewhere since the 1960s have naturally turned national attention inward, to development and stability. This has gradually led to increased political confidence, diplomatic initiatives, and in many nations the move toward more democratic systems. America has
directly benefited as well, and not merely from years of lower consumer prices, but also from the general conditions of peace in Asia. Yet policymakers need to remember that even during these decades of growth, moments of economic shock, such as the 1973 Oil Crisis, led to instability and bursts of terrorist activity in Japan, while the uneven pace of growth in China has led to tens of thousands of armed clashes in the poor interior of the country. Now imagine such
instability multiplied region-wide. The economic collapse Japan is facing, and China's potential slowdown, dwarfs any previous economic troubles, including the 1998 Asian Currency Crisis. Newly urbanized workers rioting for jobs or living wages, conflict over natural resources, further saber-rattling from North Korea, all can take on lives of their own. This is the nightmare of governments in the region , and
particularly of democracies from newer ones like Thailand and Mongolia to established states like Japan and South Korea.
How will overburdened political leaders react to internal unrest? What happens if Chinese shopkeepers in Indonesia are attacked, or a Japanese naval ship collides with a Korean fishing vessel? Quite simply, Asia's political infrastructure may not be strong enough to resist the slide towards confrontation and conflict. This would be a political and humanitarian disaster turning the clock back decades in Asia. It would almost certainly drag America in at some point, as well . First of all, we have alliance responsibilities to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines should any of them come under armed attack. Failure on our part to live up to those responsibilities could mean the end of America's credibility in Asia. Secondly, peace in Asia has been kept in good measure by the continued U.S. military presence since World War II. There have been terrible localized conflicts, of course, but nothing approaching a systemic conflagration like the 1940s. Today, such a conflict would be far more bloody, and it is unclear if the American military, already stretched too thin by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, could contain the crisis .
Nor is it clear that the American people, worn out from war and economic distress, would be willing to shed even more blood and treasure for lands across the ocean. The result could be a historic changing of the geopolitical map in the
world's most populous region. Perhaps China would emerge as the undisputed hegemon. Possibly democracies like Japan and South Korea would link up to oppose any aggressor. India might decide it could move into the vacuum. All of this is guess-work, of course, but it has happened repeatedly throughout history. There is no reason to believe we are immune from the same types of miscalculation and greed that have
destroyed international systems in the past. Here are some things America, its allies, and all interested nations in Asia can do to mitigate the possibility of the worst happening. The United States will have an opportunity to arrange a meeting of the region's top leaders on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Singapore later this year. There, President Obama might express his determination to intervene at the first sign of possible conflict--even if that means putting U.S. forces in between ships aiming their guns at each other. President Obama might also establish an Asia crisis ad hoc committee in Washington, at the National Security Council, to keep tabs on possible flare-ups. This could be replicated in the region by an ad hoc mechanism tied to the ASEAN secretariat that would allow for immediate discussions between parties in confrontation. Working with Japan, Australia, and China, the United States can also establish clear procedures to limit humanitarian crises that erupt from internal instability in Asian countries. Perhaps most important, Washington must get clear assurances from its allies that they
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Japan Re-arm Disadvantage Starter Pack will stand with us should hostilities erupt and that any aggressor will be met with a united front. None of this may be needed. Decades of economic integration and political discussion have made Asia a far more peaceful place . But war, like politics, is local. The pain being felt in Asian countries , their sense of national honor, and fears about their future, may coalesce into a toxic brew. Without preparation now, the world may be paying the price for years to come.
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Impact US Economy 1/2

Japanese re-arm crushes the U.S. economy Morgan 99 (Robert-, RFI Analysis: Clinton's China Policy: Unintended Consequences,
http://www.pelagius.com/AppleRecon/monsoon.html) It's no longer a joking matter or a discussion relegated to the likes of Japanese Nationalists over whether Japan should rearm in order to defend itself from aggression. It's being whispered and discussed as a possible necessity in light of the Clinton Administration's caving in to China over defending them from Chinese or North Korean missiles. Suddenly, there is talk about having to increase defense spending and re-arming for "self-defense ," which is allowed under Japan's Constitution. How long would it take for the Japanese to build nuclear weapons? Missiles? Not long. Missile defenses? Not too long. Extremely expensive yes. Long? No. That will have consequences. The Japanese will need hard currency to make the appropriate purchases, etc. It's
no longer a matter of national pride but survival. Therefore, they will need those Dollars in their massive Dollar reserves as well as those Dollars currently locked into Treasuries. If they have to, they will use those reserves in order to finance their national defense. And to hell with the U.S. and the impacts that it would have on the American economy and markets. Defense contractors might have salad days, but the ripple effects throughout the rest of the U.S. economy and markets would be disastrous. If the Japanese have to re-arm to protect themselves, and therefore repatriate even more capital to finance it then the Bond would tank and rates would rise . It takes a lot of money to build and deploy a national
defense that has been minimal all these years. And while those Dollars would be used to buy and manufacture tangible goods, the impacts it would have on the Japanese economy might not be as stimulative as some might think . Yes, the "unthinkable" has become the thinkable in Japan now. And as the Bond tanks so will the U.S. markets . Flight to quality and safety would be the norm. But even then it wouldn't prove to be safe as rates would continue to rise. And those higher interest rates would also stall the U.S. economy with the aforementioned exceptions. Think Japan in the '90s.
Don't take this lightly, or as our engaging in gloom and doom scenarios. Think of the massive build up the United States had to undergo during World War II. Think of the expenditures the U.S. had to undergo during World War I and the resultant inflation. Think of all the treasure that was expended during the Cold War and the costs
that it inflicted. Not to mention the inflation that it caused. Yes, the economy and markets flourished for the most part during the Cold War but it came at a high cost. Don't expect history to repeat itself if Japan has to re-arm. And we wouldn't blame them if they did.
This potential "arms race" and "New Cold War" could cause a huge disruption in the global economy and both Japan's and the United States' economies are inextricably linked . Some would dispute that assertion, but we disagree. If Japan has to re-arm it would have very negative consequences in the U.S. and the entire globe.
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CNDI 2010
Impact US Economy 2/2

Extinction Kerpen, Director of Policy for Americans for Prosperity, 8 (Phil, October 28, From Panic to
Depression?, National Review) But with so many real culprits out there, we cannot afford to blame the fake culprits of free trade, low taxes, and flexible labor markets. These are the fundamentals of a free economy. If we undermine them in response to the panic, we risk repeating the mistakes that followed another great panic and ushered in the Great Depression. First, trade. The SmootHawley tariff was Congress's first major policy blunder leading up to the Great Depression. Despite a warning from more than 1,000 prominent economists, Congress raised protective tariffs to record-high levels in June 1930. The result was that U.S. imports crashed while retaliation from abroad sunk U.S. exports. Some historians believe the political debate surrounding the Smoot-Hawley bill actually contributed to the initial stock market crash of 1929, and most believe it was a factor in turning that crash into the Great Depression. The world economy is far more interconnected today. Trade volumes are much higher and large sectors of the U.S. economy are extremely trade-dependent. Thus, any protectionist response to the current panic would be even more disruptive. Unfortunately, China-bashing has become a bipartisan pastime in Congress. And Sen. Barack Obama is campaigning on poison-pill labor and environmental standards that many of our trading partners can't afford. It's a sure way to sink free-trade agreements. Obama also promises new non-tariff barriers to trade that could spark a global trade war, such as direct subsidies for companies willing to locate production in the United States. Under undivided Democratic rule it appears unlikely that there would be any progress on a new global trade agreement. And the existing World Trade Organization framework could unravel under so-called "fair trade" pressure, or even from a return to explicit protectionism. Second, taxes. President Herbert Hoover's infamous Revenue Act of 1932 was the biggest and worsttimed tax hike in U.S. history. The bill was a bipartisan "achievement," a compromise between the Hoover administration's plan to raise income taxes and the Democratic Congress's plan to institute a national sales tax. The top marginal income-tax rate was raised from 25 to 63 percent. New excise taxes were put on everything from cars and trucks to refrigerators, chewing gum, soft drinks, and electricity. The death tax was doubled. And the results were tragic. By raising taxes during an economic downturn, the economic pain of the 1930s was made deeper and more permanent. The higher Hoover taxes discouraged work, savings, and investment, prevented capital formation, and depressed consumer spending. Today, even liberal congressman Barney Frank of Massachusetts has said there should be no tax hikes in the next year because of the current economic weakness. Yet Barack Obama remains committed to a program of raising the top marginal tax rate from 35 percent to 39.6 percent while also hiking capital-gains taxes, dividend taxes, and the death tax. All this will put the brakes on economic activity right when we need to hit the accelerator . Third, labor. Economists at UCLA have determined that President Franklin Roosevelt's anti-competitive, pro-union policies prolonged the Depression seven full years. In particular, those policies led to artificially expensive products that discouraged consumer spending and artificially high wages that prevented employment from recovering. Despite this lesson, congressional Democrats, including Obama, are today poised to give unions their greatest power boost since Roosevelt's 1935 National Labor Relations Act. The vehicle this time is the shamelessly named Employee Free Choice Act, which, among other pro-union legal changes, would abolish secret-ballot elections for union organizing. By way of a new procedure called card check, workers will be openly pressured to sign union cards, after which, if a majority of workers sign, unions will be automatically certified. Coercive tactics by union bosses would run rampant if this policy is ever enacted. And as unions gain in power and force wages unnaturally high, mass unemployment could be the unintended result. It's important that we avoid all these policy errors -- not just for the sake of our prosperity, but for our survival. The Great Depression, after all, didn't end until the advent of
World War II, the most destructive war in the history of the planet. In a world of nuclear and biological weapons and non-state terrorist organizations that breed on poverty and despair, another global economic breakdown of such extended duration would risk armed conflicts on an even greater scale . To be sure,
Washington already has stoked the flames of the financial panic. The president and the Treasury secretary did the policy equivalent of yelling fire in a crowded theater when they insisted that Congress immediately pass a bad bailout bill or face financial Armageddon. Members of Congress splintered and voted against the bill before voting for it several days later, showing a lack of conviction that did nothing to reassure markets. Even Alan Greenspan is questioning free markets today, placing our policy fundamentals in even greater jeopardy. But after the elections, all eyes will turn to the new president and Congress in search of reassurance that the fundamentals of our free economy will be supported. That will require the shelving of any talk of trade protectionism, higher taxes, and more restrictive labor markets. The stakes couldn't be any higher.
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Impact Timeframe = Immediate

Loss of the credibility of U.S. deterrence causes Japanese prolif and destabilizing Asian arms races in 30 days Rowe 95 (Stephen C.-, Ph D Candidate Chicago, April 15, The Negative Effects of Minimal Deterrence on the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, http://synapticstorm.org/thesis.html#N_67_) "The rule of thumb among nuclear experts in Washington is that Japan could produce a nuclear device in 30 days if it so chose." - Larry Pressler, Washington Times, January 11, 1994. Should Japan decide to move in such a direction, it could well be disastrous. A nuclear Japan would threaten many of
its neighbors who still vividly remember what Japan did to them during World War II. They may decide to pursue nuclear weapons to counter the Japanese threat. What would result is the simultaneous destabilization of the region's security balance and a race for nuclear weapons.(68)
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A2: No Re-arm Perception Link

Even if Japan doesnt nuclearize controversy causes an arms race Bakanic MA International Affairs Princeton 8 (Elizabeth D.-, June 9, The end of Japan's nuclear taboo,
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-end-of-japans-nuclear-taboo) All that said, by no means is Japan on the road to nuclear weapons development--or even considering it as a serious option. Technically speaking, Japan has several huge constraints to nuclear weapons development--see "Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt" PDF and "Japan's Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests." PDF
So why should the world be concerned about Japan's fading nuclear allergy? Because Tokyo's attitude toward nuclear weapons is incredibly important to Japan's neighbors and the nonproliferation regime, meaning subtle changes in its attitude could carry serious security consequences for both. Historically, Japan has maintained complicated relations with many of its neighbors--specifically China, North Korea, and South Korea. While functional relationships do exist, deep mistrust and suspicions persist, creating a paranoid security environment where an innocuous change from an outside perspective sets off alarm bells in the region. So what may seem like a natural shift in Japan's nuclear attitudes may be a destabilizing change for those less trustful and less objective . Therefore, if discussing nuclear weapons becomes more acceptable in Japan, China and the Koreas might perceive this as a dangerous development and use it as an excuse to increase their military capabilities--nuclear or otherwise. In terms of the teetering nonproliferation regime, a change in Japan's attitude toward nuclear weapons would be a serious blow. To date, Tokyo has been a foremost advocate of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
campaigning against proliferation and rejecting the idea of developing nuclear weapons despite possessing the best nuclear capability of any non-nuclear weapon state and having two nuclear weapon states near its borders . The binding nature of international agreements relies on such attention and support from its signatories. So although Japan may
never violate the treaty, if Tokyo is perceived as being less supportive as it opens up domestically on the nuclear issue, the effect on NPT morale could be dire , which speaks directly to the NPT's current vulnerability.
Some element of the changing attitude toward nuclear weapons in Japan must be due to discomfort with the status quo and a security need that the NPT or the country's other security partnerships isn't satisfying. Therefore, a disturbing factor of Japan's nuclear normalization is what it may symbolize for the NPT overall.
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A2: No Re-arm Technical Barriers

No technical barriers to Japanese Re-arm Matsumura Fellow Brookings 6
(Masahiro-, Nov. 10, The Brookings Institution, Prudence and Realism in Japan's Nuclear Options, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2006/1110japan_matsumura.aspx) The world is watching Japan's reaction to North Korea's nuclear test for signs that it may go nuclear itself. Japan, already a
virtual nuclear superpower, could build an arsenal ranked only behind the U.S. and Russia. It possesses plenty of fissile material, and its space program's advanced rockets could easily be converted to carry nuclear payloads. The nation also clearly has the financial capacity to join the nuclear club . Finally, Japan's pacifist Constitution could be interpreted to tolerate the possession of nuclear weapons for purely defensive objectives, or for deterrence by retaliation.
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A2: No Re-arm DPJ

DPJ doesnt solve the risk of prolif- public concern still drives their security motivations. Wittner 09 (Lawrence, prof of history at SUNY-Albany, Japan's Election and Anti-Nuclear Momentum,
http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/22524) At the moment, the degree to which the
Japanese elections will increase the clout of this burgeoning nuclear abolition campaign remains uncertain. The DPJ faces a number of challenges if it is to implement its nuclear-free promises. Although public sentiment in Japan is strongly antinuclear, there is also a rising fear of North Korea's nuclear program - a fact that might lead to an erosion of the new administration's nuclear-free doctrine. Compromise on maintaining a nuclear-free Japan is alluring, as Japan has the scientific and technological capability to produce nuclear weapons easily and quickly. Furthermore, many Japanese (and particularly LDP members), though uneasy about Japan's development of nuclear weapons, feel comfortable under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Thus, they might resist international efforts to create a nuclear-free world.
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A2: No Re-arm Public 1/2

Japanese public willing to re-arm because of North Korea Ebrey, History Professor at UWash, 9 (Patricia, Modern East Asia from 1600: A Cultural, Social, and
Political History p 528)
Japan's fear of North Koreas nuclear weapons and missiles has pushed public sentiment toward rearmament and nuclear weapons. Six hundred books have been published on North Korea in Japan, most of thim
extremely hostile. Initial attempts to negotiate with North Korea to pay reparations for the damage done by Japanese colonialism backfired when Kim Jong II admitted kidnapping Japanese as a means of recruiting Japanese language instructors. The public, the media, and Japanese nationalists have responded with demands for a hard line
against North Koreano peace treaty, no economic aid without a full accounting of all the abductees. Nationalists also argue that until Japan has a legitimate military, it will not be a truly independent nation. Calls for re-arm increasing Takai Fmr. Researcher Military Science JSDF Staff College 9-11 (Mitsuo-, JSDF = Japan Self-Defense
Force, UPI Asia, Japan's priority: Non-nuclear conventional weapons http://www.upiasia.com/Politics/2009/09/11/japans_priority_non-nuclear_conventional_weapons/1755) Against the backdrop of China's rapid military buildup, there are rising voices in Japan arguing in favor of nuclear armament a hitherto unthinkable option in the only nation that has ever suffered a nuclear catastrophe in human history.
Japanese public wont check re-arm- younger generation Rublee 9 (Maria Rost, April, Ph.D., Strategic Insights, The Future of Japanese Nuclear Policy, Vol. 8 #2,
http://www.nps.edu/ Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Apr/rubleeApr09.html) If Japan is unlikely to develop nuclear weapons in the short term, what about in the long term? An over-the-horizon view can help us pinpoint the factors most likely to instigate changes in Japanese nuclear weapons policy. Because of the strength of most domestic factors in keeping Japan non-nuclear, international factors will be the most likely cause should Japan decide to reverse its decades-long policy of nuclear forbearance. Domestic Determinants Most domestic inputs act to keep Japan non-nuclear (although not all). Thus, reversal in some of these inputs could influence a reconsideration of the nuclear option. Nuclear Allergy. The Japanese nuclear allergythe widely used term to describe the Japanese aversion to nuclear weapons is weakening but still has the potential to be a powerful political force. The allergy is strongest among older populations, who have more of a connection with Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, even after the North Korean nuclear test, few Japanese wanted to see the country acquire its own nuclear option. This is in part due to what one Japanese defense expert called reproduced memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Cartoons, comic books, movies, radio programs, and television shows have exposed generations of Japanese to the atomic devastation Japan experienced.[25] Peace education is a mandatory component in schools, and even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spends money on anti-nuclear education programs.[26] As a result, the Japanese dread of nuclear weapons is deep-seated and long lasting. One prominent defense official, who received training in the United States and other Western countries, noted, As a graduate student in the U.S., I felt very uneasy when I tried to discuss topics like nuclear strategy objectively, leaving those moral judgments aside. I somehow do not like nuclear weapons. More instinctively, I hate them.[27] The political potency of the nuclear allergy comes into play because due to it, politicians are extremely reluctant to raise the possibility of a Japanese nuclear option. Defense experts agree that nuclear weapons are the political third rail in Japanese politics, a topic to be handled carefully and best avoided if at all possible. A former ambassador noted, No politician dares to take this up! Anti-nuclear sentiment is SO strong. Some may think it in their heart but would never express it.[28] Even those who believe the nuclear allergy has weakened significantly still admit that the threat of negative public response keeps politicians from raising the nuclear issue. Pacifist public opinion is not organized, just very vague, just atmosphere, one senior Japanese defense expert said. But, if politicians are regarded by the general public as hawkish on nuclear weapons, they could lose their seat.[29] To what extent could we expect the importance of this factor to fade? Over time, the nuclear allergy is likely to become less prominent. In March 2007, a range of defense experts interviewed in Tokyo agreed that the younger generation shows less hesitation about Japan exerting military power and shows less aversion to nuclear weapons than older cohorts. Because of the transmission of experiences from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this will likely take place more slowly than might be expected but will still occur.
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A2: No Re-arm Public 2/2

Crisis creates unique pressures for re-arm Campbell Sr VP CSIS 2 (Kurt M.-, Kissinger Chair in National Security @ CSIS, Winter, Washington
Quarterly, Nuclear Proliferation beyond Rogues, Vol. 26 #1, Lexis) States in decline often suffer from a kind of societal insecurity over future economic and security shortfalls. Such anxiety could well trigger national consideration of nuclear options to forestall the heightened vulnerability that naturally accompanies decline. Just as failing or slipping states have historically sought to wage preventive war against rising and competitive states in the international system, declining states may well consider the nuclear option as a relatively costeffective and technically achievable equalizer that could prevent the state's descent into oblivion or trial by rising regional rivals. This complex societal dynamic of "regime pessimism" is currently in play among virtually all the states in the Middle East, and some might even argue in Japan as well. Countries that once aspired to international greatness or at least a level of prominence but that now fear irrelevance or worse might regard nuclear weapons as a way to provide not only a psychological hedge but potentially a strategic one.
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______________ *****AFF*****
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2AC Non-unique Re-arm Now

North Korea causing Japan re-arm Groening, OneNewsNow, 5-27-10
(Chad, Maginnis: Japan http://www.onenewsnow.com/Security/Default.aspx?id=1027284) A Pentagon advisor and national defense expert says the recent revelation that North Korea may re-arm
was responsible for the sinking of a South Korean warship has compelled Japan to rethink its national security policy . Tensions over North Korea's sinking of a South Korean warship are serious enough to have prompted Japan's Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama to break a campaign promise. He had pledged to close the U.S. Marine
base in Okinawa, but he now says he has decided to keep Marine Corps Air Station located on the strategically important island, which is close to Taiwan and the Chinese mainland and not far from the Korean peninsula. The island hosts more than half the 47,000 American troops in Japan under a mutual security pact. Lt. Col. Bob Maginnis (USA-Ret.) believes Japan recognizes its vulnerability "not only because of North Korea, but also the Chinese and the Chinese aggressions." "It's really a tough set of circumstances that the Japanese find themselves facing," he notes. " I do believe that they're going
to make decisions that are in their national interests, and that well may be the need to build up its armed forces. They'll use the excuse, of course, of a hostile North Korea, which isn't getting any better, and...a growing and very robust Chinese military." The national defense expert adds that Japan has one of the world's leading economies and may decide they no longer want to depend solely on an overstretched U.S. military for their national security. Japan re-arming now North Korea and economy Hung, China Post, 4-13-9 (Joe, Japan
may now have to rearm http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/the-china-post/joe-hung/2009/04/13/204014/Japan-may.htm) itself
The fear of a nuclear attack from North Korea, coupled with the current economic recession, is more than likely to prompt Japan to re-arm itself. North Korea , rather than Russia or the People's Republic of China, is Japan's only potential enemy. And the country is headed by Kim Jong-Il, the erratic despot son of Kim Il-Song, who
launched an invasion to kick off the Korean War in 1950. Pyongyang has gone on the record by saying it has stopped trying to make nuclear bombs, but the Japanese military suspects that they may have been stockpiled . Japan has a mutual defense treaty with the United States. Uncle Sam provides a nuclear defense umbrella for Japan under the treaty signed at the beginning of the Cold War era for protection against attacks from the Soviet Union. Thanks to the mutual defense arrangements, Japan has been able to refrain from rearmament , which is frowned upon by the United States and the People's Republic of China, along with those Asian countries that were invaded or occupied by the Japanese Imperial Army before and during the Second World War. The global financial crisis has changed the situation, however. Japan is one of the countries hardest hit by the silent tsunami, which, if not halted in time, may engulf the world like the Great Depression of the early 1930s. The Wall Street crash of 1929 precipitated a sharp decline in Japan's silk industry first. By 1931, the index of raw silk prices, with those in 1914 at 100, was down to 67, compared with 151 in 1929 and 222 in 1925. Over the same period, the index for rice fell from 257 to 114. A world slump in international trade simultaneously reduced Japan's cotton exports, driving a large proportion of unemployed girl factory workers to seek refuge in their native villages. The result was widespread poverty in rural areas. One solution Japan found to cure its economic woes was to expand military spending . The Kwantung Army created the Mukden Incident on Sept. 18, 1931. The people who began to consider Western democracy the source of all evils cheered on the army, the only stabilizing force in the nation, for the occupation of Manchuria and the founding of Manchukuo with China's "last emperor," Henry Pu Yi, as the puppet emperor. This laid the ground for expansion abroad and the building of a country organized for war. Government policy played an important part in these developments. At first, this was because of attempts to overcome the economic crisis, but it came later to depend very largely on military needs. Military spending rose sharply from under 500 million yen and 30 percent of the budget in 1931 to 4 billion yen and 70 percent of the budget in 1937-8. And on July 7, 1937, the undeclared war between Japan and the Republic of China under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek occurred. In fact, Japan was among the first countries to recover from the Great Depression by massive
military spending. If the current economic crisis continues to deepen, Japan simply has to sharply increase defense spending to tide it over. It will spend its way out of the crisis.
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2AC No Link Troops Not Key

Troops don't solve allied prolif. They're no longer seen as sufficient. Davis et al 9 (Jacquelyn, Ex. VP Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Pres. IFPA and
Prof. Intl. Sec. Studies Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts U. and former DOD Consultant, Charles M. Perry , VP and Dir. Studies IFPA, and James L. Schoff, Associate Dir. Asia-Pacific Studies IFPA, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis White Paper, Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning: Reassuring Allies, Deterring Legacy Threats, and Dissuading Nuclear "Wannabes", February, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating_US_Deterrence_Concepts.pdf, p. 8) In the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, that satisfaction and trust is no longer a given , and
divergent threat perceptions have given rise to contending approaches to dealing with would-be proliferators and legacy challenges. Consequently, reassuring and discouraging a nuclear cascade of allies, or former allies, has emerged as a crucial element of deterrence planning, and, in the absence of consensus about the nature of the threats that we are facing, that reassurance function has become more complex and subject to more varied interpretations than it was in the past. In the wake of Iraq and in the midst of the Afghanistan war, as the United States endeavors to reset its forces and transform its overseas (military) footprint, the forward deployment of U.S. troops may not be sufficient in itself to convince American allies that our commitment to extended deterrence remains credible, especially in the case of political differences over preferred ways for dealing with emerging threats and legacy challenges . This, in turn, may lead some U.S. allies or coalition partners to conclude that their interests would better be served by pursuing their own nuclear options. As the Interim Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United
States, previously cited, points out: Our non-proliferation strategy will continue to depend upon U.S. extended deterrence strategy as one of its pillars. Our military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, underwrite U.S. security guarantees to our allies, without which many of them would feel enormous pressures to create their own nuclear arsenals. So long as the United States maintains adequately strong conventional forces, it does not necessarily need to rely on nuclear weapons to deter the threat of a major conventional attack. But long-term U.S. superiority in the conventional military domain cannot be taken for granted and requires continuing attention and investment . Moreover, it is not adequate for deterring nuclear attack. The U.S. deterrent must be both visible and credible, not only to our possible adversaries, but to our allies as well.6
Other methods suffice to sustain deterrence. Even if troops matter only tiny numbers are enough. Adams 5 (Karen Ruth, Associate Prof. IR U. Montana, and PhD Pol Sci. UC Berkeley, New Great Powers:
Who Will They Be, and How Will They Rise?, http://www.cas.umt.edu/polsci/faculty/adams/greatpower.pdf, p. 11)
Extended deterrence can be substantiated in many ways through the deployment of expatriates such as diplomats, advisors, or troops, for example, or through the cultivation of extensive political, economic, or cultural ties. Determining how this is most efficiently and effectively done in the nuclear, information age will be the
key to identifying how second-tier states become great powers, as well as which ones are furthest along that path.41
Despite the variety of options, there is a tendency in the US to focus on troop deployments, especially large ones. This is why policy makers see command of the commons as so vital. It is also why they discount the possibility that the US will have peer competitors in the near future. Yet, occasionally, officials acknowledge the logic of deterrence. For example, although during the Cold War, massive US deployments in the Korean DMZ were thought necessary to deter North Korea from attacking the South, today (when those troops are being redeployed to Iraq and within South Korea), Pentagon officials acknowledge that trip-wire forces of 5,000 are just as effective as deployments of 500,000.42
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2AC No Impact No Re-arm (Technical Barriers) 1/2

Not enough space to test Yokoti Associate Editor at Newsweek Japan, responsible for the coverage of defense and diplomatic issues 6/22
Takashi, The N Word, http://www.newsweek.com/id/201859/output/print For another, Japana crowded island nationlacks the space to test a bomb. Japan has large stockpiles of plutonium for its nuclear-energy industry. But plutonium-type bombs require physical testing to verify their efficacy. (Uranium bombs are considerably simpler and so may not need physical testing, but Japan doesn't have the weapons-grade uranium to make such a device .) While some experts argue that Japan could test a plutonium weapon by detonating it underground, others including former defense chief Shigeru Ishiba
insist that there is simply nowhere to do so in such a densely populated nation. Simulations would not be sufficient; those only work after at least one actual test. Technical obstacles and diplomatic blowback Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes - associate professors of strategy, U.S. Naval War College 9
THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE, Naval War College Review, Summer 2009, Vol. 62, No. 3 As noted above, analysts and Japanese politicians evince conviction that Japan could erect a nuclear deterrent in a relatively short period of time. We are unpersuaded by this apparent optimism and conventional wisdom. It is true that Japan
possesses all the trappings of a nuclear power. Yet the path to a credible nuclear status is likely to be long and winding. Above all, Japan needs the material capacity to develop a bomb. (40) With fifty-five nuclearpower plants in operation around the country and the nuclear sector's large reserves of reactor-grade plutonium, Japan enjoys a readily available supply of fissile material. According to Sankei Shimbun, Japan possesses enough plutonium on its own soil and in reprocessing plants overseas to produce 740 bombs. (41) How usable this reactor-grade material would be for weapons purposes, however, remains a matter of dispute among technical specialists. An internal government report unearthed by Sankei Shimbun reportedly concluded that Japan would need several hundred engineers , 200-300 billion yen (or $2-$3 billion), and three to five years to fabricate a serviceable nuclear warhead . (42) The real question would be timing. It is doubtful in the extreme that Japan could circumvent its safeguards agreement with the IAEA undetected for long. (43) While the cases of Iran and North Korea demonstrate that it is possible to bypass the IAEA, Japan holds itself to much higher, more stringent standards, having assented to one of the most intrusive, regular inspection programs in the world. (44) Furthermore, think of the diplomatic blowback: one can only imagine the
uproar if such an effort on the part of Japan, a consistent, sincere opponent of nuclear weapons, were exposed to public and international scrutiny. Thus, Japanese policy makers must consider the extent to which Tokyo could withstand mounting external pressure to cease and desist while its nuclear complex amassed enough bomb-making material for a viable arsenal. Tokyo cannot expect to deceive the international community long enough to present the world a fait accompli. It would probably have to make its intentions clear--and endure international opprobrium--well before reaching the breakout threshold, if not at the outset. Even assuming that Japan can procure enough fissile materials to build an arsenal, its engineers would still have to leap over several technical barriers. First, Japan must devise an effective, efficient delivery system. The most direct route would be to arm Japan's existing fleet of fighter aircraft with nuclear bombs or missiles. The fighters in the Air Self-Defense Force ( SDF) inventory, however, are constrained by four factors: vulnerability to preemptive strikes while still on the ground at their bases; limited range, as Japan possesses no strategic bombers; susceptibility to interception by enemy fighters while en route to their targets; and vulnerability to increasingly sophisticated integrated air-defense systems. Compounding these shortcomings, Japan is surrounded by water, substantially increasing flight times to targets on the Asian mainland. In light of this, ballistic or cruisemissiles would likely rank as Japans weapon of choice.45 The challenges would be two. First, if Tokyo chose to rely on amissile delivery system, it would have to produce a workable,miniaturized nuclear warhead that could be mounted atop an accurate cruise or ballistic missile. Such a feat is not beyond Japanese engineering prowess, but it would involve significant lead time. Second, the nation must develop the delivery vehicle itself. Even the U.S. defense-industrial sector, with its half-century of experience in this field,
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Japan Re-arm Disadvantage Starter Pack takes years to design and build new missiles. Japan could conceivably convert some of its civilian space-launch vehicles into ballistic missiles, but it would have to perfect key components, like inertial guidance systems. If it opted for long-range cruise missiles, Tokyo would in effect find itself unless it could purchase Tomahawk cruise missiles off the shelf fromtheUnited States, a doubtful prospect, given the highly offensive nature of Tomahawks and thus the political sensitivity of such a sale compelled to start from scratch . Procuring and integrating satellite guidance,
terrain-contour matching, and other specialized techniques and hardware would demand long, hard labor from Japanese weapon scientists. There is also the question of testing. Japan would need to ensure the safety and reliability of its nuclear arsenal. There would be no substitute for an actual nuclear test that proved this new (for Japan) technology while bolstering the credibility of Japanese deterrence. The Japanese Archipelago is simply too small and too densely populated for a test to be conducted there safelyeven leaving aside the potential for a political backlash, given thememories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki it would conjure up . Tokyo could detonate a device near some Japanese-held island in the Pacific, such as Okinotori-shima. But again, the diplomatic furor from flouting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)would be intense,while the Japanese populace would think back to the Lucky Dragon incident during the Bikini tests of the 1950s.46 One
need only recall the uproar over French and Chinese tests on the eve of the CTBTs entry into force. Computer simulations of weapon performance may be less optimal but would certainly be more palatable from a political standpoint for Japan. The Israeli experience may be instructive here for any Japanese bomb-making efforts. The technical dilemmas reviewed
above demonstrate that there is no shortcut to a nuclear breakout, even for a technological powerhouse of Japans standing. The Congressional Research Service notes, If one assumes that Japan would want weapons with
high reliability and accuracy, then more time would need tobe devoted to their development unless a weapon or information was supplied by an outside source.47 Kan Ito, a commentator on Japanese strategic affairs for nearly two decades, concurs, considering observers who predict a rapid breakout utterly presumptuous. Declares Ito, It is dangerous to believe such a misconception. It will take 15 years for Japan to build up its own autonomous nuclear deterrence capability that is truly functional .48 While one may quibble with his fifteenyear timeline, which seems unduly pessimistic, the period required to develop and field a credible deterrent would probably be measured in years rather than the weeks or months cavalierly bandied about.
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2AC No Impact No Re-arm (DPJ) 1/2

No re-arm theyre peaceful Nakanishi, International Herald Tribune, 10 (Yoshio, February 1, Imagining a Nuclear-armed Japan
New York Times) To me a nuclear-armed
Japan seems like the remotest possibility, even in 30 years. This is a nation drenched in a peace-at-any-price mentality after Hiroshima and Nagasaki and under the influence of a Constitution that renounces war, a legacy of postwar American occupation. Successive Japanese governments have had no choice but to uphold the three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, making or letting in nuclear weaponry. Meanwhile, Japans new Democratic government is making an issue of a past secret deal alleged to have been struck between Tokyo and Washington to enable nuclear-armed U.S. vessels to visit or come near Japan. Nuke hawks lost political power Yokoti Associate Editor at Newsweek Japan, responsible for the coverage of defense and diplomatic issues 6/22
Takashi, The N Word, http://www.newsweek.com/id/201859/output/print
There's one other roadblock to consider: Japan's top nuclear hawks have seen their power weaken considerably in recent years. Abe lost most of his clout after abruptly resigning as prime minister two years ago. In February, Nakagawa resigned as finance minister in disgrace after appearing drunk at a news conference. And Aso is practically a lame duck these days, with little room for bold moves. Pre-election links are irrelevant new Japanese government will never re-arm Takubo, Operator of Nuclear Information at Kakujoho, 9 (Masa, September 24, Japans Challenges and
Dilemmas over Nuclear Disarmament Policy Forum Online, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09077Takubo.html) That may now change. While conservative sections of the Japanese political and military establishment may be opposed to the US adopting no-first-use and core deterrence policies, such views are by no means unanimous. On 30 August, 2009 the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won a landslide victory in the general election, defeating the ruling Liberal Democrat Party (LDP), which had been in almost unbroken power since 1955. According to its nuclear policy determined in 2000, the DPJ supports no first use, a position that was underscored on 12 May, 2009 when DPJ Secretary-General Katsuya Okada (in line to become Foreign Minister at the time of writing) told a Diet session that "a norm not allowing at least the first use , or making it illegal to use nuclear weapons against countries not possessing nuclear weapons should be established. Japan should be at the forefront of this effort as a leader."[19] Just before the election, in response to a questionnaire organized by Peace Pledge Japan and Governance Design Laboratory, DPJ President Yukio Hatoyama also expressed the view that no-first-use policies should be pursued. In view of such positions, we can hope that the new coalition government will encourage the Obama administration to pursue nuclear disarmament and adopt appropriate policies to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons.[20] Whether or not the government gives active support to specific changes in US doctrine, it is
unlikely to stand in the way if the Obama administration decides to adopt core deterrence and pursue deeper cuts in the US and Russian arsenals.
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2AC No Impact No Re-arm (DPJ) 2/2

No constituency for rearm Lewis Director, the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative, the New America Foundation- 9 Jeffrey,
Japan TLAM/N, May, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2284/japan-tlamn The debate in Washington, I think, starts from a mistaken assumption. It is not the
case that, if the US reduces the credibility of its extended deterrent, the Japanese will just build nuclear weapons to make up the difference. On the contrary, there is no mainstream constituency in Japan for an independent nuclear deterrent . If you
want to know where Japan is heading, read this article by Hajime Izumi and Katsuhisa Furukawa. Across the political spectrum, Japanese policy-makers realize that an independent nuclear deterrent would destroy the USJapan bilateral relationship a bilateral relationship to which Japan has no alternativ e. It is this lack of
viable geopolitical alternatives to the U.S. alliance that creates an extreme risk-aversion among Japanese policymakers to any change in U.S. nuclear policy, good or bad. An analogy might be the irrational fear of flying in some people an anxiety that results from a sense of having little or no control over ones fate. The solution to this sort of anxiety isnt to retain obsolete capabilities like the TLAM/N, any more than Aunt Ginny should skip
her daughters wedding because she hates airplanes. Take this thought experiment: What if a Japanese official suggested, in addition to the TLAM/N, that we design a new low-yield, earth penetrating nuclear weapon (PLYWD)? a weapon that does not make strategic or political sense to borrow a phrase? Would you do something dumb just because the Japanese asked you to? Of course not. That some Japanese officials irrationally focus on irrelevant capabilities to
measure our commitment to Japan is a symptom of a much bigger problem that needs to be addressed with more than hardware.
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2AC No Impact No Re-arm (Public) 1/4

No public support Yokoti Associate Editor at Newsweek Japan, responsible for the coverage of defense and diplomatic issues 6/22
Takashi, The N Word, http://www.newsweek.com/id/201859/output/print Yet this is all just rhetoric. For one thing, despite North Korea's threats
and China's growing military and political power, the Japanese people remain dead set against building nuclear weapons. Polls conducted over the past three years show that less than 20 percent of the public currently says it favors possessing such a deterrent. No re-arm public checks Tamamoto Sr. Fellow World Policy Institute Fall 09 (Masaru-, World Policy Journal, The Emperors New
Clothes Can Japan Live Without the Bomb?, Vol. 26 #3, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/wopj.2009.26.3.63?cookieSet=1) As seen from Tokyo, Bill Clintons visit to Pyongyang in August and his successful efforts to secure the release of two American journalists opens the way for a renewed dialogue between Washington and the North Korean regime. At the same time, the Obama administration is moving to build a comprehensive and constructive partnership with China, which should include confidence- building measures with regard to security. These are all hopeful signs, but there are those in Japan who fret that a security deal between Washington and Beijing may cut Tokyo out, thereby diminishing the long-standing guarantee of American security. In a way, Japans dependence on a foreign protector has infantilized the nation. Today,
officials in Tokyo feel ever more fearful of abandonmentthat the nuclear blanket they have held onto for so long may be ripped from their hands. This sort of discussion is a glimpse of the thinking of a narrow group of national security strategists in Japan. But when it comes to the Japanese public, fear of
abandonment is not the issue. Rather, during the Cold War and beyond, the public had been fearful of being dragged into Americas wars. Opinion polls show that the majority of Japanese do not think that a nuclear umbrella is necessaryand certainly that they would not countenance a domestic nuclear deterrent . When pushed, most people observe that the U.S.-Japan security treaty and presence of American military bases in Japan increase the possibility that the nation will be sucked into a broader conflict. This is not to say that most Japanese are anti-American, rather the public is generally oblivious to national security issues and focused more on concerns over social security, employment, and the economy. The public response to the series of North Korean nuclear and missile tests since 2006 was decidedly muted , though the news media had a field day playing up the menace. To the extent that North Korea actually registers in the public consciousness, it is anger toward Pyongyangs abduction of Japanese citizens . While there is skepticism among national
security authorities that the Obama administration may diminish Japans position among regional rivals in developing a broad East Asian policy, the Japanese public, along with much of the world, cheered Obamas election and found his vision of a world free from nuclear weapons resonating with their call for No More Hiroshimas. Takao Takahara, a prominent peace activist and professor at Meiji Gakuin University, observes that the publics long distrust of the legitimacy of the nuclear umbrella is now becoming an asset to the pursuit of global nuclear disarmament. Japan will also have to convince neighbors of [its] peaceful intentions, says
Takahara. From the perspective of the [Japanese] people this will mean strengthening democratic control over security issues, along with significant arms reductions and the devising of creative nonmilitary ways to contribute to international efforts towards peace. But Japans security authorities often find public opinion a hindrance in their pursuit
of what they think is correct and necessary. They simply dont believe the broad population understands what is at stake. How a nation with such a pacifist public has been able to prosper in a troublesome, often dangerous neighborhood is a tribute to the American military occupation following World War II and the subsequent brilliant, but opaque, politics of Japans leaders. Demilitarization and democratization were the twin goals of the postwar occupation. American forces abolished the military and transformed imperial subjects into democratic citizens, while constitutionally prohibiting the country from going to war against its enemies. As Article 9 of the constitution famously reads, We the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as
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Japan Re-arm Disadvantage Starter Pack means of settling international disputes.... The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. To date, not a single word of the U.S.-written constitution has been amended. A Political Dance Hayato Ikeda, who became prime minister in 1960, eight years after the end of the American military occupation, is commonly credited with setting in place Japans business- oriented and pacifist agenda that has sought to avoid political and military entanglements abroad. But Ikeda was no pacifist. Like most other Japanese leaders of the time, he saw clearly that, for his nation to recover fully its sovereignty and independence, would require mending the psychic wounds of defeat and occupation. He believed deeply that a sovereign and independent nation naturally possesses military power and should exercise it judiciously. But his electoral district was Hiroshima and his ruling party faced a newly democratic electorate still possessed by fear and hatred of war. Prioritizing national security had become a sure way to lose elections. So Ikeda dropped talk of military preparedness and announced his income-doubling plan as the basis for an economic rebound. In 1964, China exploded its first atomic bomb. In 1965, Ikedas immediate successor, Eisaku Sato (who held personal views congruent with his predecessor), secured assurances from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara that the United States would immediately respond with nuclear weapons should China embark on war. Having won this guarantee, Prime Minister Sato formally laid out Japans non-nuclear policy, for which he was awarded the 1974 Nobel Peace Prize. Tokyo adopted the three non-nuclear principles, thus establishing Japans non-nuclear status. Enunciated in 1968, Sato pledged that Japan will neither manufacture nor possess nuclear weapons and will not allow the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. This further strengthened the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, which publicly maintained the no-nukes policy. Yet behind the Peace Prize and the three-part pledge, a brilliant diplomatic dance was being performed that kept the Japanese public totally in the dark. Cold War Pledges Of course, Japans Cold War adversaries the Soviet Union and Chinanever doubted that the United States had quietly introduced nuclear weapons into the bases it maintained in Japan and onto the ships it berthed thereall with scarcely a public ripple. Sato, meanwhile, repeatedly sought to assure his public and Washington that Japan would not follow the French Gaullist path by acquiring nuclear weapons and assuming a more independent foreign policy. But there was more than goodwill and pacifist intentions behind Satos assurancesan unwritten, yet iron-clad, handshake agreement guaranteed a solid American security commitment. In this fashion, Sato managed to reinforce the nuclear umbrella while making it less visible to the Japanese. As the United States withdrew from the Vietnam debacle in the 1970s, Japan again quietly sought assurance of a firm American alliance and security commitment. In 1975, the U.S. government officially and explicitly announced its commitment to the nuclear protection of Japan against nuclear or conventional forces in a joint communiqu by President Gerald Ford and Prime Minister Takeo Miki. By this time, fear was fading among the Japanese public of their country becoming embroiled in war. After all, Japan had managed to stay out of Vietnam. The U.S. pronouncement of nuclear protection was little noticed. What got some attention was Mikis announcement the following year that his government was capping Japans military spending at 1 percent of GDP, reinforcing Japans self-image as a peaceful nation. Simultaneously, the prime minister pushed the Diet to ratify the NPT. The apparent incongruity of a self-styled peaceful nation that eschewed nuclear weapons, while living under foreign nuclear protection, deepened. But more to the point, the Japanese public seemed to no longer even recognize that the contradiction existed. Tokyos diplomatic maneuvers marked the rule of a succession of prime ministers Ikeda, Sato, and Mikias well as other leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party, who governed all but unchallenged for decades. Each managed the delicate maneuver of forging the American relationship into Japans buffer against the often dangerous currents of international politics. At the same time, each was hard at work cultivating a domestic climate of security, where the people could avoid preoccupation with strategic military matters. Such were the cheerful and unintended consequences of Americas gift of democracy. But it is important to note that the U.S.-Japan security treaty was never an alliance among equals. The Japanese military has never been obligated to come to the defense of the United States, as is required for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members. Instead, the treaty has served in essence as a real estate deal that allows the United States to use Japanese land as military bases. Today, the Japanese public (if it is concerned at all with the presence of the U.S. military) is primarily troubled with the military bases themselvescrimes committed by U.S. soldiers, noise generated by aircraft. Moreover, such concerns are largely voiced by those who find military bases in their neighborhood. Over the years, the Japanese government has successfully persuaded the United States to move the bulk of its forces to the tiny island prefecture of Okinawa, far from mainland Japan. Even the bases, once everywhere, are now out of sightand largely out of mind, as well. The Nuclear Deterrent According to Japans current National Defense Program Guideline, To protect its territory and people against the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. At the same time, Japan will play an active role in creating a world free of nuclear weapons by taking realistic step-by-step measures for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. The contradiction is blatantly apparent: a Japan firmly huddled beneath the American nuclear umbrella is in no
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Japan Re-arm Disadvantage Starter Pack position to suggest folding it, or even punching a few holes here and there. Nevertheless, Japan has made a host of initiatives toward global arms control and nuclear non-proliferation. Since 1994, Japan has introduced multiple resolutions on nuclear disarmament at the UN General Assembly, which have been adopted almost unanimously. In 2008, the Japanese and Australian governments undertook a joint initiative, establishing the International Commission on Nuclear Non- Proliferation and Disarmament. And the Japanese government sent one of its ambassadors to chair the preparatory committee for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. So what is Japans real position on nuclear weapons ? Is Tokyo hedging? Absolutely. But theres more at work to Tokyos diplomatic maneuverings: officials may be realistic as to the gulf between rose-tinted disarmament rhetoric and the difficulties of putting this into practice, but they still seek greater clarity from Washington. When the Bush administration recognized the legitimacy of Indias nuclear weapons in apparently complete violation of the NPT, there was little that Japan, a fully committed member, could do. They were in no position to take a public stand against the U.S.-India nuclear deal and, in effect said nothing. But the Obama administration now seems serious about realizing a world without nuclear weapons, which not only takes from Japan the mantle of being a state rhetorically committed to disarmament, but throws into question just what kind of nuclear umbrella will remain for it to cling to. The talk in Japan of the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons is new, but rather limited . It is
amplified only because critics in the United States, China, and South Korea hear in it proof of their longheld suspicion of Japanese militarism that goes back to the imperial era. This is a deep and dangerous misreading of the political currents in Japan, which mistakes the sentiments of a small cadre of nationalists for that of broader officialdom . Japanese nationalists share the American sentiment of independence and sovereignty and embrace a nineteenth-century notion of the state with its own functioning military. They are frustrated to see their country so complacently subservient to the United States. Yet, when nationalists discuss the nuclear option, it is almost always in coordination with Washington. The difference is that they seek to make the American alliance real and equal, no longer just a real estate deal. If they really think, however, that the United States would establish an equal strategic relationship with Japan or any other nation, then they are delusional.
Ability, not Willingness
Japan has the technical capability to produce a nuclear bomb. But the domestic and international costs would be prohibitive, and the bulk of the leadership understands that national security will be poorly served by going nuclear. Japan has a sizeable and competent military, but with no force projection capability. The
Japanese Self Defense Force (the constitution prohibits Japans possession of land, naval, and air forces with any offensive capability) is structured primarily for territorial defense. When the Japanese army ventured abroad for the first time since 1945 to a war zoneIraqtheir equipment had to be ferried by chartered Russian cargo planes. In Iraq, Japanese soldiers concentrated on reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, and were guarded by Australian and British soldiers, because as a constitutional matter Japanese soldiers could not engage in combat. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, betraying the awkwardness of the situation, reasoned that the soldiers were going to a safe area and therefore the mission was not unconstitutional. Yet Japans nationalists saw in the effort evidence of great progress toward reviving Japan as a sovereign and independent state. Koizumi acted in the tradition of Ikeda, Sato, and Mikiunprincipled but expedient. When Bush warned that you are with us or against us, Koizumi chose the former. He had watched the deterioration of relations between the United States and some European countries that had opposed the Iraq War. Germany and France had greater Europe to bolster their security, but Japan had only the United States. And so, to further cement the American relationship and tradition of military protection, Koizumi made the historic decision to send troops abroad to war. Fortunately, there were no casualties among Japanese soldiers in Iraq, and they caused none either. Domestically, there was little serious and open discussion about the wisdom of the Iraq war. Though the precedent may have been problematic, the consequences were largely beneficial: as Washington put it, U.S.-Japan relations improved, becoming better than ever. And Koizumi, for his part, became one of the longest reigning prime ministers in Japans parliamentary history. However, Koizumis successor, Shinzo Abe, a nationalist icon, misread the political tea leaves, and attempted to take the nations acceptance of its soldiers participation in Iraq a step further. Abe moved to rewrite the Japanese constitution to make the country again sovereign and independent, fully self-reliantreviving, what he called, a beautiful Japan. Abe moved, in effect, to shed the tradition of pacifism backed by the American nuclear umbrella. During his tenure, there arose increasing talk about Japans acquiring the ability to launch a preemptive strike against North Korea. The public instinctively sensed the danger in Abes vision of beauty. The prime minister lasted barely a year. Abe abandoned office in 2007, abruptly checking himself into a hospital with a stomach ache.
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CNDI 2010 The China Opportunity
Today, North Korea provides an ideal excuse for some Japanese to discuss openly their countrys nuclear option. At this point, only Pyongyang poses a real threat to war in Asia, but the probability of this is still low. The world does not need George W. Bush in the White House to know what the United States will do to North Korea if it decided to attack South Korea or Japan. The response would be immediate and devastating, creating reconstruction and refugee problems. If, in this horrendous scenario, the United States proved insufficient to deter North Korean aggression, than it is hard to imagine how Japan could do any better.
If Tokyo were to embark on a nuclear program, the historical antagonism between Japan and North Korea would only contribute to provoking Pyongyang in a manner the international community is trying so hard to avoid. Any escalation of the threat carries the danger of breaking down deterrence. So, even among Tokyos hawks, a nuclear Japan, propelled by fear of abandonment and North Korean belligerence, makes little security sense. But the real concern is tomorrows China. Viewed from Tokyo, it seems as if Washington, for the first time, is not picking Japan as its go-to dance partner. Economic imperatives have trumped the demonization of the communist government in Beijing, and Washington has begun to deal with Japan and China equally, and independently. Yet for those in Japan and the United States worried about China transforming its newly acquired wealth into military power, the relevant question is: why would any country threaten the very system that made it rich and powerful?
Instead of worrying about the strategic implications of an increasingly powerful China or the possibility of Japan going nuclear in response, the United States and the countries in Northeast Asia should embark on substantive discussions on comprehensive arms reductions . The interlinking of economies has provided an opportunity to create transparency and trust. The nationalist voices in Japans parliament must be seen for what they are: a fringe group of radicals, with only a tiny sliver of public support. Though critics warn of an intensifying arms race in the region, the historical memories of Japanese imperial aggression are fading with the passage of time. A new generation knows nothing of this, and six decades of Japanese pacifism surely should count for something . Though analysts note the economic rivalries between these two powers, the reality is far closer to interdependence in the first quarter of 2009, China was Japans largest trading partner . These ties can give life and purpose to the Obama administrations goal of no
more Hiroshimas. In this, Obama will find much support from the Japanese public . Winning the same trust and confidence with the Chinese public may take longer, but Japans history and confident first steps into the brave, new world could be inspirational. In 1543, the Portuguese introduced the musket into fiercely warring Japan. Over the next few decades, the samurai improved the musket and changed the face of warfare. By centurys end, there were more guns in Japan than in Europe. When finally the Tokugawa clan won dominance in 1600, its first initiative was to confiscate these arms from more than 100 feudal lords. They destroyed the guns, including their own. Peace and order ensued for the following two and a half centuries. Now it is time to lead once more in giving up the bomb.
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2AC Strong Alliance Bad Sino-Japan War

Current strong US-Japan relations make Sino-Japanese war more likely Xinbo, IR Professor at the Center for American Studies, 6 (Wu, Winter, The End of the Silver Lining: A
Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance Washington Quarterly, Vol 29 No 1, p 119-130)
As the U.S.-Japanese alliance has strengthened, Japan has embraced the idea that a rising China is a strategic rival. In December 2004, Japans new National Defense Program Guidelines named China as a possible threat to its national security for the first time.10 Beyond discussions of the North Ko- rean threat, the guidelines turned to China, expressing strong concern over Chinas modernization of nuclear and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces and the expansion of its area of operation at sea. The new guidelines, which set out Japans defense policies for the next decade, suggested that Japan should be attentive to Chinas future course. Prior to this, Japans Ground Self-Defense Force developed a defense plan to prepare for a possible Chinese
attack. 11 Furthermore, in February 2005 the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee released a joint statement laying out a set of common strategic goals for the alliance. Noteworthy was its inclusion of China-related issues, including Taiwan. Although the wording was subtle, the fact that Japan and the United States officially recognized confronting
these issues as one of their common strategic goals suggests that China will increasingly drive security cooperation between Tokyo and Washington and underscores Japans increased focus on China as a priority concern on its national security agenda.
JAPAN BECOMING A MAJOR MILITARY PLAYER From Tokyos and Washingtons perspectives, Japans return to normalcy means greater military might and a more active and assertive security policy. Beijing, however, is very
concerned with the orientation of Japans security policy, viewing it as one of the key factors affecting stability in Northeast Asia as well as Chinas security environment .12 Given Japans well-equipped SelfDefense Forces (SDF) and particularly its advanced naval and air forces, Japan is already a major military power in Asia. Moreover, its military strength continues to grow as Tokyo seeks to develop its power projection, intelligence collection, and ballistic missile capabilities. The Chinese also wonder whether Japan will continue to lower the threshold for
its overseas military activities. In the late 1990s, the revised U.S.-Japanese defense guidelines and the Laws Regarding Contingencies in the Surrounding Areas of Japan made it possible for Japanese troops to be involved in a conflict outside of Japanese territory. Nuclear war Brzezinski 04 (Former Sect. Of State) 2004 [Zbigniew, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership,
Perseus, New York)
How the power dynamics in the Far East are shaped by the interrelationship among America, Japan, and China will also affect global stability. The United States should seek to translate the emerging equilibrium among itself, Japan, and China into a more structured security relationship. Geopolitically, Asia roughly resembles Europe prior to World War I. America has stabilized Europe but it still faces a potential structural crisis in
Asia, where several major powers still contend, though checked by Americas peripheral strategic presence. That presence is anchored by the American-Japanese connection, hut the rise of a regionally dominant China and the unpredictability of North Korea signal the need for a more active U.S. policy to promote, at a minimum, a triangular security relationship. As argued earlier, such a triangular equilibrium, to be enduring, will require a more internationally engaged Japan that will have gradually assumed a wider range of military responsibilities. Creating this equilibrium might entail, in turn, fostering a trans Eurasian multilateral security structure for coping with the novel dimensions of global security. Failure to engage China
and Japan in at least a de facto security structure could eventually trigger a dangerous tectonic shift, perhaps involving the unilateral remilitarization of Japan, which already has the potential to very quickly become a nuclear power, in addition to the already grave challenge posed by North Koreas quest for a nuclear arsenal of its own, The need for a collective regional response to North Korea reinforces the more general point
that only a co-optive American hegemony can cope effectively with the increasingly pervasive spread of weaponry of mass destruction, whether among states or extremist organizations. [P. 226-227]
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2AC Strong Alliance Bad US-Sino War

Strong US-Japan alliance causes Taiwan war Xinbo, IR Professor at the Center for American Studies, 6 (Wu, Winter, The End of the Silver Lining: A
Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance Washington Quarterly, Vol 29 No 1, p 119-130) THE TAIWAN STRAIT Of Beijings various concerns about the U.S.- Japanese alliance,
the most acute is the potential impact on Chinas handling of the Taiwan issue. Un- fortunately, the strengthened U.S.Japanese alliance has led to Japans accel- erated involvement in the Taiwan issue , as demonstrated by the February 2005 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee joint statement, which in turn has further harmed SinoJapanese relations. The widespread anti-Japa- nese protests in China in the spring of 2005 were aroused not only by historical and territorial disputes but also by Japans unwarranted interference in what China perceives as its core national interests in the Taiwan issue. To Washington and Tokyo, the alliance will serve first and foremost as a formidable deterrent against Beijings possible use of force against Taiwan. Should deterrence fail, their alliance would serve as a platform for a joint U.S.-Japanese response to a contingency in the Taiwan Strait. In 1996 and 1997, when the United States and Japan worked to revise their defense cooperation guidelines, they included the Taiwan Strait in the parameters. Even though Tokyo insisted that the parameters are situational rather than geographical, the Taiwan Strait and the Korean
peninsula have been listed by Tokyo and Washington as the two potential hot spots necessitating U.S.Japanese security cooperation in East Asia. Since the defense cooperation guidelines were revised, both U.S.Taiwanese and Japanese-Taiwanese security ties have been remarkably enhanced. Given the long-held U.S. security commitment to Taiwan, the expansion of U.S.-Taiwanese military relations may be expected. The growth of Japanese-
Taiwanese security ties, however, should be attributed to the expanded mission of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. In fact, interaction between Washington and Tokyo on the Taiwan issue has been increasing, with Tokyo more actively consulting and coordinating with Washington in its relations with Taipei . After
listing Taiwan as a common strategic objective in February 2005, Japan and the United States are reported to be working on a joint war plan for the Taiwan Strait. 16 As the U.S.-Japanese alliance assumes the function of security
guarantor to Taiwan, it serves to embolden the separatist forces in Taiwan, who believe that, no matter which side provoked a war in the Taiwan Strait, Washington and To- kyo would be ready to come to their rescue. Based on this calculus, Taiwan has been pushing for the creation of a U.S.-Japan-Taiwan security coalition in recent years.17 For Beijing, the hard reality is that, if the situation in Taiwan spins out of control and requires force, it has to be prepared to deal not only with the United States but also with a militarily more active and capable Japan. That risks a massive nuclear war Johnson 01 (President of the Japan Policy Research Institute) [Chalmers, Time to Bring the Troops Home, The
Nation, (May 14, 2001 issue), pg. http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20010514&c=1&s=johnson] China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China , and all serious US militarists know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no one wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the world's most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust. However, given the nationalistic challenge to China's sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally, forward-deployed US forces on China's borders have virtually no deterrent effect.
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CNDI Japan Re Arm Disadvantage

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Japan Re-arm Disadvantage Starter Pack

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will be kept from blowing up the entire world.

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Writing on nanotechnology, Drexler warns,

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