Mediterranean Dialogue critical test: a NATO DDR-SSR framework for Libya Todays Libya is led by a regime hoping to gain

legitimacy after the summer 2012 planned elections. It is good to have a relatively stable interlocutor for the international community, but it is hard to conceive that Cyrenaicas incipient quest for autonomy and around 250 separated militias only in the coastal city of Misurata could be solved by a democratic exercise, without a stable and secure setting for development. As such, the first problem to be tackled is related to the implementation of a post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program. The DDR program would pursue the recovery of armaments (mainly small arms and light weapons), in order to avoid a return to an armed conflict as a result to the current tensions. The extension of NATO Trust Fund for demilitarization (armaments destruction or physical security and stockpile management) to include MD1 could be seen as an important tool in the DDR process. But DDR is not only about armaments and has also an important role to play in reintegrating former rebel soldiers into society, in the light of its reintegration dimension. Therefore, another major advantage for NATO, besides the Trust Fund would consist of Alliances consolidated experience with the disbandment of the Kosovo Liberation Army, within a joint project with the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations and, more recently with the Afghan and Iraqi militia forces. However, DDR alone would not solve the Libyan multi-factor equation. Some academic analytical quarters are talking of a DDR-SSR-GIB nexus2, where the DDR programs are accompanied by Security Sector Reform (SSR) endeavors as well as by Governance and Institution Building (GIB) initiatives (where the center of gravity would lay with the Transitional Justice efforts). Given the comprehensiveness of a DDR-SSR-GIB approach I think it is quite clear that NATO cannot act alone but within an extended network of international organizations (primarily the UN and the European Union, but also the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Arab League or the African Union), where the Alliance could eventually emerge as a hub for the security sector oriented efforts. While NATO has little role to play in the GIB initiatives (only in those related to the security sector), the real challenge for the Alliance would be to engage Libya in pursuing a real SSR process. Taking into account the broadening of the concept of security, a SSR process would follow a set of principles ranging from the improvement of basic security up to the development of a reform process to review the capacity and technical needs of the security system, in order to establish effective governance, oversight and accountability mechanisms across this sector. Hence, the core of a NATO SSR endeavor could lay with the PAP-DIB framework 3 (even though it currently pertains to the Partnership for Peace arrangements), envisioning effective and transparent arrangements, procedures or measures for the democratic control of defence and security activities, including through appropriate legislation. The NATO SSR effort could emerge also beyond an educational framework, the case of the MD itself, toward even the deployment of Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) in Libya, in order to increase the degree of connectedness with the indigenous forces. The Chicago Summit offers a timely opportunity to launch a NATO DDR-SSR framework for Libya, either as part of the current structure of partnerships (most likely within the MD), or as a menu-based or plug-and-play individual partnership.
1 2

http://www.namsa.nato.int/Demil/back_e.htm. http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-SSR-ResearchBrief-2010-English.pdf. 3 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50083.htm.

Nevertheless, the Allied decision makers must be aware that time is ticking away and a failed Libyan state would have an significant impact on the regional security, both as source of instability for the neighboring countries as Algeria, Egypt and last, but not least, the Southern Europe states, as well as safe heaven for the local terrorist organizations such as the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Moreover, a failure in building a stable and secure Libyan state could be perceived as a failure of NATO in thinking way beyond the Operation Unified Protector framework.