Cena v CSC Facts: Gaudencio Cena worked for 7 years as a Legal Officer of the Law Dept of Caloocan City.

He was then transferred to the Office of the Congressman where he worked as a Supervising Staff Officer for 3 months. He was then appointed as Registrar of the RD (Register of Deeds) in Malabon. In total, he has rendered govt service for 11 years, 9 months and 6 days. Before reaching his 65 th bday, he requested the LRA Administrator that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the 15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with full benefits of old age pension. The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the CSC. The CSC denied the extension but Cena filed a motion for reconsideration. This time around, CSC granted a 1-yr extension to him. Cena still filed a case against CSC for grave abuse of discretion when it granted an extension of only 1 yr. He contends that the law(Sec 11, PD 1146 also known as Revised Govt Insurance Act) does not limit or specify the maximum number of years the retiree may avail of to complete the 15-year service. Thus, the CSC has no authority to limit through a memorandum the number of years. In defense, CSC said that since it is the central personnel agency of the govt, it is vested with power to grant or allow extension of service beyond retirement age. Issue: Whether or not Cena is allowed to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement? Held: Yes. An administrative circular, such as a memorandum of the CSC cannot limit PD 1146, on extension of service of employees who reach 65. While it is true that CSC is given the authority to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service, it cannot extend to matters not covered. The CSCs authority is limited only to carrying into effect what PD 1146 says. It cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. The CSC Memorandum, being in the nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle that a regulation must be in harmony with the provisions of the law and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. CSC has no power to supply or add perceived omissions in PD 1146.

Rabor v. CSC Facts: Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. He entered the government service as a Utility Worker on 10 April 1978 at the age of 55 years. Sometime in May 1991, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he had already more than 68 years old. Rabor responded by showing a GSIS certificate with a notation to the effect that his service is extended for him to complete the 15-years requirement for retirement. The Davao City Government wrote to the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission, Region XI, Davao City informing the latter of the foregoing and requesting advice as to what action should be taken on Rabors case. Director Caward replied by saying that Rabors continued employment is contrary to OP M.C. No. 65 hence, it is non-extendible. Mayor Duterte furnished Rabor a copy of Cawads letter and order him not to work anymore. Rabor asked Director Cawad for extension of his job until he completed the 15-year requirement but was denied. Rabor then asked OP for an extension. His request was referred by OP to CSC and thereafter CSC denied Rabors request. Rabor asked for reconsidered of CSC ruling

citing Cena case but was denied. Rabor reiterated his request to Mayor Duterte but was rebuffed. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON Rabor request for extension should be granted in view of Cena case Held: No. Cena doctrine overturned. In Cena v. CSC, the Court reached its conclusion primarily on the basis of the "plain and ordinary meaning" of Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms, there were (and still are) two (2) administrative issuances which prescribe limitations on the extension of service that may be granted to an employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age. These are CSC Circular No. 27, s. 1990 and OP M.C. No. 65. The Court resolved the challenges posed by the above two (2) administrative regulations by, firstly, considering as invalid Civil Service Memorandum No. 27 and, secondly, by interpreting the Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65 as inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T. Cena. Nevertheless, the Court now ruled that the SC in Cena made a narrow interpretation. It is incorrect to decide the issue on the basis only of PD 1146. Reading the pertinent provisions the Admin Code particularly the provisions governing the CSC, it is clear that both the Admin Code and PD 1146 are the governing laws relating to retirement of government officials and employees. It was on the basis of the above quoted provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code that the Civil Service Commission promulgated its Memorandum Circular No. 27. In doing so, the Commission was acting as "the central personnel agency of the government empowered to promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for efficient, responsive and effective personnel administration in the government." It was also discharging its function of "administering the retirement program for government officials and employees" and of "evaluat[ing] qualifications for retirement." It is also incorrect to say that limitation of permissible extensions of service after an employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The physiological and psychological processes associated with ageing in human beings are in fact related to the efficiency and quality of the service that may be expected from individual persons. CSC Memo No. 27 is not invalid for having gone beyond the parameters set by PD 1146. In fact what the legislature intends is that the CSC should fill in the details in the implementation of PD 1146.

RARO V. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION 172 SCRA 845 GUTIERREZ, JR., J. FACTS 1. Zaida Raro was in perfect health when employed as clerk by the Bureau of Mines and Geo Sciences at the Regional Office in Daet, Camarines Sur on March 17, 1975. 2. Four years later, she began suffering from severe and recurrent heahaches coupled with blurring of visions. 3. She was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from brain tumor. By that time her memory, sense of time and reasoning power have been lost. 4. A claim for disability benefits with GSIS was denied because there was no proof that the disease is workconnected. 5. Petitioner contend on the other hand that if a claimant cannot prove the necessary work connection because the causes of the disease are still unknown, it must be presumed that working conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment. ISSUES 1. Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during employment is compensable under the present compensation laws.

2. Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable under the present compensation laws when the disease is not listed as occupational disease. HELD 1. NO. The first thing that stands in the way of this petition is the law itself. The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing that the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by working conditions. To say that since proof is not available (since medical science cannot positively identify the causes of various types of cancer), therefore the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence or non-existence of proof cannot be presumed. 2. YES. The new law discarded the concepts of presumption of compensability and aggravation and substituted a system based on social security principles. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employers obligation to pay workmens compensation and the employees right to receive reparation for work connected or disability. Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer, we now have a social insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid by the employers to a trust fund and claims are pain from the trust fund to those who can prove entitlement. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. If diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which tens of millions of workers and their families look for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur. ILOILO DOC & ENGINEERING CO. V. WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION 27 SCRA 103 CASTRO, J. FACTS On January 29, 1960, Teodoro Pablo and Rodolfo Galopez, had just finished overtime work at 5:00 pm and was going home. At around 5:02 pm, while Pablo and Galopez was walking along the IDECO road, about 20 meters from the IDECO main gate, Pablo was shot by Martin Cordero. The motive for the crime was and still unknown since Martin Cordero was himself killed before he could be tried for Pablos death. ISSUES 1. Whether or not Pablos death occurred in the course of employment and arising out of the employment. 2. Whether the PROXIMITY RULE should apply in this case. 3. Whether the death of Pablo was an accident within the purview of the Workmens Compensation Act. HELD 1. YES. Workmens compensation is granted if the injuries result from an accident which arise of and in the course of employment. Both the arising factor and the course factor must be present. If one f actor is weak and the other is strong, the injury is compensable but not where both factors are weak. Ultimately, the question is whether the accident is work connected. The words arising out of refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are descriptive of its character, while the words in the course refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place. The presumption that the injury arises out of and in the course of employment prevails where the injury occurs on the employers premises. While the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it was using the same as the principal means of ingress and egress. The private road leads directly to its main gate. Its right to use the road must then perforce proceed from either an easement of right of way or a lease. Its right therefore is either a

legal one or a contractual one. In either case the IDECO should logically and properly be charged with security control of the road. 2. YES. The general rule in workmens compensation law known as going and coming rule provides that in the absence of special circumstances, an employee injured in, going to, or coming from his place of work is excluded from the benefits of workmens compensation acts. The following are the exceptions: a. Where the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his employer b. Where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the premises of his employer by way of exclusive or customary means of ingress and egress c. Where the employee is charged while on his way to or from his place of employment or at his home or during his employment, with some duty or special errand connected with his employment d. Where the employer, as an incident of the employment provides the means of transportation to and from the place of employment. The second exception is known as the proximity rule. The place where the employee was injured being immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and therefore arose out of or in the course thereof. 3. YES. An assault although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is considered an accident within the meaning of the Workmens Compensation Act since the word accident is intended to indicate that the act causing the injury shall be casual or unforeseen, an act for which the injured party is not legally responsible. BELARMINO V. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION 185 SCRA 304 GRIO-AQUINO, J. FACTS 1. Oania Belarmino was a classroom teacher of the Department of Education Culture and Sports assigned at the Burucan Elementary School in Dimasalang, Masbate for 11 years. 2. On January 14, 1982, Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th month of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on the classroom floor. 3. She complained of abdominal pain and stomach cramps but she continued reporting for work because there was much work to do. 4. On January 25, 1982, she went into labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl at home. 5. Her abdominal pain persisted even after delivery. 6. When she was brought to the hospital, her physician informed her that she was suffering from septicemia post partum due to infected lacerations of the vagina. 7. After she was discharged from the hospital, she died three days thereafter. 8. The GSIS denied the claim on the ground that septicemia post partum, the cause of death is an occupational disease and neither was there any showing that the ailment was contracted by reason of her employment. 9. On appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission, latter also denied the claim affirming the denial of the claim by GSIS. ISSUE Whether or not the cause death of Mrs. Belarmino is not work-related and therefore not compensable.

HELD NO. The death of Mrs. Belarmino from septicemia post partum is compensable because an employment accident and the conditions of her employment contributed to its development. The condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the development of post partum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the proximate cause1 that set in motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise. The right to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury. Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimants own negligence or misconduct. Mrs. Belarminos fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her employment as a classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from it: her recurrent abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia post partum and death are compensable. 1Proximate Cause the efficient cause which sets the others in motion and is to be distinguished from a mere preexisting condition upon which the effective cause operates and must have been adequate to produce the resultant damage without the intervention of an independent cause. ALANO V. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION 158 SCRA 669 GUTIERREZ, JR. J. FACTS 1. Dedicacion De Vera worked as principal of Salinap Community School in san Carlos City, Pangasinan. 2. Her usual tour of duty was from 7:30 am to 5:30 pm. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 AM while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to school, she was bumped and ran over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted to her instantaneous death. 3. Her brother Generoso Alano filed the instant claim for income benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the decedents children. 4. The claim was denied by GSIS on the ground that the injury upon which compensation is being claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law. 5. The ECC affirmed the denial by GSIS. It claimed that the deceaseds accident did not meet the conditions under the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. First, the accident occurred at about 7:00 am or thirty minutes before the deceaseds working hours. Second, it happened not at her workplace but at the plaza where she usually waits for a ride to her work. Third, she was not then performing her official functions as school principal nor was she on a special errand for the school. ISSUE Whether or not the injury sustained by the deceased Dedicacion de Vera resulting in her death is compensable under the law as an employment accident. HELD YES. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.

In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principals being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there.

LAZO V. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION 186 SCRA 569 PADILLA, J FACTS 1. Salvador Lazo is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines. 2. His shift is usually from 2:00 PM to 10:00 PM. 3. On June 18, 1986, the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive. Lazo rendered overtime duty up to 5:00AM the following day. 4. Lazo, with the permission from his superior, to left early in order to take home his sack of rice. 5. On his way home, the jeepney that he was riding on turned turtle due to the slippery road. 6. Lazo sustained injuries and for which he seeks compensation. 7. The GSIS denied the claim on the ground that Lazo was not at his place of work when the incident occurred. This denial of claim was affirmed by ECC. ISSUE Whether or not the injuries sustained by Lazo due to the vehicular accident on his way home from work should be construed as arising out of or in the course of employment and thus compensable. HELD YES. Employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employers premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employers premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. It can be seen that petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, because the reliever did not arrive, and so petitioner was asked to go on overtime. After permission to leave was given, he went home. There is no evidence on record that petitioner deviated from his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the journey. There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be protected for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employers premises. While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmens Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code; it is significant that the liberality of the law in general in favor of the workingman still subsists. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the Labor Code. The policy then is to extend the applicability of the Labor Code to as many employees who can avail of the benefits there under.

MEEZ V. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION 97 SCRA 87 MAKASIAR, J. FACTS 1. Gloria Meez was a public school teacher. She was assigned to Raja Soliman High School in Tondo-Binondo, Manila. 2. She retired on August 31, 1975 under the disability retirement plan at the age of 54 years after 32 years of teaching due to rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis. 3. Petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits with the GSIS. GSIS denied the claim o n the ground that petitioners ailments are not occupational diseases taking into consideration the nature of her particular work. 4. ECC affirmed the denial of the claim by GSIS. It contended that Meezs employment has nothing to do with the development of her disabling disease. They are not listed as occupational disease as to merit compensation under the Labor Code. 5. Petitioner however claims that she contracted the pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on January 27, 1975 after wetting and chilling during the course of employment which are permanent and recurring in nature and work-connected. They arose in the course of her employment and were aggravated by the condition and nature of her work. ISSUES Whether or not the illness of the petitioner may be considered occupational diseases. HELD YES. For an illness to be compensable, it must either be: 1. An illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease. 2. An illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. An occupational disease is one which results from the nature of the employment and by nature is meant conditions to which all employees of a class are subject and which produce the disease as a natural incident of a particular occupation and attach to that occupation a hazard which distinguishes it from the usual run of occupations and is in excess of the hazard attending the employment in general. Rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis can be considered occupational diseases. All public school teachers are subject to emotional strains and stresses, dealing as they do with intractable teenagers, especially young boys and harassed as they are by various extracurricular or nonacademic assignments, aside from preparing lesson plan until late at night, if they are not badgered by very demanding superiors. In her work, the petitioner also has to contend with the natural elements like the inclement weather heavy rains, typhoons as well as dust and disease-ridden surrounding peculiar to an insanitary slum area. These unwholesome conditions are normal and consistently present in or are hazards peculiar to the occupation of a public high school teacher. But even if rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are not occupational diseases, there is ample proof that petitioner contracted such ailments by reason of her occupation as a public high school teacher due to her exposure to the adverse working conditions abovementioned.

DABATIAN V. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM 149 SCRA 123 GANCAYCO, J. FACTS 1. Sigfredo Dabatian was employed as a Garbage Truck Driver in the General Services Department of the City Government of Cagayan de Oro City. 2. He was usually assigned mostly in the night shift. At the time of his death, his shift started from 10:00 PM to 6:00 AM. 3. Dabatian was a heavy coffee drinker which was his way of warding off sleepiness. 4. He was observed to have been getting paler and weaker while at work until the time he collapsed. 5. Despite hospitalization, Dabatian died two weeks after he collapsed.

6. When his widow, Hilaria Dabatian filed a claim from GSIS, the same was denied on the ground that the decedents ailment, Peptic Ulcer, is not an occupational disease as listed under the present law on compensation. 7. Petitioner argues that the decedents predisposition to drinking coffee heavily aggravated his contraction of the disease resulting to his death. Petitioners argument is hinged on the presumption of compensability and principle of aggravation as sufficient ground for entitlement under the Workmens Compensation Act. ISSUE Whether or not under the premises the death of Sigfredo Dabation is compensable. HELD NO. Petitioner died on July 3, 1976 when the old compensation law had already been abrogated. The present Labor Code as amended, abolished the presumption of compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness caused by the nature of employment, the reason being to restore a sensible equilibrium betwe en the employers obligation to pay workmens compensation and the employees right to receive reparation for work connected death or disability. Under the present law, in order for the employee to be entitled to sickness or death benefits, the sickness or death resulting therefrom must be or must have resulted from either: a) Any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission; or b) Any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. Since peptic ulcer is not included in the list of occupational diseases as drawn up by the Commission, then petitioner has the burden of proving that the nature of her husband s work increased the risk of contracting the disease. Aside from the undisputed fact that the diseased is a heavy coffee drinker, which was his way of warding off sleepiness, no evidence was ever adduced by petitioner to bolster the theory that her husbands work increased the risk of contracting the ailment. Being a heavy coffee drinker may have aggravated his peptic ulcer, but, aggravation of an illness is no longer a ground for compensation under the present law.

RODRIGUEZ V. ECC 178 SCRA 1989 REGALADO, J. FACTS 1. Hector Rodriguez was a public school teacher assigned at Salaan Elementary School in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. 2. On November 19, 1975, he went on sick leave and was hospitalised at Pangasinan Provincial Hospital after he complained of severe stomach pains accompanied by nausea and vomiting. He was later diagnosed to have an Intestinal Lipomatis of the Large Colon with Obstruction of the Ascending Colon . 3. He underwent surgery but the same was unsuccessful. He died on December 2, 1975. 4. When his widow filed a claim with GSIS, the same was denied. GSIS contended that the nature of the deceased duties as a teacher could not have directly caused his ailment which eventuated in his subsequent death. 5. The ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS. 6. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that the principal duties of her husband as a classroom teacher alone would not have any connection with the disease. However, she posits that the deceaseds auxiliary activities as a classroom teacher directly affected his physical consatitution and caused him to have sustained some trauma in his abdominal cavity and other parts of the body. ISSUE Whether or not the death of the deceased caused by Intestinal Lipomatis of the Large Colon with Obstruction of the Ascending Colon, is compensable.

HELD NO. Claims on death benefits under Art. 194 must result from an occupational disease. A compensable disease means any illness accepted and listed by the ECC or any illness caused by the employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same was increased by the working conditions. If the disease is listed in Annex A, no proof of causation is required. If it is not so listed, it has been held that the employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove, a positive proposition, that is, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by working conditions. Proof of direct causal relation is indispensably required. It is enough that the claimant adduces proof of reasonable work connection, whereby the development of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. Strict rules of evidence, which has been held to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. The circumstances alleged by the petitioner and the evidence she presented are not enough to discharge the required quantum of proof, liberal as it is. There is no clear evidence as to when the diseased commenced and supervened; the tumors which developed in the deceaseds colon may have been growing for many years even before he was employed as a teacher. The trauma that was supposed to have caused or at least contributed to the disease was neither satisfactorily clarified nor adequately proved.