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Intensities of Feeling: Towards a Spatial Politics of Affect Author(s): Nigel Thrift Source: Geografiska Annaler.
Series B, Human Geography, Vol. 86, No. 1, Special Issue: The Political Challenge of Relational Space (2004), pp. 57-78 Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3554460 . Accessed: 13/09/2013 10:32
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INTENSITIES OF FEELING: TOWARDS A SPATIAL POLITICS OF AFFECT

by Nigel Thrift
diacyof Nazi ralliescomesto mind.So does Richbodies urban of troubled ardSennett'ssummoning to read in FleshandStone.But,generally speaking, Thispaperattempts to takethepoliticsof affectas ABSTRACT. to resortto the to thelife of cities,giventhatcities aboutaffectin cities it is necessary butcentral notjustincidental of the tracklines and of or transhuman of as inhuman entitiesandthatpolitics pages novels, arethought poems. withoutunity.It is in is understood as a processof community Why this neglectof the affectiveregisterof citto af- ies? It is not as if thereis no Thefirstpartsets outthemainapproaches threemainparts. historyof the studyof The secondpartconsiders fect thatconformwiththis approach. and overmanycenturies. There affect. patentlyis, of affecthasbecome thewaysin whichthesystematic engineering debathave For and The continually central to thepoliticallife of Euro-American cities, example,philosophers why. kindsof progressive thirdpartthensets out the different politics ed the placeof affect.Plato'sdiscussionof therole that might become possible once affect is takeninto account. of artistscomes to mind as an early instance:for Therearesomebriefconclusions. becauseit gave an outlet Plato artwas dangerous emotions and for the expressionof uncontrolled Keywords:affect,politics,space dramais a threatto reason feelings. In particular, rebel- becauseit appeals besidespolitical No doubtone could to emotion.4 Nobodyknowshowmanyrebellions in the massesof life whichpeopleearth lions ferment such as Matrackforward figures through pivotal JaneEyre,1847/1993p. 115 chiavelli,Rousseau,Kantand Hegel, notingvariand romantic ous rationalist reactions,depending Introduction upon whether (and which) passions are viewed or with suspicion5. of affect. favourably Citiesmaybe seen as roilingmaelstroms thoughat Similarly, have scientists later much a and as affects such Particular date, recognisedthe anger,fear,happiness the least since At of affect. the subsidare on publication here, boil, importance rising continually joy ing there, and these affects continuallymanifest of Charles Darwin's (1998) The Expression of the themselvesin eventswhichcan takeplaceeitherat Emotions in Man and Animals in 1872, and no hiseve- doubtbeforethat,therehas been a continuous a grandscale or simplyas a partof continuing scientificstudyof affect,and rydaylife.1 So, on the heroic side, we mightpoint toryof the systematic to the mass hysteriaoccasionedby the death of althoughit would be foolish to say that we now PrincessDianaor the deafeningroarfroma sports know all thereis to know aboutthe physiologyof whena crucialpointis scored.Onthepro- emotions,equallyit wouldbe foolishto saythatwe stadium suchasthesehave Inturn, literatures emotional knownothing. saic side we mightthinkof the mundane the frustrated shoutsand been repletewith all kindsof moreor less explicit labourof the workplace, of chil- politicaljudgements- about which passions are laughter gesturesof roadrage,thedelighted drenas theytoura themepark,or thetearsof a sus- wholesomeandwhicharesuspector even dangerous, about the degree to which passions can or police interrogation.2 pectedfelon undergoing licence,andabout Giventhe utterubiquityof affect as a vital ele- shouldbe alloweduntrammelled or repressed. ac- how passionscan be amplified of almosteveryurban mentof cities,its shading urban So why the neglectof affectin the current huesthatwe all recognise,you tivitywithdifferent evenin thecase of issues suchas identity would thinkthatthe affectiveregisterwould form literature, a largepartof the studyof cities - but you would andbelongingwhichquiverwith affectiveenergy? cometo mind.Oneis a rebe wrong.3Though affect continuallyfigures in A seriesof explanations cultural Cartesianism sidual side. are off the There it is to accounts (repletewith all kinds usually many affectis a kindof friva few honourableexceptions, of course. Walter of genderedconnotations): to the realworkof of the emotionalimme- olous or distracting background Benjamin'sidentification
a spatialpolitics of feeling:Towards N. 2004:Intensities Thrift., of affect.Geogr.Ann.,86 B (1): 57-78.
Geografiska Annaler ? 86 B (2004) ? 1
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decidingour way throughthe city. It cannotbe a partof our intelligenceof that world.Anotheris concerned withthe cultural divisionof labour. The creativearts alreadydo that stuff and there is no needto follow.A third is thataffectfigexplanation uresmainlyin perceptual likepropriocepregisters tion which are not easily capturedin print. No doubtotherexplanations could be mustered. atonetime,thesemayhavebeenseenas Perhaps, valid reasons,but they are not any more. I would point to threereasonswhy neglectingaffect is, as muchnowas in thepast,criminal neglect.First,systematic of thecreation andmobilisation knowledges of affecthavebecomean integral partof the everyaffecthasbecomepartof a redayurban landscape: flexiveloop whichallowsmoreandmoresophisticatedinterventions in various of urban life. registers Second,these knowledgesare not only being deployedknowingly, theyarealsobeingdeployed politically(mainlybutnotonlyby therichandpowerful) to politicalends:whatmighthavebeenpainted as aestheticis increasingly instrumental. Third,affect hasbecomea partof how citiesareunderstood. As citiesareincreasingly to have'buzz',to expected be 'creative', andto generally bringforthpowersof andintuition, invention all of whichcan be forged intoeconomicweapons, so theactiveengineering of theaffective of citieshasbeenhighlighted as register theharnessing of thetalentof transformation. Cities must exhibit intense expressivity.Each of these threereasonsshowsthat,whereas affecthasalways, of course,beena constant of urban now experience, affectis more andmorelikely to be activelyengineeredwiththeresultthatit is becomingsomething moreakinto the networks of pipes andcablesthat are of such importance in providing the basic mechanicsandroottextures life (Armstrong, of urban 1999), a set of constantlyperforming relays and junctionsthatare laying down all mannerof new emotional historiesandgeographies. In thispaperI wantto thinkaboutaffectin cities and about affective cities, and, above all, about what the politicalconsequencesof thinkingmore explicitlyaboutthese topics mightbe - once it is acceptedthat the 'politicaldecision is itself produced by a series of inhumanor pre-subjective forces andintensities'(Spinks,2001, p. 24) which the idea of 'man'has reducedto ciphers.My aims will be threefold: to discussthe nature of affect,to showsomeof thewaysin whichcitiesandaffectinteractto producea politics which cannot be reducedto simplya shiftingfield of communalselfreflectionor the neat conceptualeconomy of an
58
ideology, and to producethe beginningsof a synin the firstpartof optic commentary. Accordingly, the paper,I will describesome of the different positionsthathavebeentakenon whataffectactually is. This is clearlynot an inconsequential exercise and it has a long andcomplexhistorywhichtakes in luminariesas differentas Spinozaand Darwin andFreud.But,giventhepotential size of theagenda, this has meantpulling out four key traditions a completereview.Thiswork rather thanproviding of definitionover,in the secondpartof the paperI will then describe some of the diverse ways in which the use andabuseof variousaffectivepractices is graduallychangingwhat we regardas the I will pointto sphereof 'thepolitical'.Inparticular, fourdifferent butrelatedwaysin whichthemanipulationof affectfor politicalends is becomingnot just widespreadbut routinein cities throughnew kinds of practicesandknowledgeswhich are also redefiningwhatcountsas the sphereof the political. These practices,knowledgesandredefinitions are not all by any meansnice or cuddly,which is of whatadding one all too commoninterpretation affect will contribute. Indeed,some of them have the potentialto be downright scary.But this is part and parcelof why it is so crucialto addressaffect now: in at least one guise the discoveryof new meansof practicing affectis also the discoveryof a whole new meansof manipulation by the powerI will focus ful. In the subsequent partof thepaper, moreexplicitlyon the way in whichthesedevelopmentsare changingwhatwe may thinkof as both politicsand 'thepolitical',usingthefourtraditions I will not be makingthe thatI outlinedpreviously. silly argumentthat just about everythingwhich nowturnsupis political,in somesenseortheother, butI will be arguing thatthe move to affectshows up new political registersand intensities,and allows us to workon themto brewnew collectivesin ways which at least have the potentialto be propartof thepaper, gressive.Then,in thepenultimate I will brieflyconsiderin more detail some of the into afkindsof progressive politicalinterventions be made,usingtheidefect thatmightlegitimately as stimulatedby recent work on virtualart and, most notably, the work of Bill Viola. Finally, I present some too brief conclusionswhich argue witha 'cosmopolitics' thatthe current experiments mustinof newkindsof encounter andconviviality clude affect. in sucha waythatit doesnot Inwritingthispaper dryreview,I have simplybecomea long andrather had to make some draconiandecisions. First, in
Geografiska Annaler * 86 B (2004) ? 1
on current Euro-AmergeneralI haveconcentrated ican societies.This meansthatI havegenerallyneglectedboththerichveinof work(chieflyfromanthropology)which has offered up cross-cultural comparisonsand the equally rich vein of work which has examinedthe historicalrecordfor evidenceof broadshiftsin emotionaltoneandevenin whatis regarded andnamedas emotion.6 Toooften, thispaperwill presume then,in thenameof brevity, an affective common-sense backgroundwhich does not exist. Sensoriumsvary by culture and therefore 2002).Thepaper through history(Geurts, risks ethnocentrism in an area which, more than most, has been awareof difference. Second,I have concentrated mainlyon theoretical explorations of affect,althoughmanyof these explorationsare backed up by solid empirical work.This means,in particular, thatI havetended to pass by the very largeamountof material in social psychologyandcognitivescience. This is unfortunate since this workis now going beyondthe crudebehaviourism of thepast,butincorporating it wouldhavenecessitated notjust a supplement but a completenew paper(cf. Davidsonet al, 2003). is constrained, if thatis the Third,my approach right word, by a specific theoreticalbackground whicharisesfroma particular timein thehistoryof social theory,one in whichwe arestarting to grasp elementsof whatconstitutes'goodtheory'in ways thathavebeen apprehended before,butoften only I will out very faintly. pull just a few of the princito produce newconceptual ples whichareintended and ethicalresources,mainlybecausethey are so germaneto whatfollows. (1) Distance from biology is no longer seen as a prime markerof social and cultural theory ev(Turner, 2002). It has becomeincreasingly ident that the biological constitutionof being hasto be takenintoac(so-called'biolayering') countif performative force is everto be underthe dynamicsof birth stood, and in particular, (and creativity)ratherthan death (Battersby, 1999). (2) Relatedly, naturalismand scientism are no sins.A keyreasonforthis longerseenas terrible is thatdevelopments like variousformsof systems theory,complexitytheoryand nonlinear dynamicshave made science morefriendlyto social and culturaltheory.Anotherreason is the historyof social andculthat,increasingly, turaltheory and science share common forebears. For example, since the 1940s systems
theoryhas informedboth domainsin diverse we seemto be entering waysand,consequently, a periodin whichpoststructuralism is likely to be renewedby its forebear, structuralism. (3) Humanlanguageis no longerassumedto offer the only meaningful modelof communication. (4) Eventshaveto be seen as genuinelyopen on at least some dimensions and, notwithstanding the extraordinary power of many social systems, 'revolt,resistance,breakdown, conspirais everywhere' 2002, p. cy, alternative (Latour, andthe alche124).Hencea turnto experiment formthatsuch a turnapmy of the contingent 2002). plies (Garfinkel, seen as cru(5) Timeandprocessareincreasingly cial to explanation (Abbott,2001) becausethey offer a direct challenge to fixed categories which,in a previous phaseof socialandcultural theory,still survived,though complicatedby the idea thatone consideredtheirworkingsin more detail. The multiplicationof forms of knowledgeandthe trafficbetweenthemis taken seriously(Rabinow, 2003). (6) Space is no longer seen as a nested hierarchy moving from 'global' to 'local'. This absurd notion is replacedby the noscale-dependent tion that what counts is connectivityand that the social is 'only a tiny set of narrow, standardised connections' out of many others 2002, p. 124). (Latour, (7) In otherwords,what is at stake is a different modelof whatthinkingis, one thatextendsreof actors,thatrecognises flexivityto all manner reflexivityas not just a propertyof cognition and which realises the essentiallypatchyand material nature of whatcountsas thought. What is affect? The problemthat must be faced straightaway is that there is no stable definitionof affect. It can meana lot of different things.Theseareusuallyassociatedwith wordssuch as emotionand feeling, anda consequent of termssuchas hatred, repertoire shame,envy,jealousy,fear,disgust,anger,embarrassment,sorrow,grief, anguish,pride,love, happiness,joy, hope, wonder,thoughfor variousreasons that will become clear, I do not thinkthese wordsworkwell as simpletranslations of the term 'affect'.In particular, I wantto get awayfromthe idea that some root kind of emotion (like shame) can act as a keypoliticalcipher(Nussbaum, 2002). Inthebriefandnecessarily foreshortened review 59
NIGEL THRIFT
thattend whichfollows, I will set asideapproaches to work with a notion of individualised emotions (suchas areoftenfoundin certainformsof empirical sociology andpsychology)and stick with approachesthatworkwith a notionof broadtendencies andlines of force:emotionas motionbothliterallyand figurally(Bruno,2002). I will consider fourof these approaches in turnbutit is important not to assumethatI am makingany strongjudgementsas to theirefficacy:eachof theseapproaches has a certainforcewhichI wantto drawon as well it is extremelyimas certaindrawbacks. However, could to notethatnoneof these approaches portant be describedas based on a notionof humanindividualscoming togetherin community. Rather,in line with my earlierwork,each cleaves to an 'inin whichindiframework human'or 'transhuman' as effects of the vidualsare generallyunderstood events to which their body parts (broadlyunderAnstood)respondand in which they participate. otherpoint that needs to be made is that each of these approacheshas connections(some strong, some weak) to the others.7Then one last point needsto be noted;in eachapproach affectis under-
the body,fromthe settingitself, but this settingis cancelledout by such methodsas questionnaires In the secondcase, the andothersuchinstruments. problemis thatemotionsarelargelynon-represenevidenceof what,in one's tational: theyare'formal relations with others, speech cannot conceal' (Katz, 1999, p. 323); Studiesalmost always end up analysinghow peopletalkabouttheiremotions.If thereis anything distinctiveabout emotions, it is that, even if they commonlyoccurin the courseof theyarenottalk,notevenjust forms speaking, of expression,they are ways of expressing somethinggoing on that talk cannot grasp. Historicaland culturalstudiessimilarlyelide emotionalexthe challengeof understanding when texts, symbols, they analyse perience material objects,andways of life as representationsof emotions. (Katz, 1999,p. 4)
Becausethereis no timeoutfromexpressive being, perceptionof a situationand response are interkindof 'response-abilstood as aform of thinking, often indirect and non- twinedandassumea certain reflective,it is true,butthinkingall the same.And, ity' (Katz, 1999), an artfuluse of a vast sensorium all manner of the spaceswhichtheygen- of bodily resourceswhich dependsheavily on the similarly, eratemustbe thoughtof in the sameway,as means actionsof others(indeedit is throughsuch re-acin action.Affect is a dif- tions thatwe most often see what we are doing).8 andas thought of thinking is invisible ferentkindof intelligenceaboutthe world,butit is Most of the time, this response-ability it stirs noticeable it becomes when but and up powerful intelligencenone-the-less, previousattempts whichhave eitherrelegatedaffectto the irrational emotions: or raisedit up to the level of the sublimeareboth Blushes,laughs,cryings,andangeremergeon equallywrong-headed. faces and through of affectwhichI wantto adThefirsttranslation coveringsthatusuallyhide The doing of emotionsis a visceralsubstrata. dressconceivesof affectas a set of embodied pracof tears visibleconductas anouterlining. ticesthatproduce bodilyboundaries, processof breaking as and This translation ariseschieflyout of the phenomeout, laughter burning up, rage spilling of gutsas involvement bursts butalsoincludestracesof social out,the emphatic nologicaltradition sourceof the involvement. a designated interactionismand hermeneutics (cf. Redding, (Katz, 1999, p. 322) 1999). Its chief concernis to developdescriptions of howemotionsoccurin everyday life, understood as the richly expressive/aesthetic feeling-cum-be- In other(than)words,emotionsform a rich moral haviour of continualbecoming that is provided arraythroughwhich and with which the worldis chieflyby bodily statesand processes(andwhich thoughtandwhichcan sense differentthingseven is understoodas constitutiveof affect). This has thoughthey cannotalwaysbe named. thathaveplagued meantgettingpasttwo problems Betweenoneself andthe worldthereis a new the sociology of emotionsin the past:the problem of decontextualisation and the problemof repreterm,a holisticallysensed,new texturein the social moment, and one relates to others in Inthefirstcase,theproblem is that,more sentation. and throughthat emergentand transforming thannormally, contextseems to be a vital element occurs in the constitution of affect.Veryoften,the source experience.A kind of metamorphosis or in whichthe self goes into a new container outside of emotionsseemto comefromsomewhere 60
takes on a temporary flesh for the passageto an alteredstateof socialbeing.The subjectsof our analysisin the firstplace own the poetic devices. (Katz, 1999, p. 343)
to a supposaffectis not subservient ForTomkins, drivesystem. In manycases the apedly primary parent urgencyof the drivesystemresultsfromits affectswhich act as co-assemblywith appropriate Indeed,affectsmay be: necessaryamplifiers.
The secondtranslation of affectis the most cultureithermuchmorecausalthanany drivecould is now a partof be or muchmoremonopolistic....Mostof the ally familiarin thatits vocabulary to the which Freudattributed how Euro-American characteristics subjects routinely describe themselves.It is usuallyassociated withpsychoanUnconsciousand to the Id are in fact salient a notionof drive. alyticframesandis basedaround aspectsof the affect system....Affect enables and extremelability,fickleboth insatiability Often, it will follow the Freudianunderstanding that one's physiologicaldrive- sexuality,libido, ness andfinickiness. desire- is therootsourceof humanmotivation cited in Sedgwick,2003, p. 21) and (Tomkins vehicles or maniidentity.Emotionsareprimarily festationsof the underlying for Tomkins,it is the face thatis the libidinaldrive;varia- Significantly, the tionson thethemeof 'desire'.A conception suchas chief site of affect:'I havenow come to regard this,whichreducesaffectto drive,maybe too stark, skin, in general,andthe skin of the face in particin producing the As Sedgwick(2003, p. 18) putsit, sucha ular,as of the greatestimportance however. move 'permits a diagrammatic sharpness of feel of affect' (Tomkinscited in Demos, 1995, p. thatmay,however, be too impoverishing in 89).11 But, for Tomkins, it is important to note that thought terms'. the face was not the expressionof somethingelse, qualitative it tries to solve this was affectin process. Sedgwick problemby turning and of affectis naturalistic to the work of Silvan Tomkins (Demos, 1995; The thirdtranslation in interaction SedgwickandFrank,1995).Tomkins distinguishes hinges on addingcapacitiesthrough It is betweenthe driveandthe affectsystem.The drive a worldwhichis constantly usually becoming. and in- associatedfirstof all with Spinozaandthensubsesystem is relativelynarrowlyconstrained in beingconcentrated strumental on particular aims quentlywithDeleuze'smoder ethologicalreinterof Spinoza. excret(e.g. breathing, eating,drinking,sleeping, pretation ing), time-limited(e.g. stoppingeach of these acSpinozaset out to challengethe model put fortivities will have more or less deleteriousconse- wardby Descartesof the body as animated by the a or mind after a of and an immaterial on will of concentrated soul, positionwhich quences period time) of airor a li- reflectedDescartes'allegianceto the idea thatthe particular objects(e.g. gettinga breath extensubstances: treof water).In contrast, affects9 suchas anger,en- worldconsistedof two different of field excitement or shame sion and distress sadness, (the physical objectspositionedin a joyment, to us as can range across all kinds of aims (one of which geometric spacewhichhasbecomefamiliar which may simply be to stimulatetheir own arousal- a Cartesian space)andthought(theproperty what Tomkinscalls their autotelicfunction),can distinguishes consciousbeingsas 'thinking things' the aimunderconsideration1?, fromobjects). redefine continually can have far greaterfreedomwith respectto time In contrast,Spinozawas a monist.He believed thandrives(an affect such as angermay last for a thattherewas only one substancein the universe, few secondsbutequallymaymotivate revengethat 'GodorNature'in all its forms;humanbeings and spans decades) and can focus on many different all otherobjects could only be modes of this one kindsof object: unfoldingsubstance.Eachmodewas spatiallyextendedin its own way andthoughtin its own way Affects can be, and are, attachedto things, and unfolded in a determinatemanner.So, in people, ideas, sensations,relations,activities, Spinoza's world, everythingis partof a thinking and any othernumber and a doing simultaneously:they are aspects of ambitions,institutions, In of otherthings, includingotheraffects. Thus the same thing expressed in two registers.12 one can be excited by anger, disgusted by turn, this must mean that knowing proceeds in shame,or surprised by joy. parallelwith the body's physical encounters,out howev(Sedgwick,1993, p. 19) of interaction.Spinozais no irrationalist, er. What he is attemptinghere is to understand
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NIGEL THRIFT
in a new way, extendingits activthoughtfulness ity into nature. Spinoza'smetaphysicswas accompanied by a notionof whatwe mightnowadayscall particular human psychology.ForSpinoza,humanpsychology is manifold,a complexbodyarisingoutof interactionwhich is an allianceof many simplebodies andwhichtherefore exhibitswhatnowadays would - the capacityto demonstrate be calledemergence which do powers at higherlevels of organization notexistatotherlevels; 'anindividual maybe characterisedby a fixed numberof definiteproperties and yet possess an in(extensiveand qualitative) definitenumber of capacities to affectandbe affected by otherindividuals' 2002, p. 62). In (DeLanda, turn,thismanifoldpsychologyis beingcontinually modifiedby themyriad encounters takingplacebetweenindividual bodiesandotherfinitethings.The exactnature of the kindsof modifications thattake thatarepossiplacewill dependuponthe relations ble betweenindividuals who arealsosimultaneously elementsof othercomplexbodies. Spinozadescribestheactiveoutcomeof theseencounters to affect or be affectedby usingthe termemotionor affect (affectus)whichis bothbody andthought. By EMOTION(affectus) I understandthe modifications of the body by whichthe power of action of the body is increasedor diminandat the sametime ished,aidedor restrained, the idea of these modifications.
(Ethics. III,def.3)
which belongto it in the sameway properties and the like beas heat, cold, storm,thunder of the to the nature atmosphere. long
(Ethics, Pref.: C492)
So affect,definedas the property of the activeoutcomeof an encounter, takestheformof an increase or decrease in theabilityof thebodyandmindalike to act,whichcanbe positive- andthusincrease that - or negability(countingas 'joyful'or euphoric) ative - and thus diminishthatability(countingas 'sorrowful'or dysphoric).Spinoza thereforedetaches 'the emotions'fromthe realmof responses and situationsand attachesthem insteadto action andencounters as the affectionsof substance or of
its attributes and as greater or lesserforces of ex-
becomefirmlya partof 'naisting.They therefore ture',of the sameorderas stormsor floods. The way of understanding the natureof anything, of whateverkind, must always be the theuniversal rulesandlaws same,viz. through of nature....I havetherefore regarded passions like love, hate, anger,envy, pride, pity, and
other feelings which agitate the mind ... as 62
to bodyandmind Butaffectwill present differently of body, affect at each encounter. In the attribute so thatbodiesaredisposedfor structures encounters of mind, actionin a particular way. In the attribute as a seriesof modificaencounters affectstructures betweenideaswhich fromtherelations tionsarising andmoreor less emmaybe moreor less adequate In otherwords,the issue is the composipowering. So 'euphoria and tion of an affectiverelationship. arenot the groundof anygiven emotion dysphoria is theground of the anymorethanmusicalharmony simultaneous toneswhichgive riseto it. Thenames aremerelythe of the manyemotionswe experience namesgiven to differentlyassembledeuphoricor dysphoricrelations,akin to chords' (Brown and Stenner,2001, p. 95). is important. on relations Thisemphasis Though to 'individuals' references makes repeated Spinoza of bodiesandminds it is clearfromhis conception andaffectsas manifoldsthatfor him the priorcategory is what he calls the 'alliance'or 'relationship'.So affects,forexample,occurin anencounter betweenmanifoldbeings,andthe outcomeof each encounter depends uponwhatformsof composition thesebeingsareable to enterinto. fromrelations andenSucha way of proceeding social countershas manyechoes in contemporary science and forms the touchstoneof much recent work in human geography.Most especially, it to find comshows up in workwhichis concerned mon complexesof relation,such as thatinformed philosophersand most notably by contemporary Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze (1988, 2003) addedwhat spinto Spinoza'sasmightbe calledanethological fromtheirresertionthatthingsareneverseparable lationswith the worldby drawingon the workof writers such as von Uexktill on the perceptual the samekind worldsof animalsandthenapplying of thinking to humanbeings.ThusDeleuze (1988) considersthe simplestof von Uexkiill'sanimals,a tick, whose raison d'etre is suckingthe blood of It appears to be capableof only passingmammals. threeaffects:light (climb to the top of a branch), thatpassesbeneaththe smell (fall on to a mammal branch)and heat (seek the warmestspot on the mammal).Deleuze then appliesthe same kind of reasoningto humanbeings. But there he has to reservation that we really make the considerable
have no idea eitherwhat affects humanbodies or minds might be capableof in a given encounter ahead of time or, indeed, more generally,what worldshuman of building, beingsmightbe capable so affects are 'the nonhuman becomingsof man' 1994, p. 169). He is there(Deleuzeand Guattari, fore led towardsa language/practice of different speedsandintensitieswhichcan trackall the compositions and combinationsthat human beings mightbe ableto bringinto play. If we areSpinozistswe will not definea thing by its form,norby its organsandits functions, nor as a substanceor a subject. Borrowing termsfromthe MiddleAges, or fromgeography, we will defineit by longitudeor latitude. A bodycanbe anything; it can be an animal,a body of sounds,a mindor an idea;it can be a linguisticcorpus,a social body, a collectivity. We call longitudeof a bodythe set of relations of speedandslowness,of momentum andrest, between particlesthat compose it from this elepoint of view, thatis, betweenunformed ments.We call latitudethe set of affects that occupya body at each moment,thatis, the intensivestatesof an anonymous force(forcefor existing, capacityfor being affected).In this way we constructthe map of the body. The longitudes and latitudes together constitute or consistenNature,the plane of immanence cy, whichis alwaysvariableandis constantly being altered,composedand recomposedby individuals andcollectivities. (Deleuze, 1988,pp127-128) ThisSpinozan-Deleuzian notionof affectas always is best set outby Massumi(2002,pp. 35emergent 36, my emphasis)whenhe writes: Affectsarevirtualsynesthetic anperspectives choredin (functionally limitedby) the actually existing, particular things that embodythem.
The autonomy of affect is ... its openness. Af-
to any parfrom but unassimilable separable ticular, functionally anchored perspective. Thatis why all emotionis moreor less disorienting, and why it is classically describedas being outside of oneself, at the very point at andunshareably whichone is most intimately in contactwith oneself and one's vitality .... thingslive in and Actuallyexisting,structured throughthatwhich escapesthem. Theirautoof affect. nomyis the autonomy The escape of affect cannot but be perceived, alongsidethe perceptionsthat are its This side-perception maybe punctual, capture.
localised in an event .... When it is punctual, it
is usually describedin negative terms, as a of form of shock (the sudden interruption But it is also continfunctionsof connection). uous, like a background perceptionthat accompanies every event, however quotidian. of affectiveescapeis put Whenthe continuity into words,it tendsto takeon positiveconnotations.For it is nothingless thanthe percep'freedom'). One's 'sense of aliveness' is a continuousnonconsciousself-perception (unconscious self-reflectionor self-referentialiof this self-perception, ty). It is the perception its namingand makingconscious,thatallows affectto be effectivelyanalysed- as long as a can be foundfor thatwhich is imvocabulary but perceptible whose escapefromperception cannot but be perceived, as long as one is alive. of affect I want to foreground one last translation For Darwin,exwhich we might call Darwinian. pressionsof emotion were universaland are the productof evolution.Neitherour expressionsnor our emotionsare necessarilyuniqueto humanbeings. Otheranimalshave some of the same emotions,andsome of the expressions produced by anwhichtypiimals resembleour own. Expressions, cally involvethe face andthe voice, andto a lesser have a number extentbodypostureandmovement, of cross-culturalfeatures. In contrast, gestures, which typically involve hand movement,are not universal: generally,they varyfromcultureto culturein the sameway as language. Thoughscientificworkon emotionsflourished, Darwin'sworkon emotionswas all butignoredfor a hundred yearsor so. However,it has recentlyenof a revival,associatedin particujoyed something
63 tion of one's own vitality, one's sense of aliveness, of changeability (often described as
fect is autonomous to the degreeto whichit escapes confinement in the particularbody whosevitality,orpotential forinteraction, it is. Formed, qualified, situated perceptionsand cognitionsfulfilling functionsof actualconnectionorblockagearethecapture andclosure of affect. Emotionis the most intense (most - andof of thatcapture contracted) expression the fact that somethinghas always and again inescaped.Somethingremainsunactualised,
NIGEL THRIFT
lar with the work of Ekman(1995, 2003; Ekman andRosenberg,1997).As Ekmanhas shown,Darwin's workwas important for threereasons.First, it triedto answerthe 'why' question: Why areparticularexpressions associatedwithparticular emotions?Second,it drewon a widerangeof evidence, not only of a peculiarquantity(Darwindrewon a but large amountof international correspondents) also of a peculiarquality:Darwin'suse of engravof theface, usinga number of ings andphotographs sources,has become iconic. Third,there was his claimthatthereis a strong line of emotional descent from animals to born of out theevhumans, running olutionof affectiveexpressionas a meansof preparingthe organismfor action, a claim arisingin partout of a desireto answercriticsof evolution. WhatDarwinomittedfrom his study was any communicative aspectof emotionandit is this aspect whichhas been addedin today.Flying in the face of totalcultural arneo-Darwinians relativism, gue thatthereare at least five emotionswhich are commonto all cultures: fear,sadness, anger, disgust andenjoyment,13 andthateachof theseemotionsis manifestedin common facial expressions.These commonfacialexpressions areinvoluntary signsof internal a and not physiological changes just partof theback-and-forth of thecommunicative repertoire. But this is not to say thatemotionsoperatelike inComstincts,uninfluenced by cultural experience. munication hasits say. 'Socialexperience influences attitudes about creates emotions, displayandfeeland tunes the occarules, ing develops particular sionswhichwill mostrapidly call forthanemotion' turesmaynothavethe samewordsfor emotionsor emotionin a radically difmay explaina particular ferent thespecificeventsthattrigger Further, way.15 emotions can,of course,be quitedifferent particular betweencultures; for example,disgustis triggered kindsof foodaccording to cultural by quitedifferent normsof whatis nice andnasty. Four differentnotions of affect, then, each of whichdependson a sense of pushin the worldbut the senseof pushis subtlydifferent in eachcase. In the case of embodiedknowledge,thatpushis provided by the expressive armouryof the human body. In the case of affecttheoryit is providedby biologicallydifferentiated positiveandnegativeaffectsrather thanthedrivesof Freudian theory.Inthe worldof SpinozaandDeleuze,affectis thecapacity of interaction thatis akinto a natural forceof emeruniverse,affect is a gence. In the neo-Darwinian deep-seated physiologicalchangewritteninvolun64
(Ekman, 1998, p. 387).14 In particular,different cul-
tarilyon the face. How might we thinkaboutthe notions politicsof affect,given thatthese different cues andeven ontolwouldseemto implydifferent ogies? To begin with, we need to thinkaboutgeneralchangesin theaffectivetoneof Euro-American thepoliticallandcultures thatarebusilyredefining That is the function of the next section. scape. The politics of affect Of course,affecthas alwaysbeen a key elementof powerfulpopolitics and the subjectof numerous litical technologieswhich have knottedthinking, technique and affect together in various potent of One exampleis the marshalling combinations. trainforms of various military through aggression oncentury ings suchas drill.Fromthe seventeenth havebecomemoreand wardthesekindsof training more sophisticated, runningin lockstepwith 'advances' in military technology. These trainings were used to conditionsoldiersandothercombatants to kill, even thoughit seems highly unlikely that this would be the normalbehaviourof most involved These trainings people on the battlefield. whichallowedfearto be conbodilyconditionings trolled.They allowed angerand other aggressive intoparticular situations. emotionsto be channelled They dampeddownrevengekillingsduringbursts effects (e.g. of rage,andthey resultedin particular increasedfiringratesandhigherkill ratios)which hadnotbeen achievingheretofore the military (see 1996;Bourke,2000). 1976; Grossman, Keegan, examto manyto be anextreme Thismayappear towards of a tendency ple.ButI thinkit is illustrative of affect, notthe greaterand greaterengineering the many covert emotionalhistories withstanding to be recovered thatareonlynowbeginning (cf. Berhave been Similar lant,2000). happening processes on a doof sociallife, whether in manyotherarenas mesticor largerscale, sufficientto suggestthatthe envelopeof whatwe call thepoliticalmustincreasingly expandto takenote of 'theway thatpolitical are partlyconditioned and statements attitudes by thatdo not simintenseautonomic bodilyreactions the traceof a politicalintentionand ply reproduce withinan ideological cannotbe whollyrecuperated 2001,p. 23). Inthissection (Spinks, regimeof truth' how this envelopeis expanding I wantto illustrate Thefirst in citiesby reference to fourdevelopments. consistsof thegeneral of thesedevelopments changes in theformof suchpoliticswhicharetaking place in thecurrent era,changeswhichmakeaffectaninvisibleelementof thepolitical.Inparticcreasingly
so-called'agenciesof ular,I wantto pointtowards in line witha choice'and'mixed-action repertoires' generalmove to makemoreandmoreareasof life the subjectof a new set of responsibilities called 'choice'.As Norris(2002, p. 222) putsit: The expansion of the franchise during the andearlytwentieth centuries nineteenth generated the rise of traditional channelsfor political mobilisation andexpressionin representathegrowthof extive government, particularly tra-parliamentary party organizations, the spreadof cheapmass-circulation newspapers, and the establishment of traditional groupsin civic society,exemplified laby the organized bourmovement,civic associations, voluntary groups, and religious organizations. By the 1940s and 1950s, these channelshad settled andconsolidated andweretakenfor granted as the majorinstitutions citizens and the linking state within establisheddemocracies.Rising levels of humancapitaland societalmodernizationmeanthat,today,a moreeducatedciticies of loyaltyto agenciesof choice, andfrom electoralrepertoires towardmixed-action repertoires electoral activitiesandprocombining test politics. In postindustrial societies, the have beyounger generations,in particular, come less willingthantheirparents andgrandparents to channel their political energies throughtraditionalagencies exemplified by partiesand churches,and more likely to exa varietyof ad hoc, pressthemselvesthrough contextual,and specific activities of choice, via new social movements, interincreasingly net activism, and transnational policy networks. Conventional indicators may blind us to the fact thatcriticalcitizensmaybe becomin orientation ing less loyalist and deferential
toward mass branchparties ... at the same time zenry ... has moved increasingly from agen-
ent upon the media, as well as similar appeals which
thatthey arebecomingmoreactivelyengaged via alternative meansof expression.
to reducetheseaffectiveimpacts(e.g.by endeavour to referring science, by variousmeans of deconstructionof the 'reality'of an image and so on) (Boltanski,2002). which Thisbringsme to the seconddevelopment of poliis the heavy andcontinuing mediatization in and tics.We live in societieswhichareenveloped it is difsaturated by the media:most importantly, ficult to escape the influenceof the screen which locations now staresat us from so manymundane - fromalmostevery roomin the house to doctors' lounges to shops and waitingrooms,from airport shopping malls, from bars to many workplaces Cetina, 2001;McCarthy, 2001), fromthein(Knorr - thatit is posto wholebuildings sidesof elevators sibleto arguethatthe screenhastakenon a number of the roles formerly ascribed to parent,lover, andblankstooge,as well as addinga whole teacher seriesof 'postsocial'16 relationswhich seem to lie betweenearlyfilmtheory'sbrutetranssomewhere lation of screen-icforce (Kracauer, 1960; Balasz, 1970) and cognitive film theory'slater,more nuin which cognitiveprocesses anced interpretation andstyles variousconventions arestrained through and Bordwell Thrift, Carroll, 1996; 2004b). (see effects. As has had important This mediatization McKenzie(2001) has pointedout, its most important effect has been to enshrinethe performative soattheheartof moder Euro-American principle cieties andtheirpoliticalforms.This has occurred in a numberof ways. To begin with, the technical emoform of moder media tends to foreground on key affectivesites tion,bothin its concentration of the suchas thefaceorvoice andits magnification smalldetailsof the bodythatso often signifyemoPoliticalpresentation tion.17 nowadaysoften fixes andmakesthemstandfor on suchsmalldifferences a whole. One line of movementcan becomea progressionof meaning,able to be actualisedandimplantedlocally.Massumi(2002, p. 41, my emphasis) observesthis qualityin RonaldReagan: Thatis why Reagancould be so manythings of to so manypeople;thatis why the majority could disagreewith him on mathe electorate jor issues but still vote for him. Because he as a was actualised,in their neighbourhood, movementandmeaningof theirselection- or at least selected for them with their acquiesIt was cence. He was a manfor all inhibitions. by procommonlysaidthathe ruledprimarily Thatwas theemojectinganairof confidence. 65
Manyof thesenew formsof choicepoliticsrely on an expansionof whathas been conventionally regardedas the urbanpoliticalsphere.Forexample, thepoliticalnowadays takesin all manner. routinely of forms of culture-nature relation(e.g. environmentalpolitics,animal or rightspolitics,pro-choice anti-lifepolitics).In turn,this redefinition of what countsas politicalhas allowedmoreroomfor exwhichareheavilydependplicitlyaffectiveappeals
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powerin knowledge.These knowledgesconstruct a numberof ways - by deliveringmessages with passion,for example(indeed,it is often the force with whichpassionis deliveredwhichis moreimportantthan the message), by providing a new minutelandscapeof manipulation (Doane,2002), by addingnew possibilitiesfor makingsigns, and generallyby addingnew openingsout of the event. But,mostimportantly, theyprovidea newmeansof conformsincreasingly creating 'fractal'subjectschallengedto perform Thus,politicalpresentation in a waywhich situations to media normsof presentation which emphasize acrossa seriesof different the performance of emotionas being an index of demandsnot so muchopennessas controlledflexAs McKenzie(2001, p. 19) putsit: aris- ibility.18 credibility. Increasingly, politicallegitimation es from this kind of performance(Thompson, The desire producedby performative 2001). And, as a finalpoint,thesekindsof presenpower andknowledgeis not mouldedby distinctdistation chime with the increasingly 'therapeutic' form of selfhood which is becomingcommon in ciplinarymechanisms.It is not a repressive desire:it is instead'excessive', intermittently societies(cf. Giddens,1991;Rose, Euro-American modulatedand pushed across the thresholds 1996). Indeed,Nolan (1998) arguesthatthis therof various limits by overlappingand someapeuticor 'emotivist'ethos is embeddingitself in of theAmerican times competingsystems.Further, thestructures stateto sucha degree diversityis is itself for integration not simply integrated, thatit is becominga keytechnologyof governance, both challengingandto some extentreplacingthe becoming diversified.Similarly,deviationis for normsoperateand 'manot simplynormalised, affective backgroundof older bureaucratic theirown transthemselvesthrough chine' technologies,by, for example,recognising transform emotionallabour,emotionmanagement andemogression and deviation.We can understand betterwhen we realise that this development tionallearningas key skills (Smith,2002): the mechanismsof performative power are and nomadicandflexiblemorethansedentary Life in the machinehas made appealsto the anddigital older [traditional] rigid,thatits spacesarenetworked systemsof meaningimposmorethanenclosedandphysical,thatits temto sible. Insteadthe individualis encouraged and andnon-linear arepolyrhythmic from to within and refer to the lanporalities escape not simply sequentialand linear.On the perguage of emotions.The emotivistmotif,then, formativestratum,one shuttles quickly beis the 'dictum that truthis graspedthrough tween different evaluative grids, switching sentimentor feeling, ratherthan throughraback and forthbetween divergentchallenges tionaljudgementor abstract reasoning'.It en- or else. to perform courages a particular ontology that replaces maxim 'I think,thereforeI am' the Cartesian is closely linkedto mediatiI am'. This A thirddevelopment with the emotive 'I feel, therefore emotivistunderstanding of the self shapesthe zationandthe rise of performance knowledges.It in sensory of calculation new forms in of which individuals is the and comgrowth way participate municatein societallife. In the contemporary registers that would not have previously been context,as JeanBethkeElshtainobserves,'all deemed 'political'. In particular, throughthe adseries of of whole vent a seem to revolve around the individual's technologies,smallspaces points subjectivefeelings - whetherof frustration, and times, upon which affect thrives and out of have become visible Thecitizenrecedes; which it is often constituted, anxiety,stress,fulfilment. self prevails'. the therapeutic and are able to be enlargedso that they can be (Nolan, 1998, p. 6) knowinglyoperated upon.Thoughit wouldbe possibleto arguethatoutpostswerealready beingconbackin continent of of in this a series structed of Thus, phenomenality heterogeneous knowledges performance move to centrestagein modemsocieties the seventeenthcentury with, for example, the themilitary in conditioning which constitutea new 'disaggregated' mode of growthof interest body discipline, an emergent stratumof power and throughsuch practicesas drill,I would arguethat tional tenorof his politicalmanner,dysfunction notwithstanding. Confidenceis the emotional translation of affect as capturable life emotionalexprespotential;it is a particular sion andbecoming- consciousof one's sideperceivedvitality.Reagantransmitted vitality, virtuality, tendency,in sickness and interruption. 66
the main phase of colonisation dates from the midnineteenth century and rests on four developments (Thrift, 2000). First, there is the ability to sense the small spaces of the body through a whole array of new scientific instruments which have, in turn, made it possible to think of the body as a set of micro-geographies. Second, there is the related ability to sense small bodily movements. Beginning with the photographic work of Marey, Muybridge and others and moving into our currentage in which the camera can impose its own politics of time and space, we can now think of time as minutely segmented frames, able to be speeded up, slowed down, even frozen for a while. Third, numerous body practices have come into existence which rely on and manage such knowledge of small times and spaces, most especially those connected with the performing arts, including the 'underperforming' of film acting, much modem dance, the insistent cross-hatched tempo of much modern music, and so on. Special performance notations, like Labanotation and other 'choreo-graphics', allow this minute movement to be recorded, analysed and recomposed. Then, finally, a series of discourses concerning the slightest gesture and utterance of the body have been developed, from the elaborate turntaking of conversational analysis to the intimate spaces of proxemics, from the analysis of gesture to the mapping of 'body language'. Thus, what was formerly invisible or imperceptible becomes constituted as visible and perceptible through a new structure of attention which is increasingly likely to pay more than lip-service to those actions which go on in small spaces and times, actions which involve qualities like anticipation, improvisation and intuition, all those things which by drawing on the second-to-second resourcefulness of the body, make for artful conduct. Thus perception can no longer 'be thought of in terms of immediacy, presence, punctuality' (Crary, 1999, p. 4) as it is both stretched and intensified, widened and condensed. In turn,this new structureof attention, ironically enough through the application of greater speed, has allowed us to gain a much greater understanding of what is often nowadays called 'bare life' (Thrift, 2000). An undiscovered country has gradually hoved into view, the country of the 'half-second delay'. This is the period of bodily anticipation originally discovered by Wilhelm Wundt in the mid-nineteenth century. Wundt was able to show that consciousness takes time to construct; we are 'late for consciousness' (Damasio, 1999, p. 127).
That insight was subsequently formalised in the 1960s by Libet using new body recording technologies. He was able to show decisively that an action is set in motion before we decide to perform it: the 'average readiness potential' is about 0.8 seconds, although cases as long as 1.5 seconds have been recorded. In other words, 'consciousness takes a relatively long time to build, and any experience of it being instantaneous must be a backdated illusion' (McCrone, 1999, p. 131). Or, as Gray (2002, p. 66) puts it more skeletally; 'the brain makes us ready for action, then we have the experience of acting.' 19 To summarize, what we are able to see is that the space of embodiment is expanded by a fleeting but crucial moment, a constantly moving preconscious frontier.This fleeting space of time is highly political. The by now familiar work of Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, Bourdieu and Varela shows the ways in which the structure of expectation of the world (the background) is set up by body practices which have complex and often explicitly political genealogies: the smallest gesture or facial expression can have the largest political compass (Ekman, 1995, 2003). More recent work has added to this understandingby emphasising the degree to which these body practices rely on the emotions as a crucial element of the body's apprehension of the world; emotions are a vital part of the body's anticipation of the moment. Thus we can now understand emotions as a kind of corporeal thinking (Le Doux, 1997, Damasio, 1999, 2003): 'through our emotion, we reach back sensually to grasp the tacit, embodied foundations of ourselves' (Katz, 1999 p.
7).20
The result is that we now have a small space of time which is increasingly able to be sensed, the space of time which shapes the moment. Of course, once such a space is opened up it can also be operated on. As Foucault and Agamben make clear, biopolitics is now at the centre of Western modes of power. But what is being ushered in now is a microbiopolitics, a new domain carved out of the halfsecond delay which has become visible and so available to be worked upon through a whole series of new entities and institutions. This domain was already implicitly political, most especially through the mechanics of the various body positions which are a part of its multiple abilities to anticipate. Now it has become explicitly political through practices and techniques which are aimed at it specifically. A fourth development which involves affect is the careful design of urban space to produce political response. Increasingly, urban spaces and times 67
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are being designed to invoke affective response according to practical and theoretical knowledges that have been derived from and coded by a host of sources. It could be claimed that this has always been the case - from monuments to triumphalprocessions, from theatrical arenas to mass body displays - and I would agree. In the twentieth century, it could be arguedthatmuch of the activity of the design of space was powered up again, becoming entangled with the evolution of knowledges of shaping the body (such as the microbiopolitics referred to above), often in a politics of the most frightening sort.21But what I would argue is different now is both the sheer weight of the gathering together of formal knowledges of affective response (whether from highly formal theoretical backgrounds such as psychoanalysis or practical theoretical backgrounds like performance),the vast numberof practical knowledges of affective response that have become available in a semi-formal guise (e.g. design, lighting, event management, logistics, music, performance), and the enormous diversity of available cues that are able to be worked with in the shape of the profusion of images and other signs, the wide spectrum of available technologies, and the more general archive of events. The result is that affective response can be designed into spaces, often out of what seems like very little at all. Though affective response can clearly never be guaranteed,the fact is that this is no longer a random process either. It is a form of landscape engineering that is gradually pulling itself into existence, producing new forms of power as it goes.
these developments as rather worrying - and indeed as likely to lead to a new kind of velvet dictatorship - to produce their own analyses and political agendas. As part of the general move towards thinking democracy as a process of 'community without unity' (Castronovo and Nelson, 2003), I want to try to address this task. But how to frame such an agenda? In a general sense, one might argue that the goal is a kind of 'emotional liberty'. But this goal must be tempered by the familiar realisation, going back to Plato and before, that the untrammelled expression of emotions is not necessarily a good thing at all. In other words, what is being aimed for is a navigation of feeling which goes beyond the simple romanticism of somehow maximising individual emotions. That navigation must involve at least three moments. First of all, it needs to be placed within a set of disciplinary exercises if it is to be an effective force, taking in the various forms of agonistic and ethical reflexivity that Foucault grouped under 'care of the self', forms of reflexivity that were intended to produce 'an athlete of the event' (cited in Rabinow, 2003, p. 9). It will therefore defacto involve various forms of channelling and 'repression'. Second, it requires a more general expressive exploration of existential territories of the kind that Guattari (1995) gives at least a flavour of when he writes that: there is an ethical choice in favour of the richness of the possible, an ethics and politics of the virtual that decorporealizes and deterritorializes contingency, linear causality and the pressure of circumstances and significations which besiege us. It is a choice for processuality, irreversibility and resingularization. On a small scale, this redeployment can turn itself into the mode of entrapment, of impoverishment, indeed of catastrophe in neurosis. It can take up reactive religious references. It can annihilate itself in alcohol, drugs, television, an endless daily grind. But it can also make use of other procedures that are more collective, more social, more political. Third, it will attempt to engage a productive, forward sense of life (Thrift, 2001/2004, 2004a,b) which strives to engage positively with the world rather than make private bargains with misery, a politics of hope which must necessarily be, in part, an affective exercise of what Bloch (1986, Vol. 1, p. 143) calls 'productive premonition':'It is openly
Changing the political

What might these four developments and others like them mean for the practice of the political (and by implication the definition of the political itself)? In what I hope is a recognisable echo of the papers by Ash Amin and Doreen Massey in this issue, I would want to point to a number of shifts, each of which focuses on new intensities and speeds that have heretofore not so much been neglected as been kept firmly in the realm of either the utterly practical or heavily theoretical realms. But now all kinds of corporate and state institutions are trying to formulate bodies of knowledge of these realms which are both systematic and portable (Thrift, 2003), knowledges of complex affective states of becoming, 'regimes of feeling' which are bound to be constitutive of new political practices. It therefore becomes incumbent on those forces which regard
68
conscious of itself, precisely as a Not-Yet-Conscious, demonstrates in its alertness the desire to learn, shows the capacity to be circumspect in its foreseeing, to have circumspection, even foresight in its fore-sight'. This is a kind of practical utopianism, if you like, an anticipatory intelligence engrained in going forward, a sense of tendency: 'its support and correlate is process, which has not yet surrenderedits most immanent What-content, but which is still under way' (Bloch, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 146). And why the necessity of sticking to this agenda? In orderto begin to forge a politics of affect. For it is quite clear that there are enormous emotional costs and benefits for individuals or groups in being shaped by particularinstitutions in particularways. However, it is often quite difficult to show what is at stake for the individual or groups in submitting to such institutions and embracing certain affective styles that render them deferential, obedient or humble - or independent, aggressive and arrogant. Yet, equally, we can all attest to the fact that there are many 'hidden injuries' in the systems that we inhabit and, equally, all manner of proto-political longings to change our situation that we cannot necessarily articulate but which drive us along: 'as you said all along, you had no idea what you were doing. You were feeling your way toward something maybe, but you don't know what' (Kipnis, 2000, p. 44). For example, Kipnis (2000, pp. 4243) cites the example of the emotional enterprise of adultery as a behaviour which very often involves a kind of affective utopianism in among all the mess: No, of course, we don't want to elevate individual experiences like these into imaginary forms of protorevolutionary praxis, or to hold up private utopias as models for social transformations. Adultery doesn't necessarily present you with models of utopian worlds; instead the utopianism is contained in the feelings it embodies - an experience, not a blueprint. Disciplines like psychoanalysis have been very good at searching out the violence done and the costs that have to be borne and laying them bare through such indices as physical trauma and tears. But, at the same time, we still lack a politics of emotional liberty22or hope which can be both productive and not so attached to Euro-American individualism that it simply reproduces the assumptions of
the West in what it strives for: a kind of free to do what one likes goal-oriented selfishness which actually flies in the face of all the evidence thathuman individuals (or perhaps better 'dividuals') only exist as faint traces in much larger and more extensive circuits of social relation (Porter, 2003). As Reddy (2001, p. 114) puts it: Can a person who feels that an emotion is a learned response, a product of social construction, be oppressed - in the political sense of the term - by this feeling? The concept of emotions as used in the West is closely associated with the individual's most deeply espoused goals; to feel love for one's spouse or fear of one's opponent, presumably, is to be moved by those things one most authentically wants. It is hard to see how a person can be oppressed by his or her most authentic, most deeply held goals. To make such a claim, that a certain person, group, or community is politically oppressed - without knowing it - would require that one be prepared to assert something about the nature of the individual. Such an assertion, by definition, would have to apply to the individual as universally constituted, outside the parameters of any given 'culture'. Who would have the temerity, today, to make positive claims about this politically charged issue? In what follows, I therefore want to point to four 'venturings beyond' (Bloch, 1986), attempts to form new political intensities and the attendantexplorations of discipline, expressive potential and hope which are grouping around them, each of which corresponds to one of the forms of affect introduced in the first part of this paper. In each case, there are some complexities. Foremost among these is the fact that these knowledges are not innocent. Each represents a striving for new forms of power-knowledge of the kind that John Allen points to in his paper as well as a new kind of political ethic. So, for example, each of the kinds of thinking about affect that I want to foreground have already been drawn on by large capitalist firms, both to understandtheir environment and to design new products. But they also provide, along with some recent experiments in cosmopolitics, one of the best hopes for changing our engagement with the political by simply acknowledging that there is more there there. I will begin by considering the kind of affect as69
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sociated with embodied practices.The political of workmightbest be described goal of this strand to receiving new affectively charged disclosive of receptive spaces.Thisprivileging practicesis in contrastto much that currently goes on in EuroAmericanculturewhich 'while still structured by to changingstyles of practice,seems to receptivity be replacing the substantive good of opennesswith thatof controlled flexibility'(Spinosa,et al. 1997, p. 180). Thusthe politicalprojectin all cases is to make receptivityinto the 'top ontologicalgood' (Spinosaet al. 1997);but,of course,no clearprincanbe adduced. whatis Rather, ciple of receptivity likea politicalethicof the beingstatedis something kindlaidoutby suchwriters asVarela. Here,I want to point to Varela'semphasison the potentialfor new formsof affectbornout of the understanding task of producing new practiceswhich are not reliant on an implicit or explicit promiseto satisfy some request.ForVarela, it is possibleto learn to be open througha combinationof institutional transformation and body trainingswhich use the half-seconddelay to act into a situation with good Such a politics might be one of atjudgement.23 to redefine education so thatit emphasises tempting good judgement(cf. Claxton,2000) or, at a more mundane level, designingnew 'affective' computer interfaces whichcanwrapthemselvesaround their subjects'concernsin ways whichdo not,however, actonly as a confirmation of theworldbutalsoprovide challenges. The secondkindof affectis associated withpsychoanalyticmodelsof affectof the kindproduced
by Tomkins and is an attempt to move outside 'the as skilful comportment which allows us to be open
(an extreme of the same 'negativerelation' that had, in Foucault'sargument, definedthe in the first Anplace).... hypothesis repressive otherproblemwith reifyingthe statusquo is what it does to the middlerangesof agency. One's relationto whatis riskedbecomingreactive and bifurcated,that of a consumer: one's choices narrow to acceptingor refusing (buying,notbuying)this or thatmanifestation of it, dramatizing only the extremesof comYetit is only the middle pulsionor voluntarity. rangesof agencythatoffer spacefor effectual or change. creativity (Sedgwick,2003, pp. 12-13) In particular, it is herethatit is possibleto workon by takingup reparnegativeaffects(e.g. paranoia) a differentrangeof ative positionsthatundertake affects, ambitionsandrisks andtherebyallow the releaseof positiveenergieswhichcan thenbe further workedupon. Seek pleasureratherthanjust forestallpain.Again,whatwe findhereis anethical principle. as meansof procourse,becomingcommonplace to affective orientations knowledgewhich ducing add anotherdimensionto what knowingis. I am thinkinghere of many studies in the spheres of postcolonialstrugglesor strugglesover sexual or ethnicidentityin whicha coalitionof activistshas ableto changethegrainandcontent beengradually of perceptualsystems by workingon associating affectiveresponsein boththoughtandextension. ofThethirdkindof affectis thatin thetradition fered by Spinozaand Deleuze. I want to point to two possibilitiesof a politics.Oneis a verygeneral Herethesimplepoone.Thatis a modelof tending. is to widenthe potentialnumber litical imperative of interactions a livingthingcan enterinto,to widen the marginof 'play', and,like all living things, but to a greaterdegree,increasingthe numberof of the effectsof one sensorymode transformations into another. Massumiframesthis kind of 'intercessor'approach in relation to thefuture missionof culturalstudies. If radical cultural studies semi-artistically refusesto set itself up as a modelof anykind, yet lacks powersof contagion,how can it be effective? What mode of validity can it thatthe expanded achievefor itself?Consider empiricalfield is full of mutuallymodulating, battling,negotiating processlines liberallyenGeografiska Annaler ? 86 B (2004) ? 1
Such projects of reparative knowing are, of
structure of relentlesslyself-propagating, adaptive therepressive hypothesis' (Sedgwick,2003, p. 12).

In one sense, this is clearly an attempt to continue the Foucauldian project. In another sense it is an attempt to move beyond it by valorising what Sedgwick (2003) calls the 'middle ranges of agency'. [Foucault's] analysis of the pseudodichotomy between repression and liberation has led, in
the even more abstractly reified form of the hegemonic and subversive. The seeming ethical urgency of such terms masks their gradual evacuation of substance, as a kind of Gramscian-Foucauldian contagion turns 'hegemonic' into another name for the status quo (ie everything that is) and defines 'subversive' in, increasingly, a purely negative relation to that 70
in manycases, to its conceptualreimposition
couragedto developand sharplyexpressselfinterestacrosstheircollectivelyremaindered, The anomalyof an ongoing transformations. affectively engaged yet largely disinterested processline couldbe a powerfulpresenceif it were capableof conveyingits (masochistic?) removalof self-interest. The reciprocal re-adjustmentsalways underway in the empirical fieldmakethe pursuit of politicsan ecological whetherit thinks of itself that undertaking, way or not..... This is a politicalecology.The 'object'of politicalecology is the coming-toof processually gether or belonging-together formsof life. Its objectis uniqueanddivergent 'symbiosis' along the full length of the nature-culturecontinuum.The self-disinterest of culturalstudiesplacesit in a privilegedposition to side with symbiosis as such. What cultural studiescouldbecome,if it findsa way of expressing its ownprocessual is a potential, politicalecology affectivelyengagingin symbiosis-tending. This approach will appear a little high andmighty to some. So let us turnin a slightlydifferent direction to end this catalogueof new political directions. HereI wantto concentrate on the idea of a politics aimedat some of the registersof thoughtthat havebeenheretofore neglectedby criticalthinkers, eventhough,as already pointedout above,thosein to theseregisters as a fertilenew powerhaveturned fieldof persuasion andmanipulation. The mottoof this politics might be Nietzsche's (1968, p. 263) phrase'Betweentwo thoughtsall kinds of affects play their game; but their motions are too fast, therefore we fail to recognisethem'.Buttoday'the dense series of counterloopsamong cinema, TV, philosophy,neurophysiologyand everyday life' mean that we do recognise the realm between thinkingandaffectsandarebeginningto outlinea 'neuropolitics' (Connolly,2002) that might work withthem.It is a politicswhichrecognisesthatpoliticalconceptsandbeliefscan neverbe reducedto 'disembodied tokensof argumentation. Culture has multiplelayers,witheachlayermarked by distinctive speeds,capacitiesandlevels of linguisticcomplexity' (Connolly,2002, p. 45). Take difference and identity as one example of this geology of in this area has thinking.The political literature tendedto foreground at signification theexpenseof affect and has thereforeenactedcultureas a flat world of concepts and beliefs which can be
othernew concepts changedsimplyby engraining andbeliefs.It mightbe possibleto pointto (anddoin everyday life mesticate)the vagariesof thinking via a conceptlike habitusbut thatis aboutit. But difference andidentityisn't like that.It operates on eachwiththeirownorganisations severalregisters, andcomplexities.So, thatdeon one registerit is a definedminority viates from the majoritypractice.On a secthatvariesfromotherconond,it is a minority in a settingwherethereis no definstituencies itive majority. On a third,it is thatin an identity (subjective or intersubjective)that is obscured,suppressed,or remaindered by its own dominanttendencies- as in the way devout Christians may be inhabitedby fugitive forgetfulnessand doubts not broughtup for reviewin daily conversations or in church,or in the way that militantatheistsmay tacitly afterdeathwhen not conprojectlife forward centratingon the belief that consciousness stopswiththe deathof thebody.Thethirdregfadesinto a fourth,in which isterof difference surpluses,traces, noises, and chargesin and the beliefs of embodiedagentsexpress around and judgementstoo crude to proto-thoughts in a refinedway butstill inbe conceptualised tensiveandeffectiveenoughto makea difference to the selective way judgements are formed,porous argumentsare received, and are weighted.And in a layered, alternatives is always texturedculture,culturalargument porous.Some of the elementsin such a fugitive fundmightbe indicated, butnot of course represented,by those noises, stutters, gestures, looks, accents, exclamations,gurgles, or irburstsof laughter, gesturesandrhythmic rhythmicmovementsthat inhabit,punctuate, inflectandhelp to movethe worldof concepts andbeliefs. (Connolly,2002, pp. 43-44) a microbiopolitics of the subliminal, So we require much of which operatesin the half-seconddelay between action and cognition, a microbiopolitics thekindof biological-cum-culwhichunderstands tural gymnastics that takes place in this realm to newandsomewhichis increasingly susceptible times threateningknowledges and technologies thatoperateuponit in ways thatproduceeffective outcomes, even when the exact reasons may be which understands the inopaque,a micropolitics
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sufficiency of argument to political life without, however, denying its pertinence. That micropolitics may be thought to be composed of three main and closely related components. One is quasiFoucauldian and consists of attention to the arts of the self of the kind already signalled. The second is an 'ethic of cultivation', an ethico-political perspective which attempts to instil generosity towards the world by using some of the infrasensible knowledges that we have already encountered on a whole series of registers (Connolly, 2002). The thirdinvolves paying much greaterattention to how new forms of space and time are being constituted. In an era in which several new forms of time and space have been born (e.g. cinematic time and the movement image, standardised space and the ability to track and trace) this latter component seems particularly pressing. The fourth kind of affect is that associated with a neo-Darwinian approach. That approach tends to focus on the face and faciality as an index of emotion and it is this aspect that I want to take up in the next section by concentrating on a particular case study.After all, for most of us, 'the living face is the most important and mysterious surface we deal with. It is the center of our flesh. We eat, drink, breathe and talk with it, and it houses four of the five classic senses' (McNeill, 1998, p. 4). So let's face it, most especially through the medium of the screen which has now become such a dominant means of connecting western cultures.
I do not know what it is i am like24

The discussion so far will be trying for some because of its lack of concreteness. So, in this final section I want to bring some of the elements of my argument together in a concrete example which takes elements from the four approaches to affect that I have identified (and especially the neo-Darwinian obsession with the face) and extends them into politics conceived as an art of showing up showing up differently. I want to set out at least some elements of the last kind of politics I want to furtherby venturing into the realm of video art (taking in any screened art) (Rush, 1999; Ascott, 2003). I have chosen this field for four reasons. First, the film and video screen have become a powerful means of conveying affect in our culture, drawing on a set of historically formed stock repertoires for manipulating space and time which have existed now for nearly a century (Doane, 2002). Second, because video art has slowly come of age as the 72
available technologies have become more adaptable to expression25 and has gradually been able to forge a common vocabulary of spacing and timing differently which can travel across a number of screened media and which is now also becoming interactive (film, video, web, virtual reality). The blurred and crudely lit video art of the past, often not much more than a means of recording performance art, has been replaced by degrees of colour, texture and motion that make genuine and concerted demands on attention (Campbell, 2003). Third, because new developments such as the web give video artists large and culturally primed audiences which were not available when works had to be sited in the aspic of galleries and which spread out beyond self-defined cultural elites. Fourth, because this work has engaged explicitly with affect. A good example is Roy Ascott's notion of telematic love, built on Charles Fourier's theory of 'passionate attraction' (see Amin and Thrift, 2002), which was described by him as 'the drive given us by nature prior to any reflection ... toward the co-ordination of the passions ... and consequently toward universal unity' (Fourier,cited in Shanken, 2003, p. 75). On this base, Ascott builds a kind of telematic cosmopolitics, in which telematics forms the beginnings of a global networked consciousness26 based on continuous exchange which is both cognitive and affective. Ascott has built a set of artworks on this premise which act as a machine for imagining life as it could be. However, it is not only for these reasons that I want to turn to video art. It is also because it can show something about the energetics of movement and emotion and how that relationship is formed and made malleable in cities in which, as I pointed out above, screens, patches of moving light populated chiefly by faces, have increasingly become a ubiquitous and normal means of expression, populating more and more urban spaces and producing a postsocial world in whichfaces loom larger than life (Balazs, 1970).27 To help me in this endeavour, I want to call on the work of Bill Viola (1995, 2002). Why Viola?28 I want to point to three reasons. First, and very importantly for me, because he gets real audience response: his works have grip. The mix of unnaturalnaturalism and magical realism he projects in his works stirs spectators and sometimes stirs them mightily. His exhibitions are not only popular but they also regularly produce extreme emotional responses in their audiences which sometimes seem to cross over into the therapeutic (cf. Gibbons, 2003).
of actressesand Second,becausehe is intenton engagingaffect iognomyin theuse by directors butthrough a seriesof depictions whichknowingly actorswhosefacialdeftnessallowsthemto disengagetheunconscious historyof affect,pullingon play a mapof emotions,andinvolvesthe spectator in an intricateprocess of watching and heart-strings developed over many centuries.In otherwords,in what is often only a few seconds, searching for clues (Taussig, 1999; Bruno, Viola is producing an archaeologyof the contem2002). and thera- - the cliches of moder pressreporting andphoporarypast which is both transcendent whichprovidea kind of habitualvispeutic and perhaps,in certainsenses, redemptive tography ual taxonomythroughwhich we face/feel the (Buchli andLucas,2001). At a minimum,this arworld which is thing-likein its materialpreschaeologyrecalls the following historiesand carof the contemporary ence. tographies past; - the oligopticgaze of the dry schemataof mod- the historyof the representation of the agonies ern facial recognitionsystemsthatareincreasof ChristandotherChristian of systemsof surimageryfromthe ingly beingusedin a plethora MiddleAges andthe Renaissance. This is a traveillance and whose genealogy again reaches ditionof depictionwhichharksbackto the anbackto physiognomy(Elkins,1999). cientGreektermpathos andvarious (whichsimplysignified - therecentstrugglesof performance thatbefallsone') andthewaythatthis thekernelof artto capture kindsof performance 'anything termbecamemixedupwiththeChristian notion the videoed face, building on the legacy of of passionwhich namedthe sufferingand crumovementslike behaviorist art,variouscybercifixion of Jesus and was heavily loaded with netic models, kineticart and interactivity genemotion(Meyer,2003). erally(Ascott,2003). - the historyof exact scientificrepresentation of the expressiveface fromthe earlydaysof phys- Viola enacts this multiplehistorical/cartographic iognomy (as in Le Brun'sseventeenth-century legacy by, for example,using close-up and slow on state-of-the artLCDflatscreenswhich depictionof faces transported by extremeemo- motion29 the writingsof nineteenth-century recallthe multiplescreensof medievalpolyptychs. tion)through anatomistsand physicianson facial muscula- The depictionsstretchout time in such a way that ture and expression to Rejlander'scarefully they allow nuancesof feeling to be observedthat contributions to Darwin's wouldbarelybe noticedin the to andfro of everystagedphotographic workandon to the current interestin the face to day life. They are carefullystaged and scripted, be foundin the so-calledaffectivesciences. sometimesinvolvinga huge cast of actors,as well - thehop, stepandjumpdelayof scientificexper- as stuntpeople,hundreds of extras,anda panoply imenton humanperception, as foundin, for ex- of scene designers,plus set builders,a directorof wardrobe, ample, nineteenth-centuryGerman psycho- photography, makeup, lights,andso on, physics. This genealogy may be best tracked all for takeswhichmay be less thanone minutein throughthe historyof the inventionandopera- length,given the limitedcapacityof a film magationalization of the feedbackloops of cybernet- zine athighspeed(Wolff,2002).Theintentis clearics andso on into the elementary formsof cap- ly to let facialexpression or otherbodymovements italistlife to be foundin the minimalpresences (and, most obviously,the hand),patternsof light of the brandandothersuch sigils. interactin telling and differentspatialformations - the sensateassaulton vision whichbeginswith ways,providing'turbulent in whichemosurfaces' the technologicalreproduction of realityin the tionalandphysicalshapecoincidein arcsof intenlinkedimagesof silentfilmflitting by andwhich sity.At the same time, the depictionspointknowallows a certaintype of intensefacialityof the inglyto theirownoperations, pullingin paratextual kind found especiallyin the close-up observa- elements (e.g. like frames and times) as integral tions of silent film (Moore,2000), the 'rawvi- partsof the performance. sion'so belovedof Benjamin andEpsteinwhich Third,Viola's works point to aspects of cities he has pressestoo close andhitsus betweentheeyes in whicharetoo oftenneglected.In particular, its jerky nearness(Crary,1999); 'film moves, been concernedto highlightthe face as a primary andfundamentally "moves"us, with its ability composer of affectandmaker of presence(Taussig, to renderaffectsand,in turn,to affect'(Bruno, 1999).Violasees theface as a colourwheelof emoas se2002, p. 7). Again,therearedirectlinksto phys- tionsandconstantly placesemotionstogether
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quenceswhich illustratethis shiftingspectrumof affect.Butit is notjust theface, it hasto be said.Viola also considersthe hand as an index of affect (Tallis,2003). He alsouses thewholebodyto index more general affective practices of coping, of which the most notable is probablycrying (cf. Thrift,2004). So, the city as a sea of faces, a forest of hands, an ocean of lamentation: these are the buildingblocks of modemurbanism just as much as brickand stone. In otherwords,Viola provides an affective history of the city, understoodas a of facesandhandsandtears.Thisis aninchronicle timategeographythroughwhich and as which affect makesits way, a set of historiesof the way in whichaffecttakesholdtoldby foregrounding a set of affective which are too often practices neglected: seeing visions, praying,crying,each of which has its own culturalhistory.But Viola is also quite awarethatthese ecstaticpracticesareusuallypart of a dailyroundwhichcan itself becomehis focus of attention; a chain of ordinary tasks themselves become a spiritual practice,a set of marginsconas they go. stantlyedgingforward, recomposing But what,then,is the politicalimportof Viola's I thinkit is threefold, 'slowly turningnarratives'? witheachsucceedingelementmoreimportant than theonebefore.Oneelementis showingthecomplex processof mimesisby which we learnto generate affect. Viola is able, by slowing things down, to showhow each elementof the body (andmost especiallytheface)takesits partin a showof emotion whichhasits owncontested cultural He prehistory. sentsus with a kind of affectivehistoricalgeograelementsof thebodyliketheface, phyof expressive of our the bodies are socializedthrough maps way and otherprocessesfrom birthonward mimesis30 overmanycenturies, whichhavebeencreated quite a release of meaningsfromthe literallyproducing of the spatialplay of affectmay past.The mapping notbe particularly butVioladoes it beauoriginal,31 tifully,using all the aestheticcues thathave come downto us as cultural signifiersof intensitywhich we learnfrominfancyon. In turn,the audiences react to their own processesof emotionallearning, playing these corporeal'memories'back in their body and very often amplifyingthem throughthe processof Viola's depictionsin ways step-by-step be described whichmaylegitimately as therapeutic. Then,second,Viola embedsaffectin space and time. His sets, whetherthey are an iconic human face, a countrywalk or a house in flood are carefully cued spatial and temporaltransformations whichresistthereading-writing-text but paradigm
74
to a criticallyalertaudiare still comprehensible ence as variousforms of (e)motion.Their visual 'vocabulary'cracks open familiar horizons of spaceandtime andshowsthe way thatwherescan also be elsewheres,andhow these new alignments mightoffer new affectiveresonancesandresources. By operatingon space and time (stretching, theybecomea kindof miniaturizing) transforming, from which new for the emotions floor threshing once argued traffic instinctual maycome. Kracauer that artof estrangement thatfilm was a redemptive could put us back in touch with reality (Carter, no doubt.But, in 2002).32Too granda statement, to his Viola'scase, it seemsto bearsome relevance ambitions(cf. Viola, 2003). aboutthe Violais ableto showsomething Third, affectiveformsof the modemworldas elementary on screensandthentransmitted they areproduced intourban bodiesandotherbywaysas a kindof visceralshorthand existingonly in verysmallsubliminal spaces and times. Marcus(2002) puts it well whenhe writes:'Whena moviehasbecomepartof the folklore of a nation,the bordersbetween the movie andthe nationcease to exist.The moviebeThenit comes a fable;thenit becomesa metaphor. Viola a joke, a shortcut.' becomes a catch-phrase, shows us all the affectivecatch-phrases, jokes and culturesbutthrough thattypifyWestern short-cuts slow motion and close-up restoresthem to their so thatwe cansee them nature originalstep-by-step at work.Theymaybe difficultto describein words butwe can still since theyarenon-representational detect them through Viola's laying out of the clueswe usuallyworkon minuteanddiagrammatic in everydaylife as somethingmore akin to large 1992). signposts(Ginzburg, Of course,whatViolapointsto is notregular politics but, unless the matterof how we aremadeto as somehowout be/be connectedis to be regarded of court,whathe is focusingon is surelyanintensely politicalprocess,one which mattersto people. Withoutthis kind of affectivepolitics, whatis left of politicswill too oftenbe the kindof machoprothatemaciateswhatit is to be hugramme-making man- becauseit is so sureit alreadyknowswhat thatis or will be. Conclusions So let me briefly conclude.There is more to the in too many worldthanis routinelyacknowledged writingson politicsandthis excess is notjust inciof fugitiveworkin dental.It pointsin the direction
OFAFFECT POLITICS A SPATIAL INTENSITIES OFFEELING: TOWARDS
the social sciencesandhumanities whichcan read Notes as a partof 1. This paperwas occasionedby a challenge from Doreen the little,themessy andthejerry-rigged not to it. It Masseyto thinkmoreseriouslyaboutthe politicsof affect. and incidental politics just pointsas well ThisI havetriedto do! in thedirection of workthatwantsto giveupthean2. This emotionallabourcan turn up in unexpectedplaces. cient settlement betweenknowledgeandpassions floors of large investment Takethe exampleof the trading andculture, andpeopleandthings,and andconsistently banks:'traders (andnature speakof theneed frequently for dealingwith to manageemotions,they developroutines truthandforce) in favourof considering whatties emotion management and consider these emotions, they things togetheras an explicit politics (Stengers, part of the expertise and savvy of professionaltrading' 1997). I think we live in exciting times because (KnorrCetinaand Bruegger,2002, p. 400). The last three havebecomemixedup, most thesetwo 'traditions' examplesareall takenfromKatz's(1999) seminalbook. in thinking aboutthepol- 3. Why, for example,are thereno studiesof cities of tearsor especiallyin experiments as other thesesubjects whichdo notapproach things? laughter the spacesof cities which we itics of encountering arisefromrestraandbravery 4. Virtueslike courage,stamina areonly atthe startof layingout andworkingwith. of ing one's immediatedesires. Anothergood illustration In particular, I wouldwantto end withthe work this point is Sophocles'Antigone,in which, in a medium that Plato deplores,similarcriticismsarise (Butler,2002). as a resultof alliances currently being undertaken Antigone'sclaimto a rightto grieveandburyhertraitorous betweensocialsciencesandartists. Themarriage of brothercorruptsthe state from within as the spectacle science and the artsis often called 'engineering', erodespublicjudgement. andthisseemsto me to be therighttermforthekind 5. Of course, there are emotions through the history of whichhavebeenconsidered politicallyvirtuous. of theoretical-practical thatarenowbephilosophy knowledges Love for wisdomwas an affectthateven Plato(in TheSyming derived,ad hoc33knowledgesof the ad hoc madnessof fromthe dangerous posium)wantedto separate whichcansimultaneously changeourengagements love love andothersuch waywardnesses. Hegel mentioned with the world.In struggling to represent some of emotions.Andso on. andgenerosity as desirable by Reddy(2001).It theissuesdealtwithin thispaperthefoundations of 6. A goodreviewof bothareasis provided emotionalstates some there in that seems are, fact, likely aregradually a newkindof cultural beengineering whichare commonto all societiesat all times (e.g. shame) which with which constructed and new ing upon but, equally,thereare some stateswhich are massivelyat formsof politicalpractice thatvaluedemocracy as variance. by that functionaldisunitywill be able to be built.I have 7. Forexample,Ekman'sworkwas stronglyinfluenced of Tomkinson the face. Deleuze'sworkwas influenced by hearda numberof commentators that these argue to Bateson.And the ghostsof Greindebtedness Guattari's kinds of engineeringexperimentsare essentially gory Batesonand CharlesDarwinlurk in the background trivialandthatwe needto getbackto the 'real'stuff. fairlyconstantly. andmanyof themhave aremanifold I am not persuaded. I am not persuaded at all. It 8. Thesebodilyresources
seems to me that no choice has to be made. We need
to pursue manyof theolderformsof politicsandthe politicalas vigorouslyas beforebut we also need the 'research anddevelopment' thatwill allowus to expandthe envelopeof the politicalandso bothrestorethespacesof moralandpoliticalreflection that 'man'hascollapsedandbringnewformsof politics intobeing.If we don'tdo it, othersmostsurelywill. Acknowledgements The contentof this paperhas been aidedimmeasof Jakob Amoldi,Dag Peurablyby the comments RichardSennettandKirsttersson,PaulRabinow, en Simonsen.
Nigel Thrift Division of Life and Environmental Sciences University of Oxford Oxford OX1 3UB England
Forexample,one of the mostponot beenfully considered. is clearlytouch.It can, tentmeansof bodilycommunication to the type of encounter, producefeelings of afaccording andinhifectionandjoy, andequallyfeelingsof insecurity bition(Montagu, 1986;Field,2001). Touchin turnleadson to consideration of the handas the chief touchingorgan,a comhapticextensionwhich has greatbiological-cultural or the saluteor clapplexity (thinkonly of the handshake ping,the variousmeansof writingor the lover'stouch)(see of the hand seems to Tallis, 2003). In turn,development of our brain. have been a crucialfactorin the development can be Similar chains of affect/intelligence/development foundfor,forexample,smellandbalance(see Thrift, 2003). 9. Thus,for Tomkins,affectsare the correlated responses(insysvolving the facial muscles,the viscera,the respiratory and tem,the skeleton,changesin bloodflow, vocalizations, which makesto a situation, so on) thatan organism produce or intensityof stimuan analogueof the particular gradient lationimpinging uponit. of a piece 10. Sedgwick(2003) gives the exampleof enjoyment of musicleadingto wantingto hearit over andover again, to becomea musilisteningto othermusicor even training cianoneself. werecrucial. voice andbreathing 11. Tomkinsalso thought 12. In a famouspassagefromtheEthicsSpinozaputsthispropositionbaldly: The mindandbody areone andthe samething,whichis
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of thought, now under conceivednowunder the attribute the 27. As Sobchack (2000, p. 185)putsit: attribute of extension. Whenceit comes aboutthatthe order A humanface ... can be seen with a clarityand dimenof thingsis one, or, nature is conceived of the concatenation viin 'ordinary' sion impossible unmediated, lived-body now underthis, now underthatattribute, andconsequently the other's sion. If I get too physicallyclose to another, thatthe order of actionsandpassionsof ourbodyis simultaface loses its precisevisible presenceas a figurein my neousin nature withtheorderof actionsandpassionsof our visualfield even as it increasesits hapticpresence.The mind. blursas it fills my visualfield, thus visibleface partially III, (Ethics, prop.2,note) becoming,in part,its ground.Indeedsome of the face and the final invisibilitythat flows into indeterminacy we mightidentifysuchas shameandembar13. Other emotions marksthe horizon of my perceptiveact. An extreme do not seemto havecommonfacialexpressions. rassment, ... for me by the projector mediated close-upof a human 14. Ekman (1998,p. 387) goes on to write:'I believethatmuch It is centeredin is given to the experiencetransformed. of the initialemotion-specific physiologicalactivityin the is thefigureof my percepmy visualfield .... Itsentirety is also not firstfew milliseconds of an emotional experience tion, not its ground,andthusdoes not flow into indetera statement which I am social penetrable by experience', minacyin my vision. as maybe inferred fromwhatcomeslater sureis notcorrect, work has been heavily criticisedby some for, for Viola's in the paper,but this does not mean that I would want to 28. example, its hackneyedaesthetic,its parasitismof great denythe influenceof biology. of affects, to a narrow worksof art,its attraction 15. A termwhichrefersto the thesisthatwe now live in a 'postspectrum and so on. These may or may not be valid criticismsbut I social' world in which social principlesand relationsare in why Viola's work is able to elicit am more interested 'emptyingout' and being replacedby other culturalelein the firstplace. reactions mentsandrelationships, andmostnotablyobjects. strongemotional 29. Oftenextremeslow motion.Forexample,film is often shot at 300fpsandplayedbackat 30fps. of a disintePostsocialtheoryanalysesthe phenomenon thatin its originalGreekformmisocial universe,the reasonsfor this 30. It is worthremembering grating'traditional' andreas enactment mesis meantperformance to andthe direction of changes.It attempts (understood disintegration thanimitation) rather enactment and,of course,mimesisis postsocialrelationsas forms of sociality conceptualise of anexactcopy(Rush,1999). theproduction stillveryrarely and whichchallengecore conceptsof humaninteraction in artwork film of the face has beena constant 31. Slow-motion solidarity,but which nonethelessconstituteforms of to get theright for sometime,butI thinkViolahas managed bindingself and other.The changesalso affect human interminable a detailedanalysisin experiments. speed,unlikesomeearlier, sociality in ways which warrant 32. 'It effectively assists us in discoveringthe materialworld theirown right. We literallyrewith its psychophysical correspondences. Cetina,2001, p. 520) (Knorr deem this worldfrom its dormant state,its stateof virtual the it through to experience non-existence, suchemotions 16. Forexample,it is relatively by endeavouring easy to generate camera.And we are free to experienceit becausewe are as fearby dintof thiskindof detail(see Altheide,2002). 1960,p. 300). 17. Forexample,interpreting sadnessas a sickness. (Kracauer, fragmented' modem educationaland trainingsys- 33. In usingthis term,I meanto implythe way in whichengi18. Thus, increasingly, whichalencounters and creativity- but tems stress the need for adaptability neeringis alwaysbornout of concrete low the worldto speakback;I am not tryingto imply that within very narrowlydefined parameters. They often use is just make-it-up-on-the-spot. engineering knowledges to inculcate these values (see performance Thrift, 2003). 19. Of course,none of this brief explicationof the so-called 'half-seconddelay' is meant to suggest that conscious References is just along for the ride. Rather,we might say ABBOTT, awareness of A. (2001): TimeMatters. Chicago,IL: University thatthe preconscious comes to be morehighly valuedand, ChicagoPress. is repositioned as a ABU-LUGHOD, L (1999): Veiled Sentiments. Honor and Poetry at the same time, consciousawareness meansof focusingandsanctioning action. in a BedouinSociety. Berkeley:Universityof California the workof 20. I will takeup this phraseagainin considering Press. Bill Viola. ALTHEIDE, D.L. (2002): Creating Fear News and the Construc21. I thinkhereaboutthe way in whichthe workof choreograAldinede Gruyter. tionof Crisis.NewYork: pherssuch as WigmanandLabanwas put to the serviceof AMIN, A. and THRIFT, N.J. (2002): Cities. Re-imagining Urban masspoliticaleventsduring the Nazi periodin Germany. Cambridge: PolityPress. Theory. 22. Forexample,whatdoes it meanto arguefor the emancipa- ASCOTT, R. (2003): Telematic Embrace. Visionary Theories of tionof emotional labour(Smith,2002)? Art, Technology, and Consciousness. Berkeley: University of have turnedto Bud23. It is no accidentthatso manyauthors Press. California dhismfor inspiration (cf. Varela,1999;Sedgwick,2003). BALAZS, B. (1970): Theory of the Film. Character and Growth takenfroma video disk madeby Bill Viola in 24. Subheading DoverPress. of a NewArt.NewYork: 1986 (see Viola,1995). BALIBAR, E. (2002): Politics and the Other Scene. London: Verwhichprovides hereis the riseof morphing 25. A goodexample so. a visibleflux of becoming.Significantly for affect,muchof BATTERSBY, C. (1999): The Phenomenal Woman. Cambridge: on the face (see the work in this area has concentrated PolityPress. of Sobchack, 2000). L. (ed.)(2000):Intimacy. BERLANT, Chicago,IL:University fromFoufor this projectapart 26. Thereareobviousforebears ChicagoPress. riersuch as Teilhard de Chardin, JamesLovelockandGre- BLACKMAN, V.(2001):MassHysteria. L. andWALKERDINE, goryBateson. Critical Psychology and Media Studies. London: Palgrave.
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Intensities of Feeling: Towards a Spatial Politics of Affect Author(s): Nigel Thrift Source: Geografiska Annaler.

INTENSITIES OF FEELING: TOWARDS A SPATIAL POLITICS OF AFFECT

INTENSITIES OF FEELING: TOWARDS A SPATIAL POLITICS OF AFFECT

INTENSITIES OF FEELING: TOWARDS A SPATIAL POLITICS OF AFFECT

INTENSITIES OF FEELING: TOWARDS A SPATIAL POLITICS OF AFFECT

INTENSITIES OF FEELING: TOWARDS A SPATIAL POLITICS OF AFFECT

ent upon the media, as well as similar appeals which

thatthey arebecomingmoreactivelyengaged via alternative meansof expression.

INTENSITIES OF FEELING: TOWARDS A SPATIAL POLITICS OF AFFECT

Changing the political

INTENSITIES OF FEELING: TOWARDS A SPATIAL POLITICS OF AFFECT

Such projects of reparative knowing are, of

structure of relentlesslyself-propagating, adaptive therepressive hypothesis' (Sedgwick,2003, p. 12).

in manycases, to its conceptualreimposition

INTENSITIES OF FEELING: TOWARDS A SPATIAL POLITICS OF AFFECT

I do not know what it is i am like24

INTENSITIES OF FEELING: TOWARDS A SPATIAL POLITICS OF AFFECT

OFAFFECT POLITICS A SPATIAL INTENSITIES OFFEELING: TOWARDS

Geografiska Annaler ? 86 B (2004) ? 1

Geografiska Annaler ? 86 B (2004) ? 1

Geografiska Annaler ? 86 B (2004) ? 1

Geografiska Annaler ? 86 B (2004) ? 1

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