Reliability 2

Federal University of Technology Owerri
Reliability
ECE 510 Reliability and Quality Assurance in Electronics
2nd Semester April. 2013
RISK
Major accidents in recent years have taken a sad toll of lives: Bhopal Chernobyl Piper Alpha Challenger So have natural disasters: Bam December 26 Tsunami The immediate reaction is always It must never happen again We need to eliminate hazards as far as possible and reduce the risks so that the remaining hazards are only a small addition to the inherent risks of everyday life RELIABILITY & RISK ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES are the methods used to assess the safety of modern complex systems
ECE 510 Reliability and Quality Assurance in Electronics 2nd Semester April. 2013 2
RELIABILITY
Definition
Reliability is the ability of a product

to perform as intended ( that is without failure and
within specified performance limits )
for a specified mission time when used in the manner and for the purposes
intended
under specified application and operational

conditions
RELIABILITY
Alternative Definition
Reliability is the probability that a device or system

properly performs its intended function over time when operated within the environment for which it
is designed
RELIABILITY
Definition stresses 4 elements
Probability Time
quantitative
Adequate performance must be defined

the period over which we can expect a
certain degree of performance
Operating conditions temperature, humidity,

shock, vibration
RELIABILITY
Characteristics of a Product
Estimated in Design Controlled in Manufacturing Measured during Testing Sustained in the Field
RELIABILITY
Importance of Reliability
In this modern day of science and technology where complex devices are used for commercial, military, scientific, consumer and pleasure purposes A high degree of reliability is an absolute necessity There is too much at stake in terms of cost and human life to take any significant risks with devices that might not function properly when needed most
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RELIABILITY
First we will deal with
Foundation of Reliability
Probability and Statistics Then
In-depth reliability engineering considerations
Objective
To give an overview of The reliability issues Techniques Tasks Limitations associated with The design Manufacture Operation
Probability & Statistics
Pragmatic approach Discussion will include Shape of failure distributions Estimating parameters
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RELIABILITY
Focus on Preventing failures through Robust design and manufacturing practices Based on Life cycle loads and stresses Product architecture Potential defects and failure mechanisms
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RELIABILITY
There are 2 strands in Reliability FAULT AVOIDANCE Conservative Design High Quality Components FAULT TOLERANCE
Assumes despite all efforts components will fail
USE REDUNDANCY Price in efficiency

RELIABILITY
The Characteristics of a Product are:

Estimated in Design Controlled in Manufacturing Measured during Testing Sustained in the Field
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RELIABILITY
Random input Variables
Continuous {x} Discrete {y} Binary {z} Output performance Characteristics
Performance Characteristics of an engineering product
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Quality Production The Quality of a Product

Performance characteristics may be Continuous. Fuel consumption these are objective can be accurately established by independent measurements and not dependent on the opinion of an individual Discrete. Visual appeal, body style these are subjective based on some scale like (5) excellent (4) Good.. Binary Based on some feature that the product does or does not possess. Presence or absence of sun roof..
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PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS FOR A FAMILY CAR

Continuous {x} Urban fuel consumption Time from 0 to 60m.p.h. Braking distance at 60m.p.h. Engine noise level Range of exterior colours Quad stereo? % CO2 in exhaust Maximum speed Range of interior colours Tinted glass? Power assisted steering? Sun-roof? Comfort of ride Central locking? Discrete {y} Binary {z} Visual appeal of body and Leaded/ unleaded petrol? style Visual appeal of interior Starts first time?
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Specification
The manufacturer of an engineering product will need to produce a specification defines the product for a potential customer. Consists of a set of target values x1T, x2T, a target vector {xT} Urban fuel consumption 40 miles per gallon Maximum speed 100 miles per hour Time from 0 to 60m.p.h. 13 seconds Braking distance at 60m.p.h. 180 feet Engine noise level 70dB % CO2 in exhaust 1% Random effects X1T + 1 Tolerance limits Tolerance vector {}
RELIABILITY
Target performance {xT} Tolerance {} Reject if : the actual performance {x} lies outside {xT }
Both manufacturer and customer need to know how the actual random variations in a given performance characteristic {x} for a given product, across different individual units and under different environmental and operating conditions, compare with the target and tolerance values {xT} and { }.
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RELIABILITY
A statistical analysis of the variations is required. This involves calculating: Mean Standard deviation Probability Probability density function To do this we require N sample values of the performance characteristic {x} specified by xi where i = 1,2,N
RELIABILITY
Mean x = 1 N
i=N i=1
xi
i=N i=1
1 Standard Deviation = N
(xi - x)2
i=N i=1
1 Root mean square xRMS = N
(xi)2
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RELIABILITY
System Failure Rate The Bathtub Curve
F a I l u r e R a t e
Infant Mortality Period
Operating Period
Wear-out Period
Time
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THE BATHTUB CURVE

The infant mortality period or debugging stage Failures typically caused by manufacturing flaws Damage received in transit Damage received in handling The operating period Smaller failure rate Failure rate tends to remain constant Failure typically due to only to chance Failure generally results from severe, unpredictable and usually unavoidable stresses that arise from environmental factors such as vibrations, temperature, shock and pressure.
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THE BATHTUB CURVE

The wear-out period Failure rate increases rapidly Failure as a result of gradual degradation of some property of the system essential to proper operation The degradation may occur from causes such as fatigue, creep, corrosion and abrasion We are most interested in the period between infant mortality and wear-out. In this period we have Constant failure rate Exponential failure time density function
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RELIABILITY
Failure Rate Assume at t = 0 we have N0 articles At time t = t we observe Ns have survived The number failed is NF So N0 = NS(t) + NF (t) And R(t) = NS(t) / N0 R(t) is the Reliability as a function of time
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RELIABILITY
Ns N0
Ns(t)
Graph of NS vs t
The failure rate is the limit as t 0 of (the gradient at t) NS
t+t
Time
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RELIABILITY
The reliability R of a product can be defined
as the probability that the product continues to meet some specification The unreliability F of a product can be defined as the probability that the product fails to meet the specification Both reliability and unreliability vary with time R(t) decreases with time F(t) increases with time R(t) + F(t) = 1
PRACTICAL RELIABILITY DEFINITIONS

Non- repairable items
Suppose that N individual items of a given non-repairable product are placed in service and the times at which failures occur are recorded during a test interval T Further assume that all N items fail during T and the ith failure occurs at time Ti i.e. Ti is the survival time or up time for the ith failure The total up time for N failures is therefore
I =N
I =1
Ti
and the mean time to failure is given by
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Mean Time To Fail = i.e. MTTF = 1 N
i=N i=1
Total up time Number of failures
Ti
Number of Failures Mean Failure Rate = Total up time N i.e. =
i=N
Ti
i=1
The mean failure rate is the reciprocal of MTTF
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REPAIRABLE SYSTEMS
Mean Time To Failure & Mean Time Between Failures
LIVE Under Repair TTF TBF Repair Time
1 MTTF = N
f ti is TTF
f
i =1
0
ti
1 MTTF = t[ Nf ( t ) dt ] = N 0
or total life for N devices = N MTTF
tf ( t ) dt
and between t and t+ t the number live is NR(t)
MTTF =
R ( t ) dt
0
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There are N survivors at 1 time t = 0, N - i at t = Ti, decreasing to zero at time t = T. The figure shows the probability of survival, i.e. the reliability, Ri = (N-i) / N decreases from Ri = 1 at 2/N t = 0, to Ri = 0 at t = T. MTTF = Total area under 1/N 0 graph R T1 T2
TN t
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Quantification of Reliability
ReliabilityThe probability that a system/component works AvailabilityThe probability that a system/component works on demand Availability at time t The probability that a system / component works on demand AvailabilityThe fraction of the total time that a system / component can perform its required function
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Unavailability = 1 - Availability Unreliability = 1 - Reliability For the failure process let F(t) = P[a given component fails in [0,t)] The corresponding probability density function f(t) is therefore
f (t ) = dF (t ) dt
t
So So
f(t)dt = P[a component fails in time period [t, t + dt)]
F (t ) = f (t )dt
0
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Transition to the failed state can be characterised by the conditional failure rate h(t). This function is sometimes referred to as the hazard rate or hazard function. This parameter is a measure of the rate at which failures occur taking into account the size of the population with the potential to fail, i.e. those that are still functioning at time t: So h(t)dt = P[a component fails in time period t, t + dt| it has not failed in [0, t)]
For conditional probabilities we can write:
P( A B) P( A B) = P( B)
Since h(t)dt is a conditional probability we can define events A and B as follows by comparing this with the equation above: A Component fails between t and t + t+dt B component has not failed in[0, t) With events defined like this P(A B) = P(A) since if the component fails between t and t+dt it is implicit that it cannot have failed before time t
h(t)dt = P[component fails between t and t+dt] P[component not fail in [0, t)]
f ( t ) dt = 1 F (t ) t t f (t ' ) h ( t ' ) dt ' dt ' = 1 F (t ' ) 0 0
Integrating gives
t
h (t ' ) dt ' = -ln[1-F(t)]

t F(t) = 1-exp h ( t ' ) dt ' 0
t F(t) = 1-exp h(t ' )dt ' 0
If h(t), the failure rate or hazard rate for a general system or component is plotted against time we get the bathtub curve. In the useful life period h(t) = is constant. So after integration F(t) = 1-e-t
And the reliability, the probability that the component works continuously over (0, t] is the exponential function R(t) = e-t
System Mean Time to Failure

When system failure can be tolerated and repair can be instigated an important measure of the system performance is the system availability A= MTBF MTBF + MTTR
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QUANTIFIED RISK ASSESSMENT

SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE
SYSTEM DEFINITION PHASE
Establish reliability requirements
CONCEPT DESIGN PHASE

Perform global safety/ availability assessment
DETAIL DESIGN PHASE

FMEA / FTA of critical systems and components database Carry out detailed system reliability assessment Prepare safety case
MANUFACTURING
OPERATING
PHASE
PHASE
Audit reliability performance Collect and analyse reliability, test and maintenance data Assess reliability impact of modifications
Set provisional reliability/ Identify critical availability areas and targets components Prepare reliability specification Confirm / review targets
Prepare and implement reliability Review reliability specifications Review reliability demonstrations
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RELIABILITY
CRITICAL FAILURES Where failure causes total loss of function MAJOR FAILURES Where failure causes major loss of function but the product can still be used to some extent MINOR FAILURES Where failure leaves the product still able to be used to perform the major function but with the loss of some convenience function
A reliability network is a representation of the reliability dependencies between components of a system Dependencies are used in such a way as to represent the means by which the system will function Such a network can be used to assess the probability of failure of a system
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TOPOLOGICAL RELIABILITY
The functional behaviour of most systems can be
characterised by a network diagram Nodes denote the subsystems Branches of the network represent the functional relationship between these subsystems Example A high voltage supply system consisting Transmitter A of two transmitters A and B and Power a power supply. C Supply For the system to work the power supply and at least one of Transmitter B the transmitters must operate A path must exist between C and D for the system to work.
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The question of what constitutes proper operation or proper function for a particular type of equipment is usually specific to the equipment Rather than attempt to suggest a general definition for proper function we assume that the appropriate definition for a device of interest has been specified
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We can represent the functional status of the device as
1 0
if the device functions properly if the device has failed
Note that this representation is intentionally binary. We assume that the status of the equipment of interest is either satisfactory or failed. There are many types of equipment where one or more de-rated states are possible and methods have been developed to cope.
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We presume that most equipment is comprised of components and that the status of the device is determined by the status of the components. Let n be the number of components that make up the device and define the component status variables xi as
xi
1 0
if the device functions properly if the device has failed
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The set of n components that make up the device is represented by the component status vector: x = { x1, x2,, xn } The dependence of the device status on the component status is represented by the function = (x) referred to as a system structure function or a system status function or simply as a structure
There are 4 generic types of structural relationships between a device and its components.
1. 2. 3. 4.
Series Parallel k out of n All others
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SERIES SYSTEMS
Definition
A series system is one in which all components must function properly in order for the system to function properly. Reliability block diagram of a series system
1 2 3
Conceptual analogue circuit
Series electrical
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Example 2 In an aircraft electronics system consisting of a sensor subsystem, guidance subsystem, computer subsystem and fire control subsystem the system can only operate successfully if these four subsystems operate
Sensor Guidance Computer Fire Control
NOTE: The figure only depicts the functional relationship required for system
operation and does not necessarily mean that these subsystems are electrically wired together in series.
Examples where components are not physically connected: The set of legs on a 3-legged stool. The set of tyres on a car.
SERIES SYSTEMS For the series structure the requirement that all components must function implies that an algebraic form for the structure function is:
n
( x ) =
x1= x2 = 1, x3 = 0 results in (x) = 0 results in (x) = 0 Only the functioning x1= x2 = x3 = 0 results in (x) = 1 x1= x2 = x3 = 1 of all components
i= 1
xi
1 Examples
results in system function
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PARALLEL SYSTEMS
Definition
A parallel system is one in which any one component must function properly in order for the system to function properly.
Reliability block diagram of a series system 1 2 3
Conceptual analogue
Parallel electrical circuit

PARALLEL SYSTEMS
1 2 3 Examples
Similar to the series the structure function for the parallel system may be expressed as:
n
(x) = 1- (1- xi)

i=1
x1= x2 = 1, x3 = 0 x1= 1, x2 = x3 = 0 x1= x2 = x3 = 0
results in (x) = 1 results in (x) = 1 results in (x) = 0
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PARALLEL SYSTEMS Parallel systems are often referred to as Redundancy

Often, but not always, the parallel components are identical There are actually several ways in which the redundancy may be implemented This diversity can lead to different reliability under different environmental conditions
A distinction is made between redundancy obtained using a parallel structure in which all components function simultaneously (ACTIVE REDUNDANCY) and that obtained using parallel components of which one functions and the other or others wait as standby units (STANDBY REDUNDANCY).
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k-outout-ofof-n SYSTEMS
Definition
A k-out-of-n system is one in which any k of the n components that comprise the system must function properly in order for the system to function properly.
n
1
k-out-of-n
(x)=
2 3 4
1 0
if i=1 xi k otherwise
Example cases for a 3-out-4 system results in (x) = 1 x1= x2 = x3 = 1, x4 = 0 results in (x) = 0 x1= x2 = 1, x3 = x4 = 0 results in (x) = 0 x1= x2 = x3 = 0, x4 = 1
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Example 3 In a computer system with a computer, a controller, and three memory units suppose that the system can only satisfy its operational requirements if at least two of the three memory units are operable and both the computer and the controller are operable. The 4 branches represent the 4 possible ways we can obtain system operation.
Unit 1 Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Controller Unit 3 Unit 2 Unit 3 Computer
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Equivalent Computer Network
2 4 5
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Communication System diagram
Antenna Receiver Converter Pulse Shaping Unit Antenna Receiver Converter Teleprinter Teleprinter
At least 1 of the two Antenna Receiver Converters must work At least 1 of the two Teleprinters must work The Pulse shaper must work
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In general suppose the topological or network representation of a system consists of n nodes and define R(N1,Nm) = probability that nodes number N1,, Nm are operating and the other n-m nodes are not operating Then the probability that exactly m nodes are simultaneously operating is given by Rm = ..... R(N1, , Nm) N 1 Nm Where the sum is taken over all positive integers N1, , Nm such that n N1 > N2 >.>Nm 1 Thus the probability that at least k nodes are operating is n given by Rm m=k
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Reliability of Systems
1 Series systems
R1 R2 R3 R4 Ri Rm
System of m elements in series with individual reliabilities R1, R2, , Ri, Rm respectively. The system will only survive if every element survives , if one element fails the system fails. Assume The reliability of each element is independent of the reliability of the other elements The probability that the system survives is the probability that element 1 survives and the probability that element 2 survives and the probability that element 3 survives etc. The system reliability is the product of the element reliabilities. Rsyst = R1R2R3 Ri Rm
1 Series systems
If we assume a constant failure rate for the elements then since Ri = e-t Rsyst = e-1 t e-2 t .e-I t .e-mt So if syst is the overall system failure rate Rsyst = e-syst t = e-(1 + 2 + .+ I t . +m) t syst = 1 + 2+. +i+. +m Failure rate of a series network is the sum of the individual element failure rates so it is important to keep the number of elements to a minimum and so the reliability will be maximum.
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1 Series systems
Unreliability of Series System with Small Failure rates
Protective systems have element and system UNRELIABILITIES F that are very small. The corresponding system reliabilities are therefore very close to 1, for example 0.9999 may be typical. Then the calculation of Rsyst = R1R2R3 Ri Rm may be arithmetically unwieldy and the alternative equation involving unreliabilities may be more useful since Rsyst = 1 - Fsyst and Ri = 1- FI We have 1 - Fsyst= (1- F1 ) (1- F2 ) (1- FI ) (1- Fm ) = 1 (F1 + F2 ++ FI + +Fm ) + terms involving products of Fs If the individual Fi are small i.e. Fi << 1 the terms involving products of Fs can be neglected giving the approximate equation Fsyst F1 + F2 ++ FI + +Fm
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Parallel Systems
An overall system consisting of n individual Elements or systems in parallel with Individual unreliabilities F1, F2, , Fj, Fn Only one individual element is necessary to meet the functional requirements of the overall system The remaining elements increase the reliability of the system THIS IS CALLED REDUNDANCY. Failure only if ALL the elements fail The unreliability of a parallel system Fsyst = F1F2FjFn
F1 F2
Fj
Fn
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Voting Systems Majority voting systems are used to protect hazardous plant and processes and have applications in the chemical, nuclear and aerospace industries. Diagram shows a typical system with 2 out of 4 voting with initiators A, B, C, D.
A B C D
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2oo4
voting element
Shut down system
Trip setting Process parameter inputs
Voting Systems Suppose R and F are the reliability and unreliability of the individual initiators. The overall initiation system fails to protect the plant if either all 4 initiators fail or any 3 initiators fail If 2 or less initiators fail there are still sufficient left to trip the plant Since the Fs are normally small then the rare events approximation is valid and the overall system unreliability is the sum of the following probabilities
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Voting Systems FINIT = Probability that A and B and C and D fail + Probability that A and B and C fail + Probability that B and C and D fail + Probability that A and C and D fail + Probability that A and B and D fail Each of the terms is the product of individual unreliabilities and reliabilities.
Voting Systems FINIT = F4 + F3R + F3R + F3R + F3R = F4 + 4F3R = F3(F + 4R) This result can be obtained from the binomial expansion of (F + R)4 (F + R)4 = F4 + 4F3R + 6F2R2 + 4FR3 + R4 The first term F4 represents the probability of all 4 initiators failing and the second the total probability of 3 failing. If R 1 and F << 1 Then FINIT 4F3 The unreliability of the complete protective system is FSYST FINIT + FVOTING + FSHUT-DOWN
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Majority Voting Systems In a majority voting system there are n trip channels and the plant is tripped if m (n m) indicate that the plant should be tripped. Such a system is referred to as m out of n or m oo n The binomial distribution can be used to calculate overall failure probabilities. Consider the jth term in the binomial expansion of (F +R)n where F and R are the single channel reliability and unreliability and n is the total number of channels. nC FjRn-j and is the probability that This is j j channels fail i.e. (n-j) channels survive.
Fail-Safe & Fail-Danger Fail-Danger failure Any system or component failure that prevents, or tends to prevent, the plant being tripped when a potentially hazardous fault condition occurs. Example A pressure switch failed to open when the pressure exceeded the trip pressure Fail-Safe failure Any system or component failure that produces a plant trip when a plant trip is not required. Example A pressure switch opened when the pressure was below the trip pressure
Fail-Safe & Fail-Danger A fail-danger failure is a very serious occurrence Fail-safe failures are less serious but cause loss of production and confidence in the trip system Fail-danger and Fail-safe failures will generally have different failure rates and so different failure probabilities Detailed information on the failure rates associated with all possible modes of failure of trip equipment is not always available We may have to assume both rates are equal to the average failure rate
Fail-Safe & Fail-Danger Supposing we wish to calculate overall fail-danger and fail-safe for a system with two out of three voting i.e. 2 oo 3 where m = 2 and n = 3 . These probabilities can be calculated from the binomial expansion of (R + F) 3, where F and R are the single channel reliability and unreliability respectively. So we have (F + R)3 = F3 + 3F2R + 3FR2 + R3 where F3 represents the probability that all 3 channels fail, 3F2R the probability that 2 channels fail, 3FR2 the probability that 1 channel fails and R3 the probability that no channel fails
Fail-Safe & Fail-Danger Looking at fail-danger first if either 2 or 3 channels fail dangerously then there are correspondingly only 1 or zero channels left working. This is insufficient to trip the plant with 2 oo 3 voting and an overall fail danger situation has occurred. If FD is the single channel fail-danger probability then the overall fail danger probability is PD = FD3 + 3R FD2 = FD2(3R + FD) In a protective system R 1 and FD << 1 giving PD 3FD2
Fail-Safe & Fail-Danger Looking at fail-safe A fail-safe failure of no channels or only one channel will not cause a plant trip with 2 oo 3 voting. A fail-safe failure of two channels will cause an unnecessary plant trip. The failure of a third channel is irrelevant because the plant is tripped by only 2 channels. The overall fail-safe probability is therefore PS = 3RFS2 3FS2 where FS is the single channel fail-safe probability
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Fail-Safe & Fail-Danger Overall fail-danger probability PD = CrF D where r = n-m+1 and Cr = n! / {r!(n-r)!}
MAX FD n n r
= 1-
-DT e
DT (if DT << 1
n m CmF S
Overall fail-safe probability PS = where Cm= n! / {m!(n-m)!} FS

MAX n
= 1- e
-ST
ST (if ST << 1
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Fail-Safe & Fail-Danger FRACTIONAL DEAD TIME FDT Is related to fail-danger probability Is the mean proportion of the testing interval T that the trip system is incapable of protecting the plant FDT = {1/ T} 0 FD(t)dt FDT is a similar concept to unavailability FDT = {1 / (r+1)} CrF D Majority voting can be implemented with combinatorial logic.
FAULT TREE , EVENT TREE and FMECA ANALYSIS

To check for fault propagation one technique is Failure Modes Event Criticality Analysis A full FMECA is hard and expensive. Take every component, wire, connector and think of every possible fault. Consider the effects of all of these - are they single point failures? Can they propogate? propagate? Document the results. An FMECA is a development from an FMEA - (Failure Modes Event Analysis) FMEA and FMECA are bottom-up analyses. The alternative approach is a fault tree analysis.
FMECA ANALYSIS
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FMECA ANALYSIS
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FAULT TREE , EVENT TREE and FMECA ANALYSIS

Event trees are
Encountered frequently in the analysis of events including human activities that can lead to disasters or undesirable events Sometimes called Cause - Consequence analysis Used more frequently in Safety studies
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EVENT TREE
Consider the following example of a fire alarm system. Ideally if there is a fire then The alarm goes off. A sprinkler system extinguishes the fire. In each case there is a human standby If either the alarm or the sprinkler system fails Human operator can operate either or both
This can be represented by the event tree in the figure
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EVENT TREE
Fire starts Alarm functions Operator notices malfunction Sprinkler system functions Operator notices malfunction
YES 0.999 YES 510-4 NO 10-3 NO 0.9995 YES 0.99 NO 10-2
Fire Suppressed YES 4.9810-4 0.998 YES Fire Suppressed 8.9910-7 NO 0.9 Fire Spreads NO 210-3 9.9910-8 0.1 YES Fire Suppressed 0.998 4.910-7 YES Fire Suppressed NO 0.999 NO 9.910-10 210-3 10-3 Fire Spreads 9.910-13 Fire Spreads 510-9 NO FIRE 0.9995
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EVENT TREE
Notice that of all the possible outcomes only three are that the fire spreads The possible sequence of events that that can lead to this undesireable event can now be identified from these outcomes. The alarm fails to function and the operator fails to notice and take action in time The alarm functions but the sprinkler fails to function and the operator fails to notice and take action in time The alarm fails to function, and the operator notices, but the sprinkler fails to function, and the operator fails to notice If sufficient data exists to estimate probabilities the likelihood of the various outcomes can be obtained
FAULT TREE
An Example of a Deductive approach. What can cause this? Used to identify the causal relationships leading to a specific system failure mode. The system failure mode is the TOP event and the FAULT TREE is developed in branches below this event showing its causes.
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Fault Tree From Logic Expression

T = (abc + f)[(a + d)f](a +be)
a b c a T4 f f T5 d b T6 e a
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T1
T2
T3
Fault Tree from Logic Expression

Simplifying the expression: T = (abc + f)[(a + d)f](a +be) = (abc +f)(af + df)(a + be) = abcf + af + abcdf + adf + abcef + abef + abcdef + bdef Using XX = X = abcf(1+d+e+de) + af (1+d+be) + bdef Using (1 + X) = 1 = abcf + af + bdef = af (bc + 1) + bdef = af + bdef = f(a +bde)
QUALITY DESIGN AND QUALIFICATION

TESTING ACTIVITIES
Design testing refers to laboratory tests on computer and / or prototype models to prove that the design is capable of meeting the quality specification
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QUALITY DESIGN AND QUALIFICATION
Qualification testing refers to field testing of pre-production models and production models involving all performance characteristics over the full range of relevant environmental variables to further verify that the specification can be met.
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DESIGN FOR RELIABILITY

Objective To design a given product or system which meets the target failure rate T under the environmental conditions specified. It is assumed that all components and elements are operating in the useful life region where failure rate is constant with time.
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General principles to be observed. a) Element / component selection Only elements / components with well established failure rate data / models should be used Some technologies are inherently more reliable than others. e.g. Solid state switching devices are more reliable than electromechanical reed relays Inductive displacement transducers are more reliable than the resistive potentiometer type.
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b) De-rating Stress (x) was defined as variable which when applied to an element or component tends to increase failure rate. e.g. mechanical stress voltage Strength (y) was defined as any property of the element or component which resists the applied stress e.g. elastic limit rated voltage
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To reduce failure rate strength should exceed stress by an adequate (y-x) Safety Margin (x2 + y2) In a mechanical element SM > 5.0 In an electronic circuit the voltage Stress Ratio SR should be kept below 0.7 x Stress Ratio y
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c)Environment Component / element failure rate critically dependent on environment. Environment correction factor E OBS = E B
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d) Minimum complexity For a series system the system failure rate is the sum
of the individual component / element failure rates
thus
The number of components / elements in the system should be the minimum required for the system to perform its function
In electronic systems reliability can be improved by

using integrated circuits which replace hundreds or thousands of basic devices. The failure rate of the integrated circuit is generally less than the sum of the failure rates of the devices it replaces.
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e)Redundancy The use of several identical elements / systems connected in parallel increases the reliability of the overall system. Redundancy should be considered in situations where either the complete system or certain elements of the system have too high a failure rate.
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f) Diversity The problem of common mode failure was discussed Here a fault can occur that causes more than one element in a system to fail simultaneously e.g. Electronic system where several of the circuits share a common power supply
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If the pro b ability of c om m o n m od e fa ilure lim its the re lia bility of the o verall s ys tem equip m e nt d ive rsity sho uld be c onsidered H ere a com m on function is carrie d b y tw o system s in p arallel but E a ch ele m e nt is m ade up of differe nt e le m e nts w ith differe nt o pera ting princ ip les e.g. A te m p erature m eas urem ent d e vic e m ade u p o f tw o s ubs ys te m s in p arallel on e electron ic on e pne um atic

g) Calculation of system reliability Once the components / elements have been chosen and their configuration in the system/product decided then The overall system / product reliability can be calculated. The Reliability / Failure rate calculated for the overall product should be then compared with the target value If the target value is not met then the design should be adjusted until the target figure is reached.
High Reliability Design

The system designer may consider component redundancy ADVANTAGES of redundancy The quickest solution if time is of prime importance The easiest solution, if the component is already designed The cheapest solution, If the component is economical in comparison with the cost of redesign The only solution, if the reliability requirement is beyond the state of the art
97
High Reliability Design

DISADVANTAGES of redundancy Too expensive, if the components are costly Exceed the limitations on size and weight, particularly in satellites Exceed the power limitations, particularly in active redundancy Attenuate the input signal, requiring additional amplifiers which increase complexity Require sensing and switching circuitry so complex as to offset the advantage of redundancy
98
Exercises
1) Discuss, giving examples, the methods including procurement and testing procedures, used by manufactures to ensure the reliability of a product. 2) Discuss the differences in reliability required in systems such as consumer products, trains, aeroplanes, satellites. What value would you assign to the overall failure rate of each of these systems. 3) What do you understand by the reliability of a system? Discuss some practical ways to assign a quantitative value to the reliability of a system. 4) Draw a fault tree for the lighting system in a car and hence derive a logic equation for the failure of the headlights. 5) Discuss the concepts of fail-safe and fail-danger. Why is the single unit probability for fail-safe and fail-danger often assumed to be the same. Explain why in spite of this assumption the overall fail-safe probability of a complex system will be different from the overall fail-safe probability.
99
Problems
1) )The figure shows a protective system, based on temperature measurement. The system is to have a maximum fail-danger probability not exceeding 810-3 and a maximum fail-safe probability not exceeding 510-2. The system is tested and proved to be working correctly at three-week intervals. Annual fail-safe and fail-danger failure rates for each component are: Thermocouple S = D = 0.5 Thermocouple input trip amplifier/comparator S = D = 0.1 m out of n voting element S = D = 0.05 Logic operated switch S = D = 0.1 Solenoid valve S = D = 0.1 Trip valve S = D = 0.1 Calculate the maximum fail-safe and fail-danger probability PS and PD for: a) The high integrity voting equipment, HIVE. b) The high integrity trip initiator, HITI. c) The high integrity shutdown system, HISS. And hence d) The total system fail-danger probability e) The total system fail-safe probability State whether the system meets the design criteria
2nd
Semester April. 2013
10 0
Problems
0.5
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
0.5
0.1
0.05
0.1 0.5
Thermocouple
0.1
Solenoid valve
0.1
Trip valve
0.1
Trip amp/comp
2 oo 3 voting
Logic switch
HITI
HIVE
HISS
2nd
10 1
Problems
Solution i ii HIVE Maximum FS = FD = 1- e-0.053/52 = 2.8 10-3 HITI single channel Maximum FS = FD = 1- e-0.63/52 = 3.4 10-2 2 00 3 voting HITI; PD= 3FD2 = 3 (3.4 10-2)2 3.4 10-3 HISS single channel Maximum FS = FD = 1- e-0.33/52 = 1.7 10-2 Two channels in parallel PD= FD2 = (1.7 10-2)2 0.3 10-3 PS= 2FS 2 1.7 10-2 = .3.44 10-2 Total System fail-danger probability = (PD)HITI + (PD)HIVE + (PD)HISS = 3.4 10-3 + 2.8 10-3 + 0.3 10-3 = 6.5 10-3
iii
iv
Total System fail-safe probability = (PS)HITI + (PS)HIVE + (PS)HISS = 3.4 10-3 + 2.8 10-3 + 34.4 10-3 = 40.6 10-3 = 4.1 10-2 The system meets the design specification
2nd
10 2
Problems
2) A taxi owner has 20 cars. Records show each car on average breaks down once every 2 years and that this is reasonably constant. How many breakdown calls will he have per year? What is the probability of 1 breakdown in a 3 month period? Solution. Statistical assumptions hold c = 1/2 (for 1 car) F = Nc = 10 3 months = 1/4 year F(t) = 1 - e
-Ft
F(1/4) = 1 - e = 0.92 OR
-10.1/4
92% chance of at least one failure in 3 months.
2nd
10 3
Problems
3) A basic guidance and navigation system for a proposed space probe consists of an Inertial Set, a Canopus Sensor, a Sun Sensor, and a Computer. The reliability for each device is Rinertial set = 0.95; Rsun sensor = 0.90; Rcanopus sensor = 0.85; Rcomputer = 0.90. For the system to operate all four subsystems must be operating. Due to design constraints the space probe can only contain one Inertial set and one Computer. To increase the reliability of the system three Canopus Sensors and two Sun Sensors are used in hot redundancy. (i). Draw a reliability block diagram for the system without the redundancy (ii). Draw a reliability block diagram for the system including the redundancy Calculate the reliability of the system in each case.
2nd
10 4
Problems
(4) In a distillation column a hazardous situation is created if the flow rate of steam to the reboiler goes high; this causes a high flow rate of vapour up the column producing a high pressure which could cause the vessel to rupture. The temperature control loop consists of a platinum resistance thermometer (PRT), a transmitter ( which converts resistance change to a 4-20mA current signal), a controller, a current-to-pneumatic converter and a control valve. The plant is protected by a pressure trip system consisting of a pressure switch and three-way solenoid valve located in the air line between the converter and the control valve. Failure mode and effect analysis of the system shows that: 1. A fail-danger situation F in which the Steam control valve moves fully open, occurs if either Pressure in valve bonnet increases (F1) or Control valve fails open (F2). 2. F1 occurs if Pressure signal to control valve increases (F3) and Solenoid does not vent air (F4). 3. F3 occurs if PRT short circuit (F5) or Transmitter O/P fails low (F6) or Controller O/P fails high (F7) or I/P Converter O/P fails high (F8). 4 F4 occurs if Pressure switch fails to open (F9) or Solenoid fails to vent (F10) (i). Draw a fault tree diagram for the fail-danger failure (ii). Write down the logic expression for the fail-danger failure F.
2nd
10 5

Reliability 2

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Federal University of Technology Owerri

ECE 510 Reliability and Quality Assurance in Electronics

2nd Semester April. 2013

Reliability is the ability of a product

under specified application and operational

Reliability is the probability that a device or system

ECE 510 Reliability and Quality Assurance in Electronics

2nd Semester April. 2013

Adequate performance must be defined

Operating conditions temperature, humidity,

ECE 510 Reliability and Quality Assurance in Electronics

2nd Semester April. 2013

ECE 510 Reliability and Quality Assurance in Electronics

2nd Semester April. 2013

First we will deal with

In-depth reliability engineering considerations

ECE 510 Reliability and Quality Assurance in Electronics

2nd Semester April. 2013

Probability & Statistics

ECE 510 Reliability and Quality Assurance in Electronics

2nd Semester April. 2013

ECE 510 Reliability and Quality Assurance in Electronics

2nd Semester April. 2013

USE REDUNDANCY Price in efficiency

The Characteristics of a Product are:

ECE 510 Reliability and Quality Assurance in Electronics

2nd Semester April. 2013

Continuous {x} Discrete {y} Binary {z} Output performance Characteristics

Performance Characteristics of an engineering product

ECE 510 Reliability and Quality Assurance in Electronics

2nd Semester April. 2013

Quality Production The Quality of a Product

ECE 510 Reliability and Quality Assurance in Electronics

2nd Semester April. 2013

PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS FOR A FAMILY CAR

ECE 510 Reliability and Quality Assurance in Electronics

2nd Semester April. 2013

ECE 510 Reliability and Quality Assurance in Electronics

2nd Semester April. 2013

1 Root mean square xRMS = N

ECE 510 Reliability and Quality Assurance in Electronics

2nd Semester April. 2013

Infant Mortality Period

ECE 510 Reliability and Quality Assurance in Electronics

2nd Semester April. 2013

THE BATHTUB CURVE

ECE 510 Reliability and Quality Assurance in Electronics

2nd Semester April. 2013

THE BATHTUB CURVE

ECE 510 Reliability and Quality Assurance in Electronics

2nd Semester April. 2013

ECE 510 Reliability and Quality Assurance in Electronics

2nd Semester April. 2013

2nd Semester April. 2013

PRACTICAL RELIABILITY DEFINITIONS

and the mean time to failure is given by

ECE 510 Reliability and Quality Assurance in Electronics

2nd Semester April. 2013

PRACTICAL RELIABILITY DEFINITIONS

Total up time Number of failures

Number of Failures Mean Failure Rate = Total up time N i.e. =

The mean failure rate is the reciprocal of MTTF

ECE 510 Reliability and Quality Assurance in Electronics