Israel Affairs Vol. 18, No.

4, October 2012, 503525

Existential threats to Israel: learning from the ancient past

Steven R. David*
Department of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University Israel is one of the only countries whose existence is openly called into question. There are a number of contemporary threats that could bring an end to Israel as a Jewish democracy. They include hard threats of nuclear destruction and conventional invasion and soft threats of an emerging Arab majority and elite actions to end Israel either as a Jewish state or as a democratic state. Israeli policymakers can learn how to cope with these threats by examining how Israel was destroyed in ancient times. Israels destruction at the hands of the Assyrians, Babylonians, and Romans reinforces Realist lessons for contemporary Israel. They include the dangers of relying on outside allies for support, the need to prevent adversaries from gaining the capability to destroy you, the risks of an unfavourable demographic balance, and how internal conict can bring about ones demise. Although appeasement proved to be the preferred policy for some of Israels ancient forebears, the total threat posed by some of modern Israels adversaries and Israels contemporary ability to overpower its regional foes require substantial modication before such an approach should be considered today. Keywords: ancient Israel; Jewish democracy; King Saul; King David; Assyrians, Babylonians; Romans; Babylonia; modern Israel

Israel is one of the only countries whose very existence is called into question. Leaders of countries and groups openly seek its destruction. Whether by conventional invasion, nuclear attack, or terrorism, many of Israels neighbours seek to wipe it off the map. Israels existence as a Jewish democracy is also challenged from within, by a growing Arab population, and by Israeli Jews, some of whom believe the states commitment to liberal democracy makes it impossible to have a Jewish state while others assert that the states commitment to Judaism makes it impossible to have a democratic state. A great deal of attention has been paid to assessing just how serious these threats are and what Israel can do to address them. Impassioned scholars, pundits, and policymakers have put forth a wide range of recommendations with no clear consensus emerging. What these recommendations have in common is that they ignore the experiences of ancient Israel as a guide to contemporary Israeli policy. This is a critical omission because these experiences yield powerful insights into the

*Email: sdavid@jhu.edu
ISSN 1353-7121 print/ISSN 1743-9086 online q 2012 Taylor & Francis http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2012.717386 http://www.tandfonline.com

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dangers Israel faces today. Ancient Israel, it turns out, confronted remarkably similar threats to those now confronting Israel. On several occasions, these threats proved fatal, causing the demise of the Jewish state. By examining why the Israel of thousands of years ago succumbed to threats, a better understanding can be achieved as to how Israel can cope with the threats it faces today. This article consists of three parts. It begins with an overview of the threats facing present-day Israel. The heart of the essay then examines the reasons for the destruction of ancient Israel by the Assyrians, Babylonians, and Romans. It concludes by examining how lessons from Israels ancient history can guide modern Israels leaders in meeting the threats that once again seek to destroy the Jewish state. Contemporary threats Israel confronts two kinds of threats, both of which would bring about its end as a Jewish state. The rst would produce the physical annihilation of Israel. These hard threats include the use of weapons of mass destruction, outside invasion, and civil conict. Regarding weapons of mass destruction, Israels neighbours have or can make biological and chemical weapons, which could inict horric harm.1 Even more alarming are nuclear weapons. Israels population is so concentrated that as few as three nuclear weapons could destroy 70% of its people, effectively ending its existence as a Jewish state.2 Nuclear programmes exist throughout the Middle East, notably in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Most frightening for Israel is Iran, whose president, Mahmoud Ahmadenijad, famously declared his intention to wipe the occupying regime [Israel] off the map.3 Iran is now enriching large amounts of uranium, giving it the capability to carry out this threat.4 The conventional threat is only slightly less frightening. Israel inhabits a rough region, lled with powerful, hostile neighbours. The countrys military forces of some 176,000 regular troops and about 400,000 reserves are outnumbered by each of the militaries of Egypt, Iran, and Syria.5 Israels adversaries taken together have several times the number of tanks, artillery, and aircraft. The Arab armies and Iran are catching up with Israel qualitatively, especially as they are equipped with newer precision-guided munitions such as surface-to-air missiles and anti-tank weaponry that depend less on the skill of the operator. Syria and Iran do not recognize Israels right to exist, and the viability of Egypts peace with Israel has been thrown into doubt in the wake of Hosni Mubaraks overthrow in a country where Islamists have taken control of the government. Israel is also threatened by the possibility of civil conict among Israeli Jews. If such conict did break out, it would most likely stem from efforts by the Israeli government to remove some of the 400,000 settlers now living in the West Bank. In one sense, the situation is not terribly dire. Most Israeli Jews live in settlements near the 1967 border that are likely to be retained by Israel in a peace agreement. Others would probably leave peacefully, especially if they are given nancial incentives. Nevertheless, a signicant minority may violently resist efforts to

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remove them, sparking major civil conict. If civil conict does break out, Israel could be weakened militarily, thus inviting outside attack.6 In the wake of Jews killing Jews, extremism may ourish internally, undermining the democratic foundations of the state. Either way, Israel is likely to change in fundamental ways, and may cease to exist at all.7 Israel can also be destroyed by soft threats that leave the country and its population physically intact, but end its existence as a Jewish democracy. As a democracy, Israel grants the right to vote to each of its citizens. If Israel holds on to the West Bank, over 2.5 million Palestinians will join the over 1 million Israeli Arabs to create a non-Jewish majority in Israel in just a few years. The Israeli government would then face the dilemma of either granting the Palestinians in the West Bank the right to vote, thus ending Israel as a Jewish state, or it could continue the deny the Palestinians the right to vote, thus ending Israels claim to be a democracy.8 Aside from the threat of a growing Arab majority, dangers are posed by Israeli Jews (and others) who increasingly question the Zionist ideal of Israel as a Jewish democracy. On the left are those who assert that in the world of the twenty-rst century, where distinct nations have given way to multicultural identities, it is unacceptable to privilege one group over another. Since Israel is a self-described Jewish state, with Jews afforded rights and responsibilities denied to non-Jews (such as the Right of Return and the obligation to serve in the military), Israel is seen as illegitimate.9 On the right, Israeli Jews are mounting their own challenge to Israel as a Jewish democracy. Voices are increasingly raised asserting that if Israel is to remain Jewish, it must curtail the freedoms that dene Israel as a liberal democracy. Efforts to restrict the role of the Israeli Supreme Court, constrain the rights of Israeli Arabs to live in Jewish areas, impose a loyalty oath on Israeli Arabs, limit the rights of non-governmental organizations to criticize Israeli polices and growing extremism among some Israeli settlers contribute to the sense that, for many, retaining Israels Jewish character is more important than any commitment to liberal democracy. If the commitment to Israel as a Jewish democracy is increasingly challenged by elites on both the left and right, the long-term future of Israel cannot be secure. All the more so as doubts about Israels viability are reected in the international sphere as well. Whether it be in lopsided United Nations votes against Israel, the extreme anti-Israeli rhetoric at international conferences such as occurred in Durban in 2001, or the growing movement against Israel by international NGOs, Israel is increasingly seen as a global pariah.10 Israel then confronts a wide range of threats from outside and inside the country. It has attempted to deal with these threats by seeking alliances with major powers, relying on its own strength, and drawing support from the Jewish community abroad. Powerful foes have been resisted and, more rarely, appeased. Israel has used many of these same approaches to counter similar threats in the hostile worlds of the ancient past. These policies proved ultimately unsuccessful then, raising questions of whether they will work today.

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Ancient Israel The Jewish State of Israel (sometimes known as Judah or Judea) has died three times in the past, in each case by the hands of a more powerful neighbour.11 In 722 BCE Israel was vanquished by the Assyrians, in 586 BCE by the ce in 135 CE) by the Babylonians, and in 70 CE (with the nal coup de gra Romans. Israel disappeared from world maps for more than 100 years after its rst death, then for several centuries following the Babylonian onslaught, and for nearly 2000 years after its destruction by Rome. The causes of each of Israels deaths differ, but they all reect some combination of weaknesses within Israel itself and the unchecked power of its adversaries, a situation that eerily resembles contemporary challenges to the Jewish state today. What follows is a brief historical summary of the events surrounding Israels deaths highlighting the principal causes. Unication, the divided monarchy and demise: 1000 BCE to 722 BCE Any study of ancient Israel needs to confront questions of reliability, especially when the Bible is used as a source. Despite constant questioning, especially from ideologically motivated detractors, most historians agree that from around 1000 BCE we can reconstruct the history of Israel to a reliable degree by balancing the biblical account with archaeological evidence and written accounts independent from the Hebrew Bible.12 It is with some condence therefore that it is believed that the various Hebrew tribes rst became unied under King Saul around 1050 BCE. Saul brought the tribes together so that they could better deal with the external threat of the Philistines, Israels ancient enemy. Following Sauls death (by the Philistines) he was succeeded by David, who created the rst truly unied Jewish state.13 Under Davids leadership, the two separate kingdoms of Judah and Israel were united, with Jerusalem established as their capital. David took advantage of the relative weakness of the two neighbouring empires of Egypt and Assyria to carve out a place for the new kingdom of Israel, establishing it as a regional power in the southern Levant.14 Although David unied Judah and Israel, the two former territories never gave up their distinct identities. Israel was much larger than Judah; more urbanized; had a greater population and more fertile land than its southern neighbour.15 Despite these advantages, Israel remained subservient to Judah in the united kingdom. Israel resented Judah for interfering with its religious and political traditions, taking up a disproportionate number of key governmental and military positions, and forcing its citizens to serve in a common army. Egypt exacerbated these resentments in an effort to prevent the emergence of a strong, united state that would threaten its crucial trade routes.16 David overcame these tensions through his charismatic leadership and deft policies. When David died, however, his successors, Solomon and his sons, proved unable to keep the two kingdoms together. In the 920s BCE, the northern tribes of Israel, angry at what they perceived to be unfair treatment by Judah, bitter over heavy taxation, and

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stricken with internal unrest, revolted against the united kingdom, re-establishing the Kingdom of Israel as a separate entity.17 The kingdoms of Judah and Israel went their separate ways, with Judah turning out to be the more politically stable of the two. Judah had a relatively homogeneous population, consisting of mostly one tribe with a leadership that had the good fortune to descend from David, providing it with a strong sense of legitimacy. Judah also had the advantage of retaining Jerusalem as its capital, a powerful symbol of unity. Israel, on the other hand, was made up of 10 tribes, forcing it to endure the conicts that festered among them. Constant power struggles among the ruling families plagued the Israelite leadership, with dynasties rising and falling, often with the interference of outside powers anxious to project their inuence. Despite these difculties, Israel dominated Judah, which at times became Israels vassal. Their common Hebraic roots notwithstanding, the two kingdoms often went to war with each other. These conicts proved especially costly because they prevented the emergence of a united front at a time when rising empires threatened the security of both kingdoms. No threat loomed larger for Israel and Judah than the growing power of Assyria. The Assyrian Empire had been expanding throughout the ninth century BCE, and showed no signs of slowing down. The situation became even more dire when the power-hungry Tiglath-Pileser III assumed leadership in 745 BCE and promptly accelerated Assyrias imperialist campaign. The strength of Assyria under Tiglath-Pileser depended less on its own forces than on vassal kings leaders who would do its bidding without question. If a vassal did not obey or refused to pay tribute, he would be removed. States that rebelled against Assyria paid dearly. The indigenous population of conquered kingdoms would be deported, usually to Assyrian lands, only to be replaced by Assyrian colonists. The kingdom itself would vanish as an independent entity, absorbed by the greater Assyrian empire. When Tiglath-Pileser turned his attention towards the lucrative trade routes of the Near East upon which sat Israel and Judah, their leaders recognized the common danger they confronted. Each, however, chose to respond to the Assyrian threat differently.18 When confronted with Assyrias might, Israel at rst opted to appease, agreeing to pay Assyria large amounts of tribute. This policy succeeded until a revolt broke out in Israel, replacing the pro-Assyrian leadership with one committed to resisting Assyrian power. The uprising most probably stemmed from anger by the Israelites at the costs of the tribute they were forced to pay Assyria. It is also likely that Syria, a rival to Assyria, fostered a revolt in Israel to bring to power a leadership in Israel committed to resisting Assyrian expansion. With both Syria and Israel now confronting Assyria, the two kingdoms turned their attention to Judah, under King Ahaz, seeking to enlist his support in the anti-Assyrian coalition. Ahaz, however, wanted no part of this alliance. Judah had been living in relative peace and prosperity, not yet paying tribute to Assyria and having no wish to provoke the menacing Tiglath-Pileser.19 Syria and Israel then

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attacked Judah, seeking to force Ahaz to change its mind and join them in the battle against Assyria. Their plan failed miserably. Facing an external invasion, and having to deal with newly developing internal strife, Ahaz rejected Syrian and Israelite entreaties to join with them, and instead turned to the power most able to ensure his survival, Assyria. Ahaz offered to pay tribute to Assyria in exchange for Assyria protecting it from Syria and Israel.20 Judahs most pressing need was for Assyria to attack Israel, its greatest threat. Assyria agreed to Judahs request, both to secure Judahs overall support and to vanquish the Israelite enemy that threatened them both. Tiglath-Pileser began his assault on Israel in 733 734 BCE. He won battle after battle, given Assyrias overwhelming power against an Israel weakened by domestic political and religious strife. Tiglath-Pileser died in 727, but his successors pressed on, eventually taking over most of Israel. With only a small part of Israel remaining, its desperate leadership agreed to end their resistance and pay tribute to Assyria. This bought Israel some time, but then, perhaps because the King of Israel thought Egypt would come to his aid, Israel once again adopted a policy of resistance and suspended tribute.21 Egypt sent no help and Assyria then invaded all the land including the capital of Samaria.22 After three years, in 722 BCE, in what today would be called ethnic cleansing, the 10 tribes of Israel scattered, some to Assyrian territory and others to the southern kingdom (thus preserving their stories for the Hebrew Bible). In their place came Assyrian settlers as the land of Israel was absorbed into four Assyrian provinces. The Kingdom of Israel, a once mighty regional power, was no more.23 Judah did not perish, but its fate was hardly worthy of celebration. Judah remained a loyal vassal of Assyria, paying large amounts of tribute and making sure its policies did not interfere with Assyrian wishes. For a while, the appeasement of King Ahaz (which famously earned the support of the prophet Isaiah) kept Judah safe.24 When Ahaz died and was succeeded by his son, Hezekiah, everything changed. Believing that a different Assyrian leadership and the support of Egypt eroded the Assyrian threat to Judah, Hezekiah ended Judahs appeasement and initiated a policy of active resistance to Assyrian dominance. He did so against the wishes of Isaiah, who counselled that security was found not through military might or alliances with great powers, but in faith in God. Better to let Assyria do what it wished and wait for divine retribution, than take matters into ones own hand.25 Hezekiahs policy did indeed prove disastrous, as the Assyrian leader, Sennacherib, launched a furious attack against the wayward Judah and Egypt once again proved to be less an ally than a broken reed that provided no help to the beleaguered Judah.26 Assyria destroyed much of Judah and would have conquered the entire kingdom but for being stopped at Jerusalem in 701BCE. Exactly what halted the Assyrian advance is in some dispute. Some credit Hezekiahs efforts to protect Jerusalem with newly built walls and developing an ingenious system to transport water into the city which enabled it to survive the siege. Others argue that a sickness, probably bubonic plague, ravaged the surrounding Assyrian army, thus sparing Jerusalem. In any event,

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Jerusalem survived, and so too did Judah, albeit as a vassal once again to Assyria.27 Over the next century, the Assyrian empire, overextended and burdened by internal rebellions, began to crumble. This enabled Judah to reassert its independence, just in time to place it in confrontation with the new rising empire of the Near East, Babylonia. The Babylonian conquest, 586 BCE The demise of the Assyrian Empire at the end of the seventh century BCE complicated life for Judahs leaders. As long as Assyria dominated the Near East, decisions for the leaders of Judah proved relatively simple: appease Assyria when it was strong, resist its inuence when it weakened. This formula, however, could not work once Assyria left the scene. Instead of having to contend with one hegemonic power, it now had to deal with two Egypt in the west and Babylonia to the east. The game of a resistance and appeasement, of balancing and bandwagoning, would need to continue as Judah lacked the military might to stand on its own.28 The decisions, however, became far more difcult with two powers, both of which had the ability to destroy Judah and both of which were adversaries of the other. Judah had to be sure that its efforts at resistance and appeasement with one great empire did not unduly antagonize the other. Moreover, it had to constantly gauge which great power posed the most immediate threat, as a miscalculation could well prove fatal. Just as some today may feel some nostalgia for the relative simplicity of the Cold War, it is not hard to imagine Judahs leaders longing for the time when they had to contend only with Assyria.29 Judah began with a policy of seeking to balance against Egypts power. This approach did not last long as Egypt replaced Judahs king with one who agreed to serve as Egypts vassal. Judah was now safe from Egyptian designs, but only at the price of appeasing Egyptian demands. Over time, the Egyptian threat to Judah waned, as Egypts power began to decline, especially relative to the rising Babylonian empire. In 605 BCE, Babylonia destroyed much of the Egyptian army in the battle of Karchemish, enabling it to push into areas adjacent to Judah. With Egypt weakened and Babylonia on its doorstep, the King of Judah, Jehoiakim, recognized that the near enemy needed his immediate attention and he began to pay Babylonia tribute, in effect appeasing Babylonia while leaving the embrace of Egypt. This policy might have succeeded except for Babylonias failed attempt to invade Egypt in 601/600 BCE. Babylonias defeat caused Jehoiakim to rethink his decision to spurn Egypt. Believing that Babylonia was now a spent power, heeding the cry of Judahs extremists anxious for a showdown with Babylonia, encouraged by domestic turmoil in Babylonia, and counting on Egypt to back him, Jehoiakim decided to reverse his policy of appeasement to Babylonia and turned once again to Egypt for support.30 The realignment of Judah proved disastrous. Babylonias leader, Nebuchadnezzar, attacked Judah, quickly taking over the Kingdom and capturing Jerusalem. He then probably killed Jehoiakim, eventually replacing him with Zedekiah,

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whom Nebuchadnezzar believed would be more beholden to Babylonia. While Judahs autonomy had been compromised, the situation was not hopeless. Nebuchadnezzar treated Judah well and allowed life to go on pretty much as before. Jerusalem and its inhabitants were spared and Zedekiah proved, at rst, to be a dutiful vassal. Zedekiah, though, yearned to be free of Babylonian control. After establishing an alliance with Egypt to protect him, he contemplated turning against Babylonia. He did so against the passionate advice of the prophet Jeremiah, who urged Zedekiah to appease Babylonia rather than incur the wrath of such a powerful adversary. Zedekiah, however, spurned Jeremiahs advice, transforming his policy of appeasement to one of active resistance to Babylonian control. It proved to be a fatal mistake. Not only was Zedekiah foolishly confronting mighty Babylonia, he was placed in power precisely to follow Nebuchadnezzars wishes. If a vassal like him could get away with such insubordination, others would surely follow, ending the Babylonian Empire once and for all. A furious Nebuchadnezzar again attacked Judah, prompting Egypt to send forces to aid its ally. The Egyptian rescue, however, proved too little too late, leaving Judah alone to suffer the wrath of Babylonia. This time, Nebuchadnezzar showed Judah no mercy. The Kingdom of Judah was utterly devastated by the Babylonian forces. The capital of Jerusalem was ravaged, with its population dropping from 150,000 to only 3000 and the Holy Temple destroyed. Temple ofcials, military commanders, and much of the noble class were executed, with the survivors sent to exile in Babylonia. As for Zedkiah, the renegade vassal, his sons were executed in front of his eyes, before he was blinded and taken to Babylonia in chains. Judah, like Israel before it, had ceased to exist, ending several centuries of Jewish sovereignty and Davids dynasty.31 Rome 77 135 CE32 The defeat of the Babylonian Empire in 539 BCE by the Persians ended the Jewish exile as the Persian emperor, Cyrus, allowed the Jews to return to what had been Judah, now the Persian province of Yehud or Judea. Many Jews decided to remain in Babylonia, but a fair number accepted Cyruss invitation and returned to Judea. Whether in Judea or in Babylonia, Jews continued to live as a distinct people, practising their religion and culture, under the relatively enlightened rule of the Persians.33 Although the Persian Empire fell to Alexander the Great in 331 BCE, little changed for the Jews, who were able to continue much as before, as Alexander proved as tolerant towards other faiths as the Persians. The death of Alexander in 323 BCE, however, transformed the situation. The Jews found themselves buffeted among several rival empires, seeking once again to appease and resist their way towards preserving some semblance of an independent existence. Their efforts came apart when the successors to Alexanders empire, the Seleucids, took over what had been Judea. Not content to allow the Jews to go their own way, Seleucid leaders, particularly Antiochus IV,

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supported by powerful Jewish factions, embraced the Hellenization of Jewish life, took money from the Temple Treasury to nance endless wars, and sought to eliminate Jewish religious practices. This led to the famous Maccabee revolt (168 142 BCE), an insurgency directed as much against Hellenized Jews as their Seleucid overseers. Faced with a Jewish rebellion and having to deal with the rising power of Rome, the Selecuids decided to cut their losses, and capitulated to the Maccabees. They allowed the Maccabees to re-consecrate the deled Holy Temple, restore Jewish religious practices throughout Judea, and serve as leaders of the Jewish population. In 142 BCE the Seleucids also accepted the emergence of Judea as an independent state, freeing it from any obligation to pay tribute. After over 400 years, the Jews once again had a country of their own, ruled by what became known as the Hasmonean dynasty. Under the Hasmoneans, Judea at rst ourished. With the Seleucid Empire in decline and the newly rising Roman Empire not yet strong enough to penetrate into the Near East, Judea emerged as a major regional power, ruling over territory roughly equivalent to contemporary Israel including the West Bank. One of the Maccabee rulers, John Hyrcanus (ruled 134 104 BCE) was especially committed to expansion, believing that it was Gods will that the Jewish people rule over the entirety of the Holy Land as depicted in the Hebrew Bible. This growing power of Judea alarmed Rome. It was one thing for Judea to exist as a small, weak state with modest ambition, quite another for it to be driven by religious fervour to seek seemingly limitless expansion. Moreover, Judeas strategic position along the caravan trade route proved to be of vital economic importance to Rome. It could not allow Judea to be so powerful as to put a halt to this trade or so wracked by internal discord that the caravans would be unable to get through.34 Romes growing hostility was reinforced by one of the earliest manifestations of anti-Semitism. Roman leaders portrayed Jews as spreading hatred and perversion through their teachings, which were seen as primitive and barbaric.35 The refusal of the Jews to assimilate angered the Romans, who resented Jewish demands to retain their identity as a separate people. The Romans saw the Jews as being especially dangerous, with a religion and culture that posed a threat to Roman existence far greater than that posed by other groups. The hatred of the Jews became so great that the Romans proposed destroying the Jewish people to end their threat once and for all. For the Romans, then, the Jews were not simply another barbarian people, but an existential threat requiring (at times) a genocidal response.36 While Rome seethed, Judea became wracked with internal discord. Religious disputes between the Pharisees and the Sadducees, and political struggles among competing groups, threatened to plunge Judea into civil war. Events reached a fever pitch when two brothers of the Hasmonean dynasty, Hyrcanus II and Aristobulus II, fought each other over who would succeed their mother in power. Instead of a united front against Rome, Judea found itself severely weakened from within.37 As ghting raged throughout Judea, Hyrcanuss minister, Antipater, feared that a full-scale civil war would undermine his privileged

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position, and so cut a deal with the Romans. In exchange for protection and a guarantee of his remaining in power, Antipater would deliver Judea to Rome. The Romans, already engaged in hostilities with Judea, agreed to his offer. Antipater surrendered to the Roman general Pompey in 63 BCE, causing Judea to lose its independence and become a client of Rome. Judea became even more entrenched in the Roman Empire when Antipaters son, Herod, assumed power around 40 BCE. A Jewish independent state had again been snuffed out, this time with the active cooperation of the Jews themselves.38 Although Judeas formal independence ended, a vigorous Jewish life persisted under Roman rule. Jews continued to pray at the Holy Temple and were free to follow a wide range of Jewish practices. Nevertheless, many Jews never accepted Roman rule and violently resisted the encroachment of Roman culture, seeing it as a threat to the Jewish way of life. Herods death worsened matters as his sons (and successors) proved to be ineffective rulers, creating instability throughout Judea. Rome tried to quell the unrest by instituting direct rule over Judea through the dispatch of procurators, but this proved wholly unsuccessful. Jews resented not being able to govern themselves; the favouritism showed by the Romans to the Greek inhabitants of Judea, and the ruinous rule of the Roman governors and mad Roman emperors such as Caligula. Making matters worse, the procurators periodically raided the Holy Temples Treasury to nance the occupation, enraging the Jewish populace. Jews increasingly came to the conclusion that the only way they could ensure the sanctity of the Temple and lead a Jewish life was to expel the Romans and replace them with Jewish leaders.39 Radical Jewish groups, opposed to Roman rule and angered by growing inequality among the Jews, were the rst to act. Some of these groups believed that they were living at the end of times and sought militant action to hasten the arrival of the Messiah. One Jewish faction, the Zealots, opposed to Roman rule and losing patience with what it saw as the collaboration of the Jewish upper classes, took matters into its own hands and massacred a Roman garrison in 66 BCE. The rebellion gained the support of other Jewish groups, including some of the aristocracy who resented their increasing marginalization by Roman rulers. Jews elsewhere in the Roman Empire, in the Diaspora, are also believed to have provided assistance to the rebels.40 Despite this cooperation, most Jewish groups remained hostile to one another, precluding a united front against the Romans. Nevertheless, the revolt unfolded, perhaps encouraged by the belief that Roman efforts against Judea would be diverted by their having to ght in the east, most notably against Parthia, which had earlier gone to war with Rome.41 The Romans recognized that if they allowed this uprising to succeed they faced not only the loss of Judea, but the collapse of their empire, as it would be a signal to all of its captive lands that Rome could be successfully challenged. Rome responded with a massive campaign to eradicate the revolt. Given the overwhelming power of Rome and divisions among the Jews, the outcome was never in any doubt, and what became known as the Jewish War ended in a total Roman victory in 70 CE. The Holy Temple was destroyed, perhaps by accident,

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depriving the Jews of their central place of worship. The arch erected celebrating the victory remains standing today, complete with the depiction of the Jewish religious objects seized from the Temple.42 The failed revolt devastated Jewish life in what had been Judea, but it did not end it. Jerusalem was left in ruins, the Temple was not rebuilt, and much of the land was laid to waste. The Romans issued harsh measures against the Jews, instilling a special tax and spreading anti-Semitic rants throughout their empire.43 Nevertheless, Jewish life survived as the land came back to life and the population replenished, with Jews continuing to constitute a majority of the people.44 Jews were able to continue their religious practices, aided by the growth of institutions such as the synagogue that had been developed during the exile in Babylonia. Under the direction of several prominent rabbis, Jewish worship and scholarship ourished. As in the past, however, the (relatively) good times did not last. Things came to a head under the Roman Emperor Hadrian (ruled 128 132 CE), who adopted a policy of intense hostility to anything Jewish. He forbade circumcision and sought to transform Jerusalem into a pagan city, complete with the construction of a Roman temple at the site of the Jewish Temple. This proved unacceptable to the vast majority of Jews. Under the leadership of Simon Bar Kokhba, the Jews once again revolted against the might of Rome, only this time they were united. The revolt began in 132 CE and initially succeeded in wresting control of the entirety of Judea, including Jerusalem, from the Romans. Coins bearing the inscription the redemption of Israel were struck as Jewish authority replaced the Romans throughout the land.45 The return of the independent state of Judea, however, did not last long. Over time, the might of Rome could not be denied, even by a united Jewish society led by a charismatic leader. In the summer of 135 CE, the revolt ended with the fall of the city of Betar and the death of Bar Kokhba. Unlike their victory in 70 CE, the Romans were in no mood for mercy. As many as 1 million Jews were killed or sold into slavery some 90% of the population. Jerusalem was rebuilt as a pagan Roman city renamed Aelia Capitolina, with Jews allowed to visit only one day a year. To completely sever the link between Judaism and Judea, Hadrian renamed the land Syria-Palestina, the land of the Philistines (later shortened to Palestine). The few Jews left faced harsh persecution, with many scholars brutally executed. While elements of Jewish life survived, particularly in Galilee, an independent Jewish existence had ended, not to be restored until the creation of the modern state of Israel, nearly 2000 years later.46 Lessons from Ancient Israel The perilous world of ancient Israel is not fundamentally different from the situation confronting Israel today. Ancient Israel, like contemporary Israel, lived in a world similar to that described by Realist theorists in which states, living in an environment of international anarchy, are responsible for their own security in

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a global system dominated by the threat of war. Both ancient and modern Israel have lived in rough neighbourhoods surrounded by predatory states seeking their destruction. Neither ancient nor modern Israel has been able to rely on world opinion or international organizations to protect them from their neighbours. Instead, they have depended on a self-help approach to navigate their way through a dangerous world of powerful adversaries.47 Both ancient and modern Israel have also attracted the wrath of outsiders because they are Jewish states, with seemingly peculiar practices and beliefs. Precisely because the fundamentals of Israels plight have not changed for over 4000 years, lessons gained from its ancient experience are relevant today. Some of the principal lessons are considered below. A critical lesson from ancient times relates to the precariousness of reliance on outside powers to ensure ones survival. Weak states have traditionally turned to strong powers to protect them from powerful adversaries. Israel and Judah were no exception, constantly looking to other states to counterbalance more pressing foes. Their strategies often proved successful, enabling them to navigate their way through a thicket of hostile empires. Israel and Judahs reliance on outside powers to save them, however, often proved disastrous. The major reason that ancient Israel chose to break with Judah and ght against Assyria was its belief that with Egyptian support, it could successfully resist Assyrian power. Egypt showed itself to be no more sturdy than a broken reed, leaving Israel to confront the fury of Assyria alone, resulting in its destruction. With a healthy scepticism of what allies would and could accomplish, Judah chose the path of becoming a vassal of Assyria, enabling it to survive. Judahs caution regarding the value of outside support proved short-lived, much to its detriment. At the time when Babylonia moved into the Near East, threatening Judah, the Jewish kingdom prudently accommodated itself to its demands. Later, however, Judah (much to the displeasure of Jeremiah) changed its appeasement policy to one of seeking to counter Babylonian threats when once again the promise of Egyptian help gave rise to the notion that Babylonia could be successfully resisted. When Egyptian assistance proved hopelessly inadequate, Babylonia vented its anger against weak, isolated Judah, ending its existence. At the beginning of the revolts against Rome in 66 CE and 132 CE, the Jews could not count on any outside power coming to their assistance. They may have been encouraged, however, by the belief that Rome would be weakened by wars with other states. In particular, Jewish groups may have hoped that the Roman wars with Parthia, a major power to the east, would divert Roman efforts to the point where the revolt could succeed. Such beliefs, if they did exist, proved unfounded, as Rome settled its disputes with Parthia, enabling it to focus its full wrath on the Judean insurgency. Yet again, hope for outside assistance, be it direct or indirect, proved unfounded.48 It should be easy for contemporary Israel to embrace the lesson of not placing its trust in outside powers given its history of failed alliances. Post-1948 Israel came into existence due in large part to the efforts of the Soviet Union, its rst major arms supplier (via Czechoslovakia). Soon thereafter, Moscow became

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a major adversary of Israel, providing the principal support to its Arab foes in several wars. In the rst decade of Israels existence, France served as its principal ally. Following the 1967 war, however, French support of Israel ended, replaced with a policy that became overtly pro-Arab. None of these early allies could be relied upon to defend Israel today. The United States, of course, is another matter. America has been a strong supporter of Israel since its birth, dramatically increasing its assistance since 1970. The pillars of that support shared values, strategic benets, and powerful domestic lobbies remain strong and show little sign of diminishing.49 Nevertheless, the lessons of the recent past and ancient Israel must be heeded. Allies come and go. Accept American support while it lasts, but do not assume it will last forever. America is a good friend, but so, at one time, were Assyria, Babylonia, Ancient Egypt, and the Roman Empire. As far as Israel is concerned, the lessons of Realism serve as a useful guide. It is a brutal world out there, lled with shifting alignments and interests. In the end, you have only yourself to depend upon. If Israel cannot depend on allies to ensure its security, it must do so on its own, which means that it has no choice but to acquire nuclear weapons. With a modest population (around 7.5 million) and small size (roughly the area of New Jersey), modern Israel like its ancient counterparts can never aspire to become a great power. Unlike its ancient predecessors, however, present-day Israel can protect itself without outside help by deploying a nuclear arsenal. Nuclear weapons give Israel a life insurance policy, letting its adversaries know that they cannot destroy the Jewish state without bringing about their own destruction as well. It is highly unlikely that Assyria, Babylonia, or Rome would have destroyed Israel if they knew that to do so would have meant committing suicide. Israel recognizes the critical role nuclear weapons play in ensuring its survival. Using a French supplied reactor, Israel is believed to have developed nuclear weapons in the late 1960s.50 Its arsenal today consists of land-based ballistic missiles, submarine launched cruise missiles, and long-range bombers that would survive an attack from any of its conceivable adversaries.51 Although it continues to resist publicly announcing its nuclear status for fear of offending the United States and provoking its regional foes, there is no doubt that Israel possesses large numbers of nuclear arms. Israel, of course, continues to cherish its alliance with the United States, but heeding the lessons of modern and ancient history, it recognizes that in the nal analysis it can only depend on itself to ensure its security, which in turn requires the maintenance of a robust nuclear arsenal. A second lesson from the ancient experience for Israel is never to allow itself to be put in a situation where its survival is dependent on the decisions of others. Even when confronting a seemingly reasonable outside power, Israel must remember that policies can change in an instant. Benign leaders such as Cyrus and Alexander gave way to malevolent ones or simply switched their policies. Relying on the hope that leaders will behave reasonably has proved catastrophic for Israel. Assyria and Babylonia at times pursued relatively moderate policies

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that accommodated a measure of autonomy for Israel and Judah. Under the leadership of Tiglath-Pileser and Nebuchadnezzar those policies changed in part due to provocations from Israel and Judah resulting in the death of the Jewish states. Romes treatment of the Jews was wholly dependent on who exercised power. The comfort of enlightened leaders who allowed Jewish life to continue unmolested stood in contrast to leaders who did their best to destroy any element of Jewish existence. Some Roman leaders, such as Hadrian, began as tolerant and sympathetic leaders, only to turn against the Jews with unbridled fury for reasons lost in time. Relying on the kindness of strangers has historically been a risky approach. For ancient Israel, it proved to be a fatal mistake. If Israel wants to ensure that its survival is not dependent on the whims of other leaders, it must ensure that none of its adversaries acquire a nuclear arsenal. Nuclear weapons offer Israels enemies the ability to destroy the Jewish state in an instant. It is the most likely hard way that Israel would be destroyed. Only by preventing its enemies from getting nuclear weapons in the rst place can Israel heed the ancient lesson of not placing its survival in the hands of others. Israel appears to have learned this lesson well, launching air attacks that destroyed an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and a Syrian reactor in 2007. Israel is believed to be mounting a vigorous campaign against Iran to prevent it from developing a nuclear weapons capability, including the killing of Iranian nuclear scientists and the development of a computer worm (Stuxnet) that has slowed down the production of fuel necessary to make nuclear bombs.52 If these efforts prove insufcient to stop Iranian nuclear developments, the lessons of the ancient past suggest that Israel must take more extreme actions, including a military attack on Iranian nuclear installations, despite the massive costs. The notion that deterrence, dissuading someone from doing something that they can accomplish by threatening them with unacceptable punishment, can protect Israel is belied by both ancient and modern history. Enemies such as Tiglath-Pileser and Caligula demonstrate that relying on the rationality of leaders to ensure your survival is too risky. In more contemporary times, the emergence of leaders like Adolph Hitler, Saddam Hussein, and Osama Bin Laden support the notion that it is far too dangerous for Israel to depend on the self-restraint of others. Defensive means such as Israels anti-ballistic missile system are worth pursuing but are far from adequate, given the difculty of destroying missiles in ight and the ease with which nuclear weapons can be delivered by other means (aircraft, cruise missiles, smuggling).53 The only sure way to protect Israels existence in a nuclear world is to make certain that those who wish it harm are not able to acquire the capability to do what they threaten. Israels neighbours, therefore, cannot be allowed to follow Israels path in developing nuclear weapons. A third lesson from ancient times is that internal strife can be as dangerous as outside enemies in bringing about national demise. The united kingdom under King David constituted a formidable regional power. When Israel split from Judah, both kingdoms military capabilities were dramatically weakened, making them vulnerable to external pressures. Their plight worsened when Israel went to

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war with Judah, beginning a process that eventually led to Israels destruction. Judahs efforts to convince Babylonia not to invade were hampered by divisions between extremists seeking confrontation and moderates willing to accept Babylonian inuence as well as a growing gap between the rich and the poor.54 These divisions contributed to Judahs changing and inconsistent policies towards Babylonia that eventually led to its demise. Although many see the revolt of the Maccabees as a battle against the Seleucids, it was rst and foremost a civil war among Jews, with radically different views about the role of Jewish practice and governance. Internal divisions also brought about the destruction of Judea under the Roman Empire. The end of Judea as an independent state in 63 CE came less from an invasion than from an invitation from one warring brother to the Romans to enlist their support against the other warring brother. Rome was simply the arbiter of a Jewish family ght, one that ended a century of independent (albeit nasty) Jewish rule. Intra-Jewish strife continued under Roman domination eventually precipitating a revolt against a far stronger foe. While the Jews had little hope against the Romans under any circumstances, their religious and political divisions, the conicts between the aristocracy and the common people, the baseless hatred, prevented the united front necessary to give them a ghting chance of carving out a measure of autonomy.55 The perils of internal strife that so plagued ancient Israel are all too relevant today. As a vibrant democracy, it is to be expected and welcomed that Israelis will passionately disagree over a very wide range of issues. When those disagreements cut to the heart of Israel as a Jewish democracy, however, the lessons of the past become frighteningly appropriate. In particular, the issues highlighted by the prophets Isaiah, Ezekiel, and Jeremiah that purported to explain the destruction of ancient Israel have resurfaced in contemporary Israel. The prophets argued that the devastation of Israel was due, in part, to the lack of faith and commitment to Jewish practices, particularly by the elite. On the left, secular Israeli intellectuals, many of whom have been labelled post-Zionists, seemingly have ignored this lesson. For many post-Zionists the demands of liberal democracy trump those of Jewish practice, calling into question whether one can have a Jewish state without a commitment to Judaism.56 The extreme Israeli right presents perhaps an even greater challenge to the warnings of the prophets. Their actions to curtail individual freedoms, restrict the rights of the Arab citizens, and (for the most extreme) to employ violence against the state in support of illegal settlements ignores the lesson of the prophets that a Jewish state cannot survive without social justice and tolerance.57 If the radicals in either camp triumph, Israel as a Jewish democracy will be nished. In the meantime, those extremists who call into question Israel as a Jewish state or a democracy are eroding the foundations of both. Another critical warning from the ancient past highlights the importance of demography as a threat to Jewish people. Israels enemies recognized the centrality of demography in their dealings with the Jews. Each of Israels foes believed that to thoroughly destroy the Jewish state, they had to transform its

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demographic make-up by eliminating the Jewish majority. Following Assyrias conquest of Israel in 722 BCE, one of its rst acts was to cast the 10 tribes into exile while repopulating the territory with non-Jews. Following Babylonias defeat of Judah in 586 BCE, Nebuchadnezzar lost no time in deporting the majority of the Jewish population into Babylonia, replacing them with non-Jews. The most extreme form of ethnic cleansing occurred following the failure of the Bar Kokhba revolt in which Rome slaughtered much of the Jewish population, emptying the land of a signicant Jewish presence. To make the state disappear, you made the people disappear or at least ensure they were a minority presence. What Israels ancient enemies did by force, Israels governments are doing willingly, namely diluting the Jewish character of the state through the incorporation of large numbers of non-Jews by continuing to occupy the West Bank. The notion that Jews may become a minority in Israel is frightening enough; that such a prospect may come about due to the decisions (or indecision) of a Jewish government ies against the experience of the ancients. Moreover, unlike the heads of Assyria, Babylonia, and Rome, the leaders of contemporary Israel cannot simply expel an unwanted populace. An Israeli action to eject the Palestinians from the West Bank would iname Israeli public opinion, make Israel into an even bigger international pariah, and risk losing American support. Ancient Israels conquerors knew that to destroy Israel as a Jewish state required ending a majority Jewish presence. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon embraced this lesson, prompting his 2005 withdrawal from Gaza. Whether Israels present leaders also recognize the demographic lessons of the ancient past remains to be seen. A fth lesson is not to rely on divine intervention to ensure state survival.58 The prophet Isaiahs message of trusting in God rather than weaponry, of beating swords into ploughshares, resonates even today, but when confronting an enemy like Assyria, better to have swords at the ready. Hezekiahs belief in divine intervention, in part, encouraged him to attack the much stronger Assyrian empire. Although the Bible treats him well, his actions resulted in the death of Judah, when a policy not relying on the intercession of God could have produced a more accommodating approach, such as followed by King Ahaz, that at least would have kept Judah alive.59 Similarly, the prophet Jeremiahs proclamations not to resist Babylonia, that in fact, Babylonia was the instrument of Gods anger that must be embraced, could not help but have weakened Judahs resolve to cope with the threatened invasion.60 Relying on divine intervention proved most costly in the decision to revolt against the Romans. The belief that the end of times had come convinced groups to take up arms against the mighty Roman Empire in a hopeless cause. Moreover, the decision of some of the Temples defenders to destroy scarce food and weaponry in an effort to hasten the arrival of the Messiah proved predictably disastrous. Faith in God has done much to keep the Jewish nation alive, but when confronted with outside invasion, better to rely on the strength of ones earthly arms. Israeli policy must be driven by the national interest and not interpretations of divine mandate for the Jewish people. As a Jewish state, it is to be expected and

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welcomed that Jewish values, ethics and philosophy will play a role in Israeli policy. The Prophets were right to decry the absence of Jewish belief and behaviour in Judah and Israel. Ancient history warns us, however, that problems develop when beliefs about God are used to determine policy. It is not likely that modern Israel would embrace Isaiahs vision and entrust the countrys security to divine intervention rather than the Israeli Defence Forces. Nor is it probable that, faced with an overwhelming attack, the IDF would emulate the Zealots and destroy its remaining arms to quicken the arrival of the Messiah. Pursuing a Greater Israel policy according to which the borders of Israel are determined by the Bible presents a more plausible danger. Such a policy, it should be remembered, was followed by Israel under the later Maccabees, creating problems with the Roman Empire, an approach that did not end well. Today, the pursuit of a Greater Israel would likely iname relations with Israels neighbours, foment domestic discord, endanger its relationship with the United States, and hasten the explosion of a demographic time bomb. Faith in God has helped keep the Jewish people together over these millennia. Misplaced faith in God should not be allowed to once again guide Israeli policy to a self-destructive end. Unlike the other lessons from the ancient world, the lesson of the value of appeasement requires substantial modication. Throughout history, weaker states have struggled to endure by adopting policies of appeasing or resisting threats. Both approaches carry risks as resistance may prove insufcient to deter an aggressor, thus inviting attack; and appeasement leaves you at the mercy of a stronger adversary who may not wish you well.61 Although outcomes are difcult to predict for any state following either strategy, the experience of ancient Israel (and Judah) overwhelmingly supports appeasement to ensure survival. When one cannot defeat a more powerful adversary, it is far better for the weaker power to accommodate its wishes. Against Assyria, both Israel and Judah initially sought appeasement. Israel, however, abandoned that approach, in the belief that aligning with Egypt would give it the power to resist Assyria, preserving its security without incurring the political and economic costs that submitting to Assyria entailed. Judah stuck to its policy of appeasement, preferring to avoid provoking Assyria, even if that meant becoming its vassal. Israel paid with its life by seeking to resist Assyria, while Judah survived, albeit with its autonomy compromised and territory reduced. Judah failed to learn the value of appeasement when, more than a century later, it believed that it could count on Egypts help to balance against the rising power of Babylonia. Babylonia reacted to Judahs switch from an appeasement to a resistant strategy by brutally ending Judahs independent existence. The value of appeasement was again ignored by the Jews under the Roman Empire. Life was hardly idyllic for Jews as a Roman province, but a vibrant Jewish presence endured and, at times, ourished. Over time, however, the Jews refused to acquiesce to Roman rule, initiating a hopeless revolt against a much more powerful foe, resulting in the end of Jewish statehood, this time for two millennia. Just war theory argues that there needs to be a reasonable prospect for success before engaging in hostilities, a view ignored by

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the Jewish rebels. Appeasement is rarely a popular policy and few wish to live under the heel of foreign rule. Nevertheless, time and again, independent Jewish states died because they chose doomed resistance over limited autonomy, a choice that does not look so wise in retrospect. Although appeasement was a wise policy for ancient Israel (and Judah) to follow, enabling them to survive in a hostile world of more powerful states, modern Israel needs to follow a different approach. Contemporary Israel emerged in a Middle East surrounded by countries that openly seek its destruction. Although some countries have seemingly softened this aim over time, as evidenced by peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, others such as Syria and Iran have kept their dream of destroying the Jewish state. Israel cannot appease those who seek its annihilation. Appeasing Assyria allowed Israel to live. Appeasing the present regime in Iran could well mean the end of Israel. Fortunately for Israel, it does not have to appease its intractable foes, because today it can overpower them. Ancient Israel had no hope of countering the Assyrian, Babylonian and Roman empires that threatened it. Modern Israel, on the other hand, can maintain the military might to counter threats by any conceivable combination of its neighbours. Doing this in the face of an Arab and Iranian military build-up will not be easy or cheap and will require many sacrices. But if Israel is to avoid the fate of its ancient predecessors, maintaining military superiority over its neighbours so that they are not even tempted to attack must remain a priority. While appeasement made sense for Israel in ancient times, it is neither prudent nor necessary for the threats confronting Israel today. This is not to say that offering concessions to foes has no role to play for Israel at the present time. Appeasement has achieved a pejorative connotation since the 1938 Munich accords, but it was not always viewed unfavourably. If appeasement is seen as giving in to the demands of an adversary by a just sacrice i.e. giving up something that should be given up for peace rather than giving in to the demands of an adversary out of fear there is room for Israel to adopt such an approach,63 especially so long as it will be operating from a position of strength. As the political scientist Charles Kupchan has noted,64 peace is often achieved when the stronger power makes concessions, which demonstrate benign motives and reassure the targeted state that it is safe to accept the overture. Ancient Israel and Judah appeased their foes from a position of weakness, enabling them to survive, but only for a limited time. Modern Israel can accommodate its foes from a position of strength, a far better approach for ensuring its long-term survival. The lessons of the ancient past point in different directions for modern Israel. Developing its own nuclear arms while denying them to others, limiting reliance on allies, and not allowing religious beliefs to dictate security policy reinforce existing practices. Other lessons, such as exploring where compromise and accommodation may prove benecial and being even more sensitive to demographic shifts and elite discontent may push Israel to rethink some of its present policies. There is no uniform, linear message from the ancient past for Israel to be either tougher or more accommodating. Some policies, such as

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preventing an Iranian nuclear capability at all costs are more hard-line, while others, like doing more to persuade the Palestinians of accepting a two-state solution are more dovish. If there is one overriding lesson, it is that the destruction of Israel, having happened before, can happen again. Should this happen, it would almost certainly come about through a combination of internal weaknesses and outside threats. It is therefore incumbent on Israel to act now to mitigate these threats so as not to suffer the fate of its predecessors. Conclusion At 63 years, Israel may feel old, but it has been in existence less time than any of the Jewish states that preceded it. Like its ancient antecedents, present-day Israel lives in an anarchic world surrounded by hostile foes while confronting domestic challenges to its right to live as a free, Jewish state. The similarities with its ancient history are remarkable and alarming, given the fate of the early Jewish kingdoms. Israel, however, also has some advantages that its ancient brethren did not share, including a strong military and the ability to destroy any adversary that is foolhardy enough to try to bring about its demise. The Israel of today can also benet by learning from its mistakes of long ago, not allowing any outside power to become so strong as to threaten its existence and by ensuring that the great majority of its citizens are committed to the ideals that make Jewish democracy work. By studying its own ancient history and gleaning lessons from it, modern Israel stands a good chance of demonstrating that the past need not be prophecy. Notes on contributor
Steven R. David is a Professor at the Department of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University.

Notes
1. On biological weapons, see Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-Sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); on chemical weapons, see Jonathan B. Tucker, Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda (New York: Pantheon, 2006). 2. Leonard Weiss, Israels Future and Irans Nuclear Program, Middle East Policy XVI, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 82. 3. Ralph Sanders, Israel and the Realities of Mutual Deterrence, Israel Affairs 15, no. 1 (January 2009): 82. 4. For an insightful treatment of Irans development of nuclear weapons, see David Albright and Jacqueline Shire, Irans Growing Weapons Capability and Its Impact on Negotiations, http://www.armscontrol.org/act2009_AlbrightShire. 5. For numbers on forces and equipment, see The Military Balance 2011 (London: Institute of Strategic Studies, 2011), chap. 7. 6. See for example, Chaim Levinson, Israeli Court Sends Right-wing Activists Charged with Tracking IDF to House Arrest, Haaretz.com, January 8, 2012; the article details the activities of right-wing settlers to harass the IDF, including orchestrating an attack on an IDF base.

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7. One of the best (though a bit dated) examinations of the potential for civil conict among Israeli Jews is, Ehud Spinzak, Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination (New York: Free Press, 1999). 8. For a view highlighting the demographic crisis in Israel, see Evgenia Bystrov and Arnon Soffer, Israel: Demography and Density 2007 2020, http://geo.haifa. ac.il/ , ch-strategy); For a dissenting view arguing that Palestinian numbers are overstated, see Bennett Zimmerman, Roberta Seid, and Michael L. Wise, The Million Person Gap: the Arab Population in the West Bank and Gaza, Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 65 (Ramat-Gan, Israel: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, February 2006). 9. See for example, Tony Judt, Israel: The Alternative, New York Review of Books, October 23, 2003; Avraham Burg, The Holocaust is Over: We Must Rise From Its Ashes (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). Burg, a member of a distinguished Zionist family, advocates the end of the Law of Return, which gives every Jew the right to citizenship in Israel (ibid., 236, 237). 10. Once countries are seen as illegitimate, their prospects for long-term survival diminish. See David Strang, Anomaly and Commonplace in European Political Expansion: Realist and Institutional Accounts, International Organization 45, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 143 62. 11. I use the term Israel here as a catch-all term rather than referring simply to the Northern Kingdom. Moreover, when I refer to the death of the state of Israel, this does not mean that Israel as a people ceased to exist. There is persuasive evidence that even when the state apparatus of Israel ended, Israelites still continued to inhabit the land. For more on this, see Oded Lipschits and Joseph Blenkinsopp, Judeans in the Neo-Babylonian Period (New York: Eisenbrauns: 2003), part 1. 12. Andre Lemaire, The United Monarchy: Saul, David and Solomon, in Ancient Israel: From Abraham to the Roman Destruction of the Temple, ed. Hershel Shanks, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Biblical Archaeology Society, 2011), 96, 97. 13. By state I refer to entities that had armies, leaders, and bureaucracies controlling a set territory. Clearly, ancient states differ from their modern counterparts, yet retain enough similarities to justify calling them states. See Stuart J. Kaufman and William C. Wohlforth, Balancing and Balancing Failure in Biblical Times: Assyria and the Ancient Middle Eastern System, 900 600 BCE, in The Balance of Power in World History, ed. Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little and William Wohlforth (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007), 24. 14. Simon Dubnov, History of the Jews (New York: A.S. Barnes, 1967), 109 10; Lemaire, The United Monarchy, 106. There are some voices in biblical studies that challenge the notion of any state in David and Solomons times. See, for example, Keith Whitelam, The Invention of Ancient Israel (London: Routledge, 1997). For a more balanced treatment, see Israel Finkelstein, Amihay Mazar, and Brian B. Schmidt, The Quest for the Historical Israel: Debating Archaeology and the History of Early Israel, Invited Lectures Delivered at the Sixth Biennial Colloquium of the International Institute for Secular Humanistic Judaism, Detroit, October 2005, Society of Biblical Literature Archaeology and Biblical Studies 17 (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2007). 15. Nadav Naaman, Let Other Kingdoms Struggle with the Great Powers You, Judah, Pay the Tribute and Hope for the Best: The Foreign Policy of the Kings of Judah in the Ninth-Eighth Centuries BCE, in Isaiahs Vision of Peace in Biblical and Modern International Relations, ed. Raymond Cohen and Raymond Westbrook (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 55.

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16. Tal Dingott Alkopher, Is Isaiah a Social Constructivist?, in Isaiahs Vision of Peace (see note 15), 128, 131. 17. John Bright, A History of Israel, 3rd ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1981), 231. 18. Raymond Cohen and Raymond Westbrook, Introduction: The World of Isaiah, in Isaiahs Vision of Peace (see note 15), 4. 19. Siegfried H. Horn and P. Kyle McCarter, Jr., The Divided Monarchy: the Kingdoms of Judah and Israel, in Ancient Israel (see note 12), 170 72; Bright, History of Israel, 272 3. 20. Abraham Malamat, Origins and the Formative Period, in A History of the Jewish People, ed. H.H. Ben-Sasson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 134, 135. 21. Ibid., 136. 22. Bright, A History of Israel, 275. 23. Scott M. Thomas, Isaiahs Vision of Human Security, in Isaiahs Vision of Peace (see note 15), 174, 175, 180. 24. Naaman, Let Other Kingdoms Struggle with the Great Powers, 63. 25. Theodore J. Lewis, You Have Heard What the Kings of Assyria Have Done, in Isaiahs Vision of Peace (see note 15), 92; Frederick Mario Fales, On Pax Assyriaca in the Eighth-Seventh Centuries BCE and its Implications, Isaiahs Vision of Peace (see note 15), 31, 32. 26. Isaiah 36:6 27. Isaiah:33 38; 2 Kings 19:32 37. It should be noted that the Biblical passage says nothing specic about a bubonic plague but rather that divine intervention will save Jerusalem. The notion of a plague is simply a possible reason for the rapid deaths of 185,000 of Sennacheribs troops on the outskirts of the city. 28. The most comprehensive treatment of balancing and bandwagoning in the modern era can be found in Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). For an examination of balancing in the ancient world (that is critical of some elements of balance of power theory) see Kaufman and Wohlforth, Balancing and Balancing Failure in Biblical Times, 22 47. 29. Horn and McCarter, The Divided Monarchy, 205 7. See also Abraham Malamat, The Kingdom of Judah Between Egypt and Babylon: A Small State within a Great Power Confrontation, Studia Theologica, 44 (1960): 65 77. 30. Martin Noth, The History of Israel (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), 264; Horn and McCarter, The Divided Monarchy, 207; Malamat, The Kingdom of Judah, 155; Dubnov, History, 296. 31. Eric M. Meyers with the assistance of Sean Burt, Exile and Return: From the Babylonian Destruction to the Beginnings of Hellenism, in Ancient Israel (see note 12), 209, 211. See also the Book of Jeremiah (especially chapters 34, 35) in the Hebrew Bible, which vividly recounts this episode. 32. Much of the information we have from this period comes from Flavius Josephus, who was a Jewish general in the Great Revolt, but then went over to the Roman side. He wrote two books, The Jewish War (in the early 1980s) and Jewish Antiquities (in the 1990s), covering the revolt against the Romans and the scope of Jewish history. Because of his desire to please his Roman captors and the politics of the time, much of what he has written is of doubtful validity causing historians to search for archaeological and other conrming evidence before accepting Josephuss views. See also Shaye J.D. Cohen, Roman Domination: The Jewish Revolt and the Destruction of the Second Temple, in Ancient Israel (see note 12), esp. 290.

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33. Meyers, Exile and Return, 220. Nevertheless, there was still a problem with assimilation and intermarriage as seen in numerous Biblical texts such as Ezra 10; Nehemiah 13:23 30; and Ezekiel 20:40 43. 34. I am grateful to Kyle McCarter for this point. 35. Levine, The Age of Hellenism, 255 6. 36. Peter Schafer, Judeophobia: Attitudes toward the Jews in the Ancient World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 201, 207, 210. 37. Levine, The Age of Hellenism, 283. 38. Josephus gives a vivid account of Antipaters cooperation with Rome. See The Complete Works of Flavius Josephus, trans. William Whitson (Philadelphia, PA: Kregel Publications, 2008), book 14, chap. 9, 297 8. 39. According to the Jewish historian, Josephus, the last of the procurators, Gessius Flourus, was so wicked, and so violent in his use of authority that he precipitated the revolt on his own. Complete Works of Josephus, book 20, chap. 11, 426. See also Cohen, Roman Domination, 300. 40. Cohen, Roman Domination, 319. 41. Malamat, The Kingdom of Judah, 298. Although Rome had made peace with Parthia before the Great Revolt occurred, the Jews may have hoped for a renewal of hostilities to divert attention away from them. 42. Noth, The History of Israel, 443. 43. Cohen, Roman Domination, 319: Paul Johnson, A History of the Jews (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 140. 44. Yehoshafat Harkabi, The Bar Kokhba Syndrome: Risk and Realism in International Politics, (Chappaqua, NY: Rossel Books, 1983), 18. 45. Malamat, The Kingdom of Judah, 332. 46. Harkabi, The Bar Kokhba Syndrome, esp. 45 53. Harkabi argues that the revolt was the worst calamity that befell the Jews until the Holocaust (48). 47. Two fundamental works of Realism that advance these themes are: Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Boston: McGraw-Hill Education, 2006); and John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). 48. Harkabi, The Bar Kokhba Syndrome, 58. 49. One of the best accounts, if somewhat dated, on the history and origins of American backing for Israel can be found in, Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1981). One of the most notorious challenges of that support can be found in John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007). The support this book received from many quarters suggests that the US-Israeli alliance might not be as ironclad as many believe. 50. The best account of Israeli nuclear development can be found in, Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 51. Ralph Sanders, Israel and the Realities of Mutual Deterrence, Israel Affairs 15, no. 1 (January 2009): 87. 52. Scott Shane, Iran Adversaries Said to Step Up Covert Actions, New York Times, January 12, 2012, A1. At least ve scientists connected to the Iranian nuclear programme have been killed since 2007. 53. One consequence of the spread of ballistic missile defense systems is the proliferation of cruise missiles, which are largely immune to such measures. See Dennis M. Gormley, Missile Contagion, Survival 50, no. 4 (2008): 133 54. 54. Malamat, The Kingdom of Judah, 152.

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55. This is a major theme of Josephus. Even taking into account the skepticism his work engenders, he makes a persuasive point that the Great Revolt began and was doomed because of intra-Jewish strife. See Complete Works of Josephus. 56. See, for example, Ephraim Nimni, ed., The Challenge of Post-Zionism: Alternatives to Israeli Fundamentalist Politics (London: Zed Books, 2003). For a somewhat whimsical but insightful look at a post-Zionist position, see Tom Segev, Elvis in Jerusalem: Post-Zionism and the Americanization of Israel (New York: Henry Holt, 2001). 57. See for example, Isaiah 1:24 31; 10:1 11 (chapter 11 links justice with tranquility especially in verse 54). Jeremiah chapter 5: 21:11 14; See also Amos 2:6ff; 4:1ff; f:7ff. I am grateful to Stuart Cohen of Bar Ilan University for this point. 58. The theme of relying on divine intervention rather than ones own military might is clearly expressed by Lewis, You Have Heard What the Kings of Assyria Have Done. 59. Nadav Naaman, Let Other Kingdoms Struggle with the Great Powers, 70. 60. Malamat, The Kingdom of Judah, 154. 61. This is a major theme of Walt, The Origins of Alliances. 62. Harkabi, The Bar Kokhba Syndrome, 65. 63. One of the best treatments of good appeasement versus bad appeasement is found in Martin Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement (New York: New American Library, 1970). 64. Charles A. Kupchan, How Empires Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 40, 41.