What can we learn about the fragility of civilisation from the Late Bronze Age Collapse ca.1200 BCE?

Vlad Tomes 2012

Abstract
Much research has been undertaken regarding the causes and consequences of the Late Bronze Age Collapse, however no theory is complete. After extensive research of the literature regarding the different theories, the best explanation seems to be a synthesis of several ideas. Systems collapse and drought are put forward as the causes that result in destructive migrations and invasions. Additionally, a comparison is made between Late Bronze Age civilisation and 21 st century Western civilisation. This comparison reveals how both societies are inherently fragile and susceptible to collapse under severe stresses, such as climate change.

Contents Page
1. Introduction . 2. Literature Review ................ 2.1. Earthquakes .. 2.2. Droughts 2 3 3 4

2.3. Iron Working . 6 2.4. Invasions and Migrations . 2.4.1. The Dorians . 2.4.2. The Sea Peoples ............... 2.4.3. The Neighbours ............... 7 7 8 10

2.4.4. The Evolution of Warfare ................ 11 2.5. Systems Collapse ............... 3. Discussion 12 14

4. Conclusion ............... 19 5. Evaluation 20

6. Appendix .............. 21 7. Bibliography .................... 32

Introduction
Around 1200 BCE a number of Bronze Age civilisations in the Mediterranean were devastated and most would never recover. Stories of this traumatic age were passed down through Homeric legends but it was only in the 20th century that the true extent of the catastrophe came to light. Forty-seven major cities from the coast of the Levant to the Peloponnesus were destroyed and the civilisations that flourished there disappeared within a generation. Even Ancient Egypt was severely crippled and never recovered. In the rest of the Eastern Mediterranean a Dark Age descended lasting several hundred years. When civilisation remerged it was a drastically different world, with new organisations, materials and a westward shifted core. What caused this great change? Whilst historians agree on the catastrophe, there is no consensus on the likely causes. A range of explanations exists for the collapse of the Mycenaeans in Greece, the Hittites in Anatolia and the Canaanites in the Levant. Frustratingly, there is no categorical agreement on the exact dates for the destructions and different authors have used different methods to establish an absolute chronology. However, that is a different discussion to the causes of the collapse; hence a relative chronology will be used in putting forward my argument. Initially, the five major theories for the cause of the catastrophe will be discussed; Earthquakes, Drought, Iron working, Invasions and/or Migrations and Systems Collapse. The significant scientific, archaeological and literary evidence for these will be presented with an analysis into their strengths and weaknesses. It will then be proposed that drought and systems collapse combine as the main causes and showing how environmental pressures could have aggravated internal wounds precipitating the collapse of civilisations seemingly at their peak. The Late Bronze Age (LBA) has clear parallels with the modern world because both are based on: international trade, stratification of society, bureaucratic governments and the exploitation of Mother Nature. Just as we do today, they faced the powerful force of climate change. However, there is one major difference; they had the excuse of ignorance, which in the 21st century humankind has lost. For we know what we are doing to the planet. However, just as 3000 years ago, we are being condemned to disaster by the failures of our leadership.

Literature Review
Earthquakes Whilst some had already considered earthquakes, Schaeffer, who had discovered that Ugarit had been destroyed suddenly (evidenced by the Letters from the Oven; Shelmerdine 2008), was the main proponent. After examining collapsed walls he concluded that an earthquake followed by a severe conflagration caused the destruction and the complete abandonment of the town (Schaeffer, 1968). Subsequently, the seismologist Amos Nur concluded that many other LBA destructions could be attributed to earthquakes (Nur and Cline 2000, Nur 2008). Nur (2008) showed that many LBA sites lay on or near geological fault lines. Moreover, the cities appear to be in places of maximum intensity of ground motion (Nur 2008). Nur also highlighted that earthquakes are partly responsible for sites having dozens of destruction layers, such as at Armageddon (Megiddo) and Troy, which have 30 and 45 layers respectively (Nur 2008). However, Shelmerdine (2008) asserts that earthquake storms were not supported by seismic activity in Greece nor by the majority of seismologists. The evidence for such a statement is limited though. Victims who were trapped by the collapsing debris and whose skeletons have been discovered in the destroyed cities provided further evidence. Although, Schaeffer failed to find any skeletons at Ugarit and therefore argued that the town had already been deserted due to famine or prior tremors (Schaeffer 1968), Nur has found better proof. Thirteen LBA skeletons crushed by falling debris have been found in Greece alone, including six at Mycenae, as well as other skeletons from places such as Armageddon (Nur 2008). All seem to have been crushed by falling walls and roofs. Other authors have also entertained the idea that earthquakes struck the Mycenaean centres in the Argolid (French 1996, Schofield 2007, Schwartz 2011), but neither of them accept any of Nurs other ideas. Nevertheless, Nurs most important contribution was the identification of earthquake storms rather than an isolated earthquake as the culprit (Nur and Cline 2000, Nur 2008). Nur (2008) uses modern records of earthquakes along the North Anatolian Fault as parallels for historic earthquake storms in the region. Nur (2008) proposes that earthquakes led to the destructions and conflagrations visible in the towns destruction layers. Nur rebuffs the criticisms that a single earthquake could not have knocked out so many centres over such a wide timescale by proposing a 50 year earthquake storm from 1225-1175 BCE. This adversely affected many of the cities and may have contributed to systems collapse or increased vulnerability to foreign invasions (Nur and Cline 2000, Nur 2008). The main argument against earthquakes notes that most cities and states recovered from them and none have ever destroyed entire civilizations, even in seismically active areas (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993, Dickinson 1994, Schofield 2007). Moreover, Drews (1993) points out how unlikely it is that an earthquake could cause a fire (with no pre-industrial examples) and that rather, it is a sign of pillaging. This is further highlighted by the fact that the only precious objects found in Ugarit were hidden in walls and floors (Schaeffer 1968, Sandars 1978, Drews 1993, Lance and Miles 2010), and not buried under rubble. Drews (1993) also explains that many post-collapse settlements were located nearer to the coast, closer to the danger of tsunamis. Finally, Drews (1993) declares that the Egyptian accounts are completely silent about such a noteworthy event.

Droughts Carpenter suggested that a prolonged drought caused the Mycenaean collapse and subsequent depopulation (Carpenter 1966). He suggested there were different reasons for the conflagrations and destructions, some the result of civil unrest and the burning of granaries, others due to human carelessness (Carpenter 1966). Several other authors proposed local explanations for the destruction events in Greece (Mylonas 1966, Schofield 2007). However, the first evidence to support Carpenters drought hypothesis was presented by Bryson, Donley and Lamb (1974) who showed that Greece was on the boundary between deficit and excess moisture. After studying rainfall patterns from November 1954 to March 1955 they found that whilst most of the Peloponnesus and Crete only received 60% of average rainfall, Attica, Messenia and the Ionian Islands received 80%-120% of the average (Bryson, Donley and Lamb 1974). This not only supported Carpenter but explained how such weather patterns could have led to droughts in the Argolid whilst Attica, Euboea and the Ionian Islands were unaffected, allowing the population increase ca.1200 (Finley 1970, Sandars 1978, Dickinson 1994). They concluded that one such year could have been manageable but a series of such years would have been catastrophic for Mycenaean agriculture (Bryson, Donley and Lamb 1974). Furthermore, research on the Anatolian weather patterns of 1972 showed it received only 60% of its average rainfall and in some places on the plateau as low as 7% of the average (Weiss 1982). On the other hand the south western extremity of Anatolia and Rhodes received over 140% of its average rainfall (Weiss 1982). In addition, temperatures across Anatolia were between 2.5C and 4 C higher than average (Weiss 1982). The same year also showed that Syrian and Libyan rainfall was down by 60% and 50% below average respectively. Accompanying temperatures were 1.5C above average (Weiss 1982). Consequently, Weiss (1982) used the Palmer Drought Index to show that the majority of the LBA sites across the Eastern Mediterranean would have been affected by a drought similar to that of 1972. If this had occurred ca. 1200 BCE it could have been the cause behind the Libyan attacks on Egyptians during Merneptahs reign ( Fagan 2004). Scientific evidence for drought ca. 1200 BCE is plentiful. Signs of drought at Ugarit were discovered by Schaeffer, who noticed that a layer of sandy dust covered the ruins but both the preceding and succeeding layers displayed a much wetter climate (Schaeffer 1968). Further evidence from pollen samples and alluvial deposits from Gibala (near Ugarit) show climate instability and a severe drought (Kaniewski et al 2010). The key findings are the lower precipitation levels, a sharp fall in pollen of cultivated species and evidence of prolonged drought conditions lasting some 350 years (Kaniewski et al 2010). Additionally, ca. 1200 there is evidence for lower discharges of the Nile (Butzer 1976, Fagan 2004) as well as of the Tigris and Euphrates (Kay and Johnson 1981), low water levels in the Dead Sea (Bookman et al 2004). Dendrochronology indicates a four or five year long drought in Anatolia (Schwartz 2011). There is also contemporaneous textual evidence for famines. Firstly, the Libyans that faced Merneptah (ca. 1207 BCE) spend the day roaming the land and fighting to fill their bellies, they have come to the land of Egypt to seek food for their mouths (Drews 1993). Secondly, the Hittites were forced to import grain from Egypt and Ugarit to keep alive the land of Hatti (Macqueen 1975,

Drews 1993 Fagan 2004, Schwartz 2011). However, Bryce (2005) proposes this may have been a regular occurrence after Qadesh because of perpetual Hittite grain deficits rather than an emergency relief shipment. Likewise, one of the letters from the ovens at Ugarit testifies to a request of a 450 tonne shipment of grain by the Hittites because it was a matter of life and death (Macqueen 1975, Drews 1993, Fagan 2004, Schwartz 2011). Later (ca. 11th century BCE) Assyrian chronicles mention bad rains and harvest failures causing a famine so severe that they turned to cannibalism and ate one anothers flesh (Lance and Miles 2010). Whilst no textual evidence for drought in Greece has been discovered, Fagan (2004) expanded on Carpenters (1966) theory by emphasising the fact that many of the Mycenaean trade goods such as wine and olive oil relied on good harvests. Without these export goods they could not secure grain imports. Others have also commented on how disturbance of trade routes by pirates as well as a reduction in tradable commodities due to harvest shortfalls would have had a devastating effect on the Mycenaeans (Vermeule 1960, Iakovides 1974, Sandars 1978, Dickinson 1994, Dickinson 2006, Shelmerdine 2008). Another addition to the drought theory includes the paring of famine with plague as the cause of the disintegration during the LBA in Greece and Hatti (Robbins 2001, Dickinson 2006). Robbins (2001) notes how the Black Death in Europe was preceded by a widespread famine and how its effects were similar to the events that unfolded in Mycenaean Greece, namely rapid depopulation and abandonment of urban centres. Robbins (2001) also suggests that there may be some historical truth behind the opening of the Iliad, where Apollo spreads disease (using the metaphor of shooting arrows) among the Mycenaean camp to punish Agamemnon. Lastly, the lack of evidence for mass graves for the victims that such a plague would have caused can be explained by the hasty ad hoc manner of the burials (Robbins 2001). Written sources from Babylon seem to correspond to this because they mention both a famine and a plague (Neumann and Parpola 1987 cited in Robbins 2001 and Kaniewski 2010). Nevertheless, various authors are not convinced by the drought hypothesis. Firstly, Drews (1993) cites a lack of evidence for drought and puts forward Liveranis ( 1968, cited in Drews 1993) observation that it was colder and wetter during that period. Drews (1993) claims that lake levels from Switzerland and Himalayan glaciers support Liveranis observations for the whole northern hemisphere. Archaeological evidence from the 13 th century BCE Greece supports this because in the violin-bow fibulae, which were used to secure warmer woollen garments, were introduced into the Aegean (Desborough 1964, Snodgrass 1971, Drews 1993, Schofield 2007). Palmers research (1989, cited in Drews 1993) into food rations at Pylos and Knossos showed that the Pylians received 128% of their recommended daily calorie intake, showing no signs of food scarcity. Drews (1993) also points out that tablets found at Ugarit show many large flocks and herds as well as an exchange rate that shows no signs of famine or food shortages. Plus the only textual evidence for famine in Ugarit is the Hittite food tablet (Drews 1993). Drews (1993) also argues that since burnt cereals have been discovered in some of the destruction layers it suggests they werent destroyed by a starving populace or hungry invaders. Finally, Drews (1993) point out that there is no historical precedent of people destroying cities due to hunger, ever, and he wonders how they would have been able to overwhelm the state apparatus and the ruling elites.

Iron Working Equally, a technological innovation, ironworking, has been suggested as the trigger behind the LBA collapse (Childe 1942, Gottwald 1999, Lance and Miles 2010). Childe (1942) proposed that ironworking was developed in secret by the Hittites and subsequently cheap and abundant iron allowed the peasants and manufactures to become independent from the bureaucratic palaces. More importantly the state monopoly on bronze weapons was destroyed and soon barbarian rebels or disgruntled citizenry would be able to defeat civilised armies (Childe 1942, Gottwald 1999, Lance and Miles 2010), such as that of the Hittites (Childe 1942). Childes (1942) Marxian analysis postulated that iron provided a new found strength to the oppressed and impoverished base, which rose up against the imperialist elites and blew away the whole superstructure. This explains the differences in social organisation during the Iron Age. The Sea Peoples are also credited with using iron weapons to spread destruction and as well as the skill of ironworking across the rest of the Mediterranean (Childe 1942, Lance and Miles 2010). A Mycenaean-specific theory that is worth mentioning here is the idea of a Dorian revolution (Andronikos 1954 cited in Drake 2012, Chadwick 1976, Lance and Miles 2010), which tries to reconcile the differences between the Bronze Age and the Iron Age, namely the conundrum of the Dorians and Doric Greek, without an invasion. This theory is underpinned by two assumptions. Firstly, the existence of an oppressed lower class and aristocratic elite, for which there is evidence (Childe 1942, Drews 1993, Schofield 2007, Lance and Miles 2010, Schwartz 2011). Secondly, the ruling class spoke a different variety of Greek, which was used in writing the Linear B tablets whilst the lower classes spoke a different variety, which would later develop into Doric (Sandars 1978, Chadwick 1976, Schofield 2007). Evidence for such a division would be nigh-impossible to find without textual sources, and so far none has been found (Dickinson 2006). Lance and Miles (2010) suggest that the availability of iron weaponry was responsible for the destabilisation of Mycenaean society, which had functioned normally for centuries despite these contradictions. As tempting a theory as iron ascendancy may be, the opposing evidence is too strong to make it credible. Firstly, there is no evidence that the Hittites developed iron weaponry ca.1200 (Macqueen 1975) nor is there any evidence that the Sea Peoples used iron weaponry (Sandars 1978). Secondly, Waldbaums (1978) research into the weapons of the Eastern Mediterranean has determined that 96% of all 12th century BCE weapons found were still made of bronze and only in the 10 th century BCE does iron form the majority of the weapons found (54%) (cited in Drews 1993). Therefore, all theories that pertain to iron armed armies or insurrections as the cause are insupportable; however that does not completely discredit the revolution hypothesis.

Invasions and Migrations Rampaging barbarians are always a popular explanation for destruction and this period is no exception, with much literature devoted to military explanations. Hence, the discussion of invasion and migration hypotheses is divided further into four interrelating subtopics; The Dorians, The Sea Peoples, The Neighbours and The Evolution of Warfare. The Dorians The theory of a Dorian Invasion was extremely popular up to the mid-20th century, but nowadays it is mostly obsolete. Although the theory had only come into use during the 19 th century it was based on an Ancient Greek myth (The Return of the Heracleidae). Mapsero (1870, cited in Drews 1993) believed in a mass migration of Indo-European people ca. 1200 from Illyria, Epirus and the Danubian Delta, namely the Dorians and the Phrygians, who expelled the Mycenaeans and the Hittites respectively. The Dorians thus introduced Greek, the myth of the Return of the Heracleidae and brought widespread destruction (Maspero 1870, cited in Drews 1993, Childe 1942, Finley 1970). This was evidently most popular before the decipherment of Linear B in 1952 but proponents of the Dorian Invasion were still to be found. In turn, archaeological evidence began to be used to support the Dorian Invasion in favour of Ancient Greek myths. Desborough (1964) argued that non-Mycenaean objects such as the Type IIa swords and the violin-bow fibulae were introduced to Greece via the Dorians. The Dorians apparently came from Thessaly rather than Epirus (Desborough 1964, Paparigopouls 1902, cited in Drews 1993) and to protect from this northern threat a wall had been constructed at the Isthmus of Corinth (Desborough 1964). Moreover, the cyclopean walls were cited as a response to the threat of an invasion and the additions of the mid-13th century that secured the water source were also to protect against an outside threat (Desborough 1964). Nevertheless, this theory is flawed because Type IIa swords were already in use in the Mediterranean before the collapse (Snodgrass 1971, Sandars 1978 Dickinson 1994, Schofield 2007). Moreover, Snodgrass (1971) emphasises how trade could have easily spread the violin bow fibula southwards and secondly other intrusive elements found in Greece are not common enough to suggest a large cultural shift (Dickinson 2006, Shelmerdine 2008). This is further evidenced by the fact that most finds have been found in Mycenaean shaft graves and the pottery following the collapse is clearly an inferior version of Mycenaean craftsmanship rather than a new type of pottery (Snodgrass 1971). Explanations for the lack of Dorian material culture include a swift withdrawal following the destruction of the Mycenaeans (Finley 1970), hence no settlement. As well as the suggestion that the Dorians, being less advanced than the local Mycenaean population, left no archaeological traces (Winter 1977). But why would they go to such lengths to destroy places and then leave, plus if they didnt stay how did the area become Dorian (Dickinson 2006)? There is also uncertainty over the Isthmus Wall, because both Dickinson (2006) and Schofield (2007) doubt the existence of such a defensive wall at the Isthmus. Furthermore, both (Dickinson 2006, Schofield 2007) doubt whether the cyclopean walls were really a sign of outside threat rather than a show of power and prestige. Finally, the areas which were Doric in Ancient Greece, notably Laconia, show a sharp decline in population rather than an influx of new settlers that a migratory

invasion would have brought (Snodgrass 1971, Dickinson 2006), with a reduction in settlements in the Peloponnesus from 320 in the 13th century BCE to just 40 by the 11th (Tainter 1988). The Sea Peoples Another group who have been put forward as the cause of the collapse are the Sea Peoples (Maspero 1870), which are mentioned and illustrated by the Egyptians, primarily at Ramses III mortuary temple at Medinet Habu and the Great Karnak Inscription. One of the few things that is actually known is that the Sea Peoples consisted of a disparate collection of peoples from across the Mediterranean (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993, Schwartz 2011). The Egyptians named them as the; Shardana, Lukka, Ekwesh, Teresh, Shekelesh, Tjekker, Denyen, Peleset and the Weshesh (Sandars 1978). The Shardana (Sherden) had been used as mercenaries by the Egyptians, notably at the Battle of Qadesh (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993). They have been linked to Sardinia by scholars due to the phonological similarity (cited in Drews 1993), however it is now thought the evidence for that is weak (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993). Instead they may have come from the Syrian coasts (Carpenter 1966, Sandars 1978) and only resettled in Sardinia (Drews 1993). The only archaeological link to Sardinia is bronze statuettes that portray Shardana style armour and weaponry dated to ca. 1000 BCE (Sandars 1978). Equally, a bronze statuette of an ingot god found at Enkomi in Eastern Cyprus and a Baal statuette from Ugarit exhibit Shardana characteristics (Sandars 1978). Sandars (1978) also notes that the admiration of the bull, epitomised by the horns, was common in the Levant, Anatolia and Mesopotamia as well as in Minoan Crete. The Lukka were also known to the Egyptians since the soldiers of the Lukka Lands fought against them at Qadesh. The Lukka Lands have been associated with Lycia and Caria (Sandars 1978, Bryce 2005) and are documented by the Hittites first as a defeated enemy people then as pirates, who constantly raided Cyprus (Sandars 1978). The Ekwesh (Akawasha) are the largest group making up the Sea Peoples and have been linked to Homers Achaeans and Hittite Ahhiyawa (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993). However, there is uncertainty over where these Achaeans came from since Mycenaeans settled not only the Peloponnesus but also Crete, Rhodes, south western parts of Anatolia as well as smaller islands (Carpenter 1966). However, the Ekwesh are described as being circumcised, which is unusual for Indo-European peoples and more common of Semitic cultures. The Denyen have also been identified with the Mycenaeans via the Homers Danaans (Drews 1993, Schwartz 2011). After their defeat by the Egyptians it is thought they settled in Cyprus which became known as Yadanana (Schwartz 2011) and introduced greaves, the Greek language and a new pottery style (Snodgrass 1971, Sandars 1978, Dickinson 1994, Schwartz 2011). On the contrary, Sandars (1978) links the Denyen to the Land of Danua mentioned by the Egyptians, which corresponds to an area north of Ugarit and more precisely to Adana in Cilicia. Likewise Sandars (1978) links the Denyen to the Biblical Tribe of Dan which resided in the area during the Iron Age, as described by the Bible. The Teresh (Tursha) have been connected with the Hittite Taruisha, who became known to the Greeks and Romans as the Tyrrhenians (Sandars 1978). They were migrants and pirates from Asia Minor who were mentioned by Hesiod as settling in Italy (cited in Sandars 1978). In his Histories, (I.

94) Herodotus supports this by claiming that the origins of the Etruscans lay in Prince Tyrrhenus who fled from famine in Lydia. Drews (1993) also supports the theory of an Asia Minor homeland for the Teresh and pinpoints it to the city of Tarsa that is found in Hittite texts, which may well be the future Tarsus. Both the Tjekker and the Weshesh have been labelled as Trojan due to the connection to the Teucri tribe from the Troad and the Hittite name for Troy, Wilusa from which the Greek (W)Ilios is derived (Sandars 1978). After the LBA collapse it seems that the Tjekker resettled in the Levant because an Egyptian 11th century papyrus describing the Tale of Wen Amon mentions the Tjekker as living in Dor, Canaan (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993). The Peleset were another group who settled in the Levant after the LBA collapse and subsequently gave their name to Philistia or what is now called Palestine (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993). Although identified with the Sea Peoples, it seems they took part in a land migration through Canaan to reach the Delta (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993). Philistine pottery shows a combination of Aegean characteristics and Levantine imagery (Finley 1970, Sandars 1978) so there are possible links to Anatolia and Greece (Finley 1970, Sandars 1978, Drews 1993). Lastly, the Shekelesh have been identified with the Sikala mentioned in Ugaritic accounts and the Sikels of Sicily (Sandars 1978). They were circumcised, suggesting a Near Eastern origin, but little else is known about them (Sandars 1978). The Sea Peoples, along with other participants, form the basis of two hypothesises into the LBA collapse the Raiders theory and the Migrations theory. The raiders hypothesis views the Sea Peoples as pirates and brigands who brought wide scale destruction to the coasts of the Eastern Mediterranean and as such were the cause of the collapse rather than a consequence (Finley 1970, Drews 1993). The tablet from Pylos which speaks of watchers of the sea being dispatched and the King of Ugarits preoccupation with enemy ships is evidence for a naval threat, which whilst powerful was limited in number (Sandars 1978, Lance and Miles 2010). A tablet from Ugarit highlights this the seven ships of the enemy that came here inflicted much damage upon us (Lance and Miles 2010). Consequently, trade was inhibited by piracy, which in turn led to more piracy as people supplemented lost trade with plunder (Vermeule 1960, Snodgrass 1971, Lance and Miles 2010). Furthermore, the Armana documents complain of Lukki raids on the Island of Alashiya or Cyprus (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993) and their continuous seizing of villages in Alashiya (Sandars 1978, Armstrong 2003). The Sea Peoples that faced the Egyptians were the final stage of the collapse that involved many peoples who had joined the original pirates (Sandars 1978, Dickinson 1994). On the other hand the migration hypothesis attributes the Sea Peoples to migrations that were the consequence of the LBA collapse rather than the cause of it (except for Maspero 1870). Population movements by land included the Libyans and Philistines as well as other smaller groups across the Eastern Mediterranean (Sandars 1978, Dickinson 1994, Lance and Miles 2010, Schwartz 2011). In Greece evidence for 75%-90% population decline (Finley 1970, Tainter 1988) may be evidence of mass emigration. Whilst at Medinet Habu the Libyan ox cart with women and children as well as the

reference enemy bringing his wife and his children on the Great Karnak Inscription show a migration rather than a purely military force. The Hittites were also on the move ca. 1200 BCE as demonstrated by the establishment of the neo-Hittite kingdoms further south in Northern Syria (Macqueen 1975, Sandars 1978). They in turn may have been set into motion by the Kaska people from northern Anatolia, who had been a perpetual nuisance and were moving southwards before eventually being defeated by the Assyrians (Macqueen 1975, Tainter 1988) These migrations occurred simultaneously by land and by sea (Sandars 1978), but why? The proposed causes of these migrations add strength to the argument because they provide a motive. The Sea Peoples could have been climate refugees that were fleeing famine stricken homelands that attacked Egypt because it had regular Nile floods and therefore greater agricultural stability (Fagan 2004, Schwartz 2011). Alternatively, they could have been escaping overpopulation and other factors which had led to systems collapse (Childe 1942, Sandars 1978, Dickinson 1994). Finally, they could have been pushed out by population movements further north (Maspero 1870 cited in Drews 1993, Lance and Miles 2010). The main difficulties with the raiders hypothesis is that there are no signs of destruction in the Cyclades which lie en route, no explanations for why the raiders were suddenly strong enough to take on empires and also the destruction of well-defended inland settlements such as Hattusas (Sandars 1978, Dickinson 1994, Dickinson 2006). Drews (1993) puts forward an explanation for the superiority of the attacker, which will be discussed below in The Evolution of Warfare section. Equally, the migration theory has not found total acceptance due to the lack of explicit evidence and its overreliance on the propagandistic inscriptions at Medinet Habu and at Karnak (Drews 1993, Dickinson 1994). Although, Drews (1993) accepts that the Libyan and Philistine migrations did occur, he claims that Sea Peoples were mercenaries that sided with the Sea Peoples (Sandars (1978) also suggest this for the Shardana) and therefore account for such a small number of casualties. The Neighbours Another exclusively Greek theory assigns the collapse to internal conflicts between the different Mycenaean palatial centres. Competition over diminishing resources may have been the cause of intensified conflict (Dickinson 1994). This led to the securing of fresh water in the citadels and the expansion of the Cyclopean walls surrounding Mycenae, Tiryns and Athens, not only for defence but also as a show of power to rivals (Dickinson 1994, Dickinson 2006, Schofield 2007, Shelmerdine 2008). However, away from the Argolid, at Pylos there were no fortifications at all suggesting its relative isolation put it out of ha rms way (Sandars 1978, Schofield 2007). The strongest evidence for inter-state warfare are the multiple destructions of Thebes up to a century before the destructions of the other Mycenaean centres (Dickinson 2006, Schofield 2007), suggestive of the myth of Seven against Thebes. There is no written evidence for internal conflict and frescoes such as the one at Pylos seem to portray the enemy as primitive peoples in fur skins rather than equals of the Mycenaeans (Shelmerdine 2008). Finally, this does not necessarily mean the destructions are due to local rivalries but local conflicts could have weakened the Mycenaeans enough for raiders or natural disasters to be catastrophic or it may have contributed to systems collapse (Dickinson 1994).

10

The Evolution of Warfare The idea that a new way of fighting caused the LBA collapse is relatively new theory and as of 2012 the only proponent of it is Robert Drews. Drews (1993) saw the merits of a military explanation for the disasters but saw that there was no explanation of the sudden military superiority of pirates that had previously only been a slight nuisance. Therefore, he developed the hypothesis that an evolution in military tactics gave them an advantage The 2nd millennium BCE saw the diffusion of chariot warfare across Asia and by the 13th centuries BCE armies containing thousands of chariots were being fielded by the great empires, notably the Egyptians and the Hittites (Drews 1993). For just one chariot team up to 10 acres of fertile grain land as well as armour and weaponry for the noble elites was needed (Drews 1993). The chariot teams were the main combatants whilst infantry played a minor role serving as skirmishers (runners in Egyptian terminology), clean up troops, besiegers, guards and fighting in terrain inaccessible to chariots (Drews 1993). Since smaller kingdoms, rebels and so on could not field chariot armies they were not a threat to the empires, but ca. 1200 BCE a rapid change in infantry weapons and armour changed the situation (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993). The innovations cited by Drews (1993) include the use of greaves, javelins, slashing swords and round shields. The discovery of thirteen javelin heads in Ugarit as well as the spread of the Naue Type II swords exemplifies the spread of this equipment from Europe (Drews 1993). The changes in warfare started off in Greece, being adopted by the mass infantry armies of Libya and used by Sea People mercenaries (Drews 1993). The defeats of old style chariot armies by new mobile foot soldiers happened across the Eastern Mediterranean except for in Egypt (Drews 1993). The Egyptians under Ramses III adopted similar tactics in order to win against the Sea Peoples in the Nile Delta (Drews 1993). Finally, he cites Homers references to warriors as aichmetai, based on the root aichme meaning spear, as a sign of a change in warfare ( Drews 1993). He also parallels this with the Dorians, who might have fought as close order spearmen and derived their name from doru, also meaning spear (Drews 1993). As well-rounded as this theory seems at a first glance, it still has trouble explaining some aspects surrounding a military explanation. Firstly, the innovations in weapons technology that he mentions have been found at Mycenae and at Enkomi dating to the mid-13th century BCE hence it was not introduced as suddenly and as violently as he proposes (Snodgrass 1971, Sandars 1978, Dickinson 2006). However, even if these new tactics were in use how would they help in storming wellfortified towns such as Hattusas and Mycenae (Dickinson 2006)? Nevertheless raiders and pirates would seldom get tied down to besieging cities (Dickinson 2006), especially cities with secure water sources and cyclopean walls that would take a long time to fall. To storm these places there would need to be overwhelming force for which there is no archaeological evidence at sites following the LBA collapse, indeed the opposite is seen in Greece (Dickinson 2006). Secondly, why would the conquerors wish to completely destroy their victory prize (Dickinson 2006)? Finally, some reject his theory on the simple basis that it presents a simplistic monocausal explanation to a complex multifaceted problem (Dickinson 2006, Shelmerdine 2008).

11

Systems Collapse Systems collapse theory was developed by Joseph Tainter in 1988 and is a general model for describing why complex societies collapse. The theory revolves around the fact that complex societies (civilisations) are problem solving organisations that gradually grow more and more complex as a result of recurring stresses (Tainter 1988). These problem solving systems require upkeep and as complexity increases so does the upkeep cost per capita in order to maintain the complexity (Tainter 1988). The regular stresses are also accompanied by unexpected stresses which the complex society must navigate (Tainter 1988). It can only do this if there are still reserves in the system, if the society is already at full capacity maintaining the current complexity it will not be able to cope with unexpected stress surges (Tainter 1988). Moreover, complex societies often reach a point of declining marginal returns on their investments, which forces them to invest even more in maintaining the current complexity (Tainter 1988). This eventually leads to the evaporation of production surpluses, making unexpected problems even harder to deal with (Tainter 1988). Finally, the declining marginal returns make the complexity of the current system less appealing and beneficial to some strata of society who may move towards independence from the complexity (Tainter 1988). This results in a sapping away of the elites power base and opens the complex society to external and internal threats (Tainter 1988). The theory of systems collapse in relation to the LBA collapse has been used mostly to explain the Mycenaean and Hittite collapses. The Mycenaean kingdoms have been identified as being overcentralised and overspecialised (Sandars 1978, Dickinson 1994, Fagan 2004, Schofield 2007, Shelmerdine 2008), which made them prime candidates for unsustainable complexity. The increasing population (Childe 1942, Sandars 1978) led to the over intensive use of marginal farmland for growing only one cereal wheat (Betancourt 1976, Sandars 1978, Dickinson 1994). As land lost its productivity surpluses dwindled and the Kings (Wa-na-ka) lost control over their populaces because of the failure of the redistributive economy (Sandars 1978, Tainter 1988, Dickinson 1994, Schofield 2007). This was followed by the collapse of trading and opened up the Mycenaeans to the destructions of their palaces either by internal or external agents (Sandars 1978, Tainter 1988, Dickinson 1994). In essence the final push is less important than the reasons behind the economic collapse of a top heavy superstructure (Childe 1942). Tainter (1988) also notes how the Mycenaean could have succumbed to stresses that they had previously survived due to the existence of a reserve in the system. The existence of many craftsmen and traders in the cities who had no knowledge of farming further aggravated the problem (Sandars 1978, Schofield 2007) and may have led to an increase in piracy as well as the mass emigration from the Peloponnesus (Childe 1942, Sandars 1978). The Hittites also faced symptoms of systems collapse, mainly in the form of unruly vassals, revolting border provinces, collapse of their form of feudalism and feuds within the royal family (Macqueen 1975, Sandars 1978, Fagan 2004). Moreover, they may have been severely weakened by this disintegration that they were defeated by the Kaska, a northern enemy who had previously been easily put down (Macqueen 1975, Tainter 1988). Egypt also saw economic and political breakdown partly due to Egypts overreliance on foreign mercenaries (Sandars 1978). With the collapse of the Hittites and the

12

weakening of Egypt the Levant faced a power vacuum, resulting in disintegration and the penetration of semi-nomadic shepherds and Sea Peoples into the area (Sandars 1978) However, the tablets from Pylos and from Ugarit show no evidence of systems collapse; on the contrary it shows that all systems were working until the final moments of the collapse (Drews 1993, Shelmeridne 2008). The only textual evidence of systems collapse actually comes from Egypt where there are records of social upheaval and general strikes triggered by a failure to distribute rations and the decline of Nubian gold ores (Faulkner 1975, Fagan 2004). Ultimately, systems collapse theory explains the socio-economic and political background behind the breakdown but does not detail nor concern itself with the exact causes of the violent finale (Shelmerdine 2008).

13

Discussion
The two theories with the most merit appear to be systems collapse and drought. It will be argued that climatic change was the precipitating factor of the catastrophe. Using archaeological and primary source evidence a plausible version of events resulting from the drier climate over the Eastern Mediterranean can be reconstructed followed by a look at what could be learnt from the LBA collapse. Mycenaean palace economies were over-centralised (Sandars 1978, Dickinson 1994, Schofield 2007), with conservative and bureaucratic governance not conducive to adaptation. The kingdoms had reached an unsustainable level of complexity and had greatly exceeded the carrying capacity of the land (Childe 1942, Sandars 1978), leading to the exhaustive use of marginal land for concentrating on growing only few types of crops (Betancourt 1960, Sandars 1978, Dickinson 1994). To complicate matters further, their economy was over-specialised in agriculture and in production (Sandars 1978, Dickinson 1994) making them vulnerable to rapid changes in demand and supply. Furthermore, their society was highly stratified, with a large gap between the palatial elites (including the warrior caste) and the serfs, which would create class antagonisms between the various sections of society (Childe 1942, Sandars 1978, Schofield 2007). Finally, warfare between Mycenaean kingdoms (Sandars 1978, Dickinson 1994) required high military expenditure in order to maintain well-equipped armies and well-defended citadels. The destruction of the Theban palace that took place before the collapse and the extension of the cyclopean walls at Mycenae Tiryns and Athens (Sandars 1978, Dickinson 2006, Schofield 2007) are evidence for this interstate fighting, which was intensifying due to decreasing resources. Consequently, the elites waged war at the expense of socio-economic investment. The Hittite empire contained comparable vulnerabilities such as over-centralisation, social inequality and high military spending on chariot forces and defences (Sandars 1978, Schwartz 2011). However, the Hittites were also over-reliant on grain imports through the port of Ura in Cilicia (Macqueen 1975, Sandars 1978, Bryce 2005). This rendered them extremely vulnerable to changes in the trade networks, especially those caused by pirates. The Hittite Empire was based on a primitive form of feudalism, however it gave too much power to the barons who often proved disloyal (Macqueen 1975, Fagan 2004) and furthermore in the last century of the Hittite empire feuds within the royal family resulted in political instability (Macqueen 1975, Dickinson 2006). Finally, the Hittite empire faced constant threats from hostile borderlands in the north from the Kaska, in the east from the Assyrians and in the west from Arzawa (Macqueen 1975, Sandars 1978, Tainter 1988, Drews 1993). Similarly Egypt was a centralised and stratified society that was heavily reliant on the Nile floods to furnish its granaries (Sandars 1978, Fagan 2004). Like the aforementioned civilisations it also invested heavily in the military (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993, Fagan 2004) but rather than feudal service it was dependent on mercenaries, namely the infamous Shardana (Sandars 1978). Considering there had been over half a century of peace the continued presence of warriors in Egypt was dangerous to civil society due to the risk of mutinies (Sandars 1978). Despite the peace, Egypt did have a number of volatile borders, the Nubians in the south, the Libyans to the west and the semi-nomadic tribes of Arabia in the east (Drews 1993).

14

Finally, the Canaanite and Ugaritic kingdoms along the coast of the Levant had the same underlying weaknesses, namely an over centralised economy, a stratified society (Sandars 1978) and high military spending (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993). However, since the tablets found at Ugarit show no sign of systems collapse (Drews 1993, Shelmerdine 2008) it is possible that Ugarit had not yet reached the point of declining marginal returns and was able to cope with the pressures caused by the drought. Although the LBA civilisations contained these inherent weaknesses the societies were functional (Drews 1993) as long as everything ran smoothly. However, because the societies were running at a hundred per cent capacity any unexpected stresses would have been damaging to the proper functioning of the systems (Tainter 1988) and would likely have exposed these flaws. The best contender for the unexpected stress is a prolonged drought that affected the Eastern Mediterranean (Carpenter 1966, Bryson et al 1974, Weiss 1982, Fagan 2004, Kaniewski et al 2010, Schwartz 2011). Modern analyses of weather patterns (Bryson et al 1974, Weiss 1982, Fagan 2004) suggest drought can have the necessary characteristics. Can this model explain the collapse? The primary impacts of a drought would be crop failures across the Mediterranean (Dickinson 1994, Fagan 2004, Kaniewski et al 2010). Even areas less dependent on rainfall, such as the Nile Delta, would have been affected due to the lower levels of the Nile floods (Butzer 1976, Fagan 2004). The initial effects would have been food shortages and a decrease in tradable goods (Sandars 1978, Dickinson 1994, Shelmerdine 2008). Whilst the kingdoms may well have been able to overcome the first year of drought a succession of droughts would have resulted in decreased surpluses and income leading to famine (Dickinson 1994, Fagan 2004). The urgent requests of Ugaritic grain shipments by the Hittites (Macqueen 1975, Drews 1993, Fagan 2004, Schwartz 2011) and if rejecting Bryces interpretation (2005) the Egyptian grain shipments to the Hittites (Macqueen 1975, Drews 1993 Fagan 2004, Schwartz 2011) show efforts at famine relief. The secondary impacts included economic disintegration and the melting away of the Kings powerbase and legitimacy (Sandars 1978, Fagan 2004). In the Hittite Empire this resulted in peripheral regions becoming independent (Macqueen 1975, Sandars 1975). Anatolia and Greece also saw an increase in piracy (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993, Dickinson 1994), which was used to supplement the loss of trade and agricultural income. This increase in piracy resulted in a breakdown of the trade and communications systems (Dickinson 1994, Dickinson 2006, Shelmerdine 2008), which prevented the Hittites and Mycenaeans from importing essential supplies. The increase in seaborne raiding is evidenced by the tablets at Pylos, which show preoccupation with a naval threat just prior to the destruction of the city (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993, Dickinson 1994, Schofield 2007, Lance and Miles 2010), which was likely caused by the Mycenaean neighbours in search of easy plunder, Pylos being un-walled (Schofield 2007). Equally, in Anatolia the main raiders were the Lukka, which Hittite records show as continually attacking Cyprus (Sandars 1978). Some of the population in the Hittite Empire and the Mycenaean kingdoms started to disperse from the urban centres (Snodgrass 1971, Sandars 1978, Fagan 2004), it is possible that they headed for regions with reliable sources of water or more stable rainfall (Fagan 2004). This search for favourable agricultural conditions could explain the increase in population in Achaea, Attica, Euboea and the Ionian Islands (Finley 1970, Sandars 1978, Dickinson 1994). Nevertheless, large cohorts of

15

craftsmen previously supported by the palaces, who had no knowledge of farming (Sandars 1978, Fagan 2004, Schofield 2007) remained within the cities. In Egypt the fall in income resulted in unpaid wages to the mercenaries (Childe 1942, Sandars 1978), which would prove to be perilous later. The pivotal events of the collapse occurred in the Peloponnesus and in Anatolia in the last decades of the 13th century BCE (Snodgrass 1971, Macqueen 1975, Sandars 1978). The starving, disenchanted populations destroyed the palaces and other symbols of state power (Chadwick 1976, Sandars 1978, Drews 1993, Dickinson 1994, Dickinson 2006, Schofield 2007, Schwartz 2011) and either abandoned the city or stayed in the impoverished lower city stripped of the trappings of civilisation (Snodgrass 1971, Sandars 1978, Dickinson 2006). Even though this seems foolish and of no benefit to any class (Snodgrass 1971, Drews 1993) one has to realise that at that time the whole palatial system was of no benefit to the lower classes. In fact it was unnecessary complexity that was only beneficial to the ruling minority, which had successfully alienated the serfs (Childe 1942). Therefore the majority had no stake in the luxurious society of the ruling class who now gave nothing in return and it is perfectly understandable why the populace would destroy its own cities (Andronikos 1954, Chadwick 1976). With the destructions in Greece and Anatolia a series of emigrations, by land and by sea began, creating the Sea Peoples. The Hittites and the Mitanni started moving southwards (Macqueen 1975, Sandars 1978) bringing destruction to northern Mesopotamia and Northern Syria. Whilst in the rest of Anatolia people were fleeing the drought either by moving eastwards on land or by setting out to sea (Sandars 1978). It is likely that the Lukka, Teresh and maybe the Shekelesh came from the coasts of Anatolia (Sandars 1978) and were joined by the Ekwesh from the Mycenaean centres (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993, Dickinson 1994). In addition to this, the Libyans were also migrating (Childe 1942, Sandars 1978, Drews 1993, Fagan 2004) as a result of the drought which extended as far south as Libya (Fagan 2004). This collection of peoples was heading towards the Nile because it presented a stable agricultural land, a well-known fact across the Eastern Mediterranean due to centuries of trade between the various civilisations (Fagan 2004, Schwartz 2011). The final member of this coalition was the Shardana (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993) who were Egyptian mercenaries that had decided to defect (Sandars 1978) or maybe they simply served the highest bidder. This is what the Egyptians faced during the reign of Merneptah (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993, Schwartz 2011). The defeat of the Sea Peoples by Merneptah (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993) forced the Sea Peoples to find landfall somewhere else and they most probably split and went to several locations. However, evidence for an influx to Cyprus is the most fascinating (Sandars 1978, Dickinson 1994, Schwartz 2011). During the period Cypriot cities were destroyed but then rebuilt and re-inhabited by large populations which left material remains reflecting both Levantine and Mycenaean culture rather than Cypriot (Sandars 1978). This new influx of population could have been the Sea Peoples which naturally brought a mixture of cultures to the island. Furthermore, the introduction of the Greek Language around this time and the discovery of bronze greaves (Sandars 1978, Dickinson 1994) highlight the fact that the Sea Peoples contained a large contingent of Greeks, the Ekwesh.

16

Additionally, the ingot god found at Enkomi exhibits similar features to the Shardana portrayed at Medinet Habu, namely a round shield and a horned helmet (Sandars 1978). From their bases in Cyprus the Sea Peoples continued raiding the surrounding area, Ugarit was likely the victim of such seaborne raiders (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993, Kaniewski et al 2010). The raiders removed any valuables in plain sight, leaving only the hidden caches of precious goods found in the wall and floors (Schaeffer 1968, Sandars 1978, Drews 1993). The subsequent destruction by fire of Ugarit (Schaeffer 1968, Sandars 1978, Drews 1993, Kaniewski et al 2010) is very strong evidence for human destruction. The raiders were successful because the Ugaritic kingdom was already weakened due to engagement against other opponents (Drews 1993, Lance and Miles 2010), possibly migrants from Anatolia, and equally it was facing a drought (Schaeffer 1968, Kaniewski et al 2010). However, sometime after the destruction of Ugarit, during the 8 th year of Ramses III reign the Sea Peoples once again threatened Egypt (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993, Robbins 2001). However, the composition of these Sea Peoples had changed, the Shekelesh are joined by new names at Medinet Habu - the Peleset, Tjekker, Weshwesh and Denyen (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993). The Peleset, Tjekker and Weshwesh may well have been new migrants that were uprooted from their Anatolian and Syrian homelands either by drought, immigrants, raiders, or most likely a melange of these reasons (Carpenter 1966, Sandars 1978). The Peleset made their way by land towards Egypt whilst the Weshwesh and Tjekker may have joined the Denyen and Shekelesh on their sea (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993). However, the Denyen were not a new people but rather the Ekwesh (Drews 1993) that had been staying on Cyprus, which had acquired the name Yadanana (Schwartz 2011). Also of note is that in Homers Iliad Achaean and Danaan are used interchangeably, which could parallel the Egyptian nomenclature for the Greeks. Once again the Sea Peoples were defeated, on sea and on land by Ramses III (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993). After their defeat the Sea Peoples settled in the Levant, the Peleset giving their name to Philistia or Palestine (Finley 1970, Sandars 1978, Drews 1993) and the Tjekker settling slightly further north where they are encountered at Dor in the 11 th century Tale of Wen-Amun (Sandars 1978). A mixture of Greek and Anatolian peoples settling there would explain the different style of pottery found at Philistine sites (Finley 1970, Sandars 1978). Overtime the different cultures merged adopting local language and culture (Sandars 1978) in contrast to the changes that took place on Cyprus (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993, Dickinson 1994, Schwartz 2011). Despite the fact that Egypt was victorious against the Sea Peoples it still entered a protracted decline (Sandars 1978, Drews 1993, Fagan 2004, Schwartz 2011). The drought showed no sign of easing, with Nile discharge dropping (Butzer 1976, Fagan 2004) and trading partners as well as some peripheral regions of the empire being lost (Sandars 1978, Schwartz 2011). The redistributive economy was breaking down due to harvest shortfalls, as evidenced high inflation and the strikes of the royal craftsmen who had not received their food rations (Faulkner 1976, Fagan 2004). There was also socio-political turmoil, resulting in an outbreak of tomb robberies (Fagan 2004). All these factors led to the permanent decline of the Egyptian New Kingdom, to the benefit of the Shasu (Sandars 1978). The Shasu were semi-nomads from the Arabian Peninsula who would emerge as the Israelites and Arameans during the Dark Ages and settle in the Levant (Sandars 1978, Schwartz 2011).

17

The LBA collapse is what Tainter (1988) would call a rapid reduction in complexity. Within a generation (Sandars 1978, Dickinson 1994, Fagan 2004) the Eastern Mediterranean world was radically different. Initially, the events were triggered by natural causes, drought, but soon human actions created a positive feedback loop (a series of events that reinforced and aggravated the problem), which resulted in the widespread destructions. Moreover, the previous development of unsustainable complexity and of unstable structures in these kingdoms is what generated the potential for such a catastrophe. So what can we learn about civilisation from a collapse that occurred over three thousand years ago? Western Civilisation in the 21st century is as unstable, if not more so, than its counterparts in the LBA. It is inherently unstable and unsustainable because of number of factors. Firstly, global capitalism is reliant on economic growth, has internal contradictions and its perpetual crises create instability (Marx 1894). Secondly, the fossil fuel economy is unsustainable because current predictions suggest oil and gas will last for about fifty years, and coal less than two hundred (The Guardian 2011, EIA 2012). That is not even mentioning the other diminishing or poorly distributed resources, such as food and water (Guardian 2011, UNESCO 2012). Moreover, the world economy is overspecialised and over reliant on international trade, for example the USA imported $2.236 trillion worth of goods in 2011, including over 10 million barrels of oil per day (CIA Factbook). Furthermore, the world is experiencing exponential population growth, by 2100 it is projected that there will be over 10 billion people (UN 2010). Yet, instead of using the income created by cheap fossil fuels to secure the future, governments spend large amounts on military expenditure, the USA for example spent over 4% of its GDP and Oman spent almost 12% of its GDP on military expenditure in 2005 (CIA Factbook). Lastly and arguably most importantly humans are destroying their own habitat, through the exploitation and destruction of nature as well as by altering the world climate (UNEP 2012). The aforementioned threats are in my opinion the greatest international problems that we face, however there is a host of smaller country-specific problems that in unison pose an equally large threat, from ageing populations in the UK (The Telegraph 2008) to the threat of super weeds in the USA (Earth Justice 2011). Fossil fuels have allowed civilisation to rapidly gain complexity in the last two centuries (Tainter 1988) but, as indicated above, it is still unstable and unsustainable, just like the LBA societies. We are also close to, if not already at the point declining marginal returns (Tainter 1988, Evans 2011, UNEP 2012) and we still have to face the myriad of pressures that roughly 3 of warming by 2100 (IPCC 2007) would bring. In general, humankind will have to face similar challenges that it did during the LBA collapse, breakdown of economic and political systems, climate refuges, increased warfare plus many other climatic problems (IPCC 2007). Therefore, there is potential for massive suffering, mortality and even the possibility of a new Dark Age to parallel that of the LBA descending over the world.

18

Conclusion
The LBA collapse shows how climatic change could be the trigger behind the complete destruction of civilisation due to the inherent weaknesses or contradictions that permeate a society. The LBA kingdoms were over-centralised, over-specialised, stratified, had high military expenditure and crucially they had reached the point of diminishing returns on their investments in maintaining the level of complexity. The unexpected stress of a prolonged drought, which could have lasted several hundred years, was all that was necessary to initiate a chain reaction that within a generation had engulfed the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean. The Mycenaean and Hittite superstructure was destroyed by their own people and the cities razed to the ground whilst Egypt was mortally wounded in the fight against refugees from the crumbling civilisations. These refugees came in two phases by land and by sea, and thanks to the Egyptians have become known as Sea Peoples. The Ugaritic kingdom and other Canaanite city sates were also severely weakened by raiders and the drought resulting in the inevitable destruction by a final wave of Sea Peoples who had settled in Cyprus following their defeat by Merneptah. Studying the LBA collapse is important because it is not merely a historical curiosity but helps highlight the direct parallels between the 13 th century BCE and the 21st century. Firstly, Western civilisation is extremely unstable due to similar reasons; a perilous economic system that creates stratification and unsustainability, overpopulation, squandering of resources on warfare and reliance on trade. Added to this, modern civilisation is heavily reliant on non-renewable fossil fuels and is on the point of diminishing returns on its investments. Finally, just as in the 13 th century BCE, climate change will put an overwhelming strain upon society. The marked difference between these two ages however is knowledge; humankind knows exactly what it is doing to the planet and it knows how to start fixing the problem, but seems to be failing. Little is being done by short sighted, profit oriented corporations and governments to protect the future of human civilisation just as the Mycenaean Kings just carried on fighting each other, living in a luxury and neglecting the rest of the population. When the Mycenaean people became aware of this they decapitated their masters but in the processes they lost civilisation. However, if people in 21 st century took power off the self-interested minority, they would have the potential to transform society in order to avoid a repeat of the events of the LBA collapse and preserve the fragile invention of civilisation.

19

Evaluation
It was necessary in order to control the length of this project that several areas of research be greatly summarized or omitted for the sake of clarity and brevity. Some works were also impossible to find (for example, Maspero 1870), requiring me to use citations from other sources. My lack of relevant linguistic knowledge leaves my argument highly dependent on translations of the primary documents, which warrant further analysis due to the inherent ambiguities and differing renditions. Equally, my inadequacies in the scientific field limit the efficacy of my critique of the seismological and meteorological arguments. This meant that there is no discussion as to the causes of the changing weather patterns behind the drought. Equally, it was judged that the enormous literature on the chronology of the catastrophe could not be thoroughly treated in my report, although I did research this literature in order to scope its importance. As one of the most important research sub-topics surrounding the catastrophe it would be deserving of a study on its own. The comparison between the Late Bronze Age and the present day is still rather threadbare and could be fleshed out considerably, including the addition of major contrasts between the two societies. When I came to write the project I had already decided that I wanted to write a piece that looks forward to the future and maybe in this way my argument for the causes of the collapse is too deeply rooted in contemporary issues. But can a historian ever get away from the world that he lives in? Finally, whilst, in the conclusion, there is recognition that change must come, a question that needs further contemplation is how to ensure that the 21 st century does not result in a Late Silicon Age Collapse.

20

Appendix

21

Figure 1 (above): Major sites in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean which were destroyed at the end of the Late Bronze Age (Drews 1993). Certain extracts from the Great Karnak Inscription (for full text see Manassa 2003) In the beginning of the victory which the king of Upper and Lower Egypt Banire -mi-amun, the son of Re, Hotephima-Merneptah, granted life, achieved over the wretched chief of Libya, Meryey, the son Dedy, Akawasha, Terusha, Lukka, Sherden Shekelesh, the northerners who came from all lands. Sherden, Shekelesh, Akawasha, Lukka, and Tursha consisting of the seizure of the best of every fighter and every runner of his foreign land; he bringing his wife, his children. To fill their bellies daily do they spend the day wandering and fighting. To seek the necessities of their mouths do they come to the land of Egypt. Of the Rebu slain and their phalli with foreskins carried off total of the great chiefs 6,359 Sherden, Shekelesh, Akawasha from the foreign lands of the sea who did not have foreskins foreskins Shekelesh 222 men amounting to 250 hands Tursha 742 men amounting to 790 hands | Sherden Akawasha who did not have foreskins who were slain and their hands carried off, making uncircumcised phalli 6,111 men their hands 2,362 men. Wives of the fallen chief of Rebu whom he brought with him, they being alive 12 Rebu women. Certain extracts from Medinet Habu (for full text see Breasted 2001) The countries -- --, the Northerners in their isles were disturbed, taken away in the fray -- at one time. Not one stood before their hands, from Kheta, Kode, Carchemish, Arvad, Alashia, they were wasted. They desolated his people and his land like that which is not. They came with fire prepared before them, forward to Egypt. Their main support was Peleset, Tjekker, Shekelesh, Denyen, and Weshesh. (These) lands were united, and they laid their hands upon the land as far as the Circle of the Earth.

22

 I equipped my frontier in Zahi, prepared before them. The chiefs, the captains of infantry, the nobles, I caused to equip the river-mouths, like a strong wall, with warships, galleys, and barges. They were manned completely from bow to stern with valiant warriors bearing their arms, soldiers of all the choicest of Egypt, being like lions roaring upon the mountain-tops. The charioteers were warriors, and all good officers, ready of hand. Their horses were quivering in their every limb, ready to crush the countries under their feet. Those who reached my boundary, their seed is not; their heart and their soul are finished forever and ever. As for those who had assembled before them on the sea, the full flame was in their front, before the river-mouths, and a wall of metal upon the shore surrounded them. They were dragged, overturned, and laid low upon the beach; slain and made heaps from stern to bow of their galleys, while all their things were cast upon the water. As for the Nine Bows, I have taken away their land and their boundaries; they are added to mine. Their chiefs and their people (come) to me with praise. The northern countries, which are in their isles, are restless in their limbs; they infest the ways of the river-mouths. Come, to take them, being: Peleset, Denyen, Shekelesh. Thy strength it was which was before me, overthrowing their seed Certain extracts from the Letters at Ugarit (from Lance and Miles 2010) My father, behold the enemys ships came; my cities were burned and they did evil things in my country. May my father know it: the seven ships of the enemy that came here infl icted much damage upon us. Ships of the enemy have been seen at sea! Well, you must remain firm. Our food on the threshing floor is burned and also the vineyards are destroyed. Our city is destroyed and may you know it.

23

Figure 2 (above): Ramses III naval battle against the sea peoples, line drawing of the illustration at Medinet Habu (http://teachmiddleeast.lib.uchicago.edu/historical-perspectives/empiresto-nation-states/before-islam/images/empires-nations-before-islam09.jpg) Figure 3 (left): A detail from the naval battle showing the Shardana, at Medinet Habu (http://riversfromeden.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/seapeoples17.jpg)

24

Figure 4 (Right): A detail from the land battle against the sea peoples shows ox carts, women and children and Peleset warriors, at Medinet Habu (http://colonne.idra.info/lnx/IMG/jpg/GUERRIER.jpg) Figure 5 (below left): Captured warriors of the Sea Peoples with original colours, at Medinet Habu (http://www.historyfiles.co.uk/images/MiddleEast/ Anatolia/SeaPeoples_Ekwesh01_full.jpg) Figure 6 (below right): Mean annual precipitation for two Greek cities over three millennia, showing a pronounced reduction in rainfall ca.1200 BCE (Bryson et al 1974, http://ccr.aos.wisc.edu/resources/CPEP/ archaeo_models-myc.php)

25

Figure 7 (left): The Late Bronze Age collapse and Ancient Dark Age from the viewpoint of climatology and food availability using the LBAIA sequence from the alluvial deposits of the Rumailiah River, north of Gibala-Tell Tweini. The pollen-derived climatic proxy is drawn as PCA-Axis 1 scores (AB). The Late Bronze Age and Iron Age modified conventional chronology is shown with the PCA-Axis 1 scores (A). Grey shades indicate cultural changes. Cultivated species and Poaceae cerealia time-series are plotted on a linear agescale (C). (Kaniewski et al 2010). Figure 8 (below): Rainfall patterns over the Aegean in 1954/55 showing percentages above and below normal (Fagan 2004)

26

Figure 9 (top): The Mycenaean Warrior Vase made ca. 12th century BCE (http://bama.ua.edu/ ~ksummers/cl222/mycenae/ mycenaen_vase_warriors _large.jpg)

Figure 10 (bottom): Mycenaean Naue Type II bronze sword, ca. 13th century BCE (http://img127.imageshack.us /img127/1721/ naue2reconstructiear5.jpg)

27

Figure 11 (top left): The Lion Gate at Hattusas (http://2.bp.blogspot.com/VTi1b9tr6Ts/T6bT5qLH0OI/ AAAAAAAAApA/J52fgmE60I/ s1600/Collapse+of+Bronze+Age +Hattusa+Lion+Gate.jpg) Figure 12 (bottom left): Lion Gate at Mycenae (http://employees.oneonta.edu/farberas/arth/ Images/ARTH209images/Mycenaean/lions_gate.jpg) Figure 13 (below): An artists impression of the megaron or kings palace at Pylos (http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/ jmarks/glory/ Glory-images/Glory-Q1images/pylos.jpg)

28

Figure 14 (above left): A battle scene from a fresco in the palace at Pylos (http://neoskosmos.com/news/sites/default/files/2011/July/commwallpainting.jpg) Figure 15 (above right): A bronze statuette of the ingot god ca. 12th century BCE, found at Enkomi, Cyprus (http://ftp5.dnssystems.net/~hiddenhistory/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Barren-Gott_Enkomi1.jpg).

29

Figure 16 (top left): House I of the Panagia group at Mycenae showing the destruction in Room five with the skeleton in the background (Nur and Cline 2000). Figure 17 (bottom left) ): House I of the Panagia group at Mycenae showing a close-up of the skeleton believed to have been crushed to death in the doorway of Room five during an earthquake (Nur and Cline 2000). Figure 18 (bottom right): One of the tablets found at Ugarit, ca. 12th century BCE. (http://www.crystalinks.com/CuneiformUgarthicAlphabet.jpg)

30

Figure 19 (above left): Map of the destroyed Sites in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean superimposed on the maximum intensity of seismic ground motion in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean using data from 1900-1980. (Nur 2008) Figure 20 (above right): One of the Armana letters, dating to the 14th century BCE (http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ae/Amarna_Akkadian_letter.png)

31

Bibliography
Armstrong, K., 2003. Settlement Hierarchy and the location of Alashiya on Cyprus. M.A. University of Cincinnati Beckford, M., 2008. Britain's ageing population 'as big a threat as climate change. The Telegraph. [Online] Avilable at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2048794/Britains-ageingpopulation-as-big-a-threat-as-climate-change.html Betancourt, P., 1976. The End of the Greek Bronze Age. Antiquity Publications Ltd. Bookman et al 2004. Late Holocene lake levels of the Dead Sea. [Online] Available at: http://gsabulletin.gsapubs.org/content/116/5-6/555.abstract Breasted, J.H. 1906. Ancient Records of Egypt vol. 4. University of Illinois Press. Bryce, T., 2005. The Eternal Treaty from the Hittite perspective. [Online] Available at: http://www.britishmuseum.org/pdf/6a%20The%20Eternal%20Treaty.pdf Bryce, T., 2006. The Kingdom of the Hittites. Oxford University Press Bryson, R.A., Donley, D., and Lamb, H.H., 1974. Drought and the decline of the Mycenaeans. Antiquity 43 Butzer, K.W., 1976. Early hydraulic civilization in Egypt. University of Chicago Press. [Online] Available at: http://oi.uchicago.edu/pdf/early_hydraulic.pdf Carpenter, R., 1966. Discontinuity in Greek Civilisation. Cambridge University Press. Chadwick, J. 1976. The Mycenaean World. Cambridge University Press. Childe, G. 1942. What Happened in History. 3rd ed. Penguin Books. Central Intelligence Agency, 2012. The World Factbook. [Online] Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html Deffeyes, K.S., 2001. Hubberts Peak : The Impending World Oil Shortage. 2 nd ed. Princeton University Press. Desborough, V.R.DA., 1964. The Last Mycenaeans and their Successors. Oxford University Press Diamond, J., 2005. Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. Viking Adult Dickinson, O., 1994. The Aegean Bronze Age. Cambridge University Press. Dickinson, O., 2006. The Aegean from Bronze Age to Iron Age : Continuity and Change between the 12th and 8th centuries BC. Routledge

32

Drake, B. L., 2012. The inuence of climatic change on the Late Bronze Age Collapse and the Greek Dark Ages [Online] Available at: http://unm.academia.edu/BrandonDrake/Papers/ 1459541/The_Influence_of_Climatic_Change_on_the_Late_Bronze_Age_Collapse_and_the_Gr eek_Dark_Ages Drews, R., 1993. The End of the Bronze Age : Changes in Warfare and the Catastrophe ca. 1200 BC. Princeton University Press. Earth Justice, 2011. GMOs: Engineering an Environmental Disaster. [Online] Available at: http://earthjustice.org/gmo EIA, 2012. Annual Energy Outlook 2012 : with projections to 2035. [Online] Available at: http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383%282012%29.pdf Evans, A., 2011. Resource Scarcity, Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict (WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011). Center on International Cooperation. [Online] Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWDR2011/Resources/64060821283882418764/WDR_Background_Paper_Evans.pdf Fagan, B., 2004. The Long Summer. Granta Books. Faulkner, R.O., 1975. Egypt, from the inception of the nineteenth Dynasty to the death of Ramesses III. Cambridge University Press. Finley, M.I. 1970. Early Greece : The Bronze Age and Archaic Ages. Chatto & Windus Ltd. French, E.B. 1996. Evidence for an earthquake at Mycenae. Archeoseismology. Fitch Laboratory Occasional Paper No. 7. Gottwald, N. 1999. Tribes of Yahweh: A Sociology of the Religion of Liberated Israel, 12501050 BCE. T&T Clark. Gurney, O. R., 1952. The Hittites. Penguin Books. Herodotus 5th century BCE. The Histories, Book I. [Online]. Available at: http://www.sacred texts.com/cla/hh/hh1090.htm Homer, 8th century BCE. The Iliad Books 1-12 and 13-24 (Translated by Murray, A.T. and Wyatt, W.F.). Loeb Classical Library IPCC 2007. Climate Change 2007 : Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers. [Online] Available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf Kaniewski, D., Paulissen, E., Van Campo, E., Weiss, H., Otto, O., Bretschneider, J., and Van Lerberghe, K. 2010. Late secondearly first millennium BC abrupt climate changes in coastal Syria and their possible significance for the history of the Eastern Mediterranean. [Online]. Available at: http://leilan.yale.edu/pubs/files/Kaniewski_et_al_ACC_East_Med_2010 _QR.pdf Kaniewski, D., Van Campo, E., Van Lerberghe, K., Boiy, T., Vansteenhuyse, K., Jans, G., Nys, K.,Weiss, H., Morhange, M., Otto, T. and Bretschneider, J., 2011. The Sea Peoples, from

33

Cuneiform Tablets to Carbon Dating [Online] Available at: http://www.plosone.org/ article/info%3Adoi/10.1371/journal.pone.0020232 Kay, P.A. and Johnson, D. L., 1981. Estimation of Tigris-Euphrates streamflow from regional paleoenvironmental proxy data. [Online] Available at: http://www.springerlink.com/content/ u4n640k326013982/ Kunstler, J.H., 2005. The Long Emergency : Surviving the Converging Catastrophes of the Twenty-first century. Atlantic Monthly Press. Lance, A. and Miles, R., 2010. Ancient Worlds : The search for the origins of Western civilisation. Penguin Group. Macqueen, J. G., 1975. The Hittites and their contemporaries in Asia Minor. 2 nd ed. C.S. Graphics. Manassa, C. 2003. The Great Karnak Inscription of Merneptah: Grand Strategy in the 13th Century B.C. Stinehour Press . Marx, K. 1894. Capital, Vol. 3. [Online] Available at: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx /works/1894-c3/ Mylonas, G.E., 1966. Mycenae and the Mycenaean Age. Princeton University Press. Nur, A. 2008. Apocalypse : Earthquakes, Archaeology, and the Wrath of God. Dawn Burgess. Nur,A. and Cline, E.H., 2000. Poseidons Horses: Plate Tectonics and Earthquake Storms in the Late Bronze Age Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean [Online] Available at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/48895496/Poseidon%E2%80%99s-Horses-by-Amos-Nur-Eric-HCline-2000 Palmer, L., 1961. Mycenaeans and Minoans.2nd ed. Faber and Faber Ltd. Perelman, M., 1999. The Natural Instability of Markets : Expectations, Increasing Returns, and the Collapse of Capitalism. Palgrave Macmillan. Ponting, C., 2007. A new green history of the world : the environment and the collapse of great civilizations. Penguin Books. Robbins, M., 2001. Collapse of the Bronze Age : The Story of Greece, Tory, Israel, Egypt, and the Peoples of the Sea. iUniverse. Ruz, C., 2011. The six natural resources most drained by our 7 billion people. The Guardian. [Online] Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/blog/2011/oct/31/six-naturalresources-population Salimbeti, A. 2012. The Greek Age of Bronze. [Online] Available at: http://www.salimbeti .com/micenei/index.htm Sandars,N.K., 1978. The Sea Peoples. 2nd ed.Thames and Hudson Ltd.

34

Schaeffer, C.F.A., 1968. Ugaritica V. (Translated by Coogan, D.). [Online] Available at: http://www.ericlevy.com/Revel/Intro2/Remembering%20Ugarit.PDF Schofield, L., 2007. The Mycenaeans. The British Museum Press. Schwartz, M. 2011. Darkness descends : The end of the Bronze Age empires. [Online] Available at: http://gvsu.academia.edu/MarkSchwartz/Papers/1759937/Darkness_descends _The_end_of_the_Bronze_Age_empires_Introduction_to_the_Theme._Ancient_Warfare_IV4_6-9 Shelmerdine, C.W., 2008. The Cambridge Companion to the Aegean Bronze Age. Cambridge University Press. Snodgrass, A.M. 1971. The Dark Age of Greece. 2nd ed. Edinburgh University Press. Spengler, O., 1918-1923. The Decline of the West. Oxford University Press. Tainter, J. A., 1988. The Collapse of Complex Societies. Cambridge University Press. Taylour, W., 1964. The Myceneans. Drukkery Thieme Nijmegen. UN, 2010. World Population Prospects : The 2010 Revision. [Online] Avialable at: http://www.alapop.org/2009/Docs/ProjectionsSeminar/FinalPresentations/Presentation_RioNov2 011_Heilig.pdf UNEP, 2012. Global Environmental Outlook 2012. [Online] Available at: http://www.unep. org/geo/pdfs/geo5/GEO5_report_full_en.pdf UNESCO, 2012. UN World Water Development Report 4 : Managing Water under Uncertainty and Risk. [Online] Available at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002154/ 215492e.pdf Vermeule, E.T., 1960. The Fall of the Mycenaean Empire. Archaeology 13 Waldbaum, J.C., 1978. From Bronze to Iron. The Transition from the Bronze Age to the Iron Age in the Eastern Mediterranean. [Online] Available at: http://journals.cambridge.org/action/ displayAbstract?fromPage=Online&aid=4087308 Weiss, B., 1982. The decline of the Late Bronze Age civilization as a possible response to climate change. Climatic Change 4. Winter, F.A. 1977. An Historically Derived Model for the Dorian Invasion. Symposium on the Dark Ages of Greece.

35