PEOPLE V.

VILLANUEVA- Disbarment

Category: Uncategorised FACTS: On Sept. 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged SImplicio Villanueva with crime of Malicious Mischiedf, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said Municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was representry by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private-prosecutor, having secuting the permission of the the Secretary of Justice. Counsel for the accused presented a Motion in inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private prosecutor in this case, this time invoking sec. 32, Rule 127, now sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.

ISSUE: Whether of not Atty. Fule violate sec. 32 of Rule 127 now Sec. 35, Rule 138, revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.

RULING: The Court holds that the appearance of Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. The word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. It has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

People vs Tuanda - A case digest A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant vs.ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent. Facts; Respondent was suspended for practicing his profession until further notice from the Supreme Court finding her guilty of violating BP 22.

Atty. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing that her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of the offense charged. Issue; WON the suspension of Atty. Fe Tuanda be lifted. Ruling; The Supreme Court ruled to DENY the respondent of his Motion to Lift Order of Suspension and affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals regarding the suspension. The court found Atty. Fe Tuanda guilty of an offense involving moral turpitude citing Secs 27 and 28 of the Rules of Court and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Magdalena Arciga vs Segundino Maniwang On August 14, 2012 106 SCRA 591 Legal Ethics Gross Immoral Conduct In 1970, when Maniwang was still a law student, he had a relationship with Arciga, then a medical technology student. They started having a sexual relationship in 1971. In 1973, Arciga got pregnant. The two then went to Arcigas hometown to tell the latters parent about the pregnancy. They also made Arcigas parents believe that they were already married but they would have to have the church wedding in abeyance until Maniwang passes the bar exams. Maniwang secured a copy of his birth certificate in preparation of securing a marriage license. In 1975, Maniwang passed the bar. But after his oath taking, he stopped communicating with Arciga. Arciga located his whereabouts and there she found out that Maniwang married another woman. Arciga confronted Maniwangs wife and this irked Maniwang so he inflicted physical injuries against Arciga. Arciga then filed a disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on gross immoral conduct. Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arcigas child; that he did promise to marry Arciga many times; that he broke those promises because of

Arcigas shady past because apparently Arciga had an illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born. ISSUE: Whether or not Maniwang should be disbarred. HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwangs case is different from the cases of Mortel vs Aspiras and Almirez vs Lopez, and other cases therein cited. Maniwangs refusal to marry Arciga was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment (though not much discussion was provided by the ponente as to why). But the Supreme Court did say that it is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.

Five J Taxi and/or Juan Armamiento vs. NLRC [235 SCRA 556] Facts: Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily boundary of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their boundary, for every actual working day. In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already failed to report for work for unknown reasons. Petitioners learned that he was working for Mine of Gold Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners on September 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to this home province to recuperate. In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and conditions as when he was first employed, but his working schedule was made on an alternative basis where he drove only every other day. However, on several occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule. On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his boundary of P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for Bulaklak Company.

Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was effected when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers. On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. Issue: Whether or not the deductions made were illegal and if illegal, considered a prohibition regarding wages. SC Ruling: The Court declares that the deposits made amounts to the prohibition provided by law. The deposits made were illegal and the respondents must be refunded. Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows: Deposits for loss or damage. No employer shall require his worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except when the employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations. It can be deduced that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his boundary. On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has given to the same clean condition when he took it out, and as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the context of the law." Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to prevent

private respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.

Diao v Martinez 7 SCRA 745 3.29.63

FACTS: 2 years after passing the Bar exam, a complaint was filed against Diao on false representation of his application to the Bar examination that he has the requisite academic qualification. The Solicitor General made an investigation and recommended to strike the name of Diao off the rolls of attorney because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education. I: WON Diao may continue to practice the law profession. RULING: The court held that his admission to the bar was under the pretense that he had acquired a pre-legal education, an academic requirement before one could take the bar exam. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses is thereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-atlaw, taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential. His name thus was stricken out from the Rolls of Attorneys.

Enrique Zaldivar vs Raul Gonzalez On June 25, 2012 166 SCRA 316 Legal Ethics Contemptuous Language Duty of a Lawyer Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar. Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Courts

issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course. Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to go slow on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt. HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer. Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case. The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.

First Philippine International Bank vs Court of Appeals On October 12, 2012 252 SCRA 259 Legal Ethics Forum Shopping Civil Law Contract of Sale Parties to a Sales Contract Producers Bank (now called First Philippine International Bank), which has been under conservatorship since 1984, is the owner of 6 parcels of land. The Bank had an agreement with Demetrio Demetria and Jose Janolo for the two to purchase the parcels of land for a purchase price of P5.5 million pesos. The said agreement was made by Demetria and Janolo with the Banks manager, Mercurio Rivera. Later however, the Bank, through its conservator, Leonida Encarnacion, sought the repudiation of the agreement as it alleged that Rivera was not authorized to enter into such an agreement, hence there was no valid contract of sale. Subsequently, Demetria and Janolo sued Producers Bank. The regional trial court ruled in favor of Demetria et al. The Bank filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, Henry Co, who holds 80% shares of stocks with the said Bank, filed a motion for intervention with the trial court. The trial court denied the motion since the trial has been concluded already and the case is now pending appeal. Subsequently, Co, assisted by ACCRA law office, filed a separate civil case against Demetria and Janolo seeking to have the purported contract of sale be declared unenforceable against the Bank. Demetria et al argued that the second case constitutes forum shopping. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not there is forum shopping. 2. Whether or not there is a perfected contract of sale. HELD: 1. Yes. There is forum shopping because there is identity of interest and parties between the first case and the second case. There is identity of interest because both cases sought to have the agreement, which involves the same property, be declared unenforceable as against the Bank. There is identity of parties even though the first case is in the name of the bank as defendant, and the second case is in the name of Henry Co as plaintiff. There is still forum shopping here because Henry Co essentially represents the bank. Both cases aim to have the bank escape liability from the agreement it entered into with Demetria et al. The Supreme Court did not lay down any disciplinary action against the ACCRA lawyers but they were warned that a repetition will be dealt with more severely. 2. Yes. There is a perfected contract of sale because the bank manager, Rivera, entered into the agreement with apparent authority. This apparent authority has been duly proved by the evidence presented which showed that in all the dealings and transactions, Rivera participated actively without the opposition

of the conservator. In fact, in the advertisements and announcements of the bank, Rivera was designated as the go-to guy in relation to the disposition of the Banks assets

People vs. Villanueva (G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965) Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Sunday, March 18, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: The complainant in the case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City after securing permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition for his appearance as such was that every time he would appear at trial of the case he would be considered on leave of absence and that he would not receive any payment for his services. Such appearance was questioned by herein respondents counsel.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Fule should be allowed to appear on behalf of the complainant

Held: The court ruled in the affirmative. The court held that in appearing as private prosecutor in the case, the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. Furthermore Atty. Fule was given the permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice.

DIGEST: Legal Profession Case 23 LEGAL PROFESSION CASE 23 ROYONG VS. OBLENA

AC No. 376 April 30, 1963 En Banc, Barrera FACTS: Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the bar and bench, with rape. The Solicitor General immediately conducted an investigation and found out that there was no rape, the carnal knowledge between complainant and respondent seems to be consensual sex. In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other misconduct. The Solicitor General made another complaint charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character, of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year old Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him unfit to practice law, praying that this Court render judgment ordering the permanent removal of the respondent as lawyer and judge. ISSUE: Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the adulterous cohabitation of respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment. HELD: Ariston Oblena was disbarred. RATIO: The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as ground for disbarment. Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law. As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him sqemed to have acuuiesced to his utatus, did noq render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his

immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.

Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, [G.R. No. L-27072 July 31 1968] 31 Jul FACTS: Surigao Mineral Reservation Board issued an Invitation to Bid for the exploration and development of mineral deposits in a certain portion in the Province of Surigao. It was joined by two (2) bidders. After evaluation, both were disqualified and their subsequent motions denied. One of the (failed) bidder filed a petition at the Court of First Instance of Manila seeking relief. After the petitioners here (respondents in the said case) answered the petition, Judge Gaudencio Cloribel of CFI issued a restraining order to petitioners here (respondent in the petition to Judge Cloribel) to avert from their action in the bidding process. Petitioners here seek a writ of preliminary injunction to the Supreme Court on the assailed action of Judge Cloribel due to his alleged grave abuse of discretion on the subject matter. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Cloribel had committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. HELD: YES. Costs against the respondent. RATIO: There is no cause of action as a basis of the judge to issue the restraining order. Invitation to Bid is not an offer from which deemed accepted by the other party in their submission of bids. In fact, there is still no contract unless the bid is determined to be the most advantageous offer to the government. What was accepted by the bidder was the condition, inter alia, that the government reserves the right to reject any and all bids, waive any defect of form or accept such bid as may be deemed advantageous to it. As a consequence, the bidder (one of respondent here) is in estoppel to object or to assail the exercise of the said right by the petitioner as the Board.

LEGARDA VS CAFACTS : Petitioner Victoria Legarda was theowner of a parcel of land and the improvementslocated at 123 West Avenue, Quezon City. On January 11, 1985 respondent New Cathay House,Inc. filed a complaint against the petitioner forspecific performance with preliminary injunctionand damages in RTC alleging that petitionerentered into a lease agreement with the privaterespondent through its representative, Roberto V.Cabrera, Jr., of the aforestated property of petitioner. Respondent drew up the writtencontract and sent it to petitioner, that petitionerfailed and refused to execute and sign the samedespite demands of respondent.Petitioner engaged the services of counsel tohandle her case. Said counsel filed hisappearance with an urgent motion for extensionof time to file the answer within ten (10) daysfrom February 26, 1985. However, said counselfailed to file the answer within the extendedperiod prayed for. Counsel for private respondentfiled an ex-parte motion to declare petitioner indefault. This was granted by the trial court onMarch 25, 1985 and private respondent wasallowed to present evidence ex-parte . Thereafter,on March 25, 1985, the trial court rendered itsdecision.Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment but took no steps to have the same setaside or to appeal therefrom. Thus, the judgmentbecame final and executory. The property of petitioner was sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment in favor of private respondent. Theproperty was sold to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr.,representative of private respondent, and acertificate of sale was issued in his favor. Theredemption period expired after one year so afinal deed of sale was issued by the sheriff infavor of Cabrera, who in turn appears to havetransferred the same to private respondent.During all the time, the petitioner was abroad.When, upon her return, she learned, to her greatshock, what happened to her case and property,she nevertheless did not lose faith in her counsel.She still asked Atty. Coronel to take suchappropriate action possible under thecircumstances.As above related, said counsel filed a petition forannulment of judgment and its amendment in theCourt of Appeals. But that was all he did. After anadverse judgment was rendered againstpetitioner, of which counsel was duly notified,said counsel did not inform the petitioner aboutit. He did not even ask for a reconsiderationthereof, or file a petition for review before thisCourt. Thus, the judgment became final. It wasonly upon repeated telephone inquiries of petitioner that she learned from the secretary of her counsel of the judgment that hadunfortunately become final. HELD : A lawyer owes entire devotion to theinterest of his client, warmth and zeal in themaintenance and defense of his rights and theexertion of his utmost learning and ability, to theend that nothing can be taken or withheld fromhis client except in accordance with the law. Heshould present every remedy or defenseauthorized by the law in support of his client'scause, regardless of his own personal views. Inthe full discharge of his duties to his client, thelawyer should not be afraid of the possibility thathe may displease the judge or the general public. 12 Judged by the actuations of said counsel in thiscase, he has miserably failed in his duty toexercise his utmost learning and ability inmaintaining his client's cause. 13 It is not only acase of simple negligence as found by theappellate court, but of reckless and grossnegligence, so much so that his client wasdeprived of her

property without due process of law. The Court finds that the negligence of counsel inthis case appears to be so gross and inexcusable. This was compounded by the fact, that afterpetitioner gave said counsel another chance tomake up for his omissions by asking him to file apetition for annulment of the judgment in theappellate court, again counsel abandoned thecase of petitioner in that after he received a copyof the adverse judgment of the appellate court,he did not do anything to save the situation orinform his client of the judgment. He allowed the judgment to lapse and become final. Suchreckless and gross negligence should not beallowed to bind the petitioner. Petitioner wasthereby effectively deprived of her day in court. Thus, We have before Us a case where to enforcean alleged lease agreement of the property of petitioner, private respondent went to court, andthat because of the gross negligence of thecounsel for the petitioner, she lost the case aswell as the title and ownership of the property,which is worth millions. The mere lessee thennow became the owner of the property. Its trueowner then, the petitioner, now is consigned topenury all because her lawyer appear to haveabandoned her case not once but repeatedly.

In re: Sotto January 21, 1949 Atty. Vicente Sotto was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt in connection with his written statement of the Supreme Court's decision in the matter of Angel Parazo's case, which was published in Manila Times and in other newspapers in the locality. Sotto was given ten days more besides the five originally given him to file his answer, and although his answer was filed after the expiration of the period of time given him the said answer was admitted. He does not deny the authenticity of the statement as it has been published. He however, contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, the Supreme Court has has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and it can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive. He also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one. Issue: Whether or not Sotto is guilty of contempt. HELD:

The Court finds that the respondent Sotto knowingly published false imputations against its members. He accused them of such depravity as to have committed "blunders and injustices deliberately." He has maliciously branded them to be incompetent, narrow-minded, perpetrators of evil, "a constant peril to liberty and democracy," to be the opposite of those who were the honor and glory of the Philippines judiciary, to be needing a lesson in law, to be rendering an intolerable sentence, to be needing replacement by better qualified justices. Respondent has not presented any evidence or offered any to support his slanderous imputations, and no single word can be found in his answer showing that he ever believed that the imputations are based on fact. It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct.

People vs Veneracion On November 5, 2010 249 scra 244 Duty of a Judge to Impose Prescribed Penalty On August 2, 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide of a seven year old girl in the RTC presided by Judge Lorenzo P. Veneracion. Respondent judge however, refused to impose the corresponding penalty of death and he rather imposed reclusion perpetua to each of the accused. The city prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the penalty of death be imposed upon the four accused. The respondent judge refused to act. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge can impose penalty lower than that prescribed by law. HELD: The Supreme Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose the proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. In this case the respondent judge must impose the death penalty. This is consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code Article 9 that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.