War, Peace and Conflict Resolution: Towards an Indian Ocean Model Author(s): John House Source: Transactions of the

Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1984), pp. 3-21 Published by: The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers) Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/621864 . Accessed: 27/08/2013 22:10
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resolution: towards War,peace andconflict an IndianOceanmodel

Mackinder Road,Oxford Halford Professor ofGeography, University ofOxford, Mansfield OX1 3TB
1983 MS received1 September oftheInstitute ofBritish Addressdelivered at theAnnualConference (Presidential Durham, Geographers, January 1984) JOHN HOUSE

ofpolitical is little concern thestudy there with ABSTRACT. In theresurgence ofwarandthecausesofwar,threats geography ofinternational A geographical theories is to peace,and conflict resolution. contribution mustbe set within butthere relations, A growing on warand peace studies intoaccount. A a place forinductive-empirical literature must also be taken case-studies. in the IndianOcean is outlined, forsystem of interactions at all scale levelsand forall political framework simulation actors, in theinterests of tension thecharacter and significance oftheIndianOcean as The stagesof analysis are,first, management. ofthesuperin theimage theobjectives and interaction and,secondly, spacesofdecision-takers; interpreted plansandbehaviour ofco-operation each other, with client states thedegree littoral states. The interrelationships are with and,finally among powers ofchanging focused on theuse ofsea power as an instrument of policy. Sovietand U.S. policies set within thecontext events, arecontrasted, in their on littoral andon theUnited ZoneofPeace proposals. states Nations impact Indian KEY WORDS: Political Conflict resolution. Ocean,Sea power, simulation, System geography,

is seen to be risingfromits ashes. Like so manytwinkling Phoenix-like, politicalgeography on items research a proposalto establish stars, agendasproliferate (Taylor,1982), whilst shortly a Commissionto study'Problemsof the worldpoliticalmap' will be consideredby the IGU The ashes too are stirring, ExecutiveCommittee. since continuity has alwaysmatchedchange in the oldest and most enduringbranch of geography.Yet in the renaissance,even the fallow fields and totallyresurgenceof political geographythere are missingingredients, fundamental issues. Where are of the vision,themasterly ignored today'scounterparts synoptic or of time and a radiated Mackinder a Mahan? Wherein political globalinterpretation space, by are to be found or structures behavioural of comparable models systems geography explanatory It is truethatthereis progress to thosein otherbranchesof humangeography? sophistication to report.Saul Cohen's geostrategic conceptions(1973; 1982) indicateone line of advance, in the extensionof traditional geopolitics.Wallerstein's analysisof the worldsystem(1974) and the role of the capitalist worldeconomy(1979) underline the interpretative and strengths in the studyof international internalcoherenceof the politicaleconomyviewpoint affairs at the globalscale. Yet the greatestgap of all remains,and to fillit is a dauntingtask: concernwithwars and thecauses ofwar,withthreats to peace and theneed to resolve or abateinternational tension conflict resolution. theworldis passingthrough an almostuniquelyturbulent Although through hitherto have given littleattention to war and peace studies,eitheras a phase, geographers field of or in case studies(House, 1983). Withproresearch, generalinterdisciplinary empirical in war and without studies gress peace place, geographical inputs,in the fieldsof intertaking
Trans. Br. Geogr. N.S. 9: 3-21 (1984) ISSN 0020-2754 Inst. Printed in Great Britain

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JOHN HOUSE

and studiesdevotedto thetheory and practice of conflict nationalrelations resolution, analysis, risksbeingonce morerelegated to an exceptionalist position. politicalgeography The opportunity is thereforpoliticalgeographers, since the spatial dimensionand the of to be either orhabitually differentiation issues tend underplayed geographical problem ignored To define and a contriother geographical by specialists(Gottmann,1982). explore potential The butionwe need to know much more on the state of the art among otherpractitioners. of theories a structured set of offers international relations (Frankel,1973a,p. 28), loosely study at all scale levels grouped around: the study of power and conflict;social communication or an in The interaction terms. of study power (Boulding,1962) analysis system (cybernetics); and positive(associatas a general socialprocess,withnegative(dissociative) conflict interprets ofcommunimodel (Deutsch, 1963) analysestheflow ive) aspects.The social communications a refusal behaviour with cations among actorson the international stage, balancingadaptive as yet method(Kaplan, 1967), thoughlimited to adapt or to take heed. The systems-analytic from in for in explanatory terms is useful complex formulating power, organizational hypotheses forthinking it further offers the most usefulframework about data. For politicalgeography the scale-level problem,with nested levels of spatial analysis.Finally,the linkageapproach that recurrent (Rosenau, 1969) is a limitedbut usefulwayof studying sequences of behaviour in in and are This reacted to another. one interpreinput/output system (scale-level) originate tationalso permits the integrative policy,by regarding studyof domesticpoliticsand foreign each sphereas a systemin interaction. of actual transaction Such specificexamination flows adds depthto the moreabstract so too in intersystems-analytical approach.As in geography butrather seen as complementary, are rarely relations studiesalternative national methodologies the quantitative withthe intuitive, as competitive, the empiricalvyingwith the nomothetic, or the theoretical withthe applied. A risingbody of literature and methodin war and peace studiesalso needs to be taken ofWar project(Singer,1981; Small the Correlates intoaccount.Some majorstudies,including 'whatthe incidence in character, and Singer,1982), are highly seekingto establish quantitative of war has been and what conditionscorrelatewith its presence, absence or magnitude' of conflict have yetemerged it seems 'that theories (O'Loughlin, 1983). Though no consistent traditionalgeographicinterestin location and strengthas predictorsof war involvement of Nations (DON) project are well-founded' (Van der Wusten, 1983). The Dimensionality units studies nations as social (Rummel,1977, 1979) In attrican be analytically dividedintotwospaces: behavior and attribute. whosebehavior of theircharacteristics bute space nationsare locatedin terms economic, (social, political, of theirinteretc.) and in behavior military, space, dyadsof nationsare locatedin terms actions (co-operation, conflict, avoidance,etc.) ... Its strong pointsare its measuresof of domesticto international distancesbetweenstates,its relationship absoluteand relative of a behaviorist elementin policymakers' its clear events,its incorporation evaluations, of formal and and its examination tests of hypothesized causes of international conflict functional the scale. at regions global (O'Loughlin, 1983) studieson war and peace, focusing Alongsidesuch majorprojectsthereare smaller-scale and the frequency on: the relationships betweenmembers of the interstate respectively system of wars betweenthem (Wallensteen,1981); the significance of territorial disputesamongthe causes of war since 1945 (Weede, 1975); and the distribution of internal wars and explanation within the Third Worldcountries to think (Kende, 1978). Though at thisstageit is premature

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thereis a clear need forgeoof applicationsfromthese studies to war avoidance strategies research field. Two broadavenues of advance for in this novel and vital involvement graphical of time-space models and calibration construction the indicated: seem geographers political diffusion and contagion analysismorefully;and thatwhich (O'Loughlin, 1983), incorporating at the macro-scale, followshere, the empirical-inductive relationships studyof international in this case the Indian Ocean and its littoralstates, set withinthe contextof superpower involvement.
TENSION MANAGEMENT: AN INDIAN OCEAN MODEL

Indian Ocean model resolution: Conflict

forthe geographical is an interim It mustbe emphasizedthatwhat is presented methodology in international affairs. It is altogether to visualize of a macro-scaleproblem premature analysis of international model embracing the myriad an integrated relationships complexities systems in time and space of so large and differentiated a segmentof the global surface.The most of the reciprocal actions forsystems simulation that is attempted is to establisha framework ofstructure, timeand space. thedimensions ofpolitical actorsand their environment, embracing of particular the significance Partsof the interaction, politicaleventsor decisions,have earlier been explored procedures (Graubardand Builder,1982), whichincidentally gaming by iterative for device a veryusefulteaching also offer politicalgeographers. between The completesystem of transactions and interactions politicalactors,at all scaleand is within the unit levels,internally political externally, impossibly complexto modelin its be A framework can, nevertheless, postulatedand disaggre(Simon, 1970). systems entirety ofenvironment. The model of within cover between actors to sets segments relationships gated, decision-takers. Such mentalmaps are framework conditions the mentalmaps of geostrategic made up from'image plans'. These may be both positiveor negativesets of presuppositions, or tacticalin character, the visual and logical attributes political,economic,social, strategic of the geographical mind (Henrikson,1980). When set withincultural-historical as well as there is some to 'Behaviour Mackinder's spaces' similarity 'organizer' concept. spatialcontexts, fieldswithinwhich activity is generated and diffused, the 'horse-sense' are the geographical to others. The constructive thespheresofinfluence conceptofMackinder, purposeofthemodel framework is to improvetensionmanagement in the nationaland international communities, In sea behaviour. to increaseadaptiveand diminish maladaptive particular, powerwill be exfordemilitarization and with its to proposals counter-actions, ramifications, relationship plored, of the Indian Ocean. or denuclearization The stages of analysis(Fig. 1) are: i) the character and significance of the system frame, the Indian Ocean; ii) objectivesof: externalpowers,the littoralstates and the international between: externalpowers with each other,external community; iii) the sets of interactions stateswitheach other;iv) the degreeof effectiveness states,and of littoral powerswithlittoral of force(including and the extentof positivetensionmanagement achieved,by wars,threats or economicaid, treatiesor alliances; v) an evaluationof system sea power), bases, military of thiswithin a widerglobalcontext. and the setting or instability stability, The system frame: the Indian Ocean In ordersof magnitude, of the world's arounda 4000 X 4000 mile ocean, therelives one-third and most Third World countries;and on mostdays of UN members one-quarter population, 20 per cent of worldshippingis in transit(Fig. 2). The oil resourcesof the Persian Gulf, and their vitalimportance to theWestern Worldfurther the tanker distribution-routes underpin on its strategic worth(Bowman of the Indian Ocean. Yet views differ the global significance a perhaps and Clark,1981). External theU.S.A. and theU.S.S.R., perceive particularly powers,

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6 OUTSIDE POWERS

JOHN HOUSE

LITTORAL AND HINTERLAND POWERS

IMAGE PLANS
Political Economic/Social Strategic/Tactical

BEHAVIOUR SPACES
Ocean logistics ClientStates, allies areas Adversary

Contiguity <Cooperation Ocean frontage/space

Conflict

PROJECTION
Arms transfers
Naval/Military Diplomacy

Foreign aid Trade Cultural/Educational training

INTERACTION
Superpowers outsidepowers Other Each other Superpowers

& Hinterland Littoral States

Other outside powers

for in theIndian simulation 1. A framework Ocean FIGURE system

Indian Ocean unity.To the Soviets'the Indian Ocean and the countries roundit are illusory becomingan independent geopolitical entity'(Davidov and Kremenyuk, 1973). To gradually 'The theUnited Statesaccording Indian Ocean has the area with to Admiral become Zumwalt, the potentialto produce majority shiftsin the global power balance over the next decade' to Cohen (1973, pp. 63-5) theIndianOcean was 'an eventual (Mugomba, 1976, p. 18), whilst thirdgeostrategic with a character'. On theworldscale, however, the region, globe-influencing withthe West had its epicentre in Europe,but 'a struggle of willswas increasSoviet struggle of the international inglydisplacedto the periphery system'(Dismukesand McConnell, 1979, Terms and included used 'the of the powerstruggle of our times' fulcrum p. 285). concepts (Kaushik, 1972, p. 9); a 'universalflank'(Dept. Extra Mural Stud. 1973, viii), both to the Asian inlandcontainment and to Brezhinshki's the 'arc of crisis'through conceptof Spyckman Middle East intoAfrica.Yet these are almostentirely external and by strategists conceptions, at that,lookingat a vast ocean space not centralto the superpower balance and, even so, sufof manysmall-scale conflicts ficiently large and diverseto have given rise to a proliferation from whichexternal stoodaside. powershave rarely

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Jordan Egypt

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HOUSE JOHN Few observers have regarded the littoral statesthemselves as reflecting anykindof unity. In Australian 'the Indian a Ocean is not unit. It consists of countries 1976, eyes (Vaili, p. 31) which have great diversity of race, politics,strengths and opportunities', a kind of ethnic, and cultural chessboard. Wall (1975, p. 139) asserted thattheIndianOcean is 'neither religious nor sociallycoherent, nor are many states in it'. Such states are oftennewlyeconomically unstable and vulnerablewith lack of connectivity independent, (linkages) to others.Hayes fivequite distinct each witha different sub--areas, (1974, p. 1) identifies cultural, geographical, economicand politicalcharacter. it was the threat to peace and security Yet, ironically, arising fromthe intrusion and activities of the naval forcesof both superpowers thatled in 1971 to the first states.A sense of UN-sponsored Zone of Peace proposals,on behalfof the littoral collectiveIndian Ocean identity underexternalthreathas developedfurther, in the meeting of 44 littoral and hinterland statesin 1979, and the mostrecentre-iteration of the UN Zone of Peace proposalsin 1982. Yet dissention and diversity have neverbeen set aside. The political actors on stage Withsuch incompatibility and variety ofimageplanstheinteraction inbehaviour spaces is inevitablycomplex.The imageplans of external Britain, France,Japanand China powers,including as well as thetwosuperpowers are,in each case, a uniquemixofpolitical/ideological, economic/ social and strategic/tactical Their behaviour of ingredients. spaces encompassan appreciation ocean logistics,includingaccess fortrade,the searchforbases, recruitment and supportfor clientstatesor allies,and counteraction towards adversarial statesand theirexternal protectors. The projection of such policyplans is directed to maximizing in thesystem, adaptivebehaviour to the advantageof the instigator. The projectionof such policy plans is cumulative,thoughnot necessarilyregularor ofillustrating the spatial incapableof beingset intoreverse (e.g. Somalia,Egypt). One method outcomeof outsideinfluence exercised(Fig. 3) is to chronicle and date specific evidence(treatand much moreexhaustively, to ies, agreements, Thereafter, includingdefenceagreements). events(oversomethreedecades). The proportions ofthebar-graphs analyseunfolding mapped thusillustrate the strength of influence by outsidepowerson the politicalgamingboard. The means of bringing or ratherleverage,to bear include: trade (Figs. 4, 5, influence 6 and 7), especially thaton preferential overseas or grants, credits withan overtly terms; political of the IMF or unlike the terms the world armstransfers consortia; purpose (Fig. 8), banking (Fig. 9), on whichreliabledata is hardto find(Tahtinen,1977), and the U.S.S.R. contribution is certainly naval or military the exerciseof sea power; understated; diplomacy, particularly and cultural/educational or training programmes.
SEA POWER AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY

10

of sea powerby thesuperpowers, the deployment Settingaside the nucleardeterrence problem in particular, has become so widespreadand commonin the past decade or so thatit presents a specialkindofreal and growing threat to peace (Alford, to peace is increas1980). This threat felt a of the littoral of Indian states the Ocean for that ingly by majority and, reason,is extracted from the maze of transactions forseparateconsideration. underverydifferent tenetsand rulesofthe gamesincethewritings ofMackinder Although or Mahan sea powerremainsflexible, and universal visible, persuasive(Luttwak,1974; Bull, the degreesof naval suasion,in supportof policies 1975; Cable, 1981). Figure 10 illustrates of eithersea control or sea denial.

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aid to lessdeveloped countries FIGURE 8. Overseas creditsand grantsby socialist countries(1954-77) Source:CIA (1978) Communist oftheFree World(WashingtonDC) and FIGURE 9. Arms transfers expenditures (1967-76) Source: U.S. Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency (1978) Worldmilitary armstransfers, 1967-76, Publ. 98 (WashingtonDC)

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12
LATENT

HOUSE JOHN
ACTIVE

DETERRENT

SUPPORTIVE

SUPPORTIVE

COERCIVE

BENEFICIAL (alliesencouraged)

ADVERSE (alliesoverreact)

POSITIVE (compellence)

NEGATIVE (deterrence)

US & Soviet US NavyoffBengal subs (1971) & N. Yemen nuclear (1979); SovietNavy off Somalia(1970)

seizureof Israeli Golan Heights; of Lebanon invasion (1982); Vietnamese invasion of (1978) Kampuchea

RN:Mozambique Ship visits: US 7thfleet; Channel, USSR Eskadra Falklands, (1982) 5

US Navy taskforces: Nicaragua (1983); SirteGulf, Libya (1983)

a typology ofsea power: FIGURE 10. The political 1974,Table 1) (basedon LUTrWAK applications

is thusapplicablein tension theinternational The use of sea powerwithin managesystem or menteitherin an adaptive(system-maintaining) maladaptive(system-destroying) manner, et al., the worldoceans as a neutral (Cottrell, place d'armes.The naval superpowers through between Ocean the contrasts in the Indian in in interests common, yet many 1981) have reality are instrucbehaviour naval policies,image-plans, Soviet and American spaces and interaction of Peace continued on the Zone U.N. as 1982 the Committee in a as realm late where, tive, states. of the littoral to peace and security threat to perceivea dangerousand growing Soviet Strategies ofopenly-discussed internal evidencetheinterpretImage plans (political) Giventhepaucity has to relyon eventanalysisand reasonedconjecture. ationof Soviet Indian Ocean intentions Hence western writers 1972; Dismukesand McConnell,1979) havetendedto exaggerate (Jukes, and continued and misinterpret theentry presenceoftheRed Fleet in theIndianOcean, followof ocean guardian, the the traditional after1968. The suspicions withdrawal Britain, ing upon from wereenhancedbyboastful such as Admiral Gorshkov statements (1979), thoughPresident of Breshnevhad made it clear as earlyas 1971 that he was not committed to the ambitions a clique of Soviet admirals;moreover, continuedto be the U.S.S.R. defenceestablishment Westernpoliticianscontinuedto view the Red Fleet dominatedby the army.Nevertheless, a war-related 'almost within conceptframe' exclusively (Dismukesand McConnell, deployment was that the U.S.S.R. was enhancingher global statusand from 1979, p. 291). The reality

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Indian Ocean model resolution: Conflict

13

1961 on had deliberately developeda seven-oceannavy(Fairhall,1971). Witha globalstrategy thevisionsof Mackinder and Mahan (Cottrell and Burrell, 1972, p. 6) SovietIndian combining economicand politicalconsiderations, Ocean policybecame a complexof military, strategic, wereinvolved. thoughno vitalinterests In 1968 ForeignMinisterGromyko definedSoviet interests as: freedom of commerce and freedom of the the to and access mineral resources of the navigation; high seas; biological aid to and the countries. It was also less oceans; anti-pollution management; developed pointed out (Kudryavtsev, the onlynon-freezing sea route 1974, p. 117) thattheIndian Ocean 'offered the overburdened Trans-Siberian Sovietportsin theBlack and (supplementing railway) linking Azov seas withthosein the Far East',--and not onlyforpeacefulcommercial purposes!With an averageof one hundredSoviet cargovessels a month the ocean a substantial and transiting 2 fleet 1973 on 16 the seas there were > fishing (1948 Mt, Mt) regularly present high legitimate fortheRed Fleet to protect. interests and Burrell, 1972, p. 334) stressed Geopoliticians (Cottrell a moresinister the need to outflank China and shieldthe Indian Ocean from Chinese motive, whilstconcurrently within inland Asia. incursions, applying pressure The Arab-Israeliwar of 1967 was a watershed in Indian Ocean politics,and thereafter and naval rivalry the rules of the strategic became endemic.To a game changed, superpower was an extent it indirect for Third World their and exploitation, clients, large struggle protection in whichthe U.S.S.R. substituted for realpolitik ideologicalpurity (Bezboruah,1977, p. 141). Instead of homogeneous had to be accepted,as the Soviet partisanship competitive pluralism had to deal withestablished and parties.The new local war doctrine government governments of ideologicalgoals in the expectation meanta sacrifice of gainsin influence. In thisthe display of sea powerwas an activeinstrument of policy, 'Wouldthepolitical bybothsuperpowers. shape and complexity of the Third World have been the same ifthe Soviet navyhad been the only coercivediplomacy since 1967?' (Dismukes and McConnell, 1979, p. 300). An navypractising question! intriguing mustreston doctrinal Naval doctrine and practice Here too interpretation pronouncements, naval operations modus withobserver and target views. undertaken, operandi, together identifying The pattern, and composition ofregular naval deployments tripfrequency suggestsa symbolic visiblepresence,inadequatefordistantforward wire,a modestthoughdeliberately projection. An essentially defensive intervention posturedoes not,however, precludeopportunist/assertive to tip local mainlandbalances when Soviet interests are at stake,as in Somalia during1970. Area familiarization for Soviet crews involvesflag-showing and goodwillvisits to countries withclose ties, or thosewithcommercial links.In thisway the U.S.S.R. transfers the physical intothe psychological presencein themindsofdecision-takers presenceof warships (Dismukes and McConnell, 1979, p. 287). The forthright natureof Soviet naval writings would logicallylead to more aggressive stancesagainstthe imperialists. after British withdrawal from the east of Suez in 1968 Indeed, the Soviet naval staff an active of a navaltaskforce (Darby, 1973) hawkishly urged deployment in the Indian Ocean (Jukes,1972, p. 11). With the U.S. PolarisA3 missiles,deployedafter need to extendthe Red Fleet's capacity 1964, witha rangeof 2500 miles,therewas an urgent to cover and interdict in the such hazards, especially ArabianSea. Crisis operations, mainly in responseto majorU.S. 7thFleet initiatives in the 1970s (Fig. 11) meantthe 'close embrace' or shadowingpolicyto limitthe U.S. Navy's freedom of action. Both anti-carrier and antisubmarine warfare wereassembledad hoc.As theTridentclass of U.S. submarines, taskforces withmuch greater missileranges,comes into operation the ArabianSea will lose its value as an offensive base and theIndianOcean willbe oflittle in theglobalnuclearbalance. significance

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FIGuUn 12. Ocean strategy:naval and airfieldfacilitiesof the U.S.S.R. and Western powers, indicatingthe areas of potential of forces deployment

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resolution: Indian Oceanmodel 15 Conflict in the Behaviour spaces The spatial outcome of Soviet Indian Ocean policies is reflected of alignments(Fig. 3), emphasizingthe treatieswith Mozambique, patternand strength in the The attempts at hegemony India, Somalia (until 1974), Ethiopia,Iraq and Afghanistan. Horn of Africa(Gorman, 1981) led to a totalreversalof U.S. and Soviet clientstates after the Ethiopianrevolution of 1974 and the Ogaden warwithSomalia. Most Sovietnaval concentration has been in and aroundbases in the Gulf of Aden and the lowerRed Sea, withnaval exercises(code-namedOkean, 1975) practising interdiction of the oil routeand shipping lanes in general.Otherwise, naval activity is on the high seas, lackingshorebases, and relying on fleetanchoragesand mooring war threatthe Soviet priority buoys (Fig. 12). Under potential would no doubt be to control the 'choke-points' of the Straitsof Hormuz (Ramazani, 1979), Bab el Mandeb and the Cape route(McEwan, 1979). In peacefultimesthe policyofleverage of clients(Fig. 3) will continue, and increasing dependency thoughtherehas alwaysbeen too in economicterms.Sovietarmsexports littleon offer to theIndianOcean countries have proved an inadequatethoughinflammatory substitute. United States strategies and conflicts Image plans (political) Under an open democraticsystemthe differences betweenactorsin theU.S. politicalarenaare moreapparent. There would,however, be general concensusthat,fortheWestern economicsurvival, whereas powers'access to theseas is vitalfor forthe Soviets it is a bonus' (Cottrell,1981, p. 30). On the otherhand, untilthe 1970s, few in the U.S.A. saw the Indian Ocean as any kind of vital interest. Sri Lanka is 11 500 miles distantfromboth New York and San Francisco,and to the Americans on a scale of 1 to 10 the Indian Ocean rankedonly 2 to 3 (Vili, 1976, p. 186). Initially, thereseemed littlemerit in seekingto replace a Britishpresencewherepolicies had been 'manipulative, and catalytic rather than garrison-like or fora sustaineddefence'(Martin, 1969, p. 413). Indeed, through the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. had soughta continental rimlandcontainment policyaround the U.S.S.R., in supportof regionaltreaties, such as CENTO or SEATO. The withdrawal of British forces and the approachthereafter of Sovietnaval unitsin theIndianOcean, together with a generalerosionof post-colonialstability, presageda dramaticchange in U.S. policies for that area. PresidentNixon's Guam doctrineenunciatedin 1969, in pursuitof a balance of powermorefavourable to the U.S., requireda moreactivestance in the Indian Ocean but for a naval policyjustifications presencewere moreambiguous.Melvin Laird, Defense Secrein in the Indian Ocean is not so much in maintaining claimed 'our a large 1972, tary, strength in rather but our to in move of and the ocean as the out occasion standingforce, ability freely and our interest dictate'. But to what purpose?A policingrole aimed at the preservation of to maintain of the balance and or to retain restore the of reservoir peace; influence; power goodwill towardsthe U.S.A.; or to secure and protecteconomicinterests, petroleum particularly and the oil routes?(Mugomba, 1976, p. 22). Afterthe Arab-Israeliwars of 1967 and 1973 and the Indo-Pakistanwars of 1965 and 1971 U.S. politicalinterest and naval involvement in the Indian Ocean escalatedsharply, and, at the same time,became internally morecontroversial The realpolitik amongU.S. politicians. of Kissingerand Schlesinger was based on the threat to Western oil supplies,thoughonlyten the Gulf: thusthe need to seek reliablepoliticalrelations per cent of U.S. suppliescame from withoil-suppliers;findand arm reliableregionalpartners, withoverwhelmingly tragicresults in Iran; or increasingly to 'go-it-alone'; witha slow but increasing armsbuild-up and naval deployment. By the mid-1970s these policies were receivedwitha risingdissentin the U.S. Congress,comparableto thaton present-day policies in CentralAmerica.On the one side in and theDefenseDepartment; on theother, theWhiteHouse 1974-5 werelinedup thePentagon

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HOUSE 16 JOHN of President withDefenseofthe Salt II negotiaCarterand State Department (untila trade-off The and a of were lengthy and bitter(U.S. debates tions) bevy Congressmen. Congressional of over the Congr. House, 1971, 1974, 1975, 1979; Senate, 1975), particularly development a substantial U.S. naval and air base on Diego Garcia, a nodal island in the BritishIndian a political Ocean Territory, unitcreatedin 1965. As trenchantly put in 1975 byChesterBowles, former U.S. ambassadorto India 'Only those who liked Vietnamwould love Diego Garcia'. forDiego Garcia , Initiallyin 1975, the U.S. Senate rejectedthe increasein appropriations the and the Defense DepartIndian Ocean policywas dominated but increasingly by Pentagon U.S. counterpart ment. AdmiralElmo Zumwalt (1974), a redoubtable of the Soviet Admiral aid and claimedthat'the Indian Ocean has become a focalpoint forU.S. foreign Gorshkov, talkswith has a growing Congresswantednaval armslimitation impacton our own security'. and the Soviets, but it was the Pentagonand the U.S. Navy, with'a grandocean strategy' in the place of gunboats, to 'influence local warsor threats to peace' the use of aircraft-carriers thatwon the day. Naval doctrine and practice From 1945 to 1967 the U.S. had had a world-widemonopoly in naval powerand diplomacy, but no presencein the Indian Ocean untilafter1968; in 1972 the 'chopline'of the U.S. 7th Pacificfleet was extendedwestwards to the shoresof Africaand the Middle East. Though the nearestfleetbase was at Subic Bay in the Philippines therewas a chain of fortified island bases stretching back across the Pacificto San Diego. Though the based on a strategic connaval policywas assertedto be one of graduated deterrance, mobility came be more one of as of the carrier task it to crisis entries such force, cept wide-ranging threatto peace, and many those of 1967, 1971, 1973, 1976, 1979, each withits immediate in the eventpolitically The carrier taskforce wereto influence deployments counterproductive. that them local there little evidence of did so. is conflicts, particular though any in theIndianOcean is thusone ofstrategic The U.S. navalposture sea control, deterrence, of the value of a on littoral states and the naval diplomatic projection powerashore, presence of anti-submarine warfare barriers the creation Soviet (ASW) against navy(Holst, 1975, p. 3). but increasof ocean 'choke-points' is fundamental, In pursuitof such objectivesthe control has to an Middle the Indian been viewed as the backdoor unstable Ocean East, rather ingly or the maritime a Asian rimland containthan as a realmin its own right to vanished back-up in 1979 in the Carterdoctrine, which mentpolicy.Priority forMiddle East policyculminated The Carterdoctrine followed the Sovietentry intoAfghanistan. statedthat'an attempt by any outside powerto gain controlof the Persian Gulf regionwould be regardedas an assault on the vital interests of the U.S.A. and any such assault would be repelledby use of any means an enhancedU.S. navalpresence force'.To bolster such a doctrine military necessary, including in the Indian Ocean and the creationof a Rapid Deployment were Force forland operations in an shift effective momentum! but two of the ingredients. Truly regionalgeopolitical Behaviour spaces Once more the evidenceon politicalalignments (Fig. 3), trade (Figs 4, the out and and transfers illustrate arms 6 5, spatialworking and degreesofsuccess (Fig. 9) 7) in strategic has the U.S. navalpreference The island complemented policies. strategic concept which on and constraints formaximum the without the unstable complicating highseas, mobility the U.S. has soughtwell-located the politicsof mainlandbases would imply.Nevertheless, forshorefacilities and agreements land bases wherever (Fig. 12). Not possible,withtreaties to the or counter-bidding this has been partof an off-setting game in opposition infrequently U.S.S.R. Though the U.S. had pouredvast volumesof economicaid into Saudi Arabia,Iran and

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resolution: Indian Oceanmodel 17 Conflict forthe Defense Secretary, Ethiopia fromthe 1950s onwardsit was optimistically premature Melvin Laird, to claim in 1974 that 'countriessuch as Pakistan,Iran, Saudi Arabia,Kuwait and Ethiopia all feel a sense of security by our additionalpresencein the area'. Tell it not in Teheran or Addis Ababa! ofthe U.S. base on Diego Garcia has been thefocusof growing The upgrading discontent in India, increasingly alarmedby superpower naval rivalry. states,particularly among littoral The abilityto sustain 13 pre-positioned merchant ships, to provide30-days supportfortwo U.S. carriertask groupsand the back-up for a land-based Rapid DeploymentForce seems a farcryfrom the original concept(Bezboruah,1977, p. 63) of 'gaininga littlebalancingtime fornaval units'. Superpower interaction:the turbulentdecade (1970 on) states and Figure 11 shows the incidenceof armed conflict among the Indian Ocean littoral of naval force,which in all cases but one, Somalia in the accompanying crisisdeployments From 1946 to themid-1970swarsin Vietnamand theMalaysianconflict 1970, wereAmerican. withIndonesiamade South-East Asia the cock-pitof conflict (Leifer,1980). Troubleson the bordersof India occupied the centreof the stage duringthe 1960s, involving warswithChina in 1962 and with Pakistanin 1965 and 1971. In the 1970s local wars focusedon the Horn of Africa, Southern Arabiaand betweenUganda and Tanzania. The Middle East has remained in turmoil withArab-Israeliwars in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973. The Iran-Iraq conflict has in bloodyfashion since 1980. The closerand larger-scale continued U.S. carrier taskforce supIt inevitably and, to some, morethreatening. portsteadilybecame morepronounced provoked a balanced Sovietcounter-response. naval strategies, and by Figure 12 shows the cumulativespatial impactof superpower the highrisksof a continuing of bases, build-up. The U.S. 7th fleethas a pattern implication the strategic west through solidlyfoundedat Subic Bay and in WesternAustralia, extending island of Diego Garcia, to more tenuousand uncertain facilities on the African and Arabian mainlands.The Soviet fleetcan occupystrategic bases at Aden and in the southern Red Sea, but the facilities at Umm Qasr (Iraq) are inoperative at present.Sovietfleet bases, in the Black Sea, at Danang and Camrahn Bay in Vietnam, and Vladivostockare very far distantfor or resupply.Hence the need forfleetanchoragesand mooring reinforcement buoys (Fig. 12). Yet witheach crisisdeployment of U.S. carriertask forcesin the 1970s the Soviet fleethas matchedthe implied threatby an anti-carrier strikegroup. Though 'close embrace'tactics have been characteristic no belligerent outcomedeveloped.This is not thena simplecold war warrior's 'zero-sum'gamematching shipforship. It is theoutcomeofa complexaction/reaction but only within process in which both navies are in the business of crisis management, the contextof a wider global policy. An extension,indeed, or similargames played in the the Pacificand the Atlantic In the Indian Ocean Mediterranean, oceans, but witha difference. sea powerprimarily or for the of client states favours uncommitted thirdparties.An competes mix of liberation fanaticism and racism fuelsinternal nationalism, movements, unholy religious and international All too oftenU.S. involvement conflicts. has seen her interests 'paintedinto a corner'(Bowmanand Clark, 1981, p. 10) in defenceof an indefensible status quo. Since the aim of the game is minimizelosses rather than maximizegains,opportunities forthe diplomatic ofthe use of naval powerare constrained, the superpowers inhiexploitation and As in each efforts other's as the stakes biting neutralizing poker, (Bull, 1975, p. 7). though, are loweredmoreplayersenterthe game, morelimitedlocal conflicts ensue, and the risksof are escalated. generalconflagration It is possibleto arguethatthe interest of bothsuperpowers wouldbestbe servedbyseeing

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HOUSE JOHN the Indian Ocean as a 'regionof dissociation'(Labrousse, 1980, p. 25), peripheral to a global balance of powerand an implicit detentegoingas farback as Yalta. Competition will be conunlessvitalinterests are threatened, and the balance of powerwill be preserved. trolled, Thus, thereare surfaceantagonisms and warlike thereis an underlying although deployments supershare (Bowman and Clark, 1981, pp. 132-3). Indeed, bothsuperpowers powerunderstanding in the Indian Ocean: to conscribe, not a fewcommoninterests if not control conflicts regional and the excesses of revolutionary to limitnuclearproliferation; and to limitthe movements; enclosureof the oceans underinternational law. The proposed12-mile territorial progressive sea would close critical 200-mile ExclusiveEconomicZones (EEZs) and straits; 'choke-point' restrict of actionin peace time. the archipelagic naval freedom conceptwould further greatly in systemmaintenance Thus a shared interest emphasizesthe need forquiet, bilateral and development resource (Bowmanand Clark,1981, p. 147). To this,a naval arms diplomacy for the limitation Indian Ocean wouldbe an important nuclearcounterpart, agreement though submarines would have had to be excluded Some (SSBNs) steps powered (Salt Agreements). in thisdirection weretaken;in 1972 there was jointadherence to theIncidents at Sea agreement, talkswere begun 1977-8, but failedeven to definebases, the type and naval armslimitation of arms,or the equivalenceof ships, and were suspendedsinedie in 1979. Events tookover to peace in the Indian Ocean have neverbeen greater. and in the early1980s the threats
THE LITTORAL AND HINTERLAND STATES

18

differentiation. Three states Image plans are as variegatedas the mosaic of geographical are of outstanding and to these S. Australia be India; significance: Africa, might added the OPEC the of the Southern countries. South Gibraltar Africa, economically-powerful the mineral and carries resource industrial 1976, poten(Mugomba, p. 24), greatest Hemisphere forcesforits internal destruction tials, whilstracialismand apartheidare amongthe greatest the strategic of the Cape route,the Simonstown naval (Spence, 1970). Ironically, significance centre are vital,butpolitically the base and the Silvermine communications renounced West. by buttressed of her coastlinein the Indian Ocean Australia, by the ANZUS pact, has one-third there.During the 1970s, the Australian and fifty per cent of overseastradetransits through became increasingly risksto her rich western mineral Government concernedabout security Fed. Parlt. 1972) and, by implistrategic policywas pursued(Australia, province.A forward cation the cover afforded by the ANZUS pact was extendedto include the Indian Ocean Fed. Parlt. 1974, 1976), thoughin the earlystageswithAmerican reluctance. India (Australia, littoral has pursuedambivalent and fellow states thesuperpowers political policies,bothtowards in 1965 and 1971 made 1957; Braun,1972). Wars,withChina in 1962 and Pakistan (Panikkar, to be non-aligned, a treaty forcaution.Though claiming was signedwiththeU.S.S.R. in 1971, Chineseand UnitedStatesinfluence in Pakistan. As themostdevelopeddevelopto offset partly India had the industrial aid programmes and, after capacityto generateforeign ing country, India Australia, possessesthe mostpowerful navyon theIndian Ocean. Non-alignedor neutral leaderof the northern Indian Ocean arc. is a logical,if not uncontested potential in searchof an identity Most littoral and a place in the stateswere freshly independent, all of above confirmation their world, needing Internally, legitimacy. manylacked cohesion, in either or tribally, or religious terms. Economicbackwardness and vulneranationally, racially, weakenedby inept democratic bilityof a post-colonialsocietywere further legacies, or the rulers(Wall, 1975). Externally, unstableregimesof authoritarian fearsof hegemony, ancient 'encirclement' or rivalries inclined some states towards antagonisms, trading greatpowerassociation. Amongthe weakestand mostvulnerable littoral stateswerethe scattered island groups, in theirnarrowly-based to worldfluctuations to divertrade,withfewopportunities permeable

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or tourism(Ostheimer,1975; Hourbert,1981). Some had strategic sifyinto manufacturing in a strategically-festooned assets to offer, 'insecuremicro-states ocean', but onlytheMaldives and eventhenat theexpense profited thereby, (Gan), Diego Garcia and theCocos Islandsreally of theirinhabitants. made for an inchoatesense of regionalism. Distance and diversity Objectivesmightbe held in common:to retainnationalpower; to maximizeeconomicstandards;ensurenational or enhanceinternational status(Cottrelland Burrell,1972, p. 68). All theserequired security and a naval assistancefromoutside,in economicand technicalaid, supportfromneighbours Yet regionalissues weremoreoften than umbrella. presence,perhapsas a security competitive the after-effects of disparatecolnationalisms; religiousrivalries; complementary: competing formilitary, onialismand competition strategic, politicalor economicadvantage(Bowmanand trade and politicalinteraction are both still limitedand it Clark, 1981, p. 3). Inter-regional statesare divergent, notconvergent has been arguedthatpresent trends amonglittoral (Alford, correlation 1980, p. 16). A systems-based analysis(Simon, 1970) showedthat:a strong positive betweenpairs of statesand the degreeof amity; existedbetweenthe numberof transactions in a clear relation was foundbetweenindustrial capacityand the capacityto react vigorously increased This the regionalsystem;and the regional61lites supported regionalco-operation. was because thereexistedonly a moderateperception of an externalthreat;a high domestic demand for increasedresourceallocationfavouredco-operation;and there were fears that defenceexpenditure increasedinternal would add even moreto international tension. A United Nationsreport(1971a) underlined that the vast majority of littoral and hinterland states(oftheIndianOcean) are stilldeveloping and forlocal conflicts. Involvement economically, socially politically--with greatpotential of the GreatPowerswouldbe in no-one's interest. to derive would Anyattempt advantage lead to counter-moves. a littoral state to a undue Any attempt by gain support by Great from another Great Power. Powerleads to another stateseekingcountervailing support Yet the diplomaticgame ignoredsuch a universal truth. Adherents to Marxistdialecticswere fromthe non-aligned,and both frombelieversin the westernconstruct differentiated of a balance of power,or any sense of democracy, howeverdebased. A fewwantedall outsiders removedfrom the Indian Ocean; othersfearedremoval wouldincreasetensionamongregional had fears of and feltthatthe need of protection whilst others thus powers; yet aggression by some external power. The Zone of Peace proposals As earlyas 1964 at the Cairo Conference of Non-AlignedNations an 'atom-free zone' was as 1981 at a similarDelhi conference demandedforthe Indian Ocean. As recently 'graveconcernwas expressedoverthe military build-up of the Great Powersin the IndianOcean against the expresswishes of the littoral and hinterland in the states'. Little had changed,however, and self-interest had reignedsupreme.The 1971 proposalsby Sri meantime;both confusion Lanka (UnitedNations,1971b), witha suspiciouseye on Indianhegemony, appearedto include armslimitation littoral states. Since 1972 an United ad hoc Nations Committee on the among Indian Ocean (annual) has keptthe Zone of Peace proposalsunderconstant review, expanding froman initialrepresentation of 20 littoral and hinterland statesin 1979; states,to 44 littoral Dissentionruledon all sides and 'sysChina, Greece and Japanwerealso members. curiously, tematiccollectiveuniversalsecurity' remainsas far away as ever. India refused'a reasonable balance' and destroyed the denuclearization military proposalsby explodinga nucleardevice in 1974. Australiadeclined to take part and South Africawas refusedentry.The U.S.A.

resolution: Indian Ocean model Conflict

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20

JOHN HOUSE

freedom of the seas policy,whilstthe U.S.S.R favoured favoured the Zone of Peace proposals, but acted in a contrary manner.It is becomingrecognizedthatthe elimination of superpower navies depends on the global balance of powers; that the U.N. objectivesof arms limitation and reduction of regional rivalries are vague enoughto be ignored, and indeedfailto recognize of disputes or the deteriorating regionalrealities;whilstthe clauses on peaceful settlement of force,are at most devoutly renunciation to be wishedforbut unlikely, giventhe history of the past fewdecades.
IN CONCLUSION

All evidencepointsto a growing and disseminated threat the actionsofthe superto peace from and their client states the the around Indian Ocean. powers majorriskis of continuing Though the limited cumulative and assertive use of sea most wars, power, notably bytheU.S.A., backed the in Force on land ofa globalorder. introduces external risks 1981, Rapid Deployment up by The matchingof U.S. 7th fleetcrisisdeployments and antithe Red Fleet anti-carrier by submarine warfare task forcesseems to presage the greatest is within but dangers, probably knownand acceptedrulesof the superpower game. Littoral and hinterland statesaredisunited on almost issue,including security, every peace, the or of There maybe innategeographical outside involvement. disarmament, banning power reasons forthis, of distance and diversity, but this opens the way to outside interventions. such interventions the of sea is one of the mostpolitically use Among power,in novel forms, potent. The situation is so complexand fraught simulation withtensionsthatany system must An remaina generalframework, and withstructural, and event impacts. spatial temporal inputs or sequence of eventsmaybe calibrated within such a framework. Iterative simulation, gaming has thus farprovedthe mostrealisticmethodof tracing involving playersas decision-takers, betweendifferent sets of actorsat severalscale-levels.Scenariowriting or Delphic interaction, methodshave been the mostuseful,but the involvement in such issues of politicalgeographers of war and peace has scarcely yetbegun.

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