RULE 113 ARREST SECTION 1.

Definition of arrest Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. SEC. 2. Arrest; how made An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person arrested shall not be subject to a greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. What Constitutes Arrest The act relied upon as constituting an arrest must have been performed with the intent to effect an arrest and must have been so understood by the party arrested. Also, the person making the arrest must be acting under some real or pretended legal authority for taking the person into custody. It is not necessary, however, that there be an application of actual force, or manual touching of the body, or physical restraint which may be visible to the eye, or a formal declaration of arrest. It is sufficient if the person arrested understands that he is in the power of the one arresting and submits in consequence. However, in all cases in which there is no manual touching or seizure or any resistance, the intentions of the parties to the transaction are very important; there must have been an intent an the part of one of them to arrest the other, and an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission was necessary. There can be no arrest when the person sought to be arrested is not conscious of any restraint of his liberty. But the mere submission of a person whether pretended or actual, will not constitute an arrest, if he is not at the time actually within the power of the officer. If an officer having authority to make an arrest lays his hand upon the person of the prisoner, however lightly, with the intention of taking him into custody, there is an arrest, even though he has not succeeded in stopping or holding him even for an instant. An arrest signifies restraint on person, depriving one of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. No Unnecessary or Unreasonable Force shall be Used in Making Arrest Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm, yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise. The doctrine is restated in the Rules of Court thus: "No violence or unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention."
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And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest. Arrest of Notorious Criminal The court noted in one case: "It is suggested that a notorious criminal 'must be taken by storm' without regard to his right to life which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. This Court may approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise, this court cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation not condonation should be the rule; otherwise, this Court would offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation. Thus, it may be true that Anseimo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the peace of the community but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when, in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance, or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down, although upon different facts." Force Necessary to Overcome Actual Resistance to Arrest In People v. Delima, a prisoner escaped from jail. He was found armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance. Accused policeman asked him to surrender but prisoner answered with a stroke of his lance. The policeman fired his revolver but did not hit the criminal who ran away. He pursued, firing and killing the prisoner. Held: The killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under the obligation to surrender, and had no right, after evading service of his sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in the hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to extreme means, which, although it proved to be fatal, was justified by circumstances. In another case, the deceased was creating a disturbance when the defendant, a policeman, attempted to arrest him and take him to the presidensia. The deceased resisted the arrest by striking the accused with a calicut whereupon the latter shot him with his revolver causing the former's death. The Court held: "Although a police officer may employ force to overcome active resistance to an arrest, it is not reasonably necessary to kill his assailant" to repel an attack with a calicut, and only an incomplete defense is made out. A police officer is not justified in using unnecessary force in effecting arrest or in treating with wanton violence the arrested person or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be affected otherwise.

Police Officer Must Stand His Ground In U.S. v. Mojica One of the Constabulary soldiers, the deceased, was placed under arrest. He resisted and finally succeeded in freeing himself. He then struck a policeman with the fist, drew a mess kit knife and brandishing it attacked the accused, another policeman. The accused retreated a step or two, drew his revolver and fired killing the soldier. Held: A police officer, in the performance of his duty, must stand his ground and cannot, like a private individual, take refuge in flight, his duty requires him to overcome his opponent. The force requires him to overcome his opponent. The force which he may exert therefore differ somewhat from that which may ordinarily be offered in selfdefense. Bearing this in mind, we do not think that the appellant in using his revolver against the deceased can be said to have employed unnecessary force. The deceased attacked him with a deadly weapon; he might perhaps, have saved himself by running away, but this his duty forbade. Was he to allow himself to be stabbed before using his arms? It may, perhaps, be argued that the appellant might have used his club, but a policeman's club is not a very effective weapon as against a drawn knife and a police officer is not required to afford a person attacking him the opportunity for a fair and equal struggle.

SEC. 3. Duty of Arresting Officer It shall be the duty of the officer executing the warrant to arrest the accused and deliver him to the nearest police station or jail without unnecessary delay. COMMENT: As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint to liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. The prisoner whether under preventive detention or serving fail sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation or hold office, elective or appointee, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.

SEC. 4. Execution of Warrant The head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was delivered for execution shall cause the warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10) days after the expiration of the period, the officer to whom it was assigned for execution shall make a report to the judge who issued the warrant. In case of his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state the reasons therefor. The rule does not require a return of the warrant of arrest but only a report to the judge who issued the warrant and, in case of the officer's failure to execute the same, shall state the reasons therefor.
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A warrant of arrest does not become stale or functus oficio unlike a search warrant which is valid only for ten days. A warrant of arrest remains valid until arrest is effected or the warrant lifted.

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when Lawful A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

Amendments to the Rule, Explained a. Former Rule (1964) Sec. 6, Rule 113 b. When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it; and 1985 AMENDMENT b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and Reason For 1985 Amendment In 1985, the rule, which was transposed to section 5 of Rule 113, introduced a significant change. Subsection (b) of section 5, Rule 113 inserted the word "just" before been committed, and the phrase "he has reasonable ground to believe" was changed to "he has personal knowledge of facts" to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay. Controversy arose in the interpretation of what are those fact which must be within the personal knowledge of the person effecting the arrest? Otherwise stated, what are the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed the crime. The restrictive interpretation is that the facts constituting the crime must be personally known by the person effecting the arrest, hence, there are cases which excluded even an eyewitness identification allegedly because of lack of personal knowledge by the arresting officer.
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The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure As revised, the present rule reads: "(B) WHEN AN OFFENSE HAS JUST BEEN COMMITTED AND HE HAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE BASED ON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS OR CIRCUMSTANCES THAT THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED HAS COMMITTED IT." The present rule removed the requirement that an offense must have in fact been committed and clarified that probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts refer to "facts and circumstances" that the person to be arrested has committed it. Such knowledge would be sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest for an offense that has just been committed. The amendment is in accord with Supreme Court decisions that the indubitable existence of a crime is not necessary to justify a warrantless arrest and that 'personal knowledge of facts,' in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled "with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. The only difference is that in flagrante arrests, under subpar. (a), the facts constituting probable cause occur in the presence of the arresting person, while in hot pursuit, knowledge of the facts occurred after the commission of the crime. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It, likewise, refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. Personal Knowledge of Facts Constituting Probable Cause In its resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration in the Umil v. Ramos cases, the majority opinion explained the meaning of Personal Knowledge of Facts (under section 5[b]), as follows: "It has been ruled that 'personal knowledge of facts,' in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled "with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest." The foregoing standards were again adopted in warrantless "hot pursuit" arrest in the 1999 case of People v.
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Doria. As observed by an eminent author there does not exist (and never will exist) a "bright line" marking the exact boundaries of probable cause, so that a warrant should be upheld when the initial judgment of the magistrate could considerably have gone either way. General Principles; Warrantless Arrest Not Allowed a. As a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyone without a warrant except in those cases expressly authorized by law. The law expressly allowing arrests without a warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under circumstances contemplated under Sec. 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto" while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit arrest." b. A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or the complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal in cities, or directly with the justice of the peace courts (now municipal courts) in municipalities and other political subdivisions. If the city fiscal has no authority, and he has not, to order the arrest of a person charged with having committed a public offense even if he finds, after due investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint of the offended party or other persons even though after investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged. c. Section 2463 of Revised Administrative Code recognized as basis for warrantless arrest was repealed by R.A. No. 409 otherwise known as the Charter of Manila.

Exception The rules recognize and allow arrests without warrant and a search and seizure without warrant incident to a lawful arrest whether the arrest is with or without a warrant. As stated in People v. Kaqui Malasugui, the Constitutional precepts do not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable. To hold that no criminal can in any case be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances. It is the duty of a policeman to arrest those who disturb an assemblage by words and blows constituting a breach of the peace and the defendant who requested the arrest and the officer who made it did not incur criminal responsibility. Municipal councilors and lieutenants or "barrios" are charged with duty of maintaining order, and preserving and protecting life and property in the "barrios" specially placed under their direction in conformity with Sec. 37 of Act No. 82, and are therefore clothed with authority to make arrests without warrants, not inferior to those powers usually conferred upon peace officers, more especially those of peace officers known as "constables" in American and English law. Thus, the Lieutenant of a "barrio" was held to be within lawful performance of his duties when he attempted to arrest a person caught in flagrante delicto conducting a clandestine cockpit.
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Any officer charged with the preservation of the public peace may arrest without a warrant any person who is committing, or has committed, a breach of peace in his presence. Source of Rule on Warrantless Arrest a. A warrantless arrest in this jurisdiction as an exception to the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure was originally governed by Rules 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code, which authorized among others the arrest of persons when there is reasonable ground to believe him guilty of some offense, provided: First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful act, amounting to crime had been committed. Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person arrested participated in the commission of such unlawful act or crime. The Supreme Court in the 1909 case U.S. v. Fortaleza (supra), likewise pointed to section 37 of Act No. 183 (Charter of Manila) which designated customs officials, including police officers or peace officers who may pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace; or may arrest, or cause to be arrested without warrant, any offender, when the offense is committed in the presence of a peace officer or within his view. b. The extent of a peace officers' arrest powers in the Philippines without warrant and the limitations therein was upheld by the Supreme Court in the 1917 case of U.S. v. Santos and as stated in the Legislature in the Charter of the City of Manila and (2) the Administrative Code and (3) Sec. 2258, edition of 1917 which enjoins Municipal policemen to "exercise vigilance in the prevention of public offenses. The decision, likewise cited the common law rule on the arrest of suspicious night walkers. c. In the 1939 case of People v. Ancheta the Supreme Court pointed to section 848 of the Administrative Code and Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code as allowing members of the Constabulary or policemen to make arrests without warrant, not only when a crime is being committed or is about to be committed in their presence, but also when they reasonably believe or have grounds to suspect that a crime has been committed and that it has been committed precisely by the person arrested.

d. Under Commonwealth Act No. 181 (Sec. 3), an arrest without warrant may be made by agents of the Department of Justice (i.e., the Chief of the Division of Investigation and his subordinates) for a crime which has been committed in their presence, or within their view, or in cases where the person making the arrests has reasonable grounds to strongly believe that the person so arrested is guilty of such crime and where there is likelihood of the person escaping before a legal warrant can be obtained for his arrest, but the person arrested shall be immediately taken before the competent Court of Justice. Under this law members of the investigation staff of the Bureau of Investigation shall be peace officers and as such have the power to make arrests, searches and seizure in accordance with existing laws and rules. Earlier Rulings (Before 1940): Arrest Based on Suspicion, Were Held Valid The bases of the rulings are Rules 27 and 28, Provisional Rules for Application of Penal Code, Revised Administrative Code and Section 37 Charter of Manila which allows warrantless arrest based on reasonable ground of belief. The following cases are illustrative: a. U.S. u. Burgueta warrantless arrest of accused while quarreling in public with Municipal Councilor.
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b. U.S. v. Fortaleza upholding warrantless arrest of operator by barrio lieutenant of a clandestine, cockpit operation. c. U.S. u. Samonte - Meaning of committed in one's presence Seeing or Hearing at a Distance. An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. In this case, as the priest engaged in a quarrel was down and was being maltreated, he shouted "police! police!" and the police heard this and attempted to arrest appellant, he resisted arrest and struck the police. Appellant was held guilty of assault upon an agent of a person in authority. d. U.S. u. Batallones A peace officer can justify an arrest without warrant if there is reasonable ground of suspicion tending to show that a person committed or is about to commit any crime 01 breach of the peace, and if he acts in good faith. Under such conditions, even if the suspected person is later found to be innocent, the peace officer is not liable for coercion or arbitrary detention. e. U.S. v. Sanchez The legality of the detention does not depend upon the fact of the crime, but upon the nature of the deed, where such characterization may reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at that moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen. One of the duties of the police is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them at the disposal of the judicial or executive authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the act constituting the violation or to prosecute and secure the punishment thereof. One of the means conducing to these ends being the identification of the person of the alleged criminal or lawbreaker, the duty that directly devolves upon the police to make the arrests or detentions for the purposes of such investigation cannot be questioned, (supra) Hearing the screeching of tires followed by a thud and seeing the sideswiped victim is a crime committed in one's presence to justify a warrantless arrest. f. In a case of arbitrary detention, the Supreme Court held that there is No need of fact of commission of offense to justify the detention. Probable cause for an arrest without warrant is allowed where there is reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing the accused to be guilty. No crime was committed here. The persons merely entered an uninhabited camarin but their arrest was justified to prevent the commission of a crime. Common Law rule applied. Justice Malcolm stated that: "One should, however, not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. Often he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal. To err is human. Even the most conscientious officer must at times be misled. If, therefore, under trying circumstances and in a zealous effort to obey the orders of his superior officer and to enforce the law, a peace officer makes a mere mistake in good faith, he should be exculpated. Otherwise, the courts will put a premium on crime and will terrorize peace officers through a fear of themselves violating the law."

g. In People v. Kagui Malasugu a warrantless arrest for a crime committed not in arresting officer's presence but made on the same day was justified. h. In other words, such arrest or detention does not necessarily presume that really a crime had been committed. It is sufficient that there was ample ground to believe honestly and reasonably that the cause of the surrounding phenomena at the time was a crime that has just been or was about to be committed and that the person detained was responsible for it. People v. Ancheta, reiterated the ruling laid down in U.S. v. Santosand adopted that of a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 5, 1892. Indubitable Existence of Crime Not Required Thus, under the pre-1940 rulings, a lawful warrantless arrest does not require the indubitable existence of a crime. It is sufficient if the officer effecting the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristic of a crime and that the person sought to be detained has participated therein, a warrantless arrest was made on the basis of information given by one of the accused naming his companions who, on the basis thereof, was arrested without a warrant. The arrest was considered as lawful. Restrictions on Warrantless Arrest In Sayo, et al. v. Chief of Police, the court, however, held that: "THE LAW RESTRICTS THE CASES WHEN A PEACE OFFICER MAY ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT; THE SO-CALLED COMMON LAW RULE RELATING TO OTHER CASES OF ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT HAS NO APPLICATION IN THIS JURISDICTION, AND EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY SUCH STATUTE, AN ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT IS ILLEGAL. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONS EXTENDING THE RIGHT TO MAKE ARRESTS WITHOUT A WARRANT BEYOND THE CASES PROVIDED BY LAW IS DEROGATORY OF THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERTY" Present Rule on Warrantless Arrest The law expressly allowing arrests without a warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under circumstances contemplated under Sec. 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto" while that under Sec. 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit arrest." The foregoing rule specifies the instances when warrantless arrests may be made by a peace officer or a private person. The old Rule was modified as follows: (a) the phrase "about to commit an offense" was changed to "is attempting to commit an offense," because the old phraseology implied that no offense had as yet been committed, (b) the word "just" was inserted before "been committed," and the phrase "he has reasonable ground to believe" was changed to "he has personal knowledge of facts" to minimize arrests based on mere 44 suspicion or hearsay. The 1940 Rules of Court (effective July 1, 1940), provided for warrantless arrest in section 6 of Rule 109 thereof. These were taken from the Provisional Law for the application of the Penal Code and sections 21 and
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22 of the American Law Institute with one significant change. The warrantless arrest under subsection (b) requires as a condition thereof that an "offense has in fact" been committed. In 1985 rule, which was transposed to section 5 of Rule 113, introduced another significant change. Subsection (b) of section 5, Rule 113 inserted the word "just" before been committed, and the phrase "he has reasonable ground to believe" was changed to "he has personal knowledge of facts" to minimize arrests based 46 on mere suspicion or hearsay. Application of Present Rule Despite the 1985 amendments on warrantless arrest, the court appears to have returned to pre-amendment doctrines in the application of the rule. In Flagrante Arrests (For crimes committed in presence of arresting person) Sec. 5(a), Rule 113, Sec. 12, Rule 126 arrest for crimes In Presence of arresting officer. WHEN IN HIS PRESENCE, THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED HAS COMMITTED, IS ACTUALLY COMMITTING, IS OR ATTEMPTING TO COMMIT A CRIME. Essential Requisites Reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence of and within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. To constitute probable cause, two requisites must concur: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. A warrantless arrest is not justified by the mere fact that a crime is being committed in one's presence. The arresting officer must have personal knowledge of such commission. The knowledge must precede the arrest. The arrest cannot be justified by discovery thereafter that the person was committing a crime. Knowledge Must Be At Time of, Not After, Arrest An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbance caused thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, or the offense is continuing; or has not been consummated at the time when the arrest is made.

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Knowledge of the commission of the crime in one's presence must precede the arrest. The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed. In other words, the acts must be known to the officer at the time of their commission through his sensory perceptions. Thus, there could have been no in flagrante delicto arrest preceding the search, in light of the lack of an overt physical act on the part of accused-appellant that he had committed a crime, was committing a crime or was going to commit a crime. As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it has been held that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Hence, in People u. Aminudin, we ruled that "the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension." The reliance of the prosecution in People v. Tangliben, to justify the police's actions is misplaced. In the said case, based on the information supplied by informers, police officers conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He acceded latel on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night ol his arrest. In the instant case, the apprehending policemen already hac prior knowledge from the very same informant of accused-appellant's activities. The police operatives cannot feign ignorance of the alleged ille gal activities of accused-appellant. Considering that the identity address and activities of the suspected culprit was already ascertained two years previous to the actual arrest, there was indeed no reason why the police officers could not have obtained a judicial warrant before arresting accused-appellant and searching his person Whatever information their civilian asset relayed to them hours be fore accused-appellant's arrest was not a product of an "on-the-spot tip which may excuse them from obtaining a warrant of arrest Accordingly, the arresting team's contention that their arrest of accused-appellant was a product of an "on-thespot" tip is untenable In Randolph David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court stressed: The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable search and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
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personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." The plain import of the language of the Constitution is that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection given by this provision is that between person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest. In the Brief Account submitted by petitioner David, certain facts ire established: first, he was arrested without warrant; second, the PNP operatives arrested him on the basis ofPP 1017; third, he was brought at Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he was fingerprinted, Dhotographed and booked like a criminal suspect; fourth, he was created brusquely by policemen who "held his head and tried to push him inside an unmarked car; fifth, he was charged with Violation of Satas Pambansa Bilang Big. 880 and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he was detained for seven (7) hours; and seventh, he was eventually released for insufficiency of evidence. Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner David's warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of B.P. Big. 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective "Oust Gloria Now" and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally. Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition. Further, he also stated that there is insufficient evidence for the charge of violation of B.P. Big. 880 as it was not even known whether petitioner David was the leader of the rally. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES: Meaning of Personal Knowledge Based on Sensory Perceptions People v. Claudio Pat. Obina a member of the NARCOTICS UNIT, was on board the Victory Liner, seated on the second seat at the back. While he was thus seated, suspect Anita Claudio boarded the same bus and took the seat in front of him after putting a bag which she was carrying at the back of the seat of Obina. The bag placed by suspect behind his seat was a woven buri bag made of plastic containing her bag behind Pat. Obina's seat aroused his suspicion and made him felt (sick) nervous. With the feeling that there was something unusual, he had the urge to search the woven plastic bag. But it was only at San Fernando, Pampanga when he was able to go to the bag. He inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at the bottom of the woven bag and smelt marijuana. The plastic woven bag appearing to contain camote tops on the top has a big bundle of plastic marijuana at the bottom. He could recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that time at the ANTI-NARCOTICS UNIT. He did not, however, do anything after he discovered that there was marijuana inside the plastic bag of the accused until they reached Olongapo City and the accused alighted from the bus in front of the Caltex Gasoline Station in Sta. Rita. Right after the accused alighted from the bus, policeman Obina intercepted her and showed her his ID identifying himself as a policeman and told her he will search her bag because of the suspicion that she was carrying marijuana inside said bag. In reply, accused told him, "Please go with me, let us settle this at home." HELD: Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obina did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught inflagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a
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lawful arrest is in itself lawful. PEOPLE V. BURGOS Strict Interpretation Personal Knowledge Interpreted. The need to strictly adhere to the rule was stressed by Justice Hugo Gutierrez, Jr., in no uncertain terms in People v. Burgos In this case Cesar Masamlok surrendered to the PC on May 12, 1982 stating that, he was forcibly recruited by Ruben Burgos a member of the NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm against his life, if he refused. A joint team of members of the PC-INP was dispatched the following day to arrest Ruben Burgos and they were able to locate and arrest him while he was plowing his field. Interrogation was made in the house of the accused. He first denied possession of the firearm but later, upon further questioning, the team with the wife of the accused, the latter pointed to a place below their house where a gun was buried in the ground. After the recovery of the firearm, the accused likewise pointed to the subversive documents which the PC found kept in a stock pile of cogon, at a distance of three meters apart from his house. Accused when confronted with the firearm readily admitted the same as issued to him by the team leader of a sparrow unit. The lower court justified the arrest, search and seizure without warrant under Section 6-A, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court held the arrest as unlawful. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view." There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife. At the time he was arrested, he was not committing a crime but was plowing his field. If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally, nothing that is discovered afterwards cannot make it lawful ARREST UNLAWFUL WHERE WAS NO URGENCY AND THERE IS OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN WARRANT In People v. Aminnudin, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the accused was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin. HELD: Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
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The present case presented no urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC Lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary." The accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible. Aminnudin was reiterated in People v. Encinada, under substantially identical factual setting. To the trial court's justification that there was no time to obtain a search warrant because the information was received at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and that the ship was to dock at 7:00 a.m., the court pointed to Administrative Order No. 12 which allows applications for search warrants even after office hours. COMPARE: Where there was No Opportunity to Obtain Warrant In People v. Saycon A warrantless arrest, search and seizure based on information from a NARCOM agent that a suspected Shabu courier was arriving at Dumaguete City on board a vessel and who was pointed to by another agent was justified although the suspect was not perceptively committing a crime but (like Aminnudin) merely alighted from the vessel. The search and seizure was justified under the principle justifying the search of moving vehicles as there was no time to obtain a warrant. The case was distinguished from Aminnudin where there was time to obtain a search warrant. The record shows that the NARCOM officers were uncertain as to the precise date and time appellant would arrive from Manila; all they knew is that he would be taking a boat from Manila to Dumaguete on the morning of 8 July 1992. More specific details were received earlier in the morning that the appellant would be arriving the same morning. Clearly, the agents had to act quickly but there was not enough time to obtain a warrant of arrest or search warrant.

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Mere suspicion Insufficient WHERE THE ACCUSED CARRYING A BURI BAG WAS ACTING SUSPICIOUSLY AND WAS FOUND IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM AND EXPLOSIVE, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL ARGUED THAT WHEN THE TWO POLICEMEN APPROACHED THE PETITIONER, HE WAS ACTUALLY COMMITTING OR HAD JUST, COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION IN THE PRESENCE OF POLICE OFFICERS AND CONSEQUENTLY THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE CONTRABAND WAS INCIDENTAL TO THE LAWFUL ARREST IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 12, RULE 126 OF THE RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. The Supreme Court held: "At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant. Thus, to justify the arrest without warrant, under Section 6 (a), it is not enough that a crime is actually being committed in his presence. The person or peace officer making the arrest must be personally aware of the commission of such crime." People v. Mengote The police received a telephone call that there were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard at Tondo. The police responded and saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. The police approached them and identified themselves as policemen whereupon the two tried to ran away. The other lawmen surrounded them and searched them and one of them was found with an unlicensed firearm and live ammunition. Was the search and seizure legal? Held: It is illegal. At the time of the arrest, the appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen. This is not a crime. The police did not know then what offense if at all had been committed and neither were they aware of the participation therein of the appellant, x x x As for the illegal possession of firearm, the police discovered this only after he had been searched and investigated. The Supreme Court cited the cases of Burgos, Alih Castro and Aminnudin holding that it would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomachache or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or attempting to commit it. People v. Rodriguez The arrest, search and seizure was held illegal in view of the admission by the police that he did not actually see the appellants transacting but only saw them acting suspiciously. The court held that the cardinal rule is that no person may be subjected by the police to a search of his house, body or personal belonging except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. If a person is searched without a warrant, or under circumstances other than those justifying an arrest without
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warrant in accordance with law, merely on suspicion that he is engaged in some felonious enterprise, and in order to discover if he has indeed committed a crime, it is not only the arrest which is illegal but also, the search on the occasion thereof as being the fruit of the poisonous tree. In that event, any evidence taken, even if confirmatory of the initial suspicion, is inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding. COMPARE: Arrest Based on Suspicion; Where there is Urgency Where around 9:30 in the evening the police on a surveillance mission noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously and they confronted himand requested him to open the red travelling bag but the person refused. Found inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less. Accused was held to havev been caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid. In contrast, to the Aminnundin case, Tangliben presented urgency. Although the trial court's decision did not mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant. We cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin to the case at bar. To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated. Upon being informed by their civilian informer that there would ie a transaction involving the buying and selling of marijuana which would take place on that same day, Patrolmen immediately proceeded to the vicinity where the alleged transaction would take place. While positioned at a street corner, they saw appellant and Warner Marquez ay the side of the street about forty to fifty meters away from them the police officers). They saw Marquez giving something to appellant who, thereafter, handed a wrapped object to Marquez who then inserted the object inside the front of his pants infront of his abdomen while appellant, on his part, placed the thing given to him inside his pocket. The court a quo correctly ruled: The facts and circumstances attendant precisely fall under Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The subsequent arrest of Marquez and accused were made under the principle of hot pursuit. The recovery of the marijuana from Marquez and the P190.00 from accused by the said police officers were not violative of their constitutional rights since Marquez and the accused voluntarily surrendered them to the police officers. But even for the sake of argument that the recovery of the marijuana and peso bills were against the consent of Marquez and accused, still, the search on their persons were incidental to their valid warrantless arrest."
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Compare Mere time to obtain a warrant not sufficient to invalidate a warrantless arrest. To be considered likewise is whether or not a warrant may be issued under the circumstances. In Lo Ho Wing (supra), it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the authorities had reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the country. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a member. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case. In People v. Montilla, the opportunity to obtain a warrant was not considered as sufficient to invalidate the legality of the warrantless arrest. For, under the circumstances, the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. The informant did not know to whom the drugs would be delivered and at which particular part of the barangay there could be such delivery or the precise time of the suspect's arrival, or of his means of transportation, the container or contrivance wherein the drugs were concealed and whether the same were arriving with, or being brought by someone separately from the courier. The court ruled that in determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered especially in rural areas. Shift In Jurisprudence: Warrantless Arrest Under Section 5(a) Based On Reasonable Ground of Suspicion a. Probable Cause Based on Surveillance; No Crime Committed In Harvey v. CID Commissioner Santiago, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The Supreme Court justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant due to the existence of probable cause. b. Reasonable Ground to Believe Rule Applied The Supreme Court explained that petitioners were not caught in the act, does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms, the one with John Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances, the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as psycho-sexual perversion involving children."
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"Pedophilia for unusual sexual activity in which children are the preferred sexual objects" Solicitor General's Return of the Writ, on p. 101. While not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it is a behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the State to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, social well-being of our youth. c. People v. Allan Rodriguez Reasonable ground based on tip of informer delivery of suspicious stuff to tricycle driver justified warrantless arrest. The police officers were tipped off by an informer about the illegal trade of the accused. The exact location where this trading in drugs was taking place was given to them. They witnessed the person hand deliver a suspicious stuff to the tricycle driver who in turn gave something to the person. The suspicious stuff taken from the accused were confirmed to be marijuana after tests were conducted on them. The attending circumstances taking place before their eyes led the police officers to reasonably conclude that an offense was actually being committed. d. Personal Knowledge Under Section 5(a) Was Not Likewise Strictly Observed in the Following Cases: In these cases, the fact that the search yielded possession of illegal articles was included as a justification for a warrantless Arrest under Section 5(a) although the arresting officer at the time of arrest has no personal knowledge of a crime being committed in their presence as prescribed in U.S. v. Samonte (supra); Sayo v. Chief of Police (supra); People v. Burgos (supra); and People v. Posadas Meaning of Personal Knowledge of Facts Constituting Probable Cause Sufficient In its resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration in the Umil v. Ramos cases, the majority opinion explained the meaning of Personal Knowledge of Facts, as follows: It has been ruled that 'Personal Knowledge of Facts,' in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, "coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest." The Continuing Crime Principle to Justify Warrantless Arrest The Umil u. Ramos, and seven other petitions for habeas corpus were all based on the ground that the arrests of the petitioners were made without warrant and that no preliminary investigation was first conducted so that
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the information filed against them are void. The Supreme Court in a per curiam decision, however, found that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, were freshly committed and that the accused were actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified. The court then proceeded to give a brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight petitioners. 1) In Umil v. Ramos, one of the petitioners, Rolando Dural who was then confined in the hospital for a gunshot wound was positively identified as a member of the sparrow unit who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM Mobile patrol car. The Supreme Court found that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two soldiers. He was charged with the crime of Double Murder with Assault upon Agents of Persons in Authority. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of the offense for his arrest came a day after the shooting incident. He was arrested in the hospital. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified. The Court, however, justified the arrest of Rolando Dural for being a member of the New People's Army (NPA) an outlawed subversive organization. "Subversion being a continuous offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State are in the nature of continuing crimes." The Court then went on to quote Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile,
91

where the Supreme Court held:

"From the facts as above narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing jurisdiction in our jurisdiction." 2) In G.R. Nos. 84581-82, the arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra who admitted membership in the NPA and officers and/or members of the NUFC-CPP were likewise justified for the same reasons stated in UMIL. The arrest without warrant of Roque was additionally justified as she was, at the time of apprehension, in possession of ammunition without license to possess. 3) In Anonuevo v. Ramos, the arrest of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple without a warrant was also found to be justified. Both are admittedly members of the standing committee of the NUFC and, when apprehended in the house of Renato Constantino, they had a bag containing subversive materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition for which they had no license to possess or carry.
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The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of August 13,1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of Renato Constantino at Marikina Heights, Marikina, which was still under surveillance by military agents. The military agents noticed bulging objects on their waist-lines. When frisked, the agents found them to be loaded guns. Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their permit or license to possess or carry firearms and ammunition, but they could not produce any. Hence, they were brought to PC Headquarters for investigation. Found in their possession were the following articles: (c) Voluminous subversive documents (d) Firearms and ammunitions. Anonuevo and Casiple claim that they were unlawfully arrested because there was no previous warrant of arrest. The Supreme Court held the claim as without merit. "The record shows that Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their persons when they were apprehended." 4) In Ocaya u. Aguirre, the arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocaya was justified under the Rules, since she had with her unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested. The record of this case shows that on 12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and investigation of the Rizal PC-INP Command, armed with a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court ofPasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a house located at Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the CPPNPA. In the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car of Vicky Ocaya. As a result, Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought to the PC Headquarters for investigation. When Vicky Ocaya could not produce any permit or authorization to possess the ammunition, an information charging her with violation of P.D. No. 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 737. Danny Rivera, on the other hand, was released from custody. In answer to her claims that she'.,was illegally arrested, the Supreme Court held that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagrante delicto so that her arrest without a warrant is justified. 5) In Espiritu v. Lim, the respondents claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without a judicial warrant of arrest (on November 23) since petitioner when arrested had in fact just committed an offense in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, during a press conference of the National Press Club. Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was urging all drivers and operators to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988, to force the government to give in to their demands to lower the prices of spare parts, commodities, water and the immediate release from detention of the president of the PISTON (Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide). Further heard was Deogracias Espiritu taking the place of PISTON president Medardo Roda and also announced the formation of the Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988.
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Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Press Club in order to investigate him, but he gave the lawmen the slip. He was next seen at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a gathering of drivers and symphathizers at the corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was heard to say: "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot no. ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto noting pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at ang pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na." The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He was invited for questioning and brought to Police headquarters after which an Information for violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The Supreme Court held that the arrest of petitioner without a warrant is in accordance with the provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b). 6) In Nazareno v. Station Commander, the record of this case shows that at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1988, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men near the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regala who was arrested by the Police on 28 December 1988. Upon questioning, Regala pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions in the killing of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof, the police officers, without warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought him to the police headquarters for questioning. The Supreme Court held: "Evidently, the arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after he was positively implicated by his co-accused Ramil Regala in the killing of Romulo Bunye II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held in People v. Ancheta: "The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the person in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated therein." THE PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO JUSTIFY WARRANTLESS ARREST In People v. Malmstedt The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession.

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To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest." While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime. Sufficiency of Knowledge of Probable Cause Reiterated En Bane Probable cause as a ground to justify a warrantless arrest in flagrante was reiterated in the en bane decision in People u. Montilla. In this case, an informer informed the police the day before that a drug courier whom he could recognize would be arriving in Cavite from Baguio City. As soon as the appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney the informer at once indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand pointing to him from the waiting shed, the informer told them that the marijuana was likely hidden inside the travelling bag and carton box which appellant was carrying at the time. The court held that the officers thus realized that he was their man even if he was simply carrying a seemingly innocent pair of luggage for personal effects. The Court therein wrote: "the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in cadence with the instances of permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a)." According to the court, the conventional view is that probable cause, while a relative term the determination of which must be resolved according to the facts of each case, is understood as having reference to facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe and conclude as to the commission of an offense, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The court pointed out that under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to "engender a well founded belief as to the fact of the commission of the crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. It has the same meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule, that is, that the investigating fiscal "finds cause to hold the respondent for trial," or where "a probable cause exist." It should, therefore, be in that sense, wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally authorized.

COMPARE: WHEN WARRANTLESS ARREST BASED ON INFORMATION INVALID In People v. Aruta, the police was tipped off by his informant that a certain "Aling Rosa" will be arriving from
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Baguio City the following day with a large volume of Marijuana. The police proceeded to the place at 4:00 p.m. of the following day and deployed themselves near the PNB. A Victory Liner Bus arrived. Two females and a male got off, and the pointed to "Aling Rosa" carrying a traveling bag. The police approached her and inquired about the contents of the traveling bag which she handed to the police, who, upon inspection found dried leaves of marijuana packed inside a plastic bag. In determining whether the warrantless search and seizure was valid. The Court noted that there was ample opportunity to obtain a warrant of arrest. The identity of the accused was ascertained. The accused was not acting suspiciously, and distinguished the case: a. from People v. Tangliben (supra), where policemen were confronted with an on the spot tip. Moreover, the policemen knew that the Victory Liner compound is being used by drug traffickers as their business address. More significantly, Tangliben was acting suspiciously. His actuations and surrounding circumstances led the policemen to reasonably suspect that Tangliben is committing a crime. In instant case, there is no single indication that Aruta was acting suspiciously. b. from People v. Malmstedt. In Malmstedt, where there was no reasonable time for the police authorities to obtain a search warrant, and his actuations also aroused suspicion of the officers conducting the operation. In Aruto, there was time to obtain a search warrant, her identity was priorly ascertained, and she was not acting suspiciously. Malmstedt was searched abroad a moving vehicle, a legally accepted exception to the warrant requirement, Aruta on the other hand, was searched while she was about to cross the street. c. from People v. Bagista, where probable cause was drawn from the fact that the accused fitted the description given by the NARCOM informant and that it involves a search of a moving vehicle plus the fact the police officers erected a checkpoint in view of the confidential information from the regular informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of the accused would be bringing marijuana from up to north.

d. from Manalili v. Court of Appeals, where the court held that the policemen had sufficient reason to accost accused to determine if he was actually "high" on drugs due to suspicious actuations, he was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in swaying manner he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen coupled with the fact that based on the information, this area was a haven for drug addicts. The Court noted that in all the above-cited cases, there was information received which became the bases for conducting the warrantless search. Furthermore, additional factors and circumstances were present which, when taken together with the information constituted probable causes which justified the warrantless searches and seizures in each case. No reference was made to Montilla.

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In applicable earlier decisions, the Supreme Court held that there was probable cause in the following instances: (a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried by the accused; (b) where an informer positively identified the accused who was observed to have been acting suspiciously; (c) where the accused fled when accosted by policemen; (d) where the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policeman who had earlier received confidential reports that the said accused would transport a large quantity of marijuana; and (e) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged the said accused where bringing prohibited drugs into the country Other Cases where there was no Probable Cause There is, no probable cause where the arresting team was only armed with knowledge of the suspect's "attire" which the witness could not even remember. The team did not have a physical description of the suspect nor his name. They were not even given a specific place within which to target their search of the suspect, only a vicinity of the Muslim Area in Quiapo, near the Muslim Mosque. Yet the arresting team directly zeroed in on the accused and his companions who were only eating halo-halo at a small restaurant, surely not a crime in itself. While SP04 Clemente claims that accused had a "bulging waistline," this alone, in the light of the availing circumstances, is insufficient to constitute probable cause for the arrest of the accused. In another case, the police officers were informed that accused were repacking drugs. Accompanied by an informer, they peeped first through the window before they saw the activities of the suspects inside the room and entered the house and arrested the suspects. The court held that the arrest, search and seizure were illegal. They should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the activities and identities of the suspects were already known and if there was probable cause, they should have applied for a search warrant. The court reiterated the 7 situations of a warrantless search and held that the arrest, search and seizure do not fall on any of them. In another case, the court noted that the ETC never took the pains of pointing to such facts, (constituting probable cause) but predicated mainly its decision on the finding that "accused was caught red-handed carrying the bag-full of [s]habu when apprehended." In short, there is no probable cause. At least in People v. Tangliben, the Court agreed with the lower court's finding that compelling reasons (e.g., accused was acting suspiciously, on the spot identification by an informant that accused was transporting prohibitive drug, and the urgency of the situation) constitute of probable cause impelled.

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In another case, the Solicitor General proposes that the following details are suggestive of probable cause persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines (he lacked the necessary travel documents or visa), CHUA's suspicious behavior, i.e., he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which CHUA can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws. The Court, however, found that these do not constitute "probable cause." Tell-tale Clues of Probable Cause Reiterated None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drugs confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/ deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no classified information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. And despite claims by CID and BADUA that CHUA attempted to flee, ALMOITE testified that the latter was merely walking and oblivious to any attempt at conversation when the officers approached him. In People v. Luaa, a buy-bust operation was conducted against the accused. After he had gone inside his house and returned with the three tea bags of marijuana and received the marked money, the designated poseur-buyer gave the signal to his fellow police officers who closed in and arrested the accused. In the course of the arrest, a police officer noticed something bulging at accused's waistline, which turned out to be an unlicensed .38 caliber "paltik" with two live bullets. Accused was charged with illegal possession of firearm. The search was held to be a valid incident of a lawful arrest. BUY-BUST OPERATIONS CONSIDERED AS IN FLAGRANTE ARRESTS Buy-Bust Operations Search and Seizure Pursuant to Buy-Bust Operation What is a buy-bust operation? A buy-bust operation is far variant from an ordinary arrest; it is a form of entrapment which has been repeatedly accepted to be valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. In a buy-bust operation, the violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime. In flagrante arrests are usually made in drug cases during a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto.

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It is the employment by peace officers to catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. It is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of entrapping or capturing a lawbreaker. The term, in connection with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and catch malefactor in flagrante delicto. But, while buy-bust operation is a recognized means of entrapment for the apprehension of drug pusher, it does not always commend itself as the most reliable way to go after violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act as it is susceptible to mistake as well as to harassment, extortion and abuse. The Court therefore stressed that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that the law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement. Principle of Continuity-in Buy-Bust Operations The buy-bust operation and the search and seizure pursuant to the buy-bust operation must be continuous: Buy-Bust Operation and Search Rejected for Not Being Continuous. Thus, in People v. Enrile, an arrest based on information of a person who was entrapped to selling marijuana that the source of the Marijuana was Enrile and led the police to Enrile's house and after calling for the latter pointed to him as the source of the marijuana was held as invalid. In People v. Bautista, an arrest and search based on information of the poseur-buyer to the police who were outside the house waiting that he was able to buy the shabu from the appellant inside the house who immediately went inside and arrested the appellant was held as valid. In People v. Buenaventura, an arrest based on information of the seller after he was apprehended in a buybust operation that the source of the marijuana was the accused who was then arrested in a follow-up operation was held as invalid citing the case of People u. Enrile. In People v. Merabueno, the Supreme Court found: DURING THE INVESTIGATION OF BASILIO, THE POLICE LEARNED THAT THE SUPPLIER OF THE MARIJUANA WAS CRUZ. A POLICE TEAM WAS DISPATCHED TO ANTIPOLO, RIZAL, WHERE CRUZ LIVED. THE FIRST MISSION RETURNED WITHOUT FINDING CRUZ.

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The team returned to Antipolo at 7:00 P.M. of the same day. According to the police, they met Cruz on their way to his house while Cruz claimed that the police just barged into his house. But assuming that the version of the police is the correct one, there was no reasonable basis to place Cruz under arrest without a warrant and then search him, also without a warrant. Certainly, the arrest was not made in the course of a "hot pursuit" of Cruz, because he was not in Marikina during the "buy-bust" operation. In such a case, the police should have first secured a warrant of arrest and a search warrant before they arrested and bodily searched Cruz. This case should be distinguished from People u. Cuachan, involving a continuing buy bust operation where after the sale, the shabu was handed to a policeman a block away who after determining it was shabu which took only a few minutes immediately proceeded to the house of the appellant and arrested him. In the case, the police conducted a buy-bust operation. As planned, Pat. Uggadan and the informant proceeded to the residence of their quarry while Pfc. Reyes and the other members of the team posted themselves in strategic places. After a few minutes, Pat. Uggadan together with the informant, reported to Pfc. Reyes that he had succeeded in buying shabu from the appellant at the same time presenting the merchandise to Pfc. Reyes. After determining it was shabu, Pfc. Reyes and his men immediately proceeded to the residence of the appellant and found in one of the rooms several men seated around a table, engaged in pot session and several paraphernalia. Pat. Uggadan pointed to the appellant to PFC Reyes as the person who earlier sold Shabu to him. Thereupon, Pfc. Reyes frisked accused-appellant and found in his person the two 100.00 peso bills he gave to Pat. Uggadan as buy-bust money and a quantity of shabu contained in a plastic bag. The court justified the warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrest and the obligation of the police to apprehend even without a warrant of arrest. Pat. Uggadan witnessed the illegal act of selling shabu on the occasion of the buy-bust operation in front of the room of the accused. He did not make the arrest right then and there because there were only himself and the informant as against the different male and female voices he heard from both rooms of appellant's house. Considering that the operation took place inside the house of appellant, understandably Pat. Uggadan and his informant had to get out of the house and inform their backup that the sale had been consummated. Furthermore, weighty consideration is the fact that, as previously stated, Pat. Uggadan immediately gave the shabu to Pfc. Reyes who was only a block away and after the latter had determined that it was shabu, which only took a few minutes, they all immediately proceeded to the house of appellant and arrested him. It was a continuing buy-bust operation which, as the phrase connotes, commenced with buying shabu and culminated in his arrest. Since his arrest was lawful, it follows that the incidental search was also valid. In another case, the arresting officers were informed by the NARCOM Chief that a transaction had been agreed upon in Las Pinas, Metro Manila for the delivery of Shabu to take place in Room No. 77 of the Hyatt Terraces at Baguio City. Undercover agents waited for the appellant inside the room, but the latter did not show up in the afternoon, but the following morning. Appellant with an undercover agent arrived at Room No. 77. The latter signaled that appellant had Shabu with him. While the sale of the Shabu which was agreed upon
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with a Chinese business man in Las Pinas, Metro Manila, did not take place in the presence of the agents, the delivery or attempted delivery of the subject matter took place in their presence. The Court held the warrantless arrest of appellant inside Rooir 77 was merely the culmination of an entrapment operation and that the taking of shabu from appellant was either done immediately be fore, or was an incident to a lawful arrest. The Hot Pursuit Arrest Elements: a. Offense have been committed; b. Offense has just been committed; c. Probable cause based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that persons to be arrested committed it. a. First Element: Meaning of Offense Committed The present rule abandons the pronouncement in People v. Burgos, that in arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. The rule now is the indubitable existence of a crime is not necessary to justify a warrantless arrest. In People v. Ramos, an informant apprised the police of the presence of a drug pusher at the corner of 3rd Street and Rizal Avenue, Olongapo City. Acting on such information and in their presence, their superior, Captain Castillo, gave the informant marked money to buy marijuana. The informant, now turned poseur-buyer, returned with two sticks of marijuana. Captain Castillo again gave said informant marked money to purchase marijuana. The informant poseur-buyer thereafter returned with another two sticks of marijuana. The police officers then proceeded to the corner of 3rd Street and Rizal Avenue and effected the arrest of appellant. The Supreme Court with Justice Gutierrez as ponente, held, from the above facts, that it may be concluded that the arresting police officers had personal knowledge of facts implicating the appellant with the sale of marijuana to the informant-poseur-buyer. The arrest was held legal and the consequent search which yielded 20 sticks of marijuana was lawful for being incident to a valid arrest. The fact that the prosecution failed to prove the sale of marijuana beyond reasonable doubt does not undermine the legality of the appellant's arrest. It is not necessary that the crime should have been established as a fact in order to regard the detention as legal. The legality of detention does not depend upon the actual commission of the crime, but upon the nature of the deed when such characterization may reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen.
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People v. Euaristo, cited the doctrine in People v. Sucro (supra), when crime is deemed committed in one's presence e.g., hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at the scene thereof. To justify a warrantless arrest not on Sec. 5(a) but Sec. 5(b), the Supreme Court held that the usual observation of a bulge on the waist of Carillo, along with the earlier report of gunfire, as well as the peace officer's professional instincts, are more than sufficient to pass the tests of the rules. Consequently, under the facts, the firearms taken from Carillo can be said to have been incidental to a lawful and valid arrest under Sec. 5(b), Rule 113.

b. Second Element: Meaning of just been committed "Just been committed" connotes immediacy in point of time, per dissent of Justice Teehankee cited by C.J., Fernan in his concurring dissenting in Umil v. Ramos. It means a very short time ago. The arrest must be made almost immediately as soon after these acts, not at anytime after the suspicion of the arresting officer begins, no matter how long ago the offense was committed. The time interval between the actual commission of the crime and the arrival of the arresting officer must be brief indeed. The recency contemplated here, in relation to the making of the warrantless arrest, is the time when the crime was in fact committed, and not the time when the person making the arrest learned or was informed of such commission. 1) Espiritu v. Lim The arrest of the accused one day after commission of the crime of Inciting to Sedition was held to be valid. 2) People v. Nazareno Arrest made 14 days after commission of the crime is valid. 3) People v. Sucro The fact that Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was caught throwing the marijuana sticks and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the same from the accused-appellant clearly indicates that accused had just sold the marijuana sticks to Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an illegal act of which the police officers had personal knowledge, being members of the team which monitored Sucre's nefarious activity. 4) Rolito Go v. Court of Appeals Arrest six days after commission of the crime based on information from alleged eyewitness held unlawful. A warrantless arrest three (3) days after commission of the crime or 19 hours thereafter were held to be unlawful. c. Third Element: Personal Knowledge of Facts Following are the doctrines under the 1985 Rule on the meaning of Personal Knowledge of Facts Based on Information Rejected 1) People v. Burgos, personal knowledge based on, information by suspect rejected. 2) Alih v. Castro, (Need for personal knowledge) 3) People v. Aminnudin Warrantless arrest based on tip of informer who pointed to the suspect was rejected.
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4) People u. Sucro, citing People v. Bati Police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused. 5) In People u. Alvarez Arrest based on surveillance by informant who was once a policeman was held to be valid. 6) People v. Briones Warrantless arrest made by a police officer based on disclosure by eyewitness who disclosed the identity of the perpetrator was rejected. 7) People v. Cendana Arrest based on information from unknown sources given a day after the commission of the crime was rejected. 8) People v. Tonog Arrest based on knowledge of facts gathered from investigation was held valid. In this case there was an oral confession. 9) Nazareno v. Station Commander of Muntinlupa Arrest based on information of a suspect 14 days aftel commission of crime held as valid. This is of doubtful validity. 10) Rolito Go u. Court of Appeals (supra, February 1992) Justice Feliciano as ponente Arrest 6 days after shooting based on information of alleged eyewitnesses was held unlawful Petitioner's arrest took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The arresting officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly who Maguan. Neither could the arrest effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected when [the shooting had] ii fact just been committed within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the arresting officers had any personal knowledge of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitness to the shooting one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife name. That information did not, however, constitute personal knowledge.

Personal Knowledge of Facts Based on Information Allowed 1) In People v. Madriaga, personal knowledge based on information of the co-accused pointing to accused as to source of marijuana, was held as valid. 2) In People v. Gerente, the policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death; a piece of wood and a concrete hollow which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eyewitness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente as one of the killers.

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Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did. 3) In People u. Bautista, held as valid an arrest made by the station commander, who was outside the house, based on information of the poseur-buyer after the purchase was made. Said case cited in U.S. v. Santos, which justified a warrantless arrest on reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing the accused to be guilty. 4) In People u. Saycon, warrantless arrest of debarking passenger from vessel based on information was held valid. COMPARE: People v. Enrile Information by co-accused that Enrile gave him the marijuana is invalid. In People v. Encinada, the court held that: "Raw intelligence information is not a sufficient ground for a warrantless arrest." However, in People v. Montilla (supra), the court observed that "although information gathered and passed on by law enforcers are vague and piece-meal, and not as neatly and completely packaged as one would expect from a professional spymaster, such tip-offs are sometimes sucessful as it proved to be in the apprehension of appellant." 5) In Sanchez v. Demetriou. The Warrantless arrest based on the sworn statement of Centeno by an officer who had no personal knowledge is unlawful but the defect was cured by the filing of charges and issuance of warrant of arrest. In People v. AcoZ, a group held up a passenger jeepney Policemen immediately responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket. He pointed them to the policemen. When the group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different directions. Three were caught and arrested. Each was found in possession of an unlicensed revolver and charged with illegal possession of firearms. The accused claimed that the warrantless seizure of firearms was illegal. The Court rejected their plea and held that the search was a valid incident of a lawful arrest. The subsequent search of accused-appellant's person and the seizure from him of the firearm was likewise lawful. Personal Knowledge of Facts Based on Reasonable Grounds of Suspicion Rule is now the Rule In its resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration in the Umil v. Ramos cases, the majority opinion explained the meaning of personal knowledge of facts, as follows: "It has been ruled that 'personal knowledge of facts,' in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. (Subjective) The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
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person to be arrested. (Objective) A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest." In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth in section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested but whether they are probably guilty thereof. Not evidence of guilt but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant. The Courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code and/or for other administrative sanctions. The same principle was stated in People u. Aruta. Probable cause in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. The foregoing standards were also adopted in warrantless "hot pursuit" arrest. Thus, in the 1999 case of People u. Doria, the Court en bane speaking thru Jusice Reynato Puno wrote, "Personal knowledge" of facts arrests without warrant under Section 5(b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion" and reiterated the rule in Umil v. Ramos. In this case, accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused. P03 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his (P03 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money was, Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her coaccused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house. With or without her knowledge, with or without conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable. Said the U.S. Supreme Court: "THE ARREST MUST STAND UPON A FIRMER GROUND THAN MERE SUSPICION THOUGH THE ARRESTING OFFICER NEED NOT HAVE IN HAND EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD SUFFICE TO CONVICT. The quantum of information which constitutes probable cause or evidence which would warrant a man of
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reasonable caution in the belief that a felony has been committed must be measured by the facts of the particular case. A significantly lower quantum of proof is required to establish probable cause than guilt." Probable cause may, however, not be established simply by showing that the officer who made the challenged arrest or search subjectively believed that he had grounds for his action. Good faith alone is not sufficient. The probable cause test is an objective one. The mere subjective conclusion of a police concerning the existence of probable cause is not binding in the court which must independently scrutinize the objective facts to determine the existence of probable cause. In doing so, however, the expertise of the officer are to be taken into account. This is as it should be for there would be little merit in securing able trained men to guard the public peace if their actions were to be measured by what might be probable cause to untrained civilians. In assessing the conduct of the police officer, it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard.

The test is: Would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appreciated. Personal Knowledge of the Death of Victim and Facts Indicating that Accused Was the Assailant In People v. Tonog, the police found the lifeless body of a person with several stab wounds. An informer pointed to the accused as the person who had killed the victim. That afternoon, police officers arrested the accused. On their way to the police station, a policeman noticed bloodstains on the accused's pants which, when examined, was found to be the same blood type "0" found on the fatal knife. The Court upheld the warrantless arrest and ruled that the blood-stained pants, having been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest, was admissible in evidence. In People v. Gerente, the police arrested the accused three hours after the victim had been killed. They went to the scene of the crime where they found a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block used by the killers in bludgeoning the victim to death. A neighbor of the accused who witnessed the killing, pointed to him as one of the assailants. The warrantless arrest was held valid under Rule 113, Sec. 5(b). In People v. Jay son, there was a shooting. The policemen summoned to the scene of the crime and found the victim. Accused-appellant was pointed to them as the assailant only moments after the shooting. In fact accused-appellant had not gone very far (only ten meters away from the "lhaw-Ihaw"), although he was then fleeing. The arresting officers thus acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that accused-appellant was the assailant. The court upheld the warrantless arrests as valid. In another case, the police officers were informed that accused were repacking drugs. Accompanied by an informer. They peeped first through the window before they saw the activities of the suspects inside the room and entered the house and arrested the suspects. The court held that the arrest, search and seizure were illegal. They should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the activities and identities of the suspects were already known and if there was probable cause, they should have applied for a search warrant.
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The court reiterated the seven (7) situations of a warrantless search and held that the arrest, search and seizure do not fall on any of them. ONLY COURTS COULD DECIDE THE QUESTION OF PROBABLE CAUSE SINCE THE STUDENTS WERE NOT BEING ARRESTED IN FLA-GRANTE DELICTO In Posadas v. The Hon. Ombudsman, the NBI agents tried to effect an arrest four days after commission of the crime and had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the crime and what they had were the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, the court held this is insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI. The Court distinguished the case from that of People v. Tonog, relied upon by the prosecution to justify the arrest. In Tonog, the accused voluntarily went upon invitation of the police officer who later noticed the presence of blood stains on the pants of the accused. Upon reaching the police station, the accused was asked to take off his pants for examination at the crime laboratory. The question in that case involved the admissibility of the maong pants taken from the accused. It is clear that Tonog does not apply to this case. First, the accused in that case voluntarily went with the police upon the latter's invitation. Second, the arresting officer found blood stains an the pants of the accused, on the basis of which he concluded that the accused probably committed the crime for which reason the latter was taken into custody. Third, the arrest was made on the same day the crime was committed. In the words of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b), the crime had "just been committed" and the arresting officer had "personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it." The court reiterated the rule in People v. Doria (supra), that: '"Personal knowledge' of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5(b) of Rule 113 must be based upon 'probable cause' which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspension are reasonable when, the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest." To allow the arrest which the NBI intended to make without warrant would in effect allow them to supplant the courts. The determination of the existence of probable cause that the persons to be arrested committed the crime was for the judge to make. The law authorities a police officer or even an ordinary citizen to arrest criminal offenders only if the latter are committing or have just committed a crime.
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Otherwise, we cannot leave to the police officers the determination of whom to apprehend if we are to protect our civil liberties. This is evident from a consideration of the requirements before a judge can order the arrest of suspects. Art. Ill, Sec. 2 of the Constitution. Rule in Drug Cases The Supreme Court in People v. Saycon pointed out that: "It is important to note that unlike in the case of crimes like, e.g., homicide, murder, physical injuries, robbery or rape which by their nature involve physical, optically perceptible, overt acts, the defense of possessing or delivering or transporting some prohibited or regulated drug is customarily carried out without any external signs or indication visible to police officers and the rest of the outside world. Drug "pushers" or couriers do not customarily go about their enterprise or trade with some external visible sign advertising the fact that they are carrying or distributing or transporting prohibited drugs. Thus, the application of the rules in Section 5(a) and (b), Rule 133 of the Rules of Court needs to take that circumstances into account. The Court has had to resolve the question of valid or invalid warrantless arrest or warrantless search or seizure in such cases by determining the presence or absence of a reasonable or probable cause, before that such a felony (possessing or transporting or delivering prohibited drugs) was then in progress. In Barros, the Court listed the kinds of causes which have been characterized as probable or reasonable cause supporting the legality and validity of a warrantless search and a warrantless arrest in cases of this type: "THIS COURT HAS IN THE PAST FOUND PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONDUCT WITHOUT A JUDICIAL WARRANT AN EXTENSIVE SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLES IN SITUATIONS WHERE (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the 204 route where the search was conducted; (3) Narcom agents were informed or "tipped off" by an undercover "deep penetration" agent that prohibited drugs would be brought into the country on a particular airline flight on a given date; (4) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do so; and (5) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana." Caution: The government's drive against illegal drugs needs the support of every citizen. But it should not undermine the fundamental rights of every citizen as enshrined in the Constitution. The constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded as overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the constitution and the rights it guarantees should be paramount in their minds, otherwise their good intentions will remain as such simply because they have blundered.
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The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence. Rule on Escapees When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. An officer may arrest without a warrant, a prisoner who has escaped from custody after trial and commitment, and it has been held that even a private person may without a warrant, arrest a convicted felon who has escaped and is at large. An officer may arrest without a warrant, a prisoner who has escaped from custody after trial and commitment. Even a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a convicted felon who has escaped and is at large, since he might also, before conviction, have arrested the felon. Evasion of service of sentence; Arrest, without a warrant, principle applied. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court may be invoked in support of this conclusion; for, under Section 6(c) thereof one of the instances when a person may be validly arrested without warrant is where he has escaped from confinement. Undoubtedly, this right of arrest without a warrant is founded on the principle that at the time of the arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of committing a crime evading the service of his sentence.

SEC. 6. Time of Making Arrest An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night. SEC. 7. Method of Arrest by Officer by Virtue of Warrant When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable. SEC. 8. Method of Arrest by Officer Without Warrant When making an arrest without a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of his authority and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. Duty of Arresting Officer At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger.
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It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, or by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Procedure, Guidelines and Duties of Arresting or Investigating Officer Considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the evidence against an accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court as guardian of the rights of the people, and in the light of the new legal developments, laid down an updated procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting or investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of making arrest and again at and during the custodial interrogation in accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438: a. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. Every other warnings, information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person; b. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him; c. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;

d. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him, and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf; e. That whether or not the person arrested has lawyer he must be informed that no custodial investigation any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made; f. The person arrested must be informed that at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means telephone, radio, letter or messenger with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or any one from his immediate family or by counsel or be visited or by conferences with duly accredited national or international non-governmental organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;

g. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same; h. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;

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i.

That the person must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced or the interrogation must ceased (sic) if it has already begun; The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statement; and He must also be informed that any statement or evidence as the case may be obtained in violation of any of the foregoing whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part shall be inadmissible in evidence.

j.

k.

SEC. 9. Method of Arrest by Private Person When making an arrest, a private person shall inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, or has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists before the person making the arrest has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. SEC. 10. Officer may Summon Assistance An officer making a lawful arrest may orally summon as many persons as he deems necessary to assist him in effecting the arrest. Every person so summoned by an officer shall assist him in effecting the arrest when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself. SEC. 11. Right of Officer to Break into Building or Enclosure An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or without a warrant as provided in section 5, may break into any building or enclosure where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance thereto, after announcing his authority and purpose. SEC. 12. Right to Break Out from Building or Enclosure Whenever an officer has entered the building, or enclosure in accordance with the preceding section, he may break out therefrom when necessary to liberate himself. SEC. 13. Arrest After Escape or Rescue If a person lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued, any person may immediately pursue or retake him without a warrant at any time and in any place within the Philippines. SEC. 14. Right of Attorney or Relative to Visit Person arrested Any member of the Philippine Bar shall, at the request of the person arrested or of another acting in his behalf, have the right to visit and confer privately with such person in the jail or any other place of custody at any hour of the day or night. Subject to reasonable regulations, a relative of the person arrested can also exercise the same right. Under Republic Act No. 7438: "SECTION 2(B) ANY PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE, OR ANYONE ACTING UNDER HIS ORDER OR IN HIS PLACE, WHO ARRESTS, DETAINS OR INVESTIGATES ANY PERSON FOR THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE SHALL INFORM THE LATTER, IN A LANGUAGE KNOWN TO AND UNDERSTOOD BY HIM, OF HIS RIGHTS TO REMAIN SILENT AND TO HAVE COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, PREFERABLY OF HIS OWN CHOICE, WHO SHALL AT ALL TIMES BE ALLOWED TO CONFER PRIVATELY WITH THE PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.
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(a) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights or by any international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse, fiance or fiancee, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward. AS USED IN THIS ACT, "CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION" SHALL INCLUDE THE PRACTICE OF ISSUING AN "INVITATION" TO A PERSON WHO IS INVESTIGATED IN CONNECTION WITH AN OFFENSE HE IS SUSPECTED TO HAVE COMMITTED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE LIABILITY OF THE "INVITING" OFFICER FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW. SEC. 4 A) ANY ARRESTING PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE, OR ANY INVESTIGATING OFFICER, WHO FAILS TO INFORM ANY PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND TO HAVE COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL PREFERABLY OF HIS OWN CHOICE, SHALL SUFFER A FINE OF SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) OR A PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF NOT LESS THAN EIGHT (8) YEARS BUT NOT MORE THAN TEN (10) YEARS, OR BOTH. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been previously convicted of a similar offense. THE SAME PENALTIES SHALL BE IMPOSED UPON A PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE, OR ANYONE ACTING UPON ORDERS OF SUCH INVESTIGATING OFFICER OR IN HIS PLACE, WHO FAILS TO PROVIDE A COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL TO A PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION FOR THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE IF THE LATTER CANNOT AFFORD THE SERVICES OF HIS OWN COUNSEL. B) ANY PERSON WHO OBSTRUCTS, PREVENTS OR PROHIBITS ANY LAWYER, ANY MEMBER OF THE IMMEDIATE FAMILY OF A PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, OR ANY MEDICAL DOCTOR OR PRIEST OR RELIGIOUS MINISTER CHOSEN BY HIM OR BY ANY MEMBER OF HIS IMMEDIATE FAMILY OR BY HIS COUNSEL, FROM VISITING AND CONFERRING PRIVATELY WITH HIM, OR FROM EXAMINING AND TREATING HIM, OR FROM MINISTERING TO HIS SPIRITUAL NEEDS, AT ANY HOUR OF THE DAY OR, IN URGENT CASES, OF THE NIGHT SHALL SUFFER THE PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF NOT LESS THAN FOUR (4) YEARS NOR MORE THAN SIX (6) YEARS, AND A FINE OF FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00). UNDER SEC. 2(D), REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7348 ANY EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESION MADE BY A PERSON, ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION" (WHICH SHALL INCLUDE AN "INVITATION FOR INVESTIGATION" SHALL BE IN WRITING AND SIGNED BY SUCH PERSON IN THE PRESENCE OF HIS COUNSEL OR IN THE LATTER'S ABSENCE, UPON A VALID WAIVER, AND IN THE PRESENCE OF ANY OF THE PARENTS, ELDER BROTHERS AND SISTERS, HIS SPOUSE, THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR, THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, DISTRICT SCHOOL SUPERVISOR, OR PRIEST OR MINISTER OF THE GOSPEL AS CHOSEN BY HIM; OTHERWISE, SUCH EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE IN ANY PROCEEDING. In other words, if there is a valid waiver, and the lawyer's presence is waived, the confession must still be signed in the presence of any persons enumerated above. 1. Application of Actual Force, Manual Touching of the Body, Physical Restraint or a Formal Declaration of Arrest is Not Required It is enough that there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and intent on the
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part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. a. A letter-invitation is equivalent to arrest.

Where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military officers and the designated interrogation site as a military camp, this is obviously a command or an order of arrest. b. Under R.A. No. 7438, the requisites of a custodial interrogation are applicable even to a person not formally arrested but merely invited for questioning, 2. Illegality of Arrest Does Not Render the Proceedings Void where No timely Objection to the Irregularity is Made a. See also People v. Macam for waiver of illegality of arrest. A motion to quash should be filed. The illegality of the arrest or the procedure in acquiring jurisdiction of the person of an accused must be raised before plea. [I]t is too late for appellant to raise the question of his arrest without a warrant. When accused-appellant was arrested and a case was filed against him, he pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, participated in the trial and presented his evidence. Appellant is thus estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. It is well-settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. Besides, this issue is being raised for the first time by appellant. He did not move for the quashal of the information before the trial court on this ground. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial. Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after the trial free from error. b. Thus, the unlawfulness of an arrest does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. In other words, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error.
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