G.R. No. L-11904 October 9, 1917 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

DERHAM BROTHERS and THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION, defendantsappellants. Facts: Derham Brothers entered into negotiations with the Director of Lands for the purpose of securing from the Government of the Philippine Islands a lease covering an area reclaimed from the sea.The Executive Secretary published a notice regarding some of the conditions on which the land would be leased. Thereafter, Derham Brothers sent a communication to the Director of Lands stating the terms under which said firm would take the property. The condition mentioned was grading to the official line and grade and metalling of the roadway of the streets of the three blocks on the south, east, and the west, contiguous to said property, as well as the roadway of the street on the north of said property to its entire length. They wanted to have a direct outlet for their proposed building. The Director of Lands replied and enclosed the form of lease which will be executed upon the completion of the four streets surrounding said block, together with an outlet to street already constructed or to be constructed. Derham Brothers thereupon took possession of the premises and executed an assignment to the International Banking Corporation in order to transfer their right to receive from the Government of the Philippine Islands the lease to the premises in question when the same should be formally executed.The bank accepted and the Director of Lands approved it. There was no change in the obligation of the parties. The present action was instituted on behalf of the Government in order to recover a judgment against Derham Brothers for the use and occupation of the premises and to compel the defendant bank to execute the lease of the premises in question.The Court of First Instance decided in favor of the plaintiff and so the defendants have appealed. Issue: Whether or not the conditions upon which the liability of the lessee for rent depended had been complied with upon the date mentioned. Held: The decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed. It appears that the block in question is surrounded on all four sides by streets which have been prepared and opened for use. The Government complied with its obligation to metal the roadway of said streets, and that these streets are in a state of completion as contemplated in the communication of the Director of Lands. The engineer who admitted in his testimony that they were incomplete or unfinished; was speaking only with reference to the official plans and specification for the improvement of the territory. Defendants offered no proof that the roadway so finished was in any respect inadequate for the traffic required of it. Since the width of the roadway was not specified in the contract, it may be safely inferred, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the roadways shown to be in existence on all these streets are ample for the traffic required of them. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention of the defendants so far as regards either the grade, the width of the roadway, or the quality of the finish of these streets.

The next question to be considered has reference to the failure to extend Aduana Street on eastward to the Malecon. Article 1288 of the Civil Code declared that the interpretation of obscure clauses in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity. If there is no ambiguity, then that specification is limited by the words contained in the communication of the Director of Lands who uses the expression "the completion of the four streets surrounding said blocks, together with an outlet to street already constructed or to be constructed." Therefore, Derham Brothers were bound. It is a familiar principle that a contracting party is bound by that interpretation of an ambiguous provision which he knows the other party has adopted; and on the other hand, if it was a counterproposal, Derham Brothers accepted it by taking possession of the property. The Government was not bound to open Aduana Street any farther than to Boston Street. Derham Brothers emphasized the necessity of a direct outlet for their proposed building. It is shown that they have all the possible outlets from their building directly to the street which they could have. It is not proper to impose upon the Government the obligation to open another street leading directly from their building to another part of the city. __________ Republic vs Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (GR No. L-21749, September 29, 1967) Facts: A barge being towed by tugboats "Bangus" and "Barbero" all owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corp. rammed one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan Bailey Bridge due to the swollen current of the Pasig after heavy rains days before. The Republic sued Luzon Stevedoring for actual and consequential damages. Luzon Stevedoring claimed it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees; that the damages to the bridge were caused by force majeure; that plaintiff has no capacity to sue; and that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction to navigation.

Issue: Whether or not the collision of appellant's barge with the supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge was in law caused by fortuitous event or force majeure.

Held: There is a presumption of negligence on part of the employees of Luzon Stevedoring, as the Nagtahan Bridge is stationary. For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical in so far as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, "events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines). It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. Luzon Stevedoring knew the perils posed by the swollen stream and its swift current, and voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious danger; it therefore assured the risk, and cannot shed responsibility merely because the precautions it adopted turned out to be insufficient. It is thus liable for damages. ____ Rakes vs Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co. 7 Phil 359 Facts: Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s. One day, they were working in the companys yard and they were transporting heavy rails using two cars ( karitons?); each car carrying the opposite ends of the rails. The cars were pulled by rope from the front and other workers are pushing the cars from behind. There were no side guards installed on the sides of the cars but the rails were secured by ropes. The track where the cars move were also weakened by a previous typhoon. It was alleged that Atlantics foreman was notified of said damage in the tracks but the same were left unrepaired. While the cars were being moved and when it reached the depressed portion of the track, and while Rakes was beside one of the cars, the ropes gave in and the rails slipped thereby

crushing his leg and causing it to be amputated. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and he won; he was awarded 5,000 pesos for damages ($2,500). Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered their workers to be walking only before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the cars have no side guards to protect them in case the rails would slip. Atlantic also alleged that Rakes should be suing the foreman as it was him who neglected to have the tracks repaired; that Rakes himself was negligent for having known of the depression on the track yet he continued to work. ISSUE: Whether or not Atlantic is civilly liable. HELD: Yes. Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in the track as it was another employee who swore he notified the foreman about said damage. Further, his lack of caution in continuing to work is not of a gross nature as to constitute negligence on his part. On the other hand though, Rakes contributory negligence can be inferred from the fact that he was on the side of the cars when in fact there were orders from the company barring workers from standing near the side of the cars. His disobedient to this order does not bar his recovery of damages though; the Supreme Court instead reduced the award of damages from 5,000 pesos to 2,500 pesos. In this case, the SC also elucidated the two kinds of culpa which are: 1. Culpa as substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation between two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; may be also considered as a real source of an independent obligation (extra-contractual or culpa aquiliana). 2. Culpa as an incident in the performance of an obligation which cannot be presumed to exist without the other, and which increases the liability arising from the already existing obligation (contractual or culpa contractual). __________________ BERNAL V HOUSE 54 PHIL 327MALCOLM; January 30, 1930 FACTS Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal went to Tacloban, Leyte to attend the procession of Holy Friday. After the procession, they, accompanied by two other persons, passed along a public street named Gran Capitan.The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance of her mother and her friends. While in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric &Ice Plant, Ltd., an automobile appeared on which frightened the child. She turned to run, but fell into the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House. When the mother and her companions reached the child, they found her face downward in the hot water. The girl was taken to the provincial hospital. Despite his efforts, the child died that same night. It was certified that the cause of death was "Burns,3rd Degree, whole Body", and that the contributorycauses were "Congestion of the Brain and visceras of the chest & abdomen. The defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down the side of the street Gran Captain with the knowledge and consent of the authorities; that the cause of death was other than the hot water; and that in the death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence. The trial judge, however, after examination of the evidence presented by the defendants, failed to sustain their theory of the case, except as to the last mentioned special defense. He neverthelesswas led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. ISSUE WON the action should be dismissed due to the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs HELD NO- The death of the child was the result of fault and negligence in permitting hot water to flow through thepublic streets, there to endanger the lives of passers-by who were unfortunately enough to fall into it- The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of

Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held.- There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water.- The doctrines announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil.,359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages. DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from was in part be reversed and in the court of origin another judgment was issued in favor of Fortunata Enverso and against J.V. House for the amount of P1,000, and for the costs of both instances. ___________ TEODORO C. UMALI vs. HON. ANGEL BACANI (Judge, CFI Pangasinan) and FIDEL H. SAYNES G.R. No. L-40570. 30 January 1976. Facts: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the storm, the banana plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant (AEP) were blown down and fell on the electric wire. The live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the ground. The following morning, barrio captain saw Cipriano Baldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it. Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed. Issues: (1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to a fortuitous event- storm; (2) WON boys parents negligence exempts petitioner from liability. Ruling: Decision affirmed. (1) A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that a series of negligence on the part of defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. With ordinary foresight, the employees of the petitioner could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down. (2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants' (petitioners) lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. _________________ PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL vs THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987 FACTS: Respondent Leonardo Dionisio was driving on his way home from a cocktail-and-dinner party, from which he had a shot or two of liquor. He had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati when allegedly his car headlights suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc.

("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street, facing the oncoming traffic. It also did not have any lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. Due to the event therefore the herein private respondent filed an action for Damages on the grounds that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Phoenix had allowed its truck to be parked. Petitioners defense: that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due rare in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver. The petitioners Phoenix and Carbonel contend that if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel. Intermediate Appellate Court confirmed. ISSUE: Whether or not Phoenixs negligence is the proximate cause? HELD: YES. We agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. The truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in an probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines). Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of private respondent Dionisio on one hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, 17 we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio.