2. DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN VS.

SECRETARY OF LABOR FACTS: Divine Word University Employees Union (DWUEU) is the sole and bargaining agent of the Divine Word University. Sometime in 1985, DWUEU submitted its collective bargaining proposals. The University replied and requested a preliminary conference which unfortunately did not take place due to the alleged withdrawal of the CBA proposals. Because of this, the union filed a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice. Then, an agreement between the University and DWUEU-ALU were held after the filing of the notice of strike. DWUEU-ALU, consonant with the agreement, submitted its collective bargaining proposals but was ignored by the University. ISSUE: WON the complaint for unfair labor practice filed by the Union is with merit. HELD: A thorough study of the records reveals that there was no "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining" especially on the part of the University. Its indifferent towards collective bargaining inevitably resulted in the failure of the parties to arrive at an agreement. As it was evident that unilateral moves were being undertaken only by the DWUEU-ALU, there was no counteraction of forces or an impasse to speak of. While collective bargaining should be initiated by the union, there is a corresponding responsibility on the part of the employer to respond in some manner to such acts. This is a clear from the provisions of the Labor Code Art 250(a) of which states: a.) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto not later than 10 calendar days from receipt of such notice.

Hence, petitioner's contention that the DWUEU-ALU's proposals may not be unilaterally imposed on it on the ground that a collective bargaining agreement is a contract wherein the consent of both parties is indispensable is devoid of merit. A similar argume nt had already been disregarded in the case of Kiok Loy v. NLRC, where we upheld the order of the NLRC declaring the unions draft CBA proposal as the collective agreement which should govern the relationship between the parties. Kiok Loy vs. NLRC is applicable in the instant case, considering that the fact therein have also been indubitably established in this case. These factors are: (a) the union is the duly certified bargaining agent; (b) it made a definite request to bargain submitted its collective bargaining proposals, and (c) the University made no further proposal whatsoever. As we said in Kiok Loy v. NLRC, a company's refusal to make counter proposal if considered in relation to the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad faith and this is especially true where the Union's request for a counter proposal is left unanswered. "Moreover, the Court added in the same case that "it is not obligatory upon either side of a labor controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposal of the other. But an erring party should not be tolerated and allowed with impunity to resort to schemes feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures.

3. MANILA CENTRAL LINE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. MANILA CENTRAL LINE FREE WORKERS UNION-NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,respondents DECISION This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution dated October 10, 1991 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR Case No. 000977-90, dismissing the appeal of petitioner Manila Central Line Corporation from the order of Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto, Jr., in NLRC NCR Case No. 02-00813-90, as well as the resolution dated March 11, 1993 of the NLRC, denying reconsideration. This case arose out of a collective bargaining deadlock between petitioner and private respondent Manila Central Line Free Workers Union-National Federation of Labor. The parties collective bargaining agreement had expired on March 15, 1989. As the parties failed to reach new agreement, private respondent sought the aid of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board on October 30, 1989, but the deadlock remained unresolved. On February 9, 1990, private respondent filed a Petition for Compulsory Arbitration in the Arbitration Branch for the National Capital Region of the National Labor Relations Commission. At the initial hearing before the labor arbiter, the parties declared that conciliation efforts before the NCMB had terminated and it was their desire to submit the case for compulsory arbitration. Accordingly, they were required to submit their position papers and proposals, which they did, and in which they indicated portions of their respective proposals to which they agreed, leaving the rest for arbitration.[1] On September 28, 1990, the labor arbiter rendered a decision embodying provisions for a new collective bargaining agreement. The dispositive portion of his decision reads: WHEREFORE, the petitioner UNION and the respondent COMPANY are directed to execute and formalize their new five-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) retroactive to the date of expiry of the 1986-1989 CBA by adopting the provisions in the aforementioned test which incorporated therein in the disposition set forth by this Arbitrator within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Decision SO ORDERED.[2] Petitioner appealed, but its appeal was denied by the NLRC in its questioned resolution of October 10, 1991. On March 11, 1993, the NLRC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition with the following assignment of errors: a) The NLRC erred in affirming the Labor Arbiters decision 1. increasing the commission rate, the incentive pay, the salaries and wages of the fixed income employees covered by the CBA. 2. granting P500.00 signing bonus to the complainant-appellee; and 3. holding that the effectivity of the renegotiated CBA shall be retroactive to March 15, 1989, the expiry date of the old CBA

b) There are serious errors in the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter which were unqualified affirmed by the NLRC and which justify the review by this Honorable SUPREME COURT. c) The NLRC erred in upholding the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter; and d) The NLRC erred in affirming the finalization of the CBA by the Labor Arbiter in disregard of the provisions agreed upon by the parties. The petition is without merit. We shall deal with these contentions in the order they are presented, with the exception of the argument concerning the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter (par. (c)), which we shall treat first since it raises a threshold question. First. Despite the fact that it agreed with the union to submit their dispute to the labor arbiter for arbitration, petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter to render the decision in question. Petitioner contends that the policy of the law now is to encourage resort to conciliation and voluntary arbitration as Art 250(e) of the Labor Code provides. Indeed, the Labor Code formerly provided that if the parties in collective bargaining fail to reach an agreement, the Bureau of Labor Relations should call them to conciliation meetings and, if its efforts were not successful, certify the dispute to a labor arbiter for compulsory arbitrarion.[3]But this was changed by R.A.No. 6715 which took effect on March 21, 1989. Art 250(e) of the Labor Code now provides that if effects of conciliation fail, the Board shall encourage the parties to submit their case to a voluntary arbitrator. With specific reference to cases involving deadlocks in collective bargaining, Art. 262 provides: Jurisdiction over other labor disputes The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks. This is what the parties did in this case. After the Board failed to resolve the bargaining deadlock between parties, the union filed a petition for compulsory arbitration in the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. Petitioner joined the petition and the case was submitted for decision. Although the unions petition was for compulsory arbitration, the subsequent agreement of petitioner to submit the matter for arbitration in effect made the arbitration a voluntary one. The essence of voluntary arbitration, after all is that it is by agreement of the parties, rather than compulsion of law, that a matter is submitted for arbitration.[4] It does not matter that the person chosen as arbitrator is a labor arbiter who, under Art 217 of the Labor Code, is charged with the compulsory arbitration of certain labor cases. There is nothing in the law that prohibits these labor arbiters from also acting as voluntary arbitrators as long as the parties agree to have him hear and decide their dispute. Moreover, petitioner must be deemed to be estopped from questioning the authority of Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto, Jr., to act as voluntary arbitrator and render a decision in this case. Petitioner agreed together with the union, to refer their dispute for arbitration to him. It was only after the decision was rendered that petitioner raised the question of lack of jurisdiction. Even then, petitioner did so only for the first time in a supplemental memorandum of appeal to the NLRC. [5] As the NLRC, through Commissioner Romeo B. Putong held, it was too late in the day for petitioner to do this.[6] Indeed, it is inconsistent for petitioner to contend, on the other hand, that this case should have been resolved through voluntary arbitration and, on the other, to follow the procedure for compulsory

arbitration and, appealing the decision of the labor arbiter to the NLRC and subsequently questioning the latters decision in Luzon Development Bank v. Luzon Development Bank Employees Association,[7] this case, considered as a special civil action for certiorari to set aside the decision of a voluntary arbitrator, should have been referred, as a matter of policy, to the Court of Appeals. However, it was not evident in the beginning from a cursory consideration of the pleadings that what actually took place in the labor agency was a proceeding for voluntary arbitration. Accordingly, so as not to delay the disposition of this case, we have thought on balance that this case should be retained and decided on the merits. Second. In par. (a) (1) and par. (b) of its assignment of errors, petitioner questions factual findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC. Such findings are generally held to be binding, and even final, so long as they are substantially supported by evidence in the record of the case.[8] This is especially so where, as here, the agency and a subordinate one which heard the case in the first instance are in full agreement as to the facts.[9] The decisions of both the NLRC and the labor arbiter contain an exhaustive discussion of the issues, belying petitioners claim that they did not fully consider the evidence and appreciate what it claims are the dire economic straits it is in. This is evident from the following portion of the labor arbiters order dated September 28, 1990, which NLRC adopted: From the foregoing allegations of the parties and as expound (sic), discussed and/or argued by them in their respective position paper, the disagreement, or deadlock, as we say it, focus (sic) and centers on the so called economic issues particularly on the provisions on Salaries and Wages. Petitioner-Union proposed that the commission for drivers, conductors and conductresses shall be 10% and 8%, respectively of their gross collections. In addition, as incentive pay, it proposed that drivers, conductors and conductresses shall be entitled to incentive pay as follows: (a) For a quota of P2,600.00, the incentive should be P40.00; (b) for a quota of P2,875.00, the incentive should be P50.00 and (c) for a quota ofP3,155.00 the incentive pay should be P60.00. Further, petitioner-Union, insofar as the fixed income employees are concerned, they proposed that they should be granted a salary/wage increase as follows: (a) effective March 15, 1989 P12.00; (b) Effective March 15, 1990 P10.00; and (c) effective March 15, 1991 P8.00. Respondent, on the other hand, proposes that the commission for drivers and conductor/tresses shall be 8.5% and 6.5% of their gross collection, respectively. And in addition, these drivers and conductors/tresses shall be entitled to an incentive pay based on the following quota, to wit: (a) for a quota of P3,276.00, the incentive pay is P35.00; (b) for a quota of P3,635.00, it is P45.00; and for a quoa of P3,994.00, it is P55.00. Respondent management has no proposal insofar as grant of increase/s to fixed income employees subject of the bargaining unit. As noted at present under the old CBA, the commission for drivers and conductor/tresses is 8% and 6%, respectively. During and in the negotiation, respondent proposes to raise this rate by .5% thus making it 8.5 and 6.5 respectively. Respondent in proposing an increase of .5% justifies the same by saying that such is only what it can afford as it had been incurring financial losses as shown by Financial Statement it submitted in evidence. This was rejected by the union which proposes that the rate of the commission be raised to 10% and 8% respectively, from 8% and 6%, or an increase by 2% respectively. The union

debunked the claim fo the respondent-company that it had been financially suffering and had claim (sic) that it had earned profit in all the years that it had been under operation. A look at the parties proposal and counter-proposal shows that the union was demanding that the rate be increased to 10% and 8% from the old rate of 8% and 6% or an increase of 2% while that of the company effectively increase the rate by .5% to make the rate at 8.5% and 6.5%. From this, it appears that the disagreement lies on how much would the increase equivalent to at least 25% for the drivers and at least 33% for the conductor/tresses, while that which proposed (sic) by the company shows an increase of at least 6% and 8% respectively. The difference between the parties proposal and counterproposal is at least 19% and 25%, respectively. With this disagreement in this difference, it is thought of to be practical and reasonable to meet at the middle of the difference in the rate by dividing the same into two. Hence, the increase in the rate should be from the present 8% and 6% to 8.75% and 6.75%. However, in order to make the increase realistic it is opined that it should be rounded off to the nearest full number that is to 9% and 7%, respectively. As regards the incentive pay, the following appears: OLD CBA QUOTA P2,800.00 3,100.00 3,400.00 RESPONDENTS PROPOSAL UNIONS PROPOSAL INCENTIVE QUOTA INCENTIVE QUOTA INCENTIVE P 35.00 P3,276.00 P35.00 P2,600.00 P40.00 45.00 3,635.00 45.00 2,600.00 50.00 55.00 3,994.00 55.00 3,155.00 60.00

As can be gleaned from the above respondent raised the quota but maintained the rate for the incentive pay, while the union lowers (sic) the quota and raises (sic) the rate for the incentive. To the mind of this arbitrator, he deems it proper and fair for both parties, to adopt the quota as proposed by the respondent and the rate for the incentive pay as proposed by the union. It is believe (sic) that such is fair and reasonable because as appearing in the parties proposal and counter proposal, it would seem that they are trying to out-wit each other. Another issue where the parties are in statements (sic) is the matter of increase in the salary and wages of the fixed income employees covered by the CBA. The Union proposes an increase of P12.00, P10.00 and P8.00 to be spread in the three-year period, while the company did not submit a proposal for an increase claiming that it cannot afford to give any increase as it had suffered financial difficulty. However, as already discussed earlier where it is found that respondent, as shown by its financial statement, is not really in the verge of financial collapse, it is believed that it is reasonable and fair to the parties, particularly to the union that increase would be mandated. However, we could not adopt in toto the proposal of the union. Instead, we are to adopt the increase as provided under the old CBA, that is, P6.00 for the first year, P5.00 for the second year and P4.00 for the third year.[10] Petitioner contends, however, that the labor arbiter has a duty to indicate in his order every relevant proof necessary to show that the opposing partys evidence is superior to that of petitioner. This is not so. The quantum of proof required in proceedings before administrative agencies is substantial evidence, not overwhelming or preponderant evidence.[11] The quoted portion of the labor arbiters order shows that the proposals of the parties as well as petitioners financial statements were carefully considered by him in arriving at his judgment. As the Solicitor General states: Nor did respondent NLRC overlook the protestations of the COMPANY that it is suffering from gargantuan economic trouble. This assertion, however, was sufficiently refuted by the UNION by

presenting proof that the COMPANY had acquired a bus terminal area in Tunasan. Moreover, the COMPANY had just imported machines to recondition their old buses. Also, as can be seen in the 1992 Financial Statement of the COMPANY had just imported machines to recondition their old buses. Also, as can be seen in the1992 Financial Statement of the COMPANY, it acquired new buses worth P2,400,000.00. These facts verify the findings of the Labor Arbiter that the COMPANY is not on the verge of financial collapse.Also, the COMPANY had offered an increase of .5% but in the same breath, it claims that it can hardly maintain the commission rate of 8% and 6%. There is a contradiction of facts right there and then, which considerably weakens its assertions The increase in commission rate will not really affect the income of the COMPANY. By their very nature, commissions will only be given to the employees if the COMPANY receives more income. They are given in the form of incentives or encouragement so that employees would be inspired to put a little more industry on their particular tasks. This is unlike salaries and wages which are fixed amounts and which should be given to the employees regardless of whether the COMPANY is making any collection or not. Therefore, the employees are merely asking a percentage of the earnings of the COMPANY, which they, through their efforts, helped produce. As regards the incentive pay increase, the COMPANYs financial position was also taken into consideration. It appears that the COMPANY and the UNION were trying to outwit each other in their respective proposals. Thus, the position adopted by the Labor Arbiter - - increasing the quota and the amount of incentive is a middle ground which is fair to both parties. The increase in salaries and wages was premised on the findings of the Labor Arbiter that the COMPANY was not on the verge of financial collapse and that an increase would be mandated, particularly taking into consideration the inflation or increase in the cost of living in the subsequent years after the CBA was finalized. In adopting the wage increase rates provided in the old CBA, the financial condition of the COMPANY as well as the needs of the employees were taken into consideration. When conclusions of the Labor Arbiter are sufficiently corroborated by the evidence on record, the same should be respected by the appellate tribunals since he is in a better position to assess or evaluate the credibility of the contending parties [CDCP Tollways Operation Employees and Workers Union v. NLRC, 211 SCRA 58).[12] Nor is the grant of a P500.00 signing bonus to employees unreasonable or arbitrary. The amount is a modest sum, to be given by petitioner only once, in order to make employees finally agree to the new CBA. In ordering payment of this amount, the labor arbiter acted in accordance with Art. 262-A of the Labor Code which provides in part: Procedures. The voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have the power to hold hearings, receive evidence and take whatever action is necessary to resolve the issue or issues subject to dispute, including efforts to effect a voluntary settlement between parties. (emphasis added) Third. Petitioner also contends that in ordering a new CBA to be effective on March 15, 1989, the expiry date of the old CBA, the labor arbiter acted contrary to Art. 253-A of the Labor Code. This provision states, among others, that: Any agreement on such other provision of the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into within six (6) months from the date of the expiry of the term of such other provisions as fixed in such Collective Bargaining Agreement, shall retroact to the day immediately following such date. If any such agreement

is entered into beyond six months, the parties shall agree on the duration of retroactivity thereof. In case of a deadlock in the renegotiation of the collective bargaining agreement, the parties may exercise their rights under this Code. Art. 253-A refers to collective bargaining agreements entered into by the parties as a result of their mutual agreement. The CBA in this case, on the other hand, is part of an arbitral award. As such, it may be made retroactive to the date of expiration of the previous agreement. As held in St. Lukes Medical Center, Inc. v. Torres: Finally, the effectivity of the Order of January 28, 1991, must retroact to the date of the expiration of the previous CBA, contrary to the position of petitioner. Under the circumstances of the case, Article 253-A cannot be properly applied to herein case. As correctly stated by public respondent in his assailed Order of April 12, 1991 dismissing petitioners Motion for Reconsideration Anent the alleged lack of basis for the retroactivity to provisions awarded, we would stress that the provision of law invoked by the Hospital. Article 253-A of the Labor Code, speaks of agreements by and between the parties, and not arbitral awards . . . (p. 818 Rollo). Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public respondent is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof.[13] Indeed, petitioner has not shown that the question of effectivity was not included in the general agreement of the parties to submit their dispute for arbitration. To the contrary, as to the order of the labor arbiter states, this question was among those submitted for arbitration by the parties: As regards the Effectivity and Duration clause, the company proposes that the collective bargaining agreement shall take effect only upon its signing and shall remain in full force and effect for a period of five years. The union proposes that the agreement shall take effect retroactive to March 15, 1989, the expiration date of the old CBA. And after an evaluation of the parties respective contention and argument thereof, it is believed that the union is fair and reasonable. It is the observation of this Arbitrator that in almost subsequent CBAs, the effectivity of the renegotiated CBA, usually and most often is made effective retroactive to the date when the immediately proceeding CBA expires so as to give a semblance of continuity. Hence, for this particular case, it is believed that there is nothing wrong adopting the stand of the union, that is that this CBA be made retroactive effective March 15, 1989.[14] Fourth. It is finally contended that the labor arbiter disregarded many provisions of the old CBA which the parties had retained, improved and agreed upon, with the result that the CBA finalized by the Honorable Labor Arbiter does not reflect the true intention of the parties.[15]Petitioner does not specify, however, what provisions of the old CBA were disregarded by the labor arbiter. Consequently, this allegation should simply be dismissed. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDER

4. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES AND FACULTY LETRAN and ELEONOR AMBAS, respondents DECISION

OF

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 9 August 1999, dismissing the petition filed by Colegio de San Juan de Letran (hereinafter, "petitioner") and affirming the Order of the Secretary of Labor, dated December 2, 1996, finding the petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice on two (2) counts. The facts, as found by the Secretary of Labor and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are as follows: "On December 1992, Salvador Abtria, then President of respondent union, Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran, initiated the renegotiation of its Collective Bargaining Agreement with petitioner Colegio de San Juan de Letran for the last two (2) years of the CBA's five (5) year lifetime from 1989-1994. On the same year, the union elected a new set of officers wherein private respondent Eleanor Ambas emerged as the newly elected President (Secretary of Labor and Employment's Order dated December 2, 1996, p. 12). Ambas wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner, through Fr. Edwin Lao, claimed that the CBA was already prepared for signing by the parties. The parties submitted the disputed CBA to a referendum by the union members, who eventually rejected the said CBA (Ibid, p. 2). Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Labor Arbiter Edgardo M. Madriaga decided in favor of petitioner. However, the Labor Arbiter's decision was reversed on appeal before the NLRC (Ibid, p. 2). On January 1996, the union notified the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of its intention to strike on the grounds (sic) of petitioner's: non-compliance with the NLRC (1) order to delete the name of Atty. Federico Leynes as the union's legal counsel; and (2) refusal to bargain (Ibid, p. 1). On January 18, 1996, the parties agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on a new five-year CBA starting 1994-1999. On February 7, 1996, the union submitted its proposals to petitioner, which notified the union six days later or on February 13, 1996 that the same had been submitted to its Board of Trustees. In the meantime, Ambas was informed through a letter dated February 15, 1996 from her superior that her work schedule was being changed from Monday to Friday to Tuesday to Saturday. Ambas protested and requested management to submit the issue to a grievance machinery under the old CBA (Ibid, p. 2-3). Due to petitioner's inaction, the union filed a notice of strike on March 13, 1996. The parties met on March 27, 1996 before the NCMB to discuss the ground rules for the negotiation. On March 29, 1996, the union received petitioner's letter dismissing Ambas for alleged insubordination. Hence, the union amended its notice of strike to include Ambas' dismissal. (Ibid, p. 2-3). On April 20, 1996, both parties again discussed the ground rules for the CBA renegotiation. However, petitioner stopped the negotiations after it purportedly received information that a new group of employees had filed a petition for certification election (Ibid, p. 3).

On June 18, 1996, the union finally struck. On July 2, 1996, public respondent the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction and ordered all striking employees including the union president to return to work and for petitioner to accept them back under the same terms and conditions before the actual strike. Petitioner readmitted the striking members except Ambas. The parties then submitted their pleadings including their position papers which were filed on July 17, 1996 ( Ibid, pp. 2-3). On December 2, 1996, public respondent issued an order declaring petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice on two counts and directing the reinstatement of private respondent Ambas with backwages. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated May 29, 1997 (Petition, pp. 8-9)."[1] Having been denied its motion for reconsideration, petitioner sought a review of the order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and affirmed the findings of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals sets forth: WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this Petition is DISMISSED, for being without merit in fact and in law. With cost to petitioner. SO ORDERED.[2] Hence, petitioner comes to this Court for redress. Petitioner ascribes the following errors to the Court of Appeals: I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT WHICH DECLARES PETITIONER LETRAN GUILTY OF REFUSAL TO BARGAIN (UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE) FOR SUSPENDING THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS WITH RESPONDENT AEFL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SUSPENSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION BY A RIVAL UNION WHO CLAIMED TO COMMAND THE MAJORITY OF THE EMPLOYEES WITHIN THE BARGAINING UNIT. II THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT WHICH DECLARES PETITIONER LETRAN GUILTY OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE FOR DISMISSING RESPONDENT AMBAS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT HER DISMISSAL WAS CAUSED BY HER INSUBORDINATE ATTITUDE, SPECIFICALLY, HER REFUSAL TO FOLLOW THE PRESCRIBED WORK SCHEDULE.[3] The twin questions of law before this Court are the following: (1) whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union when it unilaterally suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) upon mere information that a petition for

certification has been filed by another legitimate labor organization? (2) whether the termination of the union president amounts to an interference of the employees' right to self-organization? The petition is without merit. After a thorough review of the records of the case, this Court finds that petitioner has not shown any compelling reason sufficient to overturn the ruling of the Court of Appeals affirming the findings of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. It is axiomatic that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court and will not be reviewed or disturbed on appeal. In this case, the petitioner failed to show any extraordinary circumstance justifying a departure from this established doctrine. As regards the first issue, Article 252 of the Labor Code defines the meaning of the phrase "duty to bargain collectively," as follows: Art. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. - The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession. Noteworthy in the above definition is the requirement on both parties of the performance of the mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. Undoubtedly, respondent Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran (AEFL) (hereinafter, "union") lived up to this requisite when it presented its proposals for the CBA to petitioner on February 7, 1996. On the other hand, petitioner devised ways and means in order to prevent the negotiation. Petitioner's utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union is obvious in its failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the latter. More than a month after the proposals were submitted by the union, petitioner still had not made any counter-proposals. This inaction on the part of petitioner prompted the union to file its second notice of strike on March 13, 1996. Petitioner could only offer a feeble explanation that the Board of Trustees had not yet convened to discuss the matter as its excuse for failing to file its reply. This is a clear violation of Article 250 of the Labor Code governing the procedure in collective bargaining, to wit: Art. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. - The following procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining: (a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice.[4] xxx As we have held in the case of Kiok Loy vs. NLRC,[5] the company's refusal to make counter-proposal to the union's proposed CBA is an indication of its bad faith. Where the employer did not even bother to submit an answer to the bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the duty to

bargain collectively.[6] In the case at bar, petitioner's actuation show a lack of sincere desire to negotiate rendering it guilty of unfair labor practice. Moreover, the series of events that transpired after the filing of the first notice of strike in January 1996 show petitioner's resort to delaying tactics to ensure that negotiation would not push through. Thus, on February 15, 1996, or barely a few days after the union proposals for the new CBA were submitted, the union president was informed by her superior that her work schedule was being changed from Mondays to Fridays to Tuesdays to Saturdays. A request from the union president that the issue be submitted to a grievance machinery was subsequently denied.Thereafter, the petitioner and the union met on March 27, 1996 to discuss the ground rules for negotiation. However, just two days later, or on March 29, 1996, petitioner dismissed the union president for alleged insubordination. In its final attempt to thwart the bargaining process,petitioner suspended the negotiation on the ground that it allegedly received information that a new group of employees called the Association of Concerned Employees of Colegio (ACEC) had filed a petition for certification election. Clearly, petitioner tried to evade its duty to bargain collectively. Petitioner, however, argues that since it has already submitted the union's proposals to the Board of Trustees and that a series of conferences had already been undertaken to discuss the ground rules for negotiation such should already be considered as acts indicative of its intention to bargain. As pointed out earlier, the evidence on record belie the assertions of petitioner. Petitioner, likewise, claims that the suspension of negotiation was proper since by the filing of the petition for certification election the issue on majority representation of the employees has arose. According to petitioner, the authority of the union to negotiate on behalf of the employeeswas challenged when a rival union filed a petition for certification election. Citing the case of Lakas Ng Manggagawang Makabayan v. Marcelo Enterprises,[7] petitioner asserts that in view of the pendency of the petition for certification election, it had no duty to bargain collectively with the union. We disagree. In order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process there must be a valid petition for certification election raising a legitimate representation issue. Hence, the mere filing of a petition for certification election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the employer. The petition must first comply with the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. Foremost is that a petition for certification election must be filed during the sixty-day freedom period. The "Contract Bar Rule" under Section 3, Rule XI, Book V, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, provides that: " . If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement." The rule is based on Article 232,[8] in relation to Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of the Labor Code. No petition for certification election for any representation issue may be filed after the lapse of the sixty-day freedom period. The old CBA is extended until a new one is signed. The rule is that despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of the CBA the law still considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new CBA shall have been validly executed.[9] Hence, the contract bar rule still applies.[10] The purpose is to ensure stability in the relationship of the workers and the company by preventing frequent modifications of any CBA earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated original period.[11] In the case at bar, the lifetime of the previous CBA was from 1989-1994. The petition for certification election by ACEC, allegedly a legitimate labor organization, was filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) only on May 26, 1996. Clearly, the petition was filed outside the sixtyday freedom period. Hence, the filing thereof was barred by the existence of a valid and existing collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, there is no legitimate representation issue and, as such,

the filing of the petition for certification election did not constitute a bar to the ongoing negotiation. Reliance, therefore, by petitioner of the ruling in Lakas Ng Manggagawang Makabayan v. Marcelo Enterprises[12] is misplaced since that case involved a legitimate representation issue which is not present in the case at bar. Significantly, the same petition for certification election was dismissed by the Secretary of Labor on October 25, 1996. The dismissal was upheld by this Court in a Resolution, dated April 21, 1997.[13] In view of the above, there is no doubt that petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by its stern refusal to bargain in good faith with respondent union. Concerning the issue on the validity of the termination of the union president, we hold that the dismissal was effected in violation of the employees' right to self-organization. To justify the dismissal, petitioner asserts that the union president was terminated for cause, allegedly for insubordination for her failure to comply with the new working schedule assigned to her, and pursuant to its managerial prerogative to discipline and/or dismiss its employees. While we recognize the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee for a just or authorized cause, nevertheless, the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of law and pursuant to the tenets of equity and fair play.[14] The employer's right to terminate the services of an employee for just or authorized cause must be exercised in good faith.[15] More importantly, it must not amount to interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to selforganization because it would amount to, as in this case, unlawful labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code. The factual backdrop of the termination of Ms. Ambas leads us to no other conclusion that she was dismissed in order to strip the union of a leader who would fight for the right of her co-workers at the bargaining table. Ms. Ambas, at the time of her dismissal, had been working for the petitioner for ten (10) years already. In fact, she was a recipient of a loyalty award. Moreover, for the past ten (10) years her working schedule was from Monday to Friday. However, things began to change when she was elected as union president and when she started negotiating for a new CBA. Thus, it was when she was the union president and during the period of tense and difficult negotiations when her work schedule was altered from Mondays to Fridays to Tuesdays to Saturdays. When she did not budge, although her schedule was changed, she was outrightly dismissed for alleged insubordination.[16] We quote with approval the following findings of the Secretary of Labor on this matter, to wit: "Assuming arguendo that Ms. Ambas was guilty, such disobedience was not, however, a valid ground to teminate her employment. The disputed management action was directly connected with Ms. Ambas' determination to change the complexion of the CBA. As a matter of fact, Ms. Ambas' unflinching position in faithfully and truthfully carrying out her duties and responsibilities to her Union and its members in getting a fair share of the fruits of their collective endeavors was the proximate cause for her dismissal, the charge of insubordination being merely a ploy to give a color of legality to the contemplated management action to dismiss her. Thus, the dismissal of Ms. Ambas was heavily tainted with and evidently done in bad faith. Manifestly, it was designed to interfere with the members' right to self-organization. Admittedly, management has the prerogative to discipline its employees for insubordination. But when the exercise of such management right tends to interfere with the employees' right to self-organization, it amounts to union-busting and is therefore a prohibited act. The dismissal of Ms. Ambas was clearly designed to frustrate the Union in its desire to forge a new CBA with the College that is reflective of the

true wishes and aspirations of the Union members. Her dismissal was merely a subterfuge to get rid of her, which smacks of a pre-conceived plan to oust her from the premises of the College. It has the effect of busting the Union, stripping it of its strong-willed leadership. When management refused to treat the charge of insubordination as a grievance within the scope of the Grievance Machinery, the action of the College in finally dismissing her from the service became arbitrary, capricious and whimsical, and therefore violated Ms. Ambas' right to due process."[17] In this regard, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Court of Appeals affirming the findings of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The right to self-organization of employees must not be interfered with by the employer on the pretext of exercising management prerogative of disciplining its employees. In this case, the totality of conduct of the employer shows an evident attempt to restrain the employees from fully exercising their rights under the law. This cannot be done under the Labor Code. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Case Digest on Colegio de San Juan de Letran v. Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran, G.R. 141471, September 18, 2000- Labor Law Q: X was employed as sewer by a corporation engaged in the business of sewing costumes, gowns and casual and formal dresses.Eventually, she started to feel chest pains. She then filed a leave of absence from work as the chest pains became unbearable. After subjecting herself to medical examination, she was found to be suffering from Atherosclerotic heart disease, Atrial Fibrillation, Cardiac Arrhythmia. Upon recommendation of her doctor, she resigned from her work hoping that with a much-needed complete rest, she will be cured. She later filed a disability claim with the SSS from the Employees Compensation Fund, under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. Was the sickness compensable? A: Yes, the illness is compensable. Under the Labor Code, as amended, the law applicable to the case at bar, in order for the employee to be entitled to sickness or death benefits, the sickness or death resulting therefrom must be or must have resulted from either Case Digest on a- Labor Law any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or Case Digest on b- Labor Law any illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. In other words, for a sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the said sickness must be an occupational disease listed under Annex A the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation; otherwise, the claimant or employee concerned must prove that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working condition. Indisputably, cardiovascular diseases, which, as herein above-stated include atherosclerotic heart disease, atrial fibrillation, cardiac arrhythmia, are listed as compensable occupational diseases in the Rules of the Employees Compensation Commission, hence, no further proof of casual relation between the disease and claimants work is necessary.

5. NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP)TUCP,petitioner, vs. HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, in her capacity as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations; and the NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (NFSW)-FGT-KMU, respondents This is a petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the resolution issued by the respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations Pura Ferrer-Calleja dated June 26, 1989 setting aside the order of the Med-Arbiter dated February 8, 1989 denying the motion to dismiss the petition and directing the conduct of a certification election among the rank and file employees or workers of the Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co. situated at Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. The antecedent facts giving rise to the controversy at bar are as follows: Petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP-TUCP) is a legitimate national labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. Respondent Honorable Pura Ferrer-Calleja is impleaded in her official capacity as the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department of Labor and Employment, while private respondent National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW-FGT-KMU) is a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co., Inc. (Dacongcogon) based in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental employs about five hundred (500) workers during milling season and about three hundred (300) on offmilling season. On November 14, 1984, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and employer Dacongcogon entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) for a term of three (3) years, which was to expire on November 14, 1987. When the CBA expired, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and Dacongcogon negotiated for its renewal. The CBA was extended for another three (3) years with reservation to negotiate for its amendment, particularly on wage increases, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment. However, a deadlock in negotiation ensued on the matter of wage increases and optional retirement. In order to obviate friction and tension, the parties agreed on a suspension to provide a cooling-off period to give them time to evaluate and further study their positions. Hence, a Labor Management Council was set up and convened, with a representative of the Department of Labor and Employment, acting as chairman, to resolve the issues. On December 5, 1988, petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP filed a petition for direct certification or certification election among the rank and file workers of Dacongcogon. On January 27, 1989, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU moved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds, to wit: I

The Petition was filed out of time; II There is a deadlocked (sic) of CBA negotiation between forced intervenor and respondent-central. (Rollo, p. 25) On February 6, 1989, Dacongcogon filed an answer praying that the petition be dismissed. By an order dated February 8, 1989, the Med-Arbiter denied the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and directed the conduct of certification election among the rank and file workers of Dacongcogon, the dispositive portion of which provides as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss the present petition is, as it is hereby DENIED. Let therefore a certification election among the rank and file employees/workers of the Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co., situated at Kabankalan, Neg. Occ., be conducted with the following choices: (1) National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP-TUCP); (2) National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW); (3) No Union. The designated Representation Officer is hereby directed to call the parties for a preelection conference to thresh out the mechanics of the election and to conduct and supervise the same within twenty (20) days from receipt by the parties of this Order. The latest payroll shall be used to determine the list of qualified voters. SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 34) On February 9, 1989, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal alleging that the Honorable Med-Arbiter misapprehended the facts and the law applicable amounting to gross incompetence. Hence, private respondent prayed that the order of the Med-Arbiter be set aside and the motion to dismiss be reconsidered. On February 27, 1989, petitioner filed its opposition to the motion for reconsideration praying that the motion for reconsideration and/or appeal be denied for lack of merit. On June 26, 1989, respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations rendered a resolution reversing the order of the Med-Arbiter, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 8 February 1989 is hereby set aside and vacated, and a new one issued dismissing the above-entitled petition for being filed out of time.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 46) Hence, this petition raising four (4) issues, to wit: I. RESPONDENT HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RENDERING HER RESOLUTION DATED 26 JUNE 1989 REVERSING THE ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 8, 1989 OF MED-ARBITER FELIZARDO SERAPIO. II. THAT THE AFORESAID RESOLUTION DATED 26 JUNE 1989 OF RESPONDENT PURA FERRER-CALLEJA IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE. III. THAT THE AFORESAID RESOLUTION DATED 26 JUNE 1989 OF RESPONDENT DIRECTOR PURA FERRER-CALLEJA DENIES THE RANK AND FILE EMPLOYEES OF THE DACONGCOGON SUGAR & RICE MILLING COMPANY, AND THE HEREIN PETITIONER NACUSIP-TUCP, THEIR LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. IV. THAT RESPONDENT DIRECTOR PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, IN RENDERING HER SAID RESOLUTION DATED 26 JUNE 1989 WAS BIASED AGAINST PETITIONER NACUSIP-TUCP. (Rollo, p. 2) The controversy boils down to the sole issue of whether or not a petition for certification election may be filed after the 60-day freedom period. Petitioner maintains that respondent Director Calleja committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in rendering the resolution dated June 26, 1989 setting aside, vacating and reversing the order dated February 8, 1989 of Med-Arbiter Serapio, in the following manner: 1) by setting aside and vacating the aforesaid Order dated February 8, 1989 of MedArbiter Felizardo Serapio and in effect dismissing the Petition for Direct or Certification Election of Petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP (Annex "A" hereof) without strong valid, legal and factual basis; 2) by giving a very strict and limited interpretation of the provisions of Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, as amended, knowing, as she does, that the Labor Code, being a social legislation, should be liberally interpreted to afford the workers the opportunity to exercise their legitimate legal and constitutional rights to self-organization and to free collective bargaining; 3) by issuing her questioned Resolution of June 26, 1989 knowing fully well that upon the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6715 on 21 March 1989 she had no longer any appellate powers over decisions of Med-Arbiters in cases of representation issues or certification elections;

4) by ignoring intentionally the applicable ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Kapisanan ng Mga Manggagawa sa La Suerte-FOITAF vs. Noriel, L-45475, June 20, 1977; 5) by clearly failing to appreciate the significance (sic) of the fact that for more than four (4) years there has been no certification election involving the rank and file workers of the Company; and, 6) by frustrating the legitimate desire and will of the workers of the Company to determine their sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative through secret balloting. (Rollo, pp. 9-10) However, the public respondent through the Solicitor General stresses that the petition for certification election was filed out of time. The records of the CBA at the Collective Agreements Division (CAD) of the Bureau of Labor Relations show that the CBA between Dacongcogon and private respondent NFSW-FGTKMU had expired on November 14, 1987, hence, the petition for certification election was filed too late, that is, a period of more than one (1) year after the CBA expired. The public respondent maintains that Section 6 of the Rules Implementing Executive Order No. 111 commands that the petition for certification election must be filed within the last sixty (60) days of the CBA and further reiterates and warns that any petition filed outside the 60-day freedom period "shall be dismissed outright." Moreover, Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code enjoins the filing of a representation question, if before a petition for certification election is filed, a bargaining deadlock to which the bargaining agent is a party is submitted for conciliation or arbitration. Finally, the public respondent emphasizes that respondent Director has jurisdiction to entertain the motion for reconsideration interposed by respondent union from the order of the Med-Arbiter directing a certification election. Public respondent contends that Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6715 is not applicable, "(f)irstly, there is as yet no rule or regulation established by the Secretary for the conduct of elections among the rank and file of employer Dacongcogon; (s)econdly, even the mechanics of the election which had to be first laid out, as directed in the Order dated February 8, 1989 of the MedArbiter, was aborted by the appeal therefrom interposed by respondent union; and (t)hirdly, petitioner is estopped to question the jurisdiction of respondent Director after it filed its opposition to respondent union's Motion for Reconsideration (Annex 'F,' Petition) and without, as will be seen, in any way assailing such jurisdiction. . . ." (Rollo, p.66) We find the petition devoid of merit. A careful perusal of Rule V, Section 6, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended by the rules implementing Executive Order No. 111 provides that: Sec. 6. Procedure . . . In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise where the majority status of the incumbent collective bargaining union is questioned by a legitimate labor organization, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the conduct of a certification election if the petition is filed during the last sixty (60) days of the collective bargaining

agreement. Any petition filed before or after the sixty-day freedom period shall be dismissed outright. The sixty-day freedom period based on the original collective bargaining agreement shall not be affected by any amendment, extension or renewal of the collective bargaining agreement for purposes of certification election. xxx xxx xxx The clear mandate of the aforequoted section is that the petition for certification election filed by the petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP should be dismissed outright, having been filed outside the 60-day freedom period or a period of more than one (1) year after the CBA expired. It is a rule in this jurisdiction that only a certified collective bargaining agreement i.e., an agreement duly certified by the BLR may serve as a bar to certification elections. (Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Estrella, G.R. No. 45323, February 20, 1989, 170 SCRA 378, 382) It is noteworthy that the Bureau of Labor Relations duly certified the November 14, 1984 collective bargaining agreement. Hence, the contract-bar rule as embodied in Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the rules implementing the Labor Code is applicable. This rule simply provides that a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty days prior to the expiry date of an existing collective bargaining agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a petition for certification election during the existence of a collective bargaining agreement except within the freedom period, as it is called, when the said agreement is about to expire. The purpose, obviously, is to ensure stability in the relationships of the workers and the management by preventing frequent modifications of any collective bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated original period. (Associated Labor Unions (ALU-TUCP) v. Trajano, G.R. No. 77539, April 12, 1989, 172 SCRA 49, 57 citing Associated Trade Unions (ATU v. Trajano, G.R. No. L-75321, 20 June 1988, 162 SCRA 318, 322-323) Anent the petitioner's contention that since the expiration of the CBA in 1987 private respondent NFSWFGT-KMU and Dacongcogon had not concluded a new CBA, We need only to stress what was held in the case of Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers, Philippine Labor Union Association (G.R. No. 75700-01, 30 August 1990, 189 SCRA 179, 191) quoting Article 253 of the Labor Code that "(i)t shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties." Despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of the CBA the law still considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new CBA shall have been validly executed. Hence, the contract bar rule still applies. Besides, it should be emphasized that Dacongcogon, in its answer stated that the CBA was extended for another three (3) years and that the deadlock was submitted to the Labor Management Council. All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations did not commit grave abuse of discretion in reversing the order of the Med-Arbiter.

6. GERARDO F. RIVERA, ALFRED A. RAMISO, AMBROCIO PALAD, DENNIS R. ARANAS, DAVID SORIMA, JR., JORGE P. DELA ROSA, and ISAGANI ALDEA, petitioners, vs. HON. EDGARDO ESPIRITU in his capacity as Ch airman of the PAL Inter-Agency Task Force created under Administrative Order No. 16; HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA in his capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment; PHILIPPINE AIRLINES (PAL), LUCIO TAN, HENRY SO UY, ANTONIO V. OCAMPO, MANOLO E. AQUINO, JAIME J. BAUTISTA, and ALEXANDER O. BARRIENTOS, respondents. DECISION In this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners charge public respondents with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for acts taken in regard to the enforcement of the agreement dated September 27, 1998, between Philippine Airlines (PAL) and its union, the PAL Employees Association (PALEA). The factual antecedents of this case are as follows: On June 5, 1998, PAL pilots affiliated with the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) went on a three-week strike, causing serious losses to the financially beleaguered flag carrier. As a result, PALs financial situation went from bad to worse. Faced with bankruptcy, PAL adopted a rehabilitation plan and downsized its labor force by more than one-third. On July 22, 1998, PALEA went on strike to protest the retrenchment measures adopted by the airline, which affected 1,899 union members. The strike ended four days later, when PAL and PALEA agreed to a more systematic reduction in PALs work force and the payment of separation benefits to all retrenched employees. On August 28, 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 16 creating an Inter-Agency Task Force (Task Force) to address the problems of the ailing flag carrier. The Task Force was composed of the Departments of Finance, Labor and Employment, Foreign Affairs, Transportation and Communication, and Tourism, together with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Public respondent Edgardo Espiritu, then the Secretary of Finance, was designated chairman of the Task Force. It was empowered to summon all parties concerned for conciliation, mediation (for) the purpose of arriving at a total and complete solution of the problem. [1] Conciliation meetings were then held between PAL management and the three unions representing the airlines employees,[2] with the Task Force as mediator. On September 4, 1998, PAL management submitted to the Task Force an offer by private respondent Lucio Tan, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of PAL, of a plan to transfer shares of stock to its employees. The pertinent portion of said plan reads: 1. From the issued shares of stock within the group of Mr. Lucio Tans holdings, the ownership of 60,000 fully paid shares of stock of Philippine Airlines with a par value of PHP5.00/share will be transferred in favor of each employee of Philippine Airlines in the active payroll as of September 15, 1998. Should any share-owning employee leave PAL, he/she has the option to keep the shares or sells (sic) his/her shares to his/her union or other employees currently employed by PAL. 2. The aggregate shares of stock transferred to PAL employees will allow them three (3) members to (sic) the PAL Board of Directors. We, thus, become partners in the boardroom and together, we shall address and find solutions to the wide range of problems besetting PAL.

3. In order for PAL to attain (a) degree of normalcy while we are tackling its problems, we would request for a suspension of the Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) for 10 years.[3] On September 10, 1998, the Board of Directors of PALEA voted to accept Tans offer and requested the Task Forces assistance in implementing the same. Union members, however, rejected Tans offer. Under intense pressure from PALEA members, the unions directors subsequently resolved to reject Tans offer. On September 17, 1998, PAL informed the Task Force that it was shutting down its operations effective September 23, 1998, preparatory to liquidating its assets and paying off its creditors. The airline claimed that given its labor problems, rehabilitation was no longer feasible, and hence, the airline had no alternative but to close shop. On September 18, 1998, PALEA sought the intervention of the Office of the President in immediately convening the parties, the PAL management, PALEA, ALPAP, and FASAP, including the SEC under the direction of the Inter-Agency Task Force, to prevent the imminent closure of PAL.[4] On September 19, 1998, PALEA informed the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) that it had no objection to a referendum on the Tans offer. 2,799 out of 6,738 PALEA members cast their votes in the referendum under DOLE supervision held on September 21-22, 1998. Of the votes cast, 1,055 voted in favor of Tans offer while 1,371 rejected it. On September 23, 1998, PAL ceased its operations and sent notices of termination to its employees. Two days later, the PALEA board wrote President Estrada anew, seeking his intervention. PALEA offered a 10-year moratorium on strikes and similar actions and a waiver of some of the economic benefits in the existing CBA.[5] Tan, however, rejected this counter-offer. On September 27, 1998, the PALEA board again wrote the President proposing the following terms and conditions, subject to ratification by the general membership: 1. Each PAL employee shall be granted 60,000 shares of stock with a par value of P5.00, from Mr. Lucio Tans shareholdings, with three (3) seats in the PAL Board and an additional seat from government shares as indicated by His Excellency; 2. Likewise, PALEA shall, as far as practicable, be granted adequate representation in committees or bodies which deal with matters affecting terms and conditions of employment; 3. To enhance and strengthen labor-management relations, the existing Labor-Management Coordinating Council shall be reorganized and revitalized, with adequate representation from both PAL management and PALEA; 4. To assure investors and creditors of industrial peace, PALEA agrees, subject to the ratification by the general membership, (to) the suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA for a period of ten (10) years, provided the following safeguards are in place: a. PAL shall continue recognizing PALEA as the duly certified bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file ground employees of the Company;

b.

The union shop/maintenance of membership provision under the PAL-PALEA CBA shall be respected.

c.

No salary deduction, with full medical benefits.

5. PAL shall grant the benefits under the 26 July 1998 Memorandum of Agreement forged by and between PAL and PALEA, to those employees who may opt to retire or be separated from the company. 6. PALEA members who have been retrenched but have not received separation benefits shall be granted priority in the hiring/rehiring of employees. 7. In the absence of applicable Company rule or regulation, the provisions of the Labor Code shall apply.[6] Among the signatories to the letter were herein petitioners Rivera, Ramiso, and Aranas, as officers and/or members of the PALEA Board of Directors. PAL management accepted the PALEA proposal and the necessary referendum was scheduled. On October 2, 1998, 5,324 PALEA members cast their votes in a DOLE-supervised referendum. Of the votes cast, 61% were in favor of accepting the PAL-PALEA agreement, while 34% rejected it. On October 7, 1998, PAL resumed domestic operations. On the same date, seven officers and members of PALEA filed this instant petition to annul the September 27, 1998 agreement entered into between PAL and PALEA on the following grounds: I PUBLIC RESPONDENTS GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED THEIR JURISDICTION IN ACTIVELY PURSUING THE CONCLUSION OF THE PAL-PALEA AGREEMENT AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO SELF-ORGANIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, BEING FOUNDED ON PUBLIC POLICY, MAY NOT BE WAIVED, NOR THE WAIVER, RATIFIED. II PUBLIC RESPONDENTS GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED THEIR JURISDICTION IN PRESIDING OVER THE CONCLUSION OF THE PAL-PALEA AGREEMENT UNDER THREAT OF ABUSIVE EXERCISE OF PALS MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE TO CLOSE BUSINESS USED AS SUBTERFUGE FOR UNION-BUSTING. The issues now for our resolution are: (1) Is an original action for certiorari and prohibition the proper remedy to annul the PALPALEA agreement of September 27, 1998; (2) Is the PAL-PALEA agreement of September 27, 1998, stipulating the suspension of the PALPALEA CBA unconstitutional and contrary to public policy? Anent the first issue, petitioners aver that public respondents as functionaries of the Task Force, gravely abused their discretion and exceeded their jurisdiction when they actively pursued and presided over the PAL-PALEA agreement.

Respondents, in turn, argue that the public respondents merely served as conciliators or mediators, consistent with the mandate of A.O. No. 16 and merely supervised the conduct of the October 3, 1998 referendum during which the PALEA members ratified the agreement. Thus, public respondents did not perform any judicial and quasi-judicial act pertaining to jurisdiction. Furthermore, respondents pray for the dismissal of the petition for violating the hierarchy of courts doctrine enunciated in People v. Cuaresma[7] and Enrile v. Salazar.[8] Petitioners allege grave abuse of discretion under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The essential requisites for a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[9] For writs of prohibition, the requisites are: (1) the impugned act must be that of a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions; and (2) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [10] The assailed agreement is clearly not the act of a tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. It is not the act of public respondents Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu and Labor Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma as functionaries of the Task Force. Neither is there a judgment, order, or resolution of either public respondents involved. Instead, what exists is a contract between a private firm and one of its labor unions, albeit entered into with the assistance of the Task Force. The first and second requisites for certiorari and prohibition are therefore not present in this case. Furthermore, there is available to petitioners a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While the petition is denominated as one for certiorari and prohibition, its object is actually the nullification of the PAL-PALEA agreement. As such, petitioners proper remedy is an ordinary civil action for annulment of contract, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts.[11] Neither certiorari nor prohibition is the remedy in the present case. Petitioners further assert that public respondents were partial towards PAL management. They allegedly pressured the PALEA leaders into accepting the agreement. Petitioners ask this Court to examine the circumstances that led to the signing of said agreement. This would involve review of the facts and factual issues raised in a special civil action for certiorari which is not the function of this Court.[12] Nevertheless, considering the prayer of the parties principally we shall look into the substance of the petition, in the higher interest of justice[13] and in view of the public interest involved, inasmuch as what is at stake here is industrial peace in the nations premier airline and flag carrier, a national concern. On the second issue, petitioners contend that the controverted PAL-PALEA agreement is void because it abrogated the right of workers to self-organization[14] and their right to collective bargaining.[15] Petitioners claim that the agreement was not meant merely to suspend the existing PALPALEA CBA, which expires on September 30, 2000, but also to foreclose any renegotiation or any possibility to forge a new CBA for a decade or up to 2008. It violates the protection to labor policy[16] laid down by the Constitution. Article 253-A of the Labor Code reads:

ART. 253-A. Terms of a Collective Bargaining Agreement. Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five-year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution. Any agreement on such other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into within six (6) months from the date of expiry of the term of such other provisions as fixed in such Collective Bargaining Agreement, shall retroact to the day immediately following such date. If any such agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties shall agree on the duration of the retroactivity thereof. In case of a deadlock in the renegotiation of the collective bargaining agreement, the parties may exercise their rights under this Code. Under this provision, insofar as representation is concerned, a CBA has a term of five years, while the other provisions, except for representation, may be negotiated not later than three years after the execution.[17] Petitioners submit that a 10-year CBA suspension is inordinately long, way beyond the maximum statutory life of a CBA, provided for in Article 253-A. By agreeing to a 10-year suspension, PALEA, in effect, abdicated the workers constitutional right to bargain for another CBA at the mandated time. We find the argument devoid of merit. A CBA is a contract executed upon request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining representative incorporating the agreement reached after negotiations with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment, including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement.[18] The primary purpose of a CBA is the stabilization of labor-management relations in order to create a climate of a sound and stable industrial peace.[19] In construing a CBA, the courts must be practical and realistic and give due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose which it is intended to serve.[20] The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary collective bargaining negotiations undertaken in the light of the severe financial situation faced by the employer, with the peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting industrial peace at PAL, but preventing the latters closure. We find no conflict between said agreement and Article 253-A of the Labor Code. Article 253-A has a two-fold purpose. One is to promote industrial stability and predictability. Inasmuch as the agreement sought to promote industrial peace at PAL during its rehabilitation, said agreement satisfies the first purpose of Article 253-A. The other is to assign specific timetables wherein negotiations become a matter of right and requirement. Nothing in Article 253-A, prohibits the parties from waiving or suspending the mandatory timetables and agreeing on the remedies to enforce the same. In the instant case, it was PALEA, as the exclusive bargaining agent of PALs ground employees, that voluntarily entered into the CBA with PAL. It was also PALEA that voluntarily opted for the 10-year suspension of the CBA. Either case was the unions exercise of its right to collective bargaining. The right to free collective bargaining, after all, includes the right to suspend it. The acts of public respondents in sanctioning the 10-year suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA did not contravene the protection to labor policy of the Constitution. The agreement afforded full protection to labor; promoted the shared responsibility between workers and employers; and the exercised voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation to foster industrial peace."[21]

Petitioners further allege that the 10-year suspension of the CBA under the PAL-PALEA agreement virtually installed PALEA as a company union for said period, amounting to unfair labor practice, in violation of Article 253-A of the Labor Code mandating that an exclusive bargaining agent serves for five years only. The questioned proviso of the agreement reads: a. PAL shall continue recognizing PALEA as the duly certified-bargaining agent of the regular rankand-file ground employees of the Company; Said proviso cannot be construed alone. In construing an instrument with several provisions, a construction must be adopted as will give effect to all. Under Article 1374 of the Civil Code,[22] contracts cannot be construed by parts, but clauses must be interpreted in relation to one another to give effect to the whole. The legal effect of a contract is not determined alone by any particular provision disconnected from all others, but from the whole read together.[23] The aforesaid provision must be read within the context of the next clause, which provides: b. The union shop/maintenance of membership provision under the PAL-PALEA CBA shall be respected. The aforesaid provisions, taken together, clearly show the intent of the parties to maintain union security during the period of the suspension of the CBA. Its objective is to assure the continued existence of PALEA during the said period. We are unable to declare the objective of union security an unfair labor practice. It is State policy to promote unionism to enable workers to negotiate with management on an even playing field and with more persuasiveness than if they were to individually and separately bargain with the employer. For this reason, the law has allowed stipulations for union shop and closed shop as means of encouraging workers to join and support the union of their choice in the protection of their rights and interests vis--vis the employer.[24] Petitioners contention that the agreement installs PALEA as a virtual company union is also untenable. Under Article 248 (d) of the Labor Code, a company union exists when the employer acts *t+o initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters. The case records are bare of any showing of such acts by PAL. We also do not agree that the agreement violates the five-year representation limit mandated by Article 253-A. Under said article, the representation limit for the exclusive bargaining agent applies only when there is an extant CBA in full force and effect. In the instant case, the parties agreed to suspend the CBA and put in abeyance the limit on the representation period. In sum, we are of the view that the PAL-PALEA agreement dated September 27, 1998, is a valid exercise of the freedom to contract. Under the principle of inviolability of contracts guaranteed by the Constitution,[25] the contract must be upheld. WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion shown, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

6. On September 17, 1998, PAL informed the Inter-Agency Task Force created to address the problems of the ailing flag carrier, that it was shutting down its operations effective September 23, 1988, claiming that given its labor problems, rehabilitation was no longer feasible. The next day, the PAL Employees Association (PALEA) sought the intervention of the Office of the President to prevent the imminent closure of PAL. On September 23, PAL ceased its operations and sent notices of termination to its employees. Two days later, PAWLA offered a 10-year moratorium on strikes and similar actions and a waiver of some of the economic benefits in the existing CBA. On September 27, 2988, the PAWLA board again wrote the President proposing terms and conditions, subject to ratification by the general membership. These include the suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA for a period of ten years, PALs continuing recognition of PALEA as the certified bargaining agent of the regular rank and file ground employees of the company, respect for the union shop/maintenance of membersip provision under the PAL-PALEA CBA and no salary deduction with full medical benefits. The PAL management accepted the PALEA proposal and the necessary referendum was scheduled. Of the votes cast, 61% of favored the PAL-PALEA agreement. On October 7, 1998, PAL resumed operations. On the same date, seven officers and members of PALEA filed a petition to annul the agreement on the following grounds: 1) Grave abuse of discretion by public respondents in actively pursuing the PAL-PALEA agreement on the constitutional right to self-organization and collective bargaining cannot be waived nor the waiver ratified 2) Public respondents gravely abused their discretion and exceeded their jurisdiction in presiding over the conclusion of PAL-PALEA agreement under threat of abusive exercise of PALs management prerogative to close business used as subterfuge for union-busting. ISSUES 1) WON the orginal action for certiorari and prohibition is the proper remedy to annul the PAL-PALEA agreement 2) WON the agreement is unconstitutional and contrary to public policy HELD 1) No. The assailed agreement does not meet the essential requirements for certiorari under Rule 65. What exists is a contract between a private firm and one of its labor unions, albeit entered into with the assistance of the Task Force. The object of the action is actually the nullification of the PAL-PALEA agreement. As such, the proper remedy is an ordinary civil action for annulment of contract, an action which properly belongs to the jurisdiction of the RTC. 2) No. CBA under Article 253-A of the Labor Code has a two-fold purpose. One is to promote industrial stability and predictability. Inasmuch as the agreement sought to promote industrial peace, at the PAL during its rehabilitation, said agreement satisfied the first purpose of said article. The other purpose is to assign specific timetable, wherein negotiations become a matter of right and requirement. Nothing in Article 253-A prohibits the parties from waiving or suspending the mandatory timetable and agreeing on the remedies to enforce the same.

7. ALEXANDER REYES, ALBERTO M. NERA, EDGARDO M. GECA, and 138 others, petitioners, vs. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, as Officer-in-Charge, Bureau of Labor Relations, Med. Arbiter PATERNO ADAP, and TRI-UNION EMPLOYEES UNION, et al., respondent. The officer-in-charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations (Hon. Cresenciano Trajano) sustained the denial by the Med Arbiter of the right to vote of one hundred forty-one (141) members of the "Iglesia ni Kristo" (INK), all employed in the same company, at a certification election at which two (2) labor organizations were contesting the right to be the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit. That denial is assailed as having been done with grave abuse of discretion in the special civil action of certiorari at bar, commenced by the INK members adversely affected thereby. The certification election was authorized to be conducted by the Bureau of Labor Relations among the employees of Tri-Union Industries Corporation on October 20, 1987. The competing unions were TriUnion Employees Union-Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA), and Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS). Of the 348 workers initially deemed to be qualified voters, only 240 actually took part in the election, conducted under the provision of the Bureau of Labor Relations. Among the 240 employees who cast their votes were 141 members of the INK. The ballots provided for three (3) choices. They provided for votes to be cast, of course, for either of the two (2) contending labor organizations, (a) TUPAS and (b) TUEU-OLALIA; and, conformably with established rule and practice, 1 for (c) a third choice: "NO UNION." The final tally of the votes showed the following results: TUPAS 1 TUEU-OLALIA 95 NO UNION 1 SPOILED 1 CHALLENGED 141 The challenged votes were those cast by the 141 INK members. They were segregated and excluded from the final count in virtue of an agreement between the competing unions, reached at the pre-election conference, that the INK members should not be allowed to vote "because they are not members of any union and refused to participate in the previous certification elections." The INK employees promptly made known their protest to the exclusion of their votes. They filed f a petition to cancel the election alleging that it "was not fair" and the result thereof did "not reflect the true sentiments of the majority of the employees." TUEU-OLALIA opposed the petition. It contended that the petitioners "do not have legal personality to protest the results of the election," because "they are not members of either contending unit, but . . . of the INK" which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization . . . ."

The Med-Arbiter saw no merit in the INK employees 1 petition. By Order dated December 21, 1987, he certified the TUEU-OLALIA as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees. In that Order he decided the fact that "religious belief was (being) utilized to render meaningless the rights of the non-members of the Iglesia ni Kristo to exercise the rights to be represented by a labor organization as the bargaining agent," and declared the petitioners as "not possessed of any legal personality to institute this present cause of action" since they were not parties to the petition for certification election. The petitioners brought the matter up on appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations. There they argued that the Med-Arbiter had "practically disenfranchised petitioners who had an overwhelming majority," and "the TUEU-OLALIA certified union cannot be legally said to have been the result of a valid election where at least fifty-one percent of all eligible voters in the appropriate bargaining unit shall have cast their votes." Assistant Labor Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, then Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations, denied the appeal in his Decision of July 22, 1988. He opined that the petitioners are "bereft of legal personality to protest their alleged disenfrachisement" since they "are not constituted into a duly organized labor union, hence, not one of the unions which vied for certification as sole and exclusive bargaining representative." He also pointed out that the petitioners "did not participate in previous certification elections in the company for the reason that their religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations." It is this Decision of July 22, 1988 that the petitioners would have this Court annul and set aside in the present special civil action of certiorari. The Solicitor General having expressed concurrence with the position taken by the petitioners, public respondent NLRC was consequently required to file, and did thereafter file, its own comment on the petition. In that comment it insists that "if the workers who are members of the Iglesia ni Kristo in the exercise of their religious belief opted not to join any labor organization as a consequence of which they themselves can not have a bargaining representative, then the right to be representative by a bargaining agent should not be denied to other members of the bargaining unit." Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the "right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining." This is made plain by no less than three provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 2 Article 243 of the Code provides as follows: 3 ART. 243. Coverage and employees right to self-organization. All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical, or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes or collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, selfemployed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection. Article 248 (a) declares it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer, among others, to "interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization." Similarly, Article 249 (a) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to "restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization . . . "

The same legal proposition is set out in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, as might be expected Section 1, Rule II (Registration of Unions), Book V (Labor Relations) of the Omnibus Rules provides as follows; 4 Sec. 1. Who may join unions; exception. All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises, including employees of government corporations established under the Corporation Code as well as employees of religious, medical or educational institutions, whether operating for profit or not, except managerial employees, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and without any definite employers people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection. xxx xxx xxx The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor union or determine which of two or more unions in an establishment to join, and to engage in concerted activities with coworkers for purposes of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual aid and protection, i.e., the protection, promotion, or enhancement of their rights and interests. 5 Logically, the right NOT to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to disaffiliate or resign from a labor organization, is subsumed in the right to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to maintain membership therein. The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising said right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. The fact that a person has opted to acquire membership in a labor union does not preclude his subsequently opting to renounce such membership. 6 As early as 1974 this Court had occasion to expatiate on these self-evident propositions in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al., 7 viz.: . . .What the Constitution and Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations. Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by the different schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a "right," it can be safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself being prevented by law; second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It is therefore the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and should he choose to join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any time (Pagkakaisa Samahang Manggagawa ng San Miguel Brewery vs. Enriquez, et al., 108 Phil. 1010, 1019). It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union (Abo, et al. vs. PHILAME [KG] Employees Union, et al., L-19912, January 20, 1965, 13 SCRA 120, 123, quoting Rothenberg, Labor Relations). Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have recognized, the guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join associations of his

choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the same breath, upon the employee the duty to join associations. The law does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any association. The right to refuse to join or be represented by any labor organization is recognized not only by law but also in the rules drawn up for implementation thereof. The original Rules on Certification promulgated by the defunct Court of Industrial Relations required that the ballots to be used at a certification election to determine which of two or more competing labor unions would represent the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit should contain, aside from the names of each union, an alternative choice of the employee voting, to the effect that he desires not to which of two or more competing labor unions would represent the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit should contain, aside from the names of each union, an alternative choice of the employee voting, to the effect that he desires not to be represented by any union. 8And where only one union was involved, the ballots were required to state the question "Do you desire to be represented by said union?" as regards which the employees voting would mark an appropriate square, one indicating the answer, "Yes" the other, "No." To be sure, the present implementing rules no longer explicitly impose the requirement that the ballots at a certification election include a choice for "NO UNION" Section 8 (rule VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules) entitled "Marketing and canvassing of votes," pertinently provides that: . . . (a) The voter must write a cross (X) or a check (/) in the square opposite the union of his choice. If only one union is involved, the voter shall make his cross or check in the square indicating "YES" or "NO." xxx xxx xxx Withal, neither the quoted provision nor any other in the Omnibus Implementing Rules expressly bars the inclusion of the choice of "NO UNION" in the ballots. Indeed it is doubtful if the employee's alternative right NOT to form, join or assist any labor organization or withdraw or resign from one may be validly eliminated and he be consequently coerced to vote for one or another of the competing unions and be represented by one of them. Besides, the statement in the quoted provision that "(i)f only one union is involved, the voter shall make his cross or check in the square indicating "YES" or "NO," is quite clear acknowledgment of the alternative possibility that the "NO" votes may outnumber the "YES" votes indicating that the majority of the employees in the company do not wish to be represented by any union in which case, no union can represent the employees in collective bargaining. And whether the prevailing "NO" votes are inspired by considerations of religious belief or discipline or not is beside the point, and may not be inquired into at all. The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes of the majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be represented by a labor organization, and in the affirmative case, by which particular labor organization. If the results of the election should disclose that the majority of the workers do not wish to be represented by any union, then their wishes must be respected, and no union may properly be certified as the exclusive representative of the workers in the bargaining unit in dealing with the employer regarding wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment. The minority employees who wish to have a union represent them in collective bargaining can do nothing but wait for another suitable occasion to petition for a certification election and hope that the results will be different. They may not and should not be permitted, however, to impose their will on the majority who do not desire to have a union certified

as the exclusive workers' benefit in the bargaining unit upon the plea that they, the minority workers, are being denied the right of self-organization and collective bargaining. As repeatedly stated, the right of self-organization embraces not only the right to form, join or assist labor organizations, but the concomitant, converse rightNOT to form, join or assist any labor union. That the INK employees, as employees in the same bargaining unit in the true sense of the term, do have the right of self-organization, is also in truth beyond question, as well as the fact that when they voted that the employees in their bargaining unit should be represented by "NO UNION," they were simply exercising that right of self-organization, albeit in its negative aspect. The respondents' argument that the petitioners are disqualified to vote because they "are not constituted into a duly organized labor union" "but members of the INK which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization" and "hence, not one of the unions which vied for certification as sole and exclusive bargaining representative," is specious. Neither law, administrative rule nor jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization may take part in a certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote to all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor organization or not. As held in Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja: 9 In a certification election all rank-and-file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the "labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining." Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank-and-file employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their employment for certification election. The law refers to "all" the employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the "bargaining unit". Neither does the contention that petitioners should be denied the right to vote because they "did not participate in previous certification elections in the company for the reason that their religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations," persuade acceptance. No law, administrative rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification elections. In denying the petitioners' right to vote upon these egregiously fallacious grounds, the public respondents exercised their discretion whimsically, capriciously and oppressively and gravely abused the same. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED; the Decision of the then Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated December 21, 1987 (affirming the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated July 22, 1988) is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE; and the petitioners are DECLARED to have legally exercised their right to vote, and their ballots should be canvassed and, if validly and properly made out, counted and tallied for the choices written therein. Costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED.