Understanding Quine in Terms of Aufbauian Reductionism: Another Look at Naturalized Epistemology S.

Rocknak Hartwick College Oneonta, NY USA

True to at least Burton Dreben's word, lifelong friend and student of Quine, it is simply intellectually and historically irresponsible to attempt to understand Quines work apart from Carnaps. 1 In fact, it could even be said that Quine's dedication of his first major epistemological undertaking to Carnap as his "teacher and friend" (Word and Object (1960)) was a far stretch more than a polite gesture; it might even be ventured that without Carnap, there might not have been a Quine. Or at the very least, Quine as we know him. In fact, as if to underline this very point, Quine writes in his short essay "Homage to Rudolph Carnap" (1970) that: "Carnap was my greatest teacher I was his disciple for six years. In later years his views went on evolving and so did mine in divergent ways. But even where we disagreed he was still setting the theme; the line of my thought was largely determined by problems that I thought his position presented."2 And these problems, at their most general level, revolved around what Russell once gave the title of a book: Our Knowledge of the External World (1914). For the fundamental questions that initially drove Russell, then Carnap, and eventually Quine, were simple, although admittedly perplexing: What

1 Dreben emphasized this point repeatedly in the 1993 Carnap/Quine seminar that I regularly sat in on at Boston University. Also

see his paper "Quine" (1990), where he stresses the Carnap/Quine relationship.
2 (WOP 41). For more on Quines thoughts on Carnap see at least: all of Dear Carnap, Dear Van; The Quine-Carnap Correspondence, all of From A Logical Point of View, "The Lectures on Carnap" (1934) (DCDV), "Truth by Convention,"(1936) (WOP), "Notes on Existence and Necessity" (1956) (SPL) (this last essay was translated from parts of the book O Sentido da nova logica (1944), and eventually, was rewritten into "Reference and Modality," which can be found in From A Logical Point of View). "On Carnap's Views on Ontology," (1951) (WOP),"Carnap and Logical Truth" (1954) (WOP), The Time of My Life, (1985), "Carnap's positivistic travail" (1985), "Carnap," (1987), "Two Dogmas in Retrospect," (1991), In Praise of Observation Sentences, (Appendix), (1993), "In Conversation: W.V. Quine (video)," (1994) and all of From Stimulus to Science (1995). 1

does our knowledge3 of the external world consist of and how does one acquire it? In what sense is it certain, and/or justifiable, if at all? However, in this essay I certainly cannot explain how Carnap influenced Quine in regard to these matters in any degree of comprehensive detailthat would take a book. So instead, I focus on explicating a small portionparticularly, a thirdof what I claim is the central tension between these two philosophers, namely, one of Quines reactions to the three fundamental epistemological circles he believed to be present in Carnaps work, or what I think we may characterize as three contemporary variants of Menos Paradox.4 More specifically, I focus here on what we may identify as the first circle: [1] The rational reconstruction (LAW 158) of knowledge in the Logische Aufbau der Welt, where knowledge seems to paradoxically emerge from knowledge, where the latter, more primary mode of knowledge consists of elementary experiences, the relation R of remembering as similar and Russell and Whiteheads theory of relations. Meanwhile, if only to frame our discussion in terms of Quines more comprehensive reaction to Carnap, realize that the other two circles are: [2] The linguistic doctrine of logical truth,5 or in other words, Carnaps conventional doctrine of logical truth, as spelled out in the Logical Syntax of Language. For according to Quine, as well as any of those who wrestled with the logocentric predicament, 6 on this account, we seem to have to already know logic to acquire logic; in particular, in order to accept a logical inference as logically valid, one must presuppose the validity of that
3 It should be noted that Quine thought that we should give up the notion of knowledge as a bad job and make do rather with its separate ingredients. (Q, 109). For the most part, Quines rejection of knowledge has to do with his rejection of certainity, a notion that I touch on at the end of this paper. However, for our purposes, it is enough to realize that when Quine speaks of knowledge he is speaking of beliefs (from a behavioristic point of view), where some are true, some are justified, and some are believed in more than others: We can still speak of a belief as true, and one belief as firmer or more certain, to the believers mind. There is also the element of justification, but [there are] limitations. (Q, 109). 4 Recall that in its original sense, the paradox unfolds as follows: How may we learn, look for, or acquire knowledge if we don't already know what it is we want to learn, look for, or acquire? Otherwise, how could we identify what it is we want to know when we stumble across it? This is the first horn of the paradox. But if we already knew what we were after, why bother? This is the second horn of the paradox. In short, the epistemological puzzle is: Some thing or event X may not be known (and thus, be defined as such, for in order to define X, one must know X), unless one already knows X. But if one already knows X, one would not seek to know X. See M 80d-e. 5 See Quines "Carnap and Logical Truth" (1954) (WOP 108), where he introduces this term. 6 Dreben reminds the reader in "Quine" that Sheffer had been at odds with this problem as early as 1926 in his Review of Principia Mathematica, where he specifically identifies this problem as the logocentric predicament. However, realize that Lewis Carroll had put his finger on this problem (although somewhat playfully) as early as 1895 in What the Tortoise Said to Achilles. 2

very inference.7 [3] Carnaps brand of analyticity, which is not be confused with the linguistic doctrine of logical truth. For as Quine points out in a number of papers and letters to Carnap, 8 and most famously in The Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1950), it seems that to define analyticity, one must already have some definition of analyticity in mind, and so, correspondingly, to know what analyticity means in terms of grasping it by way of its definition, we must already know what analyticity means. However, as noted above, as interesting as it would be to examine circles [2] and [3] in more depth, time and space simply do not permit. As a result, I focus on just circle [1] here, namely, the paradox of reductionism. To do so, I have divided this paper into five sections: In 1, I sketch the general structure of the reductionist project as it is presented in the Aufbau. In 2, after canvassing the distinction between what Quine characterizes as radical reductionism (namely, Aufbauian reductionism; FLPV; TDE 39) v. attenuated reductionism (namely, the idea that the truth value of a sentence can be determined purely by empirical means; FLPV; TDE 41), I explain why Quine thought the Aufbau was flawed. In particular, I begin by examining his criticism that it smacked of mentalistic monism (FSS 15). Following, I show that in virtue of this critique, Quine puts his finger onhowever implicitlythe epistemological circularity of the radical reductionism of the Aufbau, which, I claim, reminds us of the second horn of Menos Paradox. However, in 3, I point out that this breed of epistemological circularlity is not be confused with what we may characterize as the naturalistic circle where it is alleged that using the scientific method to examine science is problematicin two fundamental respects, where the first problem was brought into

7 In this regard, Quine writes in Carnap and Logical Truth: It is impossible in principle, even in an ideal state, to get even the most elementary part of logic exclusively by the explicit application of conventions stated in advance. The difficulty is the vicious regress, familiar from Lewis Carroll which I have elaborated [on in "Truth by Convention"]. Briefly the point is that the logical truths, being infinite in number, must be given by general conventions rather than singly; and logic is needed then to begin with, in the metatheory, in order to apply the general conventions to individual cases. (p. 115). Or, as Barry Stroud (1995) explains it: "The trouble here (making a long story short) is that there is no limit to the number of logical truths, so it would be a never-ending task to declare each of them true by fiat, one by one. The 'conventions' therefore must be general, and then logic will be needed to infer particular logical truths from the general 'conventions.' If nothing were logically true independently of our adopting certain 'conventions' there would be no way of generating all logical truths from 'conventions' we might adopt" (38-39). 8 See Truth by Convention (1935) (WOP), and letter #97, Jan 1, 1943 (DCDV 296-297). See also White (1950), which came out the same year that Quine delivered The Two Dogmas of Empiricism at an APA meeting. 3

focus by Hume,9 and the second, by physicalism, particularly, Quines notion of physicalism. These circles are, respectively: a.) Science may only yield fallible results and so, if the claim We must use science to examine science is a scientific claim, it is a fallible claim. As a result, the empiricist, or in other words, the naturalized philosopher, appears to be undermined from within. b.) The epistemological foundations of science are, according to contemporary scientific research itself, overwhelmingly sparse, consisting of unrelated sense data manifest by certain sets of nerves firing. Consequently, if it is shown that scientific theory is equivalent to such scanty data as a result of reducing science to it, then our scientific claims seem to be equally scanty; they amount to nothing more than intermittent and unrelated sets of nerves firing. Subsequently, in 4-5 I show that Quines repudiation of radical reductionism, in light of its paradoxical nature (in a respect reminiscent of the second horn of Menos Paradox) could only have motivated Quine to adopt naturalism for reasons that appear to be independent of his pragmatic concerns, simply because it is not reasonable (namely, it is paradoxical)10 to adopt a Carnapian phenomenalistic/mentalistic approach to epistemology. Armed with what could only be his invigorated faith in the naturalistic method, he was then, as I see it, equipped to break the physicalistic version of the
9 Yet as Quine points out, this circle was acknowledged even in ancient skepticism (RR 2-3). However, it might be argued that

it was Hume who pushed this seemingly paradoxical mode of thinking to its limit (c.f. Husserl; C 89-90). Moreover, Quine explicitly attributes this circle to Hume in his 1946 lectures on Hume (see Pakaluk, pp. 455, 457 (#490) 459 (#500)).
10 In this respect, it may seem, on the face of it, that I am taking issue with Fogelin (2004) where he argues that according to

Quine, epistemology does not provide an independent standpoint for empirical science. (19) Rather, Fogelin continues, empirical science provides the framework for understanding empirical knowledge, including the empirical knowledge provided by empirical science. (19) However, I completely agree with Fogelin if the word naturalized is inserted before the word epistemology in the first sentence cited above. Yet non-naturalistic epistemology, namely an epistemology that seems to embrace the centrality of reason, where such reason is, it would seem, so removed from empirical revision that it seems immune to revisionand as such, is not a priori, and thus, does not, according to Quine, constitute a dreaded first science does, I argue above, seem to provide a somewhat independent standpoint for empirical science, or at the very least, a somewhat independent justification for empirical science. I say somewhat, for as just noted, although according Quine reason seems to be central to not just scientific inquiry, but to all human inquiry, it is nevertheless, not immune to revision, and thus, not a priori (see my brief discussion of analyticity in 4-5 for a bit more detail). In fact, Fogelin clearly acknowledges Quines inadvertent appeals to reason at the very end of his essay, although I think that Fogelin misleadingly characterizes such appeals as Quines latent dependence on a priori rules: But alas, Quine was not as fully committed to a naturalistic standpoint as he might have been [in particular] he tended to move at a very high level of theoretical generality, rarely touching down at empirical checkpoints. He often seemed more concerned with the relationship between his philosophical position and the philosophical positions of others than with the relationship between his position and the data need to support it. As a result, contrary to Quines stated intentions, his theory sometimes looks more like an a priori propadeutic or groundwork for science (NK 126) than like science itself. (45)
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naturalistic circle, a repudiation that, I show, entails his rejection of attenuated reductionism and concomitantly, his rejection of analyticity if not certainty altogether. As such, the Humean version of the naturalistic circle could simply be dismissed. Meanwhile, the practicality of an admitably fallible science could be unashamedly embraced, although not just for the sake of its practicalityas Quine himself seems to misleadingly indicate throughout his workbut instead, as just noted, to avoid the seemingly Platonic paradox of Aufbauian reductionism.

1 The Aufbau: a General Overview As noted above, and as Quine rightly sees it throughout his work and his letters, 11 the early Carnap was the champion of the great Russellian project in Our Knowledge of the External World, which was, according to Quine, the explication of the "construction" of the external world from bits of sense data. (TT; ROD 83) In Carnap's case in the Aufbau, this consisted of attempt[ing] to apply the theory of relations to the task of analyzing reality. (LAW 7) That is, as noted earlier, for his method of construction, Carnap employs the theory of relations as it was laid out by Russell and Whitehead in the Principia. Broadly speaking, this means that Carnap attempted to show that all concepts/objects12 may be understood as logically "reducible," or translatable13 to the primary relation remembering as similar (or what we may also refer
11 See at least "Russell's Ontological Development," (1981), (TT 84), "Homage to Rudolf Carnap," (1970) (WOP 40), and letter #37, Quine to Morris (1936) (DCDV 204-206), and (FSS 9-10). See also Richard Creaths comments in his Introduction to Dear Carnap, Dear Van, particularly: "Russell called for the rational reconstruction of our knowledge on the basis of sense experience and urged the narrowest and deepest selection of concepts [in Our Knowledge of the External World]. It seemed to speak directly to Carnap. In fact [Carnap] penciled in the margin of his copy 'This narrowing and deepening of the fundamental postulates is my task!'" (DCDV 24). 12 Note that according to Carnap, there is no logical difference between concepts and objects. Rather, this difference is, at best, a psychological difference, and so, for the purposes of the Aufbaus program, may be ignored (LAW 10). However, it should be pointed out that the object that the concept may be understood as , is not to be confused with the object that may fall under the concept: it

follows that to only one concept there belongs one and only one object its object (not to be confused with the objects that fall under the concept(LAW 10)
13 Note the following passage where Carnap makes it quite clear that at least in principle, all knowledge may be translated into

elementary experiences and R (where here, he is concerned with making it clear that by doing so, he may also account for the objectivity of knowledge): Even though the subjective origin of all knowledge lies in the contents of experiences and their connections, it is still possible, as the constructional system will show, to advance to an intersubjective, objective world, which can be conceptually comprehended and which is identical for all observers (LAW 7; emphasis added). That is, important for us to note, all knowledge is contained it, or in other words, lies in E and R.
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to as R in this paper) and certain unanalyzable elementary experiences (or what we may also refer to as E in this paper) (see LAW Chapter C). 14 In this respect, Carnap hoped to "rationally reconstruct" the concepts of all fields of knowledge (including science) by showing that they may be translated into the strictly formal world of a "constructional language." As such, this constructed language served as a model for how all fields of knowledge may be redefined, or in other words, logically reduced to R and elementary experiences.15 In a bit more detailalthough it is not relevant to indulge ourselves in all the Aufbaus technical machinery hereas far as reducing concept/objects to other concept/objects goes, and conversely, constructing concepts/objects out of other concepts/objects, Carnap explains that:16

14 According to Carnap, our elementary experiences must be understood as "wholes," as opposed to "atomistically," where ,

according to Carnap, such atoms are bits of unrelated sense data. As such, Carnap claims that by definition, these elementary experiences are unanalyzable. Thus, they do not display "any constituents or properties or aspects." (LAW 110). Carnap writes in further explanation: "In opposition to the 'atomizing' school of thought in psychology and epistemology, which postulates such psychological 'atoms,' as e.g. simple sensations as elements, there is presently more and more emphasis on the fact that 'every state of consciousness is a unit and is not, strictly speaking, analyzable.'((Schlick, Erkenntnis.) 143f., italics added). In particular, there is more and more proof that, in perception, the total impression is primary, while sensations and particular feelings etc., are only the result of an abstracting analysis" (LAW 108). Carnap refers to the following philosophical works to support this claim: Wilhelm Schuppe: (1894); 2nd ed., 1910. Hans Cornelius, (1911); 2nd ed. 1919. Heinrich Gompenz, (1901); 119 (1902) and Robert Reniger, (1911). And he refers to work done by the following psychologists as well: Wolfgang Khler, (1925) and Max Wertheimer (1925).
15 Realize that Carnap never intended to complete this constructional system in the Aufbau, instead, he merely wanted to show in what respect it was possible (LAW 176). Moreover, in Carnaps words, rational reconstruction may, in its most general sense, be understood as a formal clarification of what we do intuitively, or in other words: The constructional system is a rational reconstruction of the

entire formation of reality, which, in cognition, is carried out for the most part intuitively. In reconstructing the recognition of the plant, the botanist has to ask himself what, in the actual act of recognition, was really perceived and what was the apperceptive synthesis [verarbeitung]? But these two components which are united in the result he can only separate through abstraction. Thus, in rational reconstruction, construction theory has to distinguish, by means of abstraction, between the purely given and the synthesis; this division must be made, not only for the individual case, but for the entire conscious process. (LAW 158)
16 Where an accurate statement, or as Carnap also puts it, an definition concerning a concept/object should be understood

as a knowledge claim (see LAW, Chapter A). Also note the following passage (which refers back to Chapter A): [science] can restrict itself to statements about structures, since all objects of knowledge are not content, but form, and since they can be represented as structural entities (cf. 15 f) (LAW 107). In other words, the object of knowledge in this case is a structure, where the knowledge claim is the statement about that structure.
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if an object a is reducible to objects b, c, then all statements about a can be transformed into statements about b, c. To reduce a to b, or to construct a out of b, c, means to produce a general rule that indicates for each individual case how a statement about a must be transformed in order to yield a statement about b, c. This rule of translation we call a constructional rule or constructional definition. (LAW, 6)

That is, "construction rules" are the rules that allow us to change any statement about a into given statements about b and c, provided that the concept/object a is "reducible to," namely, may be redefined as the concept/objects b, c. For instance, Carnap points out further on in the Aufbau that we may "reduce" the concept/object of a prime number to two other concept/objects, a natural number and division. As a result, a definition that initially concerned just prime numbers (particularly, a, with b and c absent), namely, "x is a prime number" (LAW 16) may be restated to concern only b & c: "x is a natural number whose only divisions are 1 and x itself. (LAW 16) Construction proceeds exactly opposite, more specifically, if there is a statement about b and c and it can be translated into a statement about a, b, and c (where b and c may be absent), then the concept/object a is constructed. As a result, the construction of a concept/object is actually a new definition of a concept/object via other concept/objects. Or as Carnap puts it (where here, he uses the term statement rather than definition): An object (or concept) is said to be reducible to one or more other objects if all statements about it can be transformed into statements about those other objects ... [thus] if a is reducible to b, and b to c, then a is reducible to c. Thus, reducibility is transitive. (LAW 6) In short then, this constructing/reduction process is what Carnap also refers to as analysis which, as such, is analytic in nature; as a result, any statements about concepts/object a where a is reducible to other concepts/objects b and care interchangeable with statements about b and c. Ultimately, as Carnap explains in Part III, Chapter C of the Aufbau, all basic concepts/objects may then, by a method he calls quasi-analysis, (LAW 69-74) be reduced to a network of basic relations, (LAW 98) where, as noted earlier, the relation that is logically primary is R, or in other words, remembering as similar and the components that these relations obtain of consist of unanalyzable elementary experiences. However, analyzing unanalyzable wholes (namely, elementary experiences) appears to be somewhat problematic. As a result, Carnap explains that quasi-analysis is
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actually a synthesis which wears the garb of an analysis. (LAW 121; emphasis added). That is, as just noted, although the construction/reduction process of translating concepts/objects into other concepts/objects in the Aufbau is strictly analytic, the method of constructing-from/reducing-to concepts/objects by way of quasi-analysis is synthetic. But what is this synthesis? In particular, does it mean that statements about say, a lower-level concept/object c are not interchangeable with statements about E and R? No. To see why this is the case, first note the following general explanation Carnap gives of quasi-analysis: We overcome the difficulty which results from the fact that elementary experiences are unanalyzable by introducing a constructional procedure which, even though synthetic, leads from any basic elements to objects which can serve as formal substitutents for the constituents of the basic elements. (LAW 110; emphasis added) That is, quasi-analysis is simply quasi because it attributes a certain formal structure to what is, in principle, unstructured in virtue of being unanalyzable; namely, it provides a structure that acts a logical, analyzable proxy for elementary experiences, which as such, serves as the analyzable foundation for all fields of knowledge. Carnap makes this clear when he continues in the immediately following passage: We call [these objects constructed by quasi-analysis] formal substitutents, because all assertions which hold for the constitutents hold, in analogous form, also for them. We call this procedure quasi analysis. (LAW 110) That is, and crucial to note, a reduction to the objects created by quasi-analysis, is, analogously, a reduction to the elementary experiences and R, a point that is behind Carnaps remark that the subjective origin of all knowledge claims lies in the contents of experiences and their connections (LAW 7; emphasis added). For, Carnap writes on p. 111, It is of importance whenever we are concerned with unanalyzable units of any kind, that is, with objects which, in their immediate given-ness, do not exhibit any constituents or properties or aspects. These objects are given, as it were, only synthetically; nevertheless, as a result of our procedure, we can ascribe various characteristics to them (LAW 111). In short then, for our purposes, this means that according to Carnap, all knowledge claims are first reducible to the products of quasi analysis (basic relations (75-83) which obtain of elementary experiences), and then second, analogously, by way of quasi-analysis, to the elementary experiences themselves, and R.

So in short, with all additional technical detail set aside, Quine writes in "Russell's Ontological Development" (1966) that: "[In the Aufbau,] Carnap achieved remarkable feats of construction, starting with sense data and building explicitly, with full Principia techniques and Principia ingenuity, toward the external world. (TT; ROD 84) In still other words, as Quine indicates here and elsewhere, in the Aufbau, Carnap had taken the Russellian epistemological concerns to subtler, if not more daring heights; according to Quine, epistemology had, thanks to Carnap, taken a clear and decisive logical turn. And initially, this seemed to mean a turn for the better.17

2 Quines Reaction to Radical Reductionism: A Sensitivity to Circularity 2.1 Attenuated v. Radical Reductionism As is well-known, Quine rejects the idea that any sentence claim can, both in principle and in practice, be confirmed or denied on the basis of just experience; this rejection is behind his attack on the second dogma of empiricism, namely his distaste for allegedly synthetic claims. In still other words, Quines renouncement of the synthetic amounts to a repudiation of what he refers to a subtler and more tenuous form (FLPV; TDE 40) of reductionism, or what we can refer to, after Quine, as attenuated (FLPV; TDE 41; emphasis added) reductionism. Meanwhile, it is also well-known that Quine rejects what he construes as Carnaps more radical (FLPV; TDE 39; emphasis added) form of reductionism, where, as explained in 1 above, it is alleged that all statements may be reduced, or in other words, translated into sense data and ordered by at least one fundamental relation (which, as we saw in Carnaps case, consisted of, respectively, E and R). Or as Quine puts it: Radical reductionism, conceived now with statements as units, set itself the task of specifying a sense-datum language and showing how to translate the rest of significant discourse, statement by statement, into it. Carnap embarked on this project in the Aufbau (FLPV; TDE 39; emphasis added).18
17 For more instances of Quines praise of the Aufbaus technical achievements, see at least, "Homage to Rudolf Carnap" (1970) (WOP 40), letter #37, March 6, 1936 Quine to Morris (DCDV 204). Also note Quine's remarks to the same effect in the Fara video interview. 18 One should note that Quine says sense-datum language (emphasis added) here, not sense-datum simpliciter. In other

words, contrary to what we just saw in 1, it seems that Quine thought that in the Aufbau, Carnap was attempting to reduce all knowledge to a primary language about sense data (which we may refer to as L), rather than to the sense data (and R) itself. And in some respects, Quine is correct, quasi-analysis, as we saw above, consists in constructing an analogous formal
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In short then, according to Quine, the distinction between attenuated reductionism v. radical reductionism is, respectively: [1] The truth value of certain sentences (namely, synthetic ones) may be established solely by appealing to empirical evidence and [2] All knowledge claims may be reduced, or in other words, translated into empirical experiences, where such empirical experiences are ordered with a select amount of fundamental relations (e.g. Carnaps remembering as similar). 2.2 The Paradox of Radical Reductionism As briefly noted above, it appears that, on the face of it, Quine eschewed the notion of synthetic claims and so, the theory of attenuated reductionismin light of his holism, where, according to this theory, no sentence stands or falls on its own, regardless of what the empirical evidence tells us. For instead, the Quinean story goes, whether or not we reject or accept a given sentence also depends on its relationship to the rest of the theory at hand; as a result: statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually, but only as a corporate body. (FLPV; TDE 41)19 But as noted in my opening remarks to this paper, I think that the reasons behind Quines rejection of attenuated reductionism are a bit more complex than this, although Quine never directly says as much. In particular, as already suggested above, it may be shown that Quines repudiation of radical reductionism ultimately entails his rejection of attenuated reductionism by way of a rejection of what I refer to as the physicalist version of the naturalistic circle.
language about elementary experiences; particularly, the construction of the basic relations that obtain of elementary experiences. Nevertheless, as we also saw, Carnap clearly thought that all knowledge lies in the contents of experiences and their connections (LAW 7), not just in sentences made about E and R. So we might take Quines insistence on referring to a sense datum language here as an artifact of Quines behaviourism, where only sentences may be true or false, not mental entities (see for instance, WO 30-31, POT 69, FSS 90-92 and OME). Meanwhile, so-called mental entities must be understood in physical terms (e.g. as nerves firing, etc. See at least RR 34 and OME). In fact, although Quine talks about Carnap reducing to a sense-datum language here (and elsewhere, e.g. FLPV; TDE 39 and FSS 13), as noted in my introductory remarks, he claims that he rejects the Aufbau primarily because it invokes a mentalistic monism (FSS 15). In other words, Carnap appeals to elementary experiences and not a.) sentences about elementary experiences and/or b.) elementary experiences construed as physical states (e.g. nerves firing, etc.) However, regardless if in this respect Quine appears to be intermittently imposing his own epistemological predilections on the Aufbau, it may be argued that its radical reductionism still seemed paradoxical to Quine, or at the very least, struck him as an impossible task (see above for more detail).
19 For more on Quines notion of holism, see at least: The Five Milestones of Empiricism (1975) (TT) Two Dogmas in Retrospect (1991) and POT 13-16. Note that in The Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Quine credits Duhem (1906) and Lowinger (1941) for initially working out the fundamentals of holism. Quines notion of underdetermination also comes into play here, but for our purposes,

and given length restraints, we need not throw it into the mix. See Bergstrm (2004) for more detail.
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To see why this appears to have been the case, we must first understand how and why Quine rejected the paradoxical radical reductionism manifest in the Aufbau. To begin, note a particularly revealing line from Quines 1993 paper In Praise of Observation Sentences: "The lively objection to [protocol sentences], as vehicles of evidence for our knowledge of the external world, is that they already assume such knowledge But the answer is that they need not. (IPOS 108; emphasis added). In other words, here, Quine is defending the idea that his notion of an observation sentence a term that he uses interchangeably in this paper (IPOS 108) with the term protocol sentence is not, in the course of the human beings learning process, initially theory-laden (IPOS, 110). Rather, our initial use of language is purely reflexive; a product of our being habituated to say a given sentence S when we experience a given range of neural intake M (IPOS, 109). Only later, through a process that is not relevant for us to examine here, do human beings acquire theory, and relatedly, knowledge. But what we must ask is: Why does Quine balk at the idea that our observation sentences somehow initially assume knowledge such that, say, when we first learn to use the word Mama correctly, that we allegedly know who and what Mama is when we say it? Two reasons, where the first, and most well-known is: According to Quine, science tells us that our initial input is remarkable meager (FSS, 16), consisting of the mere impacts of rays and particles on our surfaces and a few odds and ends such as the strain as walking uphill (FSS 16). In this respect, our initial input consists of unrelated bits and pieces of sense data. As a result, we are not in any respect aware of such nerves firing (see at least FSS, 17-18, RR, 2-4). Instead, such input must be understood as our bodys initial and unconscious state of reacting to the worldnot only when we are infants and first experience the world, but also in terms of our outermost interface with the world, as it assails us throughout our entire lives. Thus, knowing where, according to Quine, knowing consists of at least some kind of psychological ability to evaluate data such that we may say the right thing at the right time, and as a result, at the very least, be aware of what is being experienced and what to say 20is simply not an option at this stage of our data acquisition. Rather, according to Quine, our initial, most outermost interface with the world occurs at what he characterizes as the the purely receptual (FSS 17) level of
20 This is part and parcel of Quines behaviorism; see at least FSS and POT where he gives a general outline of this position. 11

data acquisition; accordingly, awareness, and so, the possibility of knowledge occurs only at the perceptual (FSS 17) stage of data acquisition.21 Second, although Quine never explicitly says as much, it seems that assuming knowledge in our initial experience of the world incurs the second horn of Menos Paradox, namely, [A man] would not seek what he knows, for since he knows it, there is no need of inquiry. (M 80 d-e). To see why this is the case, we must briefly re-examine what is going on behind the scenes in Carnaps Aufbau. In particular, realize that if any statements about a concept/object a are, in fact translat[able (FLPV; TDE; 39) or in other words, are logically equivalent to some set of elementary experiences E and the relation of R, it seems that in virtue of just experiencing E and knowing R and the theory of relations, we must simultaneously know a and any statements about a as wellat least implicitlymuch in the same way that if we know A B and we know our equivalence rules, then we know ~A v B. For again, if it is the case that all concepts/objects may be reduced (namely, are logically equivalent to elementary experiences and R), then it seems that all our possible knowledge of the external world (including scientific theory) lies in (LAW 7) our elementary experiences and R, if only in the respect that lies in means logically equivalent to.22 For as noted above, keep in mind that the Aufbaus reductionist program was modeled after the logistic reduction carried out in the Principia (although the latter engaged in a fatally flawed reduction, as pointed out by Gdel (1931)). In fact, Quine writes in this regard in From Stimulus to Science:
21 For more on the distinction between reception and perception, see at least FSS 17-18 and RR 2-4. 22 With all the technical subtleties of the synthesis that occurs with quasi-analysis aside. For as noted earlier, the point we must

grasp is Carnaps claim that all knowledge may, in principle, be reduced, or in other words, translated via logical equivalence (as manifest by theory of relations) to elementary experiences and R, regardless if the last step in this reduction (quasi-analysis) incurs a method of establishing synthetic equivalence. More importantly still, this is how Quine understood the Aufbau. Recall, for instance the following passage from The Two Dogmas of Empiricism where he writes: Radical reductionism, conceived now with statements as units, set itself the task of specifying a sense-datum language and showing how to translate the rest of significant discourse, statement by statement, into it. Carnap embarked on this project in the Aufbau (FLPV; TDE 39; emphasis added). See also the passages cited above from From Stimulus to Science and Epistemology Naturalized, where Quine makes similar claims. However, as noted in footnote 18, it must be pointed out that at least at some level, Quine indicates that Carnap was not translating all knowledge into E and R, but instead, into certain statements about E and R, where, it would seem, these statements constituted what we referred to earlier as some primary language L. Either option however, as we see above, would have been problematic for Quine.
12

The conclusion [Whitehead and Russell] drew was that mathematics is translatable into pure logic (FSS 9)[The] total translatability [of mathematics and their basic laws and interrelations] into just elementary logic and a single familiar two-place predicate, membership, is of itself a philosophical sensation (FSS 910; emphases added)Russell adumbrated [the idea of this kind of construction] in Our Knowledge of the External World, and a dozen years later, Rudolf Carnap was undertaking to carry it out. Carnaps effort found expression in Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (1928). (FSS, 10; first two emphases added) However as far as I can tell, Quine did not overtly reject the Aufbau because, from at least a strictly logical point of view, it seems that to show that all knowledge that is possibly derivative of a given elementary experience E, the relation R and the theory of relations, is as such, assumed in these primary elements, through, quite simply, the total [logical] translatability (FSS 10) of knowledge into these primary elements. Rather, as noted in my introductory remarks, he accuses Carnap of embracing a mentalistic monism in the Aufbau because, Quine asserts, according to Carnap, elementary experiences were psychological global units (FSS 10) that as such, consisted of the individuals total experience at that moment (FSS 10). 23 As a result, Quine explains, these psychologically experienced wholes were, according to gestalt psychologistsas well as according to Carnap and a number of his philosophically-inclined contemporaries24 units that one is necessarily aware of (RR 1-4) when they are being experienced. And in the respect that one would be aware of such units, one would, to at least some inchoate degree, know them. In short then, as Quine sees it, according to this psycho-epistemological

23 Moreover, Quine thought that despite all the logically machinery that Carnap appealed to in the Aufbau, he could not adequately account for our ability to make spatial identifications. For more on this, see at least FLPV; TDE 40 and OR; NK 76-77. 24 Recall Footnote 14 of this paper. 13

account of the world, awareness of was roughly equivalent to knowledge ofsuch wholes were alleged to be the psychological foundations of knowledge (RR 1-4).25 With this in mind, realize that on the face of it, although it does not appear that Quine calls the Aufbau a sort of fiction (IPOS, 116) and make believe (OR; EN 75) because it invokes the second horn of Menos Paradox, for all intents and purposes, this must be understood as his deeper objection; overt or not: Carnaps mentalism, or what Quine also refers to as his phenomenomalism (FSS 15-16) is not just unconvincing because it incurs vague and suspicious mental entities (namely, elementary experiences), but worse still, as just noted, these entities allegedly admit of immediate awareness, and thus, knowledge of the world. And not just rudimentary knowledge, but, it seems, knowledge that is logically equivalent to all the theories and knowledge claims possibly derivative of a given elementary experience or experiences. Note in fact, where Quine does somewhat obliquely admit as much in Epistemology Naturalized (1968), paying particular attention to the idea that it would be nice, Quine thinks, if we could show that all of science is translatable to logic, observation terms and set theory (OR; EN, 76), and as such, [show] that everything done with the one apparatus could in principle be done with other (OR; EN, 76). But quite, frankly, he tells us, this is impossible. In other words, Quine did indeed think that the Aufbauian project was paradoxical, although not quite in Menos respect that we would be unmotivated to learn what we already know, but in the respect that it is simply not possible that
25 Or as Quine puts it: What are given in sensation are smells, noises, feels, flashes, patches of color and the likeBut in the

present century the Gestalt psychologists reacted against these conditions. Experiment suggests, and introspection as well, that what are sensed are not primarily those sensory elements, but significantly structured wholes (RR 1) The building blocks [needed to construct our knowledge of the external world] had to be irreducibly mental and present to consciousness [namely, one had to be aware of them]. Given these ground rules, the Gestaltists win hands down (RR 2)
14

in virtue of just elementary experiences and R we simultaneously know all of what we eventually come to learn, particularly, scientific theory, or as Quine puts it: certainly we did not grow up learning definitions of a physicalist language in terms of a prior language of set theory, logic and observation (OR; EN, 76; emphasis added).26 In fact, Quine had already put his finger on what seems to be the sheer impossibility of assuming such a cache of sophisticated logical ability some eighteen years earlier when he wrote in The Two Dogmas of Empiricism: The language which Carnap adopted as his starting point [in the Aufbau] was not a sense-datum language in the narrowest conceivable sense, for included also the notations of logic, up through higher set theory. In effect it included the whole of language of pure mathematics. The ontology implicit in it (that is, the range of values of its variables) embraced not only sensing events but classes, classes of classes, and so on. Empiricists there are who would boggle at such prodigality. (FLPV; TDE 39; emphasis added) Who, then, was boggling? We might, given what we have seen above, conclude that it was Quine who found himself gasping at such epistemological prodigality. In fact, in so many words, Quine repeats this point in his last book, From Stimulus to Science, when he writes: we are given a canon or procedure [in the Aufbau], and a brilliant one, but not one that makes the theory of the external world translatable into the language of sense experience. That is too much to ask. (FSS 13; emphasis added) So in short, according to Quine, the radically reductionist program that Carnap set up for himself in the Aufbau, however technically deft, was not only plagued with mentalistic preconceptionsnamely,
26

Note the entire passage where Quine says as much: "We should like to be able to translate science into logic and observation terms and set theory. This would be a great epistemological achievement, for it would show all the rest of the concepts of science to be theoretically superfluous. It would legitimize themto whatever degree the concepts of set theory, logic, and observation are themselves legitimateby showing that everything done with the one apparatus could in principle be done with the other. If psychology itself could deliver a truly translational reduction of this kind, we should welcome it; but certainly it cannot, for certainly we did not grow up learning definitions of physicalist language in term of a prior language of set theory, logic and observation." (OR; EN 76)
15

awareness at the initial stages of knowledge acquisitionit was a hopelessly impossible projectwe are not, thanks to just set theory, logic and observation (OR; EN 76) initially privy to our knowledge of the external world. So, to be perfectly clear, in this respect, Quines rejection of the radical epistemological reductionism invoked in the Aufbau should be understood in the context of an implicit reaction to a variant of Menos Paradox,27 particularly, the idea that to know what we do (particularly, scientific theory), we must somehow, already know it, or at the very least, it must be immediately accessible to us by way of an awareness of our elementary experiences, R, and our grasp of logic.28

3 The Naturalistic Circle With Quines rejection of radical reductionism in mind, where, as just shown, this rejection seems to turn on a somewhat implicit rejection of a form of Menos Paradox, we must now take the two versions of what I characterize as the naturalistic circle into account. For as noted in the introduction of this paper. I

27 Although I disagree with some of Fogelins (2004)

interpretations of Epistemology Naturalized, (particularly, the passages that I cite above), we do seem to be in implicit agreement when he writes: as long as the doctrinal [i.e. the Carnapian] demand [for reductionism] is in place, we are cut off, at the pain of begging the question, from exploiting a realm of highly reliable knowledge, namely a knowledge drawn from the empirical sciences. (27) In other words, Fogelin is pointing out Quines uneasiness with the circularity involved in radical Aufbauian reductionism, a circularity that I characterize here in terms of a broader historical context, namely, Menos Paradox. 28 I am grateful to recent comments by David Martens, who has helped to clarify the basic structure of the argument that I am attributing to Quine here. I have slightly modified his characterization to read as follows: P1. If the Aufbaus reductionism is correct, then, for every knowledge claim K, K is logically equivalent to some set of elementary experiences E and R (or as Quine seems to insist (recall footnote 18 of this paper), some primary language L about E and R). P2. If, for every knowledge claim K, K is logically equivalent to some set of elementary experiences E and R, then all our possible knowledge is logically contained in our elementary experiences and R (or alternatively, L) P3. If all our possible knowledge is logically contained in E and R (or alternatively, L), then all our knowledge is immediately accessible to us, not only as children, but in terms of any elementary experiences related by R (or alternatively, L) that we might have. P4. Children (and adults) do not already know everything that they eventually come to learn (e.g. scientific theory) either in terms of E and R or L. C. So, the Aufbaus reductionism is not correct.
16

argue that Quines rejection of what we may, after Quine, characterize as Carnaps phenomenalistic radical reductionismin light of its paradoxical naturecould only have reinforced his faith in naturalism. In turn, Quine rejects what we may characterize asafter Quine physicalistic radical reductionism and as such, breaks what I call the physicalist version of the naturalistic circle, which, it may be shown, entails his rejection of attenuated reductionism. Concomitttanly, because the two dogmas are indeed, at root identical (FLPV; TDE 41), a rejection of the synthetic amounted to a rejection of the analytic and thus, the need for certainty altogether. As a result, as I see it, Quine could simply dismiss the Humean version of the naturalistic circle while the scientific method, despite its fallibility, could be embraced.

3.1 The Naturalistic Circle: Humes Version According to at least Hume, the scientific method 29 where that method consists of, simply put, gathering our information about the world by means of our senses and/or various hypotheses compiled from the information given to us by the sensesis a fallible method in the respect that its subject matter consists of matters of facts. (T 1.3) This is the case because according to Hume, knowledge claims that are based on matters of fact are based on the relation of cause and effect. (T 1.3) However, no causal relation is, according to Hume, necessary, but instead, is a product of imagining certain constantly conjoined events as apprehended through any and/or all of our five senses, and as such, any causal relation can always be imagined otherwise without creating a contradiction. As a result, no matter of fact is necessarily true.

29 Hume identified this as the method of experience. See for instance, the Introduction to the Treatise (Intro. 7; SBN xvi-xvii), where Hume writes: And as the science of man is the only sound foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science must be laid on experience and observation. 17

Accordingly, because the scientific method is constructed from consideration of matters of fact, no result it yields is necessarily true (see T 1.3). Consequently, by appealing to the scientific method to show that we must use the scientific method to philosophically examine the world, where a component of that world is the scientific method itself, one makes a claim that is not necessarily true; no claim derivative of the scientific method is necessarily true, even if its the claim: We must use science to examine science. As a result, it is simply not certain that we should be doing naturalized philosophy at all; this is what we may identify as Humes version of the naturalistic circle; a circle that Hume intermittently torments himself with, particularly in the Treatise.30 It is no surprise then, that Quine, latter-day Humean empiricist that he was, puts his finger on this circle approximately two hundred years later in Roots of Reference, although here, Quine locates the circle in a historical venue that preceded Hume by thousands of years: Ancient skepticism, in its more primitive way, likewise challenged science from within. The skeptics cited familiar illusion to show the fallibility of the senses; but this concept of illusion rested on natural science, since the quality of illusion consisted simply in deviation from external scientific reality (RR, 2-3) In other words, Quines point is: Ancient skepticism challenged science from a scientific point of view because the concept of an illusion is itself a scientific concept; an illusion is, by definition, a deviation from an empirically confirmable fact. As a result, the idea that the senses are fallibleand thus susceptible to illusionis itself a claim that is derived from the senses, which means that the claim The senses are fallible seems to be fallible itself, and thus, just as susceptible to illusion. As such, just as
30 See especially, 1.4.7, particularly where he writes: This intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in

human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another. Where am I, or what? From what causes to I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? Whose favor shall I count, and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me? And who have I any influence, or who have influence on me? I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, invirond with the deepest darkness, and utterly deprivd of the use of every member and faculty. (T 1.4.7.7-8; SBN 268-9) Also see Husserl (C 89-90) for his characterization of Humes naturalistic predicament.
18

Hume would complain thousands of years later, it seems that science may be challenged from within (RR, 2).31 How then, can an empiricist, a naturalistic philosopher, avoid this? For instance, should one, like Husserlin partial response to Humes version of the naturalistic circle 32appeal to a first science, or in other words, to what Husserl called the epoch? For on this account, one might, it seems, properly justify his or her decision to use science to talk about the world. For in the case of Husserlian phenomenology, the decision to use science would not be a product of the insights gained from empirical (and thus fallible) experience, but instead, would be a product of insights gained from the epoch, or the first science, which, according to Husserlian phenomenologists, yields necessary truths (see at least I 1, lines 59-60). However, as is well-known, Quine was loath to appeal to anything like a first science, that as such, is alleged to stand on a foundation built from anything other than empirical observation.33 3.2 The Naturalistic Circle; The Physicalist Version
31 Also see Epistemology Naturalized (OR), where Quine specifically mentions the Humean predicament (72) in regard to

Humes naturalistic method. However, in the course of doing so, depending on how we read this passage, Quine seems to infuse his own physicalist version of the naturalistic circle in Hume, rather than realizing that Humes position was more a manifestation of the ancient predicament (as characterized by Quine in RR, noted above). Note: What then of the doctrinal side [of the epistemology of natural knowledge], the justification of our knowledge of truths about nature? Here, Hume despaired. By his identification of bodies with impressions he did succeed in construing some singular statements about bodies as indubitable truths, yes; as truths about impressions, directly known. But general statements, also singular statements, about the future gained no increment of certainty by being construed about impressions. (OR; EN 71-72) In other words, as Quine sees it here, Hume despaired because in virtue of identifying predictive statements (both general and singular) with statements about fragmented impressions, the former, predictive statements were to be understood as uncertain, evidently because statements about impressions do not admit of certainty. In this respect, Quine would be correct; Hume does torment himself over the fact that because the relation of cause and effect is rooted in experience (impressions), it is uncertain, and thus, all predictive claims are uncertain. However, when this passage from Epistemology Naturalized is read another way, it seems that Quine is implying that Hume may have even identified predictive statements with impressions, just as Quine seems to think that Hume identified bodies with impressions (Quine may also be read as implying as much in RR 1-3). However, at no time in the course of Humes work does Hume explicitly identify, or in other words, reduce and/or translate statements into impressions where in turn, he despairs about the uncertainty of the latter becoming a property of the former in virtue of such an identification. As a result, if this is, in fact Quines intention here, we may conclude that he is simply imposing the physicalist version of the naturalistic circle on Hume. Regardless, as noted above, Quine clearly recognized what I characterize as the Humean version of the naturalistic circle, although he captures it terms of ancient skepticism. Moreover, thanks to Pakaluks (1989) citations from Quines 1946 lecture notes on Hume, we see Quine specifically refer to Hume in regard to what I characterize as the Humean version of the naturalistic circle. See for instance, pp. 455, 457 (#490), 459 (#500).
32 See Rocknak (2001) for more detail on Husserls reaction to Humes version of the naturalistic circle. 33 See at least POT 16-21. 19

With the general structure of the Humean version of the naturalistic circle in mind, lets now take a look at what I characterize as the physicalist version, which was brought squarely into focus by Quine. As noted earlier, according to him, sense data, which he prefers to construe as neural input, is fragmented, which as suchat least at the level that Quine identifies as receptionconsists of experiences that we are in no way aware of and so, as explained above, could not possibly admit of knowledge, even knowledge in Quines behavioristic sense of the word. 34 Rather, as also explained earlier, according to Quine, awareness and so, any possibility for knowledge, only emerges at the level of perceptual similarity. In this general respect, Quines epistemology is fearlessly physicalistic it paints a picture where the primary source of all our knowledge consists of nerves firing, where awareness of such events is decisively absent. Recall that this way of looking at data acquisition is opposed to Carnaps phenomenalism, where, as noted, the source of all our knowledge consists of mentalistic entities that are related (at least by R) and we are aware of.35 But as noted in my introductory remarks, adopting the physicalist stance appears to incur another version of the naturalistic circle, which unfolds, quite simply, as follows: If one assumes physicalism and attempts to reduce, or in other words, claims to translate knowledge, particularly, knowledge of scientific theory, to nerve inputs, where such input does not admit of knowledge, then it seems that such knowledge is effectively equated to something that is not knowledge, namely: smells, noises, feels, flashes, patches of color and the like (RR 1). As a result, it simply follows that if we translate science, say, the scientific claim X All our scientific theory may be reduced to physical input to physical input, then all of science, e.g. in this particular case, X, is equivalent to nonsense; that is, mere impacts on our sensory surfaces

34 Note at least one passage where Quine makes this distinction between reception (non-awareness) and perception (awareness) clear: We have undercut the Gestalt psychologists criticism of sensory atomism by dropping the awareness requirement and talking directly of physical input as at the sense receptors. This however, is only half the story. Awareness and Gestalt still claim an important piece. Sensory receptors operate at the level of reception, and Gestalt operates at the level of perception (RR 4; emphases added) 35 Or in Quines words: Though Carnap had represented the phenomenalistic orientation of his rational reconstruction as a pragmatic choice without metaphysical significance, Neurath probably saw it (and I do) as embracing a Cartesian dualism of mind and body, if not mentalistic monism. Physicalism, on the other hand, is materialism, bluntly monisitic except for the abstract objects of mathematics. (FSS, 15) 20

(POT 1). This then, is the physicalist version of the naturalistic circle, which Quine discusses tirelessly throughout the body of his work.36

4 A Summary of What is at Stake To best organize the three main concerns that we have been dealing with, namely, Menos Paradox as it is manifest in the radical reductionism of the Aufbau, Humes version of the naturalistic circle and the physicalist version of the naturalistic circle (setting aside any discussion of attenuated reductionism for the moment), realize that Quine was faced with the following epistemological mess: If we radically reduce or translate knowledge to sense data then it seems that: a.) We must assume such knowledge in the sense data by way of the Gestalt psychologists wholes, or what Carnap preferred to call elementary experiences; this constitutes what we might call, after Quine, phenomenalistic radical reductionism. Yet as noted, according to Quine, with all suspect mentalistic overtures aside, doing as much is simply impossible. In other words, the Aufbauian project reminds us of the second horn of Menos Paradox, namely, the idea that we would not seek knowledge if we already knew such knowledge, where in this case, Quine translates the problem of a lack of motivation to seek what we already know into bleak impossibility: its just not the case that in virtue of our elementary experiences and knowledge of R and all of set theory that we know all possible knowledge claims logically derivative of E and R; this would simply be too much to ask (FSS 13) b.) Regardless if we assume that knowledge is or is not present in the sense data (e.g. in terms of elementary experiences), empiricists widely accept the fact that empirical, and thus scientific claims, are fallibleas was made particularly clear in Humes philosophy. Thus, if the claim We must use science to

36 See for instance, RR 2-4, OR; EN 71-72, 74-75, 83-84, TT; EC 24, POT 1-20 and WO 2, 4. For an appetizer, note just one of

these passages: Science itself teaches that there is no clairvoyance; that the only information that can reach our sensory surfaces from external objects must be limited to two-dimensional optical projections and various impacts of airwaves on the eardrums and some gaseous reactions in the nasal passages and a few kindred odds and ends. How, the challenge proceeds, could one hope to find out about that external world from such meager traces? In short, if our science were true, how could we know
it? (RR 2; emphasis added) 21

examine science is a scientific claim, then it is a fallible claim; this is Humes version of the naturalistic circle, and as such, challeng[es] science from within. (RR 2) c.) Moreover, ifunlike the Aufbau Carnapwe conclude that our sense input does not admit of knowledge, it seems that if we reduce, or in other words, translate scientific theory and/or knowledge into sense data conceived of from a physicalistic point of view (and thus, engage in what we might call, after Quine, physicalistic radical reductionism), then knowledge, particularly knowledge of scientific theory, equates to nerves firing, and thus, it seems, to nonsense. This is the physicalist version of the naturalistic circle. 5 The Solution: Naturalism Embraced; Radical and Attenuated Reductionism Rejected Quines three-fold solution to this mess is, as I see it, quite simple although many aspects of it have been much contested.37 [1] We cannot, according to Quine, assume knowledge in our initial input; in other words, Quine must flat-out reject Carnaps phenomenalistic radical reductionism as it is manifest in the Aufbau. For as noted above, if we did not, one simply assumes too much, causing us in fact, to boggle at [the] prodigality (FLPV; TDE 39) inherent in such an endeavor. Or in still other words, this means that Quine was awarehowever implicitlythat Carnaps Aufbau invoked a paradox, reminiscent of the idea that one would not seek what he knows, for since he knows, there is no need of inquiry (M 80 d-e). Meanwhile, as Quine sees it, contemporary scientific research shows that our initial input (reception) does not admit of knowledge; namely, science seems to favor the physicalistic approach. In other words, ironically enough,38 it seems clear enough that a simple Platonic Paradox appears to have justified Quines

37 We simply do not have time to take any of these critiques into account here; see at least : Perspectives on Quine (1990), and The Philosophy of W.V. Quine, 1986 and 1998. 38 In the respect that Plato was, by no stretch of the imagination, a naturalistic philosopher. For according to Plato, the way to

the truth was by way of pure rationality, whereas empirical evidence only created confusion, if not knee-jerk relativism (see at least, the Theaetetus).
22

endorsement of contemporary scientific research, but quite independently of Quines pragmatic reasons for embracing naturalism. Put still another way, the paradox of radical reductionsim may have made it quite clear to Quine that it is just unreasonable to assume knowledge in our initial interface with the world; or in still other words, it is simply unreasonable to take what Quine characterizes as a phenomenalistic approach. So instead, we must adopt what contemporary science seems to favor, namely, the receptive model of data acquisition. As a result, problem a.) noted above is avoided; our initial input is not only bereft of knowledge (even as adults), we are, according to contemporary scientific research, born knowing virtually nothing.39 [2] However, as noted above, if one translates knowledge claims into what science tells us constitutes our outermost interface with the world (namely, fragmented sense data (reception)) one effectively translates knowledge into nonsense; recall that this is the physicalized version of the naturalistic circle explained above. To specifically avoid this predicament, Quine must claim that at best, knowledge claims are evidence[d] (See at least TT; EC, 24; emphasis added) by stimulus, where, crucial to note, the notion evidenced by is not, equivalent to equivalent to. In other words, by "evidence," Quine is referring to the significant but not comprehensive influence that sense data has on a sentence. So instead, according to Quine, and as noted above, to grasp the given sentences entire meaning, and likewise its truth value, and thus to properly know it, it must be understood in terms of the larger context of the theory it is embedded in. As a result, and crucial to note, this means that a rejection of radical reductionism (in terms of both a phenomenalistic and physicalistic approach) entails a rejection of attenuated reductionism. For if a knowledge claim is not reducible to, and thus, is not equivalent to sense data, but
39 Although we do have some rudimentary ability to relate at the perceptual level. For more on this, see at least FSS. However, on the face

of it, this solution seems to incur the first horn of Menos Paradox, namely: How could we learn, look for, or acquire knowledge, if we do not already have such knowledge? As such, it seems that Quines solution to the problems mentioned above could invoke a critique of certain forms of behaviorism. But it is not relevant to discuss these implications here.
23

instead, its meaning, and likewise, its truth value can only be obtained upon considering it in terms of the theory it is embedded in, 40 it simply follows that there are no knowledge claims whose truth values may be obtained solely in virtue of empirical confirmation or disconfirmation. In short then, problem c.) noted above is avoided; knowledge, knowledge of scientific theory in particular, is simply not equivalent to nonsense. And as an added bonus, the synthetic dogma (namely, attenuated reductionism) is revealed for what it isa dogma. [3] With the rejection of attenuated reductionismwhich, as we just saw, is entailed by Quines rejection of physicalistic radical reductionismthe expectation for certainty is concomitantly dropped, for the two dogmas are, indeed, at root identical (FLPV; TDE 41). 41 In other words, according to Quine, just as no claim may be proven true or false purely in virtue of sense data, no claim may be proven true or false purely in virtue of its meaning, where the latter (analytic) claims, it is alleged, admit of certainty and the former (synthetic) claims do not. Rather, no claim, according to Quine, is certain, or in other words, necessary (see also, for instance, WOP; NT). 42 As a result, and crucial to note, it simply does not matter if the scientific method, or our choice to employ it, is fallible. What does matter, according to Quine is that science works, [the scientific, empirical method] is the best [method] we know (WO 4); as such, it allows us to make certain predictions about the world, which include predictions and hypotheses about scientific theory. According to this line of thought then, we might say that allegedly certain Husserlian first sciences do not allow us to fly to the moon or cure cancer, but
40 For a bit more detail on Quine s holism, see at least Two Dogmas in Retrospect, particularly 268, where he discusses the

distinction between radical v. moderate holism (note however, that this distinction does not affect our present discussion).
41 Recall the larger context that Quine made this point in: The dogma of reductionism, even in its attenuated form, is

intimately connected with the other dogmathat there is a cleavage between the analytic and synthetic. We have found ourselves led, indeed from the latter problem to the former thought the verification theory of meaning. More directly, the one dogma clearly supports the other in this way: as long as it is taken to be significant in general to speak of the conformation and infirmation of a statement, it seems significant to speak also of a limiting kind of statement which is vacuously confirmed, ipso facto, come what may; and such a statement is analytic. (FLPV; TDE 41) 42 Although some truths, such as logical truths, are more central, or in other words, significant than others. But we need not discuss this matter in any more detail here.
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regular old fallible science surely does; in this respect, science matters. And so, problem b.) noted above is avoided; the Humean version of the naturalistic circle is simply irrelevant; it is a manifestation of misplaced expecations. So in conclusion, when faced with the question of: Where does our knowledge of the external world come froma question that Socrates wrestled with thousands of years before Russell, Carnap and Quine didQuine was forced to turn to science; in fact, it is no wonder that Quines very last book, From Stimulus to Science, was devoted to physicalizing the Aufbau. For, the story goes, when we see that reducing knowledge to knowledge (e.g. elementary experiences R and all of set theory) is absurd (namely, when we see that phenomenalistic radical reductionism is absurd), we must turn to the more reasonable scientific account of knowledge acquisition, namely, the idea that we are born knowing virtually nothing. Yet this does not mean that we should equate such an initial lack of knowledge (nerves firing, etc.) with what we do know; that is, we should not engage in physicalistic radical reductionism either, and as such, the physicalized version of the naturalistic circle is avoided. Rather, we must realize that although all our knowledge claims are supported by empirical evidence, they may not be translated into them, solving the problem of if our science were true, how could we know it? (RR 2). Concomitantly, this means that no knowledge claim may be proven true or false purely in virtue of empirical evidence, namely, the synthetic dogma is revealed as a dogma; that is, attenuated reductionism may be rejected. Simultaneouslybecause the two dogmas are, at root, identicalthis also means that no knowledge claim admits of absolute certainty; inspiring us to lower our somewhat childish philosophical expectations for science. As a result, we may simply sidestep Humes torment (namely, Humes version of the naturalistic circle), and instead, exercise science for all that its worth.

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List of Abbreviations Books Carnap The Logische Aufbau der Welt (LAW) Hume The Treatise of Human Nature (T) Husserl The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenology. (C) Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and a Phenomenological Philosophy (I) Plato The Meno (M), Quine Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Quine-Carnap Correspondence (DCDV), From a Logical Point of View (FLPV), From Stimulus to Science (FSS), Pursuit of Truth (POT), Quiddities (Q), Semantics and the Philosophy of Language (SPL), Theories and Things (TT), Ways of Paradox (WOP),

Papers Quine Epistemology Naturalized (OR; EN), In Praise of Observations Sentences (IPOS), The Two Dogmas of Empiricism (FLPV; TDE), Two Dogmas in Retrospect (TDR) Necessary Truths (WOP; NT) On Mental Entities (OME)

References Bergstrom, L. Underdetermination of Physical Theory. The Cambridge Companion to Quine, ed. R.F. Gibson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004 Carnap, R. The Logical Structure of the World; Psuedo problems in Philosophy, Second Edition. Translated by R.A. George, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967 Carnap, R. The Logical Syntax of Language. Translated by A. Smeaton. London: Routledge, 1959. Carnap, R. Meaning and Necessity. Second edition with supplements. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1947. Carroll, L. The Works of Lewis Carroll, ed. R.L. Green. London: Paul Hamlyn, 1965
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Chihara, C. S. Ontology and the Vicious-Circle Principle. Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1973. Cornelius, H. Einleitung in die Philosophie. Leipzig and Berlin: 1911; 2nd ed. 1919. Creath, R. Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Quine-Carnap Correspondence and Related Work. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. Davidson, D. and Hintikka, J. eds. Words and Objections, Essays on the Work of W.V. Quine. Synthese Library 21. Revised ed. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1969. Dreben, Burton. In Medius Rebus. Inquiry, 37 (1995): pp. 441-7. Dreben, Burton. Putnam, Quineand the Facts. Philosophical Topics, 20 (1992): pp. 293-315. Duhem, Pierre. La Thorie physique: son object et sa structure (Paris 1906) Fara, R. Director: In Conversation: W.V. Quine. A Philosophy International Production, London: Philosophy International, London School of Economics, 1994: tapes 1-8. Fogelin, R. Aspects of Quines Naturalized Epistemology. The Cambridge Companion to Quine, ed. R.F. Gibson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004 Goodman, N. Structure of Appearance, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951. Gdel, K. Collected Works: Publications 1929-1936, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. Heinrich G. "Der Welt as geordnetes Ereignis. Bermerkungung zu R. Wahles Definiter Philosophie," Zeitschrift frPhilosophie und philosphische Kritik. 118 (1901); 119 (1902) Hintikka, J. Three Dogmas of Quines Empiricism, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 51 (1997): pp. 457-477 Hookway, C. Quine: Language, Experience and Reality. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988. Husserl, E. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenology. Trans. David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern U. Press, 1970. Husserl, E. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and a Phenomenological Philosophy . 1st bk trans. F. Kersten. 2nd bk trans R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer, 3rd bk trans T. Klein and W.E. Pohl. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980. Lowinger, Armand. The Methodology of Pierre Duhem. New York: Columbia: 1941.
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Khler, K. "Gestaltprobleme und Anfnge einer Gestalttheorie, bersichtreferat," Jahresberichte ber die gesamte Physiologie, III, 1925, 512-529 Leonardi, P. and Santambrogio, M. On Quine, New Essays. Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Lewis, C.I. A Survey of Symbolic Logic. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1918. Linsky, L. ed. Semantics and the Philsophy of Language. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952. Pakaluk, M. Quines 1946 Lectures on Hume. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 27 (1989): pp. 445459 Quine, W.V. Carnap Yale Review 76 (1987): pp. 226-230. Quine, W.V. From a Logical Point of View; 9 logico-philosophical essays . Second edition, revised. Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1980. Quine, W.V. From Stimulus to Science, Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1995. Quine, W.V. In Praise of Observation Sentences. Journal of Philosophy, XC, #3 (1993): pp. 107-116. Quine, W.V. Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia, 1969. Quine, W.V. Pursuit of Truth. Revised ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1992 Quine, W.V. Quiddities: An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary. Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1987. Quine, W.V. Reification. Delivered at Tufts University, 1991. Unpublished. Quine, W.V. The Roots of Reference, La Salle: Illinois: Open Court, 1974. Quine, W.V. States of Mind. Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985) pp. 5-8. Quine, W.V. Theories and Things. Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1981 Quine, W.V. Two Dogmas in Retrospect, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 21 #3 (1991): pp. 265-274 Quine, W.V. The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. Enlarged edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1976. Quine, W.V. Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1960. Robert R. Philosophie des Erkennens. Leipzig:1911.

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Richardson, A.W. Carnaps Construction of the World: The Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Rocknak, S. Husserls Phenomenologization of Hume: Reflections on Husserls Method of Epoch Philosophy Today (SPEP supplement), 45, #5 (2001): pp. 28-37. Romanos, G.P. Quine and Analytic Philosophy. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983. Russell, Bertrand. Our Knowledge of the External World. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961. Schilpp, P.A. ed, The Philosophy of Rudolph Carnap: Library of Living Philosophers , II. La Salles, Illinois: Open Court, 1963 Schilpp, P.A. and Edwin L., eds. The Philosophy of W.V. Quine: Library of Living Philosophers, XVII, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1986. Schilpp, P.A. and Edwin L., eds. The Philosophy of W.V. Quine: Library of Living Philosophers , XVII, Expanded Edition, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1986. Schuppe, W. "Die immanente Philosophie," Zeitschrif. imm. Theorie und Logik. Berlin (1894); 2nd ed., 1910. Shahan, R.W. and Swoyer, C. eds. Essays on the Philosophy of W.V. Quine , Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979 Scheffer, H.M. Review of Principia Mathematica, Isis, 9 (1926): pp. 226-31 Werthheimer, W.. ber Gestalt theorie. Berlin: 1925.

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