POST 1993 UPDATES

In response to the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the Port Authority
implemented the following changes:

I. PHYSICAL CHANGES TO BUILDINGS:

a. Elevator system upgrades:
i. Redesign of lobby command board to show status of every elevator
(as opposed to only ones originating in lobby);
ii. New and improved elevator intercom;
iii. Addition of battery operated emergency lighting and alarm bell in
addition to generator power;
iv. Purchased drifter tools to move elevators in blackouts;
b. Stairs:
i. Enhanced lighting, e.g., normal and alternate off two subs fed by 8
different feeders; emergency generators; tertiary power; local
battery in fixtures;
ii. Glow-in-the-dark signs for doors (glow paint used by NORAD);
iii. Fluorescent stair riser and handrail paint,
iv. Braille, porcelain, metal to withstand new graffiti?;
c. Backup power for emergency systems, e.g., emergency lights, fire alarm,
OCC (upgraded to 2 MW feeder from PSE&G from pre-1993 tertiary
power?);

II. NOTIFICATION ENHANCEMENTS:

a. Fire alarm system: all new class "E" system, 6 separate systems ($80 mil)
i. Multiples power sources 4 a/c plus battery;
ii. Redundant data risers, style 7-3 risers;
iii. Redundant command stations and electronics in case of necessary
lobby evacuation;
iv. Public address system in ceiling every 50 ft;
v. Upgrade for ADA compliance with strobes;
vi. Backup mode on transponders to generate evacuation tone in case
of communications failure;
b. Installation of FDNY repeater at PA expense ($ 150,000)

III. COMMUNICATIONS UPGRADE:

a. AT&T cell site installed on roof of 5 WTC with antenna positioned to
ensure coverage for towers and stairwells in WTC 1 & 2 (PA paid for cell
phones for fire warden with pre-programmed critical numbers???);
b. After closet fire in 1994/5 on 54* floor of 1 WTC, WTD leased alpha
pagers for staff contractors and installed group paging system by Pagenet
for emergency info to be broadcast to dozens of staff simultaneously under
any circumstances;
 IV. FIRE EMERGENCY UPDATES:
a. Fire Command Station
i. One in each (?) tower lobby; (changed from central location at Bl
Truck Dock pre-1993; changed approved by FDNY); primary fire
command station in lobby of 2 WTC;
ii. New OCC (backup to fire command stations) in first sub-basement
of tower 2); capable of handling all elevators;
iii. Detailed information charts provided in each;
b. Personnel:
i. Dedicated manager of Fire Safety, with masters in fire science and
arson investigations (SPI retired FDNY officer);
ii. Fire Safety Directors in the lobby of each tower twenty-four hours
a day, seven days a week for sole purpose of advancing fire safety,
(retired FDNY employees);
iii. WTC "senior staff all trained in incident command system by
police;
iv. During transitions (?) Port Authority management staff on duty 24
hours a day, 7 days a week and on-site (7-3 and S-4???), trained as
fire safety directors also;
v. Routine tabletop drills with PAPD and civilians WTD staff;

V. PREPARATION / TRAINING:
a. Fire drills:
i. Conducted bi-annually;
ii. Fire wardens provided hats, whistles, flashlights, video training
tapes; (cell phones??? See above; did not hear this from civilian
fire wadens)
iii. After-hour drills for off-hour tenants, cleaners etc;
iv. Monthly drills of observation, daycare center, etc;
v. Property managers arranged drills for new tenants as soon as they
moved in;
vi. Tenant office managers given tenant manual detailing fire and
emergency plans for tenants;
b. Special Needs:
i. Survey conducted twice a year to determine people with
disabilities; list kepy at fire command station for police/ fire dept;
(approx. 200 in each tower);
ii. PA purchased and loaned EVAC chairs to tenants in wheelchairs;

Following is brief analysis of the usefulness of 1993-induced updates based on interviews

and letters written by civilians:

Civilians who were at the World Trade Center in 1993 and in 2001 described the physical
changes to the buildings as extremely helpful. The updates have often been attributed
with improving the quality of the evacuations as well as substantially reducing their
duration. Some civilians complained about conditions in the stairs where, due to the
destruction caused by the event, improvements were either not in full effect1 or were
obscured.2 However, even where the benefits of the improvements were mitigated by the
destructive effects of the event, it was still more helpful to have them there than not.

FIRE DRILLS

The procedure for fire drills, which were conducted [three to four] floors at a time every
six months, was for the designated fire wardens on each floor, usually about [four or
five], to gather people in each of their designated areas to the center of the floor. [Some
civilians indicate that they gathered at the nearest stairwell]. There, the fire warden
would contact the lobby command center by an emergency phone designated for that
purpose. Most civilians, including fire wardens, recall being taught to await instructions
which would be given at the time of an incident, rather than being told any pre-
established procedures, i.e., that they should always evacuate down. However, one
mentioned that they were instructed that, in the event of a fire, they should descend two
flights3 [unclear if two floors below where they were or where the fire is] after checking
doors for heat, and wait there for further instructions. More startlingly, a former fire
warden claimed that, given the floor her company was on, they were specifically
instructed to go to the roof.4 Evacuation drills were never conducted, nor were civilians
ever actually brought into the stairwells.

After the drill, fire wardens would meet with the deputy fire safety directors in charge of
their buildings to discuss the success of the drills.

Civilians vary in their evaluations of the helpfulness of post-1993 fire drills. Some found
them extremely useful, attributing their escape on September 11th to lessons learned in
the drills. More describe them as formalities which engendered neither the full attention,
nor the participation, of most office workers on the floors. Letters to OSHA by victims'
families and co-workers described drills as effectively "optional," including only those
who actually decided to participate. A former fire warden labeled drills as "very
uncooperative," claiming that most people refused to leave their offices because they
were too busy and those who did participate did not pay attention, talking over PA
announcements and making it difficult for fire wardens to hear instructions over the
emergency phone. She remarked that only once did a fire safety director personally
supervise the drill. She also criticized that drills were not conducted often enough,
leaving newcomers to the building without any directions for emergency situations.5

' Apparently lights were out due to electricity failures in certain affected portions of the stairwells.
2 Overwhelming smoke conditions prevented civilians from being able to see in affected areas of the
stairwells. However, even in an almost black stairwell, one civilians was able to follow glow stripes down
to safety.
3 Letter to OSHA by fomer Aon employee.
Letter from former Aon employee and fire warden for 100* floor; father, also an Aon employee, died on
September
eptember 11
1 th.
5 Former Aoi
Aon employee and fire warden, identified above; though Reiss' post-1993 changes specifically
dispute this.
The substance of the drills has been criticized as well, faulting the Port Authority for not
bringing civilians into the stairway proper, for not alerting them that fire doors to the roof
were locked*, and for not adequately explaining the configuration of the stairways that
contained transfer halls and doors on certain floors which civilians found confusing.
Some wondered why full evacuation drills were not conducted.

Some also complain that designated fire wardens were not properly equipped to execute
their responsibilities, i.e., should have had flame retardant suits, masks.

* It is unclear whether the Port Authority had conclusively and pre-emptively ruled out
of the possibility of rooftop evacuations in any situation and, if so, whether this
conclusion was communicated to civilians during fire drills. If the emergency procedure
was indeed always to evacuate down, the fact of the roof doors being locked would
obviously be immaterial. However, if helicopter evacuations were ever a viable option,
civilians should have been informed about obstacles to getting onto the roof and
procedures for overcoming them. Many family members who wrote letters to OSHA
were under the misimpression that a helicopter rescue was thwarted on September 11th by
the very fact that civilians could not get onto the roof to be rescued.