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For legalization applicants and INS adjudicators, determination of eligibility for temporary residency
under IRCA, and the standard of proof that would be required, challenged them both. During the
initial implementation period, and subsequently, INS' interpretation and adjudication of these
eligibility requirements has been subjected to considerable legal challenge - most of which was
decided against the INS.
In the main, the requirements for general legalization program for "pre-1982" applicants were more
stringent than those required under the Special Agricultural Workers program.
Former illegal aliens were allowed to gain temporary residence in the United States under two the
following provisions of IRCA:
Eligibility for Temporary Resident Status Under the Main Legalization Program
(for what became known as "pre-1982" applicants)
Eligibility for Temporary Resident Status Under the Special Agricultural Workers (SAWs)
Program
1. Timeliness of application, that is, applicants had to file between June 1, 1987 through
November 30, 1988);
2. Evidence of having worked on perishable crops (specifically, in "seasonal agricultural
services") for at least "90 person days" between May 1, 1985 and May 1, 1986, qualified
under the INS's Section 210 (using INS Form I-700) - and this residence did not need to be
either "continuous" or "unlawful;"
3. Applicants could apply while they were outside the United States and were not required to
maintain any "continued physical presence" in the United States while their applications
were being adjudicated;
4. General admissibility as in immigrant, with the "public charge" excludability applied only if
they had relied on public case assistance.
The application period of SAWs applicants began June 1, 1987 and end
Permanent residency for SAWs is virtually automatic if granted temporal
who worked on perishable crops for 3 years were eligible on December
Accepts Legalization Questionnaires as District Court Issues Permanent Injunction in... Page 1 of 2
il
F«:Ca>2)514-1776
The injunction identifies "front-desked" class members as "those who attempted to file a
legalization application and fee with INS or a Qualified Designated Entity (QDE),
between May 5, 1987 and May 4,1988, but INS or QDE refused to accept the
application." INS will determine which aliens were "front desked."
In July 1998, INS voluntarily began accepting a legalization questionnaire for aliens to
detail any claim of "front desking" by INS. To conform with the injunction, INS has
redesigned the questionnaire to include the possibility of "front desking" by QDEs,
which were public service, non-governmental organizations authorized to accept
legalization applications from aliens who were reluctant to present themselves to INS.
Class members who believed that they were "front desked" must c-1~ ~1—1--~^"«
questionnaire on or before February 2, 2001. The questionnair ,
office and on the Internet at www.ins.usdoj .gov. The court ordei ^T/
notices are attached. *—r~~r~"
INS will review the questionnaire and notify the applicant in writing of its decision. If
the claim of "front desking" is substantiated, the alien is eligible to have the application
for legalization adjudicated. The appropriate INS Service Center will send instructions
http://uscis.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/newsrels/lulacins.htm 4/27/2004
Accepts Legalization Questionnaires as District Court Issues Permanent Injunction in... Page 2 of 2
Background
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) provided for the legalization
of certain aliens who had been unlawfully present in the United States since January
1982. In order to legalize under IRC A, aliens were required to submit an application
during a one-year period that ended in May 1988. This lawsuit, League of United Latin
American Citizens v. INS, (LULAC, later renamed as Newman v. INS), challenged the
implementation of the legalization program. To date, there are approximately 26,000
registered class members, an additional 25,000 aliens applied for class membership but
were denied.
In 1993, the Supreme Court agreed with the government's position and held that these
lawsuits could not be maintained by aliens who had not actually applied or attempted to
apply (by submitting a complete application and fee to an INS officer) before May 4,
1988. Section 377 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 was enacted on September 30, 1996. That section provides that courts may only
hear cases brought by persons seeking relief under the IRC A if they in fact filed a timely
application for legalization before May 4, 1988, or were "front desked."
-INS-
http://uscis.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/newsrels/lulacins.htm 4/27/2004
Eligibility for Legalization Under IRCA
For legalization applicants and INS adjudicators, determination of eligibility for temporary residency
under IRCA, and the standard of proof that would be required, challenged them both. During the
initial implementation period, and subsequently, INS' interpretation and adjudication of these
eligibility requirements has been subjected to considerable legal challenge - most of which was
decided against the INS.
In the main, the requirements for general legalization program for "pre-1982" applicants were more
stringent than those required under the Special Agricultural Workers program.
Former illegal aliens were allowed to gain temporary residence in the United States under two the
following provisions of IRCA:
Eligibility for Temporary Resident Status Under the Main Legalization Program
(for what became known as "pre-1982" applicants)
Eligibility for Temporary Resident Status Under the Special Agricultural Workers (SAWs)
Program
1. Timeliness of application, that is, applicants had to file between June 1, 1987 through
November 30, 1988);
2. Evidence of having worked on perishable crops (specifically, in "seasonal agricultural
services") for at least "90 person days" between May 1, 1985 and May 1, 1986, qualified
under the INS's Section 210 (using INS Form I-700) - and this residence did not need to be
either "continuous" or "unlawful;"
3. Applicants could • '"while they were outside the United States and were not required to
maintain any "co '~*\" in the United States while their applications
were being adjir *L/S
4. General admis' ?&~- "^ "^ublic charge" excludability applied only if
they had relief
The Legalization p
The one-year application period for Section 245A temporary residency began on May 5, 1987 and
ended May 4, 1988. The application period for permanent residency began on November 7, 1988
and has no fixed ending date.
The application period of SAWs applicants began June 1, 1987 and ended November 30, 1988.
Permanent residency for SAWs is virtually automatic if granted temporary residency. SAW aliens
who worked on perishable crops for 3 years were eligible on December 1, 1990.
Eligibility for Legalization Under IRCA
For legalization applicants and INS adjudicators, determination of eligibility for temporary residency
under IRCA, and the standard of proof that would be required, challenged them both. During the
initial implementation period, and subsequently, INS' interpretation and adjudication of these
eligibility requirements has been subjected to considerable legal challenge - most of which was
decided against the INS.
In the main, the requirements for general legalization program for "pre-1982" applicants were more
stringent than those required under the Special Agricultural Workers program.
Former illegal aliens were allowed to gain temporary residence in the United States under two the
following provisions of IRCA:
Eligibility for Temporary Resident Status Under the Main Legalization Program
(for what became known as "pre-1982" applicants)
Eligibility for Temporary Resident Status Under the Special Agricultural Workers (SAWs)
Program
1. Timeliness of application, that is, applicants had to file between June 1, 1987 through
November 30, 1988);
2. Evidence of having worked on perishable crops (specifically, in "seasonal agricultural
services") for at least "90 person days" between May 1, 1985 and May 1, 1986, qualified
under the INS's Section 210 (using INS Form I-700) - and this residence did not need to be
either "continuous" or "unlawful;"
3. Applicants could apply while they were outside the United States and were not required to
maintain any "continued physical presence" in the United States while their applications
were being adjudicated;
4. General admissibility as in immigrant, with the "public charge" excludability applied only if
they had relied on public case assistance.
• Acceptance^ .. /I isel);and,
• Acceptance to "T^r l^T se ")•
The application period of S/ ^^^TTcants began June 1, 1987 and ended November 30, 1988.
Permanent residency for SAWs is virtually automatic if granted temporary residency. SAW aliens
who worked on perishable crops for 3 years were eligible on December 1, 1990.
Testimony of Paul Virtue
General Counsel
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Department of Justice
A Hearing On
Past Designation of Temporary Protected Status
and Fraud in Prior Amnesty Programs
Before
The House Immigration and Claims Subcommittee
House Judiciary Committee
More than three million aliens filed applications for legalization under the
provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. The statute was drafted
both to encourage undocumented aliens to present themselves to the INS for legalization
and to address the migrant worker's lack of documents that could be used in support of an
application. These and other factors led to a high degree of fraud in the program. INS
was committed then, as it is, now to fighting application fraud, but a variety of factors
made it difficult to attack fraud at the level of the individual applicant. INS anti-fraud
efforts concentrated on filers of false affidavits and false document vendors. This
category of fraud was most prevalent both in the underlying legalization program and in
The legalization program was created under the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 (IRCA). ERCA was passed in a legislative environment in which sweeping
changes were being made to the Immigration and Nationality Act. In addition to IRCA,
the last days of the 99th Congress also saw the passage of the Immigration Marriage
Amendments of 1986.
IRCA was intended to solve the problem of illegal immigration through a two-
pronged approach: The first prong created a system of employer sanctions, intending to
remove the job "magnet" that attracts illegal immigrants. To address the illegal
16
population already present in the United States, the second prong provided a means by
which long-term illegal residents, in addition to certain agricultural workers, could obtain
The legalization provisions of the IRCA provided for adjustment of the status of
aliens who had resided in the United States continuously in unlawful status since January
1, 1982. Upon satisfactory proof of such continued residence, an alien was granted
temporary resident status, followed by a grant of permanent resident status after eighteen
months. These provisions are referred to as "245 A," for the section of the Immigration
demonstrate that they performed qualifying agricultural work in the United States for at
least ninety days during a designated period were granted temporary lawful resident status
which was automatically converted to lawful permanent status after one year. This
17
CSS applicants for class membership were required to file an application for
legalization (Form 1-687) and establish by independent evidence such as a bus ticket,
airplane ticket, or declaration of a third party that they were outside of the United States
due to a brief, casual and innocent absence after May 1, 1987 and before May 4, 1988. In
addition, these applicants had to submit a declaration explaining the reasons why no
application was filed during the application period. If these conditions were met, the INS
Many aliens claim eligibility for legalization through these lawsuits, which are
commonly referred to as the "late amnesty" litigation. The approximate number of aliens
affected by the litigation is as follows: In the CSS case, 180,287 aliens sought class
case, 50,778 aliens sought class membership. Of this total, 25,768 received class
membership.
INS together with the Department of Justice prosecuted a large number of cases
involving class membership fraud. By far, the largest operation was Operation Desert
Deception in Las Vegas, Nevada. The organizations and individuals targeted in that
investigation filed some 22,000 applications, many of which were fraudulent, for both
24
January 1991, Velez and his co-conspirators submitted approximately 3,000 fraudulent
applications.
Section 377 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 (IIRIRA) was enacted on September 30, 1996. That section provides that courts
may only hear cases brought by persons seeking relief under the IRCA if they in fact filed
a timely application for legalization before May 4, 1988, or "attempted to file a complete
application and application fee with an authorized legalization officer of the INS but had
Based on the enactment of IIRIRA section 377, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on January 16, 1998 instructed the district court to dismiss
the CSS case and vacated all interim relief orders in the case. The LULAC/Newman case
was remanded to the district court to determine if there were any persons who could meet
In April 1998, following the Ninth Circuit's dismissal in CSS, plaintiffs filed a
nearly identical lawsuit (CSS2) in the same district court (the U.S. District Court for the
preliminary injunction ordering INS to stay the removal and continue to extend
25
,62 Former National Hispanic Leader Found Guilty of Immigration Fraud Page 1 of 1
http://w^rw.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/Pre_96/May95/262.txt.html 4/26/2004
ABOUHALIMA, MOHAMMED
-2-
TRANSCRIPT
In the past few years immigrants have been the focus of legislation and political rhetoric
suggesting that they are the cause of economic woes in America. Charles Krause talks to
Hispanic-Americans to get their reaction and finds that they aren't taking it sitting down.
JUAN JOSE GUTIERREZ, March Coordinator: The Latinos finally are emer;
coherent political force, more so every day, and so that in the future we
can already envision the day when politicians are going to have to
understand that their political calculus can no longer assume that there
will be no political consequences if they are going to continue to
practice the simplistic politics of scapegoating those least able to protect
themselves, namely the immigrants.
CHARLES KRAUSE: What Hispanics some of them in the U.S. for decades have begun to
realize is that suddenly their rights are not fully protected until they become citizens. So,
fearful that the anti immigrant fever will spread, record numbers of legal immigrants are
being naturalized in mass swearing in ceremonies across the country. And it's not just
Latinos who are rushing to become citizens.
DORIS MEISSNER, Commissioner, INS: You have come from 113 countries around the
globe.
CHARLES KRAUSE: A record 1.2 million immigrants have taken out citizenship this year
alone, an increase of more than 100 percent.
DORIS MEISSNER: A very large number of people- about three million people- who
became legalized under a 1986 immigration law in the last two years— have become eligible
to file for citizenship.
MR. KRAUSE: But Meissner and activists on both sides of the issue stress the impact of
cards for analysis—were arriving in INS offices only after the applicant had been sworn in as a
United States citizen. These and other allegations of flaws in naturalization processing suggested
that INS had sacrificed naturalization processing integrity in the name of processing applicants
more quickly. In September 1996, the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs,
and Criminal Justice of the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (the
Subcommittee) held its first hearings concerning CUSA to explore the nature and extent of these
processing flaws and the motives behind INS' accelerated naturalization initiative.
The portrait of naturalization processing that emerged from the September hearings did not allay
congressional concerns. Although Executive Associate Commissioner T. Alexander Aleinikoff
described the efforts INS had made to improve the off-site testing program, his testimony
confirmed that off-site testing had lacked standards and not been monitored by INS. In addition,
INS employees from Los Angeles, Chicago, and Dallas testified to the extraordinary rush imposed
on naturalization adjudications during CUSA. That rush, according to these witnesses, meant that
INS had naturalized people without ensuring that they were eligible. Some of the shortcuts to
which these witnesses testified were that INS had not properly trained the new adjudicators hired
for CUSA, had not conducted thorough applicant criminal history checks, had not provided
applicants' permanent files to adjudicators for review before making decisions on naturalization
applications, or, when those files had been available, had discouraged the thorough review of the
file to determine whether the applicant had lawfully obtained the prerequisite permanent residency
status.
In the meantime, in response to congressional requests the Justice Management Division (JMD) of
the Department of Justice engaged an outside accounting firm, KPMG Peat Marwick, to oversee a
systematic review of CUSA naturalizations that INS would conduct using INS employees. The
KPMG-supervised review first concentrated on determining whether each person naturalized during
CUSA had a fingerprint check conducted by the FBI. Subsequent reviews would determine how
many persons had naturalized during CUSA despite a disqualifying criminal history. The KPMG-
supervised review continued over the course of the next two years, but even its preliminary results
were troubling. In March 1997, JMD reported to Congress that of the 1,049,867 persons INS had
then identified as having naturalized between August 31, 1995, and September 30, 1996,1 the
fingerprint cards of 124,111 had been returned by the FBI as "unclassifiable," meaning that the
fingerprints submitted had not been suitable for comparison. For an additional 61,366 persons, the
FBI had no record of having conducted any fingerprint check. This data, therefore, indicated that
for 18 percent of those persons naturalized during CUSA, INS had not conducted a complete
criminal history background check.
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0007/execsummary.htm 6/8/2004
/iterviews and Adjudications Page 46 of 95
(because five years had passed since the time that permanent residency had been granted), as
well as other persons who were not yet eligible to naturalize. These A-files were stored in an INS
facility in Las Vegas until sentencing and post-trial motions were completed on the 54 defendants
in the spring of 1996.
The 22,000 cases were of interest to the ODD prosecution team not just because they contained
evidence of the defendants' criminal conduct, but also because the applicants themselves—though
not the primary targets of the investigation—included persons who knowingly participated in the
defendants' criminal scheme. Although prosecutors decided that the task was too great to consider
pursuing criminal charges against individual applicants, EAC Aleinikoff, in a declaration signed on
September 13, 1995, and later filed with the federal court in Nevada in support of INS' request for
restitution from one prominent defendant in the case, told the court that INS was going to begin a
costly review of the 22,000 files
Thus, the files were also kept segregated in Las Vegas in anticipation of this INS review.^^
Despite Aleinikoff's representations, and despite INS' representations to Congress later in 1995
that it would take steps to ensure that cases in which SAW fraud was suspected would be
investigated before any decision was made to approve naturalization, INS did not timely undertake
the promised review of the 22,000 cases. The lead federal prosecutor working on the criminal
cases told the OIG that he became concerned when, despite his requests in October 1995, INS had
not taken any steps toward reviewing the cases by late 1995. The prosecutor said that each day
more of the legalization applicants were becoming eligible, and he believed that INS was bound by
Aleinikoff's declaration to conduct a thorough review. The prosecutor told the OIG that he recalled
discussions with INS officials in late 1995 during which INS balked at conducting the case review
because of budget concerns.
By May 1996, INS still had not begun to review the files. During a conference call with INS officials
on May 14, 1996, the prosecutor was advised that the reason for delays in implementing the
review was budgetary concerns, specifically that INS' resources were primarily devoted to CUSA.
As he indicated in his contemporaneous notes, INS told him that the "big priority is naturalization,
to naturalize 1.6 million people." Michael Niefach of the General Counsel's Office, who also
participated in the conference call, corroborated the prosecutor's recollection that he had expressed
his concern about the delay and had asked INS to undertake the promised review. Niefach told the
OIG that budget constraints, although not specifically the CUSA program, had prevented INS from
undertaking the review project before that date.—
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0007/interviews.htm 6/10/2004